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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: ietf@ietf.org
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 14:24:51 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:

   "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
   ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
   "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."

...

   "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
   version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."


At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
recommendations and do:

  1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
     (TLS 1.2). 
  2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
     extension and advertise TLS1.0

That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
this draft mentions:

   "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
    this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."

Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths
allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve
any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with
additional tools to manipulate implementations.

My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
extension is only used informatively.

regards,
Nikos


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 05:38:14 -0800
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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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--089e08229d68258642056659fba8
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
wrote:

> The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
> pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:
>
>    "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
>    ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
>    "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."
>
> ...
>
>    "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
>    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."
>
>
> At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
> contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
> recommendations and do:
>
>   1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
>      (TLS 1.2).
>   2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
>      extension and advertise TLS1.0
>
> That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
> introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
> ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
> code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
> mechanism?).


The text you quote explains how this can happen:
- A supports TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.3 draft X
- B supports TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.3 draft Y



> It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
> this draft mentions:
>
>    "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
>     this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."
>

It's been a while, but I believe this text was actually put in to allow for
the case that clients support TLS 1.3 draft versions but not TLS 1.3 RFC.


My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
> if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
> TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
> supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
> negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
> negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
> extension is only used informatively.
>

I'm not in favor of either of these changes at this time. IMO it's more
straightforward to have an immediate branch on the presence of the
extension and then use only that.

-Ekr




> regards,
> Nikos
>
>

--089e08229d68258642056659fba8
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.com</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">The TLS draft after versio=
n -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate<br>
pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;supported_versions&quot; extension to determine client p=
references.&quot;<br>
<br>
...<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate =
a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range.&=
quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which<br>
contains the single value &#39;TLS 1.0&#39; has to follow the draft&#39;s<b=
r>
recommendations and do:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(TLS 1.2).<br>
=C2=A0 2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0extension and advertise TLS1.0<br>
<br>
That modifies the way TLS 1.1=C2=A0 or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly<br>
introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the<br>
ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible<br>
code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3<br>
mechanism?).</blockquote><div><br></div><div>The text you quote explains ho=
w this can happen:</div><div>- A supports TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.3 draft X</div>=
<div>- B supports TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.3 draft Y</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> It is however anticipated to b=
e used for that purpose as<br>
this draft mentions:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that =
include<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versi=
ons.&quot;<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s been a while, but I=
 believe this text was actually put in to allow for</div><div>the case that=
 clients support TLS 1.3 draft versions but not TLS 1.3 RFC.</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension<br>
if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-<br>
TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the<br>
supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be<br>
negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to<br>
negotiate TLS1.x, where x&lt;3, and the second that the clientHello<br>
extension is only used informatively.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I=
&#39;m not in favor of either of these changes at this time. IMO it&#39;s m=
ore</div><div>straightforward to have an immediate branch on the presence o=
f the</div><div>extension and then use only that.</div><div><br></div><div>=
-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
<br>
regards,<br>
Nikos<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--089e08229d68258642056659fba8--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 09:58:42 -0500
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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I=E2=80=99ve submitted the following PR to make sure we answer IANA =
questions*:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159

One thing I=E2=80=99d like to get input on is which of the RSA-PSS =
signature schemes should be recommended.  The IANA considerations =
currently recommends rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, and rsa_pss_sha512. =
But, we=E2=80=99ve changed the PSS identifiers to split them so now =
we=E2=80=99ve got different identifiers that follow and we need to make =
sure we indicate which ones get marked as Recommended:
rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
rsa_pss_pss_sha256
rsa_pss_pss_sha384
rsa_pss_pss_sha512

I believe the intent was that we would specify three rsa_pss_rsae as =
Recommended.

spt

* IANA does a review of the IANA considerations section to make sure =
that they understand the requests we=E2=80=99ve made of them.

> On Feb 15, 2018, at 16:13, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG =
(tls) to
> consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
> Protocol Version 1.3'
>  <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> as Proposed Standard
>=20
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits =
final
> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2018-03-01. Exceptionally, comments may =
be
> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the =
beginning of
> the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>=20
> Abstract
>=20
>=20
>   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
>   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to =
communicate
>   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent =
eavesdropping,
>   tampering, and message forgery.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The file can be obtained via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>=20
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/ballot/
>=20
> The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
>=20
>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2900/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The document contains these normative downward references.
> See RFC 3967 for additional information:=20
>    rfc8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 =
(Informational - IETF stream)
>=20
>=20
>=20


From nobody Thu Mar  1 07:49:25 2018
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ztCMxT1lOX_2AB49LEkUDfIZLpc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be 
made more clear.

Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions 
that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports 
TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the 
server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the 
client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the 
connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to 
0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says 
that

      A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
      "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
      value (0x0304).

It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.

If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3 
could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of 
ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this 
connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draft 
says:

       In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
       "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
       legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
       version number for TLS 1.2.

To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text 
should say something like:

       For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
       using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
       the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
       version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier ServerHello
       the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS negotiated
       for this connection.

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos 
<nmav@redhat.com> wrote:

> The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
> pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:
>
>    "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
>    ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
>    "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."
>
> ...
>
>    "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
>    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."
>
>
> At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
> contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
> recommendations and do:
>
>   1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
>      (TLS 1.2).
>   2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
>      extension and advertise TLS1.0
>
> That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
> introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
> ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
> code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
> mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
> this draft mentions:
>
>    "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
>     this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."
>
> Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths
> allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve
> any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with
> additional tools to manipulate implementations.
>
> My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
> if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
> TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
> supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
> negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
> negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
> extension is only used informatively.
>
> regards,
> Nikos


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From: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 11:35:24 -0500
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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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--001a114684ae6531c805665c722d
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This is correct, all codepoints we're currently assigning are
no-dictionary.  Also, since you've asked, we've reserved the 0 codepoint in
the latest version of the draft.

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On Feb 5, 2018, at 13:32, Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 9:25 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On Jan 26, 2018, at 05:26, Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > Me and Victor would like to ask for early codepoints assignment again=
,
> if you
> > > think we are ready now.
> >
> > This now on the chair=E2=80=99s list of things to do.  It=E2=80=99s bee=
n a week and
> nobody has complained so I=E2=80=99m thinking the draft is on the right t=
rack.
>  Got one question before we start the RFC7120-dictated early code point
> assignment dance:
> >
> > Q. What=E2=80=99s the plan for the dictionary?  Is a field going to be =
included
> later to indicate which one is in use, or is the dictionary going to be
> linked to the extension number and a new one will be minted when the
> dictionary is updated?
> >
> > The plan is to allocate a new algorithm codepoint for each (compression
> method, dictionary) tuple.  I don't want to decouple them, because it tur=
ns
> out that for different algorithms the dictionary can be supplied in
> different ways, and thus the actual content for the dictionary may vary.
> >
> > (I'll address the nits a little bit later)
>
> I can live with this approach because it=E2=80=99s better than minting a =
new
> extension every time.  But just for the record then the code points we=E2=
=80=99re
> looking to assign now are =E2=80=9Cno dictionary=E2=80=9D.
>
> spt

--001a114684ae6531c805665c722d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-=
variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;=
text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoratio=
n-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">This is correct, all codepoints =
we&#39;re currently assigning are no-dictionary.=C2=A0 Also, since you&#39;=
ve asked, we&#39;ve reserved the 0 codepoint in the latest version of the d=
raft.</span><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div cla=
ss=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Feb 5, 2018, at 13:32, Victor Vasiliev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vasilv=
v@google.com">vasilvv@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 9:25 AM, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean=
@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Jan 26, 2018, at 05:26, Alessandro Ghedini &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:alessandro@ghedini.me">alessandro@ghedini.me</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Me and Victor would like to ask for early codepoints assignment a=
gain, if you<br>
&gt; &gt; think we are ready now.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This now on the chair=E2=80=99s list of things to do.=C2=A0 It=E2=80=
=99s been a week and nobody has complained so I=E2=80=99m thinking the draf=
t is on the right track.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Got one question before we start the R=
FC7120-dictated early code point assignment dance:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Q. What=E2=80=99s the plan for the dictionary?=C2=A0 Is a field going =
to be included later to indicate which one is in use, or is the dictionary =
going to be linked to the extension number and a new one will be minted whe=
n the dictionary is updated?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The plan is to allocate a new algorithm codepoint for each (compressio=
n method, dictionary) tuple.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t want to decouple them, becau=
se it turns out that for different algorithms the dictionary can be supplie=
d in different ways, and thus the actual content for the dictionary may var=
y.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (I&#39;ll address the nits a little bit later)<br>
<br>
</div></div>I can live with this approach because it=E2=80=99s better than =
minting a new extension every time.=C2=A0 But just for the record then the =
code points we=E2=80=99re looking to assign now are =E2=80=9Cno dictionary=
=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br>
spt</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 18:42:55 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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FWIW, this was BoringSSL's interpretation as well. We don't consider
supported_versions an acceptable TLS 1.2 (or earlier) ServerHello
extension. I generally agree that we shouldn't add new unnecessary
combinations.

(TBH, I don't even consider the ability to advertise TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.1 on
the client side to be an especially valuable feature, but I suppose that
falls out naturally enough.)

David

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:49 AM David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>
wrote:

>
>
> I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be
> made more clear.
>
> Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions
> that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports
> TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the
> server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the
> client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the
> connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to
> 0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says
> that
>
>       A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
>       "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
>       value (0x0304).
>
> It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.
>
> If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3
> could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of
> ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this
> connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draft
> says:
>
>        In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
>        "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
>        legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>        version number for TLS 1.2.
>
> To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text
> should say something like:
>
>        For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
>        using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
>        the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>        version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier ServerHello
>        the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS negotiated
>        for this connection.
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> <nmav@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
> > pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:
> >
> >    "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
> >    ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
> >    "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."
> >
> > ...
> >
> >    "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
> >    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."
> >
> >
> > At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
> > contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
> > recommendations and do:
> >
> >   1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
> >      (TLS 1.2).
> >   2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
> >      extension and advertise TLS1.0
> >
> > That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
> > introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
> > ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
> > code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
> > mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
> > this draft mentions:
> >
> >    "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
> >     this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."
> >
> > Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths
> > allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve
> > any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with
> > additional tools to manipulate implementations.
> >
> > My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
> > if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
> > TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
> > supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
> > negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
> > negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
> > extension is only used informatively.
> >
> > regards,
> > Nikos
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114873f2f906d205665e3a4c
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">FWIW, this was BoringSSL&#39;s interpretation as well. We =
don&#39;t consider supported_versions an acceptable TLS 1.2 (or earlier) Se=
rverHello extension. I generally agree that we shouldn&#39;t add new unnece=
ssary combinations.<div><br></div><div>(TBH, I don&#39;t even consider the =
ability to advertise TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.1 on the client side to be an especi=
ally valuable feature, but I suppose that falls out naturally enough.)</div=
><div><br></div><div>David<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:49 AM David A. Cooper &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:da=
vid.cooper@nist.gov">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be<br>
made more clear.<br>
<br>
Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions<br>
that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports<br>
TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the<br>
server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the<br>
client&#39;s preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the<br>
connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to<br=
>
0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says<br=
>
that<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respo=
nd by sending a<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extension con=
taining the selected version<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 value (0x0304).<br>
<br>
It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.<br>
<br>
If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3<br=
>
could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of<br>
ServerHello &quot;contains the version of TLS negotiated for this<br>
connection.&quot; (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draf=
t<br>
says:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates i=
ts version using the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extensi=
on (Section 4.2.1), and the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x=
0303, which is the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2.<br>
<br>
To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text<br>
should say something like:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS serv=
er indicates its version<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 using the &quot;supported_versions&quo=
t; extension (Section 4.2.1), and<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the legacy_version field MUST be set t=
o 0x0303, which is the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS =
1.2 and earlier ServerHello<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the legacy_version field contains the =
version of TLS negotiated<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 for this connection.<br>
<br>
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate<b=
r>
&gt; pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore t=
he<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the<br=
>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extension to determine cli=
ent preferences.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negot=
iate a<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse ra=
nge.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which=
<br>
&gt; contains the single value &#39;TLS 1.0&#39; has to follow the draft&#3=
9;s<br>
&gt; recommendations and do:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303<b=
r>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (TLS 1.2).<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions<b=
r>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 extension and advertise TLS1.0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That modifies the way TLS 1.1=C2=A0 or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibl=
y<br>
&gt; introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the<br>
&gt; ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible<=
br>
&gt; code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3=
<br>
&gt; mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as<=
br>
&gt; this draft mentions:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos =
that include<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the lis=
t of versions.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths=
<br>
&gt; allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve<b=
r>
&gt; any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with<br>
&gt; additional tools to manipulate implementations.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extensio=
n<br>
&gt; if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-<=
br>
&gt; TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the<br>
&gt; supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be<br>
&gt; negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to<br>
&gt; negotiate TLS1.x, where x&lt;3, and the second that the clientHello<br=
>
&gt; extension is only used informatively.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; regards,<br>
&gt; Nikos<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/5tlJdoKcvY9VLvJ7Cu-_cxQm2oY>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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Of course, the arms race with middleboxes was what added the complexity in =
the first place.

________________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of David Benjamin <davidben@chro=
mium.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 1, 2018 10:42:55 AM
To: David A. Cooper
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity

FWIW, this was BoringSSL's interpretation as well. We don't consider suppor=
ted_versions an acceptable TLS 1.2 (or earlier) ServerHello extension. I ge=
nerally agree that we shouldn't add new unnecessary combinations.

(TBH, I don't even consider the ability to advertise TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.1 on=
 the client side to be an especially valuable feature, but I suppose that f=
alls out naturally enough.)

David

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:49 AM David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov<mail=
to:david.cooper@nist.gov>> wrote:


I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be
made more clear.

Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions
that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports
TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the
server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the
client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the
connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to
0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says
that

      A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
      "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
      value (0x0304).

It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.

If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3
could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of
ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this
connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draft
says:

       In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
       "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
       legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
       version number for TLS 1.2.

To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text
should say something like:

       For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
       using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
       the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
       version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier ServerHello
       the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS negotiated
       for this connection.

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
<nmav@redhat.com<mailto:nmav@redhat.com>> wrote:

> The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
> pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:
>
>    "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
>    ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
>    "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."
>
> ...
>
>    "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
>    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."
>
>
> At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
> contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
> recommendations and do:
>
>   1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
>      (TLS 1.2).
>   2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
>      extension and advertise TLS1.0
>
> That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
> introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
> ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
> code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
> mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
> this draft mentions:
>
>    "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
>     this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."
>
> Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths
> allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve
> any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with
> additional tools to manipulate implementations.
>
> My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
> if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
> TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
> supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
> negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
> negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
> extension is only used informatively.
>
> regards,
> Nikos

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:42 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> FWIW, this was BoringSSL's interpretation as well. We don't consider
> supported_versions an acceptable TLS 1.2 (or earlier) ServerHello
> extension. I generally agree that we shouldn't add new unnecessary
> combinations.
>

So, I think the key point here is that if you receive SH with SH < TLS
1.3,then you should abort, not ignore it.

-Ekr

(TBH, I don't even consider the ability to advertise TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.1 on
> the client side to be an especially valuable feature, but I suppose that
> falls out naturally enough.)
>
> David
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:49 AM David A. Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be
>> made more clear.
>>
>> Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions
>> that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports
>> TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the
>> server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the
>> client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the
>> connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to
>> 0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says
>> that
>>
>>       A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
>>       "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
>>       value (0x0304).
>>
>> It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.
>>
>> If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3
>> could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of
>> ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this
>> connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draft
>> says:
>>
>>        In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
>>        "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
>>        legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>>        version number for TLS 1.2.
>>
>> To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text
>> should say something like:
>>
>>        For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
>>        using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
>>        the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>>        version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier ServerHello
>>        the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS negotiated
>>        for this connection.
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>> <nmav@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> > The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate
>> > pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:
>> >
>> >    "If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore the
>> >    ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the
>> >    "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences."
>> >
>> > ...
>> >
>> >    "Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a
>> >    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range."
>> >
>> >
>> > At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which
>> > contains the single value 'TLS 1.0' has to follow the draft's
>> > recommendations and do:
>> >
>> >   1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303
>> >      (TLS 1.2).
>> >   2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions
>> >      extension and advertise TLS1.0
>> >
>> > That modifies the way TLS 1.1  or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibly
>> > introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the
>> > ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible
>> > code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3
>> > mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as
>> > this draft mentions:
>> >
>> >    "Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include
>> >     this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."
>> >
>> > Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths
>> > allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve
>> > any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with
>> > additional tools to manipulate implementations.
>> >
>> > My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extension
>> > if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-
>> > TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the
>> > supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be
>> > negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to
>> > negotiate TLS1.x, where x<3, and the second that the clientHello
>> > extension is only used informatively.
>> >
>> > regards,
>> > Nikos
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:42 AM, David Benjamin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidben@chromium.org" target=3D"_blank">davidben@chromium.org</=
a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">FWI=
W, this was BoringSSL&#39;s interpretation as well. We don&#39;t consider s=
upported_versions an acceptable TLS 1.2 (or earlier) ServerHello extension.=
 I generally agree that we shouldn&#39;t add new unnecessary combinations.<=
/div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>So, I think the key point here is tha=
t if you receive SH with SH &lt; TLS 1.3,then you should abort, not ignore =
it.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>(TBH, I don&#39;t even consider the ability=
 to advertise TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.1 on the client side to be an especially va=
luable feature, but I suppose that falls out naturally enough.)</div><span =
class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div></font></span><div>=
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">David</font></span><div><div=
 class=3D"h5"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, M=
ar 1, 2018 at 10:49 AM David A. Cooper &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@n=
ist.gov" target=3D"_blank">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could be<br>
made more clear.<br>
<br>
Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions extensions<br>
that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server supports<br>
TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that the<br>
server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the<br>
client&#39;s preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the<br>
connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set to<br=
>
0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1 says<br=
>
that<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respo=
nd by sending a<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extension con=
taining the selected version<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 value (0x0304).<br>
<br>
It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.<br>
<br>
If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section 4.1.3<br=
>
could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of<br>
ServerHello &quot;contains the version of TLS negotiated for this<br>
connection.&quot; (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current draf=
t<br>
says:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates i=
ts version using the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extensi=
on (Section 4.2.1), and the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x=
0303, which is the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2.<br>
<br>
To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text<br>
should say something like:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS serv=
er indicates its version<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 using the &quot;supported_versions&quo=
t; extension (Section 4.2.1), and<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the legacy_version field MUST be set t=
o 0x0303, which is the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS =
1.2 and earlier ServerHello<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the legacy_version field contains the =
version of TLS negotiated<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 for this connection.<br>
<br>
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:24 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; The TLS draft after version -21 requires TLS1.3 servers to negotiate<b=
r>
&gt; pre-TLS1.3 versions with a new, mechanism. The document states:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;If this extension is present, servers MUST ignore t=
he<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 ClientHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the<br=
>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extension to determine cli=
ent preferences.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negot=
iate a<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse ra=
nge.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At this point, a server receiving a supported_versions extension which=
<br>
&gt; contains the single value &#39;TLS 1.0&#39; has to follow the draft&#3=
9;s<br>
&gt; recommendations and do:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 1. It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303<b=
r>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (TLS 1.2).<br>
&gt; =C2=A0 2. On the serverHello extensions include a supported_versions<b=
r>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 extension and advertise TLS1.0<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That modifies the way TLS 1.1=C2=A0 or TLS 1.0 are negotiated, possibl=
y<br>
&gt; introducing new issues with middle-boxes which see TLS1.2 in the<br>
&gt; ServerHello but TLS1.0 anywhere else. That is also a quite impossible<=
br>
&gt; code path (why would an implementation negotiate TLS1.0 using a TLS1.3=
<br>
&gt; mechanism?). It is however anticipated to be used for that purpose as<=
br>
&gt; this draft mentions:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 &quot;Servers should be prepared to receive ClientHellos =
that include<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the lis=
t of versions.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Irrespective to any middle-box issues, I believe impossible code paths=
<br>
&gt; allowed by the protocol are more likely to cause problems than solve<b=
r>
&gt; any, because they are often not tested, and provide attackers with<br>
&gt; additional tools to manipulate implementations.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; My recommendation to address that would to either ignore that extensio=
n<br>
&gt; if pre-TLS1.2 is negotiated, or revert to -21 draft behavior for pre-<=
br>
&gt; TLS1.3 protocol negotiation. That is, the server MUST not send the<br>
&gt; supported_versions extension if a pre-TLS1.3 protocol is to be<br>
&gt; negotiated. The first case ensures that there is a single way to<br>
&gt; negotiate TLS1.x, where x&lt;3, and the second that the clientHello<br=
>
&gt; extension is only used informatively.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; regards,<br>
&gt; Nikos<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 14:13:39 -0500
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 3:07 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
wrote:

> IF there's an objection to modifying the extension in order to add a
> pin-to-DANE TTL field, I would propose the following instead:
>
>     Make the pin-to-DANE be "forever" but make it so it can easily be
>     cleared if DANE is undeployed for the service.
>

This option is already covered in the draft. It doesn't use the term
pinning,
but does mention caching the existence of DANE on first contact and
requiring it subsequently (if clients want to do so).

I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the
much
more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL
commitment
and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).

Shumon.

--001a114741385201ce05665ea8fa
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Feb 28, 2018 at 3:07 PM, Nico Williams <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" target=3D"_blank">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">IF there&#39;s an objec=
tion to modifying the extension in order to add a<br>
pin-to-DANE TTL field, I would propose the following instead:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Make the pin-to-DANE be &quot;forever&quot; but make it so it=
 can easily be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cleared if DANE is undeployed for the service.<br></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>This option is already covered in the draft. It doesn=
&#39;t use the term pinning,</div><div>but does mention caching the existen=
ce of DANE on first contact and=C2=A0</div><div>requiring it subsequently (=
if clients want to do so).</div><div><br></div><div>I do not know if the dr=
aft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the much=C2=A0</div><div>more =
major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL commitment</d=
iv><div>and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is remov=
ed).</div><div><br></div><div>Shumon.</div><div><br></div></div></div></div=
>

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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 14:16:13 -0500
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 6:36 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:24:31AM -0500, Shumon Huque wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > Several of us were well aware of this during the early days of the
> > > draft, but perhaps many folks did not fully appreciate the impacts
> > > until I elaborated on them last year, and added text that described
> > > the "adversary with fraudulently obtained PKIX credentials" attack.
> >
> > Following up to my own message, sorry ..
> >
> > It occurred to me that perhaps a good way to mitigate this risk is
> > a combo of mechanisms like CAA and Certificate Transparency logs.
>
> NO.  That's insanely complicated.


Is it really?

We're talking about a scenario of incremental deployment of DANE in an
existing PKIX ecosystem. In such an environment, I would expect that
many servers will likely support both PKIX-only and DANE, at least
initially. So presumably they will already be paying attention to CT logs
to
detect mis-issuance. And even if they support only DANE, they might be
concerned about an attacker impersonating their service to DANE
unaware clients.

Shumon.

--001a114741387aae0705665eb1fc
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Feb 27, 2018 at 6:36 PM, Nico Williams <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" target=3D"_blank">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><spa=
n class=3D"gmail-">On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:24:31AM -0500, Shumon Huque w=
rote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Shumon Huque &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:s=
huque@gmail.com">shuque@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Several of us were well aware of this during the early days of th=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; draft, but perhaps many folks did not fully appreciate the impact=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; until I elaborated on them last year, and added text that describ=
ed<br>
&gt; &gt; the &quot;adversary with fraudulently obtained PKIX credentials&q=
uot; attack.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Following up to my own message, sorry ..<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It occurred to me that perhaps a good way to mitigate this risk is<br>
&gt; a combo of mechanisms like CAA and Certificate Transparency logs.<br>
<br>
</span>NO.=C2=A0 That&#39;s insanely complicated.</blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>Is it really?</div><div><br></div><div>We&#39;re talking about a sce=
nario of incremental deployment of DANE in an</div><div>existing PKIX ecosy=
stem. In such an environment, I would expect that</div><div>many servers wi=
ll likely support both PKIX-only and DANE, at least</div><div>initially. So=
 presumably they will already be paying attention to CT logs to=C2=A0</div>=
<div>detect mis-issuance. And even if they support only DANE, they might be=
</div><div>concerned about an attacker impersonating their service to DANE<=
/div><div>unaware clients.</div><div><br></div><div>Shumon.</div><div><br><=
/div></div></div></div>

--001a114741387aae0705665eb1fc--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 15:15:11 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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I should note that Ben pointed out in the PR that we might need to =
specify all 6 as recommended.  I can kind of get behind that because =
before we were doing PSS regardless of the identifier.  Thoughts?

spt

> On Mar 1, 2018, at 09:58, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> I=E2=80=99ve submitted the following PR to make sure we answer IANA =
questions*:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159
>=20
> One thing I=E2=80=99d like to get input on is which of the RSA-PSS =
signature schemes should be recommended.  The IANA considerations =
currently recommends rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, and rsa_pss_sha512. =
But, we=E2=80=99ve changed the PSS identifiers to split them so now =
we=E2=80=99ve got different identifiers that follow and we need to make =
sure we indicate which ones get marked as Recommended:
> rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
> rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
> rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
> rsa_pss_pss_sha256
> rsa_pss_pss_sha384
> rsa_pss_pss_sha512
>=20
> I believe the intent was that we would specify three rsa_pss_rsae as =
Recommended.
>=20
> spt
>=20
> * IANA does a review of the IANA considerations section to make sure =
that they understand the requests we=E2=80=99ve made of them.
>=20
>> On Feb 15, 2018, at 16:13, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG =
(tls) to
>> consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security =
(TLS)
>> Protocol Version 1.3'
>> <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>=20
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits =
final
>> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2018-03-01. Exceptionally, comments =
may be
>> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the =
beginning of
>> the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>=20
>> Abstract
>>=20
>>=20
>>  This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
>>  (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to =
communicate
>>  over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent =
eavesdropping,
>>  tampering, and message forgery.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> The file can be obtained via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>=20
>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/ballot/
>>=20
>> The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
>>=20
>>  https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2900/
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> The document contains these normative downward references.
>> See RFC 3967 for additional information:=20
>>   rfc8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 =
(Informational - IETF stream)
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>=20


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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want
people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what
people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is
still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe in
5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.

-Ben

On 03/01/2018 02:15 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
> I should note that Ben pointed out in the PR that we might need to specify all 6 as recommended.  I can kind of get behind that because before we were doing PSS regardless of the identifier.  Thoughts?
>
> spt
>
>> On Mar 1, 2018, at 09:58, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>
>> I’ve submitted the following PR to make sure we answer IANA questions*:
>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159
>>
>> One thing I’d like to get input on is which of the RSA-PSS signature schemes should be recommended.  The IANA considerations currently recommends rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, and rsa_pss_sha512. But, we’ve changed the PSS identifiers to split them so now we’ve got different identifiers that follow and we need to make sure we indicate which ones get marked as Recommended:
>> rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
>> rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
>> rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
>> rsa_pss_pss_sha256
>> rsa_pss_pss_sha384
>> rsa_pss_pss_sha512
>>
>> I believe the intent was that we would specify three rsa_pss_rsae as Recommended.
>>
>> spt
>>
>> * IANA does a review of the IANA considerations section to make sure that they understand the requests we’ve made of them.
>>
>>> On Feb 15, 2018, at 16:13, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
>>> consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>>> Protocol Version 1.3'
>>> <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
>>> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2018-03-01. Exceptionally, comments may be
>>> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
>>> the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>>
>>>
>>>  This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
>>>  (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
>>>  over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
>>>  tampering, and message forgery.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The file can be obtained via
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>>
>>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/ballot/
>>>
>>> The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
>>>
>>>  https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2900/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The document contains these normative downward references.
>>> See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
>>>   rfc8017: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 (Informational - IETF stream)
>>>
>>>
>>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want
> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what
> people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is
> still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe in
> 5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.

I think that I agree.  For recommendations PSS is fine.  If the
question is MTI, then I think we're stuck with pss_rsae.


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DQoNCg==


From nobody Thu Mar  1 13:38:03 2018
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 16:37:57 -0500
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Subject: [TLS] New Internet-Draft: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
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--Apple-Mail=_30D7AAF9-06C1-4A30-B050-770D3AD2E023
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I would like to get comments on this Internet-Draft.  Once a round of =
comments have been received and folded into -01, I would like to work =
with folks that did the earlier proofs with Tamarin to make sure that =
the this does not negatively impact the TLS 1.3 protocol changes that =
were made to eliminate the man-in-the-middle attack that they found in =
2015.

Thanks,
  Russ


> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for =
draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> Date: March 1, 2018 at 4:13:44 PM EST
> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, =
draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russ Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
> Revision:	00
> Title:		TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based =
Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key
> Document date:	2018-03-01
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		9
> URL:            =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-ext=
ern-psk-00.txt
> Status:         =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-=
psk/
> Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-0=
0
> Htmlized:       =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-ex=
tern-psk-00
>=20
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
>   authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external =
pre-
>   shared key (PSK).
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_30D7AAF9-06C1-4A30-B050-770D3AD2E023
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">I would like to get comments on this Internet-Draft. =
&nbsp;Once a round of comments have been received and folded into -01, I =
would like to work with folks that did the earlier proofs with Tamarin =
to make sure that the this does not negatively impact the TLS 1.3 =
protocol changes that were made to eliminate the man-in-the-middle =
attack that they found in 2015.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; Russ</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, 'Helvetica =
Neue', Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">From: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, 'Helvetica =
Neue', Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">New Version =
Notification for =
draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt</b><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Date: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">March 1, 2018 at 4:13:44 PM =
EST<br class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">"Russ Housley" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">A new version =
of I-D, draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt<br =
class=3D"">has been successfully submitted by Russ Housley and posted to =
the<br class=3D"">IETF repository.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Name:<span=
 class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk<br =
class=3D"">Revision:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>00<br class=3D"">Title:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>TLS 1.3 =
Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External =
Pre-Shared Key<br class=3D"">Document date:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>2018-03-01<br =
class=3D"">Group:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">=
	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Individual Submission<br class=3D"">Pages:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>9<br =
class=3D"">URL: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-=
with-extern-psk-00.txt" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-tls13-ce=
rt-with-extern-psk-00.txt</a><br class=3D"">Status: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with=
-extern-psk/" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-w=
ith-extern-psk/</a><br class=3D"">Htmlized: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-exte=
rn-psk-00" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-e=
xtern-psk-00</a><br class=3D"">Htmlized: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert=
-with-extern-psk-00" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-c=
ert-with-extern-psk-00</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Abstract:<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;This document specifies =
a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an =
external pre-<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;shared key (PSK).<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the =
time of submission<br class=3D"">until the htmlized version and diff are =
available at <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The IETF =
Secretariat<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_30D7AAF9-06C1-4A30-B050-770D3AD2E023--


From nobody Thu Mar  1 13:51:42 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 16:51:03 -0500
Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> On Mar 1, 2018, at 2:13 PM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 3:07 PM, Nico Williams =
<nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>> IF there's an objection to modifying the extension in order to add a
>> pin-to-DANE TTL field, I would propose the following instead:
>>=20
>>    Make the pin-to-DANE be "forever" but make it so it can easily be
>>    cleared if DANE is undeployed for the service.
>=20
> This option is already covered in the draft. It doesn't use the term =
pinning,
> but does mention caching the existence of DANE on first contact and=20
> requiring it subsequently (if clients want to do so).
>=20
> I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do =
the much=20
> more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL =
commitment
> and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is =
removed).

Avoiding an explicit TTL, and clients unilaterally assuming the DANE =
extension
will always be available is not IMHO a good idea.

Websites that initially implement the extension should be able to =
eventually
stop using it, if for some reason they decide that they no longer want =
to do
so.  While the server can clear the caches of clients that see a denial =
of
existence of the TLSA records, or proof an unsigned delegation from a =
parent
domain, without a max TTL there are always clients that have not yet =
connected
since the policy change, and will be broken indefinitely if the =
extension is no
longer delivered.

Therefore, any long-term caching of a destination's support for the =
extension
should require server opt-in, and must have a maximum duration.

--=20
	Viktor.



--=20
	Viktor.


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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
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Thread-Topic: Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-vLI-ThLp28EBwaQX05zIQkmfWM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 08:54:40 +1100
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Internet-Draft: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
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Hi Russ,

This seems like a welcome addition.  I'm not sure why you think that
PQ needs are a good motivation for this work though.  Managing
external PSKs is so unwieldy that it almost seems like this would do
more harm than good in that regard.  I find this more interesting from
the perspective of providing continuing proof of possession for keys
while also permitting the use of 0-RTT (and session continuation more
generally).

FWIW, I don't see any reason that this approach would be a problem
given that it is additive, the problem that Sam Scott et. al. from
before was a result of important contextual information being omitted
from the transcript.

Why didn't you consider a new codepoint on psk_key_exchange_modes that
permits/requires use of the certificate?  The purpose of that
extension is to signal that a) you want PSK, and b) what additional
things are permitted alongside that PSK.

It's not clear from your text on client certificate authentication
whether your mode permits the server to omit its Certificate, but then
send CertificateRequest.  You should clarify that one way or other.

--Martin



On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:37 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> I would like to get comments on this Internet-Draft.  Once a round of
> comments have been received and folded into -01, I would like to work with
> folks that did the earlier proofs with Tamarin to make sure that the this
> does not negatively impact the TLS 1.3 protocol changes that were made to
> eliminate the man-in-the-middle attack that they found in 2015.
>
> Thanks,
>   Russ
>
>
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> Date: March 1, 2018 at 4:13:44 PM EST
> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russ Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
> Revision: 00
> Title: TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an
> External Pre-Shared Key
> Document date: 2018-03-01
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 9
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/
> Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
>
>
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
>   authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-
>   shared key (PSK).
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Internet-Draft: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
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Martin:
>=20
> This seems like a welcome addition.  I'm not sure why you think that
> PQ needs are a good motivation for this work though.  Managing
> external PSKs is so unwieldy that it almost seems like this would do
> more harm than good in that regard.  I find this more interesting from
> the perspective of providing continuing proof of possession for keys
> while also permitting the use of 0-RTT (and session continuation more
> generally).

The key management would be pretty onerous if a different external PSK =
is distributed to each client-server pair.  I was pretty careful to make =
sure that the key schedule would work out even if the external PSK is =
know to a group of clients and a group of servers because the (EC)DHE =
key will be pairwise.

If the external PSK is not pairwise, I do not think it can be used for =
0-RTT traffic, which is why the I-D does not allow early data.

> FWIW, I don't see any reason that this approach would be a problem
> given that it is additive, the problem that Sam Scott et. al. from
> before was a result of important contextual information being omitted
> from the transcript.

I did not see a problem, but we should make sure that there is not =
something subtle.

> Why didn't you consider a new codepoint on psk_key_exchange_modes that
> permits/requires use of the certificate?  The purpose of that
> extension is to signal that a) you want PSK, and b) what additional
> things are permitted alongside that PSK.

Because of this text in the TLS 1.3 base specification:

   ... Implementations MUST NOT
   combine external PSKs with certificate-based authentication of either
   the client or the server unless negotiated by some extension.

That steered me toward an additional extension.

> It's not clear from your text on client certificate authentication
> whether your mode permits the server to omit its Certificate, but then
> send CertificateRequest.  You should clarify that one way or other.

That was intended by:

   When the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is successfully
   negotiated, authentication of the server depends upon the ability to
   generate a signature that can be validated with the public key in the
   server's certificate.  This is accomplished by the server sending the
   Certificate and CertificateVerify messages as described in Sections
   4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].

But I see that it should be reworded to include a MUST statement.

Russ


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 14:27:13 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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Hi Kenny,

Yes, this is something we are aware of. Here's the relevant text from the
document:
https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#rfc.appendix.E=
.3

I don't think we're likely to change the protocol, but if you have some
proposed text
that you think would be informative above and beyond what we already have,
please
send it along.

Best,
-Ekr





On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible timing
> attack on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is alread=
y known
> to people who've been paying more attention than me!
>
> Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes
> to be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max reco=
rd
> size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specifie=
d
> in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3
> because the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts.
> There should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the
> integrity guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.
>
> The idea for the timing attack is as follows.
>
> The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 byte=
s
> at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is
> encountered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount o=
f
> time needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to th=
e
> number of padding bytes. If there's some kind of response record for this
> record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record
> to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information
> about the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintex=
t
> (since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext
> length).
>
> The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified b=
y
> various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over ma=
ny
> records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thi=
nk
> of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is
> split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with t=
he
> next GET request from the client being the "response record". (This is a
> pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The total
> timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting, fo=
r
> example.
>
> I'm not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinking
> about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.
>
> There's at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:
>
> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext
> structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.
> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This shou=
ld
> be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)
>
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added
> to the spec.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Kenny
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Kenny,<div><br></div><div>Yes, this is something we are=
 aware of. Here&#39;s the relevant text from the document:</div><div><a hre=
f=3D"https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#rfc.appen=
dix.E.3">https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#rfc.a=
ppendix.E.3</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think we&#39;re li=
kely to change the protocol, but if you have some proposed text</div><div>t=
hat you think would be informative above and beyond what we already have, p=
lease</div><div>send it along.</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>-Ek=
r</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 1, 2018=
 at 1:52 PM, Paterson, Kenny <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Kenny.=
Paterson@rhul.ac.uk" target=3D"_blank">Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk</a>&gt;</s=
pan> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
I&#39;ve been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit, specifi=
cally the new padding mechanism. I think there&#39;s a possible timing atta=
ck on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is already know=
n to people who&#39;ve been paying more attention than me!<br>
<br>
Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes t=
o be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max record =
size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specified =
in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3 bec=
ause the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts. Ther=
e should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the integrit=
y guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.<br>
<br>
The idea for the timing attack is as follows.<br>
<br>
The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 bytes =
at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is en=
countered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount of ti=
me needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to the nu=
mber of padding bytes. If there&#39;s some kind of response record for this=
 record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record =
to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information a=
bout the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintext (=
since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext lengt=
h).<br>
<br>
The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified by =
various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over many=
 records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thin=
k of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is=
 split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with th=
e next GET request from the client being the &quot;response record&quot;. (=
This is a pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The =
total timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting=
, for example.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinkin=
g about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:<br>
<br>
1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext st=
ructure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.<br>
2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext structu=
re, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This should be saf=
e because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)<br>
<br>
Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the specification=
 process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added to the spec.<b=
r>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
Kenny<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 14:40:27 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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--000000000000de54730566618b9e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
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There's another, more cache-friendly approach too, which is to record the
position of the highest non-zero byte as the decryption occurs (while that
cache-line of plaintext is still in-cache) in-order. I found that a bit
easier to implement in constant time too because it's easy to generate an
all-1s mask that's conditional on a non-zero value.

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible timing
> attack on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is alread=
y known
> to people who've been paying more attention than me!
>
> Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes
> to be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max reco=
rd
> size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specifie=
d
> in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3
> because the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts.
> There should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the
> integrity guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.
>
> The idea for the timing attack is as follows.
>
> The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 byte=
s
> at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is
> encountered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount o=
f
> time needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to th=
e
> number of padding bytes. If there's some kind of response record for this
> record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record
> to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information
> about the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintex=
t
> (since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext
> length).
>
> The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified b=
y
> various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over ma=
ny
> records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thi=
nk
> of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is
> split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with t=
he
> next GET request from the client being the "response record". (This is a
> pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The total
> timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting, fo=
r
> example.
>
> I'm not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinking
> about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.
>
> There's at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:
>
> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext
> structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.
> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This shou=
ld
> be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)
>
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added
> to the spec.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Kenny
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20
Colm

--000000000000de54730566618b9e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s another, more cache-fr=
iendly approach too, which is to record the position of the highest non-zer=
o byte as the decryption occurs (while that cache-line of plaintext is stil=
l in-cache) in-order. I found that a bit easier to implement in constant ti=
me too because it&#39;s easy to generate an all-1s mask that&#39;s conditio=
nal on a non-zero value.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Paterson, Kenny <span di=
r=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk" target=3D"_blank=
">Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-=
left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,<b=
r>
<br>
I&#39;ve been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit, specifi=
cally the new padding mechanism. I think there&#39;s a possible timing atta=
ck on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is already know=
n to people who&#39;ve been paying more attention than me!<br>
<br>
Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes t=
o be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max record =
size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specified =
in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3 bec=
ause the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts. Ther=
e should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the integrit=
y guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.<br>
<br>
The idea for the timing attack is as follows.<br>
<br>
The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 bytes =
at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is en=
countered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount of ti=
me needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to the nu=
mber of padding bytes. If there&#39;s some kind of response record for this=
 record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record =
to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information a=
bout the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintext (=
since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext lengt=
h).<br>
<br>
The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified by =
various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over many=
 records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thin=
k of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is=
 split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with th=
e next GET request from the client being the &quot;response record&quot;. (=
This is a pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The =
total timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting=
, for example.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinkin=
g about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:<br>
<br>
1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext st=
ructure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.<br>
2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext structu=
re, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This should be saf=
e because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)<br>
<br>
Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the specification=
 process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added to the spec.<b=
r>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
Kenny<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 23:00:21 +0000
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To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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The data ultimately needs to be returned to the calling application,
presumably some HTTP parser, which in turn passes data up to more calling
code and so on. Conversely, the data must have been produced by some also
application-level process on the sender, some HTTP serializer, before it
was handed off to TLS at all. All of that work is going to freely branch on
the length. (Indeed even the traditional read/write APIs of most TLS
libraries are the wrong shape here.) Patching just the unpad corner is not
very useful without a clearer story for the rest.

I'd actually suggest that, for cases where the length needs to remain
impervious to timing leaks end-to-end, TLS is the wrong layer to pad.
Writing a fully general HTTP parser which avoids leaking the padding length
across arbitrary record boundaries not under your control sounds
implausible. You'd have to account for padding potentially between *every
byte* at the lowest-level serialization.

Rather, the higher up the stack you insert your padding, the fewer layers
you must traverse. If the process is designed to treat some length as
secret in the first place, it probably has the "padding" built-in. E.g., EC
private keys are serialized and (at least in good implementations)
represented in memory as fixed-width, bounded only by the curve order, even
though an individual private key might happen to have a leading zero byte
or so.

David

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:53 PM Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible timing
> attack on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is alread=
y known
> to people who've been paying more attention than me!
>
> Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes
> to be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max reco=
rd
> size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specifie=
d
> in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3
> because the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts.
> There should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the
> integrity guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.
>
> The idea for the timing attack is as follows.
>
> The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 byte=
s
> at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is
> encountered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount o=
f
> time needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to th=
e
> number of padding bytes. If there's some kind of response record for this
> record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record
> to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information
> about the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintex=
t
> (since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext
> length).
>
> The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified b=
y
> various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over ma=
ny
> records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thi=
nk
> of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is
> split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with t=
he
> next GET request from the client being the "response record". (This is a
> pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The total
> timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting, fo=
r
> example.
>
> I'm not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinking
> about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.
>
> There's at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:
>
> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext
> structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.
> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This shou=
ld
> be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)
>
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added
> to the spec.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Kenny
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114411f8b0a395056661d3b1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">The data ultimately needs to be returned to the calling ap=
plication, presumably some HTTP parser, which in turn passes data up to mor=
e calling code and so on. Conversely, the data must have been produced by s=
ome also application-level process on the sender, some HTTP serializer, bef=
ore it was handed off to TLS at all. All of that work is going to freely br=
anch on the length. (Indeed even the traditional read/write APIs of most TL=
S libraries are the wrong shape here.) Patching just the unpad corner is no=
t very useful without a clearer story for the rest.<div><div><br></div><div=
>I&#39;d actually suggest that, for cases where the=C2=A0length needs to re=
main impervious to timing leaks end-to-end, TLS is the wrong layer to pad. =
Writing a fully general HTTP parser which avoids leaking the padding length=
 across arbitrary record boundaries not under your control sounds implausib=
le. You&#39;d have to account for padding potentially between *every byte* =
at the lowest-level serialization.</div><div><br></div><div>Rather, the hig=
her up the stack you insert your padding, the fewer layers you must travers=
e. If the process is designed to treat some length as secret in the first p=
lace, it probably has the &quot;padding&quot; built-in. E.g., EC private ke=
ys are serialized and (at least in good implementations) represented in mem=
ory as fixed-width, bounded only by the curve order, even though an individ=
ual private key might happen to have a leading zero byte or so.</div></div>=
<div><br></div><div>David</div><div><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:53 =
PM Paterson, Kenny &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk" target=
=3D"_blank">Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
I&#39;ve been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit, specifi=
cally the new padding mechanism. I think there&#39;s a possible timing atta=
ck on a na=C3=AFve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is already know=
n to people who&#39;ve been paying more attention than me!<br>
<br>
Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00 bytes t=
o be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to the max record =
size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD scheme is specified =
in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3 bec=
ause the current AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts. Ther=
e should be no padding oracle style attack possible because of the integrit=
y guarantees of the AEAD schemes in use.<br>
<br>
The idea for the timing attack is as follows.<br>
<br>
The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00 bytes =
at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-00 byte is en=
countered. This is then the content type byte. Notice that the amount of ti=
me needed to execute this depadding routine would be proportional to the nu=
mber of padding bytes. If there&#39;s some kind of response record for this=
 record, then measuring the time taken from reception of the target record =
to the appearance of the response record can be used to infer information a=
bout the amount of padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintext (=
since the length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext lengt=
h).<br>
<br>
The timing differences here would be small. But they could be amplified by =
various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing difference over many=
 records could allow leakage of the sum of the true plaintext lengths. Thin=
k of a client browser fetching a simple webpage from a browser. The page is=
 split over many TLS records, each of which is individually padded, with th=
e next GET request from the client being the &quot;response record&quot;. (=
This is a pretty simplistic view of how a web browser works, I know!). The =
total timing difference might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting=
, for example.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth thinkin=
g about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:<br>
<br>
1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the plaintext st=
ructure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.<br>
2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext structu=
re, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This should be saf=
e because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)<br>
<br>
Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the specification=
 process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be added to the spec.<b=
r>
<br>
Thoughts?<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
Kenny<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a114411f8b0a395056661d3b1--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : SNI Encryption in TLS Through Tunneling
        Authors         : Christian Huitema
                          Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-02.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2018-03-01

Abstract:
   This draft describes the general problem of encryption of the Server
   Name Identification (SNI) parameter.  The proposed solutions hide a
   Hidden Service behind a Fronting Service, only disclosing the SNI of
   the Fronting Service to external observers.  The draft starts by
   listing known attacks against SNI encryption, discusses the current
   "co-tenancy fronting" solution, and then presents two potential TLS
   layer solutions that might mitigate these attacks.
   The first solution is based on TLS in TLS "quasi tunneling", and the
   second solution is based on "combined tickets".  These solutions only
   require minimal extensions to the TLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-02
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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> On Mar 1, 2018, at 16:31, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> =
wrote:
>> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually =
want
>> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is =
what
>> people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is
>> still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe =
in
>> 5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.
>=20
> I think that I agree.  For recommendations PSS is fine.  If the
> question is MTI, then I think we're stuck with pss_rsae.

I=E2=80=99ll submitted a revised PR [0] to change that will swap out the =
rsa_pss_sha* with rsa_pss_rsae_sha*:

OLD:

  The following values SHALL be marked as
  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
  rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.

NEW:

  The following values SHALL be marked as
  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, and
  ed25519.

spt

[0] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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--=-=-=
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On Thu 2018-03-01 21:52:51 +0000, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
> I think there's a possible timing attack on a na=C3=AFve implementation of
> de-padding.

Thanks for observing this, Kenny!  I think this came up when we were
designing the padding originally, and iirc, the general consensus was:

 (a) this scheme allows people to not pad at all, which saves bytes in
     the most heavily traffic-constrained case, and

 (b) there may well be timing attacks based on the handling of the
     non-padded data too, and those are likely to be stronger timing
     effects than the effects in the padding layer.

I think with (b) we might have gotten a bit overly nihilistic -- for one
thing, depadding probably happens in the TLS layer of the implementation
itself, so any response generated by the TLS layer will have tighter
timing bounds than anything that does data handling.  And, implementers
that use any given TLS stack can control their own timing code, but
can't necessarily control the code of the TLS implementation that
they're sitting atop.  TLS implementers probably don't want to leak info
that the user has deliberately taken steps to avoid leaking!

Our implementer guidance should also already say that the best place to
pad is at the application layer, where the implementer can more
accurately design padding that meets the expected usage profile --
padding at the TLS layer is available for implementers that don't have
this option, but probably isn't the optimal solution.

> This padding scheme is quite important for TLS 1.3 because the current
> AEAD schemes do leak the length of record plaintexts.

thanks for acknowledging the value of the padding. i agree! :)

The timing-based size leak you're talking about still looks harder to
attack reliably than the direct size leakage we have without the
padding.

> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the
> plaintext structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered.

do you have concrete implementation suggestions?

I'm not sure how to convince a clever compiler to actually run this
entire loop if you count from the back -- i can easily see the tail of
the walk being optimized away since it has no bearing on the rest of the
program control or data flow.

You could of course check from the front of the plaintext, keeping every
non-zero value:

  char ptype =3D 0;
  for (i =3D 0; i < plaintext_len; i++)
    if plaintext[i]
      ptype =3D plaintext[i];

but iiuc, this leaks the number of zeros in the plaintext overall,
assuming that the store instruction has noticeable time.

can you tell i'm not good at devising constant-time code? :P If there's
a concrete suggestion that we think will work for common
implementations, i would have no problem including it as implementer
guidance.

> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This
> should be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.)
>
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be
> added to the spec.

It's not only too late to take this approach, i think we explicitly
rejected this option because of the cost it imposes on unpadded packets,
as mentioned above.

        --dkg

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 12:05:46 +1100
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I think that I was suggesting this:

  The following values SHALL be marked as
  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
  rsa_pss_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_pss_sha384,rsa_pss_pss_sha512, and
  ed25519.

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:45 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mar 1, 2018, at 16:31, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrot=
e:
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote=
:
>>> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want
>>> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what
>>> people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is
>>> still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe in
>>> 5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.
>>
>> I think that I agree.  For recommendations PSS is fine.  If the
>> question is MTI, then I think we're stuck with pss_rsae.
>
> I=E2=80=99ll submitted a revised PR [0] to change that will swap out the =
rsa_pss_sha* with rsa_pss_rsae_sha*:
>
> OLD:
>
>   The following values SHALL be marked as
>   "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>   rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.
>
> NEW:
>
>   The following values SHALL be marked as
>   "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>   rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, and
>   ed25519.
>
> spt
>
> [0] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 12:12:57 +1100
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Cc: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 10:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> You could of course check from the front of the plaintext, keeping every
> non-zero value:
>
>   char ptype = 0;
>   for (i = 0; i < plaintext_len; i++)
>     if plaintext[i]
>       ptype = plaintext[i];

What about ?

size_t l[2];
size_t t[2];
for (i = 0; i < plaintext_len; ++i) {
  l[plaintext[i] != 0] = i;
  t[plaintext[i] != 0] = plaintext[i];
}
unpadded_len = l[0] - 1;
content_type = t[1];


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 17:17:22 -0800
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 10:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
> <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> > You could of course check from the front of the plaintext, keeping every
> > non-zero value:
> >
> >   char ptype = 0;
> >   for (i = 0; i < plaintext_len; i++)
> >     if plaintext[i]
> >       ptype = plaintext[i];
>
> What about ?
>
> size_t l[2];
> size_t t[2];
> for (i = 0; i < plaintext_len; ++i) {
>   l[plaintext[i] != 0] = i;
>   t[plaintext[i] != 0] = plaintext[i];
> }
> unpadded_len = l[0] - 1;
> content_type = t[1];


This is fun, but I want to note that many (most) APIs are not zero-copy but
rather involve
SSL_Read() copying data from some internal buffer into a caller supplied
buffer. So
that operation also needs to be made constant time (e.g., by copying the
whole
padded region?), and so on...

-Ekr

_______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a1147a324691864056663bf3f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Martin Thomson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martin.thomson@gmail.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">=
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 10:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
&gt; You could of course check from the front of the plaintext, keeping eve=
ry<br>
&gt; non-zero value:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0char ptype =3D 0;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0for (i =3D 0; i &lt; plaintext_len; i++)<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0if plaintext[i]<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ptype =3D plaintext[i];<br>
<br>
</span>What about ?<br>
<br>
size_t l[2];<br>
size_t t[2];<br>
for (i =3D 0; i &lt; plaintext_len; ++i) {<br>
=C2=A0 l[plaintext[i] !=3D 0] =3D i;<br>
=C2=A0 t[plaintext[i] !=3D 0] =3D plaintext[i];<br>
}<br>
unpadded_len =3D l[0] - 1;<br>
content_type =3D t[1];</blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is fun, but I w=
ant to note that many (most) APIs are not zero-copy but rather involve</div=
><div>SSL_Read() copying data from some internal buffer into a caller suppl=
ied buffer. So</div><div>that operation also needs to be made constant time=
 (e.g., by copying the whole</div><div>padded region?), and so on...</div><=
div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 12:29:26 +1100
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 12:17 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> This is fun, but I want to note that many (most) APIs are not zero-copy but
> rather involve
> SSL_Read() copying data from some internal buffer into a caller supplied
> buffer. So
> that operation also needs to be made constant time (e.g., by copying the
> whole
> padded region?), and so on...

Forgive me for indulging :)  For the record, I think that the current
text is perfectly adequate.


From nobody Thu Mar  1 18:11:49 2018
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Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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Okay that was a fail on my part I meant to put all 6 in.  Updated the =
PR.

spt

> On Mar 1, 2018, at 20:05, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> I think that I was suggesting this:
>=20
>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
>  rsa_pss_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_pss_sha384,rsa_pss_pss_sha512, and
>  ed25519.
>=20
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:45 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Mar 1, 2018, at 16:31, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> =
wrote:
>>>> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually =
want
>>>> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is =
what
>>>> people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that =
is
>>>> still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  =
Maybe in
>>>> 5 years the IESG can change those "yes"es to "no"s, of course.
>>>=20
>>> I think that I agree.  For recommendations PSS is fine.  If the
>>> question is MTI, then I think we're stuck with pss_rsae.
>>=20
>> I=E2=80=99ll submitted a revised PR [0] to change that will swap out =
the rsa_pss_sha* with rsa_pss_rsae_sha*:
>>=20
>> OLD:
>>=20
>>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>>  rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_sha512, ed25519.
>>=20
>> NEW:
>>=20
>>  The following values SHALL be marked as
>>  "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
>>  rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, and
>>  ed25519.
>>=20
>> spt
>>=20
>> [0] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159


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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2018 09:21:51 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 10:49 -0500, David A. Cooper wrote:
> 
> I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could
> be 
> made more clear.
> 
> Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions
> extensions 
> that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server
> supports 
> TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that
> the 
> server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the 
> client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the 
> connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set
> to 
> 0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1
> says 
> that
> 
>       A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
>       "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
>       value (0x0304).
> 
> It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.
> 
> If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section
> 4.1.3 
> could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of 
> ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this 
> connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current
> draft 
> says:
> 
>        In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
>        "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
>        legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>        version number for TLS 1.2.
> 
> To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text 
> should say something like:
> 
>        For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
>        using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
>        the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
>        version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier
> ServerHello
>        the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS
> negotiated
>        for this connection.

I understand that this is an interpretation that makes more sense and
aligns with the -21 behavior, but I do not think that this is what this
text literally says.  Both Eric in his previous email and another
engineer I've discussed the issue seem to agree that the intention is
to use the new mechanism for all negotiations. You disagree on that,
and it thus apparent that this text needs clarification.

The text was written for -21 version which didn't have the server-side
part of the extension, and the flow was natural for pre-TLS1.3
versions. When the change was done in -22 to include the server-side of
the extension, this ambiguity (in your view) and complicated side-
effect (in my view) was introduced.

regards,
Nikos


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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 21:52 +0000, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible
> timing attack on a naïve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is
> already known to people who've been paying more attention than me!
> 
> Recall that the padding mechanism permits an arbitrary number of 00
> bytes to be added after the plaintext and content type byte, up to
> the max record size. This data is then encrypted using whichever AEAD
> scheme is specified in the cipher suite. This padding scheme is quite
> important for TLS 1.3 because the current AEAD schemes do leak the
> length of record plaintexts. There should be no padding oracle style
> attack possible because of the integrity guarantees of the AEAD
> schemes in use. 
> 
> The idea for the timing attack is as follows. 
> 
> The natural way to depad (after AEAD decryption) is to remove the 00
> bytes at the end of the plaintext structure one by one, until a non-
> 00 byte is encountered. This is then the content type byte. Notice
> that the amount of time needed to execute this depadding routine
> would be proportional to the number of padding bytes. If there's some
> kind of response record for this record, then measuring the time
> taken from reception of the target record to the appearance of the
> response record can be used to infer information about the amount of
> padding, and thereby, the true length of the plaintext (since the
> length of the padded plaintext is known from the ciphertext length).
> 
> The timing differences here would be small. But they could be
> amplified by various techniques. For example, the cumulative timing
> difference over many records could allow leakage of the sum of the
> true plaintext lengths. Think of a client browser fetching a simple
> webpage from a browser. The page is split over many TLS records, each
> of which is individually padded, with the next GET request from the
> client being the "response record". (This is a pretty simplistic view
> of how a web browser works, I know!). The total timing difference
> might then be sufficient for webpage fingerprinting, for example. 
> 
> I'm not claiming this is a big issue, but maybe something worth
> thinking about and addressing in the TLS 1.3 spec.
> 
> There's at least a couple of ways to avoid the problem:
> 
> 1. Do constant-time depadding - by examining every byte in the
> plaintext structure even after the first non-00 byte is encountered. 
> 2. Add an explicit padding length field at the end of the plaintext
> structure, and removing padding without checking its contents. (This
> should be safe because of the AEAD integrity guarantees.) 
> 
> Option 2 is probably a bit invasive at this late stage in the
> specification process. Maybe a sentence or two on option 1 could be
> added to the spec.

Hi,
 It was brought previously to the WG [0], and the bottom line was to push
for any solution to implementations.

As of the "naïve implementation of de-padding", I wouldn't put like that.
It is a straightforward method of de-padding after reading the draft, and
I believe all implementations out there use that method.

regards,
Nikos


[0].
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24365.html


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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/0bfpzB7qZ6hwiwplVVFNxY4Aisc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible timing attack on TLS 1.3 padding mechanism
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From nobody Fri Mar  2 11:44:45 2018
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From: Wang Haiguang <Wang.Haiguang1@huawei.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: A personal IETF draft on using Identity as raw public key for TLS has been uploaded to TLS data tracker
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Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 19:44:29 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] A personal IETF draft on using Identity as raw public key for TLS has been uploaded to TLS data tracker
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Dear all=0A=
=0A=
We have uploaded a personal draft on using identity as raw public key for T=
LS/DTLS to TLS group website just now.=0A=
A pdf version is also attached in this email.  =0A=
=0A=
Your comments are appreciated. =0A=
=0A=
Dr Yanjiang Yang, who is author of the draft, will attend the coming IETF 1=
01 meeting. You are welcome to have a face-to-face discussion with him over=
 the potential issues of the draft. =0A=
=0A=
Best regards.=0A=
=0A=
Haiguang=

--_002_0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E036DDESINEML521MBXchi_
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From nobody Fri Mar  2 13:00:52 2018
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
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A few minutes at the TLS WG session in London have been requested to =
talk about this draft.

Russ


> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for =
draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> Date: March 2, 2018 at 3:58:35 PM EST
> To: "Ralph Droms" <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>, "Russ Housley" =
<housley@vigilsec.com>
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Ralph Droms and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility
> Revision:	01
> Title:		TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in =
the Datacenter
> Document date:	2018-03-02
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		11
> URL:            =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.tx=
t
> Status:         =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
> Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
> Htmlized:       =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
> Diff:           =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
>=20
> Abstract:
>   Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the RSA
>   handshake.  While (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
>   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH has =
impacts
>   certain enterprise network operational requirements.  The TLS
>   Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH through
>   an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS client and server to =
explicitly
>   grant access to the TLS session plaintext.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_4E269044-2490-4B94-94B3-C9B9DCF46D30
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">A few minutes at the TLS WG session in London have been =
requested to talk about this draft.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, 'Helvetica =
Neue', Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">From: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, 'Helvetica =
Neue', Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">New Version =
Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt</b><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Date: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">March 2, 2018 at 3:58:35 PM =
EST<br class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">"Ralph Droms" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rdroms.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">rdroms.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;, "Russ Housley" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">A new version =
of I-D, draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt<br class=3D"">has been =
successfully submitted by Ralph Droms and posted to the<br class=3D"">IETF=
 repository.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Name:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility<br class=3D"">Revision:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>01<br =
class=3D"">Title:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">=
	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter<br =
class=3D"">Document date:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" =
style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>2018-03-02<br =
class=3D"">Group:<span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">=
	</span><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Individual Submission<br class=3D"">Pages:<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>11<br =
class=3D"">URL: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibili=
ty-01.txt" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visib=
ility-01.txt</a><br class=3D"">Status: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/"=
 =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibilit=
y/</a><br class=3D"">Htmlized: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01<=
/a><br class=3D"">Htmlized: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibil=
ity-01" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visi=
bility-01</a><br class=3D"">Diff: =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibilit=
y-01" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibi=
lity-01</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Abstract:<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the =
RSA<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;handshake. &nbsp;While (EC) =
Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH =
has impacts<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;certain enterprise network =
operational requirements. &nbsp;The TLS<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH =
through<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS =
client and server to explicitly<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;grant access =
to the TLS session plaintext.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Please note that it may take a =
couple of minutes from the time of submission<br class=3D"">until the =
htmlized version and diff are available at <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org" class=3D"">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">The IETF Secretariat<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
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With no dis-respect to Russ or Ralph (but with zero
acceptance/respect for the main concept espoused by this
draft)...

I request that the WG chairs not waste yet more time on
agenda items dealing with proposals for breaking TLS - a
working group that spends so many f2f hours (yes, hours,
multiplied by a few hundred travelling people in a room)
on ways in which the core purpose of the WG (read the
abstract of the tls1.3 draft if you doubt that) could be
subverted *by the WG itself* seems really really weird to
me.

Enough, already.

Given the (lack of) potential for any of these (IMO bad)
ideas to garner rough consensus, I really think this would
be a *terribly* bad waste of f2f time and participant cycles,
no matter who proposes we waste time in that manner.

If time is regrettably granted for this yet again then I
also request time to propose not breaking TLS. (I don't care
if the presenter for that rebuttal slot is me or someone
else with the same views that the WG charter is clear that
the WG exists to make TLS better and not to break it.)

If a rebuttal slot is not considered appropriate then I
request a slot to help us reach consensus on whether or
not there's value in documenting the reasons to not break
TLS. (I believe the chairs agreed to try figure out if
the WG have consensus that that'd be worthwhile a couple
of meetings ago, but we've not done that so far.)

To be clear: given a choice of (a) not wasting yet more WG
time on this and (b) another bun-fight with an inevitable
outcome - I prefer (a) but will engage in (b) as necessary
(and enthusiastically, whilst grimacing;-)

Thanks,
S.

PS: That Russ requests a few minutes for an update does not
affect the above - I for one do not agree that this draft
ought get any WG time and allocating a few minutes for an
update would IMO normalise what ought be considered entirely
abnormal. The number of "proponent minutes this time" is not
a valid agenda-planning consideration IMO.

On 02/03/18 21:00, Russ Housley wrote:
> A few minutes at the TLS WG session in London have been requested to ta=
lk about this draft.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-=
01.txt
>> Date: March 2, 2018 at 3:58:35 PM EST
>> To: "Ralph Droms" <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>, "Russ Housley" <housley@vig=
ilsec.com>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Ralph Droms and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:		draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility
>> Revision:	01
>> Title:		TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter=

>> Document date:	2018-03-02
>> Group:		Individual Submission
>> Pages:		11
>> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rhrd-tls-tl=
s13-visibility-01.txt
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-=
visibility/
>> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visib=
ility-01
>> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rhrd-tls-t=
ls13-visibility-01
>> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-rhrd-tls-tls=
13-visibility-01
>>
>> Abstract:
>>   Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the RSA
>>   handshake.  While (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
>>   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH has impact=
s
>>   certain enterprise network operational requirements.  The TLS
>>   Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH through
>>   an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS client and server to explicitl=
y
>>   grant access to the TLS session plaintext.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of subm=
ission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25.txt
	Pages           : 155
	Date            : 2018-03-02

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 16:41:21 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 supported_versions complexity
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 10:49 -0500, David A. Cooper wrote:
> >
> > I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could
> > be
> > made more clear.
> >
> > Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions
> > extensions
> > that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server
> > supports
> > TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that
> > the
> > server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the
> > client's preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the
> > connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set
> > to
> > 0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1
> > says
> > that
> >
> >       A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a
> >       "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version
> >       value (0x0304).
> >
> > It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.
> >
> > If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section
> > 4.1.3
> > could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of
> > ServerHello "contains the version of TLS negotiated for this
> > connection." (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current
> > draft
> > says:
> >
> >        In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the
> >        "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the
> >        legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
> >        version number for TLS 1.2.
> >
> > To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text
> > should say something like:
> >
> >        For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server indicates its version
> >        using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and
> >        the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the
> >        version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 and earlier
> > ServerHello
> >        the legacy_version field contains the version of TLS
> > negotiated
> >        for this connection.
>
> I understand that this is an interpretation that makes more sense and
> aligns with the -21 behavior, but I do not think that this is what this
> text literally says.  Both Eric in his previous email and another
> engineer I've discussed the issue seem to agree that the intention is
> to use the new mechanism for all negotiations. You disagree on that,
> and it thus apparent that this text needs clarification.
>

I don't think that's what I meant. I agree with David that if you send
ServerHello.supported_versions it ought not to contain TLS 1.2 or below.

I missed this in -25, but I have a PR up for it now, so if this looks OK,
I'll merge and spin -26. See:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1163

-Ekr


> The text was written for -21 version which didn't have the server-side
> part of the extension, and the flow was natural for pre-TLS1.3
> versions. When the change was done in -22 to include the server-side of
> the extension, this ambiguity (in your view) and complicated side-
> effect (in my view) was introduced.
>
> regards,
> Nikos
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a1147a3247583320566775c94
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5">On Thu, 2018-03-01 at=
 10:49 -0500, David A. Cooper wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could<br=
>
&gt; be<br>
&gt; made more clear.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions<br>
&gt; extensions<br>
&gt; that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server<br>
&gt; supports<br>
&gt; TLS 1.3 and below. My interpretation of the current draft is that<br>
&gt; the<br>
&gt; server MUST use the supported_versions extension to determine the<br>
&gt; client&#39;s preference, but then once deciding to use TLS 1.0 for the=
<br>
&gt; connection sends a normal TLS 1.0 ServerHello, with version field set<=
br>
&gt; to<br>
&gt; 0x0300 and no supported_versions extension. Note that Section 4.2.1<br=
>
&gt; says<br>
&gt; that<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respo=
nd by sending a<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;supported_versions&quot; extension con=
taining the selected version<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0value (0x0304).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It says nothing about a server that negotiates an earlier version.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If my understanding is correct, then I believe the text in Section<br>
&gt; 4.1.3<br>
&gt; could be made more clear. Draft -21 said that the version field of<br>
&gt; ServerHello &quot;contains the version of TLS negotiated for this<br>
&gt; connection.&quot; (this is similar to what RFC 5246 said). The current=
<br>
&gt; draft<br>
&gt; says:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its ve=
rsion using the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;supported_versions&quot; extension (S=
ection 4.2.1), and the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303,=
 which is the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; To be consistent with RFC 5246 and earlier, it seems like the text<br>
&gt; should say something like:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 For a TLS 1.3 ServerHello the TLS server in=
dicates its version<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 using the &quot;supported_versions&quot; ex=
tension (Section 4.2.1), and<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0=
303, which is the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 version number for TLS 1.2. For a TLS 1.2 a=
nd earlier<br>
&gt; ServerHello<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the legacy_version field contains the versi=
on of TLS<br>
&gt; negotiated<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 for this connection.<br>
<br>
</div></div>I understand that this is an interpretation that makes more sen=
se and<br>
aligns with the -21 behavior, but I do not think that this is what this<br>
text literally says.=C2=A0 Both Eric in his previous email and another<br>
engineer I&#39;ve discussed the issue seem to agree that the intention is<b=
r>
to use the new mechanism for all negotiations. You disagree on that,<br>
and it thus apparent that this text needs clarification.<br></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think that&#39;s what I meant. I agree with D=
avid that if you send</div><div>ServerHello.supported_versions it ought not=
 to contain TLS 1.2 or below.</div><div><br></div><div>I missed this in -25=
, but I have a PR up for it now, so if this looks OK,</div><div>I&#39;ll me=
rge and spin -26. See:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-=
spec/pull/1163">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1163</a><br></div>=
<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The text was written for -21 version which didn&#39;t have the server-side<=
br>
part of the extension, and the flow was natural for pre-TLS1.3<br>
versions. When the change was done in -22 to include the server-side of<br>
the extension, this ambiguity (in your view) and complicated side-<br>
effect (in my view) was introduced.<br>
<div class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5"><br>
regards,<br>
Nikos<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1147a3247583320566775c94--


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Reviewer: Dale Worley
Review result: Ready with Nits

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft.  The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document:  draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
Reviewer:  Dale R. Worley
Review Date:  2018-03-02
IETF LC End Date:  2018-03-02
IESG Telechat date:  2018-03-08

Summary:

       This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits
       that should be fixed before publication.

This review only covers the general properties of the proposed
protocol and the exposition, as I am unqualified to assess its
security properties.

There are various places where the exposition could be made clearer,
especially to readers not immersed in security matters.  In many
places, it is mostly a matter of making clearer the connections
between different points in the exposition.

In a few places, there seems to be ambiguity regarding the
specification that has technical significance.  In particular:

- There is inexactness about "transcript", "handshake context", and
  "context".

- When a server receives ClientHello, is it obligated to promptly send
  not just the ServerHello, but all first-flight messages from
  ServerHello through Finished?  (section 4.2.11.3)  I ask this
  because the client is only obligated/permitted to send
  EndOfEarlyData when it receives the server's Finished.

- It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
  message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
  sending the Certificate message.  (section 4.4.2.4)

- Comparing sections 4.2.10 and 4.6.1, when a PSK was established in
  an earlier connection, exactly what are the limitations on the
  cryptographic parameters that can be used when the PSK is used in a
  resumption connection?  4.2.10 suggests that the following must be
  the same in both connections:  TLS version, cipher suite, ALPN.  But
  4.6.1 suggests that different cipher suites can be used, as long as
  they use the same hash algorithm.

- In regard to section 4.6.1, it seems to require that a client MAY
  NOT resume a connection using a ticket issued during a connection in
  which the server did not present a certificate for itself, because
  in the handshake of the resumption connection, the client is required
  to verify that the SNI is compatible with the certificate the server
  presented in the original connection.  But that constraint isn't
  stated in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the
  structure of sessions.

- Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of alert
  messages for the same reasons that they cannot send zero-length
  fragments of handshake messages (whatever those reasons are).

- There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
  require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
  nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
  alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
  extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
  statement in the text that requires an error response (with
  implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
  correct minor code).

- I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
  existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error.)

There are a number of issues which span the whole text:

The interaction of this draft with extensions defined for previous
versions of TLS is not laid out clearly.  It seems safe enough for
this draft to import data structures from earlier extensions with only
a reference to the earlier RFC, but if an extension defines behavior
(e.g., a negotiation process), exactly what is the specification of
that behavior in TLS 1.3, given that the referenced RFC only defines
its use in TLS 1.2 or earlier?  At the least, there should be an
explicit statement that the behaviors are carried forward in the
"obvious way".

It's also not clear exactly which previously defined extensions are
brought forward into TLS 1.3.  I suspect that they are all listed in
section 4.2, but is it clearly stated that those, and only those, are
grandfathered in?

Presumably, for any referenced extension, the placement of values in
messages in TLS 1.2 has a "natural" analog in TLS 1.3 that at most
involves moving the value from one field to another in certain
messages.  But it would be reassuring to have a clear statement of
this, and an enumeration of any more complex cases.

There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
require the connection to be aborted with an error.  There are 19
alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
statement in the text that requires an error response.  This code
would make it a lot easier to diagnose what is going wrong with a
handshake.  To avoid making specifying and implementing these codes
too difficult, implementations should be allowed to deviate to a
degree from the specification regarding minor codes, and there should
be a range of codes reserved for implementation-defined uses.
Conversely, there are a couple of places where the implementation MUST
NOT distinguish between different causes of an alert, but I believe
that those are explicitly mentioned in the text.

The terms "side", "server side", and "client side" are used in various
places, despite that "endpoint" is the defined term.  I suggest
replacing these terms with "endpoint", "server", and "client".

There are a number of places where "fatal alert" is used, but "error
alert" seems to be the defined term.

Detail items are:

1.  Introduction

   TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can
   layer on top of TLS transparently.

It might be informative to describe the nature of the
currently-defined application protocol (a bidirectional, reliable byte
stream) and similarly, to describe the requirements on the underlying
transport (as far as I can tell, also a bidirectional, reliable byte
stream).

1.1.  Conventions and Terminology

There are a number of terms which are frequently used in the text that
don't seem to be defined.  It's likely that they are only used in
exposition, that if all sentences containing them were deleted, the
document would still be complete and accurate.  But it seems like it
would be easier on the reader to define them.  Terms that come to mind
are:

flight -- it seems to be thought that messages are grouped into
"flights", where the messages of flight N from one sender cannot be
sent until (more or less) it receives all messages of flights M (1 <=
M <= N) from the peer.

MAC and HMAC -- by a simple count, both of these terms are used
exactly 11 times in the document.  Is there any functional difference
between them?

ticket -- it's not clear what this means concretely.  Abstractly, it
seems to include the set of cryptographic parameters needed to send
application data, but concretely I can't figure out if it is the
entire block of parameters (struct NewSessionTicket), or whether it is
(or can be) just a key that points to the parameters in some database
(the ticket *field* of struct NewSessionTicket).

A related issue is that there is a field "ticket" in the structure
"NewSessionTicket", and, at least conceptually, that structure is also
considered a "ticket".  I strongly suggest you change the name of the
field, and then revise uses of "ticket" to indicate whether they refer
to the structure or to the field.  Comparing to other parts of the
text, I think you may have intended to call the field "identity", as
the value in NewSessionTicket.ticket seems to be intended to be copied
into PreSharedKeyExtension.OfferedPsks.PskIdentity.

RTT, 0-RTT, 1-RTT -- Can these be defined more rigorously?

server name, SNI -- These two terms seem to be used interchangeably
and as if the reader already understands their meaning and use.
Suggest you standardize on one (and list the other as a synonym in the
glossary).  Also include how "server name" interacts with the server's
certificate.

advertise -- I think this means when an endpoint sends a message
containing an extension saying that it implements a feature or option,
soliciting the peer to send a message containing the same extension
(and thus agreeing to use the feature/option during this connection).

transcript -- It might be useful to put the definition of this in this
section.  Also, define the "context" or "handshake context", which
seems to be the sequence of messages included in the transcript hash
(or the concatenation thereof).  But doesn't seem clear what messages
are in the "handshake context" for any single usage.

handshake -- This has two meanings:  (1) messages whose content type
is "handshake" (see section 5), and (2) messages with content type
"handshake" that are part of the initial exchange of such messages.
The problem is that there are messages that are (1) but not (2), and
so you get confusing language like the title of section 4.6.

establish vs. provision -- The document mostly adheres to the
convention that pre-shared keys are "provisioned" whereas keys that
are set up using TLS (possibly in a previous session) are
"established".  In particular, "provisioned" is only used as an
attribute of keys, whereas "establishing" is an action and
"established" keys are ones created by that action.  But there are
places where the two terms aren't used distinctly.

ALPN -- This is used sporadically throughout the document.

"hash over" -- A personal gripe of mine is that I look at a hash as a
function, and so its value is a "hash of (some string)".  I don't mind
"hash over X", "hash protects X", and "hash covers X"n when X is
conceptualized as a substring of some larger string, that is, there's
a Y that is explicitly being excluded.  But in a lot of cases in this
document, X is explicitly constructed from various fragments, so
there's no Y.  But maybe all these usages are conventional in
cryptography.

2.  Protocol Overview

   The cryptographic parameters used by the secure channel are produced
   by the TLS handshake protocol.  This sub-protocol of TLS [...]

I think you want to s/This sub-protocol/The TLS handshake protocol/,
since a naive reader (me!) could consider "the secure channel" as a
plausible antecedent of "this".

2.1.  Incorrect DHE Share

   Note: The handshake transcript includes the initial ClientHello/
   HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.

"transcript" has not been defined yet.  Perhaps:

   Note: The handshake transcript (the message input to the MAC in the
   Finished message) starts with ...

2.2.  Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)

   Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a
   PSK and the second uses it:

The first handshake does not point out where the PSK is established.
Better would be

   Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes
   a PSK and the second uses it.  In the first, a PSK is carried from
   the server to the client in the NewSessionTicket message.  In the
   second, the identity of the PSK is sent by the client to the server
   in the ClientHello.

3.1.  Basic Block Size

   The representation of all data items is explicitly specified.  The
   basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits).

"byte" appears in the text 91 times, and "octet" appears 20 times.
You probably want to change the uses of "octet" to "byte" for
consistency.

3.3.  Vectors

You may want to move section 3.4 to before section 3.3, because
section 3.3 implicitly depends on all numeric fields being unsigned,
whereas the fact that all numeric fields are unsigned is only stated
in section 3.4.

3.5.  Enumerateds

   An additional sparse data type is available called enum.  Each

You probably want s/called enum/called enum or enumerated/.

   Future extensions or additions to the protocol may define new values.

Add "... of a previously existing enumerated."

4.1.2.  Client Hello

   In that case, the client MUST send the same
   ClientHello (without modification) except:

s/(without modification) except:/without modification, except:/

      For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector
      MUST contain exactly one byte set to zero, which corresponds to
      the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS.

There is an ambiguity in English, where this might mean "the number of
bytes in this field which are zero is exactly one".  It's a bit hard
avoiding the ambiguity, but this seems to work:

      For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST have exactly one
      member.  The member MUST be zero, which corresponds to the "null"
      compression method in prior versions of TLS.

--

      The actual "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2.

Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
(including mine) can be profitably deleted.

4.1.4.  Hello Retry Request

   This allows the client to avoid having to
   compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second
   ClientHello.

This seems to be correct but I found it very hard to decode.  This is
clearer:

   This allows the client to avoid having to compute hashes of partial
   transcripts using multiple hash functions, to be used in binders in
   the second ClientHello.

4.2.  Extensions

   In TLS 1.3, unlike TLS 1.2, extensions are negotiated for each
   handshake even when in resumption-PSK mode.  However, 0-RTT
   parameters are those negotiated in the previous handshake; mismatches
   may require rejecting 0-RTT (see Section 4.2.10).

I think what you mean is:

   Even for a session that is resumed using a PSK established in an
   earlier session, the applicable extensions are negotiated in its
   initial handshake and aren't carried over from the handshake of the
   session which established the PSK.  However, the parameters
   applicable to 0-RTT data are those negotiated in the previous
   handshake; if those parameters are unacceptable to the server, it
   may reject use of 0-RTT in the session (see Section 4.2.10).

--

   Servers should be prepared to receive
   ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in
   the list of versions.

s/should/SHOULD/

4.2.2.  Cookie

   Clients MUST NOT use cookies in their initial ClientHello in
   subsequent connections.

I think this becomes cleaner if you omit "in subsequent connections".

4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms

Items "RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms" and "RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms"
both contain:

      If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
      it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].

I think "it" references "certificate", so it would be clearer to say

      If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
      the certificate MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].

--

      If the corresponding public key's parameters present, [...]

s/parameters present/parameters are present/

   -  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
      mandatory in TLS 1.3), [...]

The phrase "Implementations that advertise" makes me think of the
label on the box.  I think you mean "Endpoints that advertise".

   The "extension_data" field of these extension contains a
   SignatureSchemeList value:

I think s/these extension/these extensions/ (rather than s/these
extension/this extension/).

4.2.7.  Negotiated Groups

   Items in named_group_list are ordered according to the client's
   preferences (most preferred choice first).

This can be simplified to "Items in named_group_list are in descending
order of the client's preferences."

4.2.8.  Key Share

   group  The named group for the key being exchanged.  Finite Field
      Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
      Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
      Section 4.2.8.2.

I think this should be capitalized as "Finite field Diffie-Hellman
..." and "Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman ...".

   key_exchange  Key exchange information.  The contents of this field
      are determined by the specified group and its corresponding
      definition.

This could be better defined by rearranging the two items, since the
parameters don't describe the group, they describe the key being
exchanged:

   group  The value designating the named group for the keys being
      exchanged, as defined in section 4.2.7.
							
   key_exchange  The key exchange information.  Finite field
      Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
      Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
      Section 4.2.8.2.

--

   Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a
   group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in
   the same order.

I think you mean to require that for a given group there can be only
one KeyShareEntry.  So you could say

   Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a distinct group
   offered in the "supported_groups" extension, and the KeyShareEntrys
   MUST appear in the order their groups appear (possibly
   non-consecutively) in "supported_groups".

4.2.8.1.  Diffie-Hellman Parameters

   This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved
   and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.

s/into a small subgroup/into insecure operation/?

4.2.8.2.  ECDHE Parameters

   For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
   validate each other's public value Y by ensuring that the point is a
   valid point on the elliptic curve.  The appropriate validation
   procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of [X962] and alternatively
   in Section 5.6.2.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of three
   steps: (1) verify that Y is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify
   that for Y = (x, y) both integers are in the correct interval, (3)
   ensure that (x, y) is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
   equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
   membership in the correct subgroup.

It seems that the language of this paragraph is a version behind,
particularly in that this paragraph seems to use "Y" differently from
the definition of UncompressedPointRepresentation.  Comparing with
[KEYAGREEMENT], it seems like it ought to read (with changes marked
>>>...<<<):

   For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
   validate each other's public value >>>Q = (X, Y)<<< by ensuring
   that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve.  The
   appropriate validation procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of
   [X962] >>>or<<< alternatively in Section >>>5.6.2.3.3<<< of
   [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of three steps: (1) verify
   that >>>Q<<< is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify that
   >>>both integers X and Y <<< are in the correct interval, >>>and<<<
   (3) ensure that >>>Q<<< is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
   equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
   membership in the correct subgroup.

(You can s/or alternatively/and also/)

In particular, 5.6.2.3.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT] is "validation without
verifying subgroup membership", so it needs to be verified that this
procedure expresses the author's intent.

4.2.9.  Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes

   psk_dhe_ke  PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment.  In this mode, the
      client and servers MUST supply "key_share" values as described in
      Section 4.2.8.

s/servers/server/

4.2.10.  Early Data Indication

   For
   externally established PSKs, the associated values are those
   provisioned along with the key.

Probably s/externally established/provisioned/.

   For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate
   that the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by
   subtracting ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age
   modulo 2^32) is within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket
   was issued (see Section 8).

s/provisioned/established/.

s/ticket_age_add/ticket_age_add in the ticket/.

   0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same (encrypted)
   content types as their corresponding messages sent in other flights
   (handshake and application_data) but are protected under different
   keys.

s/as their corresponding messages sent in/as messages of the same types sent in/

   After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
   has accepted early data, an EndOfEarlyData message will be sent to
   indicate the key change.  This message will be encrypted with the
   0-RTT traffic keys.

This is awkward.  Perhaps

   After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
   has accepted early data, the client will send an EndOfEarlyData message
   indicate that following (non-early) application data uses the
   negotiated keys.  The EndOfEarlyData message is be encrypted with the
   0-RTT traffic keys.

--

   -  Return its own extension in EncryptedExtensions, indicating that
      it intends to process the early data.  

s/its own extension/an early_data extension/

   "pre_shared_key" extension.  In addition, it MUST verify that the
   following values are consistent with those associated with the
   selected PSK:

s/consistent with/the same as/

   If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
   MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for
   all records when processing early data records.

It seems like this could be misread by binding "when processing..." to
"specified".  This avoids that:

   If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
   MUST apply to early data records the same error handling
   requirements specified for other data records.

--

   Specifically, if the
   server fails to decrypt any 0-RTT record following an accepted
   "early_data" extension it MUST terminate the connection with a
   "bad_record_mac" alert as per Section 5.2.

But probably better to s/any/an/.

   If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client
   application MAY opt to retransmit early data once the handshake has
   been completed.  

Better:

   [...] MAY opt to retransmit as non-early data the application data
   contained in the early data records

--

   Note that automatic re-transmission of early data
   could result in assumptions about the status of the connection being
   incorrect.  

This doesn't quite say what you want.  Better

   Note that after connection establishment, the application may
   consider the status of the connection to be different than it was
   for early data, and so transmitting the same bytes as non-early
   application data may not have the same effect as transmitting them
   as early application data.

--

   Similarly,
   if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
   be sent in error after the handshake completes.

A bit awkward.  Perhaps

   Similarly,
   if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
   be erroneous to re-send the same data after the handshake completes.

4.2.11.  Pre-Shared Key Extension

   The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to indicate the identity of
   the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association
   with PSK key establishment.

s/indicate/negotiate/ -- because more than one can be offered.

   selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
      (0-based) index into the identities in the client's list.

I think this is intended as an index into the (abstract) vectors
OfferedPsks.identities and OfferedPsks.binders, as opposed to an
offset into the serialized data structures.  You could be clearer with

   selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
      (0-based) index into the vector of identities in OfferedPsks.

--

   identity  A label for a key.  For instance, a ticket defined in
      Appendix B.3.4 or a label for a pre-shared key established
      externally.

See issues regarding "ticket" in section 1.1.

   In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification
   (SNI) value was intended to be associated with the session (Section 3
   of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that the SNI
   value associated with the session matches the one specified in the
   resumption handshake.  However, in reality the implementations were
   not consistent on which of two supplied SNI values they would use,
   leading to the consistency requirement being de-facto enforced by the
   clients.  In TLS 1.3, the SNI value is always explicitly specified in
   the resumption handshake, and there is no need for the server to
   associate an SNI value with the ticket.  Clients, however, SHOULD
   store the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of
   Section 4.6.1.

See issue regarding "SNI" in section 1.1.

   Implementor's note: the most straightforward way to implement the
   PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher
   suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs.

I think you mean:

   Implementor's note: the most straightforward way for the server to
   implement the PSK/cipher suite choice requirements is to choose the
   cipher suite first and then exclude any PSKs incompatible with the
   chosen cipher suite.

since this doesn't seem to describe an interaction between the server
and the client, but simply how the server responds to one message.

   In order to accept PSK key
   establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
   indicating the selected identity.

I think this sentence would read better as a separate paragraph.

   This extension MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. (This
   facilitates implementation as described below.)

Given that the previous paragraph discussed the early_data extension,
"This extension" isn't clear.  So s/This extension/The
"pre_shared_key" extension/.

   If this
   value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
   handshake.

s/does not validate/is not valid/  (An actor validates a value; a
value is validated.)

4.2.11.1.  Ticket Age

   The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
   field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the
   ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the
   "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket, see
   Section 4.6.1 modulo 2^32.

Clearer would be

   [...] "ticket_age_add" value that was in the NewSessionTicket for
   the ticket, modulo 2^32.

--

   Note that
   the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
   seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" is in milliseconds.

Expand to

   Note that
   the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
   seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" and "ticket_age_add" fields
   are in milliseconds.

4.2.11.3.  Processing Order

   Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
   server's Finished, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData message,
   followed by the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid deadlocks,
   when accepting "early_data", servers MUST process the client's
   ClientHello and then immediately send the ServerHello, rather than
   waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.

This is awkward, and omits the remainder of the servers' first flight
messages.  Better is

   Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
   server's Finished message, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData
   message, and the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid
   deadlocks, when accepting early data, servers MUST process the
   client's ClientHello immediately upon receipt, and immediately send
   all of its first flight messages from ServerHello through Finished,
   rather than waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.

4.4.  Authentication Messages

   Certificate  The certificate to be used for authentication, and any
      supporting certificates in the chain.  Note that certificate-based
      client authentication is not available in 0-RTT mode.

Probably better to say s/in 0-RTT mode/for 0-RTT data/ -- or perhaps
"early data".

   The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key
   for each scenario:

Eh, what?  I think what you mean is that this table specifies what
base keys are used for which messages.  But "Mode" and "Handshake
Context" don't seem to be defined terms.  It seems to me that a better
specification is the annotations in the state diagrams in Appendix A,
which note for each message that is sent what key applies to it.

Only after reading the text again do I realize that the "Handshake
Context" column is listing what the handshake context *is* at various
points in time.  My confusion connects with the need for a more formal
definition of "handshake context".

4.4.1.  The Transcript Hash

   Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
   transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the concatenation
   of each included handshake message, including the handshake message
   header carrying the handshake message type and length fields, but not
   including record layer headers.  I.e.,

There are a number of awkward spots in how this is phrased.  Better:

   Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
   transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the concatenation
   of a sequence of messages in the handshake, with each message
   including the TLS message type and length fields, but not any
   headers of the underlying transport protocol.

--

    Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... MN) = Hash(M1 || M2 ... MN)

Usually, symbol for "the n-th message" would use lower-case "n" as the
index, and one usually puts the operator before and after "...".  Also
add verbal explanation:

   The transcript hash of messages M1 through Mn is:

      Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) = Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || Mn)

Continue,

   As an exception to this general rule, when the server has responded to a
   ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the first ClientHello is
   replaced with a special synthetic handshake message of message type
   "message_hash" whose data part is Hash(first ClientHello).  I.e.,

  Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) =
      Hash(message_hash ||        /* Handshake type (1 byte) */
           00 00 Hash.length ||   /* Handshake message length, in bytes (3 bytes) */
           Hash(ClientHello1) ||  /* Hash of ClientHello1 */
           HelloRetryRequest || ... || Mn)

   The reason for this construction is to allow the server not
   store state after sending HelloRetryRequest by storing just the
   hash of the first ClientHello in the cookie, rather than requiring
   it to store all of the ClientHello or the entire intermediate hash
   state (see Section 4.2.2).

--

   For concreteness, the transcript hash is always taken from the
   following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first

This is awkward.  Perhaps

   the transcript hash is always of the following sequence of
   handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including
   only those messages that we sent/received:

--

   In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keeping a
   running transcript hash value based on the negotiated hash.

Probably s/negotiated hash/negotiated hash function/.

Also, this needs to include the modification of truncating the last
message if it is to include the transcript hash.  I think you need
something like:

   If the last message, Mn, is to include the transcript hash, then
   the transcript hash is always the last field of the message, and
   that message is first truncated by removing that field from the
   message.  (The message length field of Mn is unmodified; it includes
   the length of the transcript hash.)

      Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) = Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || Truncate(Mn))

4.4.2.  Certificate

   If the corresponding certificate type extension
   ("server_certificate_type" or "client_certificate_type") was not
   negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type was
   negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains a DER-encoded X.509
   certificate.

This needs a reference to RFC 7250 to define certificate type
extension.  Also, see the general issues regarding extensions.

   Each following certificate SHOULD
   directly certify one preceding it.

The phrase "one preceding it" allows extraneous certificates in the
list, as "one preceding it" doesn't usually require that it be
immediately preceding.  I think you mean "the one preceding it", which
does require it to be immediately preceding, and thus does not allow
extraneous certificates in the chain.

4.4.2.1.  OCSP Status and SCT Extensions

   CertificateStatus message.  In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP information
   is carried in an extension in the CertificateEntry containing the
   associated certificate.

Clearer to phrase it:

   [...] in the CertificateEntry containing the
   associated certificate in the Certificate message.

--

   CertificateRequest message.  If the client opts to send an OCSP
   response, the body of its "status_request" extension MUST be a
   CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066].

s/its "status_request" extension"/the "status_request" extension in
its Certificate message/.

4.4.2.2.  Server Certificate Selection

   All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature
   algorithm advertised by the client, if they are able to provide such
   a chain (see Section 4.2.3).

Probably better a/All certificates/Each certificate/.

s/they are/the server is/

   If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using [...]

The purpose of this paragraph is not clear.  Was "server" meant?  If
so, it seems to be redundant.  I think it is intended to discuss how
the client processes the (alleged) certificate chain presented by the
server, in which case, it's a sharp change of focus for this section.
That could be aided by moving this paragraph to the end of the section
and adding some words:

   If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain from the
   certificates provided by the server and decides to abort the
   handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate
   certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate";
   see Section 6.2 for more).

But it would probably be better to integrate it into section 4.4.2.4.

4.4.2.3.  Client Certificate Selection

   -  If the CertificateRequest message contained a non-empty
      "oid_filters" extension, the end-entity certificate MUST match the
      extension OIDs recognized by the client, as described in
      Section 4.2.5.

More exact would be "must match the extension OID/value pairs that are
recognized by the client."

4.4.2.4.  Receiving a Certificate Message

It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
sending the Certificate message.

4.4.3.  Certificate Verify

   This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
   possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate.

I'd prefer s/to its certificate/to the certificate it has presented/.

The discussion of how "signature" is formed is awkward and I'm not
sure I understand it.  E.g., the digital signature is computed "over"
a string, but one part of that string is "the content to be signed".
I think it could be made clearer as:

   The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see
   Section 4.2.3 for the definition of this field).  The signature is a
   digital signature using that algorithm.  The string that is signed
   is the concatenation of:

   -  A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times

   -  The context string

   -  A single 0 byte which serves as a separator

   -  Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)

But that leaves unclear what "context string" and "Handshake Context"
are.  I think you want to define those back in 4.4.1 (and probably
also in 1.1) as both being the concatenation of the messages that are
in the transcript to this point.  I also assume that the Certificate
Verify message is truncated when it is put into the Transcript-Hash
and "context string", but that needs to be stated.

4.4.4.  Finished

   The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the

s/finished/Finished/

   The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
   Base key defined in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).

This is correct, but you have to read further to understand the key
described here isn't the key that encrypts the finished message.  It
would be easier to understand if the text was rearranged:

   Structure of this message:

      struct {
          opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
      } Finished;

   The verify_data value is computed as follows:

      finished_key =
          HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length)

      verify_data =
          HMAC(finished_key,
               Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
                               Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))

      * Only included if present.

And this is another instance where the poorly-defined "Handshake
Context" appears.

   Any records following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be encrypted
   under the appropriate application traffic key as described in
   Section 7.2.

Are there any non-1-RTT Finished messages?  And aren't all application
data records encrypted under the "appropriate" key?  Or is an
"application traffic key" different from the keys used for application
data early in the connection?  This needs to be rephrased somehow, but
I can't guess in what way.

4.6.  Post-Handshake Messages

This section name is awkward.  Of course, there are messages after the
handshake.  I think the problem is that there are "handshake
messages", messages with handshake types (or content type
"handshake"), that are not part of "the handshake", the initial
exchange of handshake-type messages.  In the end, you need to decide
what terminology to use so that the title of this section makes sense.

   the appropriate application traffic key.

Is there a strict accounting of what messages are encrypted using
which key?

4.6.1.  New Session Ticket Message

   message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message.  This message
   creates a unique association between the ticket value and a secret
   PSK derived from the resumption master secret.

It would be useful to mention that the resumption_master_secret is
defined/computed in section 7.1.

Does "ticket value" mean the NewSessionTicket structure or the
"ticket" field within it.  See issues regarding "ticket" for section
1.1.

   (Section 4.2.11).  Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a single

Note the conflation here of "ticket" with "NewSessionTicket message".

   Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that has the same
   KDF hash algorithm as that used to establish the original connection.

How is a ticket "resumed"?

Also, since in a "resumption" connection, the ticket that is used is
(or refers to) a PSK, the above statement corresponds to 
the statement "In addition, it MUST verify that the
following values are consistent with those associated with the
selected PSK:" in section 4.2.10.

   Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for the server
   certificate presented in the original session, and SHOULD only resume
   if the SNI value matches the one used in the original session.

What does it mean to say a client "resumes"?

Here we suddenly descend into the usage of what seems to be an
extension, server_name, which is presumably optional and logically
added on to TLS rather than being an integral part of it.

Also the logic isn't described very cleanly; I think it means "A
client must abort resuming a connection if the ServerHello message
does not contain a server_name extension whose value is a valid SNI
for the server certificate presented in the original session ...".

All of this seems to require that a client MAY NOT resume a connection
using a ticket issued during a connection in which the server did not
present a certificate for itself.  But that constraint wasn't stated
in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the structure of
sessions.

Or am I wrong in believing that the client chooses to resume the
connection by placing the ticket in the ClientHello *before* it
receives the ServerHello (which contains the SNI)?  This paragraph
seems to be written as if the client decides to resume after receiving
ServerHello.

   ticket_lifetime  Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit
      unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket
      issuance.

Probably better to s/the time of ticket issuance/the time the
NewSessionTicket was sent to the client/, unless "issuance"/"to issue"
is explicitly defined somewhere.

   ticket  The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identity.  The
      ticket itself is an opaque label.

This shows the ambiguities around "ticket"; this specification says
that "'ticket' is the value of the ticket to be used as the PSK
identity".

Is it intended that the "ticket" field of NewSessionTicket will become
the "identity" field of PskIdentity.OfferedPsks.PreSharedKeyExtension?

   max_early_data_size  The maximum amount of 0-RTT data that the client
      is allowed to send when using this ticket, in bytes.  Only
      Application Data payload (i.e., plaintext but not padding or the
      inner content type byte) is counted.  A server receiving more than
      max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data SHOULD terminate the
      connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Note that servers
      that reject early data due to lack of cryptographic material will
      be unable to differentiate padding from content, so clients SHOULD
      NOT depend on being able to send large quantities of padding in
      early data records.

The last sentence assumes that a server that "reject early data due to
lack of cryptographic material" will be strict and count all bytes in
early data messages against the max_early_data_size quota.  However, a
server in such a situation could be liberal and not bother counting
any bytes -- since it will be discarding early data messages
(immediately after discovering that it can't decrypt them), it never
has to buffer more than one of them.  Unless I'm overlooking
something, this advice isn't needed, since a server in this situation
isn't buffering early data.

4.6.2.  Post-Handshake Authentication

   All of the client's
   messages for a given response MUST appear consecutively on the wire
   with no intervening messages of other types.

Better, "consecutively in the underlying transport stream".  But that
is a little vague given the message/fragment/record mechanism.  More
exactly,

   All of the client's messages for a given response MUST appear
   consecutively on the wire, that is, the records containing the
   fragments of the messages composing the client's response must
   appear consecutively in the underlying transport stream.

4.6.3.  Key and IV Update

I think you want to promote the first paragraph before the data
structure definition.

5.  Record Protocol
and 
5.1.  Record Layer

The text isn't very clear about the message/fragment/record mechanism.
The text wants to consider the data for each content type to consist
of a series of messages.  The messages are cut into fragments.
Adjacent fragments within one content type stream can be concatenated
to form the content of TLSPlaintext structures.

One problem is that despite this model, the boundary between messages
isn't carried through the transport.  For application data, message
boundaries are lost entirely.  For handshake and alert content types,
there are some complex restrictions how their message boundaries show
up as record boundaries, but the actual framing of messages is done
"in band" by the message length fields.  A closer description of the
services TLS provides is that the data for each content type is a
stream that can be broken arbitrarily into fragments that are the
content of records, except:

- The boundaries of alert messages must be boundaries of the records
  that carry them and no record boundary can be introduced into an
  alert message.

- If two records contain fragments of the same handshake message, all
  records between them must contain only fragments of that handshake
  message.

- If there is a key change between the sending of two handshake
  messages, there must be a record boundary between them.

   -  Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes.  Implementations
      MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change
      align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the
      connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Because the
      ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate
      messages can immediately precede a key change, implementations
      MUST send these messages in alignment with a record boundary.

Is this description correct?  As written, it says "because a key
change can happen after message X, there must be a record boundary
after message X", which isn't exactly the same as "Handshake messages
MUST NOT span key changes" -- unless there is always a key change
following these message types, in which case s/can immediately
precede/always precede/.  I think the three points listed above give a
clearer and more accurate version.

   Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake
   types, even if those fragments contain padding.

Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of alert
messages also.

   When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
   structures are written directly onto the wire.

Better "... sent directly using the underlying transport protocol".

5.2.  Record Payload Protection

I *think* what's going on with record protection is:

- The TLSPlaintext is turned into a TLSInnerPlaintext by moving the
  type field, removing the length field, and copying "fragment" to
  "content".  (Why do the structures use different names for the data
  fragment?)

- The encryption is done by:

      AEADEncrypted =
          AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaintext)

  where plaintext is TLSInnerPlaintext and AEADEncrypted becomes
  TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record.

- TLSCiphertext is transmitted.

But the text doesn't say this at all plainly.  I would add before
"AEAD algorithms take...":

   The TLSPlaintext is converted into a TLSInnerPlaintext by copying the
   type field, removing the length field, and copying the fragment
   field.

(assuming we rename "content" to "fragment")

Then replace the equation by:

   encrypted_record =
          AEAD-Encrypt(endpoint_write_key, nonce, TLSInnerPlaintext)

--

   The key is either the
   client_write_key or the server_write_key, the nonce is derived from
   the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv or
   server_write_iv, and the additional data input is empty (zero
   length).

It would be clearer to move the reference to read "the nonce is
derived from the sequence number and the client_write_iv or
server_write_iv (see Section 5.3)" as section 5.3 describes both the
sequence number and the derivation.

Similarly, the decryption algorithm is better expressed by

      TLSInnerPlaintext =
          AEAD-Decrypt(peer_write_key, nonce, encrypted_record)

--

   This limit
   is derived from the maximum TLSPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1
   octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.

s/TLSPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- the maximum length of
TLSPlaintext is 2^14 + 5.

5.3.  Per-Record Nonce

   The appropriate sequence number is incremented by one after reading
   or writing each record.  The first record transmitted under a
   particular traffic key MUST use sequence number 0.

I think the first and second paragraphs could be profitably combined:

   A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and
   writing records and is incremented by one after reading or writing
   each record.  Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning
   of a connection and whenever the key for that direction is changed;
   the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key uses
   sequence number 0.

--

   Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should not wrap.

The sense of "should" is not clear.  I think what you want to say is

   Because the size of sequence numbers is 64 bits, there is no need to
   allow sequence numbers to wrap.

--

   Each AEAD algorithm will specify a range of possible lengths for the
   per-record nonce, from N_MIN bytes to N_MAX bytes of input

I think this is clearer (as it makes clear where N_MIN comes from):

   Each AEAD algorithm specifies an N_MIN and N_MAX, which give the
   range of possible lengths in bytes of the per-record nonce.

5.4.  Record Padding

   Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the
   ContentType field before encryption.

More exact would be

   Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes following the type field
   in TLSInnerPlaintext.

--

   The presence of padding does not change the overall record size
   limitations - the full encoded TLSInnerPlaintext MUST NOT exceed 2^14
   + 1 octets.  If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
   example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then the
   reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
   type and padding.

I think you want s/encoded TLSInnerPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- all
data structures are defined with a concrete representation, so
"encoded" is redundant, but "encoded" could be confused with
"encrypted" and the encrypted plaintext can be longer than the plaintext.

   If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
   example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then the
   reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
   type and padding.

This needs clarification.  I think you mean that if the m.f.l. is
reduced, then the limit on TLSInnerPlaintext is reduced to m.f.l.+1,
but that's not what this says.  OTOH, if this text is accurate, the
maximum length of the fragment proper is m.f.l.-1.

6.  Alert Protocol

   Alert messages convey a description of the alert and a legacy field
   that conveyed the severity of the message in previous versions of
   TLS.  In TLS 1.3, the severity is implicit in the type of alert being
   sent, and the 'level' field can safely be ignored.

I think at this point you want to insert "Alerts are divided into two
classes: closure alerts and error alerts."

   Stateful implementations of tickets (as in many clients)
   SHOULD discard tickets associated with failed connections.

What is a "ticket" here?

And what are the "associations" in question?  E.g., presumably it
includes the ticket used when attempting to establish a connection if
the attempt fails.  But if a NewSessionTicket is received during a
connection, and the connection is later aborted, does the client have
to discard the remembered NewSessionTicket?

   All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST
   be treated as fatal regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.
   Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.

This was remarkably confusing until I figured out that the first
"fatal" means "with AlertLevel "fatal"" and the second and third
"fatal" mean "indicates abortive closure"!  Better:

   All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent with AlertLevel
   "fatal" and when received MUST be treated as error alerts
   regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.  Unknown alert types
   MUST be treated as error alerts.

6.1.  Closure Alerts

   user_canceled  This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is
      canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol
      failure.  If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is
      complete, just closing the connection by sending a "close_notify"
      is more appropriate.  This alert SHOULD be followed by a
      "close_notify".  This alert is generally a warning.

What does "This alert is generally a warning." mean?  What is it a
warning of?

   Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing its write
   side of the connection, unless it has already sent some other fatal
   alert.

This implies that close_notify is a "fatal alert" (properly, error
alert).  And "before closing the write side of the connection" is not
clear, since sending close_notify *is* closing the write side of the
connection.  Better:

   Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing the
   write side of the underlying transport connection, unless it has
   already sent some other error alert.

(Unless I'm mistaken regarding what is intended.)

I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error -- the sender
wants to transmit more data but the receiver is unwilling to receive
it.)

   If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.  No part of
   this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage
   profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
   connections are opened or closed.

This isn't clear too me.  The second sentence seems to mean:

   A usage profile for TLS specified how it manages its data
   transport, including when connections are opened or closed.  No
   part of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in
   which a usage profile for TLS manages its data transport.

But I can't figure out what the first sentence means.  It seems to
mean "If ... a TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
before indicating end-of-data to its application-layer.", but that's
obvious behavior, what else would cause it to signal EOD?

   Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
   reliably delivers pending data before destroying the transport.

I think you mean

   Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
   will cause the peer TLS implementation to reliably deliver all
   transmitted data before [what?]

7.  Cryptographic Computations

   The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
   combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed
   below.

Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
(including mine) can be profitably deleted.

7.1.  Key Schedule

Given the terminology in RFC 5869, struct HkdfLabel probably should be
called HkdfInfo, as it is the "info" argument to HKDF-Expand.

   Messages are the concatenation of the indicated handshake messages,

s/Messages are/Messages is/!

   Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final "master secret" is computed
   by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1, [...]

This is hard to follow.  If I understand correctly, this is a general
description of the mechanism that is diagrammed below.  But, e.g.,
"secret" is used for at least two categories of quantities.  It would
be clearer to phrase this:

   Generally, we use a construction that takes as input a sequence of
   n InputSecrets and from them computes a sequence of derived
   secrets.  The initial derived secret is simply a string of
   Hash.length bytes set to zeros.  Each successive derived secret is
   computed by invoking HKDF-Extract with an InputSecret and the
   preceding derived secret as inputs.

   Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, the construction
   proceeds as diagrammed below, with the InputSecrets on the left
   side and the derived secrets passing as shown by the downward
   arrows.  The InputSecrets are added in the following order, where
   if a given InputSecret is not available, then the 0-value is used
   in its place:

--

   -  HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top and
      the IKM argument from the left.

Append "with its output to the bottom and the name of the output at
the right".

7.2.  Updating Traffic Keys and IVs

I think you want to remove "and IVs" here.  IVs aren't mentioned in
this section.  Of course, changing the traffic key changes the IV, but
it also changes the write key, and the write key isn't mentioned in
the section title.

7.3.  Traffic Key Calculation

I think you want to title the section "Write Key and IV Calculation".

And you want to (again) de-genericize the text:

   The traffic keying material (*_write_key and *_write_iv) is
   generated from the following input values:

   -  A secret value, the applicable *_traffic_secret

   -  A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated

   -  The length of the key

7.4.1.  Finite Field Diffie-Hellman

   For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is
   performed.

I think you need a reference for this!

7.5.  Exporters

   A separate
   interface for the early exporter is RECOMMENDED, especially on a
   server where a single interface can make the early exporter
   inaccessible.

What does "where a single interface can make the early exporter
inaccessible" mean?  If you don't have a separate interface for the
early exporter, how does "a single interface" make it inaccessible?

8.1.  Single-Use Tickets

   If the tickets are not self-contained but rather are database keys,
   and the corresponding PSKs are deleted upon use, then connections
   established using one PSK enjoy forward secrecy.

What does "one PSK" mean here?  Do you mean "established using such a
PSK" (equivalently "established using such a ticket")?

Also, the question again arises as to what a "ticket" *is*.

   Because this mechanism requires sharing the session database between
   server nodes in environments with multiple distributed servers, it

Probably more conventional to say "requires a shared database between
all server instances".

8.2.  Client Hello Recording

The first paragraph is hard to follow.  I think it could be clarified
along these lines:

   An alternative form of anti-replay is to record a unique value
   derived from the ClientHello (generally either the random value or
   the PSK binder) and reject duplicates.  Recording all ClientHellos
   causes state to grow without bound, but a server can instead retain
   ClientHellos only within a given time window and use the
   "obfuscated_ticket_age" to determine whether the ClientHello was
   generated by the client recently.  Thus, the server can ensure that
   it only allows 0-RTT data in connections established by
   non-duplicate ClientHellos which were generated by the client
   within the recording window.

--

   The server MUST derive the storage key only from validated sections
   of the ClientHello.  If the ClientHello contains multiple PSK
   identities, then an attacker can create multiple ClientHellos with
   different binder values for the less-preferred identity on the
   assumption that the server will not verify it, as recommended by
   Section 4.2.11.  I.e., if the client sends PSKs A and B but the
   server prefers A, then the attacker can change the binder for B
   without affecting the binder for A.

At this point, a conditional needs to be inserted; otherwise the
argument you're making is only implicit.

   If the server uses the binder for B as part of the storage key,
   these variations on the ClientHello will not be detected by the
   server as duplicates of each other, and the server will accept all
   of them.

Then continue with:

   This may cause side effects such as replay cache
   pollution, although any 0-RTT data will not be decryptable because it
   will use different keys.  If the validated binder or the
   ClientHello.random are used as the storage key, then this attack is
   not possible.

--

   When implementations are freshly started, they SHOULD reject 0-RTT as
   long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup
   time.  Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were
   originally sent during that period.

I think this needs a couple of changes of phrasing:

   When an implementation is restarted with a cleared recording
   memory, it SHOULD reject 0-RTT as long as the startup time is
   within the recording window.  Otherwise, it runs the risk of
   accepting replays of ClientHellos which were sent during the
   previous execution.

8.3.  Freshness Checks

   Variations in client and server clock rates are likely to be minimal,
   though potentially with gross time corrections.  

What does "gross time corrections" mean?  I think you mean "with
moments of large change in the clock time", but that isn't a feature
of the clock *rate*.  I think this is more accurate:

   Differences between client and server clock times are likely to be
   minimal, though there will sometimes be gross differences due to
   uninitialized clocks and misconfigured time zones.

--

   After early data is accepted, records may continue to be streamed
   to the server over a longer time period.

More clear as

   After the server accepts early data is accepted, the client may
   continue to send early data to the server over a longer time period
   than the freshness window for ClientHellos.

9.1.  Mandatory-to-Implement Cipher Suites

   A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with
   rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (for
   CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256.

It seems that ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 is missing a statement of what
uses it must be supported for.

9.2.  Mandatory-to-Implement Extensions

   -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also contain
      a "key_share" extension, and vice versa.  An empty
      KeyShare.client_shares vector is permitted.

I think this is a bit better expressed as:

   -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also contain
      a "key_share" extension (which may contain an empty
      KeyShare.client_shares vector), and vice versa.

--

   Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the
   "server_name" extension with applications capable of using it.

I'm not clear what the test is for "applications capable of using
SNI".  I think you want to turn the conditional around:

   An application profile MAY require that the endpoint's TLS
   implementation supports use of the "server_name" extension.

9.3.  Protocol Invariants

   -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
      unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
      Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.  In TLS
      1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or NewSessionTicket
      MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.

This needs to be split, because the two parts are about different roles:

   -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
      unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
      Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.

   -  In TLS 1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or
      NewSessionTicket MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.

11.  IANA Considerations

   -  TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards
      Action [RFC8126].  IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry
      to include values for "missing_extension" and
      "certificate_required".

It would be nice to add a finer-grained "minor alert code" registry.

Appendix A.  State Machine

It would be helpful if the state diagrams were extended to describe
the activity on the "control channel" (handshake and alert content
types) after CONNECTED, that is, what happens while the connection is
established and how connections are shut down.

Appendix B.  Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values

There is no listing of the value structure corresponding to each
extension type.  Extensions collectively are only defined as:

   struct {
       ExtensionType extension_type;
       opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
   } Extension;

This is a problem because the name of the value struct is not
systematically derived from the name of the extension_type value!
E.g., "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" use
SignatureSchemeList as a value, and you can only reliably discover
that by searching through the whole of the text.

B.4.  Cipher Suites

   A symmetric cipher suite defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and
   hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.

Better phrased:

   A symmetric cipher suite is the pair of an AEAD algorithm and a
   hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.

C.3.  Implementation Pitfalls

   -  As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which
      support a compatible (EC)DHE group but do not predict it in the
      "key_share" extension?

This needs an additional condition:

   -  As a server, if you select an (EC)DHE group which the client
      supports but for which the client did not provide a
      KeyShareEntry, do you send a HelloRetryRequest?

Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility

   Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for
   various purposes.  (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
   TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field is
   [...]

I think this was intended to be formatted thusly:

   Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number
   (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
   TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) for various purposes.  As of
   TLS 1.3, this field is [...]

D.5.  Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions

   The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the
   reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
   reason.

s/and MUST NOT/and it MUST NOT/, with "it" referring to "SSL 3.0", as
otherwise the verb "MUST NOT" is parallel to the verb "is" and the
subject of "MUST NOT" is "the security of SSL 3.0".

E.1.  Handshake

   -  A set of "session keys" (the various secrets derived from the
      master secret) from which can be derived a set of working keys.

Is this consistent with the usual meaning of "session key"?  My
understanding (which may be wrong) is that a "session key" is the key
for a "session", i.e., an entire connection.  Perhaps there is already
a defined term in the text that covers the use you intend.

   Note that these
   properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the protocol
   consumers' needs.

The significance of "but" is not clear here, as it seems to be placing
in opposition "reflect the ... needs" and "independent".  I think this
is probably closer to what you meant:

   Note that these properties are not necessarily independent, but
   together they cover the protocol consumers' needs.

--

   Uniqueness of the session keys:  Any two distinct handshakes should
      produce distinct, unrelated session keys.  Individual session keys
      produced by a handshake should also be distinct and unrelated.

It's not clear how two session keys produced by a single handshake can
be "unrelated".  I suspect there's a known technical term for this,
like "cryptographically independent" (to parallel "cryptographically
random").

A similar term is needed in section E.1.4.

   If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each
   connection, then the output keys are forward secret.

When it is used as an adjective, you hyphenate "forward-secret".

E.1.3.  0-RTT

   See Section 4.2.10 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to replay.

This discussion is now in section 8.

[END]



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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Thu, 1 Mar 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:

> I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the much 
> more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL commitment
> and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).

I think it is worth discussing in London and/or some people meeting up
to talk about this and bring something to the list/WG.

The original idea of this extension I believe (and one of my reasons
behind writing RFC 7901) was to provide an alternative path for DNS
that couldn't be blocked or broken and that provides DNS answers without
additional latency. To me, that always included proof of non-existence,
as it would come in as the answer to a DNS chain-query via TLS headers
as the transport.

I don't know why this got turned into something that is almost like DNS
but not quite DNS. I think that is a mistake.

The TLS extension should be nothing more (and nothing less) than
stappled DNS suitable for a DNS routines.

Paul


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 19:21:52 -0800
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>, Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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--f403043a8c74568f7a05668db867
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Hi folks,

This is way outside the range of my DISCUSS, so maybe we should change the
thread title.

Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of nonexistence
here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops.

-Ekr


On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:09 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Thu, 1 Mar 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:
>
> I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the
>> much
>> more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL
>> commitment
>> and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).
>>
>
> I think it is worth discussing in London and/or some people meeting up
> to talk about this and bring something to the list/WG.
>
> The original idea of this extension I believe (and one of my reasons
> behind writing RFC 7901) was to provide an alternative path for DNS
> that couldn't be blocked or broken and that provides DNS answers without
> additional latency. To me, that always included proof of non-existence,
> as it would come in as the answer to a DNS chain-query via TLS headers
> as the transport.
>
> I don't know why this got turned into something that is almost like DNS
> but not quite DNS. I think that is a mistake.
>
> The TLS extension should be nothing more (and nothing less) than
> stappled DNS suitable for a DNS routines.
>
> Paul
>
>

--f403043a8c74568f7a05668db867
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<div><br></div><div>This is way outside the range=
 of my DISCUSS, so maybe we should change the thread title.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of no=
nexistence here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops.</div><div><br></=
div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:09 PM, Paul Wouters <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@noh=
ats.ca</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=
=3D"">On Thu, 1 Mar 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the muc=
h=C2=A0<br>
more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL commitme=
nt<br>
and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
I think it is worth discussing in London and/or some people meeting up<br>
to talk about this and bring something to the list/WG.<br>
<br>
The original idea of this extension I believe (and one of my reasons<br>
behind writing RFC 7901) was to provide an alternative path for DNS<br>
that couldn&#39;t be blocked or broken and that provides DNS answers withou=
t<br>
additional latency. To me, that always included proof of non-existence,<br>
as it would come in as the answer to a DNS chain-query via TLS headers<br>
as the transport.<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t know why this got turned into something that is almost like DNS=
<br>
but not quite DNS. I think that is a mistake.<br>
<br>
The TLS extension should be nothing more (and nothing less) than<br>
stappled DNS suitable for a DNS routines.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=
=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
Paul<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--f403043a8c74568f7a05668db867--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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[ Not replying for Paul, I'm sure he he'll post views separately ]

> On Mar 3, 2018, at 10:21 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
> Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of nonexistence
> here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops.

My take is:

Non-existence proofs can clear a pinned DANE policy, where a client would
other require ongoing delivery TLSA records (after initially seeing them
from the server).  The data would not be pinned, that's what the DNSSEC
signed TLSA records are for.

The attack in question is downgrade to just PKIX (with fraudulently
obtained certificates).  Such a downgrade makes PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1)
ineffective, and downgrades DANE TlSA to DV certs which are strictly weaker.

Therefore, if the extension were to include an extended pin-TTL, then
denial of existence becomes useful, and indeed the pinning is primarily
a means to make it downgrade-resistant.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Sun Mar  4 10:43:08 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26.txt
	Pages           : 155
	Date            : 2018-03-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Sun Mar  4 15:12:01 2018
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 10:11:56 +1100
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To: "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] a slightly different DTLSShortCiphertext
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We are about to remove that bit from the QUIC packet.  I don't see any
advantage in adding it here.

Can you explain in more detail who you think consumes this bit?

On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 4:33 AM, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
<thomas.fossati@nokia.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> In an off-list discussion on the wire format for DTLS CID Eric raised
> the point that a DTLSShortCiphertext header is completely stuffed, and
> it'd be impossible to grab another bit from the sequence number (already
> down to 12 bits) to signal the presence of a CID.
>
> I made a proposal for a slightly different layout of DTLSShortCiphertext
> that makes room for the CID bit, which I'd like to bring to the list for
> further scrutiny:
>
>  0                   1                   2                   3
>  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> |0|0|1|E|C|X|X|X|            sequence           |               |
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               +
> |                                                               |
> +                                                               +
> |                                                               |
> +                   [CID,] encrypted_record                     +
> |                                                               |
> +                                                               +
> |                                                               |
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>  0                   1                   2                   3
>
> Where:
> - First 4 bits are the same as in current DTLSShortCiphertext (demux +
>   low order epoch bit)
> - Subsequent 4 bits are: C, the connection-id indicator followed by 3
>   reserved bits (to be greased, I suppose)
> - Then, a 16-bit sequence number.
>
> It'd still be 4 bytes shorter than usual DTLSCiphertext, so I guess it's
> OK to keep calling it "short".  There is the question about these 3
> reserved bits, which seem like good candidates for greasing, I guess.
>
> What do people think?
>
> Cheers, thanks
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] a slightly different DTLSShortCiphertext
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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--94eb2c072d766d03cc05669f6465
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On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) <
thomas.fossati@nokia.com> wrote:

> On 04/03/2018, 23:12, "Martin Thomson" <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> > We are about to remove that bit from the QUIC packet.  I don't see any
> > advantage in adding it here.
> >
> > Can you explain in more detail who you think consumes this bit?
>
> Server or server-side middleware that doesn't know whether the packet
> that needs parsing belongs to a session that negotiated CID or not.  I'm
> not sure the analogy with QUIC holds here: AFAIU, in QUIC the server can
> always say "use CID when you are talking to me"; in DTLS, the server has
> to live with a mix of CID and non-CID sessions.
>

Well, this actually isn't strictly true: the server could refuse to
negotiate TLS 1.3
if the client didn't negotiate CID. And because you can distinguish TLS 1.3
from
TLS 1.2, ....


I genuinely can't see what advantage we get by not having its
> presence explicitly signalled.  Could you elaborate a bit on that?
>

Well, you're making every packet 1 byte bigger, for starters.

-Ekr


> Cheers, thanks
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--94eb2c072d766d03cc05669f6465
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:thomas.fossati@nokia.com" target=3D=
"_blank">thomas.fossati@nokia.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On 04/03/2018, 23:12, &quot;Martin Thomson&=
quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com">martin.thomson@gmail.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; We are about to remove that bit from the QUIC packet.=C2=A0 I don&#39;=
t see any<br>
&gt; advantage in adding it here.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Can you explain in more detail who you think consumes this bit?<br>
<br>
</span>Server or server-side middleware that doesn&#39;t know whether the p=
acket<br>
that needs parsing belongs to a session that negotiated CID or not.=C2=A0 I=
&#39;m<br>
not sure the analogy with QUIC holds here: AFAIU, in QUIC the server can<br=
>
always say &quot;use CID when you are talking to me&quot;; in DTLS, the ser=
ver has<br>
to live with a mix of CID and non-CID sessions.<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Well, this actually isn&#39;t strictly true: the server could refu=
se to negotiate TLS 1.3</div><div>if the client didn&#39;t negotiate CID. A=
nd because you can distinguish TLS 1.3 from</div><div>TLS 1.2, ....</div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I genuinely can&#39;t see what advantage we get by not having its<br>
presence explicitly signalled.=C2=A0 Could you elaborate a bit on that?<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, you&#39;re making every packet 1 byt=
e bigger, for starters.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr<br></div><div><br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
Cheers, thanks<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c072d766d03cc05669f6465--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-23.txt
	Pages           : 41
	Date            : 2018-03-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are
   preserved by the DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-23
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-24.txt
	Pages           : 41
	Date            : 2018-03-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are
   preserved by the DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

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https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-24
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-25.txt
	Pages           : 41
	Date            : 2018-03-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are
   preserved by the DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-26.txt
	Pages           : 41
	Date            : 2018-03-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are
   preserved by the DTLS protocol.


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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 14:50:00 +0800
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Subject: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 24 - small typo need correction
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Hi,

In TLSv1.3, draft 24, there is a small typographical error.  It needs
to be corrected.


(1)

Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility

Second Paragraph.  Second sentence.  There is a double "and".

/* Original */
=========
Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least
one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
==========

/* Corrected */

======
Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least
one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
======

(2)

Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters

First paragraph, first sentence.  There is a double "the".

/* Original */
=========
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
=========

/* Corrected */
=========
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
=========

(3)

Appendix E.5.  Replay Attacks on 0-RTT

Second paragraph, second line.  There is a double "the".

/* Original */
===========
If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the
speed of cryptographic operations.
===========

/* Corrected */
==========
If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the
speed of cryptographic operations.
==========

Please correct them.

with regards,
Saravanan


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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 11:52:35 +0800
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Subject: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 26 - small typo need correction
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Hi,

In TLSv1.3, draft 26, there is a small typographical error.  It needs
to be corrected.


(1)

Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility

Second Paragraph.  Second sentence.  There is a double "and".

/* Original */
=========
Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least
one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
==========

/* Corrected */

======
Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as
the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least
one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
======

(2)

Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters

First paragraph, first sentence.  There is a double "the".

/* Original */
=========
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
=========

/* Corrected */
=========
ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the
opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
=========

(3)

Appendix E.5.  Replay Attacks on 0-RTT

Second paragraph, second line.  There is a double "the".

/* Original */
===========
If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the
speed of cryptographic operations.
===========

/* Corrected */
==========
If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the
speed of cryptographic operations.
==========

Please correct them.

with regards,
Saravanan


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 16:35:53 +1100
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Internet-Draft: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00
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Hi Russ,

I just saw this in the draft:

   Thus, a certificate MUST NOT be used with a resumption PSK.

I think that this is grounded on an invalid basis:

   However, TLS
   1.3 does not permit an external PSK to be used in the same fashion as
   a resumption PSK, and this extension does not alter those
   restrictions.

TLS 1.3 is pretty clear that the difference derives primarily from the
provenance of a resumption PSK providing additional contextual
information:

"When PSKs are provisioned out of band, the PSK identity and the KDF
hash algorithm to be used with the PSK MUST also be provisioned."

In fact, the section on early_data establishes more requirements for 0-RTT:

"The parameters for the 0-RTT data (version, symmetric cipher suite,
ALPN protocol, etc.) are those associated with the PSK in use. For
externally established PSKs, the associated values are those
provisioned along with the key. For PSKs established via a
NewSessionTicket message, the associated values are those which were
negotiated in the connection which established the PSK."

So I would conclude that the two are in fact able to be used in the
same way, even if the two are forcibly distinguished in the key
schedule through the use of different labels.

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 9:14 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> The key management would be pretty onerous if a different external PSK is=
 distributed to each client-server pair.  I was pretty careful to make sure=
 that the key schedule would work out even if the external PSK is know to a=
 group of clients and a group of servers because the (EC)DHE key will be pa=
irwise.
>
> If the external PSK is not pairwise, I do not think it can be used for 0-=
RTT traffic, which is why the I-D does not allow early data.

That's a consequence of a choice not to make the key exclusive
pairwise, not the protocol you describe.  If the key meets the usage
requirements for 0-RTT, then why prohibit use with 0-RTT?

To uplevel a little, if the concern is that the server can be
impersonated due to weaknesses in the certificate authentication, you
just created a situation where all the entities with the PSK are now a
threat to session integrity. That seems like a poor outcome.

>> Why didn't you consider a new codepoint on psk_key_exchange_modes that
>> permits/requires use of the certificate?  The purpose of that
>> extension is to signal that a) you want PSK, and b) what additional
>> things are permitted alongside that PSK.
>
> Because of this text in the TLS 1.3 base specification:
>
>    ... Implementations MUST NOT
>    combine external PSKs with certificate-based authentication of either
>    the client or the server unless negotiated by some extension.
>
> That steered me toward an additional extension.

That's unfortunate, but I can see how that works.


From nobody Mon Mar  5 00:10:17 2018
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From: "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>,  "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] a slightly different DTLSShortCiphertext
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Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 08:09:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] a slightly different DTLSShortCiphertext
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To: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Op 01-03-18 om 22:50 schreef Viktor Dukhovni:
> 
> 
>> On Mar 1, 2018, at 2:13 PM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 3:07 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>>> IF there's an objection to modifying the extension in order to add a
>>> pin-to-DANE TTL field, I would propose the following instead:
>>>
>>>     Make the pin-to-DANE be "forever" but make it so it can easily be
>>>     cleared if DANE is undeployed for the service.
>>
>> This option is already covered in the draft. It doesn't use the term pinning,
>> but does mention caching the existence of DANE on first contact and 
>> requiring it subsequently (if clients want to do so).
>>
>> I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the much 
>> more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL commitment
>> and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).
> 
> Avoiding an explicit TTL, and clients unilaterally assuming the DANE extension
> will always be available is not IMHO a good idea.>
> Websites that initially implement the extension should be able to eventually
> stop using it, if for some reason they decide that they no longer want to do
> so.  While the server can clear the caches of clients that see a denial of
> existence of the TLSA records, or proof an unsigned delegation from a parent
> domain, without a max TTL there are always clients that have not yet connected
> since the policy change, and will be broken indefinitely if the extension is no
> longer delivered.
> 
> Therefore, any long-term caching of a destination's support for the extension
> should require server opt-in, and must have a maximum duration.

How do you (all) feel about using the expiry date on the RRSIG for the
TLSA to be used for this purpose?


From nobody Mon Mar  5 02:09:00 2018
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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From: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Op 26-02-18 om 15:26 schreef Paul Wouters:
> On Thu, 22 Feb 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 2:48 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>       On Wed, 21 Feb 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:
>>
>>             Okay, got it. For people that have already implemented
>> this, I think
>>             there has been an implicit understanding that the format
>> of the chain
>>             data is a sequence of concatenated wire format RRs exactly
>> as they appear
>>             in a DNS message section
>>
>>
>>       Note, I would not call it "sequence of concatenated wire format
>> RRs", as
>>       it is simply the wireformat of a DNS message.
>>
>>       The fact that some parts
>>       are concatenated RR's is just part of the wireformat of the DNS
>> reply
>>       message. That is, this isn't introducing some new form of
>> concatenated
>>       content - it is _just_ a regular DNS wire format message, and the
>>       document should not go deeper into its explanation.
>>
>>
>> It would _not_ be correct to say that this is a "DNS wire format
>> message" - that 
>> would mean there is a DNS header section with flags and response codes, 
>> and other sections. The chain data structure as currently specified
>> really is 
>> concatenated wire-format RRs (as they appear _within_ a DNS message 
>> _section_). Let me know if that is unclear in the draft (or my
>> proposed edits).
> 
> So it was decided to not use a full DNS packet format? And then since you
> miss the structure of the Answer Section and Additional/Authority
> Section, you require the "answer RR's" come first where you basically
> emulate an Answer Section?

No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.  The
only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifier is
the question.  From the question, validation starts and the relevant
records are followed and verified.  But the question section is also not
needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of the
service, i.e. <port>._tcp.<name>. TLSA

The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce the
number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes the
content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.

Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also a
verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message header.
Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs in
the message body/sections too.

The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., because
it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).

Personally, I do not have very strong feelings whether or not the
extension content is a DNS message or not, but a verifier would ignore
the header and the question anyway, so why bother with that overhead?
Also, you *can* use the content of the RFC7901 chain query.  You just
have to skip the header and question section, and then include the rest.

> 
> Isn't that an indication that we should really use the wireformat of an
> entire DNS message here? Maybe some DNS library/tools people can chime
> in here to tell us if this matters much to them (assuming they are
> adding support for creating/consuming these chains of RRsets in wire
> format.
> 
> I am personally a little sad we cannot have a dig +chainquery command
> where we write out the entire answer packet format to a blob, to be
> loaded by
> the TLS server. And where a TLS client cannot just hand over the blob
> "as if it came in as a reply from a DNS server" to its DNS/cache
> receiving code path.
> 
>> I recall at one point way back there was a discussion about whether
>> the chain
>> data should just be a fully formed DNS message, but I don't believe
>> that idea
>> had much support in the working group (personally I would have been
>> fine with 
>> that choice too, if it did have support).
> 
> Do you remember why not? I'll see about checking the archives, but to me
> the hint that you are losing information and require some kind of
> ordering seems to suggest there is a need for using the full DNS message
> reply format
> 
>> There is some residual wording in the draft about ordering of CNAMEs
>> etc in
>> the answer records part. Assuming the WG agrees, I am fine with relaxing
>> that requirement - that ended up in there because although there is no
>> defined
>> ordering of RRs within a DNS message section, as a practical matter
>> CNAMEs
>> are almost always ordered since there are some DNS queriers that get
>> confused 
>> otherwise. This is a new protocol though, so we can be more faithful
>> to the DNS 
>> spec.
> 
> I would prefer the residual wording to go away. Any hints at order being
> important should be squashed.
> 
>>       I don't think getting unrelated DNSSEC records would be an
>> issue. TLS
>>       has its maximum sizes for the handshake. In fact, it could allow
>> the
>>       extension to have some useful data in the case of MX or SRV. 
>> (and could
>>       be a feature to build a nice resolver over TLS using 1 tor
>> circuit).
>>
>> The draft currently doesn't address the MX or SRV use case. I suggest
>> that we tackle that in a future version.
> 
> Jus make sure the document doesn't forbid any such data, and allow the
> client to ignore these or put them in the cache as it sees fit.
> 
>>       I'm also not sure about the talking of unsigned CNAME records from
>>       DNAME. The above pseudo code (extended with special cases)
>> should be
>>       in some DNS library, and that library will know what records to
>> expect
>>       unsigned which are proven by the DNAME (or wildcard) synthesis
>> and knows
>>       when/if to add it to the validated cache. I don't think that
>> should be
>>       explained in this RFC at all. The DNS implementation does not need
>>       to be specified in this document and it should just focus on saying
>>       that "the DNS message response is validated and upon validation the
>>       content can be considered DANE validated".
>>
>>
>> Where we ended up, is that WG participants asked for some level of DNSSEC
>> detail to be included in this doc.
> 
> Again, that will only lead to bad implementations. There should be no
> need to update this document once something like ANAME, ALIAS or ZNAME
> is introduced to the DNS. So you should not talk about these things at
> all. TLS client should use a dns library that knows these things, or if
> they want to write one from scratch, these implementors should look at
> the DNS RFCs and not this RFC for guidance on how the DNS protocol
> works.
> 
> Paul


From nobody Mon Mar  5 03:41:55 2018
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From: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
To: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: TLS 1.3 IANA Considerations
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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.3 IANA Considerations
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Should the TLS 1.3 draft request a new registry for psk_key_exchange_modes? =

Initially, I thought that there was no way to extend it, but the email belo=
w from =

Martin Thomson suggests adding a new codepoint, so I thought it best to che=
ck
that this wasn't an oversight in the draft.
-- Tony

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Martin Thomson
Sent: 01 March 2018 21:55
To: Russ Housley
Cc: IETF TLS
Subject: Re: [TLS] New Internet-Draft: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-ex=
tern-psk-00

Hi Russ,

This seems like a welcome addition.  I'm not sure why you think that
PQ needs are a good motivation for this work though.  Managing
external PSKs is so unwieldy that it almost seems like this would do
more harm than good in that regard.  I find this more interesting from
the perspective of providing continuing proof of possession for keys
while also permitting the use of 0-RTT (and session continuation more
generally).

FWIW, I don't see any reason that this approach would be a problem
given that it is additive, the problem that Sam Scott et. al. from
before was a result of important contextual information being omitted
from the transcript.

Why didn't you consider a new codepoint on psk_key_exchange_modes that
permits/requires use of the certificate?  The purpose of that
extension is to signal that a) you want PSK, and b) what additional
things are permitted alongside that PSK.

It's not clear from your text on client certificate authentication
whether your mode permits the server to omit its Certificate, but then
send CertificateRequest.  You should clarify that one way or other.

--Martin



On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:37 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> I would like to get comments on this Internet-Draft.  Once a round of
> comments have been received and folded into -01, I would like to work with
> folks that did the earlier proofs with Tamarin to make sure that the this
> does not negatively impact the TLS 1.3 protocol changes that were made to
> eliminate the man-in-the-middle attack that they found in 2015.
>
> Thanks,
>   Russ
>
>
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> Date: March 1, 2018 at 4:13:44 PM EST
> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russ Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
> Revision: 00
> Title: TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an
> External Pre-Shared Key
> Document date: 2018-03-01
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 9
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-ex=
tern-psk-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern=
-psk/
> Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-=
00
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-e=
xtern-psk-00
>
>
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
>   authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-
>   shared key (PSK).
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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To: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 26 - small typo need correction
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The double =E2=80=9Cthe=E2=80=9D got fixed, but the double and didn=E2=80=99=
t I submitted a PR so we don=E2=80=99t forget this.

spt

> On Mar 4, 2018, at 22:52, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> In TLSv1.3, draft 26, there is a small typographical error.  It needs
> to be corrected.
>=20
>=20
> (1)
>=20
> Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility
>=20
> Second Paragraph.  Second sentence.  There is a double "and".
>=20
> /* Original */
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS =
as long as
> the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least
> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> /* Corrected */
>=20
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS =
as long as
> the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least
> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> (2)
>=20
> Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters
>=20
> First paragraph, first sentence.  There is a double "the".
>=20
> /* Original */
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> /* Corrected */
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the
> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> (3)
>=20
> Appendix E.5.  Replay Attacks on 0-RTT
>=20
> Second paragraph, second line.  There is a double "the".
>=20
> /* Original */
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the
> speed of cryptographic operations.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> /* Corrected */
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the
> speed of cryptographic operations.
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>=20
> Please correct them.
>=20
> with regards,
> Saravanan
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Mon Mar  5 05:34:34 2018
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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLSv1.3 - Draft 26 - small typo need correction
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Spoke too soon I got the double the in the following PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1164

spt

> On Mar 5, 2018, at 08:30, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> The double =E2=80=9Cthe=E2=80=9D got fixed, but the double and =
didn=E2=80=99t I submitted a PR so we don=E2=80=99t forget this.
>=20
> spt
>=20
>> On Mar 4, 2018, at 22:52, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Hi,
>>=20
>> In TLSv1.3, draft 26, there is a small typographical error.  It needs
>> to be corrected.
>>=20
>>=20
>> (1)
>>=20
>> Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility
>>=20
>> Second Paragraph.  Second sentence.  There is a double "and".
>>=20
>> /* Original */
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS =
as long as
>> the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least
>> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> /* Corrected */
>>=20
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS =
as long as
>> the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least
>> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> (2)
>>=20
>> Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters
>>=20
>> First paragraph, first sentence.  There is a double "the".
>>=20
>> /* Original */
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the
>> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> /* Corrected */
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the
>> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> (3)
>>=20
>> Appendix E.5.  Replay Attacks on 0-RTT
>>=20
>> Second paragraph, second line.  There is a double "the".
>>=20
>> /* Original */
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
>> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the
>> speed of cryptographic operations.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> /* Corrected */
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks
>> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the
>> speed of cryptographic operations.
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> Please correct them.
>>=20
>> with regards,
>> Saravanan
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20


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> On Mar 5, 2018, at 4:32 AM, Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>=20
>> Therefore, any long-term caching of a destination's support for the =
extension
>> should require server opt-in, and must have a maximum duration.
>=20
> How do you (all) feel about using the expiry date on the RRSIG for the
> TLSA to be used for this purpose?

I don't think the expiry date is adequate for this purpose.  To reduce
the scope for replay attacks, my domain has 14 day RRSIG lifetimes, and
automated re-signing happens as records age, so they are often as close
as ~4 days away from expiration when re-signed.  And yet, if were to
deploy a web server that implements this extension, I'd want to commit
to DANE for a considerably longer time.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1803051101190.28097@bofh.nohats.ca>
References: <CABcZeBOST2X0-MH2hhzpPJaUkbY++udsUV1bMnMhH2V2wQRPmA@mail.gmail.com> <CAHPuVdUs7mUJiqZjFjLDCNmHHGR9AP-g5YaLLbJj-zkDKd=_-w@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1802211425260.7767@bofh.nohats.ca> <CAHPuVdX=_6b5g572-T-9Ccwek-WwL11KdTVwV9oNC9LaO5=0=Q@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1802260913290.9977@bofh.nohats.ca> <70D42B5C-7FF9-49C1-95D4-13FDC611FF96@dukhovni.org> <CAHPuVdU8boBpYO3QutJgawH-54fKD+R9PaaT-5yWE+y2t+BwwA@mail.gmail.com> <CAHPuVdWhEnYxcLUzs-zbnKiN0zj+WO-7_cK2EobS1Gipurk7CQ@mail.gmail.com> <20180227233610.GD8921@localhost> <20180227233854.GE8921@localhost> <20180228200707.GF8921@localhost> <CAHPuVdUOZ1J+us4QfS+AedMvRzTGBRMGHvu5jpOdYr6mENGKXw@mail.gmail.com> <239165FB-38EE-4B32-91E4-92C422901801@dukhovni.org> <08d01955-841b-6744-9f25-8535474dd26d@nlnetlabs.nl> <7135BE6C-CD9E-457C-8CF5-DC5A93B43B06@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

>> On Mar 5, 2018, at 4:32 AM, Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
>>
>>> Therefore, any long-term caching of a destination's support for the extension
>>> should require server opt-in, and must have a maximum duration.
>>
>> How do you (all) feel about using the expiry date on the RRSIG for the
>> TLSA to be used for this purpose?
>
> I don't think the expiry date is adequate for this purpose.  To reduce
> the scope for replay attacks, my domain has 14 day RRSIG lifetimes, and
> automated re-signing happens as records age, so they are often as close
> as ~4 days away from expiration when re-signed.  And yet, if were to
> deploy a web server that implements this extension, I'd want to commit
> to DANE for a considerably longer time.

There is also the reverse problem of pinning something you don't have
anymore. With TTL, you can tune your commitment and risk.

Also in general, DNS data should not be used beyond its TTL unless the
data itself has some kind of TTL on it (eg a full cert payload or
openpgp key with expiry)

Paul


From nobody Mon Mar  5 12:28:36 2018
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Exported Authenticators in TLS
        Author          : Nick Sullivan
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt
	Pages           : 11
	Date            : 2018-03-05

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   to provide an exportable proof of ownership of a certificate that can
   be transmitted out of band and verified by the other party.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS 1.3
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--94eb2c114ed050cf8f0566b0cf76
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks,

Here's another entry in the DH-only pile.

I've just posted:
   draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00

This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed from
OPTLS [0]. There are obviously connections with draft-putman, but
this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style
exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server's
capabilities (though it's extensible to 0-RTT) than towards
pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the
key schedule.

We'd like 10 minutes to discuss this in London.

Thanks,
-Ekr

[0] http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/

--94eb2c114ed050cf8f0566b0cf76
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>Here&#39;s another=
 entry in the DH-only pile.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve just posted:<=
/div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-rescorla-tls13-<wbr>semistatic-dh-00</div><div=
><br></div><div>This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed f=
rom</div><div>OPTLS [0]. There are obviously connections with draft-putman,=
 but</div><div>this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style</di=
v><div>exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server&#39;s</=
div><div>capabilities (though it&#39;s extensible to 0-RTT) than towards</d=
iv><div>pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the</div>=
<div>key schedule.</div><div><br></div><div>We&#39;d like 10 minutes to dis=
cuss this in London.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>-Ekr</div><=
div><br></div><div>[0] <a href=3D"http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/docum=
ent/7467348/" target=3D"_blank">http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/<wbr>abstract/do=
cument/7467348/</a></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div=
>

--94eb2c114ed050cf8f0566b0cf76--


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From: Steve Fenter <info@e-dco.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 13:32:57 -0800
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--001a11474138d311ba0566b111c9
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

 All,

I have just submitted a draft outlining enterprise use cases for
out-of-band TLS decryption.

Please review.

Thanks
Steve Fenter


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 1:05 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00.txt
To: Steve Fenter <info@e-dco.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Steve Fenter and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-fenter-tls-decryption
Revision:       00
Title:          Why Enterprises Need Out-of-Band TLS Decryption
Document date:  2018-03-05
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          21
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-fenter-tls-
decryption-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-
decryption/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fenter-tls-
decryption-00


Abstract:
   Some enterprises are heavily TLS encrypted within their own
   enterprise network boundaries.  Many of these enterprises are also
   utilizing out-of-band TLS decryption in order to inspect their own
   traffic for purposes of troubleshooting, network security monitoring,
   and for other kinds of monitoring.  These monitoring functions are
   mission critical, and cannot just be done without when TLS 1.3
   (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26) is released or when the RSA key exchange is
   someday deprecated from TLS 1.2 (RFC5246).  This draft will outline
   the use cases for out-of-band TLS decryption, as well as alternative
   suggestions for monitoring and troubleshooting and the limitations of
   those alternatives.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

--001a11474138d311ba0566b111c9
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12=
.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">=
All,</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant=
-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color=
:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,san=
s-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fo=
nt-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decora=
tion-color:initial">I have just submitted a draft outlining enterprise use =
cases for out-of-band TLS decryption.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34=
);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-vari=
ant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:n=
ormal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Please review.</div><d=
iv style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8=
px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal=
;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><b=
r></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:i=
nitial">Thanks</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,san=
s-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fo=
nt-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decora=
tion-color:initial">Steve Fenter</div><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-=
newline">

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>F=
rom: <b class=3D"gmail_sendername"></b> <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>D=
ate: Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 1:05 PM<br>Subject: New Version Notification for d=
raft-fenter-tls-decryption-00.txt<br>To: Steve Fenter &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:info@e-dco.com">info@e-dco.com</a>&gt;<br><br><br><br>
A new version of I-D, draft-fenter-tls-decryption-<wbr>00.txt<br>
has been successfully submitted by Steve Fenter and posted to the<br>
IETF repository.<br>
<br>
Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-fenter-tls-decryption<b=
r>
Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A000<br>
Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Why Enterprises Need Out-of-Band T=
LS Decryption<br>
Document date:=C2=A0 2018-03-05<br>
Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Individual Submission<br>
Pages:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 21<br>
URL:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/internet-drafts/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/internet-<wbr>drafts/draft-fenter-tls=
-<wbr>decryption-00.txt</a><br>
Status:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank=
">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-fenter-tls-<wbr>decryption/</=
a><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//tools.ietf.org/html/<wbr>draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00</a><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org=
/doc/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/html/draft-fenter-tls-<wbr>decryp=
tion-00</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Some enterprises are heavily TLS encrypted within their own<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0enterprise network boundaries.=C2=A0 Many of these enterprises=
 are also<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0utilizing out-of-band TLS decryption in order to inspect their=
 own<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0traffic for purposes of troubleshooting, network security moni=
toring,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and for other kinds of monitoring.=C2=A0 These monitoring func=
tions are<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mission critical, and cannot just be done without when TLS 1.3=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26) is released or when the RSA key exch=
ange is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0someday deprecated from TLS 1.2 (RFC5246).=C2=A0 This draft wi=
ll outline<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the use cases for out-of-band TLS decryption, as well as alter=
native<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0suggestions for monitoring and troubleshooting and the limitat=
ions of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0those alternatives.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
</div><br></div>

--001a11474138d311ba0566b111c9--


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From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2018 01:07:55 +0000
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--001a1141ec424153220566b4136d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

FYI, I've published an updated version of exported authenticators
incorporating into account the changes discussed at IETF 100 and on the
list.

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 12:28 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt
To: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt
has been successfully submitted by Nick Sullivan and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator
Revision:       06
Title:          Exported Authenticators in TLS
Document date:  2018-03-05
Group:          tls
Pages:          11
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/
Htmlized:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   to provide an exportable proof of ownership of a certificate that can
   be transmitted out of band and verified by the other party.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

--001a1141ec424153220566b4136d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">FYI, I&#39;ve published an updated version of exported aut=
henticators incorporating into account the changes discussed at IETF 100 an=
d on the list.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">---------=
- Forwarded message ---------<br>From:  &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-draf=
ts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>Date: Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at =
12:28 PM<br>Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-tls-exported-a=
uthenticator-06.txt<br>To: Nick Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nick@cloudfl=
are.com">nick@cloudflare.com</a>&gt;<br></div><br><br><br>
A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt<br>
has been successfully submitted by Nick Sullivan and posted to the<br>
IETF repository.<br>
<br>
Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-ietf-tls-exported-authe=
nticator<br>
Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A006<br>
Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Exported Authenticators in TLS<br>
Document date:=C2=A0 2018-03-05<br>
Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls<br>
Pages:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 11<br>
URL:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-=
tls-exported-authenticator-06.txt</a><br>
Status:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authen=
ticator/</a><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06</a=
><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org=
/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06" rel=3D"noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported=
-authenticator-06</a><br>
Diff:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.o=
rg/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-06" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-ex=
ported-authenticator-06</a><br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Securit=
y (TLS)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to provide an exportable proof of ownership of a certificate t=
hat can<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0be transmitted out of band and verified by the other party.<br=
>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
</div></div>

--001a1141ec424153220566b4136d--


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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a surprisingly
understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the subject. I
am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of these are
showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.

*** Substantive Comments:

§4.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a server, it is
REQUIRED to send the
   ClientHello as its first message. "

Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar application layer
patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification request.)

§4.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive
TLS 1.2 or prior
      ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
      follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."

Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and able to
negotiate 1.2? §4.2.1 has a similar assertion:

"If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
   this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
   [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."

But §4.2.3 says:

 "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
   implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
   accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
   version."

... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
"implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle difference?

§4.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that RFC
implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations? If so,
the information in this section may continue to be useful for some time.

§D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem important. I
wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.

*** Editorial Comments and nits:

§2: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
   is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with
   the server’s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in the same
   group as one of the client’s shares. "

missing comma prior to "which".

§4.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then non-
   overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it
   is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."

I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at times. Is that
the intent?

§11: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions similar to "SHALL
update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has updated" at some
point?

§E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar



From nobody Tue Mar  6 10:49:00 2018
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for a surprisingly (because of the technical density) readable
document - I may use this as an example of a well written but dense document...

Also, thanks to the doc shepherd for a good write-up.

I'm balloting NoObj instead of Yes only because I don't think I have enough
background/expertise in the topic.



From nobody Tue Mar  6 11:12:05 2018
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I found this document to be clear despite its length and complexity. The
Gen-ART reviewer wrote a lengthy review that I encourage the author/WG to look
at. Many of his comments relate to stylistic preferences in the text and some
of them might have been more actionable earlier in the process (e.g., the
suggestion for a minor error code, which I like but wouldn't hold this up
over), but they are worth reviewing. For example, I was also confused about the
use of "fatal alert" versus "error alert," and I also found the invocation of
the SNI check in 4.6.1 to be introduced abruptly.



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Dale, thanks for your review. I have entered a Yes ballot and encouraged =
the author/WG to take a look at your comments. I suspect a lot of the =
stylistic/linguistic items derive from the WG participants having deep =
experience with the protocol and its previous versions and existing =
extensions.

Alissa

> On Mar 2, 2018, at 11:00 PM, Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com> wrote:
>=20
> Reviewer: Dale Worley
> Review result: Ready with Nits
>=20
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft.  The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
>=20
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> <https://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Document:  draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
> Reviewer:  Dale R. Worley
> Review Date:  2018-03-02
> IETF LC End Date:  2018-03-02
> IESG Telechat date:  2018-03-08
>=20
> Summary:
>=20
>       This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits
>       that should be fixed before publication.
>=20
> This review only covers the general properties of the proposed
> protocol and the exposition, as I am unqualified to assess its
> security properties.
>=20
> There are various places where the exposition could be made clearer,
> especially to readers not immersed in security matters.  In many
> places, it is mostly a matter of making clearer the connections
> between different points in the exposition.
>=20
> In a few places, there seems to be ambiguity regarding the
> specification that has technical significance.  In particular:
>=20
> - There is inexactness about "transcript", "handshake context", and
>  "context".
>=20
> - When a server receives ClientHello, is it obligated to promptly send
>  not just the ServerHello, but all first-flight messages from
>  ServerHello through Finished?  (section 4.2.11.3)  I ask this
>  because the client is only obligated/permitted to send
>  EndOfEarlyData when it receives the server's Finished.
>=20
> - It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
>  message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
>  sending the Certificate message.  (section 4.4.2.4)
>=20
> - Comparing sections 4.2.10 and 4.6.1, when a PSK was established in
>  an earlier connection, exactly what are the limitations on the
>  cryptographic parameters that can be used when the PSK is used in a
>  resumption connection?  4.2.10 suggests that the following must be
>  the same in both connections:  TLS version, cipher suite, ALPN.  But
>  4.6.1 suggests that different cipher suites can be used, as long as
>  they use the same hash algorithm.
>=20
> - In regard to section 4.6.1, it seems to require that a client MAY
>  NOT resume a connection using a ticket issued during a connection in
>  which the server did not present a certificate for itself, because
>  in the handshake of the resumption connection, the client is required
>  to verify that the SNI is compatible with the certificate the server
>  presented in the original connection.  But that constraint isn't
>  stated in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the
>  structure of sessions.
>=20
> - Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of =
alert
>  messages for the same reasons that they cannot send zero-length
>  fragments of handshake messages (whatever those reasons are).
>=20
> - There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
>  require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
>  nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
>  alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
>  extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
>  statement in the text that requires an error response (with
>  implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
>  correct minor code).
>=20
> - I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
>  existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error.)
>=20
> There are a number of issues which span the whole text:
>=20
> The interaction of this draft with extensions defined for previous
> versions of TLS is not laid out clearly.  It seems safe enough for
> this draft to import data structures from earlier extensions with only
> a reference to the earlier RFC, but if an extension defines behavior
> (e.g., a negotiation process), exactly what is the specification of
> that behavior in TLS 1.3, given that the referenced RFC only defines
> its use in TLS 1.2 or earlier?  At the least, there should be an
> explicit statement that the behaviors are carried forward in the
> "obvious way".
>=20
> It's also not clear exactly which previously defined extensions are
> brought forward into TLS 1.3.  I suspect that they are all listed in
> section 4.2, but is it clearly stated that those, and only those, are
> grandfathered in?
>=20
> Presumably, for any referenced extension, the placement of values in
> messages in TLS 1.2 has a "natural" analog in TLS 1.3 that at most
> involves moving the value from one field to another in certain
> messages.  But it would be reassuring to have a clear statement of
> this, and an enumeration of any more complex cases.
>=20
> There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
> require the connection to be aborted with an error.  There are 19
> alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
> extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
> statement in the text that requires an error response.  This code
> would make it a lot easier to diagnose what is going wrong with a
> handshake.  To avoid making specifying and implementing these codes
> too difficult, implementations should be allowed to deviate to a
> degree from the specification regarding minor codes, and there should
> be a range of codes reserved for implementation-defined uses.
> Conversely, there are a couple of places where the implementation MUST
> NOT distinguish between different causes of an alert, but I believe
> that those are explicitly mentioned in the text.
>=20
> The terms "side", "server side", and "client side" are used in various
> places, despite that "endpoint" is the defined term.  I suggest
> replacing these terms with "endpoint", "server", and "client".
>=20
> There are a number of places where "fatal alert" is used, but "error
> alert" seems to be the defined term.
>=20
> Detail items are:
>=20
> 1.  Introduction
>=20
>   TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can
>   layer on top of TLS transparently.
>=20
> It might be informative to describe the nature of the
> currently-defined application protocol (a bidirectional, reliable byte
> stream) and similarly, to describe the requirements on the underlying
> transport (as far as I can tell, also a bidirectional, reliable byte
> stream).
>=20
> 1.1.  Conventions and Terminology
>=20
> There are a number of terms which are frequently used in the text that
> don't seem to be defined.  It's likely that they are only used in
> exposition, that if all sentences containing them were deleted, the
> document would still be complete and accurate.  But it seems like it
> would be easier on the reader to define them.  Terms that come to mind
> are:
>=20
> flight -- it seems to be thought that messages are grouped into
> "flights", where the messages of flight N from one sender cannot be
> sent until (more or less) it receives all messages of flights M (1 <=3D
> M <=3D N) from the peer.
>=20
> MAC and HMAC -- by a simple count, both of these terms are used
> exactly 11 times in the document.  Is there any functional difference
> between them?
>=20
> ticket -- it's not clear what this means concretely.  Abstractly, it
> seems to include the set of cryptographic parameters needed to send
> application data, but concretely I can't figure out if it is the
> entire block of parameters (struct NewSessionTicket), or whether it is
> (or can be) just a key that points to the parameters in some database
> (the ticket *field* of struct NewSessionTicket).
>=20
> A related issue is that there is a field "ticket" in the structure
> "NewSessionTicket", and, at least conceptually, that structure is also
> considered a "ticket".  I strongly suggest you change the name of the
> field, and then revise uses of "ticket" to indicate whether they refer
> to the structure or to the field.  Comparing to other parts of the
> text, I think you may have intended to call the field "identity", as
> the value in NewSessionTicket.ticket seems to be intended to be copied
> into PreSharedKeyExtension.OfferedPsks.PskIdentity.
>=20
> RTT, 0-RTT, 1-RTT -- Can these be defined more rigorously?
>=20
> server name, SNI -- These two terms seem to be used interchangeably
> and as if the reader already understands their meaning and use.
> Suggest you standardize on one (and list the other as a synonym in the
> glossary).  Also include how "server name" interacts with the server's
> certificate.
>=20
> advertise -- I think this means when an endpoint sends a message
> containing an extension saying that it implements a feature or option,
> soliciting the peer to send a message containing the same extension
> (and thus agreeing to use the feature/option during this connection).
>=20
> transcript -- It might be useful to put the definition of this in this
> section.  Also, define the "context" or "handshake context", which
> seems to be the sequence of messages included in the transcript hash
> (or the concatenation thereof).  But doesn't seem clear what messages
> are in the "handshake context" for any single usage.
>=20
> handshake -- This has two meanings:  (1) messages whose content type
> is "handshake" (see section 5), and (2) messages with content type
> "handshake" that are part of the initial exchange of such messages.
> The problem is that there are messages that are (1) but not (2), and
> so you get confusing language like the title of section 4.6.
>=20
> establish vs. provision -- The document mostly adheres to the
> convention that pre-shared keys are "provisioned" whereas keys that
> are set up using TLS (possibly in a previous session) are
> "established".  In particular, "provisioned" is only used as an
> attribute of keys, whereas "establishing" is an action and
> "established" keys are ones created by that action.  But there are
> places where the two terms aren't used distinctly.
>=20
> ALPN -- This is used sporadically throughout the document.
>=20
> "hash over" -- A personal gripe of mine is that I look at a hash as a
> function, and so its value is a "hash of (some string)".  I don't mind
> "hash over X", "hash protects X", and "hash covers X"n when X is
> conceptualized as a substring of some larger string, that is, there's
> a Y that is explicitly being excluded.  But in a lot of cases in this
> document, X is explicitly constructed from various fragments, so
> there's no Y.  But maybe all these usages are conventional in
> cryptography.
>=20
> 2.  Protocol Overview
>=20
>   The cryptographic parameters used by the secure channel are produced
>   by the TLS handshake protocol.  This sub-protocol of TLS [...]
>=20
> I think you want to s/This sub-protocol/The TLS handshake protocol/,
> since a naive reader (me!) could consider "the secure channel" as a
> plausible antecedent of "this".
>=20
> 2.1.  Incorrect DHE Share
>=20
>   Note: The handshake transcript includes the initial ClientHello/
>   HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new =
ClientHello.
>=20
> "transcript" has not been defined yet.  Perhaps:
>=20
>   Note: The handshake transcript (the message input to the MAC in the
>   Finished message) starts with ...
>=20
> 2.2.  Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
>=20
>   Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a
>   PSK and the second uses it:
>=20
> The first handshake does not point out where the PSK is established.
> Better would be
>=20
>   Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes
>   a PSK and the second uses it.  In the first, a PSK is carried from
>   the server to the client in the NewSessionTicket message.  In the
>   second, the identity of the PSK is sent by the client to the server
>   in the ClientHello.
>=20
> 3.1.  Basic Block Size
>=20
>   The representation of all data items is explicitly specified.  The
>   basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits).
>=20
> "byte" appears in the text 91 times, and "octet" appears 20 times.
> You probably want to change the uses of "octet" to "byte" for
> consistency.
>=20
> 3.3.  Vectors
>=20
> You may want to move section 3.4 to before section 3.3, because
> section 3.3 implicitly depends on all numeric fields being unsigned,
> whereas the fact that all numeric fields are unsigned is only stated
> in section 3.4.
>=20
> 3.5.  Enumerateds
>=20
>   An additional sparse data type is available called enum.  Each
>=20
> You probably want s/called enum/called enum or enumerated/.
>=20
>   Future extensions or additions to the protocol may define new =
values.
>=20
> Add "... of a previously existing enumerated."
>=20
> 4.1.2.  Client Hello
>=20
>   In that case, the client MUST send the same
>   ClientHello (without modification) except:
>=20
> s/(without modification) except:/without modification, except:/
>=20
>      For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector
>      MUST contain exactly one byte set to zero, which corresponds to
>      the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS.
>=20
> There is an ambiguity in English, where this might mean "the number of
> bytes in this field which are zero is exactly one".  It's a bit hard
> avoiding the ambiguity, but this seems to work:
>=20
>      For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST have exactly one
>      member.  The member MUST be zero, which corresponds to the "null"
>      compression method in prior versions of TLS.
>=20
> --
>=20
>      The actual "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2.
>=20
> Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
> (including mine) can be profitably deleted.
>=20
> 4.1.4.  Hello Retry Request
>=20
>   This allows the client to avoid having to
>   compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second
>   ClientHello.
>=20
> This seems to be correct but I found it very hard to decode.  This is
> clearer:
>=20
>   This allows the client to avoid having to compute hashes of partial
>   transcripts using multiple hash functions, to be used in binders in
>   the second ClientHello.
>=20
> 4.2.  Extensions
>=20
>   In TLS 1.3, unlike TLS 1.2, extensions are negotiated for each
>   handshake even when in resumption-PSK mode.  However, 0-RTT
>   parameters are those negotiated in the previous handshake; =
mismatches
>   may require rejecting 0-RTT (see Section 4.2.10).
>=20
> I think what you mean is:
>=20
>   Even for a session that is resumed using a PSK established in an
>   earlier session, the applicable extensions are negotiated in its
>   initial handshake and aren't carried over from the handshake of the
>   session which established the PSK.  However, the parameters
>   applicable to 0-RTT data are those negotiated in the previous
>   handshake; if those parameters are unacceptable to the server, it
>   may reject use of 0-RTT in the session (see Section 4.2.10).
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Servers should be prepared to receive
>   ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 =
in
>   the list of versions.
>=20
> s/should/SHOULD/
>=20
> 4.2.2.  Cookie
>=20
>   Clients MUST NOT use cookies in their initial ClientHello in
>   subsequent connections.
>=20
> I think this becomes cleaner if you omit "in subsequent connections".
>=20
> 4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms
>=20
> Items "RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms" and "RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms"
> both contain:
>=20
>      If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>      it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].
>=20
> I think "it" references "certificate", so it would be clearer to say
>=20
>      If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>      the certificate MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].
>=20
> --
>=20
>      If the corresponding public key's parameters present, [...]
>=20
> s/parameters present/parameters are present/
>=20
>   -  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
>      mandatory in TLS 1.3), [...]
>=20
> The phrase "Implementations that advertise" makes me think of the
> label on the box.  I think you mean "Endpoints that advertise".
>=20
>   The "extension_data" field of these extension contains a
>   SignatureSchemeList value:
>=20
> I think s/these extension/these extensions/ (rather than s/these
> extension/this extension/).
>=20
> 4.2.7.  Negotiated Groups
>=20
>   Items in named_group_list are ordered according to the client's
>   preferences (most preferred choice first).
>=20
> This can be simplified to "Items in named_group_list are in descending
> order of the client's preferences."
>=20
> 4.2.8.  Key Share
>=20
>   group  The named group for the key being exchanged.  Finite Field
>      Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
>      Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
>      Section 4.2.8.2.
>=20
> I think this should be capitalized as "Finite field Diffie-Hellman
> ..." and "Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman ...".
>=20
>   key_exchange  Key exchange information.  The contents of this field
>      are determined by the specified group and its corresponding
>      definition.
>=20
> This could be better defined by rearranging the two items, since the
> parameters don't describe the group, they describe the key being
> exchanged:
>=20
>   group  The value designating the named group for the keys being
>      exchanged, as defined in section 4.2.7.
> 						=09
>   key_exchange  The key exchange information.  Finite field
>      Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
>      Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
>      Section 4.2.8.2.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a
>   group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in
>   the same order.
>=20
> I think you mean to require that for a given group there can be only
> one KeyShareEntry.  So you could say
>=20
>   Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a distinct group
>   offered in the "supported_groups" extension, and the KeyShareEntrys
>   MUST appear in the order their groups appear (possibly
>   non-consecutively) in "supported_groups".
>=20
> 4.2.8.1.  Diffie-Hellman Parameters
>=20
>   This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved
>   and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.
>=20
> s/into a small subgroup/into insecure operation/?
>=20
> 4.2.8.2.  ECDHE Parameters
>=20
>   For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
>   validate each other's public value Y by ensuring that the point is a
>   valid point on the elliptic curve.  The appropriate validation
>   procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of [X962] and alternatively
>   in Section 5.6.2.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of =
three
>   steps: (1) verify that Y is not the point at infinity (O), (2) =
verify
>   that for Y =3D (x, y) both integers are in the correct interval, (3)
>   ensure that (x, y) is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
>   equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
>   membership in the correct subgroup.
>=20
> It seems that the language of this paragraph is a version behind,
> particularly in that this paragraph seems to use "Y" differently from
> the definition of UncompressedPointRepresentation.  Comparing with
> [KEYAGREEMENT], it seems like it ought to read (with changes marked
>>>> ...<<<):
>=20
>   For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
>   validate each other's public value >>>Q =3D (X, Y)<<< by ensuring
>   that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve.  The
>   appropriate validation procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of
>   [X962] >>>or<<< alternatively in Section >>>5.6.2.3.3<<< of
>   [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of three steps: (1) verify
>   that >>>Q<<< is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify that
>>>> both integers X and Y <<< are in the correct interval, >>>and<<<
>   (3) ensure that >>>Q<<< is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
>   equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
>   membership in the correct subgroup.
>=20
> (You can s/or alternatively/and also/)
>=20
> In particular, 5.6.2.3.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT] is "validation without
> verifying subgroup membership", so it needs to be verified that this
> procedure expresses the author's intent.
>=20
> 4.2.9.  Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
>=20
>   psk_dhe_ke  PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment.  In this mode, the
>      client and servers MUST supply "key_share" values as described in
>      Section 4.2.8.
>=20
> s/servers/server/
>=20
> 4.2.10.  Early Data Indication
>=20
>   For
>   externally established PSKs, the associated values are those
>   provisioned along with the key.
>=20
> Probably s/externally established/provisioned/.
>=20
>   For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate
>   that the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by
>   subtracting ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age
>   modulo 2^32) is within a small tolerance of the time since the =
ticket
>   was issued (see Section 8).
>=20
> s/provisioned/established/.
>=20
> s/ticket_age_add/ticket_age_add in the ticket/.
>=20
>   0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same (encrypted)
>   content types as their corresponding messages sent in other flights
>   (handshake and application_data) but are protected under different
>   keys.
>=20
> s/as their corresponding messages sent in/as messages of the same =
types sent in/
>=20
>   After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
>   has accepted early data, an EndOfEarlyData message will be sent to
>   indicate the key change.  This message will be encrypted with the
>   0-RTT traffic keys.
>=20
> This is awkward.  Perhaps
>=20
>   After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
>   has accepted early data, the client will send an EndOfEarlyData =
message
>   indicate that following (non-early) application data uses the
>   negotiated keys.  The EndOfEarlyData message is be encrypted with =
the
>   0-RTT traffic keys.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   -  Return its own extension in EncryptedExtensions, indicating that
>      it intends to process the early data. =20
>=20
> s/its own extension/an early_data extension/
>=20
>   "pre_shared_key" extension.  In addition, it MUST verify that the
>   following values are consistent with those associated with the
>   selected PSK:
>=20
> s/consistent with/the same as/
>=20
>   If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
>   MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for
>   all records when processing early data records.
>=20
> It seems like this could be misread by binding "when processing..." to
> "specified".  This avoids that:
>=20
>   If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
>   MUST apply to early data records the same error handling
>   requirements specified for other data records.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Specifically, if the
>   server fails to decrypt any 0-RTT record following an accepted
>   "early_data" extension it MUST terminate the connection with a
>   "bad_record_mac" alert as per Section 5.2.
>=20
> But probably better to s/any/an/.
>=20
>   If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client
>   application MAY opt to retransmit early data once the handshake has
>   been completed. =20
>=20
> Better:
>=20
>   [...] MAY opt to retransmit as non-early data the application data
>   contained in the early data records
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Note that automatic re-transmission of early data
>   could result in assumptions about the status of the connection being
>   incorrect. =20
>=20
> This doesn't quite say what you want.  Better
>=20
>   Note that after connection establishment, the application may
>   consider the status of the connection to be different than it was
>   for early data, and so transmitting the same bytes as non-early
>   application data may not have the same effect as transmitting them
>   as early application data.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Similarly,
>   if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
>   be sent in error after the handshake completes.
>=20
> A bit awkward.  Perhaps
>=20
>   Similarly,
>   if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
>   be erroneous to re-send the same data after the handshake completes.
>=20
> 4.2.11.  Pre-Shared Key Extension
>=20
>   The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to indicate the identity of
>   the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association
>   with PSK key establishment.
>=20
> s/indicate/negotiate/ -- because more than one can be offered.
>=20
>   selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
>      (0-based) index into the identities in the client's list.
>=20
> I think this is intended as an index into the (abstract) vectors
> OfferedPsks.identities and OfferedPsks.binders, as opposed to an
> offset into the serialized data structures.  You could be clearer with
>=20
>   selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
>      (0-based) index into the vector of identities in OfferedPsks.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   identity  A label for a key.  For instance, a ticket defined in
>      Appendix B.3.4 or a label for a pre-shared key established
>      externally.
>=20
> See issues regarding "ticket" in section 1.1.
>=20
>   In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification
>   (SNI) value was intended to be associated with the session (Section =
3
>   of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that the =
SNI
>   value associated with the session matches the one specified in the
>   resumption handshake.  However, in reality the implementations were
>   not consistent on which of two supplied SNI values they would use,
>   leading to the consistency requirement being de-facto enforced by =
the
>   clients.  In TLS 1.3, the SNI value is always explicitly specified =
in
>   the resumption handshake, and there is no need for the server to
>   associate an SNI value with the ticket.  Clients, however, SHOULD
>   store the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of
>   Section 4.6.1.
>=20
> See issue regarding "SNI" in section 1.1.
>=20
>   Implementor's note: the most straightforward way to implement the
>   PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher
>   suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs.
>=20
> I think you mean:
>=20
>   Implementor's note: the most straightforward way for the server to
>   implement the PSK/cipher suite choice requirements is to choose the
>   cipher suite first and then exclude any PSKs incompatible with the
>   chosen cipher suite.
>=20
> since this doesn't seem to describe an interaction between the server
> and the client, but simply how the server responds to one message.
>=20
>   In order to accept PSK key
>   establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
>   indicating the selected identity.
>=20
> I think this sentence would read better as a separate paragraph.
>=20
>   This extension MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. (This
>   facilitates implementation as described below.)
>=20
> Given that the previous paragraph discussed the early_data extension,
> "This extension" isn't clear.  So s/This extension/The
> "pre_shared_key" extension/.
>=20
>   If this
>   value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
>   handshake.
>=20
> s/does not validate/is not valid/  (An actor validates a value; a
> value is validated.)
>=20
> 4.2.11.1.  Ticket Age
>=20
>   The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
>   field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the
>   ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the
>   "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket, see
>   Section 4.6.1 modulo 2^32.
>=20
> Clearer would be
>=20
>   [...] "ticket_age_add" value that was in the NewSessionTicket for
>   the ticket, modulo 2^32.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Note that
>   the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
>   seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" is in milliseconds.
>=20
> Expand to
>=20
>   Note that
>   the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
>   seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" and "ticket_age_add" fields
>   are in milliseconds.
>=20
> 4.2.11.3.  Processing Order
>=20
>   Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
>   server's Finished, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData message,
>   followed by the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid deadlocks,
>   when accepting "early_data", servers MUST process the client's
>   ClientHello and then immediately send the ServerHello, rather than
>   waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.
>=20
> This is awkward, and omits the remainder of the servers' first flight
> messages.  Better is
>=20
>   Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
>   server's Finished message, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData
>   message, and the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid
>   deadlocks, when accepting early data, servers MUST process the
>   client's ClientHello immediately upon receipt, and immediately send
>   all of its first flight messages from ServerHello through Finished,
>   rather than waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.
>=20
> 4.4.  Authentication Messages
>=20
>   Certificate  The certificate to be used for authentication, and any
>      supporting certificates in the chain.  Note that =
certificate-based
>      client authentication is not available in 0-RTT mode.
>=20
> Probably better to say s/in 0-RTT mode/for 0-RTT data/ -- or perhaps
> "early data".
>=20
>   The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key
>   for each scenario:
>=20
> Eh, what?  I think what you mean is that this table specifies what
> base keys are used for which messages.  But "Mode" and "Handshake
> Context" don't seem to be defined terms.  It seems to me that a better
> specification is the annotations in the state diagrams in Appendix A,
> which note for each message that is sent what key applies to it.
>=20
> Only after reading the text again do I realize that the "Handshake
> Context" column is listing what the handshake context *is* at various
> points in time.  My confusion connects with the need for a more formal
> definition of "handshake context".
>=20
> 4.4.1.  The Transcript Hash
>=20
>   Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
>   transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the =
concatenation
>   of each included handshake message, including the handshake message
>   header carrying the handshake message type and length fields, but =
not
>   including record layer headers.  I.e.,
>=20
> There are a number of awkward spots in how this is phrased.  Better:
>=20
>   Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
>   transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the =
concatenation
>   of a sequence of messages in the handshake, with each message
>   including the TLS message type and length fields, but not any
>   headers of the underlying transport protocol.
>=20
> --
>=20
>    Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... MN) =3D Hash(M1 || M2 ... MN)
>=20
> Usually, symbol for "the n-th message" would use lower-case "n" as the
> index, and one usually puts the operator before and after "...".  Also
> add verbal explanation:
>=20
>   The transcript hash of messages M1 through Mn is:
>=20
>      Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) =3D Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || Mn)
>=20
> Continue,
>=20
>   As an exception to this general rule, when the server has responded =
to a
>   ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the first ClientHello is
>   replaced with a special synthetic handshake message of message type
>   "message_hash" whose data part is Hash(first ClientHello).  I.e.,
>=20
>  Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) =3D
>      Hash(message_hash ||        /* Handshake type (1 byte) */
>           00 00 Hash.length ||   /* Handshake message length, in bytes =
(3 bytes) */
>           Hash(ClientHello1) ||  /* Hash of ClientHello1 */
>           HelloRetryRequest || ... || Mn)
>=20
>   The reason for this construction is to allow the server not
>   store state after sending HelloRetryRequest by storing just the
>   hash of the first ClientHello in the cookie, rather than requiring
>   it to store all of the ClientHello or the entire intermediate hash
>   state (see Section 4.2.2).
>=20
> --
>=20
>   For concreteness, the transcript hash is always taken from the
>   following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first
>=20
> This is awkward.  Perhaps
>=20
>   the transcript hash is always of the following sequence of
>   handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including
>   only those messages that we sent/received:
>=20
> --
>=20
>   In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keeping =
a
>   running transcript hash value based on the negotiated hash.
>=20
> Probably s/negotiated hash/negotiated hash function/.
>=20
> Also, this needs to include the modification of truncating the last
> message if it is to include the transcript hash.  I think you need
> something like:
>=20
>   If the last message, Mn, is to include the transcript hash, then
>   the transcript hash is always the last field of the message, and
>   that message is first truncated by removing that field from the
>   message.  (The message length field of Mn is unmodified; it includes
>   the length of the transcript hash.)
>=20
>      Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) =3D Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || =
Truncate(Mn))
>=20
> 4.4.2.  Certificate
>=20
>   If the corresponding certificate type extension
>   ("server_certificate_type" or "client_certificate_type") was not
>   negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type =
was
>   negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains a DER-encoded X.509
>   certificate.
>=20
> This needs a reference to RFC 7250 to define certificate type
> extension.  Also, see the general issues regarding extensions.
>=20
>   Each following certificate SHOULD
>   directly certify one preceding it.
>=20
> The phrase "one preceding it" allows extraneous certificates in the
> list, as "one preceding it" doesn't usually require that it be
> immediately preceding.  I think you mean "the one preceding it", which
> does require it to be immediately preceding, and thus does not allow
> extraneous certificates in the chain.
>=20
> 4.4.2.1.  OCSP Status and SCT Extensions
>=20
>   CertificateStatus message.  In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP =
information
>   is carried in an extension in the CertificateEntry containing the
>   associated certificate.
>=20
> Clearer to phrase it:
>=20
>   [...] in the CertificateEntry containing the
>   associated certificate in the Certificate message.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   CertificateRequest message.  If the client opts to send an OCSP
>   response, the body of its "status_request" extension MUST be a
>   CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066].
>=20
> s/its "status_request" extension"/the "status_request" extension in
> its Certificate message/.
>=20
> 4.4.2.2.  Server Certificate Selection
>=20
>   All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a =
signature
>   algorithm advertised by the client, if they are able to provide such
>   a chain (see Section 4.2.3).
>=20
> Probably better a/All certificates/Each certificate/.
>=20
> s/they are/the server is/
>=20
>   If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using [...]
>=20
> The purpose of this paragraph is not clear.  Was "server" meant?  If
> so, it seems to be redundant.  I think it is intended to discuss how
> the client processes the (alleged) certificate chain presented by the
> server, in which case, it's a sharp change of focus for this section.
> That could be aided by moving this paragraph to the end of the section
> and adding some words:
>=20
>   If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain from the
>   certificates provided by the server and decides to abort the
>   handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate
>   certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate";
>   see Section 6.2 for more).
>=20
> But it would probably be better to integrate it into section 4.4.2.4.
>=20
> 4.4.2.3.  Client Certificate Selection
>=20
>   -  If the CertificateRequest message contained a non-empty
>      "oid_filters" extension, the end-entity certificate MUST match =
the
>      extension OIDs recognized by the client, as described in
>      Section 4.2.5.
>=20
> More exact would be "must match the extension OID/value pairs that are
> recognized by the client."
>=20
> 4.4.2.4.  Receiving a Certificate Message
>=20
> It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
> message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
> sending the Certificate message.
>=20
> 4.4.3.  Certificate Verify
>=20
>   This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
>   possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate.
>=20
> I'd prefer s/to its certificate/to the certificate it has presented/.
>=20
> The discussion of how "signature" is formed is awkward and I'm not
> sure I understand it.  E.g., the digital signature is computed "over"
> a string, but one part of that string is "the content to be signed".
> I think it could be made clearer as:
>=20
>   The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see
>   Section 4.2.3 for the definition of this field).  The signature is a
>   digital signature using that algorithm.  The string that is signed
>   is the concatenation of:
>=20
>   -  A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times
>=20
>   -  The context string
>=20
>   -  A single 0 byte which serves as a separator
>=20
>   -  Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
>=20
> But that leaves unclear what "context string" and "Handshake Context"
> are.  I think you want to define those back in 4.4.1 (and probably
> also in 1.1) as both being the concatenation of the messages that are
> in the transcript to this point.  I also assume that the Certificate
> Verify message is truncated when it is put into the Transcript-Hash
> and "context string", but that needs to be stated.
>=20
> 4.4.4.  Finished
>=20
>   The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
>=20
> s/finished/Finished/
>=20
>   The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
>   Base key defined in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).
>=20
> This is correct, but you have to read further to understand the key
> described here isn't the key that encrypts the finished message.  It
> would be easier to understand if the text was rearranged:
>=20
>   Structure of this message:
>=20
>      struct {
>          opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
>      } Finished;
>=20
>   The verify_data value is computed as follows:
>=20
>      finished_key =3D
>          HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length)
>=20
>      verify_data =3D
>          HMAC(finished_key,
>               Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
>                               Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))
>=20
>      * Only included if present.
>=20
> And this is another instance where the poorly-defined "Handshake
> Context" appears.
>=20
>   Any records following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be encrypted
>   under the appropriate application traffic key as described in
>   Section 7.2.
>=20
> Are there any non-1-RTT Finished messages?  And aren't all application
> data records encrypted under the "appropriate" key?  Or is an
> "application traffic key" different from the keys used for application
> data early in the connection?  This needs to be rephrased somehow, but
> I can't guess in what way.
>=20
> 4.6.  Post-Handshake Messages
>=20
> This section name is awkward.  Of course, there are messages after the
> handshake.  I think the problem is that there are "handshake
> messages", messages with handshake types (or content type
> "handshake"), that are not part of "the handshake", the initial
> exchange of handshake-type messages.  In the end, you need to decide
> what terminology to use so that the title of this section makes sense.
>=20
>   the appropriate application traffic key.
>=20
> Is there a strict accounting of what messages are encrypted using
> which key?
>=20
> 4.6.1.  New Session Ticket Message
>=20
>   message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message.  This message
>   creates a unique association between the ticket value and a secret
>   PSK derived from the resumption master secret.
>=20
> It would be useful to mention that the resumption_master_secret is
> defined/computed in section 7.1.
>=20
> Does "ticket value" mean the NewSessionTicket structure or the
> "ticket" field within it.  See issues regarding "ticket" for section
> 1.1.
>=20
>   (Section 4.2.11).  Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a single
>=20
> Note the conflation here of "ticket" with "NewSessionTicket message".
>=20
>   Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that has the =
same
>   KDF hash algorithm as that used to establish the original =
connection.
>=20
> How is a ticket "resumed"?
>=20
> Also, since in a "resumption" connection, the ticket that is used is
> (or refers to) a PSK, the above statement corresponds to=20
> the statement "In addition, it MUST verify that the
> following values are consistent with those associated with the
> selected PSK:" in section 4.2.10.
>=20
>   Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for the =
server
>   certificate presented in the original session, and SHOULD only =
resume
>   if the SNI value matches the one used in the original session.
>=20
> What does it mean to say a client "resumes"?
>=20
> Here we suddenly descend into the usage of what seems to be an
> extension, server_name, which is presumably optional and logically
> added on to TLS rather than being an integral part of it.
>=20
> Also the logic isn't described very cleanly; I think it means "A
> client must abort resuming a connection if the ServerHello message
> does not contain a server_name extension whose value is a valid SNI
> for the server certificate presented in the original session ...".
>=20
> All of this seems to require that a client MAY NOT resume a connection
> using a ticket issued during a connection in which the server did not
> present a certificate for itself.  But that constraint wasn't stated
> in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the structure of
> sessions.
>=20
> Or am I wrong in believing that the client chooses to resume the
> connection by placing the ticket in the ClientHello *before* it
> receives the ServerHello (which contains the SNI)?  This paragraph
> seems to be written as if the client decides to resume after receiving
> ServerHello.
>=20
>   ticket_lifetime  Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit
>      unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket
>      issuance.
>=20
> Probably better to s/the time of ticket issuance/the time the
> NewSessionTicket was sent to the client/, unless "issuance"/"to issue"
> is explicitly defined somewhere.
>=20
>   ticket  The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identity.  The
>      ticket itself is an opaque label.
>=20
> This shows the ambiguities around "ticket"; this specification says
> that "'ticket' is the value of the ticket to be used as the PSK
> identity".
>=20
> Is it intended that the "ticket" field of NewSessionTicket will become
> the "identity" field of PskIdentity.OfferedPsks.PreSharedKeyExtension?
>=20
>   max_early_data_size  The maximum amount of 0-RTT data that the =
client
>      is allowed to send when using this ticket, in bytes.  Only
>      Application Data payload (i.e., plaintext but not padding or the
>      inner content type byte) is counted.  A server receiving more =
than
>      max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data SHOULD terminate the
>      connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Note that servers
>      that reject early data due to lack of cryptographic material will
>      be unable to differentiate padding from content, so clients =
SHOULD
>      NOT depend on being able to send large quantities of padding in
>      early data records.
>=20
> The last sentence assumes that a server that "reject early data due to
> lack of cryptographic material" will be strict and count all bytes in
> early data messages against the max_early_data_size quota.  However, a
> server in such a situation could be liberal and not bother counting
> any bytes -- since it will be discarding early data messages
> (immediately after discovering that it can't decrypt them), it never
> has to buffer more than one of them.  Unless I'm overlooking
> something, this advice isn't needed, since a server in this situation
> isn't buffering early data.
>=20
> 4.6.2.  Post-Handshake Authentication
>=20
>   All of the client's
>   messages for a given response MUST appear consecutively on the wire
>   with no intervening messages of other types.
>=20
> Better, "consecutively in the underlying transport stream".  But that
> is a little vague given the message/fragment/record mechanism.  More
> exactly,
>=20
>   All of the client's messages for a given response MUST appear
>   consecutively on the wire, that is, the records containing the
>   fragments of the messages composing the client's response must
>   appear consecutively in the underlying transport stream.
>=20
> 4.6.3.  Key and IV Update
>=20
> I think you want to promote the first paragraph before the data
> structure definition.
>=20
> 5.  Record Protocol
> and=20
> 5.1.  Record Layer
>=20
> The text isn't very clear about the message/fragment/record mechanism.
> The text wants to consider the data for each content type to consist
> of a series of messages.  The messages are cut into fragments.
> Adjacent fragments within one content type stream can be concatenated
> to form the content of TLSPlaintext structures.
>=20
> One problem is that despite this model, the boundary between messages
> isn't carried through the transport.  For application data, message
> boundaries are lost entirely.  For handshake and alert content types,
> there are some complex restrictions how their message boundaries show
> up as record boundaries, but the actual framing of messages is done
> "in band" by the message length fields.  A closer description of the
> services TLS provides is that the data for each content type is a
> stream that can be broken arbitrarily into fragments that are the
> content of records, except:
>=20
> - The boundaries of alert messages must be boundaries of the records
>  that carry them and no record boundary can be introduced into an
>  alert message.
>=20
> - If two records contain fragments of the same handshake message, all
>  records between them must contain only fragments of that handshake
>  message.
>=20
> - If there is a key change between the sending of two handshake
>  messages, there must be a record boundary between them.
>=20
>   -  Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes.  Implementations
>      MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change
>      align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate =
the
>      connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Because the
>      ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate
>      messages can immediately precede a key change, implementations
>      MUST send these messages in alignment with a record boundary.
>=20
> Is this description correct?  As written, it says "because a key
> change can happen after message X, there must be a record boundary
> after message X", which isn't exactly the same as "Handshake messages
> MUST NOT span key changes" -- unless there is always a key change
> following these message types, in which case s/can immediately
> precede/always precede/.  I think the three points listed above give a
> clearer and more accurate version.
>=20
>   Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake
>   types, even if those fragments contain padding.
>=20
> Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of =
alert
> messages also.
>=20
>   When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
>   structures are written directly onto the wire.
>=20
> Better "... sent directly using the underlying transport protocol".
>=20
> 5.2.  Record Payload Protection
>=20
> I *think* what's going on with record protection is:
>=20
> - The TLSPlaintext is turned into a TLSInnerPlaintext by moving the
>  type field, removing the length field, and copying "fragment" to
>  "content".  (Why do the structures use different names for the data
>  fragment?)
>=20
> - The encryption is done by:
>=20
>      AEADEncrypted =3D
>          AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaintext)
>=20
>  where plaintext is TLSInnerPlaintext and AEADEncrypted becomes
>  TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record.
>=20
> - TLSCiphertext is transmitted.
>=20
> But the text doesn't say this at all plainly.  I would add before
> "AEAD algorithms take...":
>=20
>   The TLSPlaintext is converted into a TLSInnerPlaintext by copying =
the
>   type field, removing the length field, and copying the fragment
>   field.
>=20
> (assuming we rename "content" to "fragment")
>=20
> Then replace the equation by:
>=20
>   encrypted_record =3D
>          AEAD-Encrypt(endpoint_write_key, nonce, TLSInnerPlaintext)
>=20
> --
>=20
>   The key is either the
>   client_write_key or the server_write_key, the nonce is derived from
>   the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv or
>   server_write_iv, and the additional data input is empty (zero
>   length).
>=20
> It would be clearer to move the reference to read "the nonce is
> derived from the sequence number and the client_write_iv or
> server_write_iv (see Section 5.3)" as section 5.3 describes both the
> sequence number and the derivation.
>=20
> Similarly, the decryption algorithm is better expressed by
>=20
>      TLSInnerPlaintext =3D
>          AEAD-Decrypt(peer_write_key, nonce, encrypted_record)
>=20
> --
>=20
>   This limit
>   is derived from the maximum TLSPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1
>   octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.
>=20
> s/TLSPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- the maximum length of
> TLSPlaintext is 2^14 + 5.
>=20
> 5.3.  Per-Record Nonce
>=20
>   The appropriate sequence number is incremented by one after reading
>   or writing each record.  The first record transmitted under a
>   particular traffic key MUST use sequence number 0.
>=20
> I think the first and second paragraphs could be profitably combined:
>=20
>   A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and
>   writing records and is incremented by one after reading or writing
>   each record.  Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning
>   of a connection and whenever the key for that direction is changed;
>   the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key uses
>   sequence number 0.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should not =
wrap.
>=20
> The sense of "should" is not clear.  I think what you want to say is
>=20
>   Because the size of sequence numbers is 64 bits, there is no need to
>   allow sequence numbers to wrap.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Each AEAD algorithm will specify a range of possible lengths for the
>   per-record nonce, from N_MIN bytes to N_MAX bytes of input
>=20
> I think this is clearer (as it makes clear where N_MIN comes from):
>=20
>   Each AEAD algorithm specifies an N_MIN and N_MAX, which give the
>   range of possible lengths in bytes of the per-record nonce.
>=20
> 5.4.  Record Padding
>=20
>   Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the
>   ContentType field before encryption.
>=20
> More exact would be
>=20
>   Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes following the type field
>   in TLSInnerPlaintext.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   The presence of padding does not change the overall record size
>   limitations - the full encoded TLSInnerPlaintext MUST NOT exceed =
2^14
>   + 1 octets.  If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
>   example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then =
the
>   reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
>   type and padding.
>=20
> I think you want s/encoded TLSInnerPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- all
> data structures are defined with a concrete representation, so
> "encoded" is redundant, but "encoded" could be confused with
> "encrypted" and the encrypted plaintext can be longer than the =
plaintext.
>=20
>   If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
>   example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then =
the
>   reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
>   type and padding.
>=20
> This needs clarification.  I think you mean that if the m.f.l. is
> reduced, then the limit on TLSInnerPlaintext is reduced to m.f.l.+1,
> but that's not what this says.  OTOH, if this text is accurate, the
> maximum length of the fragment proper is m.f.l.-1.
>=20
> 6.  Alert Protocol
>=20
>   Alert messages convey a description of the alert and a legacy field
>   that conveyed the severity of the message in previous versions of
>   TLS.  In TLS 1.3, the severity is implicit in the type of alert =
being
>   sent, and the 'level' field can safely be ignored.
>=20
> I think at this point you want to insert "Alerts are divided into two
> classes: closure alerts and error alerts."
>=20
>   Stateful implementations of tickets (as in many clients)
>   SHOULD discard tickets associated with failed connections.
>=20
> What is a "ticket" here?
>=20
> And what are the "associations" in question?  E.g., presumably it
> includes the ticket used when attempting to establish a connection if
> the attempt fails.  But if a NewSessionTicket is received during a
> connection, and the connection is later aborted, does the client have
> to discard the remembered NewSessionTicket?
>=20
>   All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST
>   be treated as fatal regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.
>   Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.
>=20
> This was remarkably confusing until I figured out that the first
> "fatal" means "with AlertLevel "fatal"" and the second and third
> "fatal" mean "indicates abortive closure"!  Better:
>=20
>   All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent with AlertLevel
>   "fatal" and when received MUST be treated as error alerts
>   regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.  Unknown alert types
>   MUST be treated as error alerts.
>=20
> 6.1.  Closure Alerts
>=20
>   user_canceled  This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is
>      canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol
>      failure.  If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is
>      complete, just closing the connection by sending a "close_notify"
>      is more appropriate.  This alert SHOULD be followed by a
>      "close_notify".  This alert is generally a warning.
>=20
> What does "This alert is generally a warning." mean?  What is it a
> warning of?
>=20
>   Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing its write
>   side of the connection, unless it has already sent some other fatal
>   alert.
>=20
> This implies that close_notify is a "fatal alert" (properly, error
> alert).  And "before closing the write side of the connection" is not
> clear, since sending close_notify *is* closing the write side of the
> connection.  Better:
>=20
>   Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing the
>   write side of the underlying transport connection, unless it has
>   already sent some other error alert.
>=20
> (Unless I'm mistaken regarding what is intended.)
>=20
> I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
> existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error -- the sender
> wants to transmit more data but the receiver is unwilling to receive
> it.)
>=20
>   If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
>   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.  No part of
>   this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage
>   profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
>   connections are opened or closed.
>=20
> This isn't clear too me.  The second sentence seems to mean:
>=20
>   A usage profile for TLS specified how it manages its data
>   transport, including when connections are opened or closed.  No
>   part of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in
>   which a usage profile for TLS manages its data transport.
>=20
> But I can't figure out what the first sentence means.  It seems to
> mean "If ... a TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
> before indicating end-of-data to its application-layer.", but that's
> obvious behavior, what else would cause it to signal EOD?
>=20
>   Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
>   reliably delivers pending data before destroying the transport.
>=20
> I think you mean
>=20
>   Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
>   will cause the peer TLS implementation to reliably deliver all
>   transmitted data before [what?]
>=20
> 7.  Cryptographic Computations
>=20
>   The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
>   combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed
>   below.
>=20
> Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
> (including mine) can be profitably deleted.
>=20
> 7.1.  Key Schedule
>=20
> Given the terminology in RFC 5869, struct HkdfLabel probably should be
> called HkdfInfo, as it is the "info" argument to HKDF-Expand.
>=20
>   Messages are the concatenation of the indicated handshake messages,
>=20
> s/Messages are/Messages is/!
>=20
>   Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final "master secret" is computed
>   by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1, [...]
>=20
> This is hard to follow.  If I understand correctly, this is a general
> description of the mechanism that is diagrammed below.  But, e.g.,
> "secret" is used for at least two categories of quantities.  It would
> be clearer to phrase this:
>=20
>   Generally, we use a construction that takes as input a sequence of
>   n InputSecrets and from them computes a sequence of derived
>   secrets.  The initial derived secret is simply a string of
>   Hash.length bytes set to zeros.  Each successive derived secret is
>   computed by invoking HKDF-Extract with an InputSecret and the
>   preceding derived secret as inputs.
>=20
>   Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, the construction
>   proceeds as diagrammed below, with the InputSecrets on the left
>   side and the derived secrets passing as shown by the downward
>   arrows.  The InputSecrets are added in the following order, where
>   if a given InputSecret is not available, then the 0-value is used
>   in its place:
>=20
> --
>=20
>   -  HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top =
and
>      the IKM argument from the left.
>=20
> Append "with its output to the bottom and the name of the output at
> the right".
>=20
> 7.2.  Updating Traffic Keys and IVs
>=20
> I think you want to remove "and IVs" here.  IVs aren't mentioned in
> this section.  Of course, changing the traffic key changes the IV, but
> it also changes the write key, and the write key isn't mentioned in
> the section title.
>=20
> 7.3.  Traffic Key Calculation
>=20
> I think you want to title the section "Write Key and IV Calculation".
>=20
> And you want to (again) de-genericize the text:
>=20
>   The traffic keying material (*_write_key and *_write_iv) is
>   generated from the following input values:
>=20
>   -  A secret value, the applicable *_traffic_secret
>=20
>   -  A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
>=20
>   -  The length of the key
>=20
> 7.4.1.  Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
>=20
>   For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation =
is
>   performed.
>=20
> I think you need a reference for this!
>=20
> 7.5.  Exporters
>=20
>   A separate
>   interface for the early exporter is RECOMMENDED, especially on a
>   server where a single interface can make the early exporter
>   inaccessible.
>=20
> What does "where a single interface can make the early exporter
> inaccessible" mean?  If you don't have a separate interface for the
> early exporter, how does "a single interface" make it inaccessible?
>=20
> 8.1.  Single-Use Tickets
>=20
>   If the tickets are not self-contained but rather are database keys,
>   and the corresponding PSKs are deleted upon use, then connections
>   established using one PSK enjoy forward secrecy.
>=20
> What does "one PSK" mean here?  Do you mean "established using such a
> PSK" (equivalently "established using such a ticket")?
>=20
> Also, the question again arises as to what a "ticket" *is*.
>=20
>   Because this mechanism requires sharing the session database between
>   server nodes in environments with multiple distributed servers, it
>=20
> Probably more conventional to say "requires a shared database between
> all server instances".
>=20
> 8.2.  Client Hello Recording
>=20
> The first paragraph is hard to follow.  I think it could be clarified
> along these lines:
>=20
>   An alternative form of anti-replay is to record a unique value
>   derived from the ClientHello (generally either the random value or
>   the PSK binder) and reject duplicates.  Recording all ClientHellos
>   causes state to grow without bound, but a server can instead retain
>   ClientHellos only within a given time window and use the
>   "obfuscated_ticket_age" to determine whether the ClientHello was
>   generated by the client recently.  Thus, the server can ensure that
>   it only allows 0-RTT data in connections established by
>   non-duplicate ClientHellos which were generated by the client
>   within the recording window.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   The server MUST derive the storage key only from validated sections
>   of the ClientHello.  If the ClientHello contains multiple PSK
>   identities, then an attacker can create multiple ClientHellos with
>   different binder values for the less-preferred identity on the
>   assumption that the server will not verify it, as recommended by
>   Section 4.2.11.  I.e., if the client sends PSKs A and B but the
>   server prefers A, then the attacker can change the binder for B
>   without affecting the binder for A.
>=20
> At this point, a conditional needs to be inserted; otherwise the
> argument you're making is only implicit.
>=20
>   If the server uses the binder for B as part of the storage key,
>   these variations on the ClientHello will not be detected by the
>   server as duplicates of each other, and the server will accept all
>   of them.
>=20
> Then continue with:
>=20
>   This may cause side effects such as replay cache
>   pollution, although any 0-RTT data will not be decryptable because =
it
>   will use different keys.  If the validated binder or the
>   ClientHello.random are used as the storage key, then this attack is
>   not possible.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   When implementations are freshly started, they SHOULD reject 0-RTT =
as
>   long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup
>   time.  Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were
>   originally sent during that period.
>=20
> I think this needs a couple of changes of phrasing:
>=20
>   When an implementation is restarted with a cleared recording
>   memory, it SHOULD reject 0-RTT as long as the startup time is
>   within the recording window.  Otherwise, it runs the risk of
>   accepting replays of ClientHellos which were sent during the
>   previous execution.
>=20
> 8.3.  Freshness Checks
>=20
>   Variations in client and server clock rates are likely to be =
minimal,
>   though potentially with gross time corrections. =20
>=20
> What does "gross time corrections" mean?  I think you mean "with
> moments of large change in the clock time", but that isn't a feature
> of the clock *rate*.  I think this is more accurate:
>=20
>   Differences between client and server clock times are likely to be
>   minimal, though there will sometimes be gross differences due to
>   uninitialized clocks and misconfigured time zones.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   After early data is accepted, records may continue to be streamed
>   to the server over a longer time period.
>=20
> More clear as
>=20
>   After the server accepts early data is accepted, the client may
>   continue to send early data to the server over a longer time period
>   than the freshness window for ClientHellos.
>=20
> 9.1.  Mandatory-to-Implement Cipher Suites
>=20
>   A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with
>   rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (for
>   CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256.
>=20
> It seems that ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 is missing a statement of what
> uses it must be supported for.
>=20
> 9.2.  Mandatory-to-Implement Extensions
>=20
>   -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also =
contain
>      a "key_share" extension, and vice versa.  An empty
>      KeyShare.client_shares vector is permitted.
>=20
> I think this is a bit better expressed as:
>=20
>   -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also =
contain
>      a "key_share" extension (which may contain an empty
>      KeyShare.client_shares vector), and vice versa.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the
>   "server_name" extension with applications capable of using it.
>=20
> I'm not clear what the test is for "applications capable of using
> SNI".  I think you want to turn the conditional around:
>=20
>   An application profile MAY require that the endpoint's TLS
>   implementation supports use of the "server_name" extension.
>=20
> 9.3.  Protocol Invariants
>=20
>   -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
>      unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
>      Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.  In =
TLS
>      1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or NewSessionTicket
>      MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.
>=20
> This needs to be split, because the two parts are about different =
roles:
>=20
>   -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
>      unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
>      Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.
>=20
>   -  In TLS 1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or
>      NewSessionTicket MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.
>=20
> 11.  IANA Considerations
>=20
>   -  TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards
>      Action [RFC8126].  IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry
>      to include values for "missing_extension" and
>      "certificate_required".
>=20
> It would be nice to add a finer-grained "minor alert code" registry.
>=20
> Appendix A.  State Machine
>=20
> It would be helpful if the state diagrams were extended to describe
> the activity on the "control channel" (handshake and alert content
> types) after CONNECTED, that is, what happens while the connection is
> established and how connections are shut down.
>=20
> Appendix B.  Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values
>=20
> There is no listing of the value structure corresponding to each
> extension type.  Extensions collectively are only defined as:
>=20
>   struct {
>       ExtensionType extension_type;
>       opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
>   } Extension;
>=20
> This is a problem because the name of the value struct is not
> systematically derived from the name of the extension_type value!
> E.g., "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" use
> SignatureSchemeList as a value, and you can only reliably discover
> that by searching through the whole of the text.
>=20
> B.4.  Cipher Suites
>=20
>   A symmetric cipher suite defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and
>   hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.
>=20
> Better phrased:
>=20
>   A symmetric cipher suite is the pair of an AEAD algorithm and a
>   hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.
>=20
> C.3.  Implementation Pitfalls
>=20
>   -  As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which
>      support a compatible (EC)DHE group but do not predict it in the
>      "key_share" extension?
>=20
> This needs an additional condition:
>=20
>   -  As a server, if you select an (EC)DHE group which the client
>      supports but for which the client did not provide a
>      KeyShareEntry, do you send a HelloRetryRequest?
>=20
> Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility
>=20
>   Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for
>   various purposes.  (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
>   TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field is
>   [...]
>=20
> I think this was intended to be formatted thusly:
>=20
>   Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number
>   (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
>   TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) for various purposes.  As of
>   TLS 1.3, this field is [...]
>=20
> D.5.  Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions
>=20
>   The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the
>   reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
>   reason.
>=20
> s/and MUST NOT/and it MUST NOT/, with "it" referring to "SSL 3.0", as
> otherwise the verb "MUST NOT" is parallel to the verb "is" and the
> subject of "MUST NOT" is "the security of SSL 3.0".
>=20
> E.1.  Handshake
>=20
>   -  A set of "session keys" (the various secrets derived from the
>      master secret) from which can be derived a set of working keys.
>=20
> Is this consistent with the usual meaning of "session key"?  My
> understanding (which may be wrong) is that a "session key" is the key
> for a "session", i.e., an entire connection.  Perhaps there is already
> a defined term in the text that covers the use you intend.
>=20
>   Note that these
>   properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the protocol
>   consumers' needs.
>=20
> The significance of "but" is not clear here, as it seems to be placing
> in opposition "reflect the ... needs" and "independent".  I think this
> is probably closer to what you meant:
>=20
>   Note that these properties are not necessarily independent, but
>   together they cover the protocol consumers' needs.
>=20
> --
>=20
>   Uniqueness of the session keys:  Any two distinct handshakes should
>      produce distinct, unrelated session keys.  Individual session =
keys
>      produced by a handshake should also be distinct and unrelated.
>=20
> It's not clear how two session keys produced by a single handshake can
> be "unrelated".  I suspect there's a known technical term for this,
> like "cryptographically independent" (to parallel "cryptographically
> random").
>=20
> A similar term is needed in section E.1.4.
>=20
>   If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each
>   connection, then the output keys are forward secret.
>=20
> When it is used as an adjective, you hyphenate "forward-secret".
>=20
> E.1.3.  0-RTT
>=20
>   See Section 4.2.10 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to =
replay.
>=20
> This discussion is now in section 8.
>=20
> [END]
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Gen-art mailing list
> Gen-art@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art


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Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 15:34:48 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs@ietf.org, sean@sn3rd.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Benjamin Kaduk's practice ballot (Yes) on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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[incoming AD ramping up on draft review; please consider this as a
Yes ballot with COMMENT]

I was a contributor for this work, so it is unsurprising that I
support its publication.  I have some editorial fixes that I sent
separately as a pull request
(https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1166), but will note a few
things that I did not see mentioned already.


The HelloRetryRequest flow does not allow future extensions to
change the behavior/contents of the second ClientHello (without
Updating this document); it's unclear that there is a real need for
this limitation.


Section 4.1.4 notes that:

   Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST perform the
   checks specified in Section 4.1.3 and then process the extensions,
   starting with determining the version using "supported_versions".

But I think the "checks specified" are no longer very clear
(presumably they were more clear in a previous revision).  The main
checks that I see in Section 4.1.3 are to check for specific Random
values that are signalling sentinels, but by the time we are
processing as a HelloRetryRequest we already know exactly what the
"Random" value is.  I'm not sure whether this text should be removed
or there are some other checks that I am failing to see.


We recommend that for external PSKs, clients SHOULD send an
obfuscated_ticket_age of zero, which allows observers to trivially
determine that a given PSK identity corresponds to an external PSK.
Is it necessary to leave this side channel open, instead letting the
server look up an external PSK identity and ignore the
obfuscated_ticket_age in that case?


This document explicitly prohibits the use of the OpenPGP
certificate type (RFC 6091) with TLS 1.3 but implicitly allows its use for
previous versions of TLS.  Preumably that means someone(TM) needs to
remember to do a status change for RFC 6091 along with or before RFC
5246.


-Benjamin


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 IANA Considerations
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On 03/05/2018 05:41 AM, Tony Putman wrote:
> Should the TLS 1.3 draft request a new registry for psk_key_exchange_modes? 
> Initially, I thought that there was no way to extend it, but the email below from 
> Martin Thomson suggests adding a new codepoint, so I thought it best to check
> that this wasn't an oversight in the draft.
>

Yes, it should, and there's a pull request already:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1165

Thanks for pointing this out!

-Ben


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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 14:35:23 -0800
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To: Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com>
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org,  "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:00 PM, Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com> wrote:

> - There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
>   require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
>   nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
>   alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
>   extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
>   statement in the text that requires an error response (with
>   implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
>   correct minor code).
>

Your review is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from it.
I want to pick out just one small piece, but don't mean that to diminish
how thorough it was!

On the specific suggestion of having more granular error codes, I think
this is a dangerous direction to take lightly; there's at least one
instance where granular TLS alert messages have directly led to security
issues by acting as oracles that aided the attacker.

There's a general conjecture that the more information that is provided to
attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a compromise. Personally
I believe that conjecture, and would actually prefer to see fewer signals,
ideally as few as one big error code. There is a trade-off against
debugability, but I've only seen a handful of people have the skills to
debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk. Others
disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable
contention.

-- 
Colm

--f403043ee3acf984590566c60ecf
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:00 PM, Dale Worley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:worley@ariadne.com" target=3D"_blank">worley@ariadne.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">- There are about 28 err=
or codes but nearly 150 places where the text<br>
=C2=A0 require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,<br>
=C2=A0 nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.=C2=A0 There ar=
e 19<br>
=C2=A0 alone for &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;.=C2=A0 I would like to see a=
n &quot;alert<br>
=C2=A0 extension value&quot; which assigns a distinct &quot;minor&quot; cod=
e to each<br>
=C2=A0 statement in the text that requires an error response (with<br>
=C2=A0 implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the<br=
>
=C2=A0 correct minor code).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Your review=
 is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from it. I want to p=
ick out just one small piece, but don&#39;t mean that to diminish how thoro=
ugh it was!</div><div><br></div><div>On the specific suggestion of having m=
ore granular error codes, I think this is a dangerous direction to take lig=
htly; there&#39;s at least one instance where granular TLS alert messages h=
ave directly led to security issues by acting as oracles that aided the att=
acker.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s a general conjecture that=
 the more information that is provided to attackers, the more easily they c=
an leverage into a compromise. Personally I believe that conjecture, and wo=
uld actually prefer to see fewer signals, ideally as few as one big error c=
ode. There is a trade-off against debugability, but I&#39;ve only seen a ha=
ndful of people have the skills to debug low level TLS issues and it doesn&=
#39;t seem worth the risk. Others disagree, which is valid, but it&#39;s at=
 least an area of reasonable contention. =C2=A0</div></div><div><br></div>-=
- <br><div class=3D"m_-3959784719233718033gmail_signature" data-smartmail=
=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

--f403043ee3acf984590566c60ecf--


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Cc: Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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On Mar 6, 2018, at 5:35 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> =
wrote:
> There's a general conjecture that the more information that is =
provided to attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a =
compromise. Personally I believe that conjecture, and would actually =
prefer to see fewer signals, ideally as few as one big error code. There =
is a trade-off against debugability, but I've only seen a handful of =
people have the skills to debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem =
worth the risk. Others disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an =
area of reasonable contention. =20

This makes perfect sense.   Stuart Cheshire and I were having the same =
discussion a while back about DNS Session Signaling, and he pointed out =
(I was playing Dale's role) that there's an important distinction to be =
made between "buggy implementation" and "actionable notification where =
no bug exists."   Any alert that signals "buggy implementation" is bad, =
for the reason you've stated, and also because such signals are not =
actionable=E2=80=94if you've run into a bug you should probably just =
give up, and not try to somehow guess in your implementation what might =
work when the bug happens.   The only reason to send a signal is if =
there is a known and clear action to take upon receiving the signal, =
other than "we're borked, give up."


--Apple-Mail=_2EE582FA-37AC-4DE1-B570-27AA3C2C3770
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 6, 2018, at 5:35 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" class=3D"">colm@allcosts.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">There's a general conjecture =
that the more information that is provided to attackers, the more easily =
they can leverage into a compromise. Personally I believe that =
conjecture, and would actually prefer to see fewer signals, ideally as =
few as one big error code. There is a trade-off against debugability, =
but I've only seen a handful of people have the skills to debug low =
level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk. Others disagree, =
which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable contention. =
&nbsp;</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">This =
makes perfect sense. &nbsp; Stuart Cheshire and I were having the same =
discussion a while back about DNS Session Signaling, and he pointed out =
(I was playing Dale's role) that there's an important distinction to be =
made between "buggy implementation" and "actionable notification where =
no bug exists." &nbsp; Any alert that signals "buggy implementation" is =
bad, for the reason you've stated, and also because such signals are not =
actionable=E2=80=94if you've run into a bug you should probably just =
give up, and not try to somehow guess in your implementation what might =
work when the bug happens. &nbsp; The only reason to send a signal is if =
there is a known and clear action to take upon receiving the signal, =
other than "we're borked, give up."</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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> On Mar 6, 2018, at 17:28, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> On 03/05/2018 05:41 AM, Tony Putman wrote:
>> Should the TLS 1.3 draft request a new registry for =
psk_key_exchange_modes?=20
>> Initially, I thought that there was no way to extend it, but the =
email below from=20
>> Martin Thomson suggests adding a new codepoint, so I thought it best =
to check
>> that this wasn't an oversight in the draft.
>>=20
>=20
> Yes, it should, and there's a pull request already:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1165
>=20
> Thanks for pointing this out!

The PR is based on Tony=E2=80=99s email (thanks again).  I went ahead =
and used the procedures we=E2=80=99ve adopted for the other registries.  =
In other words: no surprises.

spt=


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Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 20:26:21 -0500
From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
To: "=?utf-8?Q?<tls=40ietf.org>?=" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS 1.3
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--5a9f4021_2d1d5ae9_7b1
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Thanks for putting this together=21 I=E2=80=99m in favor of the mechanism=
 and look forward to discussing it. Negotiating with signature=5Falgorith=
ms is a simple way to roll this out, it fits in cleanly with the key sche=
dule, and the benefits outlined in the introduction (PRNG hardening, plau=
sible deniability, etc.) seem worth the effort. Although the approach has=
 its roots in OPTLS, we will certainly need to re-assess its impact on th=
e handshake. (I know of some folks actively working on this.) We also nee=
d to spend more time thinking about the open issues =E2=80=94 specificall=
y, the story around early data encryption. This variant has the benefit o=
f enabling early data with public key encryption, as opposed to (trackabl=
e) symmetric key encryption. It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whether or not we=
 need to address the static share publication issue for this benefit.

Anyway, thanks again for the draft. I=E2=80=99ll read it carefully before=
 London.

Best,
Chris

On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla <ekr=40rtfm.com>, wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> Here's another entry in the DH-only pile.
>
> I've just posted:
> =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00
>
> This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed from
> OPTLS =5B0=5D. There are obviously connections with draft-putman, but
> this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style
> exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server's
> capabilities (though it's extensible to 0-RTT) than towards
> pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the
> key schedule.
>
> We'd like 10 minutes to discuss this in London.
>
> Thanks,
> -Ekr
>
> =5B0=5D http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/
>
>
>
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> TLS mailing list
> TLS=40ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--5a9f4021_2d1d5ae9_7b1
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<html xmlns=3D=22http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml=22>
<head>
<title></title>
</head>
<body>
<div name=3D=22messageBodySection=22 style=3D=22font-size: 14px; font-fam=
ily: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystem=46ont, sans-serif;=22>Thanks for putti=
ng this together=21 I=E2=80=99m in favor of the mechanism and look forwar=
d to discussing it. Negotiating with signature=5Falgorithms is a simple w=
ay to roll this out, it fits in cleanly with the key schedule, and the be=
nefits outlined in the introduction (PRNG hardening, plausible deniabilit=
y, etc.) seem worth the effort. Although the approach has its roots in OP=
TLS, we will certainly need to re-assess its impact on the handshake. (I =
know of some folks actively working on this.) We also need to spend more =
time thinking about the open issues =E2=80=94 specifically, the story aro=
und early data encryption. This variant has the benefit of enabling early=
 data with public key encryption, as opposed to (trackable) symmetric key=
 encryption. It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whether or not we need to address=
 the static share publication issue for this benefit.
<div><br /></div>
<div>Anyway, thanks again for the draft. I=E2=80=99ll read it carefully b=
efore London.<br /></div>
</div>
<div name=3D=22messageSignatureSection=22 style=3D=22font-size: 14px; fon=
t-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystem=46ont, sans-serif;=22><br />
Best,
<div>Chris</div>
</div>
<div name=3D=22messageReplySection=22 style=3D=22font-size: 14px; font-fa=
mily: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystem=46ont, sans-serif;=22><br />
On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla &lt;ekr=40rtfm.com&gt;, wrot=
e:<br />
<blockquote type=3D=22cite=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; padding-left: 1=
0px; border-left: thin solid =231abc9c;=22>
<div dir=3D=22ltr=22>
<div>Hi folks,</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Here's another entry in the DH-only pile.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>I've just posted:</div>
<div>&=23160; &=23160;draft-rescorla-tls13-<wbr />semistatic-dh-00</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed from</div>=

<div>OPTLS =5B0=5D. There are obviously connections with draft-putman, bu=
t</div>
<div>this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style</div>
<div>exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server's</div>=

<div>capabilities (though it's extensible to 0-RTT) than towards</div>
<div>pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the</div>
<div>key schedule.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>We'd like 10 minutes to discuss this in London.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>=5B0=5D <a href=3D=22http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/74=
67348/=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/<wbr />abstr=
act/document/7467348/</a></div>
<div><br /></div>
<div><br /></div>
<div><br /></div>
</div>
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br />
TLS mailing list<br />
TLS=40ietf.org<br />
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br /></blockquote>
<div></div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--5a9f4021_2d1d5ae9_7b1--


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Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> writes:
> On the specific suggestion of having more granular error codes, I think
> this is a dangerous direction to take lightly; there's at least one
> instance where granular TLS alert messages have directly led to security
> issues by acting as oracles that aided the attacker.
>
> There's a general conjecture that the more information that is provided to
> attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a compromise. Personally
> I believe that conjecture, and would actually prefer to see fewer signals,
> ideally as few as one big error code. There is a trade-off against
> debugability, but I've only seen a handful of people have the skills to
> debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk. Others
> disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable
> contention.

I believe I've heard that position stated before, and I give it
credibility.  I retreat to the statement I made at the top of my review,
that I'm not experienced in security.  OTOH, I've spent a lot of the
previous couple of decades debugging SIP call flows, so I've learned to
appreciate any aid to debuggability that exists.

I'm tempted to consider this a classic case of conflicting requirements,
and ask if our cryptographic experience can help us square this circle.

Dale


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--001a1147a324826fc40566caac38
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Without taking a position on the security matter: this has been part of the
TLS design for 20+ years, and therefore has had multiple LCs and WG and
IETF consensus, so it would take a pretty strong set of arguments to change
now. I've debugged a lot of TLS interop issues, and as a practical matter,
I don't think this would help that much to justify making a change.
-Ekr


On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> =
wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:00 PM, Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com> wrote:
>
>> - There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
>>   require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
>>   nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
>>   alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
>>   extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
>>   statement in the text that requires an error response (with
>>   implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
>>   correct minor code).
>>
>
> Your review is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from it=
.
> I want to pick out just one small piece, but don't mean that to diminish
> how thorough it was!
>
> On the specific suggestion of having more granular error codes, I think
> this is a dangerous direction to take lightly; there's at least one
> instance where granular TLS alert messages have directly led to security
> issues by acting as oracles that aided the attacker.
>
> There's a general conjecture that the more information that is provided t=
o
> attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a compromise. Personall=
y
> I believe that conjecture, and would actually prefer to see fewer signals=
,
> ideally as few as one big error code. There is a trade-off against
> debugability, but I've only seen a handful of people have the skills to
> debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk. Others
> disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable
> contention.
>
> --
> Colm
>

--001a1147a324826fc40566caac38
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Without taking a position on the security matter: this has=
 been part of the TLS design for 20+ years, and therefore has had multiple =
LCs and WG and IETF consensus, so it would take a pretty strong set of argu=
ments to change now. I&#39;ve debugged a lot of TLS interop issues, and as =
a practical matter, I don&#39;t think this would help that much to justify =
making a change.<div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 2:35=
 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:colm@al=
lcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allcosts.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:=
00 PM, Dale Worley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:worley@ariadne.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">worley@ariadne.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex">- There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 place=
s where the text<br>
=C2=A0 require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,<br>
=C2=A0 nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.=C2=A0 There ar=
e 19<br>
=C2=A0 alone for &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;.=C2=A0 I would like to see a=
n &quot;alert<br>
=C2=A0 extension value&quot; which assigns a distinct &quot;minor&quot; cod=
e to each<br>
=C2=A0 statement in the text that requires an error response (with<br>
=C2=A0 implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the<br=
>
=C2=A0 correct minor code).<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Your=
 review is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from it. I wa=
nt to pick out just one small piece, but don&#39;t mean that to diminish ho=
w thorough it was!</div><div><br></div><div>On the specific suggestion of h=
aving more granular error codes, I think this is a dangerous direction to t=
ake lightly; there&#39;s at least one instance where granular TLS alert mes=
sages have directly led to security issues by acting as oracles that aided =
the attacker.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s a general conjectu=
re that the more information that is provided to attackers, the more easily=
 they can leverage into a compromise. Personally I believe that conjecture,=
 and would actually prefer to see fewer signals, ideally as few as one big =
error code. There is a trade-off against debugability, but I&#39;ve only se=
en a handful of people have the skills to debug low level TLS issues and it=
 doesn&#39;t seem worth the risk. Others disagree, which is valid, but it&#=
39;s at least an area of reasonable contention. =C2=A0</div></div><span cla=
ss=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"m=
_-6165950854328938141m_-3959784719233718033gmail_signature" data-smartmail=
=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</font></span></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1147a324826fc40566caac38--


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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you (Editor, Work Group, and all the contributors) for an exceedingly
well written document, pragmatic structure, and meaningful appendices (esp
Appendix E.5 for 0-RTT).

As a _very_ loose comment that can't really be actioned at this step; I like
the various 'handshake' tables however the some of the follow-on paragraphs
used to describe packets required a second read to understand. I guess it's a
stylistic preference and I'll leave that for the draft editor and RFC Editor to
look at in due course (so please don't respond to this particular comment but
expect time in the RFC ed process clarifying for the neophyte)

Can some of the subtle text be made a little tighter? (only if your AD believes
it worthwhile) For example in section 4.2:

it is written:
"Some cases where a server does not agree to an extension are error
      conditions, and some are simply refusals to support particular
      features.  In general, error alerts should be used for the former
      and a field in the server extension response for the latter."

I think what the WG is trying to say:

"In general, error alerts should be used where a server does not agree to an
extension and it is an error condition. When it is a refusal to support a
particular feature a field in the server extension response should be used."
(all with lack of RFC2119 language)

(..interestingly the bullet following the above is very clear)

Really nice plan to use 0x7f00 as the draft version indicator.

Thank you for dealing with padding as you have. Much appreciated!



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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks to the many pages of people who worked on this document. The result is
surprisingly clear and easy to understand. I'm excited to see TLS 1.3 complete,
and look forward to its widespread deployment.

I have a handful of substantive comments (which may be as much as result of my
unfamiliarity with some of the underlying technologies), followed by several
editorial nits.

===========================================================================
Substantive Comments
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Abstract:

This document obsoletes 5077, 5246, and 6961; and updates 4492, 5705, and 6066.
Please mention these in the abstract; see
<https://ietf.org/standards/ids/checklist/> §3.1.D

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.2.1:

>  TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.  Servers should be prepared to receive
>  ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in
>  the list of versions.

This "should" reads as if it should be normative. It also seems that making this
"should" instead of "MUST" could result in the same "can't negotiate to earlier
versions" implementation situation that is mentioned elsewhere in the document.
Consider a server that supports TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. It receives a ClientHello
from a client that supports TLS 1.2 and a future TLS 1.4. Let's postulate that
this client doesn't support 1.3 (say, because of some uncurable flaw that
exists in 1.3, but not in 1.2 or 1.4). If the server isn't prepared to deal
with this situation, we end up in the same "can't move versions forward"
corner that led to freezing the legacy version string at 0x0303.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.2.3:

>         /* Reserved Code Points */
>         private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF),
>         (0xFFFF)
>     } SignatureScheme;

When a node supports both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, this private use space only
allows for the definition of two private-use hashes that can be used in both
circumstances (as only 0xFE and 0xFF will be recognized by 1.2 as specifying
hashes). I don't know what the use cases for this private use space is; but
given the relatively generous allocation in RFC 5246, is two going to be enough?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§5.5:

>  There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
>  be safely encrypted under a given set of keys.  [AEAD-LIMITS]
>  provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the
>  underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.
>  Implementations SHOULD do a key update as described in Section 4.6.3
>  prior to reaching these limits.

Implementing this "SHOULD" is predicated on understanding the contents of
[AEAD-LIMITS], which means [AEAD-LIMITS] needs to be a normative reference.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§11:

>  -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
>     range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
>     [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are
>     reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte in
>     the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are
>     not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.

Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the reservation of
first byte=0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will be made from
the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is the case, I
would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request that the IANA
close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies to TLS
SignatureAlgorithm Registry.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix B:

This is a consolidation of the structures found in the document. Presumably,
Appendix B is normative and the other versions are illustrative? To help deal
with the possibility of conflicts between the two versions, it would be nice if
this were stated explicitly.

===========================================================================
Editorial Nits
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

General:

  ** There are 33 instances of too long lines in the document, the longest
     one being 8 characters in excess of 72.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

General:

Although both "implementor" and "implementer" are acceptable spellings,
it is unusual for a document to switch back and forth. I recommend consistency.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§1:

>  the protocol attributes used to negotiate Elliptic Curves.  Because
>  TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] as

"...derived, it..."

>  described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are

"...Section 7.5. It also..."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§1.3:

>  -  Elliptic curve algorithms are now in the base spec and includes
>     new signature algorithms, such as ed25519 and ed448.  TLS 1.3

s/includes/include/

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§3.4:

>  All values, here and elsewhere in the specification, are stored in
>  network byte (big-endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex

s/stored/transmitted/

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.2.3:

>  RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms  Indicates a signature algorithm using
>     RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] with mask generation function 1.  The digest
>     used in the mask generation function and the digest being signed
>     are both the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS].
>     The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
>     algorithm.  If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>     it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID [RFC5756].  When used in
>     certificate signatures, the algorithm parameters MUST be DER
>     encoded.  If the corresponding public key's parameters present,

"...parameters are present,..."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.2.6:

>  The "post_handshake_auth" extension is used to indicate that a client
>  is willing to perform post-handshake authentication Section 4.6.2.

"...authentication (Section 4.6.2)."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.2.11.1:

>  The client's view of the age of a ticket is the time since the
>  receipt of the NewSessionTicket message.  Clients MUST NOT attempt to
>  use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" value
>  which was provided with the ticket.  The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
>  field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the
>  ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the
>  "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket, see
>  Section 4.6.1 modulo 2^32.

"...the ticket (see Section 4.1.6), modulo 2^32."

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§4.4.3:

>  The context string for a server signature is "TLS 1.3, server
>  CertificateVerify" and for a client signature is "TLS 1.3, client
>  CertificateVerify".  It is used to provide separation between
>  signatures made in different contexts, helping against potential
>  cross-protocol attacks.

Although the example makes it clear, the preceding is the normative description
of behavior. Since the limitations of the RFC format result in line wrapping in
the middle of two strings that must be bit exact for the protocol to function,
it is probably worthwhile setting them off on their own lines so that they don't
contain extra line feeds and indenting spaces.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§7.4.1:

>  For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is
>  performed.  The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a byte string by
>  encoding in big-endian and padded with zeros up to the size of the
>  prime.

Presumably "...and left padded...", correct?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§12.2:

>  [DOW92]    Diffie, W., van Oorschot, P., and M. Wiener,
>             ""Authentication and authenticated key exchanges"",
>             Designs, Codes and Cryptography , 1992.

The ""quoting"" here is odd

>  [HCJ16]    Husak, M., &#268;ermak, M., Jirsik, T., and P.
>             &#268;eleda, "HTTPS traffic analysis and client
>             identification using passive SSL/TLS fingerprinting",
>             EURASIP Journal on Information Security Vol. 2016,
>             DOI 10.1186/s13635-016-0030-7, February 2016.

s/&268;/"/g

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§12.3:

This section seems superfluous.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§E.1.1:

>  more invocations of HKDF-Expand.  This ordering should always be
>  followed (including in future revisions of this document), in
>  particular, one SHOULD NOT use an output of HKDF-Extract as an input

"...of this document); in particular, one..."
                     ^

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§E.6:

>  Although TLS 1.3 does not use RSA key transport and so is not
>  directly susceptible to Bleichenbacher-type attacks

It seems that this should cite "Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols
based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1".

===========================================================================

General (deferred to the end due to length):

As a rule of thumb, "that" is used to start restrictive clauses ("Two doors
are in front of you. The door that is on the right leads outside"), while
"which" is used to start non-restrictive clauses ("The only door in the room,
which is made of wood, leads outside.") This document uses "which" where "that"
is called for in numerous locations. Although there are several more than listed
below, I'm highlighting the locations where a literal reading of "which"
technically leads to ambiguity. Each instance has a leading line for context
(except those that occur at the beginning of a paragraph).

§1.1:
>    server: The endpoint which did not initiate the TLS connection.

§1.3:
>       favor of a version list in an extension.  This increases
>       compatibility with servers which incorrectly implemented version

§4:
>    Protocol messages MUST be sent in the order defined in Section 4.4.1
>    and shown in the diagrams in Section 2.  A peer which receives a

§4.1.2:
>       alert.  Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior
>       ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST

§4.1.3:
>    cipher_suite  The single cipher suite selected by the server from the
>       list in ClientHello.cipher_suites.  A client which receives a

>    TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's
>    random value.  TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in

§4.1.4:
>    compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second
>    ClientHello.  A client which receives a cipher suite that was not

§4.2.1:
>    The "supported_versions" extension is used by the client to indicate
>    which versions of TLS it supports and by the server to indicate which

>    Implementations of this specification MUST send this extension
>    containing all versions of TLS which they are prepared to negotiate

>    If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with

>    version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range.
>    Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of

>    A server which negotiates a version of TLS prior to TLS 1.3 MUST set

>    ServerHello.version and MUST NOT send the "supported_versions"
>    extension.  A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending

§4.2.3:
>    present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to
>    signatures appearing in certificates.  Clients which desire the

>    The "signature_algorithms_cert" extension was added to allow
>    implementations which supported different sets of algorithms for

>    TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>    Implementations which have the same policy in both cases MAY omit the

>    takes as input an arbitrary-length message, rather than a digest.
>    Algorithms which traditionally act on a digest should be defined in

>       as defined in [SHS].  These values refer solely to signatures
>       which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and are not

>    Legacy algorithms  Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated

>       RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA.  These values refer solely to
>       signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and

§4.2.4:
>    [RFC6066], but is more complicated, is not used in TLS 1.3 (although
>    it may appear in ClientHello messages from clients which are offering

§4.2.5:
>    The "oid_filters" extension allows servers to provide a set of OID/
>    value pairs which it would like the client's certificate to match.

§4.2.6:
>    Servers MUST NOT send a post-handshake CertificateRequest to clients
>    which do not offer this extension.  Servers MUST NOT send this

§4.2.7:
>    When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension indicates
>    the named groups which the client supports for key exchange, ordered

§4.2.8:
>    MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a group
>    which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the

>    original ClientHello; and (2) the selected_group field does not
>    correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" extension

§4.2.10:
>    NewSessionTicket message, the associated values are those which were
>    negotiated in the connection which established the PSK.  The PSK used

>    A server which receives an "early_data" extension MUST behave in one

§4.2.11.1:
>    receipt of the NewSessionTicket message.  Clients MUST NOT attempt to
>    use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" value

>    use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" value
>    which was provided with the ticket.  The "obfuscated_ticket_age"

§4.2.11.2:
>    message (Section 4.4.4) but with the BaseKey being the binder_key
>    derived via the key schedule from the corresponding PSK which is


§4.3.2:
>    A server which is authenticating with a certificate MAY optionally

>    certificate_request_context  An opaque string which identifies the

>    certificate_request_context  An opaque string which identifies the
>       certificate request and which will be echoed in the client's

>    In prior versions of TLS, the CertificateRequest message carried a
>    list of signature algorithms and certificate authorities which the

>    Servers which are authenticating with a PSK MUST NOT send the

§4.4.2:
>    potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any
>    TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which


§4.4.2.4:
>    Any endpoint receiving any certificate which it would need to

>    and it is RECOMMENDED that any endpoint receiving any certificate
>    which it would need to validate using any signature algorithm using a


§4.6.1:
>    Note that in principle it is possible to continue issuing new tickets
>    which indefinitely extend the lifetime of the keying material


§4.6.2:
>    CertificateRequest and receiving a response.  In addition, clients
>    which receive multiple CertificateRequests in close succession MAY

§4.6.3:
>    record.  This mechanism allows either side to force an update to the
>    entire connection, but causes an implementation which receives

§5:
>    condition prior to attempting to deprotect the record.  An
>    implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or

>    implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
>    which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abort the

§5.5:
>    There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can

§6:
>    Note: TLS defines two generic alerts (see Section 6) to use upon
>    failure to parse a message.  Peers which receive a message which

>    length) MUST terminate the connection with a "decode_error" alert.
>    Peers which receive a message which is syntactically correct but

§6.2:
>    bad_record_mac  This alert is returned if a record is received which

§7:
>    The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are

§8:
>       attempting to retry requests.  However, 0-RTT adds an additional
>       dimension for any server system which does not maintain globally

>    operation, clients will not know which, if any, of these mechanisms
>    servers actually implement and hence MUST only send early data which

§8.2:
>    long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup
>    time.  Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were

§8.3:
>    number of ClientHellos and is a useful optimization for single-use
>    tickets because it allows efficient rejection of ClientHellos which

§9.2:
>    Servers receiving a ClientHello which does not conform to these

§9.3:
>    -  A middlebox which terminates a TLS connection MUST behave as a

>       compliant TLS server (to the original client), including having a
>       certificate which the client is willing to accept, and as a

>       apply to the two connections separately.  Safely deploying a TLS
>       terminator requires additional security considerations which are

>    -  An middlebox which forwards ClientHello parameters it does not

§A:
>    e.g., START) have no formal meaning but are provided for ease of
>    comprehension.  Actions which are taken only in certain circumstances


§C.3:
>    -  As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which

§D:
>    the master secret.  Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript
>    up to the server CertificateVerify, implementations which support

§E.1:
>    transitively includes the original handshake transcript, because that
>    transcript is digested into the values which produce the Resumption

>    If an exporter is used, then it produces values which are unique and

>    similar security properties.  Note that they do not include the
>    client's certificate; future applications which wish to bind to the

§E.2:
>    Integrity.  An attacker should not be able to craft a new record
>       which is different from an existing record which will be accepted

>    Order protection/non-replayability  An attacker should not be able to
>       cause the receiver to accept a record which it has already

>    sequence number being maintained independently at both sides thus
>    records which are delivered out of order result in AEAD deprotection

>    TLS does not provide security for data which is communicated on a

>    an attacker who learns a traffic secret can compute all future
>    traffic secrets on that connection.  Systems which want such

§E.5:
>    -  Duplication of actions which cause side effects (e.g., purchasing

>    data from being accepted multiple times by any cluster with
>    consistent state; for servers which limit the use of 0-RTT to one

>    window.  Because clients do not know the exact details of server
>    behavior, they MUST NOT send messages in early data which are not

>    behavior, they MUST NOT send messages in early data which are not
>    safe to have replayed and which they would not be willing to retry

§E.5.1:
>    Replays of the ClientHello produce the same early exporter, thus
>    requiring additional care by applications which use these exporters.



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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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On Wednesday, 21 February 2018 15:31:33 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> i think your general point is sound here, but I'll nitpick the statement
> that
> "if the server recognises an identity but is unable to verify correspondi=
ng
> binder".
>=20
> 1. The server only picks one identity so you if you send A, B, and C and =
you
> get an abort, you don't know if it recognized one or all.
> 2. The server can *recognize* the identity but ignore it (say it's a tick=
et
> that's
> too old)
>=20
> With that said, I think it would probably be safe to say you must ignore =
an
> identity
> where the binder doesn't validate, but I'd like to hear from cryptographe=
rs
> on this
> one.

Proposed https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1167 so that we don't for=
get=20
about it.
=20
> Thanks,
> -Ekr
>=20
> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 6:26 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 21 February 2018 15:21:58 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 6:13 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wro=
te:
> > > > On Friday, 16 February 2018 18:06:41 CET The IESG wrote:
> > > > > The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security=
 WG
> > > >=20
> > > > (tls)
> > > >=20
> > > > > to consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Securi=
ty
> > > > > (TLS)
> > > > > Protocol Version 1.3'
> > > > >=20
> > > > >   <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> as Proposed Standard
> > > >=20
> > > > The current draft states that if the server recognises an identity =
but
> >=20
> > is
> >=20
> > > > unable to verify corresponding binder, it "MUST abort the handshake"
> > >=20
> > > Which text are you referring to here?
> >=20
> > Section 4.2.11:
> >    Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
> >    the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
> >    value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
> >    handshake.  Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multiple binders;
> >    rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the binder
> >    that corresponds to that PSK.
> > >=20
> > > -Ekr
> > >=20
> > > at the same time, they "SHOULD select as single PSK and validate sole=
ly
> >=20
> > the
> >=20
> > > > binder that corresponds to that PSK"
> > > > (Page 60, draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24).
> > > >=20
> > > > That allows for trivial enumeration of externally established
> >=20
> > identities -
> >=20
> > > > the
> > > > attacker just needs to send to the server a list of identity guesse=
s,
> >=20
> > with
> >=20
> > > > random data as binders, if the server recognises any identity it wi=
ll
> > > > abort
> > > > connection, if it doesn't, it will continue to a non-PSK handshake.
> > > >=20
> > > > Behaviour like this is generally considered a vulnerability:
> > > > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2003-0190
> > > > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2006-5229
> > > >=20
> > > > I was wondering if the document shouldn't recommend ignoring any and
> >=20
> > all
> >=20
> > > > identities for which binders do not verify to prevent this kind of
> >=20
> > attack.
> >=20
> > > > --
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Hubert Kario
> > > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Repub=
lic
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > TLS mailing list
> > > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >=20
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Wed Mar  7 05:30:02 2018
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From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
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Subject: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the
following is addressed/discussed:

Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding
requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to (or
very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples on
page 37:

  TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes  are not equal to
  the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS  1.1 or below

and

 A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior  and which
 receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST  abort the handshake
 with a "protocol_version" alert.  Note that  renegotiation is not possible
 when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.

There are similar statements on page 45:

  TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.

and on page 48:

  However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
  curve.  If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared
  to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in
  the "supported_groups" extension.

I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to pure
TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose to
use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the Abstract/Introduction
that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new
requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both "Obsoletes" and
"Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

1) On page 47:
 The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest      algorithm

Length of algorithm?

2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references on
2nd/3rd use.

3) On page 57:

   The
   server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received
   records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive
   the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT
   handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the
   configured max_early_data_size.

I read this several times and still don't understand what this is saying. It is
saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either don't mean
"ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying example or a
reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful here.

4) On page 82:

   When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext  structures
   are written directly onto the wire.  Once record  protection has started,
   TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent   as described in the following
   section

Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS application
layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to
signal record type)?

5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is required to
be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional requirements on
AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:

On page 84:

   An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion  greater
   than 255 octets

and

   An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8  bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS

6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when you
use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various functions.



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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 06:16:01 -0800
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To: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
wrote:

> Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the
> following is addressed/discussed:
>
> Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding
> requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to
> (or
> very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples
> on
> page 37:
>
>   TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes  are not
> equal to
>   the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS  1.1 or below
>
> and
>
>  A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior  and
> which
>  receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST  abort the
> handshake
>  with a "protocol_version" alert.  Note that  renegotiation is not possible
>  when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.
>
> There are similar statements on page 45:
>
>   TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>
> and on page 48:
>
>   However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
>   curve.  If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared
>   to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in
>   the "supported_groups" extension.
>
> I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to
> pure
> TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose
> to
> use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the
> Abstract/Introduction
> that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new
> requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both
> "Obsoletes" and
> "Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)
>


The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S 1.4
tries
to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.

I suggest we:

(1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:
"This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

(2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:
   This document defines several changes that optionally affect
   implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also
   support TLS 1.3

(3) Strike the following graf:

   An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to
   include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not in
   use.  See the referenced sections for more details.




>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 1) On page 47:
>  The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
> algorithm
>
> Length of algorithm?
>

Right. Output of.



>
> 2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references
> on
> 2nd/3rd use.
>

Thanks.


>
> 3) On page 57:
>
>    The
>    server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received
>    records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive
>    the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT
>    handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the
>    configured max_early_data_size.
>
> I read this several times and still don't understand what this is saying.
> It is
> saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either don't
> mean
> "ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying example
> or a
> reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful
> here.
>

We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt those records
using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.


> 4) On page 82:
>
>    When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
> structures
>    are written directly onto the wire.  Once record  protection has
> started,
>    TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent   as described in the
> following
>    section
>
> Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS
> application
> layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to
> signal record type)?
>

No, you can't write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.

   Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending the Finished
   message and until the record layer starts using encryption keys.
   Note that while the server may send application data prior to
   receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent at that
   point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.

It's non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent in this
fashion
prior to the handshake.



5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is required
> to
> be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional
> requirements on
> AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:
>
> On page 84:
>
>    An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion  greater
>    than 255 octets
>
> and
>
>    An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8  bytes MUST NOT be used
> with TLS
>

I concur. Thanks.



6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when you
> use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various functions.
>

This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it
elsewhere?

   If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
   string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.  Note that this

-Ekr

--94eb2c0627384b12360566d33563
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm" target=3D"_blank">aamelnikov@fastm=
ail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for<br>
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss<br>
<br>
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br>
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br>
introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-crit=
eria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/<=
wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br>
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
DISCUSS:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the<=
br>
following is addressed/discussed:<br>
<br>
Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding<br>
requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to (=
or<br>
very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples =
on<br>
page 37:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes=C2=A0 ar=
e not equal to<br>
=C2=A0 the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS=C2=A0 1.1 or below=
<br>
<br>
and<br>
<br>
=C2=A0A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior=C2=
=A0 and which<br>
=C2=A0receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST=C2=A0 abort =
the handshake<br>
=C2=A0with a &quot;protocol_version&quot; alert.=C2=A0 Note that=C2=A0 rene=
gotiation is not possible<br>
=C2=A0when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.<br>
<br>
There are similar statements on page 45:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.<br>
<br>
and on page 48:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing<br>
=C2=A0 curve.=C2=A0 If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepa=
red<br>
=C2=A0 to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in<br=
>
=C2=A0 the &quot;supported_groups&quot; extension.<br>
<br>
I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to p=
ure<br>
TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose t=
o<br>
use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the Abstract/Introduct=
ion<br>
that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new<br>
requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both &quot;Obsol=
etes&quot; and<br>
&quot;Updates&quot; TLS 1.2 RFC.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as we=
ll. S 1.4 tries</div><div>to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>I suggest we:</div><div><br></div><div>(1) Add the foll=
owing sentence to the abstract:</div><div>&quot;This document also specifie=
s new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</div><div><br></div><div>(2=
) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:</div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0T=
his document defines several changes that optionally affect</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also</di=
v></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0support TLS 1.3</div><div><br></div><div>(3) Stri=
ke the following graf:</div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0An implem=
entation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not=
 in</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0use.=C2=A0 See the referenced sections for more =
details.</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
COMMENT:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
1) On page 47:<br>
=C2=A0The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm<br>
<br>
Length of algorithm?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right. Output of.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex">
<br>
2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references o=
n<br>
2nd/3rd use.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks.</div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
3) On page 57:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt receiv=
ed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to rece=
ive<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client&#39;s second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0configured max_early_data_size.<br>
<br>
I read this several times and still don&#39;t understand what this is sayin=
g. It is<br>
saying &quot;ignores ... until it is able to receive&quot;. I think you eit=
her don&#39;t mean<br>
&quot;ignore&quot; (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifyin=
g example or a<br>
reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful =
here.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We do mean discard. The idea here=
 is that you try to decrypt those records</div><div>using the handshake key=
s and if that fails you ignore them.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
4) On page 82:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext=
=C2=A0 structures<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are written directly onto the wire.=C2=A0 Once record=C2=A0 pr=
otection has started,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent=C2=A0 =C2=A0as des=
cribed in the following<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0section<br>
<br>
Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS applicat=
ion<br>
layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to=
<br>
signal record type)?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, you can&#39;t =
write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.</div><div><br=
></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to se=
nding the Finished</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0message and until the record laye=
r starts using encryption keys.</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that while the =
server may send application data prior to</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0receiving =
the client&#39;s Authentication messages, any data sent at that</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.</d=
iv></div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s non-application data (handshake, aler=
ts, acks) which is sent in this fashion</div><div>prior to the handshake.</=
div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is required=
 to<br>
be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional requirement=
s on<br>
AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:<br>
<br>
On page 84:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansio=
n=C2=A0 greater<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0than 255 octets<br>
<br>
and<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8=C2=A0 bytes MUST =
NOT be used with TLS<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I concur. Thanks.<=
/div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when yo=
u<br>
use &#39;0&#39; you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various function=
s.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is in the first paragraph after=
 the diagram. Would you prefer it elsewhere?</div><div><br></div><div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consistin=
g of a</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is u=
sed.=C2=A0 Note that this</div></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br=
></div></div><br></div></div>

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From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "tls-chairs" <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Ekr,

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov
> <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:>> Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
>>  draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss
>> 
>>  When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
>>  to all>>  email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
>>  cut this>>  introductory paragraph, however.)
>> 
>> 
>>  Please refer to
>>  https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html>>  for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>> 
>> 
>>  The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>  ------>>  DISCUSS:
>>  ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>  ------>> 
>>  Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes
>>  once the>>  following is addressed/discussed:
>> 
>>  Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is
>>  adding>>  requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not
>>  going to (or>>  very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two
>>  examples on>>  page 37:
>> 
>>    TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes  are
>>    not equal to>>    the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS  1.1 or below
>> 
>>  and
>> 
>>   A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior
>>   and which>>   receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST  abort the
>>   handshake>>   with a "protocol_version" alert.  Note that  renegotiation is not
>>   possible>>   when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.
>> 
>>  There are similar statements on page 45:
>> 
>>    TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>> 
>>  and on page 48:
>> 
>>    However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
>>    curve.  If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared>>    to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in>>    the "supported_groups" extension.
>> 
>>  I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements
>>  apply to pure>>  TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and
>>  choose to>>  use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the
>>  Abstract/Introduction>>  that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new>>  requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both
>>  "Obsoletes" and>>  "Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)
> 
> 
> The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S
> 1.4 tries> to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.
> 
> I suggest we:
> 
> (1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:
> "This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2
> implementations.> 
> (2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:
>    This document defines several changes that optionally affect
>    implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also
>    support TLS 1.3
> 
> (3) Strike the following graf:
> 
>    An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might
>    need to>    include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is
>    not in>    use.  See the referenced sections for more details.
I think this will address my concern.

>   
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>> ------->>  COMMENT:
>>  ----------------------------------------------------------------
>>  ------>> 
>>  1) On page 47:
>>   The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
>>   algorithm>> 
>>  Length of algorithm?
> 
> Right. Output of.
> 
>  
>> 
>> 2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some
>>    references on>>  2nd/3rd use.
> 
> Thanks.
>  
>> 
>> 3) On page 57:
>> 
>>     The
>>     server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received>>     records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive>>     the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT
>>     handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the
>>     configured max_early_data_size.
>> 
>>  I read this several times and still don't understand what this is
>>  saying. It is>>  saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either
>>  don't mean>>  "ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying
>>  example or a>>  reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very
>>  helpful here.> 
> We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt
> those records> using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.

Ok. So I suggest use "discard" and possibly delete or reword the "untill
it is able" part. Maybe split into 2 sentences?
> 
>> 
>> 4) On page 82:
>> 
>>     When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
>>     structures>>     are written directly onto the wire.  Once record  protection has
>>     started,>>     TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent   as described in the
>>     following>>     section
>> 
>>  Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS
>>  application>>  layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra
>>  octets to>>  signal record type)?
> 
> No, you can't write application data prior to this point, as
> stated in S 2.> 
>    Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending the Finished
>    message and until the record layer starts using encryption keys.
>    Note that while the server may send application data prior to
>    receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent
>    at that>    point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
> 
> It's non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent in
> this fashion> prior to the handshake.

Ok. Maybe say that in the document.
> 
>> 5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is
>>    required to>>  be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional
>>  requirements on>>  AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:
>> 
>>  On page 84:
>> 
>>     An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion
>>     greater>>     than 255 octets
>> 
>>  and
>> 
>>     An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8  bytes MUST NOT be
>>     used with TLS> 
> I concur. Thanks.
> 
> 
> 
>> 6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that
>>    when you>>  use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various
>>  functions.> 
> This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it
> elsewhere?> 
>    If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value
>    consisting of a>    string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.  Note that this

Maybe it was lack of sleep, but I didn't understand that you were
talking about the same thing. This also seems to apply more generically
then on the diagram. I suggest clarify:
  In the diagram, the value '0' denotes a string of Hash.length bytes
  set to zeros.
Or something like that.


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<body><div>Hi Ekr,</div>
<div><br></div>
<div id="sig21611513"><div>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br></div>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div>
<div><div><br></div>
<div defang_data-gmailquote="yes"><div>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm">aamelnikov@fastmail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div>Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for<br></div>
<div> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br></div>
<div> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br></div>
<div> introductory paragraph, however.)<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Please refer to <a href="https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/<wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br></div>
<div> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br></div>
<div> <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/</a><br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>----------<br></div>
<div> DISCUSS:<br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>----------<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the<br></div>
<div> following is addressed/discussed:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding<br></div>
<div> requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to (or<br></div>
<div> very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples on<br></div>
<div> page 37:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes&nbsp; are not equal to<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS&nbsp; 1.1 or below<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp;A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior&nbsp; and which<br></div>
<div> &nbsp;receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST&nbsp; abort the handshake<br></div>
<div> &nbsp;with a "protocol_version" alert.&nbsp; Note that&nbsp; renegotiation is not possible<br></div>
<div> &nbsp;when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> There are similar statements on page 45:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and on page 48:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; curve.&nbsp; If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; the "supported_groups" extension.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to pure<br></div>
<div> TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose to<br></div>
<div> use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the Abstract/Introduction<br></div>
<div> that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new<br></div>
<div> requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both "Obsoletes" and<br></div>
<div> "Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S 1.4 tries<br></div>
<div>to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>I suggest we:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:<br></div>
<div>"This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:<br></div>
<div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;This document defines several changes that optionally affect<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also<br></div>
</div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;support TLS 1.3<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(3) Strike the following graf:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not in<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;use.&nbsp; See the referenced sections for more details.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div>I think this will address my concern.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div><div defang_data-gmailquote="yes"><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;<br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div>------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>----------<br></div>
<div> COMMENT:<br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>----------<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> 1) On page 47:<br></div>
<div> &nbsp;The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; algorithm<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Length of algorithm?<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Right. Output of.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;<br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div><br></div>
<div>2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references on<br></div>
<div> 2nd/3rd use.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Thanks.<br></div>
<div>&nbsp;<br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div><br></div>
<div>3) On page 57:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;The<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;configured max_early_data_size.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> I read this several times and still don't understand what this is saying. It is<br></div>
<div> saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either don't mean<br></div>
<div> "ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying example or a<br></div>
<div> reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful here.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt those records<br></div>
<div>using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Ok. So I suggest use "discard" and possibly delete or reword the "untill it is able" part. Maybe split into 2 sentences?<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div><div defang_data-gmailquote="yes"><div><br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div><br></div>
<div>4) On page 82:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext&nbsp; structures<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;are written directly onto the wire.&nbsp; Once record&nbsp; protection has started,<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent&nbsp; &nbsp;as described in the following<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;section<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS application<br></div>
<div> layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to<br></div>
<div> signal record type)?<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>No, you can't write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending the Finished<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;message and until the record layer starts using encryption keys.<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;Note that while the server may send application data prior to<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent at that<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.<br></div>
</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>It's non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent in this fashion<br></div>
<div>prior to the handshake.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Ok. Maybe say that in the document.</div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div><div defang_data-gmailquote="yes"><div><br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div>5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is required to<br></div>
<div> be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional requirements on<br></div>
<div> AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> On page 84:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion&nbsp; greater<br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;than 255 octets<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> &nbsp; &nbsp;An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8&nbsp; bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>I concur. Thanks.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote="yes" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div>6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when you<br></div>
<div> use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various functions.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it elsewhere?<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a<br></div>
<div>&nbsp; &nbsp;string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.&nbsp; Note that this<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Maybe it was lack of sleep, but I didn't understand that you were talking about the same thing. This also seems to apply more generically then on the diagram. I suggest clarify:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp; In the diagram, the value '0' denotes a string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Or something like that.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
</body>
</html>

--_----------=_152043642529316031--


From nobody Wed Mar  7 08:38:42 2018
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Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection

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1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many other
protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understand that
this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported by the way
the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that also two
TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but
still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend for this
version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro
that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically declares
the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and extensibility is
only provided using extensions anymore.

2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why the
Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate extension?

3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I find it a
bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport in this
document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a reliable
transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information seems to
have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expect to seen
some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently
try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if it
broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to first
send other data and then start the TLS handshake?

4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changing them is
to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However, I am
wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification Required" and
not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?

5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is listed as
contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that have
contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who e.g.
brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged only.



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+1. If anything, the existing "buggy implementation" alert codes should get
folded together. (But I don't think it's worth making that change at this
stage either.) E.g. decode_error vs illegal_parameter vs
unexpected_message are rather useless distinctions and trying to get them
"right" adds complexity. Even with the granularity is it is, TLS's alert
codes needlessly expose benign differences in implementation strategy.
Adding even finer granularity would make all this worse.

My experience is also that this sort of thing would not actually help much.

On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 11:05 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> Without taking a position on the security matter: this has been part of
> the TLS design for 20+ years, and therefore has had multiple LCs and WG a=
nd
> IETF consensus, so it would take a pretty strong set of arguments to chan=
ge
> now. I've debugged a lot of TLS interop issues, and as a practical matter=
,
> I don't think this would help that much to justify making a change.
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net=
>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:00 PM, Dale Worley <worley@ariadne.com> wrote:
>>
>>> - There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
>>>   require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
>>>   nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
>>>   alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
>>>   extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
>>>   statement in the text that requires an error response (with
>>>   implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
>>>   correct minor code).
>>>
>>
>> Your review is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from
>> it. I want to pick out just one small piece, but don't mean that to
>> diminish how thorough it was!
>>
>> On the specific suggestion of having more granular error codes, I think
>> this is a dangerous direction to take lightly; there's at least one
>> instance where granular TLS alert messages have directly led to security
>> issues by acting as oracles that aided the attacker.
>>
>> There's a general conjecture that the more information that is provided
>> to attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a compromise.
>> Personally I believe that conjecture, and would actually prefer to see
>> fewer signals, ideally as few as one big error code. There is a trade-of=
f
>> against debugability, but I've only seen a handful of people have the
>> skills to debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk.
>> Others disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable
>> contention.
>>
>> --
>> Colm
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1. If anything, the existing &quot;buggy implementation&q=
uot; alert codes should get folded together. (But I don&#39;t think it&#39;=
s worth making that change at this stage either.) E.g. decode_error vs ille=
gal_parameter vs unexpected_message=C2=A0are rather useless distinctions an=
d trying to get them &quot;right&quot; adds complexity. Even with the granu=
larity is it is, TLS&#39;s alert codes needlessly expose benign differences=
 in implementation strategy. Adding even finer granularity would make all t=
his worse.<div><br></div><div>My experience is also that this sort of thing=
 would not actually help much.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><br><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 11:05 PM Er=
ic Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
>Without taking a position on the security matter: this has been part of th=
e TLS design for 20+ years, and therefore has had multiple LCs and WG and I=
ETF consensus, so it would take a pretty strong set of arguments to change =
now. I&#39;ve debugged a lot of TLS interop issues, and as a practical matt=
er, I don&#39;t think this would help that much to justify making a change.=
<div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Colm MacC=C3=
=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" targe=
t=3D"_blank">colm@allcosts.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><span>On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 8:00 PM, Dale Worley <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:worley@ariadne.com" target=3D"_blank">worl=
ey@ariadne.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">- Th=
ere are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text<br>
=C2=A0 require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,<br>
=C2=A0 nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.=C2=A0 There ar=
e 19<br>
=C2=A0 alone for &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;.=C2=A0 I would like to see a=
n &quot;alert<br>
=C2=A0 extension value&quot; which assigns a distinct &quot;minor&quot; cod=
e to each<br>
=C2=A0 statement in the text that requires an error response (with<br>
=C2=A0 implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the<br=
>
=C2=A0 correct minor code).<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Your=
 review is incredibly deep, comprehensive and I learned a lot from it. I wa=
nt to pick out just one small piece, but don&#39;t mean that to diminish ho=
w thorough it was!</div><div><br></div><div>On the specific suggestion of h=
aving more granular error codes, I think this is a dangerous direction to t=
ake lightly; there&#39;s at least one instance where granular TLS alert mes=
sages have directly led to security issues by acting as oracles that aided =
the attacker.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s a general conjectu=
re that the more information that is provided to attackers, the more easily=
 they can leverage into a compromise. Personally I believe that conjecture,=
 and would actually prefer to see fewer signals, ideally as few as one big =
error code. There is a trade-off against debugability, but I&#39;ve only se=
en a handful of people have the skills to debug low level TLS issues and it=
 doesn&#39;t seem worth the risk. Others disagree, which is valid, but it&#=
39;s at least an area of reasonable contention. =C2=A0</div></div><span cla=
ss=3D"m_-3577827528306137902m_-6841678990604225416HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#8=
88888"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"m_-3577827528306137902m_-6841678=
990604225416m_-6165950854328938141m_-3959784719233718033gmail_signature" da=
ta-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</font></span></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a114873f26257de0566d5f440--


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From: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 09:40:12 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Hi,

Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is
used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more
messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read
side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the
close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after
receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the
peer.

The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the
connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues
if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried
over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If
sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its
read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close
the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer,
the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.
It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download
a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate
the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS
layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close
the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!

It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond
with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.

Thanks,
Xuelei Fan

--f4f5e803dce41e6e9d0566d60d9c
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<div><br></div><div><div>Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1=
, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient t=
hat the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.=C2=A0 An=
d this does not have any effect on its read side of the connection.=C2=A0 I=
 think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can kee=
p reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, i=
t still can keep sending data to the peer.</div><div><br></div><div>The que=
stion comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connection.=C2=
=A0 If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues if the ap=
plication protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the=
 underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.=C2=A0 If sending =
a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side=
 and may keep write in its write side.=C2=A0 It does not actually close the=
 read side cleanly.=C2=A0 If keep waiting for the close_notify from the pee=
r, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.=
=C2=A0 It does not sound friendly to the local side.=C2=A0 =C2=A0From examp=
le, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no=
 way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the down=
loading in TLS layer.=C2=A0 I may miss something.=C2=A0 I did not find a so=
lution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.=C2=A0 P=
lease help if you have an idea!</div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s not a pro=
blem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_n=
otify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.</div></div><div><br>=
</div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Xuelei Fan</div></div>

--f4f5e803dce41e6e9d0566d60d9c--


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To: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:27 AM, Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
wrote:

> Hi Ekr,
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018, at 2:16 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
> wrote:
>
> Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the
> following is addressed/discussed:
>
> Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding
> requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to
> (or
> very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples
> on
> page 37:
>
>   TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes  are not
> equal to
>   the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS  1.1 or below
>
> and
>
>  A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior  and
> which
>  receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST  abort the
> handshake
>  with a "protocol_version" alert.  Note that  renegotiation is not possible
>  when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.
>
> There are similar statements on page 45:
>
>   TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>
> and on page 48:
>
>   However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
>   curve.  If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared
>   to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in
>   the "supported_groups" extension.
>
> I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to
> pure
> TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose
> to
> use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the
> Abstract/Introduction
> that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new
> requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both
> "Obsoletes" and
> "Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)
>
>
>
> The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S 1.4
> tries
> to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.
>
> I suggest we:
>
> (1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:
> "This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.
>
> (2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:
>    This document defines several changes that optionally affect
>    implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also
>    support TLS 1.3
>
> (3) Strike the following graf:
>
>    An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to
>    include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not in
>    use.  See the referenced sections for more details.
>
> I think this will address my concern.
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 1) On page 47:
>  The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
> algorithm
>
> Length of algorithm?
>
>
> Right. Output of.
>
>
>
>
> 2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references
> on
> 2nd/3rd use.
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>
> 3) On page 57:
>
>    The
>    server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received
>    records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive
>    the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT
>    handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the
>    configured max_early_data_size.
>
> I read this several times and still don't understand what this is saying.
> It is
> saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either don't
> mean
> "ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying example
> or a
> reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful
> here.
>
>
> We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt those records
> using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.
>
>
> Ok. So I suggest use "discard" and possibly delete or reword the "untill
> it is able" part. Maybe split into 2 sentences?
>

Sure, I can do something here.

>
>
>
> 4) On page 82:
>
>    When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
> structures
>    are written directly onto the wire.  Once record  protection has
> started,
>    TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent   as described in the
> following
>    section
>
> Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS
> application
> layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to
> signal record type)?
>
>
> No, you can't write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.
>
>    Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending the Finished
>    message and until the record layer starts using encryption keys.
>    Note that while the server may send application data prior to
>    receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent at that
>    point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
>
> It's non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent in this
> fashion
> prior to the handshake.
>
>
> Ok. Maybe say that in the document.
>

OK, I'll try to clarify this.



>
> 5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is
> required to
> be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional
> requirements on
> AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:
>
> On page 84:
>
>    An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion  greater
>    than 255 octets
>
> and
>
>    An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8  bytes MUST NOT be used
> with TLS
>
>
> I concur. Thanks.
>
>
>
> 6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when
> you
> use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various functions.
>
>
> This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it
> elsewhere?
>
>    If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
>    string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.  Note that this
>
>
> Maybe it was lack of sleep, but I didn't understand that you were talking
> about the same thing. This also seems to apply more generically then on the
> diagram. I suggest clarify:
>
>   In the diagram, the value '0' denotes a string of Hash.length bytes set
> to zeros.
>
> Or something like that.
>

Sure.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:27 AM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm" target=3D"_blank">aamelnikov@fastm=
ail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>





<div><div>Hi Ekr,</div><div><div class=3D"h5">
<div><br></div>
<div id=3D"m_6250721333531337402sig21611513"><div>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018, at 2=
:16 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br></div>
</div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><br></div>
<div><div><br></div>
<div><div>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir=3D"ltr"=
>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm" target=3D"_blank">aamelnikov=
@fastmail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>Alexey Melnikov has entered the =
following ballot position for<br></div>
<div> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all=
<br></div>
<div> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut th=
is<br></div>
<div> introductory paragraph, however.)<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discus=
s-criteria.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/stat<wbr>ement=
/discuss-criteria.html</a><br></div>
<div> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br></d=
iv>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<b=
r></div>
<div> <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/d<wbr>oc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/=
</a><br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr=
>----------<br></div>
<div> DISCUSS:<br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr=
>----------<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes onc=
e the<br></div>
<div> following is addressed/discussed:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding=
<br></div>
<div> requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not goin=
g to (or<br></div>
<div> very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two exa=
mples on<br></div>
<div> page 37:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes=C2=
=A0 are not equal to<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS=C2=A0 1.1 or=
 below<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or pr=
ior=C2=A0 and which<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST=C2=A0 =
abort the handshake<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0with a &quot;protocol_version&quot; alert.=C2=A0 Note that=C2=
=A0 renegotiation is not possible<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> There are similar statements on page 45:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.<br=
></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and on page 48:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing<br></=
div>
<div> =C2=A0 curve.=C2=A0 If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be=
 prepared<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised=
 in<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 the &quot;supported_groups&quot; extension.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements appl=
y to pure<br></div>
<div> TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and ch=
oose to<br></div>
<div> use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the Abstract/Int=
roduction<br></div>
<div> that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new<b=
r></div>
<div> requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both &quot=
;Obsoletes&quot; and<br></div>
<div> &quot;Updates&quot; TLS 1.2 RFC.)<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S=
 1.4 tries<br></div>
<div>to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>I suggest we:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:<br></div>
<div>&quot;This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implem=
entations.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:<br></div>
<div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document defines several changes that optionall=
y affect<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not =
also<br></div>
</div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0support TLS 1.3<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(3) Strike the following graf:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS =
1.2 might need to<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.=
3 is not in<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0use.=C2=A0 See the referenced sections for more details.<=
br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div><div>I think this will address my concern.<br></di=
v><span class=3D"">
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0<br><=
/div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>------------------------------<w=
br>------------------------------<wbr>----------<br></div>
<div> COMMENT:<br></div>
<div> ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr=
>----------<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> 1) On page 47:<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the diges=
t=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Length of algorithm?<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Right. Output of.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>=C2=A0<br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div>
<div>2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some referen=
ces on<br></div>
<div> 2nd/3rd use.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Thanks.<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0<br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div>
<div>3) On page 57:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0The<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt =
received<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able t=
o receive<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0the client&#39;s second flight and complete an ordinary =
1-RTT<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to =
the<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0configured max_early_data_size.<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> I read this several times and still don&#39;t understand what this is=
 saying. It is<br></div>
<div> saying &quot;ignores ... until it is able to receive&quot;. I think y=
ou either don&#39;t mean<br></div>
<div> &quot;ignore&quot; (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I cla=
rifying example or a<br></div>
<div> reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very he=
lpful here.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt those rec=
ords<br></div>
<div>using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
</span><div>Ok. So I suggest use &quot;discard&quot; and possibly delete or=
 reword the &quot;untill it is able&quot; part. Maybe split into 2 sentence=
s?<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure, I can do something=
 here.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div></div><span class=3D""=
>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div>
<div>4) On page 82:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlai=
ntext=C2=A0 structures<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0are written directly onto the wire.=C2=A0 Once record=C2=
=A0 protection has started,<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
as described in the following<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0section<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS ap=
plication<br></div>
<div> layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra oct=
ets to<br></div>
<div> signal record type)?<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>No, you can&#39;t write application data prior to this point, as state=
d in S 2.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending t=
he Finished<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0message and until the record layer starts using encryptio=
n keys.<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that while the server may send application data prio=
r to<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0receiving the client&#39;s Authentication messages, any d=
ata sent at that<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated pee=
r.<br></div>
</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>It&#39;s non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent =
in this fashion<br></div>
<div>prior to the handshake.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
</span><div>Ok. Maybe say that in the document.</div></div></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>OK, I&#39;ll try to clarify this.</div><div><br></div><div=
>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><span class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>5) I am pretty sure that [RFC511=
6] is a Normative reference. It is required to<br></div>
<div> be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional requi=
rements on<br></div>
<div> AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> On page 84:<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an ex=
pansion=C2=A0 greater<br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0than 255 octets<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> and<br></div>
<div> <br></div>
<div> =C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8=C2=A0 bytes=
 MUST NOT be used with TLS<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>I concur. Thanks.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;marg=
in-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-col=
or:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>6) The diagram in section 7.1 wa=
s a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when you<br></div>
<div> use &#39;0&#39; you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various fu=
nctions.<br></div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it =
elsewhere?<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value=
 consisting of a<br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.=C2=A0 N=
ote that this<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
</span><div>Maybe it was lack of sleep, but I didn&#39;t understand that yo=
u were talking about the same thing. This also seems to apply more generica=
lly then on the diagram. I suggest clarify:<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>=C2=A0 In the diagram, the value &#39;0&#39; denotes a string of Hash.=
length bytes set to zeros.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Or something like that.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>Sure.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div></div><br></div=
></div>

--001a1149442c8804350566d61f38--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you
either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is
> used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more
> messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read
> side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the
> close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after
> receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the
> peer.
>
> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the
> connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues
> if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried
> over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If
> sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its
> read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close
> the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer,
> the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.
> It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download
> a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate
> the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS
> layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close
> the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
>
> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond
> with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
>
> Thanks,
> Xuelei Fan
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--001a114992e01060530566d63838
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_not=
ify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.<div><b=
r></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<div><br></div><div><div>Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section=
 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipie=
nt that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.=C2=
=A0 And this does not have any effect on its read side of the connection.=
=C2=A0 I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still=
 can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify =
alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.</div><div><br></div><div=
>The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connec=
tion.=C2=A0 If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues i=
f the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried =
over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.=C2=A0 If =
sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its r=
ead side and may keep write in its write side.=C2=A0 It does not actually c=
lose the read side cleanly.=C2=A0 If keep waiting for the close_notify from=
 the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its wri=
te side.=C2=A0 It does not sound friendly to the local side.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Fr=
om example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like the=
re is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of =
the downloading in TLS layer.=C2=A0 I may miss something.=C2=A0 I did not f=
ind a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.=
=C2=A0 Please help if you have an idea!</div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s n=
ot a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a=
 close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.</div></div><=
div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Xuelei Fan</div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114992e01060530566d63838--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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> 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many
> other protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I
> understand that this has been the approach TLS has previously taken
> and is supported by the way the document is written.

Well:
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/designating-rfcs-as-historic.html
says:
A document is obsolete when there is a newer version that replaces it.

I believe that that's the relationship between TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2.


> Still, I find it
> especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated
> which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to
> be used with TLS1.2, right?

Which extensions are you referring to.


> I would recommend for this version to at
> least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro that it
> changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
> declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
> extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.

It's true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that
does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.



> 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why
> the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
> extension?

I'm sorry, I'm not following this. As opposed to what?


> 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I
> find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying
> transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in the
> intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this
> minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
> document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minimal
> text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently try
> to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if
> it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection
> to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?

This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the job
of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
some text that that's expected.


> 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of
> changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new
> extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have
> been changed to "Specification Required" and not "IETF consensus" or
> RFC Required"?

The changes aren't in this document, but the WG feeling was that
both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish
RFCs just to get a code point. The "Recommended" flag was intended
to address that need instead.


> 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
> listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are
> people that have contributed a "significant" amount of text, while
> everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list
> discussion would be acknowledged only.

I don't think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally
we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements
of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don't see a real
problem here.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net> =
wrote:

> Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many other
> protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understand
> that
> this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported by
> the way
> the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that also
> two
> TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore
> but
> still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend for
> this
> version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the int=
ro
> that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
> declares
> the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
> extensibility is
> only provided using extensions anymore.
>
> 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why the
> Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate extension=
?
>
> 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I fin=
d
> it a
> bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport in
> this
> document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a reliabl=
e
> transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information seems =
to
> have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expect t=
o
> seen
> some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to
> transparently
> try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if
> it
> broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to
> first
> send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>
> 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changing
> them is
> to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However, I
> am
> wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification Required"
> and
> not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?
>
> 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
> listed as
> contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that have
> contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who e.g.
> brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged onl=
y.
>
>
>

--94eb2c0627382961990566d66943
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>&gt; 1) I&#39;m a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the =
right approach as many</div><div>&gt; other protocols usually do not obsole=
te older versions. However, I</div><div>&gt; understand that this has been =
the approach TLS has previously taken</div><div>&gt; and is supported by th=
e way the document is written.</div><div><br></div><div>Well:</div><div><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/designating-rfcs-as-historic.ht=
ml">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/designating-rfcs-as-historic.html</=
a></div><div>says:</div><div>A document is obsolete when there is a newer v=
ersion that replaces it.</div><div><br></div><div>I believe that that&#39;s=
 the relationship between TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2.</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><div>&gt; Still, I find it</div><div>&gt; especially confusing that =
also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated</div><div>&gt; which are not need=
ed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to</div><div>&gt; be used w=
ith TLS1.2, right?</div><div><br></div><div>Which extensions are you referr=
ing to.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; I would recommend for =
this version to at</div><div>&gt; least already note in the abstract or ver=
y early in the intro that it</div><div>&gt; changes the versioning mechanis=
m itself, and thereby basically</div><div>&gt; declares the TLS handshake a=
s an invariant for all future versions and</div><div>&gt; extensibility is =
only provided using extensions anymore.</div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s t=
rue that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that</div><div>does =
not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.</div><div><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; 2) Can you provide further explanation (=
potentially in the draft) why</div><div>&gt; the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Mo=
des are provided in an extra/separate</div><div>&gt; extension?</div><div><=
br></div><div>I&#39;m sorry, I&#39;m not following this. As opposed to what=
?</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; 3) I know previous versions =
of TLS didn&#39;t say that much either, but I</div><div>&gt; find it a bit =
wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying</div><div>&gt; tra=
nsport in this document. Previous version this at least said in the</div><d=
iv>&gt; intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even thi=
s</div><div>&gt; minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this</div=
><div>&gt; document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some mini=
mal</div><div>&gt; text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to trans=
parently try</div><div>&gt; to reestablish the connection by the underlying=
 transport protocol if</div><div>&gt; it broke for some reason? Or it is ok=
ay to use the same TCP connection</div><div>&gt; to first send other data a=
nd then start the TLS handshake?</div><div><br></div><div>This is pretty ex=
plicitly outside the scope of TLS. It&#39;s just the job</div><div>of the u=
nderlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add</div><div>some=
 text that that&#39;s expected.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt=
; 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of</div><div>=
&gt; changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new</div><div>&g=
t; extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have</div=
><div>&gt; been changed to &quot;Specification Required&quot; and not &quot=
;IETF consensus&quot; or</div><div>&gt; RFC Required&quot;?</div><div><br><=
/div><div>The changes aren&#39;t in this document, but the WG feeling was t=
hat</div><div>both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publ=
ish</div><div>RFCs just to get a code point. The &quot;Recommended&quot; fl=
ag was intended</div><div>to address that need instead.</div><div><br></div=
><div><br></div><div>&gt; 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the who=
le working group is</div><div>&gt; listed as contributors. My understanding=
 was that Contributors are</div><div>&gt; people that have contributed a &q=
uot;significant&quot; amount of text, while</div><div>&gt; everybody else w=
ho e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list</div><div>&gt; discussion woul=
d be acknowledged only.</div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think we have =
any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally</div><div>we have adopted a =
pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements</div><div>of this type. G=
iven that electrons are basically free, I don&#39;t see a real</div><div>pr=
oblem here.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8=
:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@k=
uehlewind.net" target=3D"_blank">ietf@kuehlewind.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the foll=
owing ballot position for<br>
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection<br>
<br>
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br>
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br>
introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-crit=
eria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/<=
wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br>
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
COMMENT:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
1) I&#39;m a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many othe=
r<br>
protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understand tha=
t<br>
this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported by the=
 way<br>
the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that also tw=
o<br>
TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore b=
ut<br>
still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend for t=
his<br>
version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro=
<br>
that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically decl=
ares<br>
the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and extensibility=
 is<br>
only provided using extensions anymore.<br>
<br>
2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why the<b=
r>
Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate extension?<=
br>
<br>
3) I know previous versions of TLS didn&#39;t say that much either, but I f=
ind it a<br>
bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport in t=
his<br>
document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a reliable<=
br>
transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information seems to=
<br>
have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expect to =
seen<br>
some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparent=
ly<br>
try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if i=
t<br>
broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to firs=
t<br>
send other data and then start the TLS handshake?<br>
<br>
4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changing the=
m is<br>
to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However, I a=
m<br>
wondering why the policies have been changed to &quot;Specification Require=
d&quot; and<br>
not &quot;IETF consensus&quot; or RFC Required&quot;?<br>
<br>
5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is listed=
 as<br>
contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that have<b=
r>
contributed a &quot;significant&quot; amount of text, while everybody else =
who e.g.<br>
brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged only.=
<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c0627382961990566d66943--


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Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls@ietf.org
To: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Hi Xuelei,

Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read side?
If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
I don't see what the server application would do with that information. Do you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_notify
is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.

Thanks,
David Schinazi


> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
> 
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com <mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com>> wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.
> 
> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.  It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
> 
> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
> 
> Thanks,
> Xuelei Fan
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Xuelei,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Do you have =
an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read =
side?</div><div class=3D"">If you're downloading a 10GB video and the =
user cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection =
by sending a RST.</div><div class=3D"">The benefit of having a graceful =
read close would be for the server to know that the client application =
was done, but in the 10GB video example,</div><div class=3D"">I don't =
see what the server application would do with that information. Do you =
have an example where the server would treat a graceful read =
close</div><div class=3D"">differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS =
1.2 and prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would =
reply with a close_notify</div><div class=3D"">in the middle of the 10GB =
of application data. That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to =
the server application - the point of close_notify</div><div class=3D"">is=
 to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in =
this example it does get truncated.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">David =
Schinazi</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Mar =
7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" =
class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify =
and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.<div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">-Ekr</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, =
Xuelei Fan <span dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">Hi,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the =
close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will =
not send any more messages on this connection.&nbsp; And this does not =
have any effect on its read side of the connection.&nbsp; I think it =
means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep =
reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, =
it still can keep sending data to the peer.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The question comes to me is about how =
to close the read side of the connection.&nbsp; If closing the read side =
silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using =
TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport =
after the TLS connection is closed.&nbsp; If sending a close_notify =
alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may =
keep write in its write side.&nbsp; It does not actually close the read =
side cleanly.&nbsp; If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, =
the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write =
side.&nbsp; It does not sound friendly to the local side.&nbsp; =
&nbsp;=46rom example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, =
looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle =
in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.&nbsp; I may miss =
something.&nbsp; I did not find a solution about how to close the read =
side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.&nbsp; Please help if you have an =
idea!</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It's not =
a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a =
close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify =
alert.</div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">Xuelei Fan</div></div>
<br class=3D"">______________________________<wbr =
class=3D"">_________________<br class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">=

<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr =
class=3D"">listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D""></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Thanks for your review, Mirja.  I will just add one comment inline
from WG discussion and consensus.

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 1:05 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many
>> other protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I
>> understand that this has been the approach TLS has previously taken
>> and is supported by the way the document is written.
>
> Well:
> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/designating-rfcs-as-historic.html
> says:
> A document is obsolete when there is a newer version that replaces it.
>
> I believe that that's the relationship between TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2.
>
>
>> Still, I find it
>> especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated
>> which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to
>> be used with TLS1.2, right?
>
> Which extensions are you referring to.
>
>
>> I would recommend for this version to at
>> least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro that it
>> changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
>> declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
>> extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.
>
> It's true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that
> does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.
>
>
>
>> 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why
>> the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
>> extension?
>
> I'm sorry, I'm not following this. As opposed to what?
>
>
>> 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I
>> find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying
>> transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in the
>> intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this
>> minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
>> document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minimal
>> text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently try
>> to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if
>> it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection
>> to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>
> This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the job
> of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
> some text that that's expected.
>
>
>> 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of
>> changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new
>> extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have
>> been changed to "Specification Required" and not "IETF consensus" or
>> RFC Required"?
>
> The changes aren't in this document, but the WG feeling was that
> both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish
> RFCs just to get a code point. The "Recommended" flag was intended
> to address that need instead.

The working group explicitly feels that a draft that is not published
is adequate, falling into the specification required category where
informal documentation is acceptable.


Thanks,
Kathleen

>
>
>> 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
>> listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are
>> people that have contributed a "significant" amount of text, while
>> everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list
>> discussion would be acknowledged only.
>
> I don't think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally
> we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements
> of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don't see a real
> problem here.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net=
> wrote:
>>
>> Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.htm=
l
>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many other
>> protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understand
>> that
>> this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported by
>> the way
>> the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that also
>> two
>> TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymor=
e
>> but
>> still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend fo=
r
>> this
>> version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the
>> intro
>> that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
>> declares
>> the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
>> extensibility is
>> only provided using extensions anymore.
>>
>> 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why th=
e
>> Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate extensio=
n?
>>
>> 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I fi=
nd
>> it a
>> bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport i=
n
>> this
>> document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a reliab=
le
>> transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information seems
>> to
>> have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expect =
to
>> seen
>> some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to
>> transparently
>> try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol i=
f
>> it
>> broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to
>> first
>> send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>>
>> 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changing
>> them is
>> to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However, =
I
>> am
>> wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification Required"
>> and
>> not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?
>>
>> 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
>> listed as
>> contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that hav=
e
>> contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who e.g=
.
>> brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged
>> only.
>>
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 19:32:01 +0100
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS]  =?utf-8?q?Mirja_K=C3=BChlewind=27s_No_Objection_on_draft-i?= =?utf-8?q?etf-tls-tls13-26=3A_=28with_COMMENT=29?=
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Hi,

see below

> Am 07.03.2018 um 19:05 schrieb Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>:
>=20
> > 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many
> > other protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I
> > understand that this has been the approach TLS has previously taken
> > and is supported by the way the document is written.
>=20
> Well:
> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/designating-rfcs-as-historic.html
> says:
> A document is obsolete when there is a newer version that replaces it.
>=20
> I believe that that's the relationship between TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2.

I looked at this and was wondering if this is meant to rather mean newer =
version of the same document than actual protocol version.

I found this in RFC2223 (which is obsoleted by 7322 which however =
doesn=E2=80=99t give a definition):

"Obsoletes

      To be used to refer to an earlier document that is replaced by
      this document.  This document contains either revised information,
      or else all of the same information plus some new information,
      however extensive or brief that new information is; i.e., this
      document can be used alone, without reference to the older
      document.=E2=80=9C

Anyway, as I said I know why you did this; it still seem wired to me.

>=20
>=20
> > Still, I find it
> > especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated
> > which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to
> > be used with TLS1.2, right?
>=20
> Which extensions are you referring to.

RFC5077 and RFC6961 (maybe extension is not the wrong term for the first =
one)
>=20
>=20
> > I would recommend for this version to at
> > least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro that =
it
> > changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
> > declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions =
and
> > extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.
>=20
> It's true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that
> does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.

Which others do you have?

>=20
>=20
>=20
> > 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) =
why
> > the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
> > extension?
>=20
> I'm sorry, I'm not following this. As opposed to what?

You could implicitly make assumptions depending on which extension are =
present or you can add one field to the pre_shared_key extension to =
indicate the mode. I=E2=80=99m always careful is something says =E2=80=9Ei=
f this think is present, that must also be present=E2=80=9C as it can be =
an source of error that could have been avoided.

>=20
>=20
> > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but =
I
> > find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the =
underlaying
> > transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in =
the
> > intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this
> > minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
> > document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minimal
> > text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently try
> > to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol =
if
> > it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP =
connection
> > to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>=20
> This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the job
> of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
> some text that that's expected.

If that is the only requirement, it would still be good to spell that =
out.
>=20
>=20
> > 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of
> > changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new
> > extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have
> > been changed to "Specification Required" and not "IETF consensus" or
> > RFC Required"?
>=20
> The changes aren't in this document, but the WG feeling was that
> both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish
> RFCs just to get a code point. The "Recommended" flag was intended
> to address that need instead.

Hm, I think I would actually prefer to see things documented in RFCs =
instead of just having some spec somewhere. Not sure if an RFC on the =
ISE stream is that much more effort than writing a spec somewhere else =
but then at least the IESG would get to see it for a conflict review...

>=20
>=20
> > 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
> > listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are
> > people that have contributed a "significant" amount of text, while
> > everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list
> > discussion would be acknowledged only.
>=20
> I don't think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally
> we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements
> of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don't see a =
real
> problem here.

I just would have expected to see all these names in an acknowledgment =
section and not in an contributor section.=20

RFC7322 again says:

"4.11.  Contributors Section



   This optional section acknowledges those who have made significant
   contributions to the document.=E2=80=9C


Mirja



>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind =
<ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:
> Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
> 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many =
other
> protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I =
understand that
> this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported =
by the way
> the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that =
also two
> TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 =
anymore but
> still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend =
for this
> version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the =
intro
> that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically =
declares
> the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and =
extensibility is
> only provided using extensions anymore.
>=20
> 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why =
the
> Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate =
extension?
>=20
> 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I =
find it a
> bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport =
in this
> document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a =
reliable
> transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information =
seems to
> have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also =
expect to seen
> some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to =
transparently
> try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol =
if it
> broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to =
first
> send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>=20
> 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of =
changing them is
> to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. =
However, I am
> wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification =
Required" and
> not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?
>=20
> 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is =
listed as
> contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that =
have
> contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who =
e.g.
> brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged =
only.
>=20
>=20
>=20


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 10:58:37 -0800
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To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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--001a113b0328f28bee0566d727d2
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Hi Adam,


Thanks for your comments.

I'm going to let the Chairs handle the Abstract one.


Responses below (I'm ignoring a bunch which I just agree with).

> =C2=A74.2.1:
>
> >  TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.  Servers should be prepared to receive
> >  ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in
> >  the list of versions.
>
> This "should" reads as if it should be normative. It also seems that
making this
> "should" instead of "MUST" could result in the same "can't negotiate to
earlier
> versions" implementation situation that is mentioned elsewhere in the
document.
> Consider a server that supports TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. It receives a
ClientHello
> from a client that supports TLS 1.2 and a future TLS 1.4. Let's postulate
that
> this client doesn't support 1.3 (say, because of some uncurable flaw that
> exists in 1.3, but not in 1.2 or 1.4). If the server isn't prepared to
deal
> with this situation, we end up in the same "can't move versions forward"
> corner that led to freezing the legacy version string at 0x0303.

Yes, I agree. This should be a MUST.


> =C2=A74.2.3:
>
> >         /* Reserved Code Points */
> >         private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF),
> >         (0xFFFF)
> >     } SignatureScheme;
>
> When a node supports both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, this private use space onl=
y
> allows for the definition of two private-use hashes that can be used in
both
> circumstances (as only 0xFE and 0xFF will be recognized by 1.2 as
specifying
> hashes). I don't know what the use cases for this private use space is;
but
> given the relatively generous allocation in RFC 5246, is two going to be
enough?

I am not sure anyone has every used this space at all, so I tend to think
this
is OK.


> =C2=A75.5:
>
> >  There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
> >  be safely encrypted under a given set of keys.  [AEAD-LIMITS]
> >  provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the
> >  underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.
> >  Implementations SHOULD do a key update as described in Section 4.6.3
> >  prior to reaching these limits.
>
> Implementing this "SHOULD" is predicated on understanding the contents of
> [AEAD-LIMITS], which means [AEAD-LIMITS] needs to be a normative
reference.

Agreed.


> >  -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
> >     range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
> >     [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are
> >     reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte in
> >     the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are
> >     not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.
>
> Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the reservation
of
> first byte=3D0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will be made
from
> the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is the
case, I
> would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request that
the IANA
> close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies to TLS
> SignatureAlgorithm Registry.

Agreed, but I'd like to hear from the chairs.



> This is a consolidation of the structures found in the document.
Presumably,
> Appendix B is normative and the other versions are illustrative? To help
deal
> with the possibility of conflicts between the two versions, it would be
nice if
> this were stated explicitly.

B is machine generated from the rest of the text, but I'm happy to add
something here.



>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Editorial Nits
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> General:
>
>   ** There are 33 instances of too long lines in the document, the longes=
t
>      one being 8 characters in excess of 72.

I expect the RFC Editor to fix this.


>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> General:
>
> Although both "implementor" and "implementer" are acceptable spellings,
> it is unusual for a document to switch back and forth. I recommend
consistency.

OK.


>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> =C2=A74.4.3:
>
> >  The context string for a server signature is "TLS 1.3, server
> >  CertificateVerify" and for a client signature is "TLS 1.3, client
> >  CertificateVerify".  It is used to provide separation between
> >  signatures made in different contexts, helping against potential
> >  cross-protocol attacks.
>
> Although the example makes it clear, the preceding is the normative
description
> of behavior. Since the limitations of the RFC format result in line
wrapping in
> the middle of two strings that must be bit exact for the protocol to
function,
> it is probably worthwhile setting them off on their own lines so that
they don't
> contain extra line feeds and indenting spaces.

Thanks. I can do this.

> =C2=A77.4.1:
>
> >  For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is
> >  performed.  The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a byte string by
> >  encoding in big-endian and padded with zeros up to the size of the
> >  prime.
>
> Presumably "...and left padded...", correct?

Yes, thanks.

>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> =C2=A712.3:
>
> This section seems superfluous.

Agreed.

> It seems that this should cite "Chosen ciphertext attacks against
protocols
> based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1".

Agreed.


>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
> General (deferred to the end due to length):
>
> As a rule of thumb, "that" is used to start restrictive clauses ("Two
doors
> are in front of you. The door that is on the right leads outside"), while
> "which" is used to start non-restrictive clauses ("The only door in the
room,
> which is made of wood, leads outside.") This document uses "which" where
"that"
> is called for in numerous locations. Although there are several more than
listed
> below, I'm highlighting the locations where a literal reading of "which"
> technically leads to ambiguity. Each instance has a leading line for
context
> (except those that occur at the beginning of a paragraph).

I appreciate that many people hold to this rule of thumb, but it is,
unfortunately, an invented rule:

http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000918.html
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/001461.html

  There is an old myth that which is not used in integrated relative
  clauses (e.g. something which I hate) and that has to be used instead
  something that I hate). It is completely untrue. The choice between
  the two is free and open.

--001a113b0328f28bee0566d727d2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Adam,<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for your=
 comments.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m going to let the Chairs handle =
the Abstract one.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Responses below (=
I&#39;m ignoring a bunch which I just agree with).</div><div><br></div><div=
><div>&gt; =C2=A74.2.1:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 TLS =
SHOULD support TLS 1.2.=C2=A0 Servers should be prepared to receive</div><d=
iv>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 ClientHellos that include this extension but do not incl=
ude 0x0304 in</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 the list of versions.</div><div>&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; This &quot;should&quot; reads as if it should be nor=
mative. It also seems that making this</div><div>&gt; &quot;should&quot; in=
stead of &quot;MUST&quot; could result in the same &quot;can&#39;t negotiat=
e to earlier</div><div>&gt; versions&quot; implementation situation that is=
 mentioned elsewhere in the document.</div><div>&gt; Consider a server that=
 supports TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. It receives a ClientHello</div><div>&gt; fro=
m a client that supports TLS 1.2 and a future TLS 1.4. Let&#39;s postulate =
that</div><div>&gt; this client doesn&#39;t support 1.3 (say, because of so=
me uncurable flaw that</div><div>&gt; exists in 1.3, but not in 1.2 or 1.4)=
. If the server isn&#39;t prepared to deal</div><div>&gt; with this situati=
on, we end up in the same &quot;can&#39;t move versions forward&quot;</div>=
<div>&gt; corner that led to freezing the legacy version string at 0x0303.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>Yes, I agree. This should be a MUST.</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; =C2=A74.2.3:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/* Reserved Code Points */</div=
><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF=
),</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(0xFFFF)</div><div>=
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} SignatureScheme;</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><=
div>&gt; When a node supports both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, this private use sp=
ace only</div><div>&gt; allows for the definition of two private-use hashes=
 that can be used in both</div><div>&gt; circumstances (as only 0xFE and 0x=
FF will be recognized by 1.2 as specifying</div><div>&gt; hashes). I don&#3=
9;t know what the use cases for this private use space is; but</div><div>&g=
t; given the relatively generous allocation in RFC 5246, is two going to be=
 enough?</div><div><br></div><div>I am not sure anyone has every used this =
space at all, so I tend to think this</div><div>is OK.</div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><div>&gt; =C2=A75.5:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; &gt=
;=C2=A0 There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can=
</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 be safely encrypted under a given set of keys.=
=C2=A0 [AEAD-LIMITS]</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 provides an analysis of thes=
e limits under the assumption that the</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 underlying=
 primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 I=
mplementations SHOULD do a key update as described in Section 4.6.3</div><d=
iv>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 prior to reaching these limits.</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div>&gt; Implementing this &quot;SHOULD&quot; is predicated on understan=
ding the contents of</div><div>&gt; [AEAD-LIMITS], which means [AEAD-LIMITS=
] needs to be a normative reference.</div><div><br></div><div>Agreed.</div>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 -=C2=A0 TLS SignatureSch=
eme Registry: Values with the first byte in the</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required<=
/div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC8126].=C2=A0 Values with the fir=
st byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0res=
erved for Private Use [RFC8126].=C2=A0 Values with the first byte in</div><=
div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the range 0-6 or with the second byte in t=
he range 0-3 that are</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0not currently =
allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</d=
iv><div>&gt; Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the =
reservation of</div><div>&gt; first byte=3D0-6 seems to assume that no furt=
her assignments will be made from</div><div>&gt; the &quot;TLS HashAlgorith=
m Registry&quot; (after 4492bis lands). If this is the case, I</div><div>&g=
t; would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request that t=
he IANA</div><div>&gt; close the table to further registrations. The same c=
omment applies to TLS</div><div>&gt; SignatureAlgorithm Registry.</div><div=
><br></div><div>Agreed, but I&#39;d like to hear from the chairs.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; This is a consolidation =
of the structures found in the document. Presumably,</div><div>&gt; Appendi=
x B is normative and the other versions are illustrative? To help deal</div=
><div>&gt; with the possibility of conflicts between the two versions, it w=
ould be nice if</div><div>&gt; this were stated explicitly.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>B is machine generated from the rest of the text, but I&#39;m hap=
py to add</div><div>something here.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div><div>&gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</div><div>&gt; Editorial Nits</div><div>&gt; --------=
-------------------------------------------------------------------</div><d=
iv>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; General:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0** There are 33 instances of too long lines in the document, t=
he longest</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 one being 8 characters in exc=
ess of 72.</div><div><br></div><div>I expect the RFC Editor to fix this.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; --------------------------------=
-------------------------------------------</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>=
&gt; General:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Although both &quot;imple=
mentor&quot; and &quot;implementer&quot; are acceptable spellings,</div><di=
v>&gt; it is unusual for a document to switch back and forth. I recommend c=
onsistency.</div><div><br></div><div>OK.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
><div>&gt; ----------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; =C2=A74.4.3:</div><div>&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 The context string for a server signature =
is &quot;TLS 1.3, server</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 CertificateVerify&quot; =
and for a client signature is &quot;TLS 1.3, client</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=
=A0 CertificateVerify&quot;.=C2=A0 It is used to provide separation between=
</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 signatures made in different contexts, helping a=
gainst potential</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 cross-protocol attacks.</div><di=
v>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Although the example makes it clear, the preced=
ing is the normative description</div><div>&gt; of behavior. Since the limi=
tations of the RFC format result in line wrapping in</div><div>&gt; the mid=
dle of two strings that must be bit exact for the protocol to function,</di=
v><div>&gt; it is probably worthwhile setting them off on their own lines s=
o that they don&#39;t</div><div>&gt; contain extra line feeds and indenting=
 spaces.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks. I can do this.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>&gt; =C2=A77.4.1:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 For=
 finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is</div><di=
v>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 performed.=C2=A0 The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a=
 byte string by</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 encoding in big-endian and padded=
 with zeros up to the size of the</div><div>&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 prime.</div><di=
v>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Presumably &quot;...and left padded...&quot;, c=
orrect?</div><div><br></div><div>Yes, thanks.</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; =C2=A712.3:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div>&gt; This section seems superfluous.</div><div><br></div><div>Agreed.=
</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; It seems that this should cite &quot;Chosen =
ciphertext attacks against protocols</div><div>&gt; based on the RSA encryp=
tion standard PKCS #1&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>Agreed.</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Gener=
al (deferred to the end due to length):</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt;=
 As a rule of thumb, &quot;that&quot; is used to start restrictive clauses =
(&quot;Two doors</div><div>&gt; are in front of you. The door that is on th=
e right leads outside&quot;), while</div><div>&gt; &quot;which&quot; is use=
d to start non-restrictive clauses (&quot;The only door in the room,</div><=
div>&gt; which is made of wood, leads outside.&quot;) This document uses &q=
uot;which&quot; where &quot;that&quot;</div><div>&gt; is called for in nume=
rous locations. Although there are several more than listed</div><div>&gt; =
below, I&#39;m highlighting the locations where a literal reading of &quot;=
which&quot;</div><div>&gt; technically leads to ambiguity. Each instance ha=
s a leading line for context</div><div>&gt; (except those that occur at the=
 beginning of a paragraph).</div><div><br></div><div>I appreciate that many=
 people hold to this rule of thumb, but it is,</div><div>unfortunately, an =
invented rule:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://itre.cis.upenn.ed=
u/~myl/languagelog/archives/000918.html">http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/lan=
guagelog/archives/000918.html</a></div><div><a href=3D"http://itre.cis.upen=
n.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/001461.html">http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl=
/languagelog/archives/001461.html</a></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0 There=
 is an old myth that which is not used in integrated relative</div><div>=C2=
=A0 clauses (e.g. something which I hate) and that has to be used instead</=
div><div>=C2=A0 something that I hate). It is completely untrue. The choice=
 between</div><div>=C2=A0 the two is free and open.</div><div><br></div></d=
iv></div>

--001a113b0328f28bee0566d727d2--


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Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 11:03:36 -0800
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To: "Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)" <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS]  =?utf-8?q?Mirja_K=C3=BChlewind=27s_No_Objection_on_draft-i?= =?utf-8?q?etf-tls-tls13-26=3A_=28with_COMMENT=29?=
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On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:32 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) <
ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:

> > > Still, I find it
> > > especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated
> > > which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to
> > > be used with TLS1.2, right?
> >
> > Which extensions are you referring to.
>
> RFC5077 and RFC6961 (maybe extension is not the wrong term for the first
> one)
>

OK. I'm not really sure of a better way to handle this.



> > > I would recommend for this version to at
> > > least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro that it
> > > changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
> > > declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions an=
d
> > > extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.
> >
> > It's true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that
> > does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.
>
> Which others do you have?
>

Once you have negotiated a new version you can change the messages in any
way you please, just as you always could have.



> > 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why
> > > the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
> > > extension?
> >
> > I'm sorry, I'm not following this. As opposed to what?
>
> You could implicitly make assumptions depending on which extension are
> present or you can add one field to the pre_shared_key extension to
> indicate the mode. I=E2=80=99m always careful is something says =E2=80=9E=
if this think is
> present, that must also be present=E2=80=9C as it can be an source of err=
or that
> could have been avoided.


Yes, we considered this design, and rejected it because we wanted a way to
indicate which kinds of PSKs the client would be willing to accept.



> > > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I
> > > find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlayin=
g
> > > transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in th=
e
> > > intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this
> > > minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
> > > document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minimal
> > > text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently try
> > > to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol if
> > > it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connectio=
n
> > > to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
> >
> > This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the job
> > of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
> > some text that that's expected.
>
> If that is the only requirement, it would still be good to spell that out=
.
>
>
Sure, I can add something.


> >
> > > 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of
> > > changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new
> > > extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have
> > > been changed to "Specification Required" and not "IETF consensus" or
> > > RFC Required"?
> >
> > The changes aren't in this document, but the WG feeling was that
> > both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish
> > RFCs just to get a code point. The "Recommended" flag was intended
> > to address that need instead.
>
> Hm, I think I would actually prefer to see things documented in RFCs
> instead of just having some spec somewhere. Not sure if an RFC on the ISE
> stream is that much more effort than writing a spec somewhere else but th=
en
> at least the IESG would get to see it for a conflict review..


Well, I can see how you would feel that way, but it was the consensus of
the WG that that was not the right approach.



> > 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
> > > listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are
> > > people that have contributed a "significant" amount of text, while
> > > everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list
> > > discussion would be acknowledged only.
> >
> > I don't think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally
> > we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements
> > of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don't see a re=
al
> > problem here.
>
> I just would have expected to see all these names in an acknowledgment
> section and not in an contributor section.
>
> RFC7322 again says:
>
> "4.11.  Contributors Section
>
>
>
>    This optional section acknowledges those who have made significant
>    contributions to the document.=E2=80=9C
>

I think this is within WG and Editor discretion.

-Ekr


>
> Mirja
>
>
>
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.n=
et>
> wrote:
> > Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> > introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.
> html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many othe=
r
> > protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understand
> that
> > this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported by
> the way
> > the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that als=
o
> two
> > TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3
> anymore but
> > still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend
> for this
> > version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the
> intro
> > that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
> declares
> > the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
> extensibility is
> > only provided using extensions anymore.
> >
> > 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why t=
he
> > Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
> extension?
> >
> > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I
> find it a
> > bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport
> in this
> > document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a
> reliable
> > transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information seem=
s
> to
> > have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expect
> to seen
> > some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to
> transparently
> > try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol
> if it
> > broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to
> first
> > send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
> >
> > 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changing
> them is
> > to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However,
> I am
> > wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification Required=
"
> and
> > not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?
> >
> > 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
> listed as
> > contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that ha=
ve
> > contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who e.=
g.
> > brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged
> only.
> >
> >
> >
>
>

--001a1149442cca511e0566d7391e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:32 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@kuehlewind.net" target=3D"_blank">ietf@kuehl=
ewind.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">&gt; &gt; Still, I find it<br>
&gt; &gt; especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecat=
ed<br>
&gt; &gt; which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid=
 to<br>
&gt; &gt; be used with TLS1.2, right?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Which extensions are you referring to.<br>
<br>
</span>RFC5077 and RFC6961 (maybe extension is not the wrong term for the f=
irst one)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>OK. I&#39;m not really sure o=
f a better way to handle this.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; I would recommend for this version to at<br>
&gt; &gt; least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro tha=
t it<br>
&gt; &gt; changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically<br=
>
&gt; &gt; declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future version=
s and<br>
&gt; &gt; extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It&#39;s true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that<=
br>
&gt; does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.<br>
<br>
</span>Which others do you have?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Once y=
ou have negotiated a new version you can change the messages in any</div><d=
iv>way you please, just as you always could have.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft)=
 why<br>
&gt; &gt; the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separa=
te<br>
&gt; &gt; extension?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;m sorry, I&#39;m not following this. As opposed to what?<br>
<br>
</span>You could implicitly make assumptions depending on which extension a=
re present or you can add one field to the pre_shared_key extension to indi=
cate the mode. I=E2=80=99m always careful is something says =E2=80=9Eif thi=
s think is present, that must also be present=E2=80=9C as it can be an sour=
ce of error that could have been avoided.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Y=
es, we considered this design, and rejected it because we wanted a way to i=
ndicate which kinds of PSKs the client would be willing to accept.</div><di=
v>=C2=A0<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">
&gt; &gt; 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn&#39;t say that much eithe=
r, but I<br>
&gt; &gt; find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underl=
aying<br>
&gt; &gt; transport in this document. Previous version this at least said i=
n the<br>
&gt; &gt; intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even t=
his<br>
&gt; &gt; minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this<br>
&gt; &gt; document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minim=
al<br>
&gt; &gt; text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently =
try<br>
&gt; &gt; to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protoco=
l if<br>
&gt; &gt; it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP conne=
ction<br>
&gt; &gt; to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It&#39;s just the =
job<br>
&gt; of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add<b=
r>
&gt; some text that that&#39;s expected.<br>
<br>
</span>If that is the only requirement, it would still be good to spell tha=
t out.<br><span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure=
, I can add something.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
><span class=3D"">
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of<br=
>
&gt; &gt; changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new<br>
&gt; &gt; extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies ha=
ve<br>
&gt; &gt; been changed to &quot;Specification Required&quot; and not &quot;=
IETF consensus&quot; or<br>
&gt; &gt; RFC Required&quot;?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The changes aren&#39;t in this document, but the WG feeling was that<b=
r>
&gt; both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish<br>
&gt; RFCs just to get a code point. The &quot;Recommended&quot; flag was in=
tended<br>
&gt; to address that need instead.<br>
<br>
</span>Hm, I think I would actually prefer to see things documented in RFCs=
 instead of just having some spec somewhere. Not sure if an RFC on the ISE =
stream is that much more effort than writing a spec somewhere else but then=
 at least the IESG would get to see it for a conflict review..</blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>Well, I can see how you would feel that way, but it was=
 the consensus of the WG that that was not the right approach.</div><div><b=
r></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span =
class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group=
 is<br>
&gt; &gt; listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors ar=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; people that have contributed a &quot;significant&quot; amount of =
text, while<br>
&gt; &gt; everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; discussion would be acknowledged only.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditional=
ly<br>
&gt; we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements<br=
>
&gt; of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don&#39;t see=
 a real<br>
&gt; problem here.<br>
<br>
</span>I just would have expected to see all these names in an acknowledgme=
nt section and not in an contributor section.<br>
<br>
RFC7322 again says:<br>
<br>
&quot;4.11.=C2=A0 Contributors Section<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This optional section acknowledges those who have made signifi=
cant<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0contributions to the document.=E2=80=9C<br></blockquote><div><=
br></div><div>I think this is within WG and Editor discretion.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
Mirja<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ietf@kuehlewind.net">ietf@kuehlewind.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for<br>
&gt; draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<=
br>
&gt; email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut thi=
s<br>
&gt; introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss=
-criteria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/i=
esg/<wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br>
&gt; for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br=
>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/dra=
ft-ietf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>=
----------<br>
&gt; COMMENT:<br>
&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>=
----------<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1) I&#39;m a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many=
 other<br>
&gt; protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understan=
d that<br>
&gt; this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported b=
y the way<br>
&gt; the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that al=
so two<br>
&gt; TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3 anym=
ore but<br>
&gt; still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend =
for this<br>
&gt; version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the =
intro<br>
&gt; that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically=
 declares<br>
&gt; the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and extensib=
ility is<br>
&gt; only provided using extensions anymore.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why =
the<br>
&gt; Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate extens=
ion?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn&#39;t say that much either, bu=
t I find it a<br>
&gt; bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport=
 in this<br>
&gt; document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a reli=
able<br>
&gt; transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information see=
ms to<br>
&gt; have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expec=
t to seen<br>
&gt; some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transp=
arently<br>
&gt; try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol=
 if it<br>
&gt; broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to=
 first<br>
&gt; send other data and then start the TLS handshake?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changin=
g them is<br>
&gt; to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However=
, I am<br>
&gt; wondering why the policies have been changed to &quot;Specification Re=
quired&quot; and<br>
&gt; not &quot;IETF consensus&quot; or RFC Required&quot;?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is l=
isted as<br>
&gt; contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that h=
ave<br>
&gt; contributed a &quot;significant&quot; amount of text, while everybody =
else who e.g.<br>
&gt; brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged =
only.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1149442cca511e0566d7391e--


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From: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 11:24:00 -0800
Message-ID: <CAJR_8qK8cOQ+nNFYPe0cQAd_Abgwgf4vtEY+oP1dvtZN-pWD0Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/emwGSrXnFZajwBvEgLoY_Mt0aU0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi David,

This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an
existing TCP connection.  For example:
1. A client connects to a proxy
2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.
3. The  server delivers 2+ records  to the client.
4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS
connection

As the  existing TCP connection may be used for follow on connections, it
might not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly.  And the
client would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.   Otherwise,
the data may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown
issues.

Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS
connection? Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not
really have a TCP connection to the server.  It would be nice to close the
TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.

Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in
TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.  The close_notify is used
to indicate the closure of client write side, but not the server write
side.  If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after
receiving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may
still send data.  Even if the server side stop sending data, the client
side does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server,
and how to clean up the TLS channel.

For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a  close_notify alert and
then wait for the server close_notify alert, and all of the intermediate
data is discarded.  There are still some problems, but in theory the client
can cleanup the TCP channel.

In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:


   If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.


For client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST
deliver a close_notify.  But it does not say if a client initiates the TLS
closure, how could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.

Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.  I will evaluate if TCP
options can help.

Thanks & Regards,
Xuelei Fan


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com> wrote:

> Hi Xuelei,
>
> Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the
> read side?
> If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you
> can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
> The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to
> know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
> I don't see what the server application would do with that information. Do
> you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
> differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client
> would send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
> in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't
> provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of
> close_notify
> is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in
> this example it does get truncated.
>
> Thanks,
> David Schinazi
>
>
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you
> either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert
>> is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more
>> messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read
>> side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the
>> close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after
>> receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the
>> peer.
>>
>> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the
>> connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues
>> if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried
>> over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If
>> sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its
>> read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close
>> the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer,
>> the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.
>> It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download
>> a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate
>> the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS
>> layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close
>> the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
>>
>> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST
>> respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Xuelei Fan
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>

--001a113f62ba5e93340566d780a9
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi David,</div><div><br></div>This issue happens when=
 the TLS connection is established/layered on an existing TCP connection.=
=C2=A0 For example:<div>1. A client connects to a proxy</div><div>2. The cl=
ient establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.</div><div>=
3. The=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">server</span>=C2=A0delivers 2+ records=C2=A0 to t=
he client.</div><div>4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to =
close the TLS connection</div><div><br></div><div>As the=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">existing TCP connection may be used for follow on=
 connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP connection direct=
ly.=C2=A0 And=C2=A0</span>the client would better cleanup the data delivere=
d by the server.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Otherwise, the data may be used by the next fo=
llow on connection and may cause unknown issues.</div><div><span style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;displa=
y:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fam=
ily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatur=
es:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-=
spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial=
;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Then the question=
 comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection?=C2=A0</span>Clo=
sing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not really have a TCP=
 connection to the server.=C2=A0 It would be nice to close the TLS connecti=
on but keeping the TCP connection alive.</div><div><br></div><div>Looks lik=
e there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer p=
er the current TLS 1.3 specification.=C2=A0 The close_notify is used to ind=
icate the closure of client write side, but not the server write side.=C2=
=A0 If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after recei=
ving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still =
send data.=C2=A0 Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side=
 does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, and =
how to clean up the TLS channel.</div><div><br></div><div>For such cases in=
 TLS 1.2, the client can send a=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">close_notify alert and then wait for the server=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial;float:none;display:inline">close_notify alert, and all of the intermed=
iate data is discarded.=C2=A0 There are still some problems, but in theory =
the client can cleanup the TCP channel.</span></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-wei=
ght:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;d=
isplay:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">In the TLS 1=
.3 specification, it says:</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,=
34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">   If the application pro=
tocol using TLS provides that any data may be
   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a &quot;close_notify&quot; a=
lert
   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.</pre>

</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none=
;display:inline">For client read side in above case, it means that the serv=
er side MUST deliver a close_notify.=C2=A0 But it does not say if a client=
=C2=A0initiates the TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server =
for a close_notify alert.</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-vari=
ant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:n=
ormal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></=
span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-v=
ariant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration=
-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Thanks for the suggestion of TCP =
RST option.=C2=A0 I will evaluate if TCP options can help.</span></div><div=
><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;fon=
t-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">=
Thanks &amp; Regards,</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Xuelei Fan=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10=
:19 AM, David Schinazi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@ap=
ple.com" target=3D"_blank">dschinazi@apple.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:a=
fter-white-space">Hi Xuelei,<div><br></div><div>Do you have an example for =
when you would need to gracefully close the read side?</div><div>If you&#39=
;re downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you can sim=
ply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.</div><div>The benefit of=
 having a graceful read close would be for the server to know that the clie=
nt application was done, but in the 10GB video example,</div><div>I don&#39=
;t see what the server application would do with that information. Do you h=
ave an example where the server would treat a graceful read close</div><div=
>differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client wo=
uld send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify</div><d=
iv>in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn&#39;t=
 provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_no=
tify</div><div>is to indicate that the data you&#39;re sending hasn&#39;t b=
een truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Thanks,</div><div>David Schinazi</div><div><div class=3D"h5"><div><=
br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric R=
escorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"m_-1988851270007266420Apple-interchange-ne=
wline"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You se=
nd close_notify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP so=
cket.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuel=
ei Fan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<div><br></div><div><div>Per TLS 1.3 dr=
aft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify=
 the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this conn=
ection.=C2=A0 And this does not have any effect on its read side of the con=
nection.=C2=A0 I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, =
it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close=
_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.</div><div><br></=
div><div>The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of th=
e connection.=C2=A0 If closing the read side silently, there are potential =
issues if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be =
carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.=
=C2=A0 If sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close=
 the its read side and may keep write in its write side.=C2=A0 It does not =
actually close the read side cleanly.=C2=A0 If keep waiting for the close_n=
otify from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to clo=
se its write side.=C2=A0 It does not sound friendly to the local side.=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0From example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, lo=
oks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in th=
e middle of the downloading in TLS layer.=C2=A0 I may miss something.=C2=A0=
 I did not find a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 conn=
ections yet.=C2=A0 Please help if you have an idea!</div><div><br></div><di=
v>It&#39;s not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST re=
spond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.<=
/div></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Xuelei Fan</div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>TLS mailing list<br=
><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br><a h=
ref=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br=
></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113f62ba5e93340566d780a9--


From nobody Wed Mar  7 11:33:59 2018
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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On 3/7/18 12:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > As a rule of thumb, "that" is used to start restrictive clauses 
> ("Two doors
> > are in front of you. The door that is on the right leads outside"), 
> while
> > "which" is used to start non-restrictive clauses ("The only door in 
> the room,
> > which is made of wood, leads outside.") This document uses "which" 
> where "that"
> > is called for in numerous locations. Although there are several more 
> than listed
> > below, I'm highlighting the locations where a literal reading of "which"
> > technically leads to ambiguity. Each instance has a leading line for 
> context
> > (except those that occur at the beginning of a paragraph).
>
> I appreciate that many people hold to this rule of thumb, but it is,
> unfortunately, an invented rule:
>
> http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000918.html 
> <http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/%7Emyl/languagelog/archives/000918.html>
> http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/001461.html 
> <http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/%7Emyl/languagelog/archives/001461.html>
>
>   There is an old myth that which is not used in integrated relative
>   clauses (e.g. something which I hate) and that has to be used instead
>   something that I hate). It is completely untrue. The choice between
>   the two is free and open.


We're going to have to agree to disagree on this point. It's your 
document and this is merely editorial, so your preference stands here.

/a


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 7, 2018, at 03:58, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>=20
> Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
> Thanks to the many pages of people who worked on this document. The =
result is
> surprisingly clear and easy to understand. I'm excited to see TLS 1.3 =
complete,
> and look forward to its widespread deployment.
>=20
> I have a handful of substantive comments (which may be as much as =
result of my
> unfamiliarity with some of the underlying technologies), followed by =
several
> editorial nits.
>=20
> =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=

> Substantive Comments
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> Abstract:
>=20
> This document obsoletes 5077, 5246, and 6961; and updates 4492, 5705, =
and 6066.
> Please mention these in the abstract; see
> <https://ietf.org/standards/ids/checklist/> =C2=A73.1.D

I did point this out in the wirte-up ;)  I don=E2=80=99t want to start =
some IESG navel gazing, but that=E2=80=99s the checklist and RFC7322 is =
still in play.  There were supposed to have concise abstracts free of =
citations.  Until 7322bis get finalized I think it=E2=80=99s guidance =
not a requirement to list those RFCs in the abstract.

I understand that there are places where folks can download just the =
abstract and they=E2=80=99ll be without the metadata, but those folks =
who actually know what those RFCs are not going to be caught off guard =
in the slightest by a NEW RFC.  Those folks who don=E2=80=99t have a =
clue what RFC XXX is are going to need the metadata to follow the bread =
metadata bread crumbs.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.1:
>=20
>> TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.  Servers should be prepared to receive
>> ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in
>> the list of versions.
>=20
> This "should" reads as if it should be normative. It also seems that =
making this
> "should" instead of "MUST" could result in the same "can't negotiate =
to earlier
> versions" implementation situation that is mentioned elsewhere in the =
document.
> Consider a server that supports TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. It receives a =
ClientHello
> from a client that supports TLS 1.2 and a future TLS 1.4. Let's =
postulate that
> this client doesn't support 1.3 (say, because of some uncurable flaw =
that
> exists in 1.3, but not in 1.2 or 1.4). If the server isn't prepared to =
deal
> with this situation, we end up in the same "can't move versions =
forward"
> corner that led to freezing the legacy version string at 0x0303.

I=E2=80=99ll leave this one to ekr.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.3:
>=20
>>        /* Reserved Code Points */
>>        private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF),
>>        (0xFFFF)
>>    } SignatureScheme;
>=20
> When a node supports both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, this private use space =
only
> allows for the definition of two private-use hashes that can be used =
in both
> circumstances (as only 0xFE and 0xFF will be recognized by 1.2 as =
specifying
> hashes). I don't know what the use cases for this private use space =
is; but
> given the relatively generous allocation in RFC 5246, is two going to =
be enough?

I think yes, because we=E2=80=99re lowering the registration bar to Spec =
Required. Note if we have screwed this up we can always allocate more =
later.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A75.5:
>=20
>> There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
>> be safely encrypted under a given set of keys.  [AEAD-LIMITS]
>> provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the
>> underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses.
>> Implementations SHOULD do a key update as described in Section 4.6.3
>> prior to reaching these limits.
>=20
> Implementing this "SHOULD" is predicated on understanding the contents =
of
> [AEAD-LIMITS], which means [AEAD-LIMITS] needs to be a normative =
reference.

Except there=E2=80=99s nothing to implement.  It=E2=80=99s a security =
analysis.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A711:
>=20
>> -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
>>    range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
>>    [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are
>>    reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte in
>>    the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are
>>    not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.
>=20
> Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the =
reservation of
> first byte=3D0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will be =
made from
> the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is the =
case, I
> would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request that =
the IANA
> close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies to =
TLS
> SignatureAlgorithm Registry.

See s17 of =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/
We don=E2=80=99t close the registry because technically, if somebody =
really, really wanted to they could register values for earlier =
versions.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> Appendix B:
>=20
> This is a consolidation of the structures found in the document. =
Presumably,
> Appendix B is normative and the other versions are illustrative? To =
help deal
> with the possibility of conflicts between the two versions, it would =
be nice if
> this were stated explicitly.
>=20
> =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=

> Editorial Nits
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> General:
>=20
>  ** There are 33 instances of too long lines in the document, the =
longest
>     one being 8 characters in excess of 72.
>=20
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> General:
>=20
> Although both "implementor" and "implementer" are acceptable =
spellings,
> it is unusual for a document to switch back and forth. I recommend =
consistency.

We=E2=80=99ll leave this one for the RFC editor.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A71:
>=20
>> the protocol attributes used to negotiate Elliptic Curves.  Because
>> TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] as
>=20
> "...derived, it..."
>=20
>> described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are
>=20
> "...Section 7.5. It also=E2=80=A6"

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A71.3:
>=20
>> -  Elliptic curve algorithms are now in the base spec and includes
>>    new signature algorithms, such as ed25519 and ed448.  TLS 1.3
>=20
> s/includes/include/

I=E2=80=99d suggest:

  Elliptic curve algorithms are now in the base spec and new signature
  algorithms, such as ed25519 and ed44, are included.

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A73.4:
>=20
>> All values, here and elsewhere in the specification, are stored in
>> network byte (big-endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex
>=20
> s/stored/transmitted/

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.3:
>=20
>> RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms  Indicates a signature algorithm using
>>    RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] with mask generation function 1.  The digest
>>    used in the mask generation function and the digest being signed
>>    are both the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS].
>>    The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
>>    algorithm.  If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>>    it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID [RFC5756].  When used in
>>    certificate signatures, the algorithm parameters MUST be DER
>>    encoded.  If the corresponding public key's parameters present,
>=20
> "...parameters are present,=E2=80=A6"

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.6:
>=20
>> The "post_handshake_auth" extension is used to indicate that a client
>> is willing to perform post-handshake authentication Section 4.6.2.
>=20
> "...authentication (Section 4.6.2).=E2=80=9D

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.11.1:
>=20
>> The client's view of the age of a ticket is the time since the
>> receipt of the NewSessionTicket message.  Clients MUST NOT attempt to
>> use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" value
>> which was provided with the ticket.  The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
>> field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the
>> ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the
>> "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket, see
>> Section 4.6.1 modulo 2^32.
>=20
> "...the ticket (see Section 4.1.6), modulo 2^32.=E2=80=9D

In a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A74.4.3:
>=20
>> The context string for a server signature is "TLS 1.3, server
>> CertificateVerify" and for a client signature is "TLS 1.3, client
>> CertificateVerify".  It is used to provide separation between
>> signatures made in different contexts, helping against potential
>> cross-protocol attacks.
>=20
> Although the example makes it clear, the preceding is the normative =
description
> of behavior. Since the limitations of the RFC format result in line =
wrapping in
> the middle of two strings that must be bit exact for the protocol to =
function,
> it is probably worthwhile setting them off on their own lines so that =
they don't
> contain extra line feeds and indenting spaces.

I can get behind this change, but let=E2=80=99s let the RFC editor deal =
with this one.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A77.4.1:
>=20
>> For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is
>> performed.  The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a byte string by
>> encoding in big-endian and padded with zeros up to the size of the
>> prime.
>=20
> Presumably "...and left padded...", correct?

Yes fixed in a PR - referenced below.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A712.2:
>=20
>> [DOW92]    Diffie, W., van Oorschot, P., and M. Wiener,
>>            ""Authentication and authenticated key exchanges"",
>>            Designs, Codes and Cryptography , 1992.
>=20
> The ""quoting"" here is odd

Fixed (I think)  a PR - referenced below.

>> [HCJ16]    Husak, M., &#268;ermak, M., Jirsik, T., and P.
>>            &#268;eleda, "HTTPS traffic analysis and client
>>            identification using passive SSL/TLS fingerprinting",
>>            EURASIP Journal on Information Security Vol. 2016,
>>            DOI 10.1186/s13635-016-0030-7, February 2016.
>=20
> s/&268;/=E2=80=9C/g

I think this is some kind of odd import issue that the RFC editor will =
need to fix.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A712.3:
>=20
> This section seems superfluous.

I can see leaving it though because we do reference it in a latter =
appendix.  I will however bow to the RFC editor as to whether this =
should just be moved to an informative reference.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A7E.1.1:
>=20
>> more invocations of HKDF-Expand.  This ordering should always be
>> followed (including in future revisions of this document), in
>> particular, one SHOULD NOT use an output of HKDF-Extract as an input
>=20
> "...of this document); in particular, one..."
>                     ^

I guess I don=E2=80=99t follow this one.

> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
>=20
> =C2=A7E.6:
>=20
>> Although TLS 1.3 does not use RSA key transport and so is not
>> directly susceptible to Bleichenbacher-type attacks
>=20
> It seems that this should cite "Chosen ciphertext attacks against =
protocols
> based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1".

I could see doing that, but [JSS15] cites it too which is found later in =
the sentence:

   servers also support static RSA in the context of previous versions
   of TLS, then it may be possible to impersonate the server for TLS 1.3
   connections [JSS15].

I=E2=80=99ve collect the changes in the following PR:

https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1169

> =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=

>=20
> General (deferred to the end due to length):
>=20
> As a rule of thumb, "that" is used to start restrictive clauses ("Two =
doors
> are in front of you. The door that is on the right leads outside"), =
while
> "which" is used to start non-restrictive clauses ("The only door in =
the room,
> which is made of wood, leads outside.") This document uses "which" =
where "that"
> is called for in numerous locations. Although there are several more =
than listed
> below, I'm highlighting the locations where a literal reading of =
"which"
> technically leads to ambiguity. Each instance has a leading line for =
context
> (except those that occur at the beginning of a paragraph).

I guess I=E2=80=99ll leave to the RFC editor but I tilted at this wind =
mill too at one point with ekr and sent me the following link:
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/001467.html

:)

> =C2=A71.1:
>>   server: The endpoint which did not initiate the TLS connection.
>=20
> =C2=A71.3:
>>      favor of a version list in an extension.  This increases
>>      compatibility with servers which incorrectly implemented version
>=20
> =C2=A74:
>>   Protocol messages MUST be sent in the order defined in Section =
4.4.1
>>   and shown in the diagrams in Section 2.  A peer which receives a
>=20
> =C2=A74.1.2:
>>      alert.  Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior
>>      ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>=20
> =C2=A74.1.3:
>>   cipher_suite  The single cipher suite selected by the server from =
the
>>      list in ClientHello.cipher_suites.  A client which receives a
>=20
>>   TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the =
server's
>>   random value.  TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in
>=20
> =C2=A74.1.4:
>>   compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second
>>   ClientHello.  A client which receives a cipher suite that was not
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.1:
>>   The "supported_versions" extension is used by the client to =
indicate
>>   which versions of TLS it supports and by the server to indicate =
which
>=20
>>   Implementations of this specification MUST send this extension
>>   containing all versions of TLS which they are prepared to negotiate
>=20
>>   If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>=20
>>   version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range.
>>   Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions =
of
>=20
>>   A server which negotiates a version of TLS prior to TLS 1.3 MUST =
set
>=20
>>   ServerHello.version and MUST NOT send the "supported_versions"
>>   extension.  A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by =
sending
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.3:
>>   present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to
>>   signatures appearing in certificates.  Clients which desire the
>=20
>>   The "signature_algorithms_cert" extension was added to allow
>>   implementations which supported different sets of algorithms for
>=20
>>   TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>>   Implementations which have the same policy in both cases MAY omit =
the
>=20
>>   takes as input an arbitrary-length message, rather than a digest.
>>   Algorithms which traditionally act on a digest should be defined in
>=20
>>      as defined in [SHS].  These values refer solely to signatures
>>      which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and are not
>=20
>>   Legacy algorithms  Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated
>=20
>>      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA.  These values refer solely to
>>      signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) =
and
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.4:
>>   [RFC6066], but is more complicated, is not used in TLS 1.3 =
(although
>>   it may appear in ClientHello messages from clients which are =
offering
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.5:
>>   The "oid_filters" extension allows servers to provide a set of OID/
>>   value pairs which it would like the client's certificate to match.
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.6:
>>   Servers MUST NOT send a post-handshake CertificateRequest to =
clients
>>   which do not offer this extension.  Servers MUST NOT send this
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.7:
>>   When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension indicates
>>   the named groups which the client supports for key exchange, =
ordered
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.8:
>>   MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a =
group
>>   which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the
>=20
>>   original ClientHello; and (2) the selected_group field does not
>>   correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" =
extension
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.10:
>>   NewSessionTicket message, the associated values are those which =
were
>>   negotiated in the connection which established the PSK.  The PSK =
used
>=20
>>   A server which receives an "early_data" extension MUST behave in =
one
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.11.1:
>>   receipt of the NewSessionTicket message.  Clients MUST NOT attempt =
to
>>   use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" =
value
>=20
>>   use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" =
value
>>   which was provided with the ticket.  The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
>=20
> =C2=A74.2.11.2:
>>   message (Section 4.4.4) but with the BaseKey being the binder_key
>>   derived via the key schedule from the corresponding PSK which is
>=20
>=20
> =C2=A74.3.2:
>>   A server which is authenticating with a certificate MAY optionally
>=20
>>   certificate_request_context  An opaque string which identifies the
>=20
>>   certificate_request_context  An opaque string which identifies the
>>      certificate request and which will be echoed in the client's
>=20
>>   In prior versions of TLS, the CertificateRequest message carried a
>>   list of signature algorithms and certificate authorities which the
>=20
>>   Servers which are authenticating with a PSK MUST NOT send the
>=20
> =C2=A74.4.2:
>>   potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from =
any
>>   TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which
>=20
>=20
> =C2=A74.4.2.4:
>>   Any endpoint receiving any certificate which it would need to
>=20
>>   and it is RECOMMENDED that any endpoint receiving any certificate
>>   which it would need to validate using any signature algorithm using =
a
>=20
>=20
> =C2=A74.6.1:
>>   Note that in principle it is possible to continue issuing new =
tickets
>>   which indefinitely extend the lifetime of the keying material
>=20
>=20
> =C2=A74.6.2:
>>   CertificateRequest and receiving a response.  In addition, clients
>>   which receive multiple CertificateRequests in close succession MAY
>=20
> =C2=A74.6.3:
>>   record.  This mechanism allows either side to force an update to =
the
>>   entire connection, but causes an implementation which receives
>=20
> =C2=A75:
>>   condition prior to attempting to deprotect the record.  An
>>   implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
>=20
>>   implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
>>   which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abort the
>=20
> =C2=A75.5:
>>   There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can
>=20
> =C2=A76:
>>   Note: TLS defines two generic alerts (see Section 6) to use upon
>>   failure to parse a message.  Peers which receive a message which
>=20
>>   length) MUST terminate the connection with a "decode_error" alert.
>>   Peers which receive a message which is syntactically correct but
>=20
> =C2=A76.2:
>>   bad_record_mac  This alert is returned if a record is received =
which
>=20
> =C2=A77:
>>   The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
>=20
> =C2=A78:
>>      attempting to retry requests.  However, 0-RTT adds an additional
>>      dimension for any server system which does not maintain globally
>=20
>>   operation, clients will not know which, if any, of these mechanisms
>>   servers actually implement and hence MUST only send early data =
which
>=20
> =C2=A78.2:
>>   long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup
>>   time.  Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were
>=20
> =C2=A78.3:
>>   number of ClientHellos and is a useful optimization for single-use
>>   tickets because it allows efficient rejection of ClientHellos which
>=20
> =C2=A79.2:
>>   Servers receiving a ClientHello which does not conform to these
>=20
> =C2=A79.3:
>>   -  A middlebox which terminates a TLS connection MUST behave as a
>=20
>>      compliant TLS server (to the original client), including having =
a
>>      certificate which the client is willing to accept, and as a
>=20
>>      apply to the two connections separately.  Safely deploying a TLS
>>      terminator requires additional security considerations which are
>=20
>>   -  An middlebox which forwards ClientHello parameters it does not
>=20
> =C2=A7A:
>>   e.g., START) have no formal meaning but are provided for ease of
>>   comprehension.  Actions which are taken only in certain =
circumstances
>=20
>=20
> =C2=A7C.3:
>>   -  As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which
>=20
> =C2=A7D:
>>   the master secret.  Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript
>>   up to the server CertificateVerify, implementations which support
>=20
> =C2=A7E.1:
>>   transitively includes the original handshake transcript, because =
that
>>   transcript is digested into the values which produce the Resumption
>=20
>>   If an exporter is used, then it produces values which are unique =
and
>=20
>>   similar security properties.  Note that they do not include the
>>   client's certificate; future applications which wish to bind to the
>=20
> =C2=A7E.2:
>>   Integrity.  An attacker should not be able to craft a new record
>>      which is different from an existing record which will be =
accepted
>=20
>>   Order protection/non-replayability  An attacker should not be able =
to
>>      cause the receiver to accept a record which it has already
>=20
>>   sequence number being maintained independently at both sides thus
>>   records which are delivered out of order result in AEAD =
deprotection
>=20
>>   TLS does not provide security for data which is communicated on a
>=20
>>   an attacker who learns a traffic secret can compute all future
>>   traffic secrets on that connection.  Systems which want such
>=20
> =C2=A7E.5:
>>   -  Duplication of actions which cause side effects (e.g., =
purchasing
>=20
>>   data from being accepted multiple times by any cluster with
>>   consistent state; for servers which limit the use of 0-RTT to one
>=20
>>   window.  Because clients do not know the exact details of server
>>   behavior, they MUST NOT send messages in early data which are not
>=20
>>   behavior, they MUST NOT send messages in early data which are not
>>   safe to have replayed and which they would not be willing to retry
>=20
> =C2=A7E.5.1:
>>   Replays of the ClientHello produce the same early exporter, thus
>>   requiring additional care by applications which use these =
exporters.
>=20
>=20


From nobody Wed Mar  7 11:53:26 2018
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Mirja,

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 2:03 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:32 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
> <ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:
>>
>> > > Still, I find it
>> > > especially confusing that also two TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated
>> > > which are not needed with TLS1.3 anymore but still probably valid to
>> > > be used with TLS1.2, right?
>> >
>> > Which extensions are you referring to.
>>
>> RFC5077 and RFC6961 (maybe extension is not the wrong term for the first
>> one)
>
>
> OK. I'm not really sure of a better way to handle this.
>
>
>>
>> > > I would recommend for this version to at
>> > > least already note in the abstract or very early in the intro that i=
t
>> > > changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
>> > > declares the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions a=
nd
>> > > extensibility is only provided using extensions anymore.
>> >
>> > It's true that we are deprecating the version mechanism, but that
>> > does not mean that it is the only extension mechanism.
>>
>> Which others do you have?
>
>
> Once you have negotiated a new version you can change the messages in any
> way you please, just as you always could have.
>
>
>
>> > > 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) wh=
y
>> > > the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
>> > > extension?
>> >
>> > I'm sorry, I'm not following this. As opposed to what?
>>
>> You could implicitly make assumptions depending on which extension are
>> present or you can add one field to the pre_shared_key extension to indi=
cate
>> the mode. I=E2=80=99m always careful is something says =E2=80=9Eif this =
think is present,
>> that must also be present=E2=80=9C as it can be an source of error that =
could have
>> been avoided.
>
>
> Yes, we considered this design, and rejected it because we wanted a way t=
o
> indicate which kinds of PSKs the client would be willing to accept.
>
>
>>
>> > > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but =
I
>> > > find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlayi=
ng
>> > > transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in t=
he
>> > > intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this
>> > > minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
>> > > document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some minimal
>> > > text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently try
>> > > to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol i=
f
>> > > it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connecti=
on
>> > > to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>> >
>> > This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the job
>> > of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
>> > some text that that's expected.
>>
>> If that is the only requirement, it would still be good to spell that ou=
t.
>>
>
> Sure, I can add something.
>
>>
>> >
>> > > 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of
>> > > changing them is to make it easier to specify and use new
>> > > extensions/mechanism. However, I am wondering why the policies have
>> > > been changed to "Specification Required" and not "IETF consensus" or
>> > > RFC Required"?
>> >
>> > The changes aren't in this document, but the WG feeling was that
>> > both of those were creating bad incentives for people to publish
>> > RFCs just to get a code point. The "Recommended" flag was intended
>> > to address that need instead.
>>
>> Hm, I think I would actually prefer to see things documented in RFCs
>> instead of just having some spec somewhere. Not sure if an RFC on the IS=
E
>> stream is that much more effort than writing a spec somewhere else but t=
hen
>> at least the IESG would get to see it for a conflict review..
>
>
> Well, I can see how you would feel that way, but it was the consensus of =
the
> WG that that was not the right approach.

I agree with Eric and poked at this in my AD review of the recent
policy changes.  There is strong WG consensus to allow for informal
documentation such as an unpublished draft.  As such, I support that
consensus as sponsoring AD since our procedures allow for this
flexibility and it makes sense.

Thanks for your review and comments, it's helpful.
Kathleen

>
>
>
>> > > 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
>> > > listed as contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are
>> > > people that have contributed a "significant" amount of text, while
>> > > everybody else who e.g. brought ideas in during mailing list
>> > > discussion would be acknowledged only.
>> >
>> > I don't think we have any IETF-wide standard here, but traditionally
>> > we have adopted a pretty generous attitude towards acknowledgements
>> > of this type. Given that electrons are basically free, I don't see a
>> > real
>> > problem here.
>>
>> I just would have expected to see all these names in an acknowledgment
>> section and not in an contributor section.
>>
>> RFC7322 again says:
>>
>> "4.11.  Contributors Section
>>
>>
>>
>>    This optional section acknowledges those who have made significant
>>    contributions to the document.=E2=80=9C
>
>
> I think this is within WG and Editor discretion.
>
> -Ekr
>
>>
>>
>> Mirja
>>
>>
>>
>> >
>> > -Ekr
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.=
net>
>> > wrote:
>> > Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
>> > draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>> >
>> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut thi=
s
>> > introductory paragraph, however.)
>> >
>> >
>> > Please refer to
>> > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>> >
>> >
>> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> > COMMENT:
>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >
>> > 1) I'm a bit uncertain if obsoleting is the right approach as many oth=
er
>> > protocols usually do not obsolete older versions. However, I understan=
d
>> > that
>> > this has been the approach TLS has previously taken and is supported b=
y
>> > the way
>> > the document is written. Still, I find it especially confusing that al=
so
>> > two
>> > TLS1.2 extensions are deprecated which are not needed with TLS1.3
>> > anymore but
>> > still probably valid to be used with TLS1.2, right? I would recommend
>> > for this
>> > version to at least already note in the abstract or very early in the
>> > intro
>> > that it changes the versioning mechanism itself, and thereby basically
>> > declares
>> > the TLS handshake as an invariant for all future versions and
>> > extensibility is
>> > only provided using extensions anymore.
>> >
>> > 2) Can you provide further explanation (potentially in the draft) why
>> > the
>> > Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes are provided in an extra/separate
>> > extension?
>> >
>> > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, but I
>> > find it a
>> > bit wired that there are NO requirements for the underlaying transport
>> > in this
>> > document. Previous version this at least said in the intro that a
>> > reliable
>> > transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even this minimal information see=
ms
>> > to
>> > have gotten lost in this document. However, I would usually also expec=
t
>> > to seen
>> > some minimal text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to
>> > transparently
>> > try to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol
>> > if it
>> > broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP connection to
>> > first
>> > send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
>> >
>> > 4) Regarding the registration policies: I assume the intend of changin=
g
>> > them is
>> > to make it easier to specify and use new extensions/mechanism. However=
,
>> > I am
>> > wondering why the policies have been changed to "Specification Require=
d"
>> > and
>> > not "IETF consensus" or RFC Required"?
>> >
>> > 5) I find it a bit strange that basically the whole working group is
>> > listed as
>> > contributors. My understanding was that Contributors are people that
>> > have
>> > contributed a "significant" amount of text, while everybody else who
>> > e.g.
>> > brought ideas in during mailing list discussion would be acknowledged
>> > only.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Hi Xuelei,

Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the TCP connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has?
As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support this.
Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy wouldn't be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.

Thanks,
David


> On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi David,
> 
> This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an existing TCP connection.  For example:
> 1. A client connects to a proxy
> 2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.
> 3. The  server delivers 2+ records  to the client.
> 4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS connection
> 
> As the  existing TCP connection may be used for follow on connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly.  And the client would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.   Otherwise, the data may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown issues.
> 
> Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection? Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not really have a TCP connection to the server.  It would be nice to close the TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.
> 
> Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.  The close_notify is used to indicate the closure of client write side, but not the server write side.  If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receiving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still send data.  Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, and how to clean up the TLS channel.
> 
> For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a  close_notify alert and then wait for the server close_notify alert, and all of the intermediate data is discarded.  There are still some problems, but in theory the client can cleanup the TCP channel.
> 
> In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:
>    
>    If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>    carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>    closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
>    before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.
> 
> For client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST deliver a close_notify.  But it does not say if a client initiates the TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.
> 
> Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.  I will evaluate if TCP options can help.
> 
> Thanks & Regards,
> Xuelei Fan
> 
> 
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com <mailto:dschinazi@apple.com>> wrote:
> Hi Xuelei,
> 
> Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read side?
> If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
> The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
> I don't see what the server application would do with that information. Do you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
> differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
> in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_notify
> is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.
> 
> Thanks,
> David Schinazi
> 
> 
>> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
>> 
>> -Ekr
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com <mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com>> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.
>> 
>> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.  It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
>> 
>> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> Xuelei Fan
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
> 
> 


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Hi&nbsp;Xuelei,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div>Can =
you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the TCP =
connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has?<div =
class=3D"">As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support =
this.</div><div class=3D"">Additionally, the close_notify alerts are =
sent encrypted so the proxy wouldn't be able to tell that applications =
are done with TLS.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">David</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, =
Xuelei Fan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" =
class=3D"">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi David,</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>This issue happens when the TLS connection is =
established/layered on an existing TCP connection.&nbsp; For =
example:<div class=3D"">1. A client connects to a proxy</div><div =
class=3D"">2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server =
via the proxy.</div><div class=3D"">3. The&nbsp;

<span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">server</span>&nbsp;delivers 2+ =
records&nbsp; to the client.</div><div class=3D"">4. The client receives =
the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS connection</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As the&nbsp;

<span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">existing TCP connection may be used =
for follow on connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP =
connection directly.&nbsp; And&nbsp;</span>the client would better =
cleanup the data delivered by the server.&nbsp; &nbsp;Otherwise, the =
data may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown =
issues.</div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">Then the question comes to me: how =
does the client close the TLS connection?&nbsp;</span>Closing the TCP =
connection may be not desired as it does not really have a TCP =
connection to the server.&nbsp; It would be nice to close the TLS =
connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Looks like there is no way to close the =
read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 =
specification.&nbsp; The close_notify is used to indicate the closure of =
client write side, but not the server write side.&nbsp; If the client =
sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receiving the =
close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still send =
data.&nbsp; Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side =
does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, =
and how to clean up the TLS channel.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client =
can send a&nbsp;

<span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">close_notify alert and then wait for =
the server&nbsp;<span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">close_notify alert, and all of the =
intermediate data is discarded.&nbsp; There are still some problems, but =
in theory the client can cleanup the TCP =
channel.</span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">In the TLS 1.3 specification, it =
says:</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size: 13.3333px; margin-top: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
word-spacing: 0px;">   If the application protocol using TLS provides =
that any data may be
   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.</pre>

</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">For client read side in above case, =
it means that the server side MUST deliver a close_notify.&nbsp; But it =
does not say if a client&nbsp;initiates the TLS closure, how could the =
client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.</span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST =
option.&nbsp; I will evaluate if TCP options can help.</span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">Thanks &amp; =
Regards,</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D"">Xuelei Fan</span></div><div =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, =
Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <span dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">dschinazi@apple.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" class=3D"">Hi =
Xuelei,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Do you have =
an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read =
side?</div><div class=3D"">If you're downloading a 10GB video and the =
user cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection =
by sending a RST.</div><div class=3D"">The benefit of having a graceful =
read close would be for the server to know that the client application =
was done, but in the 10GB video example,</div><div class=3D"">I don't =
see what the server application would do with that information. Do you =
have an example where the server would treat a graceful read =
close</div><div class=3D"">differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS =
1.2 and prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would =
reply with a close_notify</div><div class=3D"">in the middle of the 10GB =
of application data. That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to =
the server application - the point of close_notify</div><div class=3D"">is=
 to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in =
this example it does get truncated.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">David =
Schinazi</div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"m_-1988851270007266420Apple-interchange-newline"><div =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Well, this is like TCP in that =
respect. You send close_notify and then you either stop reading off of =
or close the TCP socket.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">-Ekr</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, =
Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <span dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">Hi,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the =
close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will =
not send any more messages on this connection.&nbsp; And this does not =
have any effect on its read side of the connection.&nbsp; I think it =
means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep =
reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, =
it still can keep sending data to the peer.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The question comes to me is about how =
to close the read side of the connection.&nbsp; If closing the read side =
silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using =
TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport =
after the TLS connection is closed.&nbsp; If sending a close_notify =
alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may =
keep write in its write side.&nbsp; It does not actually close the read =
side cleanly.&nbsp; If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, =
the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write =
side.&nbsp; It does not sound friendly to the local side.&nbsp; =
&nbsp;=46rom example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, =
looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle =
in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.&nbsp; I may miss =
something.&nbsp; I did not find a solution about how to close the read =
side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.&nbsp; Please help if you have an =
idea!</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It's not =
a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a =
close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify =
alert.</div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">Xuelei Fan</div></div>
<br class=3D"">______________________________<wbr =
class=3D"">_________________<br class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr =
class=3D"">istinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D""></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div>
______________________________<wbr class=3D"">_________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr =
class=3D"">listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Boundary_(ID_GD8E4r1q8KBpB3eFTHQiCw)--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>=20
> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a =
surprisingly
> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the =
subject. I
> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of =
these are
> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
>=20
> *** Substantive Comments:
>=20
> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a =
server, it is
> REQUIRED to send the
>   ClientHello as its first message. "
>=20
> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar =
application layer
> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification =
request.)

No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello =
message first ;)

> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers =
might receive
> TLS 1.2 or prior
>      ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>      follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>=20
> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and =
able to
> negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:
>=20
> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>   this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>   [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
>=20
> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
>=20
> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>   implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>   accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>   version."
>=20
> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle =
difference?

In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:

   Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
   TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.

Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about the =
server needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from the =
client.

> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that =
RFC
> implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations? =
If so,
> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some =
time.

I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for them =
to rev their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 or =
so weeks it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC =
editor=E2=80=99s queue.

> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem =
important. I
> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.

=C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations =
with 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we =
don=E2=80=99t want to say anything about earlier versions.   And, some =
of this is technically repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 =
saying don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/3. So, it ended up in an appendix.

> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
>=20
> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>   is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension =
with
>   the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in =
the same
>   group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
>=20
> missing comma prior to "which=E2=80=9D.

(grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)
So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I=E2=80=99m =
going with this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).

> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then =
non-
>   overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as =
it
>   is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
>=20
> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at =
times. Is that
> the intent?

Yes that is the intent.

> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions =
similar to "SHALL
> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has =
updated" at some
> point?

Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC =
editor to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.

> =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar

:)


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From: Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 12:53:40 -0800
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To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Hi David,

The case I can think of now is the START TLS protocols (Opportunistic
TLS).  But looks like these protocols need to use an existing plain-text
socket, and then establish a TLS connection over it, and will never go back
to plain-text again.  Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS
connection just implies close the underlying TCP socket in practice.  We
don't do that previously as we don't know how the  plain-text socket can be
used in practice in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (while
socket still alive).   If an application gets indication that the TLS
connection get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.  So it does not
actually need to understand the TLS specifics.

I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for such
requirement.  Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what the
compatibility impact could be.

Thanks,
Xuelei

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com> wrote:

> Hi Xuelei,
>
> Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the
> TCP connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has?
> As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support this.
> Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy
> wouldn't be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.
>
> Thanks,
> David
>
>
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com> wrote:
>
> Hi David,
>
> This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an
> existing TCP connection.  For example:
> 1. A client connects to a proxy
> 2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.
> 3. The  server delivers 2+ records  to the client.
> 4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS
> connection
>
> As the  existing TCP connection may be used for follow on connections, it
> might not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly.  And the
> client would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.   Otherwise,
> the data may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown
> issues.
>
> Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS
> connection? Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not
> really have a TCP connection to the server.  It would be nice to close the
> TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.
>
> Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in
> TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.  The close_notify is used
> to indicate the closure of client write side, but not the server write
> side.  If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after
> receiving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may
> still send data.  Even if the server side stop sending data, the client
> side does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server,
> and how to clean up the TLS channel.
>
> For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a  close_notify alert and
> then wait for the server close_notify alert, and all of the intermediate
> data is discarded.  There are still some problems, but in theory the client
> can cleanup the TCP channel.
>
> In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:
>
>
>    If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>    carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>    closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
>    before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.
>
>
> For client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST
> deliver a close_notify.  But it does not say if a client initiates the TLS
> closure, how could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.
>
> Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.  I will evaluate if TCP
> options can help.
>
> Thanks & Regards,
> Xuelei Fan
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Xuelei,
>>
>> Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the
>> read side?
>> If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you
>> can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
>> The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to
>> know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
>> I don't see what the server application would do with that information.
>> Do you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
>> differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client
>> would send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
>> in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't
>> provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of
>> close_notify
>> is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in
>> this example it does get truncated.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> David Schinazi
>>
>>
>> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then
>> you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert
>>> is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more
>>> messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read
>>> side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the
>>> close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after
>>> receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the
>>> peer.
>>>
>>> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the
>>> connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues
>>> if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried
>>> over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If
>>> sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its
>>> read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close
>>> the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer,
>>> the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.
>>> It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download
>>> a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate
>>> the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS
>>> layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close
>>> the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
>>>
>>> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST
>>> respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Xuelei Fan
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>>
>
>

--001a1140b00e1125d20566d8c18c
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi David,</div><div><br></div>The case I can think of=
 now is the START TLS protocols (Opportunistic TLS).=C2=A0 But looks like t=
hese protocols need to use an existing plain-text socket, and then establis=
h a TLS connection over it, and will never go back to plain-text again.=C2=
=A0 Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just implies clo=
se the underlying TCP socket in practice.=C2=A0 We don&#39;t do that previo=
usly as we don&#39;t know how the=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">plain-text</span>

 socket can be used in practice in the follow on processes after TLS get cl=
osed (while socket still alive).=C2=A0 =C2=A0If an application gets indicat=
ion that the TLS connection get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.=C2=
=A0 So it does not actually need to understand the TLS specifics.<div><br><=
/div><div>I&#39;m a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for=
 such requirement.=C2=A0 Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what t=
he compatibility impact could be.<div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Xuel=
ei</div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank">dschinazi@apple.com<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-=
wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div>Hi=C2=A0Xuelei,</div><di=
v><br></div>Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you&#39;re using that =
can reuse the TCP connection for follow on connections, and what semantics =
it has?<div>As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don&#39;t support this=
.</div><div>Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the=
 proxy wouldn&#39;t be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>David</div><div><div class=3D"h5">=
<div><br></div><div><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Mar 7, 2018,=
 at 11:24, Xuelei Fan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=
=3D"_blank">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"m_-91322=
14798684023709Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Davi=
d,</div><div><br></div>This issue happens when the TLS connection is establ=
ished/layered on an existing TCP connection.=C2=A0 For example:<div>1. A cl=
ient connects to a proxy</div><div>2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 conn=
ection to a server via the proxy.</div><div>3. The=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">server</span>=C2=A0delivers 2+ records=C2=A0 to t=
he client.</div><div>4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to =
close the TLS connection</div><div><br></div><div>As the=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">existing TCP connection may be used for follow on=
 connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP connection direct=
ly.=C2=A0 And=C2=A0</span>the client would better cleanup the data delivere=
d by the server.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Otherwise, the data may be used by the next fo=
llow on connection and may cause unknown issues.</div><div><span style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;displa=
y:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fam=
ily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatur=
es:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-=
spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial=
;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Then the question=
 comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection?=C2=A0</span>Clo=
sing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not really have a TCP=
 connection to the server.=C2=A0 It would be nice to close the TLS connecti=
on but keeping the TCP connection alive.</div><div><br></div><div>Looks lik=
e there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer p=
er the current TLS 1.3 specification.=C2=A0 The close_notify is used to ind=
icate the closure of client write side, but not the server write side.=C2=
=A0 If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after recei=
ving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still =
send data.=C2=A0 Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side=
 does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, and =
how to clean up the TLS channel.</div><div><br></div><div>For such cases in=
 TLS 1.2, the client can send a=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;f=
loat:none;display:inline">close_notify alert and then wait for the server=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial;float:none;display:inline">close_notify alert, and all of the intermed=
iate data is discarded.=C2=A0 There are still some problems, but in theory =
the client can cleanup the TCP channel.</span></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-wei=
ght:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;d=
isplay:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">In the TLS 1=
.3 specification, it says:</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,=
34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0

<pre class=3D"m_-9132214798684023709gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.33=
33px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatu=
res:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;t=
ext-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px">   If=
 the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a &quot;close_notify&quot; a=
lert
   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.</pre>

</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none=
;display:inline">For client read side in above case, it means that the serv=
er side MUST deliver a close_notify.=C2=A0 But it does not say if a client=
=C2=A0initiates the TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server =
for a close_notify alert.</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-vari=
ant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:n=
ormal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></=
span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-v=
ariant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration=
-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Thanks for the suggestion of TCP =
RST option.=C2=A0 I will evaluate if TCP options can help.</span></div><div=
><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;fon=
t-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">=
Thanks &amp; Regards,</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Xuelei Fan=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans=
-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10=
:19 AM, David Schinazi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@ap=
ple.com" target=3D"_blank">dschinazi@apple.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:a=
fter-white-space">Hi Xuelei,<div><br></div><div>Do you have an example for =
when you would need to gracefully close the read side?</div><div>If you&#39=
;re downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you can sim=
ply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.</div><div>The benefit of=
 having a graceful read close would be for the server to know that the clie=
nt application was done, but in the 10GB video example,</div><div>I don&#39=
;t see what the server application would do with that information. Do you h=
ave an example where the server would treat a graceful read close</div><div=
>differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client wo=
uld send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify</div><d=
iv>in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn&#39;t=
 provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_no=
tify</div><div>is to indicate that the data you&#39;re sending hasn&#39;t b=
een truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Thanks,</div><div>David Schinazi</div><div><div class=3D"m_-9132214=
798684023709h5"><div><br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Mar 7, =
2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D=
"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"m_-91322147986840237=
09m_-1988851270007266420Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">We=
ll, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you ei=
ther stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</=
div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank">xuelei.fan@vimous.=
com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
">Hi,<div><br></div><div><div>Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alert=
s), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender =
will not send any more messages on this connection.=C2=A0 And this does not=
 have any effect on its read side of the connection.=C2=A0 I think it means=
 that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data =
from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, it still can kee=
p sending data to the peer.</div><div><br></div><div>The question comes to =
me is about how to close the read side of the connection.=C2=A0 If closing =
the read side silently, there are potential issues if the application proto=
col using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying tra=
nsport after the TLS connection is closed.=C2=A0 If sending a close_notify =
alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may keep w=
rite in its write side.=C2=A0 It does not actually close the read side clea=
nly.=C2=A0 If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, the local ma=
y have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.=C2=A0 It does =
not sound friendly to the local side.=C2=A0 =C2=A0From example, if I downlo=
ad a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicat=
e the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS =
layer.=C2=A0 I may miss something.=C2=A0 I did not find a solution about ho=
w to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.=C2=A0 Please help if y=
ou have an idea!</div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s not a problem in TLS 1.2=
 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its ow=
n after receiving a close_notify alert.</div></div><div><br></div><div>Than=
ks,</div><div>Xuelei Fan</div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>TLS mailing list<br=
><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br><a h=
ref=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br></div></blockquote></div><br=
></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br=
></div>

--001a1140b00e1125d20566d8c18c--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
>>=20
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>=20
>>=20
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html=

>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>=20
>>=20
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
>> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a surprisingly
>> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the subje=
ct. I
>> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of these=
 are
>> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
>>=20
>> *** Substantive Comments:
>>=20
>> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a server,=
 it is
>> REQUIRED to send the
>>  ClientHello as its first message. "
>>=20
>> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar application l=
ayer
>> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification re=
quest.)
>=20
> No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello message f=
irst ;)

I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that ClientHello is t=
he first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I think some readers might=
 interpret this to mean that the client can send no other data at any layer p=
rior to ClientHello.

>=20
>> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers might=
 receive
>> TLS 1.2 or prior
>>     ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>>     follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>>=20
>> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and able=
 to
>> negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:
>>=20
>> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>>  this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>>  [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
>>=20
>> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
>>=20
>> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>>  implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>>  accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>>  version."
>>=20
>> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
>> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle diff=
erence?
>=20
> In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:
>=20
>   Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
>   TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.

That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D

>=20
> Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about the s=
erver needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from the client.=


I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to negotiate 1.2=
? Or is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to all of the related=
 MUSTs?

>=20
>> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that RFC
>> implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations? If s=
o,
>> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some time.
>=20
> I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for them to r=
ev their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 or so weeks=
 it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC editor=E2=80=99=
s queue.

Okay.

>=20
>> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem imp=
ortant. I
>> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.
>=20
> =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations with 1=
.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we don=E2=80=99t wa=
nt to say anything about earlier versions.   And, some of this is technicall=
y repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 saying don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/3=
. So, it ended up in an appendix.

Okay.

>=20
>> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
>>=20
>> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>>  is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with
>>  the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in the=
 same
>>  group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
>>=20
>> missing comma prior to "which=E2=80=9D.
>=20
> (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)

Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)

> So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I=E2=80=99m going w=
ith this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).

I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =E2=80=
=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D vs =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive clauses :-)

>=20
>> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then non-
>>  overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it
>>  is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
>>=20
>> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at times. I=
s that
>> the intent?
>=20
> Yes that is the intent.

Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want to trea=
t this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use the PSK witho=
ut (EC)DHE?

>=20
>> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions similar t=
o "SHALL
>> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has updated" a=
t some
>> point?
>=20
> Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC edit=
or to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.

Okay.

>=20
>> =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar
>=20
> :)

I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the Cat=E2=80=
=9D utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving high voltage :=
-)

>=20


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 19:39:48 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 7, 2018, at 16:35, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
>>>=20
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to =
all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>=20
>>> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a =
surprisingly
>>> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the =
subject. I
>>> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of =
these are
>>> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
>>>=20
>>> *** Substantive Comments:
>>>=20
>>> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a =
server, it is
>>> REQUIRED to send the
>>> ClientHello as its first message. "
>>>=20
>>> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar =
application layer
>>> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a =
clarification request.)
>>=20
>> No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello =
message first ;)
>=20
> I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that =
ClientHello is the first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I =
think some readers might interpret this to mean that the client can send =
no other data at any layer prior to ClientHello.

Well this is about TLS :) But, maybe r/its first message/its first TLS =
handshake message ?

>>> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers =
might receive
>>> TLS 1.2 or prior
>>>    ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>>>    follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>>>=20
>>> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and =
able to
>>> negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:
>>>=20
>>> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>>> this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>>> [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
>>>=20
>>> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
>>>=20
>>> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>>> implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>>> accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>>> version."
>>>=20
>>> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
>>> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle =
difference?
>>=20
>> In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:
>>=20
>>  Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
>>  TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.
>=20
> That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D

Right so there might be some implementations that choose to not support =
prior versions.

>> Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about =
the server needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from =
the client.
>=20
> I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to =
negotiate 1.2? Or is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to =
all of the related MUSTs?

Yes - TLS servers are allowed to refuse to negotiate earlier version; =
that=E2=80=99s deciding to not follow the SHOULD in  =C2=A7s4.2.1.  If =
they negotiate an earlier version then do that version that=E2=80=99s =
what=E2=80=99s in =C2=A7s4.1.2 and in =C2=A74.2.3.

>>> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that =
RFC
>>> implementations will ever need to interop with draft =
implementations? If so,
>>> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some =
time.
>>=20
>> I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for =
them to rev their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the =
6 or so weeks it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the =
RFC editor=E2=80=99s queue.
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
>>=20
>>> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that =
seem important. I
>>> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.
>>=20
>> =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations =
with 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we =
don=E2=80=99t want to say anything about earlier versions.   And, some =
of this is technically repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 =
saying don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/3. So, it ended up in an appendix.
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
>>=20
>>> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
>>>=20
>>> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>>> is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension =
with
>>> the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in =
the same
>>> group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
>>>=20
>>> missing comma prior to "which=E2=80=9D.
>>=20
>> (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)
>=20
> Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)
>=20
>> So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I=E2=80=99m =
going with this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).
>=20
> I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =
=E2=80=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D vs =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive =
clauses :-)

See the response to Adam=E2=80=99s comment :). But, yeah the RFC editor =
will definitely school me when the time comes.

>>> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then =
non-
>>> overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as =
it
>>> is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
>>>=20
>>> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at =
times. Is that
>>> the intent?
>>=20
>> Yes that is the intent.
>=20
> Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want =
to treat this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use =
the PSK without (EC)DHE?

So the fatal error is when the client and server are trying to negotiate =
(EC)DHE parameters and there=E2=80=99s no overlap in the =
supported_groups.  This would occur in the =E2=80=9Cnormal=E2=80=9D case =
when the client is anonymous (i.e., client only sends =
ClientHello+key_share and no psk_key_exchange_modes/pre_shared_key) or =
when the client is using PSK+(EC)DHE for client authentication.  But, =
that is described in the previous paragraph.  Maybe another way to say =
it is: normally you=E2=80=99d throw an error if supported_groups =
didn=E2=80=99t overlap, but here since you=E2=80=99re not using them =
because you=E2=80=99re doing PSK-only you don=E2=80=99t.

>>> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions =
similar to "SHALL
>>> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has =
updated" at some
>>> point?
>>=20
>> Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC =
editor to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
>>=20
>>> =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar
>>=20
>> :)
>=20
> I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the =
Cat=E2=80=9D utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving =
high voltage :-)
>=20
>>=20
>=20


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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On Mar 7, 2018, at 16:35, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >> On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
> >>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
> >>>
> >>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> >>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut th=
is
> >>> introductory paragraph, however.)
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.
> html
> >>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
> >>> COMMENT:
> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------=
-
> >>>
> >>> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a surprising=
ly
> >>> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the
> subject. I
> >>> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of
> these are
> >>> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
> >>>
> >>> *** Substantive Comments:
> >>>
> >>> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a ser=
ver,
> it is
> >>> REQUIRED to send the
> >>> ClientHello as its first message. "
> >>>
> >>> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar
> application layer
> >>> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarificatio=
n
> request.)
> >>
> >> No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello
> message first ;)
> >
> > I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that ClientHell=
o
> is the first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I think some reader=
s
> might interpret this to mean that the client can send no other data at an=
y
> layer prior to ClientHello.
>
> Well this is about TLS :) But, maybe r/its first message/its first TLS
> handshake message ?
>
> >>> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers m=
ight
> receive
> >>> TLS 1.2 or prior
> >>>    ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
> >>>    follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
> >>>
> >>> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and
> able to
> >>> negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:
> >>>
> >>> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
> >>> this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
> >>> [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
> >>>
> >>> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
> >>>
> >>> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
> >>> implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
> >>> accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
> >>> version."
> >>>
> >>> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
> >>> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle
> difference?
> >>
> >> In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:
> >>
> >>  Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
> >>  TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.
> >
> > That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D
>
> Right so there might be some implementations that choose to not support
> prior versions.
>

Indeed, I am aware of at least one.

-Ekr


>
> >> Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about t=
he server
> needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from the client.
> >
> > I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to negotiat=
e 1.2? Or
> is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to all of the related M=
USTs?
>
> Yes - TLS servers are allowed to refuse to negotiate earlier version;
> that=E2=80=99s deciding to not follow the SHOULD in  =C2=A7s4.2.1.  If th=
ey negotiate an
> earlier version then do that version that=E2=80=99s what=E2=80=99s in =C2=
=A7s4.1.2 and in =C2=A74.2.3.
>
> >>> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that =
RFC
> >>> implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations?
> If so,
> >>> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some
> time.
> >>
> >> I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for them=
 to rev
> their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 or so weeks
> it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC editor=E2=80=
=99s queue.
> >
> > Okay.
> >
> >>
> >>> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem
> important. I
> >>> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.
> >>
> >> =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations w=
ith
> 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we don=E2=80=99=
t want to
> say anything about earlier versions.   And, some of this is technically
> repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 saying don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/=
3. So, it
> ended up in an appendix.
> >
> > Okay.
> >
> >>
> >>> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
> >>>
> >>> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
> >>> is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with
> >>> the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in =
the same
> >>> group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
> >>>
> >>> missing comma prior to "which=E2=80=9D.
> >>
> >> (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)
> >
> > Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)
> >
> >> So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I=E2=80=99m go=
ing with
> this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).
> >
> > I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =
=E2=80=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D vs
> =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive clauses :-)
>
> See the response to Adam=E2=80=99s comment :). But, yeah the RFC editor w=
ill
> definitely school me when the time comes.
>
> >>> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then n=
on-
> >>> overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it
> >>> is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
> >>>
> >>> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at
> times. Is that
> >>> the intent?
> >>
> >> Yes that is the intent.
> >
> > Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want to
> treat this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use the PS=
K
> without (EC)DHE?
>
> So the fatal error is when the client and server are trying to negotiate
> (EC)DHE parameters and there=E2=80=99s no overlap in the supported_groups=
.  This
> would occur in the =E2=80=9Cnormal=E2=80=9D case when the client is anony=
mous (i.e., client
> only sends ClientHello+key_share and no psk_key_exchange_modes/pre_shared=
_key)
> or when the client is using PSK+(EC)DHE for client authentication.  But,
> that is described in the previous paragraph.  Maybe another way to say it
> is: normally you=E2=80=99d throw an error if supported_groups didn=E2=80=
=99t overlap, but
> here since you=E2=80=99re not using them because you=E2=80=99re doing PSK=
-only you don=E2=80=99t.
>
> >>> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions simi=
lar to
> "SHALL
> >>> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has
> updated" at some
> >>> point?
> >>
> >> Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC =
editor to
> make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.
> >
> > Okay.
> >
> >>
> >>> =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar
> >>
> >> :)
> >
> > I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the Cat=
=E2=80=9D
> utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving high voltage :=
-)
> >
> >>
> >
>
>

--94eb2c0571b8a095cc0566dcdd1e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=
=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Mar 7, 2018, at 16:35, Ben Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ben@nostr=
um.com">ben@nostrum.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean=
@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:b=
en@nostrum.com">ben@nostrum.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply=
 to all<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to=
 cut this<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement=
/discuss-criteria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ie=
tf.org/iesg/<wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found =
here:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls=
13/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr=
>doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>---------------------------=
---<wbr>----------<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; COMMENT:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>---------------------------=
---<wbr>----------<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It&#39;s a=
 surprisingly<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; understandable document, given its length and the complexity o=
f the subject. I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. No=
ne of these are<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; *** Substantive Comments:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: &quot; When a client first conne=
cts to a server, it is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; REQUIRED to send the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ClientHello as its first message. &quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar ap=
plication layer<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clari=
fication request.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello =
message first ;)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that ClientHel=
lo is the first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I think some reade=
rs might interpret this to mean that the client can send no other data at a=
ny layer prior to ClientHello.<br>
<br>
</div></div>Well this is about TLS :) But, maybe r/its first message/its fi=
rst TLS handshake message ?<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: &quot;Note that TLS 1=
.3 servers might receive<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; TLS 1.2 or prior<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHellos which contain other compression meth=
ods and MUST<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 follow the procedures for the appropriate prior v=
ersion of TLS.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willi=
ng and able to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;If this extension is not present, servers which are comp=
liant with<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specifie=
d in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or lat=
er.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; But =C2=A74.2.3 says:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.=C2=
=A0 TLS 1.3<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt; accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating=
 that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; version.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks=
 about<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;implementations&quot; rather than &quot;servers&quot;, s=
o perhaps there&#39;s a subtle difference?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:<br=
>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior ver=
sions of<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D<br>
<br>
</span>Right so there might be some implementations that choose to not supp=
ort prior versions.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Indeed, I am aware =
of at least one.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt; Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is abo=
ut the server needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from th=
e client.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to negotia=
te 1.2? Or is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to all of the =
related MUSTs?<br>
<br>
</span>Yes - TLS servers are allowed to refuse to negotiate earlier version=
; that=E2=80=99s deciding to not follow the SHOULD in=C2=A0 =C2=A7s4.2.1.=
=C2=A0 If they negotiate an earlier version then do that version that=E2=80=
=99s what=E2=80=99s in =C2=A7s4.1.2 and in =C2=A74.2.3.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7<a href=3D"http://4.2.1.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">4.2.1.1</a>: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that =
RFC<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; implementations will ever need to interop with draft implement=
ations? If so,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the information in this section may continue to be useful for =
some time.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for =
them to rev their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 o=
r so weeks it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC edit=
or=E2=80=99s queue.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements th=
at seem important. I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiatio=
ns with 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.=C2=A0 And, we d=
on=E2=80=99t want to say anything about earlier versions.=C2=A0 =C2=A0And, =
some of this is technically repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 say=
ing don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/3. So, it ended up in an appendix.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; *** Editorial Comments and nits:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A72: &quot;If (EC)DHE key establishment<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is in use, then the ServerHello contains a &quot;key_share&quo=
t; extension with<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST=
 be in the same<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. &quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing comma prior to &quot;which=E2=80=9D.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?=C2=A0 I=E2=
=80=99m going with this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =
=E2=80=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D vs =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive clauses :=
-)<br>
<br>
</span>See the response to Adam=E2=80=99s comment :). But, yeah the RFC edi=
tor will definitely school me when the time comes.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.1: &quot;Note that if the PSK can be used without (E=
C)DHE then non-<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; overlap in the &quot;supported_groups&quot; parameters need no=
t be fatal, as it<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph.&qu=
ot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I read &quot;need not be fatal&quot; to mean that it may still=
 be fatal at times. Is that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the intent?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes that is the intent.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want t=
o treat this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use the PS=
K without (EC)DHE?<br>
<br>
</span>So the fatal error is when the client and server are trying to negot=
iate (EC)DHE parameters and there=E2=80=99s no overlap in the supported_gro=
ups.=C2=A0 This would occur in the =E2=80=9Cnormal=E2=80=9D case when the c=
lient is anonymous (i.e., client only sends ClientHello+key_share and no ps=
k_key_exchange_modes/pre_<wbr>shared_key) or when the client is using PSK+(=
EC)DHE for client authentication.=C2=A0 But, that is described in the previ=
ous paragraph.=C2=A0 Maybe another way to say it is: normally you=E2=80=99d=
 throw an error if supported_groups didn=E2=80=99t overlap, but here since =
you=E2=80=99re not using them because you=E2=80=99re doing PSK-only you don=
=E2=80=99t.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructio=
ns similar to &quot;SHALL<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; update/has updated&quot;. Is that text expected to collapse to=
 &quot;has updated&quot; at some<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; point?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the =
RFC editor to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]=C2=A0 : Best citation anchor evar<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; :)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the Ca=
t=E2=80=9D utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving high =
voltage :-)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c0571b8a095cc0566dcdd1e--


From nobody Wed Mar  7 21:25:45 2018
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Subject: [TLS] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Nice work. Of course, no one reads a 150-page document without wondering about
a few things ...

I suspect that

   Because
   TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] as
   described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are
   carried and therefore updates [RFC6066] and obsoletes [RFC6961] as
   described in section Section 4.4.2.1.

is a run-on sentence. Perhaps a period after "section 7.5"?

Is "forward secrecy" (the term used in this draft) the same thing as "perfect
forward secrecy" (the term I hear most often, and it does appear in one
reference title)?

The use of "mandatory" as the name of a vector in

  In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain
   between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque.

was pretty hard to parse until I read further. Did anyone else find that
confusing?

In this text,

  When multiple extensions of different types are present, the
   extensions MAY appear in any order, with the exception of
   "pre_shared_key" Section 4.2.11 which MUST be the last extension in
   the ClientHello.  There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the
   same type in a given extension block.

I didn't see what to do if the MUST NOT is violated. Is that worth mentioning?

In this text,

   An
   implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
   which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abort the
   handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.  A change_cipher_spec
   record received before the first ClientHello message or after the
   peer's Finished message MUST be treated as an unexpected record type.

   Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in this
   document unless negotiated by some extension.  If a TLS
   implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST terminate
   the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  New record
   content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type
   Registry as described in Section 11.

I wondered if there was a difference between an unexpected record type and and
unexpected message.

I wondered why

   Newer
   clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, SHOULD
   negotiate the most preferred common parameters.

was not a MUST.



From nobody Thu Mar  8 02:23:45 2018
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From: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 10:23:21 +0000
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References: <CAJR_8q+LmWLk92dEq6ZQ0+jsanWJLbptB4RwdmkhNncSLZs6wA@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBM-XM4XeeKuAjpBizDOxOvqN92-QRp5-T371xkTi6BmgA@mail.gmail.com> <27F60992-04BF-4803-95F4-4F15E4E434FD@apple.com> <CAJR_8qK8cOQ+nNFYPe0cQAd_Abgwgf4vtEY+oP1dvtZN-pWD0Q@mail.gmail.com> <09BF7A66-E847-4C2B-98FF-EBF3B0DF97C1@apple.com> <CAJR_8qKu5Dvvh0=QxrWkgWR-YjSSwMy7P63WA8ZXZgyXQ=nkcg@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 05:10:45 -0800
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To: Spencer Dawkins <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:25 PM, Spencer Dawkins <
spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Nice work. Of course, no one reads a 150-page document without wondering
> about
> a few things ...
>
> I suspect that
>
>    Because
>    TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] as
>    described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are
>    carried and therefore updates [RFC6066] and obsoletes [RFC6961] as
>    described in section Section 4.4.2.1.
>
> is a run-on sentence. Perhaps a period after "section 7.5"?
>

Thanks, yes.



Is "forward secrecy" (the term used in this draft) the same thing as
> "perfect
> forward secrecy" (the term I hear most often, and it does appear in one
> reference title)?
>

Close enough. The basic problem is that people get hung up on "perfect".
So, consider the case where you generate a fresh DH key every hour or
so, but you reuse it for that period. It's clear you get forward secrecy
once that key s deleted but is that "perfect" because you have a window
of exposure uring that hour? So, we just decided to use "forward secret"

The use of "mandatory" as the name of a vector in
>
>   In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain
>    between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque.
>
> was pretty hard to parse until I read further. Did anyone else find that
> confusing?
>

I don't :)


In this text,
>
>   When multiple extensions of different types are present, the
>    extensions MAY appear in any order, with the exception of
>    "pre_shared_key" Section 4.2.11 which MUST be the last extension in
>    the ClientHello.  There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the
>    same type in a given extension block.
>
> I didn't see what to do if the MUST NOT is violated. Is that worth
> mentioning?
>

I don't think it's necessary. In general, you can always abort on a protocol
violation like this, but there's no known reason you would *need* to, other
than it would create interop problems if (say) A thinks extension #1 matters
and B thinks #2 matters, but of course there are lots of possible causes
of interop. This is different from cases where there are clear security
problems if you don't check some value or something.


> In this text,
>
>    An
>    implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
>    which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abort the
>    handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.  A change_cipher_spec
>    record received before the first ClientHello message or after the
>    peer's Finished message MUST be treated as an unexpected record type.
>
>    Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in this
>    document unless negotiated by some extension.  If a TLS
>    implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST terminate
>    the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  New record
>    content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type
>    Registry as described in Section 11.
>
> I wondered if there was a difference between an unexpected record type and
> and
> unexpected message.
>

Ah, good. One alert for two conditions:

1. An unexpected record type at the record layer.
2. An unexpected handshake message.


I wondered why
>
>    Newer
>    clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, SHOULD
>    negotiate the most preferred common parameters.
>
> was not a MUST.
>

Ugh, this is actually not even a normative statement, It's just a statement
of
what the protocol is supposed to do. Good catch!

-Ekr

--001a113b0328bb08110566e669ea
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:25 PM, Spencer Dawkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">spencerda=
wkins.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
">Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for<br>
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection<br>
<br>
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br>
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br>
introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-crit=
eria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/<=
wbr>statement/discuss-criteria.<wbr>html</a><br>
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
COMMENT:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
Nice work. Of course, no one reads a 150-page document without wondering ab=
out<br>
a few things ...<br>
<br>
I suspect that<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Because<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] =
as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0carried and therefore updates [RFC6066] and obsoletes [RFC6961=
] as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0described in section Section 4.4.2.1.<br>
<br>
is a run-on sentence. Perhaps a period after &quot;section 7.5&quot;?<br></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks, yes.</div><div><br></div><div><br></=
div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Is &quot;forward secrecy&quot; (the term used in this draft) the same thing=
 as &quot;perfect<br>
forward secrecy&quot; (the term I hear most often, and it does appear in on=
e<br>
reference title)?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Close enough. The bas=
ic problem is that people get hung up on &quot;perfect&quot;.</div><div>So,=
 consider the case where you generate a fresh DH key every hour or</div><di=
v>so, but you reuse it for that period. It&#39;s clear you get forward secr=
ecy</div><div>once that key s deleted but is that &quot;perfect&quot; becau=
se you have a window</div><div>of exposure uring that hour? So, we just dec=
ided to use &quot;forward secret&quot;</div><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">
The use of &quot;mandatory&quot; as the name of a vector in<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque.<br>
<br>
was pretty hard to parse until I read further. Did anyone else find that<br=
>
confusing?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t :)</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In this text,<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 When multiple extensions of different types are present, the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0extensions MAY appear in any order, with the exception of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;pre_shared_key&quot; Section 4.2.11 which MUST be the la=
st extension in<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the ClientHello.=C2=A0 There MUST NOT be more than one extensi=
on of the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0same type in a given extension block.<br>
<br>
I didn&#39;t see what to do if the MUST NOT is violated. Is that worth ment=
ioning?<br></blockquote><div><br>I don&#39;t think it&#39;s necessary. In g=
eneral, you can always abort on a protocol</div><div>violation like this, b=
ut there&#39;s no known reason you would *need* to, other</div><div>than it=
 would create interop problems if (say) A thinks extension #1 matters</div>=
<div>and B thinks #2 matters, but of course there are lots of possible caus=
es</div><div>of interop. This is different from cases where there are clear=
 security</div><div>problems if you don&#39;t check some value or something=
.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
In this text,<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec val=
ue or<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abor=
t the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake with an &quot;unexpected_message&quot; alert.=C2=A0 =
A change_cipher_spec<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0record received before the first ClientHello message or after =
the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0peer&#39;s Finished message MUST be treated as an unexpected r=
ecord type.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in this=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0document unless negotiated by some extension.=C2=A0 If a TLS<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST ter=
minate<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the connection with an &quot;unexpected_message&quot; alert.=
=C2=A0 New record<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Ty=
pe<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Registry as described in Section 11.<br>
<br>
I wondered if there was a difference between an unexpected record type and =
and<br>
unexpected message.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ah, good. One alert=
 for two conditions:</div><div><br></div><div>1. An unexpected record type =
at the record layer.</div><div>2. An unexpected handshake message.</div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I wondered why<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Newer<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, SHOUL=
D<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0negotiate the most preferred common parameters.<br>
<br>
was not a MUST.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ugh, this is actually n=
ot even a normative statement, It&#39;s just a statement of</div><div>what =
the protocol is supposed to do. Good catch!</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</=
div><div>=C2=A0</div></div><br></div></div>

--001a113b0328bb08110566e669ea--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 8, 2018, at 08:10, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:25 PM, Spencer Dawkins =
<spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: No Objection
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
> Nice work. Of course, no one reads a 150-page document without =
wondering about
> a few things ...
>=20
> I suspect that
>=20
>    Because
>    TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived it updates [RFC5705] as
>    described in Section 7.5 it also changes how OCSP messages are
>    carried and therefore updates [RFC6066] and obsoletes [RFC6961] as
>    described in section Section 4.4.2.1.
>=20
> is a run-on sentence. Perhaps a period after "section 7.5"?
>=20
> Thanks, yes.

Fix in https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1169

> Is "forward secrecy" (the term used in this draft) the same thing as =
"perfect
> forward secrecy" (the term I hear most often, and it does appear in =
one
> reference title)?
>=20
> Close enough. The basic problem is that people get hung up on =
"perfect".
> So, consider the case where you generate a fresh DH key every hour or
> so, but you reuse it for that period. It's clear you get forward =
secrecy
> once that key s deleted but is that "perfect" because you have a =
window
> of exposure uring that hour? So, we just decided to use "forward =
secret"
>=20
> The use of "mandatory" as the name of a vector in
>=20
>   In the following example, mandatory is a vector that must contain
>    between 300 and 400 bytes of type opaque.
>=20
> was pretty hard to parse until I read further. Did anyone else find =
that
> confusing?
>=20
> I don't :)

It=E2=80=99s at least on the same page so it=E2=80=99s not too hard to =
scan lower.  If we called it hooziewazit it=E2=80=99ll still be after it =
;)

> In this text,
>=20
>   When multiple extensions of different types are present, the
>    extensions MAY appear in any order, with the exception of
>    "pre_shared_key" Section 4.2.11 which MUST be the last extension in
>    the ClientHello.  There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the
>    same type in a given extension block.
>=20
> I didn't see what to do if the MUST NOT is violated. Is that worth =
mentioning?
>=20
> I don't think it's necessary. In general, you can always abort on a =
protocol
> violation like this, but there's no known reason you would *need* to, =
other
> than it would create interop problems if (say) A thinks extension #1 =
matters
> and B thinks #2 matters, but of course there are lots of possible =
causes
> of interop. This is different from cases where there are clear =
security
> problems if you don't check some value or something.
>=20
>=20
> In this text,
>=20
>    An
>    implementation which receives any other change_cipher_spec value or
>    which receives a protected change_cipher_spec record MUST abort the
>    handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.  A change_cipher_spec
>    record received before the first ClientHello message or after the
>    peer's Finished message MUST be treated as an unexpected record =
type.
>=20
>    Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in this
>    document unless negotiated by some extension.  If a TLS
>    implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST =
terminate
>    the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  New record
>    content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type
>    Registry as described in Section 11.
>=20
> I wondered if there was a difference between an unexpected record type =
and and
> unexpected message.
>=20
> Ah, good. One alert for two conditions:
>=20
> 1. An unexpected record type at the record layer.
> 2. An unexpected handshake message.
>=20
>=20
> I wondered why
>=20
>    Newer
>    clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, SHOULD
>    negotiate the most preferred common parameters.
>=20
> was not a MUST.
>=20
> Ugh, this is actually not even a normative statement, It's just a =
statement of
> what the protocol is supposed to do. Good catch!

I made it a MUST in:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1172

spt


From nobody Thu Mar  8 08:20:55 2018
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Subject: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:

Monday:
  =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-sessb

Wednesday:
  =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-sessa

spt



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Hi Sean, Joe,

On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>=20
> Monday:
>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-ses=
sb

That includes:
"
TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
 - 10min draft - Russ
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
 - 10min discussion - Chairs
 - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
"

Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
being given any time. I also have some questions
below.

This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
that anything has changed in the meantime.

Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
different from what was discussed on the list so I
see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.

Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?

And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?

As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
then what's the plan for ending this?

Thanks,
S.

PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
the WG based on that euphemism.


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From: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS 1.3
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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 17:41:05 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hKemb2i6APV3-qplRSDJuMCjpSg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Hi Tony,

I agree with you, TLS should not have requirements on the underlying transport.
If there is a use case that would require endpoints have a way to signal to the peer that they're done reading, I would suggest writing a draft about a new close_request alert.
I personally don't think this needs to be in the main TLS 1.3 spec, though.

Thanks,
David


> On Mar 8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com> wrote:
> 
> David,
>  
> I think this is a valid concern. It's been commented on (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html <https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html>) that the draft has NO requirements on the underlying transport. There are potentially other transports for TLS (such as being worked by the ATLAS WG) which may not have a way to terminate the transport.
>  
> At a minimum this must be addressed in DTLS, but it seems to me that the addition of a close_request alert is a small matter which would benefit both protocols. Of course, this could be added at a later date if/when the need arises.
>  
> Regards,
> Tony
>  
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Xuelei Fan
> Sent: 07 March 2018 20:54
> To: David Schinazi
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
>  
> Hi David,
>  
> The case I can think of now is the START TLS protocols (Opportunistic TLS).  But looks like these protocols need to use an existing plain-text socket, and then establish a TLS connection over it, and will never go back to plain-text again.  Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just implies close the underlying TCP socket in practice.  We don't do that previously as we don't know how the  plain-text socket can be used in practice in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (while socket still alive).   If an application gets indication that the TLS connection get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.  So it does not actually need to understand the TLS specifics.
>  
> I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for such requirement.  Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what the compatibility impact could be.
>  
> Thanks,
> Xuelei
>  
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com <mailto:dschinazi@apple.com>> wrote:
> Hi Xuelei,
>  
> Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the TCP connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has?
> As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support this.
> Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy wouldn't be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.
>  
> Thanks,
> David
>  
> 
> 
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com <mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com>> wrote:
>  
> Hi David,
>  
> This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an existing TCP connection.  For example:
> 1. A client connects to a proxy
> 2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.
> 3. The  server delivers 2+ records  to the client.
> 4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS connection
>  
> As the  existing TCP connection may be used for follow on connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly.  And the client would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.   Otherwise, the data may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown issues.
>  
> Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection? Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not really have a TCP connection to the server.  It would be nice to close the TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.
>  
> Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.  The close_notify is used to indicate the closure of client write side, but not the server write side.  If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receiving the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still send data.  Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, and how to clean up the TLS channel.
>  
> For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a  close_notify alert and then wait for the server close_notify alert, and all of the intermediate data is discarded.  There are still some problems, but in theory the client can cleanup the TCP channel.
>  
> In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:
>    
>    If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>    carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>    closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
>    before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.
>  
> For client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST deliver a close_notify.  But it does not say if a client initiates the TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.
>  
> Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.  I will evaluate if TCP options can help.
>  
> Thanks & Regards,
> Xuelei Fan
>  
>  
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com <mailto:dschinazi@apple.com>> wrote:
> Hi Xuelei,
>  
> Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read side?
> If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
> The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
> I don't see what the server application would do with that information. Do you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
> differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
> in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_notify
> is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.
>  
> Thanks,
> David Schinazi
>  
> 
> 
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>  
> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
>  
> -Ekr
>  
>  
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com <mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com>> wrote:
> Hi,
>  
> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read side of the connection.  I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.
>  
> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connection.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If sending a close_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close the read side cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.  It does not sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.  I may miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!
>  
> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.
>  
> Thanks,
> Xuelei Fan
> 
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Tony,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I agree with =
you, TLS should not have requirements on the underlying =
transport.</div><div class=3D"">If there is a use case that would =
require endpoints have a way to signal to the peer that they're done =
reading, I would suggest writing a draft about a new close_request =
alert.</div><div class=3D"">I personally don't think this needs to be in =
the main TLS 1.3 spec, though.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div =
class=3D"">David</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Mar =
8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Tony.Putman@dyson.com" =
class=3D"">Tony.Putman@dyson.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">David,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">I think this is a =
valid concern. It's been commented on (<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html=
</a>) that the draft has NO requirements on the underlying transport. =
There are potentially other transports for TLS (such as being worked by =
the ATLAS WG) which may not have a way to terminate the transport.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">At a minimum this =
must be addressed in DTLS, but it seems to me that the addition of a =
close_request alert is a small matter which would benefit both =
protocols. Of course, this could be added at a later date if/when the =
need arises.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Regards,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D"">Tony<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: =
10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;" class=3D"">From:</span></b><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>TLS [<a =
href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>]<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b class=3D"">On Behalf =
Of<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Xuelei Fan<br =
class=3D""><b class=3D"">Sent:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>07 March 2018 20:54<br =
class=3D""><b class=3D"">To:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>David Schinazi<br =
class=3D""><b class=3D"">Cc:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">tls@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Subject:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to =
close the read side of a connection?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Hi =
David,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">The case I can think of now is the START TLS =
protocols (Opportunistic TLS).&nbsp; But looks like these protocols need =
to use an existing plain-text socket, and then establish a TLS =
connection over it, and will never go back to plain-text again.&nbsp; =
Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just implies =
close the underlying TCP socket in practice.&nbsp; We don't do that =
previously as we don't know how the&nbsp;<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-family: =
Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">plain-text</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>socket can be used in =
practice in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (while socket =
still alive).&nbsp; &nbsp;If an application gets indication that the TLS =
connection get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.&nbsp; So it does =
not actually need to understand the TLS specifics.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">I'm a =
little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for such =
requirement.&nbsp; Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what the =
compatibility impact could be.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">Xuelei<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">dschinazi@apple.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Hi&nbsp;Xuelei,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Can you elaborate on =
what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the TCP connection for =
follow on connections, and what semantics it has?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't =
support this.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Additionally, the =
close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy wouldn't be able to =
tell that applications are done with TLS.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">David<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">On Mar 7, =
2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" =
target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D"">Hi David,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div=
 style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">This issue happens when the TLS connection is =
established/layered on an existing TCP connection.&nbsp; For =
example:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">1. A client connects to a proxy<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a =
server via the proxy.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">3. =
The&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" =
class=3D"">server</span>&nbsp;delivers 2+ records&nbsp; to the =
client.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">4. The client receives =
the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS connection<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">As =
the&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">existing TCP connection =
may be used for follow on connections, it might not be a solution to =
close the TCP connection directly.&nbsp; And&nbsp;</span>the client =
would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.&nbsp; =
&nbsp;Otherwise, the data may be used by the next follow on connection =
and may cause unknown issues.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Arial, =
sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">Then the question comes to me: how does the client =
close the TLS connection?&nbsp;</span>Closing the TCP connection may be =
not desired as it does not really have a TCP connection to the =
server.&nbsp; It would be nice to close the TLS connection but keeping =
the TCP connection alive.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Looks like there is no way to close the =
read side of a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 =
specification.&nbsp; The close_notify is used to indicate the closure of =
client write side, but not the server write side.&nbsp; If the client =
sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receiving the =
close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still send =
data.&nbsp; Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side =
does not actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, =
and how to clean up the TLS channel.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div=
 class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client =
can send a&nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">close_notify alert and =
then wait for the server&nbsp;close_notify alert, and all of the =
intermediate data is discarded.&nbsp; There are still some problems, but =
in theory the client can cleanup the TCP channel.</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">In the TLS 1.3 =
specification, it says:</span><o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;If the application protocol using =
TLS provides that any data may be<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><span style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, =
34); background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; carried =
over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; closed, the TLS implementation MUST =
receive a "close_notify" alert<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><span style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, =
34); background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; before =
indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></pre></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Arial, =
sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">For client read side in above case, it means that =
the server side MUST deliver a close_notify.&nbsp; But it does not say =
if a client&nbsp;initiates the TLS closure, how could the client =
indicates the server for a close_notify alert.</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">Thanks for the =
suggestion of TCP RST option.&nbsp; I will evaluate if TCP options can =
help.</span><o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Arial, =
sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; =
background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial =
initial;" class=3D"">Thanks &amp; Regards,</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(34, 34, 34); background-color: white; background-position: initial =
initial; background-repeat: initial initial;" class=3D"">Xuelei =
Fan</span><o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">dschinazi@apple.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">Hi Xuelei,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Do you have an example for when you =
would need to gracefully close the read side?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user =
cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by =
sending a RST.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">The benefit of having a =
graceful read close would be for the server to know that the client =
application was done, but in the 10GB video example,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">I don't see what the server application would do with =
that information. Do you have an example where the server would treat a =
graceful read close<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">differently from a =
non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client would send a =
close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That =
actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application - =
the point of close_notify<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">is to =
indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in this =
example it does get truncated.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Thanks,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">David Schinazi<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">On Mar 7, 2018, at =
09:51, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank"=
 style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Well, this =
is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you either =
stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">-Ekr<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; =
font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: =
purple; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;, =
serif;" class=3D"">Hi,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">Per TLS 1.3 draft =
(Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is used to notify =
the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this =
connection.&nbsp; And this does not have any effect on its read side of =
the connection.&nbsp; I think it means that after sending the =
close_notify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and =
after receiving the close_notify alert, it still can keep sending data =
to the peer.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">The question comes to me is about how to =
close the read side of the connection.&nbsp; If closing the read side =
silently, there are potential issues if the application protocol using =
TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport =
after the TLS connection is closed.&nbsp; If sending a close_notify =
alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may =
keep write in its write side.&nbsp; It does not actually close the read =
side cleanly.&nbsp; If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, =
the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write =
side.&nbsp; It does not sound friendly to the local side.&nbsp; =
&nbsp;=46rom example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, =
looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want to cancle =
in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.&nbsp; I may miss =
something.&nbsp; I did not find a solution about how to close the read =
side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.&nbsp; Please help if you have an =
idea!<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
&quot;Times New Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D"">It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior =
versions, as the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its own after =
receiving a close_notify alert.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: &quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;, serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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From: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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Fully agree. Defer it until there is a need.
-- Tony

From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of David Schinazi
Sent: 08 March 2018 17:48
To: Tony Putman
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?

Hi Tony,

I agree with you, TLS should not have requirements on the underlying transp=
ort.
If there is a use case that would require endpoints have a way to signal to=
 the peer that they're done reading, I would suggest writing a draft about =
a new close_request alert.
I personally don't think this needs to be in the main TLS 1.3 spec, though.

Thanks,
David



On Mar 8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com<mailto:Tony.Pu=
tman@dyson.com>> wrote:

David,

I think this is a valid concern. It's been commented on (https://www.ietf.o=
rg/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html) that the draft has NO requir=
ements on the underlying transport. There are potentially other transports =
for TLS (such as being worked by the ATLAS WG) which may not have a way to =
terminate the transport.

At a minimum this must be addressed in DTLS, but it seems to me that the ad=
dition of a close_request alert is a small matter which would benefit both =
protocols. Of course, this could be added at a later date if/when the need =
arises.

Regards,
Tony

From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Xuelei Fan
Sent: 07 March 2018 20:54
To: David Schinazi
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?

Hi David,

The case I can think of now is the START TLS protocols (Opportunistic TLS).=
  But looks like these protocols need to use an existing plain-text socket,=
 and then establish a TLS connection over it, and will never go back to pla=
in-text again.  Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just=
 implies close the underlying TCP socket in practice.  We don't do that pre=
viously as we don't know how the  plain-text socket can be used in practice=
 in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (while socket still alive)=
.   If an application gets indication that the TLS connection get closed, i=
t can use the cleanup socket.  So it does not actually need to understand t=
he TLS specifics.

I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for such requirem=
ent.  Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what the compatibility im=
pact could be.

Thanks,
Xuelei

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com<mailto=
:dschinazi@apple.com>> wrote:
Hi Xuelei,

Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse the TC=
P connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has?
As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support this.
Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy would=
n't be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.

Thanks,
David




On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com<mailto:xuelei.f=
an@vimous.com>> wrote:

Hi David,

This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an exi=
sting TCP connection.  For example:
1. A client connects to a proxy
2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the proxy.
3. The  server delivers 2+ records  to the client.
4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS connect=
ion

As the  existing TCP connection may be used for follow on connections, it m=
ight not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly.  And the clien=
t would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.   Otherwise, the d=
ata may be used by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown issu=
es.

Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection=
? Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not really have =
a TCP connection to the server.  It would be nice to close the TLS connecti=
on but keeping the TCP connection alive.

Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection in TL=
S layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.  The close_notify is used to=
 indicate the closure of client write side, but not the server write side. =
 If the client sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receivin=
g the close_notify the server side will not receive data, but may still sen=
d data.  Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side does no=
t actually know how may data has been delivered by the server, and how to c=
lean up the TLS channel.

For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a  close_notify alert and th=
en wait for the server close_notify alert, and all of the intermediate data=
 is discarded.  There are still some problems, but in theory the client can=
 cleanup the TCP channel.

In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:


   If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be

   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is

   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert

   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.

For client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST deli=
ver a close_notify.  But it does not say if a client initiates the TLS clos=
ure, how could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.

Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.  I will evaluate if TCP option=
s can help.

Thanks & Regards,
Xuelei Fan


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com<mailto=
:dschinazi@apple.com>> wrote:
Hi Xuelei,

Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the read=
 side?
If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, you c=
an simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to know=
 that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,
I don't see what the server application would do with that information. Do =
you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read close
differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 and prior, the client wou=
ld send a close_notify, the server would reply with a close_notify
in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't provid=
e any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close_notify
is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and in t=
his example it does get truncated.

Thanks,
David Schinazi




On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>>=
 wrote:

Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close_notify and then you =
either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei.fan@vimous.com<mailto:xu=
elei.fan@vimous.com>> wrote:
Hi,

Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close_notify alert is =
used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more message=
s on this connection.  And this does not have any effect on its read side o=
f the connection.  I think it means that after sending the close_notify ale=
rt, it still can keep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the c=
lose_notify alert, it still can keep sending data to the peer.

The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the connect=
ion.  If closing the read side silently, there are potential issues if the =
application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over t=
he underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.  If sending a c=
lose_notify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side an=
d may keep write in its write side.  It does not actually close the read si=
de cleanly.  If keep waiting for the close_notify from the peer, the local =
may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.  It does not=
 sound friendly to the local side.   From example, if I download a 10GB vid=
eo via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate the server =
that I want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.  I may=
 miss something.  I did not find a solution about how to close the read sid=
e of TLS 1.3 connections yet.  Please help if you have an idea!

It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST respond =
with a close_notify of its own after receiving a close_notify alert.

Thanks,
Xuelei Fan

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls





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<body lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Fully agree. Defer it until there is a =
need.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">-- Tony<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fo=
nt-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&qu=
ot;sans-serif&quot;"> TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>David Schinazi<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 08 March 2018 17:48<br>
<b>To:</b> Tony Putman<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connecti=
on?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Tony,<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I agree with you, TLS should not have requirements o=
n the underlying transport.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If there is a use case that would require endpoints =
have a way to signal to the peer that they're done reading, I would suggest=
 writing a draft about a new close_request alert.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I personally don't think this needs to be in the mai=
n TLS 1.3 spec, though.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">David<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mar 8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:Tony.Putman@dyson.com">Tony.Putman@dyson.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">David,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">I think this is a valid concern. It's b=
een commented on (<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/curr=
ent/msg25579.html"><span style=3D"color:purple">https://www.ietf.org/mail-a=
rchive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html</span></a>)
 that the draft has NO requirements on the underlying transport. There are =
potentially other transports for TLS (such as being worked by the ATLAS WG)=
 which may not have a way to terminate the transport.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">At a minimum this must be addressed in =
DTLS, but it seems to me that the addition of a close_request alert is a sm=
all matter which would benefit both protocols. Of course,
 this could be added at a later date if/when the need arises.</span><o:p></=
o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Regards,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Tony</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fo=
nt-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span =
class=3D"apple-converted-space"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">&nbsp;</span></s=
pan><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma=
&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">TLS
 [<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>]<=
span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b>On Behalf Of<span clas=
s=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Xuelei Fan<br>
<b>Sent:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>07 March 201=
8 20:54<br>
<b>To:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>David Schinazi=
<br>
<b>Cc:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mai=
lto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b><span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Re: [TLS]=
 TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi David,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The case I can think of now is the START TLS protoco=
ls (Opportunistic TLS).&nbsp; But looks like these protocols need to use an=
 existing plain-text socket, and then establish a TLS connection over it, a=
nd will never go back to plain-text again.&nbsp;
 Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just implies close =
the underlying TCP socket in practice.&nbsp; We don't do that previously as=
 we don't know how the&nbsp;<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</s=
pan><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;col=
or:#222222;background:white">plain-text</span><span class=3D"apple-converte=
d-space">&nbsp;</span>socket
 can be used in practice in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (w=
hile socket still alive).&nbsp; &nbsp;If an application gets indication tha=
t the TLS connection get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.&nbsp; So it=
 does not actually need to understand the TLS specifics.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user=
 case for such requirement.&nbsp; Maybe, I can just close the socket, and s=
ee what the compatibility impact could be.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Xuelei<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"col=
or:purple">dschinazi@apple.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi&nbsp;Xuelei,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're usin=
g that can reuse the TCP connection for follow on connections, and what sem=
antics it has?<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't suppo=
rt this.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Additionally, the close_notify alerts are sent encry=
pted so the proxy wouldn't be able to tell that applications are done with =
TLS.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">David<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei Fan &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:purple=
">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi David,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This issue happens when the TLS connection is establ=
ished/layered on an existing TCP connection.&nbsp; For example:<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">1. A client connects to a proxy<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a =
server via the proxy.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">3. The&nbsp;<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&qu=
ot;;color:#222222;background:white">server</span>&nbsp;delivers 2&#43; reco=
rds&nbsp; to the client.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends t=
o close the TLS connection<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As the&nbsp;<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&n=
bsp;</span><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&qu=
ot;;color:#222222;background:white">existing TCP connection may be used for=
 follow on connections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP
 connection directly.&nbsp; And&nbsp;</span>the client would better cleanup=
 the data delivered by the server.&nbsp; &nbsp;Otherwise, the data may be u=
sed by the next follow on connection and may cause unknown issues.<o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">Then the question comes to =
me: how does the client close the TLS connection?&nbsp;</span>Closing the T=
CP connection may be not desired as it does not really have a
 TCP connection to the server.&nbsp; It would be nice to close the TLS conn=
ection but keeping the TCP connection alive.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Looks like there is no way to close the read side of=
 a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.&nbsp;=
 The close_notify is used to indicate the closure of client write side, but=
 not the server write side.&nbsp; If the client
 sends the close_notify for read side closure, after receiving the close_no=
tify the server side will not receive data, but may still send data.&nbsp; =
Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side does not actuall=
y know how may data has been delivered
 by the server, and how to clean up the TLS channel.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">For such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a&nbs=
p;<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-fa=
mily:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:whit=
e">close_notify alert and then wait for the server&nbsp;close_notify alert,
 and all of the intermediate data is discarded.&nbsp; There are still some =
problems, but in theory the client can cleanup the TCP channel.</span><o:p>=
</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">In the TLS 1.3 specificatio=
n, it says:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">&nbsp; &nbsp;</span><o:p></=
o:p></p>
</div>
<pre><span style=3D"color:#222222;background:white">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;If th=
e application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be</span><o:p><=
/o:p></pre>
<pre><span style=3D"color:#222222;background:white">&nbsp;&nbsp; carried ov=
er the underlying transport after the TLS connection is</span><o:p></o:p></=
pre>
<pre><span style=3D"color:#222222;background:white">&nbsp;&nbsp; closed, th=
e TLS implementation MUST receive a &quot;close_notify&quot; alert</span><o=
:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><span style=3D"color:#222222;background:white">&nbsp;&nbsp; before ind=
icating end-of-data to the application-layer.</span><o:p></o:p></pre>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">For client read side in abo=
ve case, it means that the server side MUST deliver a close_notify.&nbsp; B=
ut it does not say if a client&nbsp;initiates the TLS closure, how
 could the client indicates the server for a close_notify alert.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">Thanks for the suggestion o=
f TCP RST option.&nbsp; I will evaluate if TCP options can help.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">Thanks &amp; Regards,</span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;s=
ans-serif&quot;;color:#222222;background:white">Xuelei Fan</span><o:p></o:p=
></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi@apple.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"col=
or:purple">dschinazi@apple.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Xuelei,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Do you have an example for when you would need to gr=
acefully close the read side?<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user canc=
els the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a =
RST.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The benefit of having a graceful read close would be=
 for the server to know that the client application was done, but in the 10=
GB video example,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I don't see what the server application would do wit=
h that information. Do you have an example where the server would treat a g=
raceful read close<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">differently from a non-graceful close? In TLS 1.2 an=
d prior, the client would send a close_notify, the server would reply with =
a close_notify<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That =
actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application - the p=
oint of close_notify<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't b=
een truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">David Schinazi<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:purple">ekr=
@rtfm.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send clo=
se_notify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.<=
o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-Ekr<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei Fan &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:xuelei.fan@vimous.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:=
purple">xuelei.fan@vimous.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the=
 close_notify alert is used to notify the recipient that the sender will no=
t send any more messages on this connection.&nbsp; And this does not have a=
ny effect on its read side of the connection.&nbsp;
 I think it means that after sending the close_notify alert, it still can k=
eep reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close_notify alert,=
 it still can keep sending data to the peer.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The question comes to me is about how to close the r=
ead side of the connection.&nbsp; If closing the read side silently, there =
are potential issues if the application protocol using TLS provides that an=
y data may be carried over the underlying
 transport after the TLS connection is closed.&nbsp; If sending a close_not=
ify alert, the peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may ke=
ep write in its write side.&nbsp; It does not actually close the read side =
cleanly.&nbsp; If keep waiting for the close_notify
 from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer happy to close it=
s write side.&nbsp; It does not sound friendly to the local side.&nbsp; &nb=
sp;From example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks lik=
e there is no way to indicate the server that I
 want to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.&nbsp; I may =
miss something.&nbsp; I did not find a solution about how to close the read=
 side of TLS 1.3 connections yet.&nbsp; Please help if you have an idea!<o:=
p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as=
 the peer MUST respond with a close_notify of its own after receiving a clo=
se_notify alert.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Xuelei Fan<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:purp=
le">TLS@ietf.org</span></a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank"><sp=
an style=3D"color:purple">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><=
/a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"color:purp=
le">TLS@ietf.org</span></a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank"><sp=
an style=3D"color:purple">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><=
/a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Hel=
vetica&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><br>
</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,&q=
uot;sans-serif&quot;">Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Te=
tbury Hill, Malmesbury, SN16 0RP, UK.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">=
&nbsp;</span><br>
This message is intended solely for the addressee and may contain confident=
ial information. If you have received this message in error, please immedia=
tely and permanently delete it, and do not use, copy or disclose the inform=
ation contained in this message
 or in any attachment.<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b=
r>
Dyson may monitor email traffic data and content for security &amp; trainin=
g.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size: 13px;">
Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Tetbury Hill, Malmesbury=
, SN16 0RP, UK.
<br>
This message is intended solely for the addressee and may contain confident=
ial information. If you have received this message in error, please immedia=
tely and permanently delete it, and do not use, copy or disclose the inform=
ation contained in this message or in any attachment.
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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 13:04:11 -0500
From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
Cc: "=?utf-8?Q?tls=40ietf.org?=" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection?
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+1

On Mar 8, 2018, 12:56 PM -0500, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman=40dyson.com>, wr=
ote:
> =46ully agree. Defer it until there is a need.
> -- Tony
>
> =46rom: TLS =5Bmailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=5D On Behalf Of David Schi=
nazi
> Sent: 08 March 2018 17:48
> To: Tony Putman
> Cc: tls=40ietf.org
> Subject: Re: =5BTLS=5D TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connect=
ion=3F
>
> Hi Tony,
>
> I agree with you, TLS should not have requirements on the underlying tr=
ansport.
> If there is a use case that would require endpoints have a way to signa=
l to the peer that they're done reading, I would suggest writing a draft =
about a new close=5Frequest alert.
> I personally don't think this needs to be in the main TLS 1.3 spec, tho=
ugh.
>
> Thanks,
> David
>
>
>
> On Mar 8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman=40dyson.com> wrote:
>
> David,
>
> I think this is a valid concern. It's been commented on (https://www.ie=
tf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html) that the draft has NO =
requirements on the underlying transport. There are potentially other tra=
nsports for TLS (such as being worked by the ATLAS WG) which may not have=
 a way to terminate the transport.
>
> At a minimum this must be addressed in DTLS, but it seems to me that th=
e addition of a close=5Frequest alert is a small matter which would benef=
it both protocols. Of course, this could be added at a later date if/when=
 the need arises.
>
> Regards,
> Tony
>
> =46rom:=C2=A0TLS =5Bmailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=5D=C2=A0On Behalf Of=C2=
=A0Xuelei =46an
> Sent:=C2=A007 March 2018 20:54
> To:=C2=A0David Schinazi
> Cc:=C2=A0tls=40ietf.org
> Subject:=C2=A0Re: =5BTLS=5D TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a co=
nnection=3F
>
> Hi David,
>
> The case I can think of now is the START TLS protocols (Opportunistic T=
LS).=C2=A0 But looks like these protocols need to use an existing plain-t=
ext socket, and then establish a TLS connection over it, and will never g=
o back to plain-text again.=C2=A0 Maybe, for START TLS protocols, closing=
 TLS connection just implies close the underlying TCP socket in practice.=
=C2=A0 We don't do that previously as we don't know how the=C2=A0=C2=A0pl=
ain-text=C2=A0socket can be used in practice in the follow on processes a=
fter TLS get closed (while socket still alive).=C2=A0 =C2=A0If an applica=
tion gets indication that the TLS connection get closed, it can use the c=
leanup socket.=C2=A0 So it does not actually need to understand the TLS s=
pecifics.
>
> I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a reality user case for such requ=
irement.=C2=A0 Maybe, I can just close the socket, and see what the compa=
tibility impact could be.
>
> Thanks,
> Xuelei
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinazi <dschinazi=40apple.com>=
 wrote:
> Hi=C2=A0Xuelei,
>
> Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you're using that can reuse th=
e TCP connection for follow on connections, and what semantics it has=3F
> As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't support this.
> Additionally, the close=5Fnotify alerts are sent encrypted so the proxy=
 wouldn't be able to tell that applications are done with TLS.
>
> Thanks,
> David
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei =46an <xuelei.fan=40vimous.com> wrote:=

>
> Hi David,
>
> This issue happens when the TLS connection is established/layered on an=
 existing TCP connection.=C2=A0 =46or example:
> 1. A client connects to a proxy
> 2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection to a server via the prox=
y.
> 3. The=C2=A0=C2=A0server=C2=A0delivers 2+ records=C2=A0 to the client.
> 4. The client receives the 1st record, and intends to close the TLS con=
nection
>
> As the=C2=A0=C2=A0existing TCP connection may be used for follow on con=
nections, it might not be a solution to close the TCP connection directly=
.=C2=A0 And=C2=A0the client would better cleanup the data delivered by th=
e server.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Otherwise, the data may be used by the next follow =
on connection and may cause unknown issues.
>
> Then the question comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connec=
tion=3F=C2=A0Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not=
 really have a TCP connection to the server.=C2=A0 It would be nice to cl=
ose the TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.
>
> Looks like there is no way to close the read side of a TLS connection i=
n TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specification.=C2=A0 The close=5Fnoti=
fy is used to indicate the closure of client write side, but not the serv=
er write side.=C2=A0 If the client sends the close=5Fnotify for read side=
 closure, after receiving the close=5Fnotify the server side will not rec=
eive data, but may still send data.=C2=A0 Even if the server side stop se=
nding data, the client side does not actually know how may data has been =
delivered by the server, and how to clean up the TLS channel.
>
> =46or such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can send a=C2=A0=C2=A0close=5Fn=
otify alert and then wait for the server=C2=A0close=5Fnotify alert, and a=
ll of the intermediate data is discarded.=C2=A0 There are still some prob=
lems, but in theory the client can cleanup the TCP channel.
>
> In the TLS 1.3 specification, it says:
>
>   If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>   carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>   closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a =22close=5Fnotify=22 al=
ert
>   before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.
>
> =46or client read side in above case, it means that the server side MUS=
T deliver a close=5Fnotify.=C2=A0 But it does not say if a client=C2=A0in=
itiates the TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server for a =
close=5Fnotify alert.
>
> Thanks for the suggestion of TCP RST option.=C2=A0 I will evaluate if T=
CP options can help.
>
> Thanks & Regards,
> Xuelei =46an
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinazi <dschinazi=40apple.com>=
 wrote:
> Hi Xuelei,
>
> Do you have an example for when you would need to gracefully close the =
read side=3F
> If you're downloading a 10GB video and the user cancels the download, y=
ou can simply tear down the TCP connection by sending a RST.
> The benefit of having a graceful read close would be for the server to =
know that the client application was done, but in the 10GB video example,=

> I don't see what the server application would do with that information.=
 Do you have an example where the server would treat a graceful read clos=
e
> differently from a non-graceful close=3F In TLS 1.2 and prior, the clie=
nt would send a close=5Fnotify, the server would reply with a close=5Fnot=
ify
> in the middle of the 10GB of application data. That actually doesn't pr=
ovide any gracefulness to the server application - the point of close=5Fn=
otify
> is to indicate that the data you're sending hasn't been truncated, and =
in this example it does get truncated.
>
> Thanks,
> David Schinazi
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla <ekr=40rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You send close=5Fnotify and the=
n you either stop reading off of or close the TCP socket.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei =46an <xuelei.fan=40vimous.com> =
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts), the close=5Fnotify ale=
rt is used to notify the recipient that the sender will not send any more=
 messages on this connection.=C2=A0 And this does not have any effect on =
its read side of the connection.=C2=A0 I think it means that after sendin=
g the close=5Fnotify alert, it still can keep reading data from the peer;=
 and after receiving the close=5Fnotify alert, it still can keep sending =
data to the peer.
>
> The question comes to me is about how to close the read side of the con=
nection.=C2=A0 If closing the read side silently, there are potential iss=
ues if the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be c=
arried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed.=C2=
=A0 If sending a close=5Fnotify alert, the peer may just treat is as clos=
e the its read side and may keep write in its write side.=C2=A0 It does n=
ot actually close the read side cleanly.=C2=A0 If keep waiting for the cl=
ose=5Fnotify from the peer, the local may have to wait until the peer hap=
py to close its write side.=C2=A0 It does not sound friendly to the local=
 side.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=46rom example, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3=
 over VPN, looks like there is no way to indicate the server that I want =
to cancle in the middle of the downloading in TLS layer.=C2=A0 I may miss=
 something.=C2=A0 I did not find a solution about how to close the read s=
ide of TLS 1.3 connections yet.=C2=A0 Please help if you have an idea=21
>
> It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versions, as the peer MUST resp=
ond with a close=5Fnotify of its own after receiving a close=5Fnotify ale=
rt.
>
> Thanks,
> Xuelei =46an
>
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> TLS mailing list
> TLS=40ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> TLS mailing list
> TLS=40ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
>
>
> Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Tetbury Hill, Malmes=
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<body>
<div name=3D=22messageBodySection=22>+1</div>
<div name=3D=22messageReplySection=22><br />
On Mar 8, 2018, 12:56 PM -0500, Tony Putman &lt;Tony.Putman=40dyson.com&g=
t;, wrote:<br />
<blockquote type=3D=22cite=22>
<div class=3D=22WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>=46ully agree. Defer it unt=
il there is a need.</span></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>-- Tony</span></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160;</span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D=22border:none;border-top:solid =23B5C4D=46 1.0pt;padding:3.=
0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><b><span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22font-si=
ze:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 xml:la=
ng=3D=22EN-US=22>=46rom:</span></b> <span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 =
xml:lang=3D=22EN-US=22>TLS =5Bmailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=5D <b>On Beha=
lf Of</b> David Schinazi<br />
<b>Sent:</b> 08 March 2018 17:48<br />
<b>To:</b> Tony Putman<br />
<b>Cc:</b> tls=40ietf.org<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Re: =5BTLS=5D TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a co=
nnection=3F</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi Tony,</p>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>I agree with you, TLS should not have requirem=
ents on the underlying transport.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>If there is a use case that would require endp=
oints have a way to signal to the peer that they're done reading, I would=
 suggest writing a draft about a new close=5Frequest alert.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>I personally don't think this needs to be in t=
he main TLS 1.3 spec, though.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Thanks,</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>David</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><br />
<br /></p>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Mar 8, 2018, at 02:23, Tony Putman &lt;<a h=
ref=3D=22mailto:Tony.Putman=40dyson.com=22>Tony.Putman=40dyson.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:</p>
</div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>David,</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160;</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>I think this is a valid con=
cern. It's been commented on (<a href=3D=22https://www.ietf.org/mail-arch=
ive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html=22><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25579.html</span></a>) =
that the draft has NO requirements on the underlying transport. There are=
 potentially other transports for TLS (such as being worked by the ATLAS =
WG) which may not have a way to terminate the transport.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160;</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>At a minimum this must be a=
ddressed in DTLS, but it seems to me that the addition of a close=5Freque=
st alert is a small matter which would benefit both protocols. Of course,=
 this could be added at a later date if/when the need arises.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160;</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Regards,</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Tony</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160;</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><b><span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22font-si=
ze:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 xml:la=
ng=3D=22EN-US=22>=46rom:</span></b><span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=
=22><span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quo=
t;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 xml:lang=3D=22EN-US=22>&=23160;<=
/span></span><span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 xml:lang=3D=22EN-US=22>=
TLS =5B<a href=3D=22mailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=22>mailto:tls-bounces=40=
ietf.org</a>=5D<span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span><=
b>On Behalf Of<span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span></=
b>Xuelei =46an<br />
<b>Sent:</b><span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span>07 M=
arch 2018 20:54<br />
<b>To:</b><span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span>David =
Schinazi<br />
<b>Cc:</b><span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span><a hre=
f=3D=22mailto:tls=40ietf.org=22>tls=40ietf.org</a><br />
<b>Subject:</b><span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span>R=
e: =5BTLS=5D TLS 1.3, how to close the read side of a connection=3F</span=
></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi David,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>The case I can think of now is the START TLS p=
rotocols (Opportunistic TLS).&=23160; But looks like these protocols need=
 to use an existing plain-text socket, and then establish a TLS connectio=
n over it, and will never go back to plain-text again.&=23160; Maybe, for=
 START TLS protocols, closing TLS connection just implies close the under=
lying TCP socket in practice.&=23160; We don't do that previously as we d=
on't know how the&=23160;<span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=2316=
0;</span><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&=
quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>plain-text</span><span class=3D=
=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span>socket can be used in practice=
 in the follow on processes after TLS get closed (while socket still aliv=
e).&=23160; &=23160;If an application gets indication that the TLS connec=
tion get closed, it can use the cleanup socket.&=23160; So it does not ac=
tually need to understand the TLS specifics.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>I'm a little bit hesitate if there is a realit=
y user case for such requirement.&=23160; Maybe, I can just close the soc=
ket, and see what the compatibility impact could be.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Thanks,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Xuelei</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:21 PM, David Schinaz=
i &lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:dschinazi=40apple.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22=
><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>dschinazi=40apple.com</span></a>&gt; wr=
ote:</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi&=23160;Xuelei,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Can you elaborate on what proxy protocol you'r=
e using that can reuse the TCP connection for follow on connections, and =
what semantics it has=3F</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>As far as I know, SOCKS and HTTP CONNECT don't=
 support this.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Additionally, the close=5Fnotify alerts are se=
nt encrypted so the proxy wouldn't be able to tell that applications are =
done with TLS.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Thanks,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>David</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><br />
<br />
<br /></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Mar 7, 2018, at 11:24, Xuelei =46an &lt;<a =
href=3D=22mailto:xuelei.fan=40vimous.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22><span=
 style=3D=22color:purple=22>xuelei.fan=40vimous.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:=
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi David,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>This issue happens when the TLS connection is =
established/layered on an existing TCP connection.&=23160; =46or example:=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>1. A client connects to a proxy</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>2. The client establishes a TLS 1.3 connection=
 to a server via the proxy.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>3. The&=23160;<span class=3D=22apple-converted=
-space=22>&=23160;</span><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&=
quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>server</span>&=23=
160;delivers 2+ records&=23160; to the client.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>4. The client receives the 1st record, and int=
ends to close the TLS connection</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>As the&=23160;<span class=3D=22apple-converted=
-space=22>&=23160;</span><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&=
quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>existing TCP co=
nnection may be used for follow on connections, it might not be a solutio=
n to close the TCP connection directly.&=23160; And&=23160;</span>the cli=
ent would better cleanup the data delivered by the server.&=23160; &=2316=
0;Otherwise, the data may be used by the next follow on connection and ma=
y cause unknown issues.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>Then the ques=
tion comes to me: how does the client close the TLS connection=3F&=23160;=
</span>Closing the TCP connection may be not desired as it does not reall=
y have a TCP connection to the server.&=23160; It would be nice to close =
the TLS connection but keeping the TCP connection alive.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Looks like there is no way to close the read s=
ide of a TLS connection in TLS layer per the current TLS 1.3 specificatio=
n.&=23160; The close=5Fnotify is used to indicate the closure of client w=
rite side, but not the server write side.&=23160; If the client sends the=
 close=5Fnotify for read side closure, after receiving the close=5Fnotify=
 the server side will not receive data, but may still send data.&=23160; =
Even if the server side stop sending data, the client side does not actua=
lly know how may data has been delivered by the server, and how to clean =
up the TLS channel.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>=46or such cases in TLS 1.2, the client can se=
nd a&=23160;<span class=3D=22apple-converted-space=22>&=23160;</span><spa=
n style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23=
222222;background:white=22>close=5Fnotify alert and then wait for the ser=
ver&=23160;close=5Fnotify alert, and all of the intermediate data is disc=
arded.&=23160; There are still some problems, but in theory the client ca=
n cleanup the TCP channel.</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>In the TLS 1.=
3 specification, it says:</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>&=23160; &=23=
160;</span></p>
</div>
<pre><span style=3D=22color:=23222222;background:white=22>   If the appli=
cation protocol using TLS provides that any data may be</span></pre>
<pre><span style=3D=22color:=23222222;background:white=22>   carried over=
 the underlying transport after the TLS connection is</span></pre>
<pre><span style=3D=22color:=23222222;background:white=22>   closed, the =
TLS implementation MUST receive a =22close=5Fnotify=22 alert</span></pre>=

<pre><span style=3D=22color:=23222222;background:white=22>   before indic=
ating end-of-data to the application-layer.</span></pre></div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>=46or client =
read side in above case, it means that the server side MUST deliver a clo=
se=5Fnotify.&=23160; But it does not say if a client&=23160;initiates the=
 TLS closure, how could the client indicates the server for a close=5Fnot=
ify alert.</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>Thanks for th=
e suggestion of TCP RST option.&=23160; I will evaluate if TCP options ca=
n help.</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>Thanks &amp; =
Regards,</span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;=
,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:=23222222;background:white=22>Xuelei =46an<=
/span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 10:19 AM, David Schinaz=
i &lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:dschinazi=40apple.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22=
><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>dschinazi=40apple.com</span></a>&gt; wr=
ote:</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi Xuelei,</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Do you have an example for when you would need=
 to gracefully close the read side=3F</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>If you're downloading a 10GB video and the use=
r cancels the download, you can simply tear down the TCP connection by se=
nding a RST.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>The benefit of having a graceful read close wo=
uld be for the server to know that the client application was done, but i=
n the 10GB video example,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>I don't see what the server application would =
do with that information. Do you have an example where the server would t=
reat a graceful read close</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>differently from a non-graceful close=3F In TL=
S 1.2 and prior, the client would send a close=5Fnotify, the server would=
 reply with a close=5Fnotify</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>in the middle of the 10GB of application data.=
 That actually doesn't provide any gracefulness to the server application=
 - the point of close=5Fnotify</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>is to indicate that the data you're sending ha=
sn't been truncated, and in this example it does get truncated.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Thanks,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>David Schinazi</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><br />
<br />
<br /></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Mar 7, 2018, at 09:51, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a=
 href=3D=22mailto:ekr=40rtfm.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22><span style=3D=
=22color:purple=22>ekr=40rtfm.com</span></a>&gt; wrote:</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Well, this is like TCP in that respect. You se=
nd close=5Fnotify and then you either stop reading off of or close the TC=
P socket.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>-Ekr</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Xuelei =46an &=
lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:xuelei.fan=40vimous.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22=
><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>xuelei.fan=40vimous.com</span></a>&gt; =
wrote:</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Hi,</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Per TLS 1.3 draft (Section 6.1, Closure Alerts=
), the close=5Fnotify alert is used to notify the recipient that the send=
er will not send any more messages on this connection.&=23160; And this d=
oes not have any effect on its read side of the connection.&=23160; I thi=
nk it means that after sending the close=5Fnotify alert, it still can kee=
p reading data from the peer; and after receiving the close=5Fnotify aler=
t, it still can keep sending data to the peer.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>The question comes to me is about how to close=
 the read side of the connection.&=23160; If closing the read side silent=
ly, there are potential issues if the application protocol using TLS prov=
ides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport after the=
 TLS connection is closed.&=23160; If sending a close=5Fnotify alert, the=
 peer may just treat is as close the its read side and may keep write in =
its write side.&=23160; It does not actually close the read side cleanly.=
&=23160; If keep waiting for the close=5Fnotify from the peer, the local =
may have to wait until the peer happy to close its write side.&=23160; It=
 does not sound friendly to the local side.&=23160; &=23160;=46rom exampl=
e, if I download a 10GB video via TLS 1.3 over VPN, looks like there is n=
o way to indicate the server that I want to cancle in the middle of the d=
ownloading in TLS layer.&=23160; I may miss something.&=23160; I did not =
find a solution about how to close the read side of TLS 1.3 connections y=
et.&=23160; Please help if you have an idea=21</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>It's not a problem in TLS 1.2 and prior versio=
ns, as the peer MUST respond with a close=5Fnotify of its own after recei=
ving a close=5Fnotify alert.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Thanks,</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>Xuelei =46an</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22 style=3D=22margin-bottom:12.0pt=22><br />
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br />
TLS mailing list<br />
<a href=3D=22mailto:TLS=40ietf.org=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22><span style=
=3D=22color:purple=22>TLS=40ietf.org</span></a><br />
<a href=3D=22https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=22 target=3D=22=5F=
blank=22><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/li=
stinfo/tls</span></a></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br />
TLS mailing list<br />
<a href=3D=22mailto:TLS=40ietf.org=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22><span style=
=3D=22color:purple=22>TLS=40ietf.org</span></a><br />
<a href=3D=22https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=22 target=3D=22=5F=
blank=22><span style=3D=22color:purple=22>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/li=
stinfo/tls</span></a></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22>&=23160;</p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&=
quot;Helvetica&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><br /></span> <span style=3D=
=22font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&qu=
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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 17:10:53 -0500
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Hi Sean, Joe,

WG also has this at its disposal:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00
Will that be discussed along with draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility?
Those two seem to be rather connected/dependant on each other.

| Artyom Gavrichenkov
| gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191
| mailto: ximaera@gmail.com
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| telegram: xima_era
| skype: xima_era
| tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58


On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hi Sean, Joe,
>
> On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
>> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>>
>> Monday:
>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-sess=
b
>
> That includes:
> "
> TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>  - 10min draft - Russ
>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
> "
>
> Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
> being given any time. I also have some questions
> below.
>
> This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
> very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
> that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
> doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
> that anything has changed in the meantime.
>
> Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
> with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
> that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
> am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
> different from what was discussed on the list so I
> see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>
> Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
> being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>
> And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>
> As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
> topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
> of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
> then what's the plan for ending this?
>
> Thanks,
> S.
>
> PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
> and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
> also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
> the WG based on that euphemism.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


From nobody Thu Mar  8 15:08:31 2018
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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 15:08:06 -0800
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Hi Stephen,

In the meeting in Prague there was interest in this problem space, but
neither the consensus to accept or reject this work.  The authors have
revised their proposal to address some of the concerns raised by working
group members and are asking to bring the new approach in front of the
working group.  I believe in this case this is the right thing to do even
if it appears there is some repetition of topic.   However, if the new
approach fails to achieve significantly more support I believe the authors
will need to find another path for their work that does not go through the
TLS working group.

Cheers,

Joe

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hi Sean, Joe,
>
> On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
> > I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
> >
> > Monday:
> >   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-
> 101-tls-sessb
>
> That includes:
> "
> TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>  - 10min draft - Russ
>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
> "
>
> Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
> being given any time. I also have some questions
> below.
>
> This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
> very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
> that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
> doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
> that anything has changed in the meantime.
>
> Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
> with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
> that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
> am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
> different from what was discussed on the list so I
> see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>
> Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
> being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>
> And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>
> As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
> topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
> of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
> then what's the plan for ending this?
>
> Thanks,
> S.
>
> PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
> and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
> also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
> the WG based on that euphemism.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--f403045c7ac8d2377d0566eec0ce
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Hi Stephen,</span></div><s=
pan style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.=
8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norma=
l;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;te=
xt-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;fl=
oat:none;display:inline"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-famil=
y:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligature=
s:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;tex=
t-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-s=
pacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;=
text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div>I=
n the meeting in Prague there was interest in this problem space, but neith=
er the consensus to accept or reject this work.=C2=A0 The authors have revi=
sed their proposal to address some of the concerns raised by working group =
members and are asking to bring the new approach in front of the working gr=
oup.=C2=A0 I believe in this case this is the right thing to do even if it =
appears there is some repetition of topic.=C2=A0 =C2=A0However, if the new =
approach fails to achieve significantly more support I believe the authors =
will need to find another path for their work that does not go through the =
TLS working group.=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><br><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,3=
4,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-=
variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spa=
ce:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoratio=
n-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><b=
r></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Cheers,</span></div><div><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8=
px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal=
;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;flo=
at:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,3=
4,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-=
variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spa=
ce:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoratio=
n-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Jo=
e</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.=
tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hi Sean, Joe,<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
&gt; I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Monday:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materi=
als/agenda-101-tls-sessb" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://data=
tracker.ietf.org/<wbr>meeting/101/materials/agenda-<wbr>101-tls-sessb</a><b=
r>
<br>
</span>That includes:<br>
&quot;<br>
TLS Vizability - Russ &amp; Chairs - 30min<br>
=C2=A0- 10min draft - Russ<br>
=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-vis=
ibility/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org=
/<wbr>doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-<wbr>visibility/</a><br>
=C2=A0- 10min discussion - Chairs<br>
=C2=A0- 10min wrap-up - Chairs<br>
&quot;<br>
<br>
Consider this as an objection to that agenda item<br>
being given any time. I also have some questions<br>
below.<br>
<br>
This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a<br>
very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in<br>
that space, despite there being quite a few fans of<br>
doing such work in the room that day. I don&#39;t see<br>
that anything has changed in the meantime.<br>
<br>
Russ&#39; draft was discussed on the list last year, also<br>
with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in<br>
that space. (While you didn&#39;t make a consensus call,<br>
am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly<br>
different from what was discussed on the list so I<br>
see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.<br>
<br>
Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees<br>
being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?<br>
<br>
And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?<br>
<br>
As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same<br>
topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack<br>
of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,<br>
then what&#39;s the plan for ending this?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
PS: I also strongly object to the &quot;visibility&quot; euphemism,<br>
and while that&#39;s partly a comment on the draft, it would<br>
also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to<br>
the WG based on that euphemism.<br>
<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--f403045c7ac8d2377d0566eec0ce--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 15:24:53 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com> wrote:

> Hi Ekr,
>
>
>
> Firstly, thanks for this. My primary reason for putting together
> draft-putman was to propose a handshake exchange which only uses a single
> asymmetric algorithm. If this proposal is extended to include raw public
> keys (I think these are already supported, but not mentioned in the text)
> and an ECDH-based MAC for client authentication, then this satisfies my
> constraints.
>

Yep, that should actually work just fine.


As a single data point, I can state that some of the IoT products that I'm
> working with already use static ECDH keys for client authentication (thou=
gh
> not within TLS).
>



>
>
> Although OPTLS is able to use 0-RTT, I don't see how this capability coul=
d
> be used in this implementation, even if the client knows the server stati=
c
> key. Because SS is only included in the key schedule when the master secr=
et
> is generated, the client_early_traffic_secret has no input secret.
> Conversely, if the SS is included in the key schedule as the PSK, then th=
e
> certificate cannot be decrypted by a client which does not have the serve=
r
> static key.
>

Yes, I agree with you. OPTLS had a less linear key schedule. I think if you
wanted to do 0-RTT you would have to have it be a pretend PSK as you
suggest in your draft.


I think that this and draft-putman are not competing, but rather that they
> serve different use case
>

Agreed. It sounds like you have a set of use cases where you know how to
predistribute the server key? This is the part we found challenging int he
web context.

-Ekr





> s. They could be synergistic, such that this draft provides a mechanism
> for distributing a static key which could later be used in a draft-putman
> exchange; however, the natural continuation would be to use a resumption
> PSK, so this would only be useful if there were a long gap between sessio=
n,
> which seems unlikely.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Tony
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Christopher Wood
> *Sent:* 07 March 2018 01:26
> *To:* <tls@ietf.org>; Eric Rescorla
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS
> 1.3
>
>
>
> Thanks for putting this together! I=E2=80=99m in favor of the mechanism a=
nd look
> forward to discussing it. Negotiating with signature_algorithms is a simp=
le
> way to roll this out, it fits in cleanly with the key schedule, and the
> benefits outlined in the introduction (PRNG hardening, plausible
> deniability, etc.) seem worth the effort. Although the approach has its
> roots in OPTLS, we will certainly need to re-assess its impact on the
> handshake. (I know of some folks actively working on this.) We also need =
to
> spend more time thinking about the open issues =E2=80=94 specifically, th=
e story
> around early data encryption. This variant has the benefit of enabling
> early data with public key encryption, as opposed to (trackable) symmetri=
c
> key encryption. It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whether or not we need to addr=
ess the
> static share publication issue for this benefit.
>
>
>
> Anyway, thanks again for the draft. I=E2=80=99ll read it carefully before=
 London.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Chris
>
>
> On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, wrote:
>
> Hi folks,
>
>
>
> Here's another entry in the DH-only pile.
>
>
>
> I've just posted:
>
>    draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00
>
>
>
> This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed from
>
> OPTLS [0]. There are obviously connections with draft-putman, but
>
> this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style
>
> exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server's
>
> capabilities (though it's extensible to 0-RTT) than towards
>
> pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the
>
> key schedule.
>
>
>
> We'd like 10 minutes to discuss this in London.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
> [0] http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Tetbury Hill,
> Malmesbury, SN16 0RP, UK.
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--94eb2c072d760dc9220566eefee4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
hu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Tony Putman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:Tony.Putman@dyson.com" target=3D"_blank">Tony.Putman@dyson.com</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_4145884896298539560WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Hi Ekr,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Firstly, thanks for this. My primary re=
ason for putting together draft-putman was to propose a handshake exchange =
which only uses a single asymmetric algorithm. If this proposal
 is extended to include raw public keys (I think these are already supporte=
d, but not mentioned in the text) and an ECDH-based MAC for client authenti=
cation, then this satisfies my constraints.</span></p></div></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Yep, that should actually work just fine.</div><div=
>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-=
GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div class=3D"m_4145884896298539560WordS=
ection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">As a single data point, I can state tha=
t some of the IoT products that I&#39;m working with already use static ECD=
H keys for client authentication (though not within TLS).</span></p></div><=
/div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div class=3D"m_41=
45884896298539560WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Although OPTLS is able to use 0-RTT, I =
don&#39;t see how this capability could be used in this implementation, eve=
n if the client knows the server static key. Because SS is only
 included in the key schedule when the master secret is generated, the clie=
nt_early_traffic_secret has no input secret. Conversely, if the SS is inclu=
ded in the key schedule as the PSK, then the certificate cannot be decrypte=
d by a client which does not have
 the server static key.</span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>Yes, I agree with you. OPTLS had a less linear key schedule. I think if=
 you wanted to do 0-RTT you would have to have it be a pretend PSK as you s=
uggest in your draft.</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:Calibri,sans-ser=
if;font-size:11pt"><br></span></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div class=3D"m_4=
145884896298539560WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">I think that this and draft-putman are =
not competing, but rather that they serve different use case</span></p></di=
v></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed. It sounds like you have a =
set of use cases where you know how to predistribute the server key? This i=
s the part we found challenging int he web context.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"pu=
rple"><div class=3D"m_4145884896298539560WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sa=
ns-serif&quot;">s. They could be synergistic, such that this draft provides=
 a mechanism
 for distributing a static key which could later be used in a draft-putman =
exchange; however, the natural continuation would be to use a resumption PS=
K, so this would only be useful if there were a long gap between session, w=
hich seems unlikely.
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Regards,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Tony<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;fo=
nt-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&qu=
ot;sans-serif&quot;"> TLS [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Christopher Wood<br>
<b>Sent:</b> 07 March 2018 01:26<br>
<b>To:</b> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;; Eric Rescorla<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for =
TLS 1.3<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div><div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div name=3D"messageBodySection">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Thanks for putting this together! I=E2=80=
=99m in favor of the mechanism and look forward to discussing it. Negotiati=
ng with signature_algorithms is a simple way to roll this out, it
 fits in cleanly with the key schedule, and the benefits outlined in the in=
troduction (PRNG hardening, plausible deniability, etc.) seem worth the eff=
ort. Although the approach has its roots in OPTLS, we will certainly need t=
o re-assess its impact on the handshake.
 (I know of some folks actively working on this.) We also need to spend mor=
e time thinking about the open issues =E2=80=94 specifically, the story aro=
und early data encryption. This variant has the benefit of enabling early d=
ata with public key encryption, as opposed
 to (trackable) symmetric key encryption. It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whethe=
r or not we need to address the static share publication issue for this ben=
efit.
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Anyway, thanks again for the draft. I=E2=
=80=99ll read it carefully before London.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div name=3D"messageSignatureSection">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><br>
Best, <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Chris<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div name=3D"messageReplySection">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><br>
On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;, wrote:<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Hi folks,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Here&#39;s another entry in the DH-only p=
ile.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">I&#39;ve just posted:<u></u><u></u></span=
></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">=C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-rescorla-tls13-<wbr>se=
mistatic-dh-00<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">This implements a semi-static DH exchange=
 mostly borrowed from<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">OPTLS [0]. There are obviously connection=
s with draft-putman, but<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">this is more oriented towards implementin=
g a 1-RTT style<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">exchange where the client has no foreknow=
ledge of the server&#39;s<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">capabilities (though it&#39;s extensible =
to 0-RTT) than towards<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">pre-distributed DH keys, and has less inv=
asive changes to the<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">key schedule.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">We&#39;d like 10 minutes to discuss this =
in London.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Thanks,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">-Ekr<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">[0]
<a href=3D"http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/" target=3D=
"_blank">http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/<wbr>abstract/document/7467348/</a><u><=
/u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">______________________________<wbr>______=
___________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:13px">
Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Tetbury Hill, Malmesbury=
, SN16 0RP, UK.
<br>
This message is intended solely for the addressee and may contain confident=
ial information. If you have received this message in error, please immedia=
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</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c072d760dc9220566eefee4--


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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Spencer Dawkins <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Spencer Dawkins' No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 12:10 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> I wondered why
>>
>>    Newer
>>    clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, SHOULD
>>    negotiate the most preferred common parameters.
>>
>> was not a MUST.
>
>
> Ugh, this is actually not even a normative statement, It's just a statement
> of
> what the protocol is supposed to do. Good catch!

Drop the SHOULD, yeah.  Is it worth noting that it's the server's
preference that wins?  As in:

   Newer clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers,
negotiate the common parameters most preferred by the server.

Or is that too constraining?


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Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 18:27:10 -0500
From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
To: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "=?utf-8?Q?<tls=40ietf.org>?=" <tls@ietf.org>
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On Mar 8, 2018, 6:25 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla <ekr=40rtfm.com>, wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman=40dyson.com>=
 wrote:
> > > Hi Ekr,
> > >
> > > =46irstly, thanks for this. My primary reason for putting together =
draft-putman was to propose a handshake exchange which only uses a single=
 asymmetric algorithm. If this proposal is extended to include raw public=
 keys (I think these are already supported, but not mentioned in the text=
) and an ECDH-based MAC for client authentication, then this satisfies my=
 constraints.
> >
> > Yep, that should actually work just fine.

Agreed.

> >
> >
> > > As a single data point, I can state that some of the IoT products t=
hat I'm working with already use static ECDH keys for client authenticati=
on (though not within TLS).
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Although OPTLS is able to use 0-RTT, I don't see how this capabilit=
y could be used in this implementation, even if the client knows the serv=
er static key. Because SS is only included in the key schedule when the m=
aster secret is generated, the client=5Fearly=5Ftraffic=5Fsecret has no i=
nput secret. Conversely, if the SS is included in the key schedule as the=
 PSK, then the certificate cannot be decrypted by a client which does not=
 have the server static key.
> >
> > Yes, I agree with you. OPTLS had a less linear key schedule. I think =
if you wanted to do 0-RTT you would have to have it be a pretend PSK as y=
ou suggest in your draft.

That sounds right =E2=80=94 the early application data key with OPTLS is =
=60g=5E=7Bsx=7D=60 instead of =60psk=60.

Best,
Chris

> >
> >
> > > I think that this and draft-putman are not competing, but rather th=
at they serve different use case
> >
> > Agreed. It sounds like you have a set of use cases where you know how=
 to predistribute the server key=3F This is the part we found challenging=
 int he web context.
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > s. They could be synergistic, such that this draft provides a mecha=
nism for distributing a static key which could later be used in a draft-p=
utman exchange; however, the natural continuation would be to use a resum=
ption PSK, so this would only be useful if there were a long gap between =
session, which seems unlikely.
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Tony
> > >
> > > =46rom: TLS =5Bmailto:tls-bounces=40ietf.org=5D On Behalf Of Christ=
opher Wood
> > > Sent: 07 March 2018 01:26
> > > To: <tls=40ietf.org>; Eric Rescorla
> > > Subject: Re: =5BTLS=5D Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment=
 for TLS 1.3
> > >
> > > Thanks for putting this together=21 I=E2=80=99m in favor of the mec=
hanism and look forward to discussing it. Negotiating with signature=5Fal=
gorithms is a simple way to roll this out, it fits in cleanly with the ke=
y schedule, and the benefits outlined in the introduction (PRNG hardening=
, plausible deniability, etc.) seem worth the effort. Although the approa=
ch has its roots in OPTLS, we will certainly need to re-assess its impact=
 on the handshake. (I know of some folks actively working on this.) We al=
so need to spend more time thinking about the open issues =E2=80=94 speci=
fically, the story around early data encryption. This variant has the ben=
efit of enabling early data with public key encryption, as opposed to (tr=
ackable) symmetric key encryption. It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whether or =
not we need to address the static share publication issue for this benefi=
t.
> > >
> > > Anyway, thanks again for the draft. I=E2=80=99ll read it carefully =
before London.
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Chris
> > >
> > > On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla <ekr=40rtfm.com>, wrot=
e:
> > >
> > > Hi folks,
> > >
> > > Here's another entry in the DH-only pile.
> > >
> > > I've just posted:
> > > =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00
> > >
> > > This implements a semi-static DH exchange mostly borrowed from
> > > OPTLS =5B0=5D. There are obviously connections with draft-putman, b=
ut
> > > this is more oriented towards implementing a 1-RTT style
> > > exchange where the client has no foreknowledge of the server's
> > > capabilities (though it's extensible to 0-RTT) than towards
> > > pre-distributed DH keys, and has less invasive changes to the
> > > key schedule.
> > >
> > > We'd like 10 minutes to discuss this in London.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > -Ekr
> > >
> > > =5B0=5D http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> > > TLS mailing list
> > > TLS=40ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > >
> > > Dyson Technology Limited, company number 01959090, Tetbury Hill, Ma=
lmesbury, SN16 0RP, UK.
> > > This message is intended solely for the addressee and may contain c=
onfidential information. If you have received this message in error, plea=
se immediately and permanently delete it, and do not use, copy or disclos=
e the information contained in this message or in any attachment.
> > > Dyson may monitor email traffic data and content for security & tra=
ining.
>

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<div name=3D=22messageReplySection=22 style=3D=22font-size: 14px; font-fa=
mily: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystem=46ont, sans-serif;=22><br />
On Mar 8, 2018, 6:25 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla &lt;ekr=40rtfm.com&gt;, wrot=
e:<br />
<blockquote type=3D=22cite=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; padding-left: 1=
0px; border-left: thin solid =231abc9c;=22>
<div dir=3D=22ltr=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fextra=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22>On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Tony Put=
man <span dir=3D=22ltr=22>&lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:Tony.Putman=40dyson.com=
=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>Tony.Putman=40dyson.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br />
<blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; paddi=
ng-left: 10px; border-left: thin solid =23e67e22;=22>
<div lang=3D=22EN-GB=22 link=3D=22blue=22 vlink=3D=22purple=22 xml:lang=3D=
=22EN-GB=22>
<div class=3D=22m=5F4145884896298539560WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Hi Ekr,<u></u><u></u></span=
></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>=46irstly, thanks for this.=
 My primary reason for putting together draft-putman was to propose a han=
dshake exchange which only uses a single asymmetric algorithm. If this pr=
oposal is extended to include raw public keys (I think these are already =
supported, but not mentioned in the text) and an ECDH-based MAC for clien=
t authentication, then this satisfies my constraints.</span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Yep, that should actually work just fine.&=23160;</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Agreed.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<blockquote type=3D=22cite=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; padding-left: 1=
0px; border-left: thin solid =231abc9c;=22>
<div dir=3D=22ltr=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fextra=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22>
<div>&=23160;</div>
<div><br /></div>
<blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; paddi=
ng-left: 10px; border-left: thin solid =23e67e22;=22>
<div lang=3D=22EN-GB=22 link=3D=22blue=22 vlink=3D=22purple=22 xml:lang=3D=
=22EN-GB=22>
<div class=3D=22m=5F4145884896298539560WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>As a single data point, I c=
an state that some of the IoT products that I'm working with already use =
static ECDH keys for client authentication (though not within TLS).</span=
></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>&=23160;</div>
<blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; paddi=
ng-left: 10px; border-left: thin solid =23e67e22;=22>
<div lang=3D=22EN-GB=22 link=3D=22blue=22 vlink=3D=22purple=22 xml:lang=3D=
=22EN-GB=22>
<div class=3D=22m=5F4145884896298539560WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Although OPTLS is able to u=
se 0-RTT, I don't see how this capability could be used in this implement=
ation, even if the client knows the server static key. Because SS is only=
 included in the key schedule when the master secret is generated, the cl=
ient=5Fearly=5Ftraffic=5Fsecret has no input secret. Conversely, if the S=
S is included in the key schedule as the PSK, then the certificate cannot=
 be decrypted by a client which does not have the server static key.</spa=
n></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Yes, I agree with you. OPTLS had a less linear key schedule. I think=
 if you wanted to do 0-RTT you would have to have it be a pretend PSK as =
you suggest in your draft.&=23160;</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>That sounds right =E2=80=94 the early application data key with OPTL=
S is =60g=5E=7Bsx=7D=60 instead of =60psk=60.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Best,</div>
<div>Chris</div>
<div><br /></div>
<blockquote type=3D=22cite=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; padding-left: 1=
0px; border-left: thin solid =231abc9c;=22>
<div dir=3D=22ltr=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fextra=22>
<div class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22>
<div><span style=3D=22font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:11pt=22><b=
r /></span></div>
<div><br /></div>
<blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; paddi=
ng-left: 10px; border-left: thin solid =23e67e22;=22>
<div lang=3D=22EN-GB=22 link=3D=22blue=22 vlink=3D=22purple=22 xml:lang=3D=
=22EN-GB=22>
<div class=3D=22m=5F4145884896298539560WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>I think that this and draft=
-putman are not competing, but rather that they serve different use case<=
/span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br /></div>
<div>Agreed. It sounds like you have a set of use cases where you know ho=
w to predistribute the server key=3F This is the part we found challengin=
g int he web context.</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br /></div>
<div><br /></div>
<div><br /></div>
<div>&=23160;</div>
<blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin: 5px 5px; paddi=
ng-left: 10px; border-left: thin solid =23e67e22;=22>
<div lang=3D=22EN-GB=22 link=3D=22blue=22 vlink=3D=22purple=22 xml:lang=3D=
=22EN-GB=22>
<div class=3D=22m=5F4145884896298539560WordSection1=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>s. They could be synergisti=
c, such that this draft provides a mechanism for distributing a static ke=
y which could later be used in a draft-putman exchange; however, the natu=
ral continuation would be to use a resumption PSK, so this would only be =
useful if there were a long gap between session, which seems unlikely. <u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Regards,<u></u><u></u></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Tony<u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:11.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></spa=
n></p>
<div>
<div style=3D=22border:none;border-top:solid =23b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0p=
t 0cm 0cm 0cm=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><b><span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22font-si=
ze:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 xml:la=
ng=3D=22EN-US=22>=46rom:</span></b> <span lang=3D=22EN-US=22 style=3D=22f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22 =
xml:lang=3D=22EN-US=22>TLS =5Bmailto:<a href=3D=22mailto:tls-bounces=40ie=
tf.org=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>tls-bounces=40ietf.org</a>=5D <b>On Beh=
alf Of</b> Christopher Wood<br />
<b>Sent:</b> 07 March 2018 01:26<br />
<b>To:</b> &lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:tls=40ietf.org=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=
=22>tls=40ietf.org</a>&gt;; Eric Rescorla<br />
<b>Subject:</b> Re: =5BTLS=5D Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishmen=
t for TLS 1.3<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class=3D=22h5=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></p>
<div name=3D=22messageBodySection=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Thanks for putting this toget=
her=21 I=E2=80=99m in favor of the mechanism and look forward to discussi=
ng it. Negotiating with signature=5Falgorithms is a simple way to roll th=
is out, it fits in cleanly with the key schedule, and the benefits outlin=
ed in the introduction (PRNG hardening, plausible deniability, etc.) seem=
 worth the effort. Although the approach has its roots in OPTLS, we will =
certainly need to re-assess its impact on the handshake. (I know of some =
folks actively working on this.) We also need to spend more time thinking=
 about the open issues =E2=80=94 specifically, the story around early dat=
a encryption. This variant has the benefit of enabling early data with pu=
blic key encryption, as opposed to (trackable) symmetric key encryption. =
It=E2=80=99s unclear to me whether or not we need to address the static s=
hare publication issue for this benefit. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Anyway, thanks again for the =
draft. I=E2=80=99ll read it carefully before London.<u></u><u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div name=3D=22messageSignatureSection=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><br />
Best, <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Chris<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
</div>
</div>
<div name=3D=22messageReplySection=22>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><br />
On Mar 5, 2018, 4:14 PM -0500, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:ekr=40=
rtfm.com=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>ekr=40rtfm.com</a>&gt;, wrote:<br />
<br />
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Hi folks,<u></u><u></u></span=
></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Here's another entry in the D=
H-only pile.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>I've just posted:<u></u><u></=
u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>&=23160; &=23160;draft-rescor=
la-tls13-<wbr />semistatic-dh-00<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>This implements a semi-static=
 DH exchange mostly borrowed from<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>OPTLS =5B0=5D. There are obvi=
ously connections with draft-putman, but<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>this is more oriented towards=
 implementing a 1-RTT style<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>exchange where the client has=
 no foreknowledge of the server's<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>capabilities (though it's ext=
ensible to 0-RTT) than towards<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>pre-distributed DH keys, and =
has less invasive changes to the<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>key schedule.<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>We'd like 10 minutes to discu=
ss this in London.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>Thanks,<u></u><u></u></span><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>-Ekr<u></u><u></u></span></p>=

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&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
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<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22>=5B0=5D <a href=3D=22http://i=
eeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7467348/=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>=
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/<wbr />abstract/document/7467348/</a><u></u><u=
></u></span></p>
</div>
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<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
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<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=22><u></u>&=23160;<u></u></span>=
</p>
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<p class=3D=22MsoNormal=22><span style=3D=22font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
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</p>
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From: Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2018 23:39:18 +0000
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Artyom,
Thanks for mentioning the ID and you are right that draft Fenter is the
supporting problem description.

The reason it was written was to help folks understand why legitimate
internal out-of-band decryption is still needed on data once it reaches its
destination and that there isn=E2=80=99t a viable alternative that we are a=
ware of.
   Especially not in-line MitM decryption.  It just doesn=E2=80=99t scale. =
 The
draft lists the legitimate internal requirements and speaks to the facts
around some of the suggestions that have been offered.

 It=E2=80=99s a good read and we are happy to answer questions in advance a=
s
needed.

Darin

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 4:11 PM Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi Sean, Joe,
>
> WG also has this at its disposal:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00
> Will that be discussed along with draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility?
> Those two seem to be rather connected/dependant on each other.
>
> | Artyom Gavrichenkov
> | gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191
> | mailto: ximaera@gmail.com
> | fb: ximaera
> | telegram: xima_era
> | skype: xima_era
> | tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Sean, Joe,
> >
> > On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
> >> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
> >>
> >> Monday:
> >>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-sessb
> >
> > That includes:
> > "
> > TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
> >  - 10min draft - Russ
> >   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
> >  - 10min discussion - Chairs
> >  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
> > "
> >
> > Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
> > being given any time. I also have some questions
> > below.
> >
> > This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
> > very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
> > that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
> > doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
> > that anything has changed in the meantime.
> >
> > Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
> > with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
> > that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
> > am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
> > different from what was discussed on the list so I
> > see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
> >
> > Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
> > being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
> >
> > And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
> >
> > As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
> > topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
> > of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
> > then what's the plan for ending this?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > S.
> >
> > PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
> > and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
> > also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
> > the WG based on that euphemism.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div><div><div dir=3D"auto">Artyom,</div><div dir=3D"auto">Thanks for menti=
oning the ID and you are right that draft Fenter is the supporting problem =
description. =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto=
">The reason it was written was to help folks understand why legitimate int=
ernal out-of-band decryption is still needed on data once it reaches its de=
stination and that there isn=E2=80=99t a viable alternative that we are awa=
re of. =C2=A0 =C2=A0Especially not in-line MitM decryption.=C2=A0 It just d=
oesn=E2=80=99t scale.=C2=A0 The draft lists the legitimate internal require=
ments and speaks to the facts around some of the suggestions that have been=
 offered.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=C2=A0It=E2=80=
=99s a good read and we are happy to answer questions in advance as needed.=
=C2=A0</div></div></div><div><div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"a=
uto">Darin</div></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>On Thu, Mar =
8, 2018 at 4:11 PM Artyom Gavrichenkov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.=
com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">Hi Sean, Joe,<br>
<br>
WG also has this at its disposal:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-=
tls-decryption-00</a><br>
Will that be discussed along with draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility?<br>
Those two seem to be rather connected/dependant on each other.<br>
<br>
| Artyom Gavrichenkov<br>
| gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191<br>
| mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gm=
ail.com</a><br>
| fb: ximaera<br>
| telegram: xima_era<br>
| skype: xima_era<br>
| tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58<br>
<br>
<br>
On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen Farrell<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.=
farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi Sean, Joe,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Monday:<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/ma=
terials/agenda-101-tls-sessb" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://=
datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-sessb</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That includes:<br>
&gt; &quot;<br>
&gt; TLS Vizability - Russ &amp; Chairs - 30min<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 - 10min draft - Russ<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls=
-tls13-visibility/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 - 10min discussion - Chairs<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 - 10min wrap-up - Chairs<br>
&gt; &quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Consider this as an objection to that agenda item<br>
&gt; being given any time. I also have some questions<br>
&gt; below.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a<br>
&gt; very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in<br>
&gt; that space, despite there being quite a few fans of<br>
&gt; doing such work in the room that day. I don&#39;t see<br>
&gt; that anything has changed in the meantime.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Russ&#39; draft was discussed on the list last year, also<br>
&gt; with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in<br>
&gt; that space. (While you didn&#39;t make a consensus call,<br>
&gt; am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly<br>
&gt; different from what was discussed on the list so I<br>
&gt; see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees<br>
&gt; being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same<br>
&gt; topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack<br>
&gt; of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,<br>
&gt; then what&#39;s the plan for ending this?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; S.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; PS: I also strongly object to the &quot;visibility&quot; euphemism,<br=
>
&gt; and while that&#39;s partly a comment on the draft, it would<br>
&gt; also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to<br>
&gt; the WG based on that euphemism.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--001a11457b3ec959550566ef2f85--


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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 08:52:15 +0300
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To: Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hi Darin,

I just asked for clarification whether it's on a TLS WG agenda for London.
I'm not quite sure this is a right thread to discuss the contents of that d=
raft.
(In fact, I'm pretty sire it isn't.)

| Artyom Gavrichenkov
| gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191
| mailto: ximaera@gmail.com
| fb: ximaera
| telegram: xima_era
| skype: xima_era
| tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58


On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 2:39 AM, Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com> wrote:
> Artyom,
> Thanks for mentioning the ID and you are right that draft Fenter is the
> supporting problem description.
>
> The reason it was written was to help folks understand why legitimate
> internal out-of-band decryption is still needed on data once it reaches i=
ts
> destination and that there isn=E2=80=99t a viable alternative that we are=
 aware of.
> Especially not in-line MitM decryption.  It just doesn=E2=80=99t scale.  =
The draft
> lists the legitimate internal requirements and speaks to the facts around
> some of the suggestions that have been offered.
>
>  It=E2=80=99s a good read and we are happy to answer questions in advance=
 as needed.
>
> Darin
>
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 4:11 PM Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Sean, Joe,
>>
>> WG also has this at its disposal:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00
>> Will that be discussed along with draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility?
>> Those two seem to be rather connected/dependant on each other.
>>
>> | Artyom Gavrichenkov
>> | gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191
>> | mailto: ximaera@gmail.com
>> | fb: ximaera
>> | telegram: xima_era
>> | skype: xima_era
>> | tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>> >
>> > Hi Sean, Joe,
>> >
>> > On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
>> >> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>> >>
>> >> Monday:
>> >>
>> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-tls-ses=
sb
>> >
>> > That includes:
>> > "
>> > TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>> >  - 10min draft - Russ
>> >   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>> >  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>> >  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
>> > "
>> >
>> > Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
>> > being given any time. I also have some questions
>> > below.
>> >
>> > This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
>> > very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
>> > that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
>> > doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
>> > that anything has changed in the meantime.
>> >
>> > Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
>> > with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
>> > that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
>> > am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
>> > different from what was discussed on the list so I
>> > see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>> >
>> > Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
>> > being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>> >
>> > And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>> >
>> > As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
>> > topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
>> > of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
>> > then what's the plan for ending this?
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> > S.
>> >
>> > PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
>> > and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
>> > also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
>> > the WG based on that euphemism.
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>> >
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hi Joe,

I'm sorry, but I gotta say that answer seems to me both unresponsive
to the questions asked and unconvincing.

On 08/03/18 23:08, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>=20
> In the meeting in Prague there was interest in this problem space, but
> neither the consensus to accept or reject this work.

Without rough consensus to adopt, the work is not adopted.

But your statement above isn't accurate - it wasn't "this work"
(as in this draft) that was discussed in Prague, but rather the
entire idea of weakening TLS in these ways - quoting from the
Prague minutes [1]:

"The main question: Is this subject something that the WG should
consider?"

There is clearly no consensus to adopt *any* work in this space,
whether that be draft-green or this latest iteration from Russ
and Ralph.

I see nothing whatsoever to indicate any significant change in
sets of opinions since Prague.

What makes you think iterating on yet more proposals like this
will ever conclude? If there's no evidence of that we ought not
waste the time and energy. Can you point at any change that
could possibly indicate that this bun-fight is worth doing yet
again?

>  The authors have
> revised their proposal to address some of the concerns raised by workin=
g
> group members and are asking to bring the new approach in front of the
> working group. =20

What significant change has there been since -00 of Russ and Ralph's
draft? I see nothing major there. that -00 was debated on the list
which is the primary place for  discussion. My read of that set of
threads it that it pretty clearly showed that the same folks have
the same opinions with no significant movement. Can you point at
some evidence to the contrary? If not, we shouldn't bother to waste
more time on this.

If instead you mean Russ and Ralph's draft differs from draft-green,
then see above - it wasn't only draft-green that was rejected in
Prague, but the entire idea of adopting work in this space, which
includes Russ and Ralph's -00 and -01.

That the authors have asked for time counts for nothing, when the
WG have no consensus to work in this space. If just asking for time
does matter, then I'll now publicly repeat my request for time
to refure the assertions that'll be made for breaking TLS. You said
no to my request, so what's different about one that relates to a
draft that has been debated on the list and attracted significant
negative comment?

> I believe in this case this is the right thing to do even
> if it appears there is some repetition of topic.  =20

It is not "some repetition" - this topic has been debated f2f and
on this draft on the list and there's zero evidence of significant
changes in opinion, in fact the opposite. Can you point at any
such evidence? If not, your position as chairs seems illogical.

> However, if the new
> approach fails to achieve significantly more support I believe the auth=
ors
> will need to find another path for their work that does not go through =
the
> TLS working group.

But the WG has already demonstrated a lack of consensus to even
consider "work in this space" (your choice of words I believe.)
That should be enough. What does or doesn't happen outside the
TLS WG is not at issue here.

To reiterate, in Prague you asked "The main question: Is this subject
something that the WG should consider?" The result was a clear lack of
any consensus to work in this space, which means not working in this
space. Yet here we are again giving agenda time to highly controversial
proposals in this space.

Please: just take this off the agenda and let the WG do it's real work.

Thanks,
S.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/minutes-99-tls

>=20
> Cheers,
>=20
> Joe
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd=
=2Eie>
> wrote:
>=20
>>
>> Hi Sean, Joe,
>>
>> On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
>>> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>>>
>>> Monday:
>>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-
>> 101-tls-sessb
>>
>> That includes:
>> "
>> TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>>  - 10min draft - Russ
>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>>  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>>  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
>> "
>>
>> Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
>> being given any time. I also have some questions
>> below.
>>
>> This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
>> very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
>> that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
>> doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
>> that anything has changed in the meantime.
>>
>> Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
>> with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
>> that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
>> am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
>> different from what was discussed on the list so I
>> see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>>
>> Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
>> being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>>
>> And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>>
>> As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
>> topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
>> of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
>> then what's the plan for ending this?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> S.
>>
>> PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
>> and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
>> also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
>> the WG based on that euphemism.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>=20

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 13:35:13 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters
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See issue #1166.

The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID appearing twice.
We should do one or the other.

-Ekr

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<div dir="ltr">See issue #1166.<div><br></div><div>The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID appearing twice. We should do one or the other.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters
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(See also https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1179)

On 03/09/2018 03:35 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> See issue #1166.
>
> The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID appearing
> twice. We should do one or the other.
>


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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 16:57:30 -0500
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hello, Stephen.

On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 4:24 PM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hi Joe,
>
> I'm sorry, but I gotta say that answer seems to me both unresponsive
> to the questions asked and unconvincing.
>
> On 08/03/18 23:08, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>> In the meeting in Prague there was interest in this problem space, but
>> neither the consensus to accept or reject this work.
>
> Without rough consensus to adopt, the work is not adopted.
>
> But your statement above isn't accurate - it wasn't "this work"
> (as in this draft) that was discussed in Prague, but rather the
> entire idea of weakening TLS in these ways - quoting from the
> Prague minutes [1]:
>
> "The main question: Is this subject something that the WG should
> consider?"

The hummed answer to that question was very close to 50/50 in the
room, inconclusive.

>
> There is clearly no consensus to adopt *any* work in this space,
> whether that be draft-green or this latest iteration from Russ
> and Ralph.

It was clear that there was no consensus to adopt draft-green and that
is considered dead in the water, we agree there.  Since there was
interest (50% of the room) to consider work in this space, I agree
with the chairs assessment to allow this presentation.  I am confident
they will work on any hums to carefully assess next steps and if any
future proposals belong in this WG or elsewhere.

>
> I see nothing whatsoever to indicate any significant change in
> sets of opinions since Prague.
>
> What makes you think iterating on yet more proposals like this
> will ever conclude? If there's no evidence of that we ought not
> waste the time and energy. Can you point at any change that
> could possibly indicate that this bun-fight is worth doing yet
> again?
>
>>  The authors have
>> revised their proposal to address some of the concerns raised by working
>> group members and are asking to bring the new approach in front of the
>> working group.
>
> What significant change has there been since -00 of Russ and Ralph's
> draft? I see nothing major there. that -00 was debated on the list
> which is the primary place for  discussion. My read of that set of
> threads it that it pretty clearly showed that the same folks have
> the same opinions with no significant movement. Can you point at
> some evidence to the contrary? If not, we shouldn't bother to waste
> more time on this.
>
> If instead you mean Russ and Ralph's draft differs from draft-green,
> then see above - it wasn't only draft-green that was rejected in
> Prague, but the entire idea of adopting work in this space, which
> includes Russ and Ralph's -00 and -01.
>
> That the authors have asked for time counts for nothing, when the
> WG have no consensus to work in this space. If just asking for time
> does matter, then I'll now publicly repeat my request for time
> to refure the assertions that'll be made for breaking TLS. You said
> no to my request, so what's different about one that relates to a
> draft that has been debated on the list and attracted significant
> negative comment?
>
>> I believe in this case this is the right thing to do even
>> if it appears there is some repetition of topic.
>
> It is not "some repetition" - this topic has been debated f2f and
> on this draft on the list and there's zero evidence of significant
> changes in opinion, in fact the opposite. Can you point at any
> such evidence? If not, your position as chairs seems illogical.
>
>> However, if the new
>> approach fails to achieve significantly more support I believe the autho=
rs
>> will need to find another path for their work that does not go through t=
he
>> TLS working group.
>
> But the WG has already demonstrated a lack of consensus to even
> consider "work in this space" (your choice of words I believe.)
> That should be enough. What does or doesn't happen outside the
> TLS WG is not at issue here.
>
> To reiterate, in Prague you asked "The main question: Is this subject
> something that the WG should consider?" The result was a clear lack of
> any consensus to work in this space, which means not working in this
> space. Yet here we are again giving agenda time to highly controversial
> proposals in this space.
>
> Please: just take this off the agenda and let the WG do it's real work.
>
> Thanks,
> S.
>
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/minutes-99-tls

Relevant comment from minutes:
Hums: No clarity whatsoever. Seemed pretty even.

Best,
Kathleen

>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Joe
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.=
ie>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Hi Sean, Joe,
>>>
>>> On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>>>>
>>>> Monday:
>>>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-
>>> 101-tls-sessb
>>>
>>> That includes:
>>> "
>>> TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>>>  - 10min draft - Russ
>>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>>>  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>>>  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
>>> "
>>>
>>> Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
>>> being given any time. I also have some questions
>>> below.
>>>
>>> This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
>>> very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
>>> that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
>>> doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
>>> that anything has changed in the meantime.
>>>
>>> Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
>>> with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
>>> that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
>>> am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
>>> different from what was discussed on the list so I
>>> see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>>>
>>> Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
>>> being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>>>
>>> And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>>>
>>> As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
>>> topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
>>> of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
>>> then what's the plan for ending this?
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> S.
>>>
>>> PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
>>> and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
>>> also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
>>> the WG based on that euphemism.
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/0Hngm_QizKqNDMn0k3Xx0MfHumc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters
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It should be OK to restrict to one appearance of the same OID, if there is =
a desire to do so.

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Benjamin Kaduk
Sent: Friday, March 9, 2018 1:45 PM
To: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters

(See also https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%=
2Fgithub.com%2Ftlswg%2Ftls13-spec%2Fissues%2F1179&data=3D04%7C01%7CAndrei.P=
opov%40microsoft.com%7Cddb0cb5ca2684dcdf7d708d58607050a%7C72f988bf86f141af9=
1ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636562287068258523%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIj=
oiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwifQ%3D%3D%7C-2&sdata=3D3QfikwA=
9T0ScU6Yw9T%2Fo3IDhmj1zYgcJzye1sx5M%2Bp0%3D&reserved=3D0)

On 03/09/2018 03:35 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> See issue #1166.
>
> The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID appearing=20
> twice. We should do one or the other.
>

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Kathleen,

On 09/03/18 21:57, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> Hello, Stephen.
>=20
> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 4:24 PM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Joe,
>>
>> I'm sorry, but I gotta say that answer seems to me both unresponsive
>> to the questions asked and unconvincing.
>>
>> On 08/03/18 23:08, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>>> Hi Stephen,
>>>
>>> In the meeting in Prague there was interest in this problem space, bu=
t
>>> neither the consensus to accept or reject this work.
>>
>> Without rough consensus to adopt, the work is not adopted.
>>
>> But your statement above isn't accurate - it wasn't "this work"
>> (as in this draft) that was discussed in Prague, but rather the
>> entire idea of weakening TLS in these ways - quoting from the
>> Prague minutes [1]:
>>
>> "The main question: Is this subject something that the WG should
>> consider?"
>=20
> The hummed answer to that question was very close to 50/50 in the
> room, inconclusive.

I'm sorry to disagree but it was entirely clear there was a
lack of consensus. That's the significant thing here. And
there is zero evidence that anyone's changing their position.

That ought be enough for the chairs to say no to all proposals
in this space unless someone turns up with something unexpected.

That's not the case here - in discussion of this draft, various
folks asked on the list that we stop the constant debate about
making TLS worse, so there is zero evidence that this draft is
going to change people's minds.

Where am I wrong?

>=20
>>
>> There is clearly no consensus to adopt *any* work in this space,
>> whether that be draft-green or this latest iteration from Russ
>> and Ralph.
>=20
> It was clear that there was no consensus to adopt draft-green and that
> is considered dead in the water, we agree there.=20

The question asked in Prague was not specific to draft-green.
I would have preferred if it had been and Lucy Lynch suggested
that in fact (so say the minutes) but the chairs conferred and
asked a much more general question. The consequence is that
Russ and Ralph's draft, having been discussed on the list, with
no evidence that it's changed minds, ought not be taken further
in the WG and ought not get agenda time.

Where am I wrong?

> Since there was
> interest (50% of the room) to consider work in this space, I agree
> with the chairs assessment to allow this presentation.  I am confident
> they will work on any hums to carefully assess next steps and if any
> future proposals belong in this WG or elsewhere.

Again, I'm sorry but that's just not logical. There's abundant
evidence that people's opinions have not changed from the earlier
discussion of Russ and Ralph's draft so it makes no sense at all
to repeatedly impose this divisive topic on the WG.

S.


>=20
>>
>> I see nothing whatsoever to indicate any significant change in
>> sets of opinions since Prague.
>>
>> What makes you think iterating on yet more proposals like this
>> will ever conclude? If there's no evidence of that we ought not
>> waste the time and energy. Can you point at any change that
>> could possibly indicate that this bun-fight is worth doing yet
>> again?
>>
>>>  The authors have
>>> revised their proposal to address some of the concerns raised by work=
ing
>>> group members and are asking to bring the new approach in front of th=
e
>>> working group.
>>
>> What significant change has there been since -00 of Russ and Ralph's
>> draft? I see nothing major there. that -00 was debated on the list
>> which is the primary place for  discussion. My read of that set of
>> threads it that it pretty clearly showed that the same folks have
>> the same opinions with no significant movement. Can you point at
>> some evidence to the contrary? If not, we shouldn't bother to waste
>> more time on this.
>>
>> If instead you mean Russ and Ralph's draft differs from draft-green,
>> then see above - it wasn't only draft-green that was rejected in
>> Prague, but the entire idea of adopting work in this space, which
>> includes Russ and Ralph's -00 and -01.
>>
>> That the authors have asked for time counts for nothing, when the
>> WG have no consensus to work in this space. If just asking for time
>> does matter, then I'll now publicly repeat my request for time
>> to refure the assertions that'll be made for breaking TLS. You said
>> no to my request, so what's different about one that relates to a
>> draft that has been debated on the list and attracted significant
>> negative comment?
>>
>>> I believe in this case this is the right thing to do even
>>> if it appears there is some repetition of topic.
>>
>> It is not "some repetition" - this topic has been debated f2f and
>> on this draft on the list and there's zero evidence of significant
>> changes in opinion, in fact the opposite. Can you point at any
>> such evidence? If not, your position as chairs seems illogical.
>>
>>> However, if the new
>>> approach fails to achieve significantly more support I believe the au=
thors
>>> will need to find another path for their work that does not go throug=
h the
>>> TLS working group.
>>
>> But the WG has already demonstrated a lack of consensus to even
>> consider "work in this space" (your choice of words I believe.)
>> That should be enough. What does or doesn't happen outside the
>> TLS WG is not at issue here.
>>
>> To reiterate, in Prague you asked "The main question: Is this subject
>> something that the WG should consider?" The result was a clear lack of=

>> any consensus to work in this space, which means not working in this
>> space. Yet here we are again giving agenda time to highly controversia=
l
>> proposals in this space.
>>
>> Please: just take this off the agenda and let the WG do it's real work=
=2E
>>
>> Thanks,
>> S.
>>
>> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/minutes-99-tls
>=20
> Relevant comment from minutes:
> Hums: No clarity whatsoever. Seemed pretty even.
>=20
> Best,
> Kathleen
>=20
>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Joe
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.t=
cd.ie>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Sean, Joe,
>>>>
>>>> On 08/03/18 16:20, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>>> I=E2=80=99ve posted the draft agendas:
>>>>>
>>>>> Monday:
>>>>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-
>>>> 101-tls-sessb
>>>>
>>>> That includes:
>>>> "
>>>> TLS Vizability - Russ & Chairs - 30min
>>>>  - 10min draft - Russ
>>>>   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
>>>>  - 10min discussion - Chairs
>>>>  - 10min wrap-up - Chairs
>>>> "
>>>>
>>>> Consider this as an objection to that agenda item
>>>> being given any time. I also have some questions
>>>> below.
>>>>
>>>> This topic was discussed at length in Prague with a
>>>> very clear lack of consensus to consider any work in
>>>> that space, despite there being quite a few fans of
>>>> doing such work in the room that day. I don't see
>>>> that anything has changed in the meantime.
>>>>
>>>> Russ' draft was discussed on the list last year, also
>>>> with (ISTM) no consensus at all to do any work in
>>>> that space. (While you didn't make a consensus call,
>>>> am I wrong?) The -01 version is not significantly
>>>> different from what was discussed on the list so I
>>>> see no need for any presentation nor discussion time.
>>>>
>>>> Given the above, on what basis are meeting attendees
>>>> being asked to waste yet more f2f time on this topic?
>>>>
>>>> And why is another want-it/hate-it exercise useful?
>>>>
>>>> As chairs, are you going to continually allow the same
>>>> topic to be raised, in the face of a very clear lack
>>>> of consensus to do anything in this space? If not,
>>>> then what's the plan for ending this?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> S.
>>>>
>>>> PS: I also strongly object to the "visibility" euphemism,
>>>> and while that's partly a comment on the draft, it would
>>>> also IMO be a significant error to pose any questions to
>>>> the WG based on that euphemism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>=20
>=20
>=20

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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Following up.

> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a server,=
 it
is REQUIRED to send the
>    ClientHello as its first message. "
>
> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar application
layer patterns?
> (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification request.)

This was clarified.


> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers might
receive TLS 1.2 or prior
>       ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>       follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>
> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and able
to negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1

We clarified this text.


> has a similar assertion:
>
> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>    this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>    [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."

I added a clarification here.


> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
>
>  "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>    implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>    accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>    version."
>
> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
"implementations"
> rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle difference?

The extension was relevant for clients and servers in TLS 1.2.


> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that RFC
implementations
> will ever need to interop with draft implementations? If so, the
information in this section
> may continue to be useful for some time.

RFC implementations don't interop with draft implementations in any
meaningful way. I.e., they just negotiate TLS 1.2.

>
> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that seem
important. I wonder why it has been
> relegated to an appendix.o

Because they are levies in the non-TLS 1.3 portions of the imp.



> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
>
> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>    is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with
>    the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in t=
he same
>    group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
>
> missing comma prior to "which".

I made a slightly different change.


> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then non-
>    overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it
>    is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
>
> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at times.
Is that the intent?

Yes. Suppose you could only use the PSK with ECDHE. That's what the "if the
PSK can be used..."
is about.


> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions similar =
to
"SHALL update/has updated".
> Is that text expected to collapse to "has updated" at some point?

Yes. RFC-Ed typically does this.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On Mar 7, 2018, at 16:35, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >> On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
>> >>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes
>> >>>
>> >>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to al=
l
>> >>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut
>> this
>> >>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/stat
>> ement/discuss-criteria.html
>> >>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> ----------
>> >>> COMMENT:
>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> ----------
>> >>>
>> >>> There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It's a
>> surprisingly
>> >>> understandable document, given its length and the complexity of the
>> subject. I
>> >>> am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. None of
>> these are
>> >>> showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.
>> >>>
>> >>> *** Substantive Comments:
>> >>>
>> >>> =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: " When a client first connects to a se=
rver,
>> it is
>> >>> REQUIRED to send the
>> >>> ClientHello as its first message. "
>> >>>
>> >>> Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar
>> application layer
>> >>> patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a
>> clarification request.)
>> >>
>> >> No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello
>> message first ;)
>> >
>> > I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that
>> ClientHello is the first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I thin=
k
>> some readers might interpret this to mean that the client can send no ot=
her
>> data at any layer prior to ClientHello.
>>
>> Well this is about TLS :) But, maybe r/its first message/its first TLS
>> handshake message ?
>>
>> >>> =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: "Note that TLS 1.3 servers =
might
>> receive
>> >>> TLS 1.2 or prior
>> >>>    ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>> >>>    follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>> >>>
>> >>> Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and
>> able to
>> >>> negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:
>> >>>
>> >>> "If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
>> >>> this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in
>> >>> [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later."
>> >>>
>> >>> But =C2=A74.2.3 says:
>> >>>
>> >>> "Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.  TLS 1.3
>> >>> implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in
>> >>> accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that
>> >>> version."
>> >>>
>> >>> ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks about
>> >>> "implementations" rather than "servers", so perhaps there's a subtle
>> difference?
>> >>
>> >> In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:
>> >>
>> >>  Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
>> >>  TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.
>> >
>> > That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D
>>
>> Right so there might be some implementations that choose to not support
>> prior versions.
>>
>
> Indeed, I am aware of at least one.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> >> Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is about =
the
>> server needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from the cl=
ient.
>> >
>> > I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to negotia=
te 1.2?
>> Or is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to all of the relat=
ed MUSTs?
>>
>> Yes - TLS servers are allowed to refuse to negotiate earlier version;
>> that=E2=80=99s deciding to not follow the SHOULD in  =C2=A7s4.2.1.  If t=
hey negotiate an
>> earlier version then do that version that=E2=80=99s what=E2=80=99s in =
=C2=A7s4.1.2 and in =C2=A74.2.3.
>>
>> >>> =C2=A74.2.1.1: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that=
 RFC
>> >>> implementations will ever need to interop with draft implementations=
?
>> If so,
>> >>> the information in this section may continue to be useful for some
>> time.
>> >>
>> >> I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for the=
m to rev
>> their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 or so week=
s
>> it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC editor=E2=80=
=99s queue.
>> >
>> > Okay.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>> =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements that see=
m
>> important. I
>> >>> wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.
>> >>
>> >> =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiations =
with
>> 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.  And, we don=E2=80=
=99t want to
>> say anything about earlier versions.   And, some of this is technically
>> repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 saying don=E2=80=99t do SSL2=
/3. So, it
>> ended up in an appendix.
>> >
>> > Okay.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>> *** Editorial Comments and nits:
>> >>>
>> >>> =C2=A72: "If (EC)DHE key establishment
>> >>> is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension wit=
h
>> >>> the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in=
 the same
>> >>> group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. "
>> >>>
>> >>> missing comma prior to "which=E2=80=9D.
>> >>
>> >> (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)
>> >
>> > Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)
>> >
>> >> So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?  I=E2=80=99m g=
oing with
>> this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).
>> >
>> > I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =
=E2=80=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D
>> vs =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive clauses :-)
>>
>> See the response to Adam=E2=80=99s comment :). But, yeah the RFC editor =
will
>> definitely school me when the time comes.
>>
>> >>> =C2=A74.1.1: "Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then =
non-
>> >>> overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as i=
t
>> >>> is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph."
>> >>>
>> >>> I read "need not be fatal" to mean that it may still be fatal at
>> times. Is that
>> >>> the intent?
>> >>
>> >> Yes that is the intent.
>> >
>> > Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want t=
o
>> treat this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use the P=
SK
>> without (EC)DHE?
>>
>> So the fatal error is when the client and server are trying to negotiate
>> (EC)DHE parameters and there=E2=80=99s no overlap in the supported_group=
s.  This
>> would occur in the =E2=80=9Cnormal=E2=80=9D case when the client is anon=
ymous (i.e., client
>> only sends ClientHello+key_share and no psk_key_exchange_modes/pre_share=
d_key)
>> or when the client is using PSK+(EC)DHE for client authentication.  But,
>> that is described in the previous paragraph.  Maybe another way to say i=
t
>> is: normally you=E2=80=99d throw an error if supported_groups didn=E2=80=
=99t overlap, but
>> here since you=E2=80=99re not using them because you=E2=80=99re doing PS=
K-only you don=E2=80=99t.
>>
>> >>> =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructions sim=
ilar
>> to "SHALL
>> >>> update/has updated". Is that text expected to collapse to "has
>> updated" at some
>> >>> point?
>> >>
>> >> Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the RFC=
 editor
>> to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.
>> >
>> > Okay.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>> =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]  : Best citation anchor evar
>> >>
>> >> :)
>> >
>> > I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the Ca=
t=E2=80=9D
>> utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving high voltage =
:-)
>> >
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>

--f403043a754876f64f05670223b1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Following up.<div><br></div><div><div>&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, fi=
rst paragraph: &quot; When a client first connects to a server, it is REQUI=
RED to send the</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHello as its first messag=
e. &quot;</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Is that intended to prohibit =
the use of STARTTLS or similar application layer patterns?</div><div>&gt; (=
To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clarification request.)</div>=
<div><br></div><div>This was clarified.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div>&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: &quot;Note that TLS 1.3 =
servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST</div><d=
iv>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0follow the procedures for the appropriate=
 prior version of TLS.&quot;</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; Is that in=
tended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willing and able to negotiat=
e 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1</div><div><br></div><div>We clarified this text.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; has a similar assertion:</div><div>&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; &quot;If this extension is not present, servers whi=
ch are compliant with</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 this specification MUST n=
egotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [RFC5=
246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later.&quot;</div><di=
v><br></div><div>I added a clarification here.</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><div>&gt; But =C2=A74.2.3 says:</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt;=
=C2=A0 &quot;Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.=C2=A0 TL=
S 1.3</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 implementations willing to negotiate TLS =
1.2 MUST behave in</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 accordance with the requirem=
ents of [RFC5246] when negotiating that</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 version=
.&quot;</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; ... which seems inconsistent (n=
oting that this paragraph talks about &quot;implementations&quot;</div><div=
>&gt; rather than &quot;servers&quot;, so perhaps there&#39;s a subtle diff=
erence?=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The extension was relevant for clien=
ts and servers in TLS 1.2.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; =C2=
=A7<a href=3D"http://4.2.1.1">4.2.1.1</a>: The section is marked for remova=
l. Do you expect that RFC implementations=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; will ever ne=
ed to interop with draft implementations? If so, the information in this se=
ction</div><div>&gt; may continue to be useful for some time.</div><div><br=
></div><div>RFC implementations don&#39;t interop with draft implementation=
s in any</div><div>meaningful way. I.e., they just negotiate TLS 1.2.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; =C2=A7D.5: This section has a=
 lot of normative requirements that seem important. I wonder why it has bee=
n</div><div>&gt; relegated to an appendix.o</div><div><br></div><div>Becaus=
e they are levies in the non-TLS 1.3 portions of the imp.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; *** Editorial Comments and nits:=
</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; =C2=A72: &quot;If (EC)DHE key establis=
hment</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 is in use, then the ServerHello contains =
a &quot;key_share&quot; extension with</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the serv=
er=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST be in the same</div>=
<div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. &quot;<=
/div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; missing comma prior to &quot;which&quot=
;.</div><div><br></div><div>I made a slightly different change.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; =C2=A74.1.1: &quot;Note that if the PSK c=
an be used without (EC)DHE then non-</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 overlap in=
 the &quot;supported_groups&quot; parameters need not be fatal, as it</div>=
<div>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous par=
agraph.&quot;</div><div>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div>&gt; I read &quot;need not be =
fatal&quot; to mean that it may still be fatal at times. Is that the intent=
?</div><div><br></div><div>Yes. Suppose you could only use the PSK with ECD=
HE. That&#39;s what the &quot;if the PSK can be used...&quot;</div><div>is =
about.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; =C2=A711: The IANA cons=
iderations have a number of constructions similar to &quot;SHALL update/has=
 updated&quot;.</div><div>&gt; Is that text expected to collapse to &quot;h=
as updated&quot; at some point?</div><div><br></div><div>Yes. RFC-Ed typica=
lly does this.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div><div><br></div></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 7, =
2018 at 5:47 PM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@=
rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div class=3D"h5">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:3=
9 PM, Sean Turner <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div class=3D"m_-4352361717329053694HOEnZb"><div class=3D"m_-=
4352361717329053694h5"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Mar 7, 2018, at 16:35, Ben Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ben@nostr=
um.com" target=3D"_blank">ben@nostrum.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mar 7, 2018, at 2:49 PM, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean=
@sn3rd.com" target=3D"_blank">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Mar 6, 2018, at 12:27, Ben Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:b=
en@nostrum.com" target=3D"_blank">ben@nostrum.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Yes<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply=
 to all<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to=
 cut this<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement=
/discuss-criteria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ie=
tf.org/iesg/stat<wbr>ement/discuss-criteria.html</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.=
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found =
here:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls=
13/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/d<wb=
r>oc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>---------------------------=
---<wbr>----------<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; COMMENT:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ------------------------------<wbr>---------------------------=
---<wbr>----------<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; There has clearly been a lot of work put into this. It&#39;s a=
 surprisingly<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; understandable document, given its length and the complexity o=
f the subject. I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; am balloting yes, but I have a few minor comments and nits. No=
ne of these are<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; showstoppers, so please do with them as you will.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; *** Substantive Comments:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, first paragraph: &quot; When a client first conne=
cts to a server, it is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; REQUIRED to send the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ClientHello as its first message. &quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Is that intended to prohibit the use of STARTTLS or similar ap=
plication layer<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; patterns? (To be clear, this is not an objection, just a clari=
fication request.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; No - this is just how it works TLS - clients send the ClientHello =
message first ;)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I assume your response to mean that the point is merely that ClientHel=
lo is the first message of the TLS handshake. As worded, I think some reade=
rs might interpret this to mean that the client can send no other data at a=
ny layer prior to ClientHello.<br>
<br>
</div></div>Well this is about TLS :) But, maybe r/its first message/its fi=
rst TLS handshake message ?<br>
<span><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.2, legacy_compression_methods: &quot;Note that TLS 1=
.3 servers might receive<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; TLS 1.2 or prior<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHellos which contain other compression meth=
ods and MUST<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 follow the procedures for the appropriate prior v=
ersion of TLS.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Is that intended to require TLS 1.3 servers to always be willi=
ng and able to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; negotiate 1.2? =C2=A74.2.1 has a similar assertion:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;If this extension is not present, servers which are comp=
liant with<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; this specification MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specifie=
d in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or lat=
er.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; But =C2=A74.2.3 says:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently.=C2=
=A0 TLS 1.3<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt; accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating=
 that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; version.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ... which seems inconsistent (noting that this paragraph talks=
 about<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;implementations&quot; rather than &quot;servers&quot;, s=
o perhaps there&#39;s a subtle difference?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; In short kinda, sorta yes: =C2=A7s4.2.1 includes the following:<br=
>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior ver=
sions of<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That still says =E2=80=9Cwhich choose to support=E2=80=9D<br>
<br>
</span>Right so there might be some implementations that choose to not supp=
ort prior versions.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div><div>Indeed,=
 I am aware of at least one.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><div c=
lass=3D"h5"><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<span><br>
&gt;&gt; Not sure it=E2=80=99s inconsistent given that the 2nd quote is abo=
ut the server needs to do with the information it=E2=80=99s getting from th=
e client.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I=E2=80=99m still confused. Is the server allowed to refuse to negotia=
te 1.2? Or is the exception in =C2=A74.2.1 supposed to apply to all of the =
related MUSTs?<br>
<br>
</span>Yes - TLS servers are allowed to refuse to negotiate earlier version=
; that=E2=80=99s deciding to not follow the SHOULD in=C2=A0 =C2=A7s4.2.1.=
=C2=A0 If they negotiate an earlier version then do that version that=E2=80=
=99s what=E2=80=99s in =C2=A7s4.1.2 and in =C2=A74.2.3.<br>
<span><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7<a href=3D"http://4.2.1.1" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"=
_blank">4.2.1.1</a>: The section is marked for removal. Do you expect that =
RFC<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; implementations will ever need to interop with draft implement=
ations? If so,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the information in this section may continue to be useful for =
some time.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I think it=E2=80=99ll be useful for about as long as it takes for =
them to rev their code bases, which I am sure hoping is faster than the 6 o=
r so weeks it=E2=80=99ll take for this draft to get to through the RFC edit=
or=E2=80=99s queue.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7D.5: This section has a lot of normative requirements th=
at seem important. I<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; wonder why it has been relegated to an appendix.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A7D.5 is about backward compatibility and though we negotiatio=
ns with 1.2 is a SHOULD we say nada about earlier versions.=C2=A0 And, we d=
on=E2=80=99t want to say anything about earlier versions.=C2=A0 =C2=A0And, =
some of this is technically repeated from other RFCs, eg. 5768 and 6176 say=
ing don=E2=80=99t do SSL2/3. So, it ended up in an appendix.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; *** Editorial Comments and nits:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A72: &quot;If (EC)DHE key establishment<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is in use, then the ServerHello contains a &quot;key_share&quo=
t; extension with<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the server=E2=80=99s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share which MUST=
 be in the same<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; group as one of the client=E2=80=99s shares. &quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; missing comma prior to &quot;which=E2=80=9D.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; (grammar police are banging on my door as we speak)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Well, my comment was labeled as editorial or nit :-)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; So is the which clause restrictive or non restrictive?=C2=A0 I=E2=
=80=99m going with this this clause being restrictive (hence no comma).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I=E2=80=99ll let the grammar police at your door debate the merits of =
=E2=80=9Cwhich=E2=80=9D vs =E2=80=9Cthat=E2=80=9D for restrictive clauses :=
-)<br>
<br>
</span>See the response to Adam=E2=80=99s comment :). But, yeah the RFC edi=
tor will definitely school me when the time comes.<br>
<span><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A74.1.1: &quot;Note that if the PSK can be used without (E=
C)DHE then non-<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; overlap in the &quot;supported_groups&quot; parameters need no=
t be fatal, as it<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph.&qu=
ot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I read &quot;need not be fatal&quot; to mean that it may still=
 be fatal at times. Is that<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the intent?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes that is the intent.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay. Would it be reasonable to offer guidance about when might want t=
o treat this as fatal even though it would have been possible to use the PS=
K without (EC)DHE?<br>
<br>
</span>So the fatal error is when the client and server are trying to negot=
iate (EC)DHE parameters and there=E2=80=99s no overlap in the supported_gro=
ups.=C2=A0 This would occur in the =E2=80=9Cnormal=E2=80=9D case when the c=
lient is anonymous (i.e., client only sends ClientHello+key_share and no ps=
k_key_exchange_modes/pre_sha<wbr>red_key) or when the client is using PSK+(=
EC)DHE for client authentication.=C2=A0 But, that is described in the previ=
ous paragraph.=C2=A0 Maybe another way to say it is: normally you=E2=80=99d=
 throw an error if supported_groups didn=E2=80=99t overlap, but here since =
you=E2=80=99re not using them because you=E2=80=99re doing PSK-only you don=
=E2=80=99t.<br>
<div class=3D"m_-4352361717329053694HOEnZb"><div class=3D"m_-43523617173290=
53694h5"><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A711: The IANA considerations have a number of constructio=
ns similar to &quot;SHALL<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; update/has updated&quot;. Is that text expected to collapse to=
 &quot;has updated&quot; at some<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; point?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes - once we=E2=80=99ve gotten the a-okay from IANA, well as the =
RFC editor to make it just say =E2=80=9Chas updated=E2=80=9D etc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Okay.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A7E.2.1: [BDFKPPRSZZ16]=C2=A0 : Best citation anchor evar<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; :)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I am trying to decide if that should sound like a =E2=80=9CBill the Ca=
t=E2=80=9D utterance or a sound effect for cartoon violence involving high =
voltage :-)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--f403043a754876f64f05670223b1--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:41:53 -0800
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To: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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--94eb2c072d76167fb0056702824e
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On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 6:16 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
> wrote:
>
>> Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DISCUSS:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the
>> following is addressed/discussed:
>>
>> Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding
>> requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to
>> (or
>> very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two
>> examples on
>> page 37:
>>
>>   TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes  are not
>> equal to
>>   the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS  1.1 or below
>>
>> and
>>
>>  A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior  and
>> which
>>  receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST  abort the
>> handshake
>>  with a "protocol_version" alert.  Note that  renegotiation is not
>> possible
>>  when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.
>>
>> There are similar statements on page 45:
>>
>>   TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.
>>
>> and on page 48:
>>
>>   However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing
>>   curve.  If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared
>>   to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in
>>   the "supported_groups" extension.
>>
>> I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to
>> pure
>> TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose
>> to
>> use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the
>> Abstract/Introduction
>> that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new
>> requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both
>> "Obsoletes" and
>> "Updates" TLS 1.2 RFC.)
>>
>
>
> The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implementations as well. S 1.4
> tries
> to be clear about this, but maybe it fails.
>
> I suggest we:
>
> (1) Add the following sentence to the abstract:
> "This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.
>
> (2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:
>    This document defines several changes that optionally affect
>    implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also
>    support TLS 1.3
>
> (3) Strike the following graf:
>
>    An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to
>    include changes to support these changes even when TLS 1.3 is not in
>    use.  See the referenced sections for more details.
>
>
>
>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> 1) On page 47:
>>  The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest
>> algorithm
>>
>> Length of algorithm?
>>
>
> Right. Output of.
>
>
>
>>
>> 2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references
>> on
>> 2nd/3rd use.
>>
>
> Thanks.
>

I just double-checked and this actually is: under ECDSA.


>
>
>>
>> 3) On page 57:
>>
>>    The
>>    server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt received
>>    records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to receive
>>    the client's second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT
>>    handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the
>>    configured max_early_data_size.
>>
>> I read this several times and still don't understand what this is saying.
>> It is
>> saying "ignores ... until it is able to receive". I think you either
>> don't mean
>> "ignore" (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifying
>> example or a
>> reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very
>> helpful here.
>>
>
> We do mean discard. The idea here is that you try to decrypt those records
> using the handshake keys and if that fails you ignore them.
>
>
>> 4) On page 82:
>>
>>    When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
>> structures
>>    are written directly onto the wire.  Once record  protection has
>> started,
>>    TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent   as described in the
>> following
>>    section
>>
>> Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS
>> application
>> layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets
>> to
>> signal record type)?
>>
>
> No, you can't write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.
>
>    Application data MUST NOT be sent prior to sending the Finished
>    message and until the record layer starts using encryption keys.
>    Note that while the server may send application data prior to
>    receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent at that
>    point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
>
> It's non-application data (handshake, alerts, acks) which is sent in this
> fashion
> prior to the handshake.
>
> I added some text.

>
>
> 5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is
>> required to
>> be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional
>> requirements on
>> AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:
>>
>> On page 84:
>>
>>    An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion
>> greater
>>    than 255 octets
>>
>> and
>>
>>    An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8  bytes MUST NOT be used
>> with TLS
>>
>
> I concur. Thanks.
>
>
>
> 6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when
>> you
>> use '0' you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various functions.
>>
>
> This is in the first paragraph after the diagram. Would you prefer it
> elsewhere?
>
>    If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
>    string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.  Note that this
>

I believe I dealt with this.

-Ekr


> -Ekr
>
>
>

--94eb2c072d76167fb0056702824e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 6:16 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><div class=3D"m_-76115202=
17546201817h5">On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm" target=3D"_blank">aamel=
nikov@fastmail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex">Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position=
 for<br>
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: Discuss<br>
<br>
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br>
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br>
introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-crit=
eria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/s=
tat<wbr>ement/discuss-criteria.html</a><br>
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/d<wbr>oc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
DISCUSS:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
Thank you for a well written document. I will be switching to Yes once the<=
br>
following is addressed/discussed:<br>
<br>
Relationship to TLS 1.2 needs to be clarified. The document is adding<br>
requirements on TLS 1.2 clients. Implementors of TLS 1.2 are not going to (=
or<br>
very unlikely to) read this document. This looks fishy to me. Two examples =
on<br>
page 37:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes=C2=A0 ar=
e not equal to<br>
=C2=A0 the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS=C2=A0 1.1 or below=
<br>
<br>
and<br>
<br>
=C2=A0A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior=C2=
=A0 and which<br>
=C2=A0receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST=C2=A0 abort =
the handshake<br>
=C2=A0with a &quot;protocol_version&quot; alert.=C2=A0 Note that=C2=A0 rene=
gotiation is not possible<br>
=C2=A0when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.<br>
<br>
There are similar statements on page 45:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension.<br>
<br>
and on page 48:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing<br>
=C2=A0 curve.=C2=A0 If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepa=
red<br>
=C2=A0 to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in<br=
>
=C2=A0 the &quot;supported_groups&quot; extension.<br>
<br>
I think you need to clarify whether these normative requirements apply to p=
ure<br>
TLS 1.2 clients or TLS clients that implement both 1.2 and 1.3 and choose t=
o<br>
use 1.2 for some reason. Or maybe you need to say in the Abstract/Introduct=
ion<br>
that although this document obsoletes TLS 1.2 it also specifies new<br>
requirements on TLS 1.2 implementations. (So it is sort of both &quot;Obsol=
etes&quot; and<br>
&quot;Updates&quot; TLS 1.2 RFC.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div></div></div><div>The intent is that these affect old TLS 1.2 implement=
ations as well. S 1.4 tries</div><div>to be clear about this, but maybe it =
fails.</div><div><br></div><div>I suggest we:</div><div><br></div><div>(1) =
Add the following sentence to the abstract:</div><div>&quot;This document a=
lso specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>(2) Rewrite the first sentence of S 1.4 to say:</div><div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document defines several changes that optionally affect</=
div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do =
not also</div></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0support TLS 1.3</div><div><br></div><=
div>(3) Strike the following graf:</div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0An implementation of TLS 1.3 that also supports TLS 1.2 might need to</d=
iv><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0include changes to support these changes even when TLS=
 1.3 is not in</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0use.=C2=A0 See the referenced section=
s for more details.</div></div><span><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
COMMENT:<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>-----=
-----<br>
<br>
1) On page 47:<br>
=C2=A0The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm<br>
<br>
Length of algorithm?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Right. Outp=
ut of.</div><span><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
2) DER need a Normative Reference on first use. There are some references o=
n<br>
2nd/3rd use.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Thanks.</div></div>=
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I just double-checked and this=
 actually is: under ECDSA.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div>=C2=A0</div><span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
3) On page 57:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server then ignores early data by attempting to decrypt receiv=
ed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0records in the handshake traffic keys until it is able to rece=
ive<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client&#39;s second flight and complete an ordinary 1-RTT<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake, skipping records that fail to decrypt, up to the<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0configured max_early_data_size.<br>
<br>
I read this several times and still don&#39;t understand what this is sayin=
g. It is<br>
saying &quot;ignores ... until it is able to receive&quot;. I think you eit=
her don&#39;t mean<br>
&quot;ignore&quot; (as in discard the rest) or I misunderstood. I clarifyin=
g example or a<br>
reference to another section (e.g. with the diagram) would be very helpful =
here.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>We do mean discard. The id=
ea here is that you try to decrypt those records</div><div>using the handsh=
ake keys and if that fails you ignore them.</div><span><div><br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
4) On page 82:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext=
=C2=A0 structures<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are written directly onto the wire.=C2=A0 Once record=C2=A0 pr=
otection has started,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSPlaintext records are protected and sent=C2=A0 =C2=A0as des=
cribed in the following<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0section<br>
<br>
Just to double check: are you saying that before the handshake TLS applicat=
ion<br>
layer effectively results in plain text messages (with some extra octets to=
<br>
signal record type)?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>No, you can=
&#39;t write application data prior to this point, as stated in S 2.</div><=
div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Application data MUST NOT be sent prio=
r to sending the Finished</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0message and until the reco=
rd layer starts using encryption keys.</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that whi=
le the server may send application data prior to</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0rec=
eiving the client&#39;s Authentication messages, any data sent at that</div=
><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated pe=
er.</div></div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s non-application data (handshake=
, alerts, acks) which is sent in this fashion</div><div>prior to the handsh=
ake.</div><span><div><br></div></span></div></div></div></blockquote><div>I=
 added some text.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span><div></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">
5) I am pretty sure that [RFC5116] is a Normative reference. It is required=
 to<br>
be understood to implemented TLS 1.3. Also, you have additional requirement=
s on<br>
AEADs, which again implies understanding of what they are:<br>
<br>
On page 84:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansio=
n=C2=A0 greater<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0than 255 octets<br>
<br>
and<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An AEAD algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8=C2=A0 bytes MUST =
NOT be used with TLS<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>I concur. T=
hanks.</div><span><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
6) The diagram in section 7.1 was a bit cryptic. Maybe explain that when yo=
u<br>
use &#39;0&#39; you mean as many bytes of 0s as needed for various function=
s.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>This is in the first paragrap=
h after the diagram. Would you prefer it elsewhere?</div><div><br></div><di=
v><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value co=
nsisting of a</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0string of Hash.length bytes set to zer=
os is used.=C2=A0 Note that this</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>I believe I dealt with this.</div><div><br></div><div>-=
Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>-Ekr=
</div><div><br></div></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c072d76167fb0056702824e--


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Re-sending hopefully smalle.

Hi Dale,

Thanks your your review.

Please provide a PR adding yourself to contributors, as in
  https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1152

Detailed responses below.

-Ekr



> - There is inexactness about "transcript", "handshake context", and
>   "context".

I'm not sure what to do with this. We have a bunch of interoperable
implementations, so this seems clear enough that people can implement
it.


> - When a server receives ClientHello, is it obligated to promptly send
>   not just the ServerHello, but all first-flight messages from
>   ServerHello through Finished?  (section 4.2.11.3)  I ask this
>   because the client is only obligated/permitted to send
>   EndOfEarlyData when it receives the server's Finished.

No, it's not obligated to every send anything. It's just that it
has to send things in a specific order.


> - It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
>   message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
>   sending the Certificate message.  (section 4.4.2.4)

This is a longstanding property of TLS that had consensus in the WG,
so I don't expect we're going to change it now.


> - Comparing sections 4.2.10 and 4.6.1, when a PSK was established in
>   an earlier connection, exactly what are the limitations on the
>   cryptographic parameters that can be used when the PSK is used in a
>   resumption connection?  4.2.10 suggests that the following must be
>   the same in both connections:  TLS version, cipher suite, ALPN.  But
>   4.6.1 suggests that different cipher suites can be used, as long as
>   they use the same hash algorithm.

4.6.1. refers to the use of PSKs for ordinary 1-RTT handshakes
whereas 4.2.10 is for 0-RTT and so also specifies the cipher suite
because this cannot be negotiated in 0-RTT. Note the title of
4.2.10: "Early Data Indication"


> - In regard to section 4.6.1, it seems to require that a client MAY
>   NOT resume a connection using a ticket issued during a connection in
>   which the server did not present a certificate for itself, because
>   in the handshake of the resumption connection, the client is required
>   to verify that the SNI is compatible with the certificate the server
>   presented in the original connection.  But that constraint isn't
>   stated in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the
>   structure of sessions.

Section 2 is a Protocol Overview, so it doesn't describe everything.


> - Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of alert
>   messages for the same reasons that they cannot send zero-length
>   fragments of handshake messages (whatever those reasons are).

Correct. S 5.1:

   Alert messages (Section 6) MUST NOT be fragmented across records and
   multiple Alert messages MUST NOT be coalesced into a single
   TLSPlaintext record.  In other words, a record with an Alert type
   MUST contain exactly one message.


> - There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
>   require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,
>   nearly 150 distinct constraints that can be violated.  There are 19
>   alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
>   extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
>   statement in the text that requires an error response (with
>   implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing the
>   correct minor code).

The structure of TLS alerts dates all the way back to SSLv3, spanning
three separate IETF Standards Track RFCs, and several WGLCs for TLS 1.3,
so I don't think this is a reasonable change to propose at this time.

> - I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
>   existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error.)

Yes, it does not exist.

> There are a number of issues which span the whole text:
>
> The interaction of this draft with extensions defined for previous
> versions of TLS is not laid out clearly.  It seems safe enough for
> this draft to import data structures from earlier extensions with only
> a reference to the earlier RFC, but if an extension defines behavior
> (e.g., a negotiation process), exactly what is the specification of
> that behavior in TLS 1.3, given that the referenced RFC only defines
> its use in TLS 1.2 or earlier?  At the least, there should be an
> explicit statement that the behaviors are carried forward in the
> "obvious way".
>
> It's also not clear exactly which previously defined extensions are
> brought forward into TLS 1.3.  I suspect that they are all listed in
> section 4.2, but is it clearly stated that those, and only those, are
> grandfathered in?

The table in 4.2 is intended to be exhaustive, but I can add some
text.


> Presumably, for any referenced extension, the placement of values in
> messages in TLS 1.2 has a "natural" analog in TLS 1.3 that at most
> involves moving the value from one field to another in certain
> messages.  But it would be reassuring to have a clear statement of
> this, and an enumeration of any more complex cases.

I don't understand the question. The table in 4.2 explicitly states
which messages extensions may appear in, and each such message
includes an extension block.


> There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places where the text
> require the connection to be aborted with an error.  There are 19
> alone for "illegal_parameter".  I would like to see an "alert
> extension value" which assigns a distinct "minor" code to each
> statement in the text that requires an error response.  This code
> would make it a lot easier to diagnose what is going wrong with a
> handshake.  To avoid making specifying and implementing these codes
> too difficult, implementations should be allowed to deviate to a
> degree from the specification regarding minor codes, and there should
> be a range of codes reserved for implementation-defined uses.
> Conversely, there are a couple of places where the implementation MUST
> NOT distinguish between different causes of an alert, but I believe
> that those are explicitly mentioned in the text.

See above.


> The terms "side", "server side", and "client side" are used in various
> places, despite that "endpoint" is the defined term.  I suggest
> replacing these terms with "endpoint", "server", and "client".

I believe this is within editor discretion.


> There are a number of places where "fatal alert" is used, but "error
> alert" seems to be the defined term.

The Alert protocol specifically defines the term "fatal" in S 6.


> Detail items are:
>
> 1.  Introduction
>
>    TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can
>    layer on top of TLS transparently.
>
> It might be informative to describe the nature of the
> currently-defined application protocol (a bidirectional, reliable byte
> stream) and similarly, to describe the requirements on the underlying
> transport (as far as I can tell, also a bidirectional, reliable byte
> stream).

I'll see what I can do.


> flight -- it seems to be thought that messages are grouped into
> "flights", where the messages of flight N from one sender cannot be
> sent until (more or less) it receives all messages of flights M (1 <=
> M <= N) from the peer.

Disagree. I think it's clear enough.


> MAC and HMAC -- by a simple count, both of these terms are used
> exactly 11 times in the document.  Is there any functional difference
> between them?

Yes. MAC is the generic term; HMAC is a specific MAC algorithm.
These are terms of art.


> ticket -- it's not clear what this means concretely.  Abstractly, it
> seems to include the set of cryptographic parameters needed to send
> application data, but concretely I can't figure out if it is the
> entire block of parameters (struct NewSessionTicket), or whether it is
> (or can be) just a key that points to the parameters in some database
> (the ticket *field* of struct NewSessionTicket).

I'll add some text.


> A related issue is that there is a field "ticket" in the structure
> "NewSessionTicket", and, at least conceptually, that structure is also
> considered a "ticket".  I strongly suggest you change the name of the
> field, and then revise uses of "ticket" to indicate whether they refer
> to the structure or to the field.  Comparing to other parts of the
> text, I think you may have intended to call the field "identity", as
> the value in NewSessionTicket.ticket seems to be intended to be copied
> into PreSharedKeyExtension.OfferedPsks.PskIdentity.

Disagree. People don't seem to have found this confusing in practice.


> RTT, 0-RTT, 1-RTT -- Can these be defined more rigorously?

I'll add some text.


> server name, SNI -- These two terms seem to be used interchangeably
> and as if the reader already understands their meaning and use.
> Suggest you standardize on one (and list the other as a synonym in the
> glossary).  Also include how "server name" interacts with the server's
> certificate.

The first use of SNI that's not in the changelog is in Section 4.2.11,
where it's defined as follows:

   In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification
   (SNI) value was intended to be associated with the session (Section 3
   of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that the SNI


> advertise -- I think this means when an endpoint sends a message
> containing an extension saying that it implements a feature or option,
> soliciting the peer to send a message containing the same extension
> (and thus agreeing to use the feature/option during this connection).

Yes, we're usign the ordinary meaning of the term.


> transcript -- It might be useful to put the definition of this in this
> section.  Also, define the "context" or "handshake context", which
> seems to be the sequence of messages included in the transcript hash
> (or the concatenation thereof).  But doesn't seem clear what messages
> are in the "handshake context" for any single usage.

It's in the table in S 4.4.


> handshake -- This has two meanings:  (1) messages whose content type
> is "handshake" (see section 5), and (2) messages with content type
> "handshake" that are part of the initial exchange of such messages.
> The problem is that there are messages that are (1) but not (2), and
> so you get confusing language like the title of section 4.6.

Disagree. This seems clear enough to me.


> establish vs. provision -- The document mostly adheres to the
> convention that pre-shared keys are "provisioned" whereas keys that
> are set up using TLS (possibly in a previous session) are
> "established".  In particular, "provisioned" is only used as an
> attribute of keys, whereas "establishing" is an action and
> "established" keys are ones created by that action.  But there are
> places where the two terms aren't used distinctly.

Feel free to point out some specific cases.


> ALPN -- This is used sporadically throughout the document.

Yes, I see that a reference crept in in 4.2.10 before the first citation.
I'll fix that.


> "hash over" -- A personal gripe of mine is that I look at a hash as a
> function, and so its value is a "hash of (some string)".  I don't mind
> "hash over X", "hash protects X", and "hash covers X"n when X is
> conceptualized as a substring of some larger string, that is, there's
> a Y that is explicitly being excluded.  But in a lot of cases in this
> document, X is explicitly constructed from various fragments, so
> there's no Y.  But maybe all these usages are conventional in
> cryptography.

Yes, this is conventional.


> 2.  Protocol Overview
>
>    The cryptographic parameters used by the secure channel are produced
>    by the TLS handshake protocol.  This sub-protocol of TLS [...]
>
> I think you want to s/This sub-protocol/The TLS handshake protocol/,
> since a naive reader (me!) could consider "the secure channel" as a
> plausible antecedent of "this".

Disagree. I think it's clear.


> 2.1.  Incorrect DHE Share
>
>    Note: The handshake transcript includes the initial ClientHello/
>    HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.
>
> "transcript" has not been defined yet.  Perhaps:
>
>    Note: The handshake transcript (the message input to the MAC in the
>    Finished message) starts with ...

Transcript is a term of art.


> 2.2.  Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
>
>    Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a
>    PSK and the second uses it:
>
> The first handshake does not point out where the PSK is established.
> Better would be
>
>    Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes
>    a PSK and the second uses it.  In the first, a PSK is carried from
>    the server to the client in the NewSessionTicket message.  In the
>    second, the identity of the PSK is sent by the client to the server
>    in the ClientHello.

Yes, I'll add something here.


> 3.1.  Basic Block Size
>
>    The representation of all data items is explicitly specified.  The
>    basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits).
>
> "byte" appears in the text 91 times, and "octet" appears 20 times.
> You probably want to change the uses of "octet" to "byte" for
> consistency.

We use them interchangeably. I think that's fine.


> 3.3.  Vectors
>
> You may want to move section 3.4 to before section 3.3, because
> section 3.3 implicitly depends on all numeric fields being unsigned,
> whereas the fact that all numeric fields are unsigned is only stated
> in section 3.4.

Done.


> 3.5.  Enumerateds
>
>    An additional sparse data type is available called enum.  Each
>
> You probably want s/called enum/called enum or enumerated/.

Done.


>    Future extensions or additions to the protocol may define new values.
>
> Add "... of a previously existing enumerated."

Not needed.


> 4.1.2.  Client Hello
>
>    In that case, the client MUST send the same
>    ClientHello (without modification) except:
>
> s/(without modification) except:/without modification, except:/

Done.


>       For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector
>       MUST contain exactly one byte set to zero, which corresponds to
>       the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS.
>
> There is an ambiguity in English, where this might mean "the number of
> bytes in this field which are zero is exactly one".  It's a bit hard
> avoiding the ambiguity, but this seems to work:
>
>       For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST have exactly one
>       member.  The member MUST be zero, which corresponds to the "null"
>       compression method in prior versions of TLS.

I did something here.



>       The actual "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2.
>
> Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
> (including mine) can be profitably deleted.

Disagree. This is fine.


> 4.1.4.  Hello Retry Request
>
>    This allows the client to avoid having to
>    compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second
>    ClientHello.
>
> This seems to be correct but I found it very hard to decode.  This is
> clearer:
>
>    This allows the client to avoid having to compute hashes of partial
>    transcripts using multiple hash functions, to be used in binders in
>    the second ClientHello.

Disagree: I think this is clear enough to implementors.


> 4.2.  Extensions
>
>    In TLS 1.3, unlike TLS 1.2, extensions are negotiated for each
>    handshake even when in resumption-PSK mode.  However, 0-RTT
>    parameters are those negotiated in the previous handshake; mismatches
>    may require rejecting 0-RTT (see Section 4.2.10).
>
> I think what you mean is:
>
>    Even for a session that is resumed using a PSK established in an
>    earlier session, the applicable extensions are negotiated in its
>    initial handshake and aren't carried over from the handshake of the
>    session which established the PSK.  However, the parameters
>    applicable to 0-RTT data are those negotiated in the previous
>    handshake; if those parameters are unacceptable to the server, it
>    may reject use of 0-RTT in the session (see Section 4.2.10).
>
> --

Yes, I think this says that,


>    Servers should be prepared to receive
>    ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in
>    the list of versions.
>
> s/should/SHOULD/

This ended up as a MUST due to in Adam's review.


> 4.2.2.  Cookie
>
>    Clients MUST NOT use cookies in their initial ClientHello in
>    subsequent connections.
>
> I think this becomes cleaner if you omit "in subsequent connections".

Disagree, I think this is clearer.


> 4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms
>
> Items "RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms" and "RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms"
> both contain:
>
>       If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>       it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].
>
> I think "it" references "certificate", so it would be clearer to say
>
>       If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate,
>       the certificate MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].

Disagree. It's the public key structure (SPKI) certificate that
has the OID. Your rephrase makes it unclear which of the many
OIDs in a certificate it refers to.


> --
>
>       If the corresponding public key's parameters present, [...]
>
> s/parameters present/parameters are present/

Done.


>    -  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
>       mandatory in TLS 1.3), [...]
>
> The phrase "Implementations that advertise" makes me think of the
> label on the box.  I think you mean "Endpoints that advertise".

Disagree. We use implementation and endpoint interchangeable for
the most part.



>    The "extension_data" field of these extension contains a
>    SignatureSchemeList value:
>
> I think s/these extension/these extensions/ (rather than s/these
> extension/this extension/).

Done.


> 4.2.7.  Negotiated Groups
>
>    Items in named_group_list are ordered according to the client's
>    preferences (most preferred choice first).
>
> This can be simplified to "Items in named_group_list are in descending
> order of the client's preferences."

This seems like a matter of editorial discretion.


> 4.2.8.  Key Share
>
>    group  The named group for the key being exchanged.  Finite Field
>       Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
>       Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
>       Section 4.2.8.2.
>
> I think this should be capitalized as "Finite field Diffie-Hellman
> ..." and "Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman ...".

Disagree. The convention is FFDH and ECDH


>    key_exchange  Key exchange information.  The contents of this field
>       are determined by the specified group and its corresponding
>       definition.
>
> This could be better defined by rearranging the two items, since the
> parameters don't describe the group, they describe the key being
> exchanged:
>
>    group  The value designating the named group for the keys being
>       exchanged, as defined in section 4.2.7.
>
>    key_exchange  The key exchange information.  Finite field
>       Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1;
>       Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in
>       Section 4.2.8.2.

I made a change here.

>    Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a
>    group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in
>    the same order.
>
> I think you mean to require that for a given group there can be only
> one KeyShareEntry.  So you could say
>
>    Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a distinct group
>    offered in the "supported_groups" extension, and the KeyShareEntrys
>    MUST appear in the order their groups appear (possibly
>    non-consecutively) in "supported_groups".

We state later that you can't offer duplicates:

  Clients MUST NOT offer multiple
   KeyShareEntry values for the same group.


> 4.2.8.1.  Diffie-Hellman Parameters
>
>    This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved
>    and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.
>
> s/into a small subgroup/into insecure operation/?

No. A small subgroup is a specific condition.


> 4.2.8.2.  ECDHE Parameters
>
>    For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
>    validate each other's public value Y by ensuring that the point is a
>    valid point on the elliptic curve.  The appropriate validation
>    procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of [X962] and alternatively
>    in Section 5.6.2.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of three
>    steps: (1) verify that Y is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify
>    that for Y = (x, y) both integers are in the correct interval, (3)
>    ensure that (x, y) is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
>    equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
>    membership in the correct subgroup.
>
> It seems that the language of this paragraph is a version behind,
> particularly in that this paragraph seems to use "Y" differently from
> the definition of UncompressedPointRepresentation.  Comparing with
> [KEYAGREEMENT], it seems like it ought to read (with changes marked
> >>>...<<<):
>
>    For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST
>    validate each other's public value >>>Q = (X, Y)<<< by ensuring
>    that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve.  The
>    appropriate validation procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of
>    [X962] >>>or<<< alternatively in Section >>>5.6.2.3.3<<< of
>    [KEYAGREEMENT].  This process consists of three steps: (1) verify
>    that >>>Q<<< is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify that
>    >>>both integers X and Y <<< are in the correct interval, >>>and<<<
>    (3) ensure that >>>Q<<< is a correct solution to the elliptic curve
>    equation.  For these curves, implementers do not need to verify
>    membership in the correct subgroup.
>
> (You can s/or alternatively/and also/)

I did some of this,


> In particular, 5.6.2.3.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT] is "validation without
> verifying subgroup membership", so it needs to be verified that this
> procedure expresses the author's intent.
>
> 4.2.9.  Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
>
>    psk_dhe_ke  PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment.  In this mode, the
>       client and servers MUST supply "key_share" values as described in
>       Section 4.2.8.
>
> s/servers/server/

Done.


> 4.2.10.  Early Data Indication
>
>    For
>    externally established PSKs, the associated values are those
>    provisioned along with the key.
>
> Probably s/externally established/provisioned/.

Done.


>    For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate
>    that the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by
>    subtracting ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age
>    modulo 2^32) is within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket
>    was issued (see Section 8).
>
> s/provisioned/established/.

I actually think provisioned is better here, b/c NST doesn't
quite establish them.


> s/ticket_age_add/ticket_age_add in the ticket/.

Disagree. I think this is clear enough.


>    0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same (encrypted)
>    content types as their corresponding messages sent in other flights
>    (handshake and application_data) but are protected under different
>    keys.
>
> s/as their corresponding messages sent in/as messages of the same types
sent in/

Done.


>    After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
>    has accepted early data, an EndOfEarlyData message will be sent to
>    indicate the key change.  This message will be encrypted with the
>    0-RTT traffic keys.
>
> This is awkward.  Perhaps
>
>    After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server
>    has accepted early data, the client will send an EndOfEarlyData message
>    indicate that following (non-early) application data uses the
>    negotiated keys.  The EndOfEarlyData message is be encrypted with the
>    0-RTT traffic keys.

Disagree.

> --
>
>    -  Return its own extension in EncryptedExtensions, indicating that
>       it intends to process the early data.
>
> s/its own extension/an early_data extension/

Done.

>
>    "pre_shared_key" extension.  In addition, it MUST verify that the
>    following values are consistent with those associated with the
>    selected PSK:
>
> s/consistent with/the same as/

Done.

>    If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
>    MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for
>    all records when processing early data records.
>
> It seems like this could be misread by binding "when processing..." to
> "specified".  This avoids that:
>
>    If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it
>    MUST apply to early data records the same error handling
>    requirements specified for other data records.

I think this is clear enough.


> --
>
>    Specifically, if the
>    server fails to decrypt any 0-RTT record following an accepted
>    "early_data" extension it MUST terminate the connection with a
>    "bad_record_mac" alert as per Section 5.2.
>
> But probably better to s/any/an/.

Actually "a"


>    If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client
>    application MAY opt to retransmit early data once the handshake has
>    been completed.
>
> Better:
>
>    [...] MAY opt to retransmit as non-early data the application data
>    contained in the early data records

Done.

> --
>
>    Note that automatic re-transmission of early data
>    could result in assumptions about the status of the connection being
>    incorrect.
>
> This doesn't quite say what you want.  Better
>
>    Note that after connection establishment, the application may
>    consider the status of the connection to be different than it was
>    for early data, and so transmitting the same bytes as non-early
>    application data may not have the same effect as transmitting them
>    as early application data.

Disagree.


>    Similarly,
>    if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
>    be sent in error after the handshake completes.
>
> A bit awkward.  Perhaps
>
>    Similarly,
>    if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might
>    be erroneous to re-send the same data after the handshake completes.

Disagree.


> 4.2.11.  Pre-Shared Key Extension
>
>    The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to indicate the identity of
>    the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association
>    with PSK key establishment.
>
> s/indicate/negotiate/ -- because more than one can be offered.

Done.


>    selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
>       (0-based) index into the identities in the client's list.
>
> I think this is intended as an index into the (abstract) vectors
> OfferedPsks.identities and OfferedPsks.binders, as opposed to an
> offset into the serialized data structures.  You could be clearer with
>
>    selected_identity  The server's chosen identity expressed as a
>       (0-based) index into the vector of identities in OfferedPsks.

I think this is clear enough.

> --
>
>    identity  A label for a key.  For instance, a ticket defined in
>       Appendix B.3.4 or a label for a pre-shared key established
>       externally.
>
> See issues regarding "ticket" in section 1.1.

See above response.


>    In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification
>    (SNI) value was intended to be associated with the session (Section 3
>    of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that the SNI
>    value associated with the session matches the one specified in the
>    resumption handshake.  However, in reality the implementations were
>    not consistent on which of two supplied SNI values they would use,
>    leading to the consistency requirement being de-facto enforced by the
>    clients.  In TLS 1.3, the SNI value is always explicitly specified in
>    the resumption handshake, and there is no need for the server to
>    associate an SNI value with the ticket.  Clients, however, SHOULD
>    store the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of
>    Section 4.6.1.
>
> See issue regarding "SNI" in section 1.1.

See above response.


>    Implementor's note: the most straightforward way to implement the
>    PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher
>    suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs.
>
> I think you mean:
>
>    Implementor's note: the most straightforward way for the server to
>    implement the PSK/cipher suite choice requirements is to choose the
>    cipher suite first and then exclude any PSKs incompatible with the
>    chosen cipher suite.

I believe it is sufficiently clear.

>
> since this doesn't seem to describe an interaction between the server
> and the client, but simply how the server responds to one message.
>
>    In order to accept PSK key
>    establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
>    indicating the selected identity.
>
> I think this sentence would read better as a separate paragraph.

Disagree.


>    This extension MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. (This
>    facilitates implementation as described below.)
>
> Given that the previous paragraph discussed the early_data extension,
> "This extension" isn't clear.  So s/This extension/The
> "pre_shared_key" extension/.

Done.

>
>    If this
>    value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
>    handshake.
>
> s/does not validate/is not valid/  (An actor validates a value; a
> value is validated.)

Disagree.


> 4.2.11.1.  Ticket Age
>
>    The "obfuscated_ticket_age"
>    field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the
>    ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the
>    "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket, see
>    Section 4.6.1 modulo 2^32.
>
> Clearer would be
>
>    [...] "ticket_age_add" value that was in the NewSessionTicket for
>    the ticket, modulo 2^32.

This was fixed in a different way.


>    Note that
>    the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
>    seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" is in milliseconds.
>
> Expand to
>
>    Note that
>    the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in
>    seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" and "ticket_age_add" fields
>    are in milliseconds.

No, ticket_age_add is not in any units. It's just a number.



> 4.2.11.3.  Processing Order
>
>    Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
>    server's Finished, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData message,
>    followed by the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid deadlocks,
>    when accepting "early_data", servers MUST process the client's
>    ClientHello and then immediately send the ServerHello, rather than
>    waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.
>
> This is awkward, and omits the remainder of the servers' first flight
> messages.  Better is
>
>    Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the
>    server's Finished message, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData
>    message, and the rest of the handshake.  In order to avoid
>    deadlocks, when accepting early data, servers MUST process the
>    client's ClientHello immediately upon receipt, and immediately send
>    all of its first flight messages from ServerHello through Finished,
>    rather than waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message.

Changed differently.


> 4.4.  Authentication Messages
>
>    Certificate  The certificate to be used for authentication, and any
>       supporting certificates in the chain.  Note that certificate-based
>       client authentication is not available in 0-RTT mode.
>
> Probably better to say s/in 0-RTT mode/for 0-RTT data/ -- or perhaps
> "early data".

No. It's not available at all if you do 0-RTT, or even in PSK. I
updated accordingly.


>
>    The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key
>    for each scenario:
>
> Eh, what?  I think what you mean is that this table specifies what
> base keys are used for which messages.

No. It specifies which messages go into the various CV and
Finished computations.


> But "Mode" and "Handshake
> Context" don't seem to be defined terms.

Handshake context is defined immediately above.

"A Handshake Context consisting of the set of messages to be
  included in the transcript hash."

> 4.4.1.  The Transcript Hash
>
>    Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
>    transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the concatenation
>    of each included handshake message, including the handshake message
>    header carrying the handshake message type and length fields, but not
>    including record layer headers.  I.e.,
>
> There are a number of awkward spots in how this is phrased.  Better:
>
>    Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a
>    transcript hash.  This value is computed by hashing the concatenation
>    of a sequence of messages in the handshake, with each message
>    including the TLS message type and length fields, but not any
>    headers of the underlying transport protocol.

No. This is incorrect, because the TLS records are not included.
Left as-is.



>     Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... MN) = Hash(M1 || M2 ... MN)
>
> Usually, symbol for "the n-th message" would use lower-case "n" as the
> index, and one usually puts the operator before and after "...".  Also
> add verbal explanation:
>
>    The transcript hash of messages M1 through Mn is:
>
>       Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) = Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || Mn)

I changed to Mn and added the ||s. I don't think the text is needed.



> Continue,
>
>    As an exception to this general rule, when the server has responded to
a
>    ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the first ClientHello is
>    replaced with a special synthetic handshake message of message type
>    "message_hash" whose data part is Hash(first ClientHello).  I.e.,
>
>   Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) =
>       Hash(message_hash ||        /* Handshake type (1 byte) */
>            00 00 Hash.length ||   /* Handshake message length, in bytes
(3 bytes) */
>            Hash(ClientHello1) ||  /* Hash of ClientHello1 */
>            HelloRetryRequest || ... || Mn)
>
>    The reason for this construction is to allow the server not
>    store state after sending HelloRetryRequest by storing just the
>    hash of the first ClientHello in the cookie, rather than requiring
>    it to store all of the ClientHello or the entire intermediate hash
>    state (see Section 4.2.2).
>
> --
>
>    For concreteness, the transcript hash is always taken from the
>    following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first
>
> This is awkward.  Perhaps
>
>    the transcript hash is always of the following sequence of
>    handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including
>    only those messages that we sent/received:

Disagree.


>    In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keeping a
>    running transcript hash value based on the negotiated hash.
>
> Probably s/negotiated hash/negotiated hash function/.
>
> Also, this needs to include the modification of truncating the last
> message if it is to include the transcript hash.  I think you need
> something like:
>
>    If the last message, Mn, is to include the transcript hash, then
>    the transcript hash is always the last field of the message, and
>    that message is first truncated by removing that field from the
>    message.  (The message length field of Mn is unmodified; it includes
>    the length of the transcript hash.)
>
>       Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) = Hash(M1 || M2 || ... ||
Truncate(Mn))

Messages never include themselves in the transcript hash. There
is a truncated case, but it is handled differently, with the
message passed in as pre-truncated.

>
> 4.4.2.  Certificate
>
>    If the corresponding certificate type extension
>    ("server_certificate_type" or "client_certificate_type") was not
>    negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type was
>    negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains a DER-encoded X.509
>    certificate.
>
> This needs a reference to RFC 7250 to define certificate type
> extension.  Also, see the general issues regarding extensions.

Disagree. It is cited earlier.

>    Each following certificate SHOULD
>    directly certify one preceding it.
>
> The phrase "one preceding it" allows extraneous certificates in the
> list, as "one preceding it" doesn't usually require that it be
> immediately preceding.  I think you mean "the one preceding it", which
> does require it to be immediately preceding, and thus does not allow
> extraneous certificates in the chain.

Yes, although the real world is much messier.


> 4.4.2.1.  OCSP Status and SCT Extensions
>
>    CertificateStatus message.  In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP information
>    is carried in an extension in the CertificateEntry containing the
>    associated certificate.
>
> Clearer to phrase it:
>
>    [...] in the CertificateEntry containing the
>    associated certificate in the Certificate message.

Disagree.

> --
>
>    CertificateRequest message.  If the client opts to send an OCSP
>    response, the body of its "status_request" extension MUST be a
>    CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066].
>
> s/its "status_request" extension"/the "status_request" extension in
> its Certificate message/.

Disagree.


> 4.4.2.2.  Server Certificate Selection
>
>    All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature
>    algorithm advertised by the client, if they are able to provide such
>    a chain (see Section 4.2.3).
>
> Probably better a/All certificates/Each certificate/.

Disagree.

> s/they are/the server is/

s/they/it/

>    If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using [...]
>
> The purpose of this paragraph is not clear.  Was "server" meant?  If
> so, it seems to be redundant.  I think it is intended to discuss how
> the client processes the (alleged) certificate chain presented by the
> server, in which case, it's a sharp change of focus for this section.
> That could be aided by moving this paragraph to the end of the section
> and adding some words:

It's not. This is about how the server decides what to send and
directly follows from the previous paragraph.

>    If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain from the
>    certificates provided by the server and decides to abort the
>    handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate
>    certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate";
>    see Section 6.2 for more).
>
> But it would probably be better to integrate it into section 4.4.2.4.
>
> 4.4.2.3.  Client Certificate Selection
>
>    -  If the CertificateRequest message contained a non-empty
>       "oid_filters" extension, the end-entity certificate MUST match the
>       extension OIDs recognized by the client, as described in
>       Section 4.2.5.
>
> More exact would be "must match the extension OID/value pairs that are
> recognized by the client."

Done.

> 4.4.2.4.  Receiving a Certificate Message
>
> It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate
> message, but the server cannot, even though the server can omit
> sending the Certificate message.

That's the way it has been since TLS 1.0 at least. We're not changing
it now.



> 4.4.3.  Certificate Verify
>
>    This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
>    possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate.
>
> I'd prefer s/to its certificate/to the certificate it has presented/.

Disagree.


> The discussion of how "signature" is formed is awkward and I'm not
> sure I understand it.  E.g., the digital signature is computed "over"
> a string, but one part of that string is "the content to be signed".
> I think it could be made clearer as:
>
>    The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see
>    Section 4.2.3 for the definition of this field).  The signature is a
>    digital signature using that algorithm.  The string that is signed
>    is the concatenation of:
>
>    -  A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times
>
>    -  The context string
>
>    -  A single 0 byte which serves as a separator
>
>    -  Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
>
> But that leaves unclear what "context string" and "Handshake Context"
> are.  I think you want to define those back in 4.4.1 (and probably
> also in 1.1)

The both are defined clearly in 4.4.1.


> as both being the concatenation of the messages that are
> in the transcript to this point.  I also assume that the Certificate
> Verify message is truncated when it is put into the Transcript-Hash
> and "context string", but that needs to be stated.

That's not how it's done. I believe a close reading of 4.4.1 will
make this clear.


> 4.4.4.  Finished
>
>    The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
>
> s/finished/Finished/
>
>    The key used to compute the finished message is computed from the
>    Base key defined in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).
>
> This is correct, but you have to read further to understand the key
> described here isn't the key that encrypts the finished message.  It
> would be easier to understand if the text was rearranged:
>
>    Structure of this message:
>
>       struct {
>           opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
>       } Finished;
>
>    The verify_data value is computed as follows:
>
>       finished_key =
>           HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length)
>
>       verify_data =
>           HMAC(finished_key,
>                Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
>                                Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))
>
>       * Only included if present.
>
> And this is another instance where the poorly-defined "Handshake
> Context" appears.

Disagree. 4.4.1 appropriately sets the context for this.


>    Any records following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be encrypted
>    under the appropriate application traffic key as described in
>    Section 7.2.
>
> Are there any non-1-RTT Finished messages?

There used to be. I updated a bit.

> And aren't all application
> data records encrypted under the "appropriate" key?  Or is an
> "application traffic key" different from the keys used for application
> data early in the connection?  This needs to be rephrased somehow, but
> I can't guess in what way.
>
> 4.6.  Post-Handshake Messages
>
> This section name is awkward.  Of course, there are messages after the
> handshake.  I think the problem is that there are "handshake
> messages", messages with handshake types (or content type
> "handshake"), that are not part of "the handshake", the initial
> exchange of handshake-type messages.  In the end, you need to decide
> what terminology to use so that the title of this section makes sense.

The WG decided on the terminology that appears here.

>
>    the appropriate application traffic key.
>
> Is there a strict accounting of what messages are encrypted using
> which key?

I think so.


> 4.6.1.  New Session Ticket Message
>
>    message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message.  This message
>    creates a unique association between the ticket value and a secret
>    PSK derived from the resumption master secret.
>
> It would be useful to mention that the resumption_master_secret is
> defined/computed in section 7.1.

Done.


> Does "ticket value" mean the NewSessionTicket structure or the
> "ticket" field within it.  See issues regarding "ticket" for section
> 1.1.

It means the ticket field. I don't think this is particularly confusing.



>    (Section 4.2.11).  Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a single
>
> Note the conflation here of "ticket" with "NewSessionTicket message".
>
>    Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that has the same
>    KDF hash algorithm as that used to establish the original connection.
>
> How is a ticket "resumed"?

See S 2.2, where we define "resumption" I added some text there.


> Also, since in a "resumption" connection, the ticket that is used is
> (or refers to) a PSK, the above statement corresponds to
> the statement "In addition, it MUST verify that the
> following values are consistent with those associated with the
> selected PSK:" in section 4.2.10.
>
>    Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for the server
>    certificate presented in the original session, and SHOULD only resume
>    if the SNI value matches the one used in the original session.
>
> What does it mean to say a client "resumes"?

See above.


> Here we suddenly descend into the usage of what seems to be an
> extension, server_name, which is presumably optional and logically
> added on to TLS rather than being an integral part of it.

As with many IETF protocols, extensions are an integral part
of TLS, though some extensions are actually not needed
for basic operations.


> Also the logic isn't described very cleanly; I think it means "A
> client must abort resuming a connection if the ServerHello message
> does not contain a server_name extension whose value is a valid SNI
> for the server certificate presented in the original session ...".

That's not how SNI works. It's not a negotiation, it's a statement.

> All of this seems to require that a client MAY NOT resume a connection
> using a ticket issued during a connection in which the server did not
> present a certificate for itself.  But that constraint wasn't stated
> in section 2.2, despite being a global constraint on the structure of
> sessions.

That's not a requirement, and I'm not sure how you're getting
that.


> Or am I wrong in believing that the client chooses to resume the
> connection by placing the ticket in the ClientHello *before* it
> receives the ServerHello (which contains the SNI)?

You're right about how the client does it, but wrong about where
SNI goes. It's a statement by the client.


> This paragraph
> seems to be written as if the client decides to resume after receiving
> ServerHello.
>
>    ticket_lifetime  Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit
>       unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket
>       issuance.
>
> Probably better to s/the time of ticket issuance/the time the
> NewSessionTicket was sent to the client/, unless "issuance"/"to issue"
> is explicitly defined somewhere.

Disagree. This is plenty clear.


>    ticket  The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identity.  The
>       ticket itself is an opaque label.
>
> This shows the ambiguities around "ticket"; this specification says
> that "'ticket' is the value of the ticket to be used as the PSK
> identity".

Yes, that's what it is.


> Is it intended that the "ticket" field of NewSessionTicket will become
> the "identity" field of PskIdentity.OfferedPsks.PreSharedKeyExtension?

Yep.


>    max_early_data_size  The maximum amount of 0-RTT data that the client
>       is allowed to send when using this ticket, in bytes.  Only
>       Application Data payload (i.e., plaintext but not padding or the
>       inner content type byte) is counted.  A server receiving more than
>       max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data SHOULD terminate the
>       connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Note that servers
>       that reject early data due to lack of cryptographic material will
>       be unable to differentiate padding from content, so clients SHOULD
>       NOT depend on being able to send large quantities of padding in
>       early data records.
>
> The last sentence assumes that a server that "reject early data due to
> lack of cryptographic material" will be strict and count all bytes in
> early data messages against the max_early_data_size quota.  However, a
> server in such a situation could be liberal and not bother counting
> any bytes -- since it will be discarding early data messages
> (immediately after discovering that it can't decrypt them), it never
> has to buffer more than one of them.  Unless I'm overlooking
> something, this advice isn't needed, since a server in this situation
> isn't buffering early data.

No, because you don't know what a server will do.


> 4.6.2.  Post-Handshake Authentication
>
>    All of the client's
>    messages for a given response MUST appear consecutively on the wire
>    with no intervening messages of other types.
>
> Better, "consecutively in the underlying transport stream".  But that
> is a little vague given the message/fragment/record mechanism.  More
> exactly,
>
>    All of the client's messages for a given response MUST appear
>    consecutively on the wire, that is, the records containing the
>    fragments of the messages composing the client's response must
>    appear consecutively in the underlying transport stream.

Disagree.


> 4.6.3.  Key and IV Update
>
> I think you want to promote the first paragraph before the data
> structure definition.

Disagree.


> 5.  Record Protocol
> and
> 5.1.  Record Layer
>
> The text isn't very clear about the message/fragment/record mechanism.
> The text wants to consider the data for each content type to consist
> of a series of messages.  The messages are cut into fragments.
> Adjacent fragments within one content type stream can be concatenated
> to form the content of TLSPlaintext structures.
>
> One problem is that despite this model, the boundary between messages
> isn't carried through the transport.  For application data, message
> boundaries are lost entirely.  For handshake and alert content types,
> there are some complex restrictions how their message boundaries show
> up as record boundaries, but the actual framing of messages is done
> "in band" by the message length fields.  A closer description of the
> services TLS provides is that the data for each content type is a
> stream that can be broken arbitrarily into fragments that are the
> content of records, except:
>
> - The boundaries of alert messages must be boundaries of the records
>   that carry them and no record boundary can be introduced into an
>   alert message.
>
> - If two records contain fragments of the same handshake message, all
>   records between them must contain only fragments of that handshake
>   message.
>
> - If there is a key change between the sending of two handshake
>   messages, there must be a record boundary between them.
>
>    -  Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes.  Implementations
>       MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change
>       align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the
>       connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.  Because the
>       ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate
>       messages can immediately precede a key change, implementations
>       MUST send these messages in alignment with a record boundary.
>
> Is this description correct?  As written, it says "because a key
> change can happen after message X, there must be a record boundary
> after message X", which isn't exactly the same as "Handshake messages
> MUST NOT span key changes" -- unless there is always a key change
> following these message types, in which case s/can immediately
> precede/always precede/.  I think the three points listed above give a
> clearer and more accurate version.

ClientHello and ServerHello may not appear before a key change.
Left as-is.


>    Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake
>    types, even if those fragments contain padding.
>
> Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of alert
> messages also.

That's stated elsewhere.


>    When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext
>    structures are written directly onto the wire.
>
> Better "... sent directly using the underlying transport protocol".

Editor discretion.


> 5.2.  Record Payload Protection
>
> I *think* what's going on with record protection is:
>
> - The TLSPlaintext is turned into a TLSInnerPlaintext by moving the
>   type field, removing the length field, and copying "fragment" to
>   "content".  (Why do the structures use different names for the data
>   fragment?)
>
> - The encryption is done by:
>
>       AEADEncrypted =
>           AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaintext)
>
>   where plaintext is TLSInnerPlaintext and AEADEncrypted becomes
>   TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record.
>
> - TLSCiphertext is transmitted.
>
> But the text doesn't say this at all plainly.  I would add before
> "AEAD algorithms take...":
>
>    The TLSPlaintext is converted into a TLSInnerPlaintext by copying the
>    type field, removing the length field, and copying the fragment
>    field.

I made a few changes, but I don't believe this text is necessary.


> (assuming we rename "content" to "fragment")
>
> Then replace the equation by:
>
>    encrypted_record =
>           AEAD-Encrypt(endpoint_write_key, nonce, TLSInnerPlaintext)

Disagree.

> --
>
>    The key is either the
>    client_write_key or the server_write_key, the nonce is derived from
>    the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv or
>    server_write_iv, and the additional data input is empty (zero
>    length).
>
> It would be clearer to move the reference to read "the nonce is
> derived from the sequence number and the client_write_iv or
> server_write_iv (see Section 5.3)" as section 5.3 describes both the
> sequence number and the derivation.

Done.

> Similarly, the decryption algorithm is better expressed by
>
>       TLSInnerPlaintext =
>           AEAD-Decrypt(peer_write_key, nonce, encrypted_record)

Disagree.

> --
>
>    This limit
>    is derived from the maximum TLSPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1
>    octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.
>
> s/TLSPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- the maximum length of
> TLSPlaintext is 2^14 + 5.

Done.


> 5.3.  Per-Record Nonce
>
>    The appropriate sequence number is incremented by one after reading
>    or writing each record.  The first record transmitted under a
>    particular traffic key MUST use sequence number 0.
>
> I think the first and second paragraphs could be profitably combined:
>
>    A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and
>    writing records and is incremented by one after reading or writing
>    each record.  Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning
>    of a connection and whenever the key for that direction is changed;
>    the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key uses
>    sequence number 0.
Done.


> --
>
>    Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should not wrap.
>
> The sense of "should" is not clear.  I think what you want to say is
>
>    Because the size of sequence numbers is 64 bits, there is no need to
>    allow sequence numbers to wrap.

Disagree. This is a statement about the future.


>    Each AEAD algorithm will specify a range of possible lengths for the
>    per-record nonce, from N_MIN bytes to N_MAX bytes of input
>
> I think this is clearer (as it makes clear where N_MIN comes from):
>
>    Each AEAD algorithm specifies an N_MIN and N_MAX, which give the
>    range of possible lengths in bytes of the per-record nonce.

Disagree.


> 5.4.  Record Padding
>
>    Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the
>    ContentType field before encryption.
>
> More exact would be
>
>    Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes following the type field
>    in TLSInnerPlaintext.

Disagree.


>    The presence of padding does not change the overall record size
>    limitations - the full encoded TLSInnerPlaintext MUST NOT exceed 2^14
>    + 1 octets.  If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
>    example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then the
>    reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
>    type and padding.
>
> I think you want s/encoded TLSInnerPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- all
> data structures are defined with a concrete representation, so
> "encoded" is redundant, but "encoded" could be confused with
> "encrypted" and the encrypted plaintext can be longer than the plaintext.

People know what encoded versus encrypted means.


>    If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for
>    example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then the
>    reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content
>    type and padding.
>
> This needs clarification.  I think you mean that if the m.f.l. is
> reduced, then the limit on TLSInnerPlaintext is reduced to m.f.l.+1,
> but that's not what this says.  OTOH, if this text is accurate, the
> maximum length of the fragment proper is m.f.l.-1.

No, that's never been the case. MFL starts as 2^14 + 1.


> 6.  Alert Protocol
>
>    Alert messages convey a description of the alert and a legacy field
>    that conveyed the severity of the message in previous versions of
>    TLS.  In TLS 1.3, the severity is implicit in the type of alert being
>    sent, and the 'level' field can safely be ignored.
>
> I think at this point you want to insert "Alerts are divided into two
> classes: closure alerts and error alerts."
>
>    Stateful implementations of tickets (as in many clients)
>    SHOULD discard tickets associated with failed connections.
>
> What is a "ticket" here?

It's synechdoche for "PSKs and the associated ticket name"


> And what are the "associations" in question?  E.g., presumably it
> includes the ticket used when attempting to establish a connection if
> the attempt fails.  But if a NewSessionTicket is received during a
> connection, and the connection is later aborted, does the client have
> to discard the remembered NewSessionTicket?

I clarified this somewhat.


>    All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST
>    be treated as fatal regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.
>    Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.
>
> This was remarkably confusing until I figured out that the first
> "fatal" means "with AlertLevel "fatal"" and the second and third
> "fatal" mean "indicates abortive closure"!  Better:
>
>    All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent with AlertLevel
>    "fatal" and when received MUST be treated as error alerts
>    regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.  Unknown alert types
>    MUST be treated as error alerts.

Done.

> 6.1.  Closure Alerts
>
>    user_canceled  This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is
>       canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol
>       failure.  If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is
>       complete, just closing the connection by sending a "close_notify"
>       is more appropriate.  This alert SHOULD be followed by a
>       "close_notify".  This alert is generally a warning.
>
> What does "This alert is generally a warning." mean?  What is it a
> warning of?

Changed.

>    Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing its write
>    side of the connection, unless it has already sent some other fatal
>    alert.
>
> This implies that close_notify is a "fatal alert" (properly, error
> alert).  And "before closing the write side of the connection" is not
> clear, since sending close_notify *is* closing the write side of the
> connection.  Better:
>
>    Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before closing the
>    write side of the underlying transport connection, unless it has
>    already sent some other error alert.

Done.


> (Unless I'm mistaken regarding what is intended.)
>
> I take it that there is no "close read side" operation.  (If that
> existed, TLS could generate the "broken pipe" error -- the sender
> wants to transmit more data but the receiver is unwilling to receive
> it.)

Yes.


>    If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
>    carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
>    closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
>    before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer.  No part of
>    this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage
>    profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
>    connections are opened or closed.
>
> This isn't clear too me.  The second sentence seems to mean:
>
>    A usage profile for TLS specified how it manages its data
>    transport, including when connections are opened or closed.  No
>    part of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in
>    which a usage profile for TLS manages its data transport.
>
> But I can't figure out what the first sentence means.  It seems to
> mean "If ... a TLS implementation MUST receive a "close_notify" alert
> before indicating end-of-data to its application-layer.", but that's
> obvious behavior, what else would cause it to signal EOD?

Some non-TLS traffic.


>    Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
>    reliably delivers pending data before destroying the transport.
>
> I think you mean
>
>    Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection
>    will cause the peer TLS implementation to reliably deliver all
>    transmitted data before [what?]

No, that's not what it means. It means that you deliver the
close_notify before sending FIN (if on TCP).

> 7.  Cryptographic Computations
>
>    The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are
>    combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed
>    below.
>
> Probably delete "actual".  Most uses of "actual" in current writing
> (including mine) can be profitably deleted.

Disagree.


> 7.1.  Key Schedule
>
> Given the terminology in RFC 5869, struct HkdfLabel probably should be
> called HkdfInfo, as it is the "info" argument to HKDF-Expand.

Disagree.


>    Messages are the concatenation of the indicated handshake messages,
>
> s/Messages are/Messages is/!

Done.


>    Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final "master secret" is computed
>    by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1, [...]
>
> This is hard to follow.  If I understand correctly, this is a general
> description of the mechanism that is diagrammed below.  But, e.g.,
> "secret" is used for at least two categories of quantities.  It would
> be clearer to phrase this:
>
>    Generally, we use a construction that takes as input a sequence of
>    n InputSecrets and from them computes a sequence of derived
>    secrets.  The initial derived secret is simply a string of
>    Hash.length bytes set to zeros.  Each successive derived secret is
>    computed by invoking HKDF-Extract with an InputSecret and the
>    preceding derived secret as inputs.
>
>    Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, the construction
>    proceeds as diagrammed below, with the InputSecrets on the left
>    side and the derived secrets passing as shown by the downward
>    arrows.  The InputSecrets are added in the following order, where
>    if a given InputSecret is not available, then the 0-value is used
>    in its place:

<---

I have updated this somewhat.


> --
>
>    -  HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top and
>       the IKM argument from the left.
>
> Append "with its output to the bottom and the name of the output at
> the right".
>
> 7.2.  Updating Traffic Keys and IVs
>
> I think you want to remove "and IVs" here.  IVs aren't mentioned in
> this section.  Of course, changing the traffic key changes the IV, but
> it also changes the write key, and the write key isn't mentioned in
> the section title.

Done.


> 7.3.  Traffic Key Calculation
>
> I think you want to title the section "Write Key and IV Calculation".

No. These are the traffic keys, which are derived from traffic secrets.

> And you want to (again) de-genericize the text:
>
>    The traffic keying material (*_write_key and *_write_iv) is
o>    generated from the following input values:
>
>    -  A secret value, the applicable *_traffic_secret
>
>    -  A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
>
>    -  The length of the key

Disagree.


> 7.4.1.  Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
>
>    For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is
>    performed.
>
> I think you need a reference for this!

TODO.


> 7.5.  Exporters
>
>    A separate
>    interface for the early exporter is RECOMMENDED, especially on a
>    server where a single interface can make the early exporter
>    inaccessible.
>
> What does "where a single interface can make the early exporter
> inaccessible" mean?  If you don't have a separate interface for the
> early exporter, how does "a single interface" make it inaccessible?

The handshake might complete in the meantime.


> 8.1.  Single-Use Tickets
>
>    If the tickets are not self-contained but rather are database keys,
>    and the corresponding PSKs are deleted upon use, then connections
>    established using one PSK enjoy forward secrecy.
>
> What does "one PSK" mean here?  Do you mean "established using such a
> PSK" (equivalently "established using such a ticket")?

I just changed it to "a PSK"



> Also, the question again arises as to what a "ticket" *is*.
>
>    Because this mechanism requires sharing the session database between
>    server nodes in environments with multiple distributed servers, it
>
> Probably more conventional to say "requires a shared database between
> all server instances".

Disagree.


> 8.2.  Client Hello Recording
>
> The first paragraph is hard to follow.  I think it could be clarified
> along these lines:
>
>    An alternative form of anti-replay is to record a unique value
>    derived from the ClientHello (generally either the random value or
>    the PSK binder) and reject duplicates.  Recording all ClientHellos
>    causes state to grow without bound, but a server can instead retain
>    ClientHellos only within a given time window and use the
>    "obfuscated_ticket_age" to determine whether the ClientHello was
>    generated by the client recently.  Thus, the server can ensure that
>    it only allows 0-RTT data in connections established by
>    non-duplicate ClientHellos which were generated by the client
>    within the recording window.

Disagree.


>
>    The server MUST derive the storage key only from validated sections
>    of the ClientHello.  If the ClientHello contains multiple PSK
>    identities, then an attacker can create multiple ClientHellos with
>    different binder values for the less-preferred identity on the
>    assumption that the server will not verify it, as recommended by
>    Section 4.2.11.  I.e., if the client sends PSKs A and B but the
>    server prefers A, then the attacker can change the binder for B
>    without affecting the binder for A.
>
> At this point, a conditional needs to be inserted; otherwise the
> argument you're making is only implicit.
>
>    If the server uses the binder for B as part of the storage key,
>    these variations on the ClientHello will not be detected by the
>    server as duplicates of each other, and the server will accept all
>    of them.
>
> Then continue with:
>
>    This may cause side effects such as replay cache
>    pollution, although any 0-RTT data will not be decryptable because it
>    will use different keys.  If the validated binder or the
>    ClientHello.random are used as the storage key, then this attack is
>    not possible.

I rewrote this a little bit.

>
>    When implementations are freshly started, they SHOULD reject 0-RTT as
>    long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup
>    time.  Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were
>    originally sent during that period.
>
> I think this needs a couple of changes of phrasing:
>
>    When an implementation is restarted with a cleared recording
>    memory, it SHOULD reject 0-RTT as long as the startup time is
>    within the recording window.  Otherwise, it runs the risk of
>    accepting replays of ClientHellos which were sent during the
>    previous execution.

Disagree.


> 8.3.  Freshness Checks
>
>    Variations in client and server clock rates are likely to be minimal,
>    though potentially with gross time corrections.
>
> What does "gross time corrections" mean?  I think you mean "with
> moments of large change in the clock time", but that isn't a feature
> of the clock *rate*.  I think this is more accurate:
>
>    Differences between client and server clock times are likely to be
>    minimal, though there will sometimes be gross differences due to
>    uninitialized clocks and misconfigured time zones.

I rewrote this a little bit


>    After early data is accepted, records may continue to be streamed
>    to the server over a longer time period.
>
> More clear as
>
>    After the server accepts early data is accepted, the client may
>    continue to send early data to the server over a longer time period
>    than the freshness window for ClientHellos.

Not necessary.


> 9.1.  Mandatory-to-Implement Cipher Suites
>
>    A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with
>    rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (for
>    CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256.
>
> It seems that ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 is missing a statement of what
> uses it must be supported for.

That is because it must simply be supported.


> 9.2.  Mandatory-to-Implement Extensions
>
>    -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also contain
>       a "key_share" extension, and vice versa.  An empty
>       KeyShare.client_shares vector is permitted.
>
> I think this is a bit better expressed as:
>
>    -  If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also contain
>       a "key_share" extension (which may contain an empty
>       KeyShare.client_shares vector), and vice versa.

Disagree.

> --
>
>    Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the
>    "server_name" extension with applications capable of using it.
>
> I'm not clear what the test is for "applications capable of using
> SNI".  I think you want to turn the conditional around:
>
>    An application profile MAY require that the endpoint's TLS
>    implementation supports use of the "server_name" extension.

Disagree. This was subject to WG consensus.


> 9.3.  Protocol Invariants
>
>    -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
>       unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
>       Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.  In TLS
>       1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or NewSessionTicket
>       MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.
>
> This needs to be split, because the two parts are about different roles:
>
>    -  A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all
>       unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.
>       Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients.

Disagree.


>    -  In TLS 1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or
>       NewSessionTicket MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.
>
> 11.  IANA Considerations
>
>    -  TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards
>       Action [RFC8126].  IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry
>       to include values for "missing_extension" and
>       "certificate_required".
>
> It would be nice to add a finer-grained "minor alert code" registry.

As noted, I do not believe this change is appropriate.


> Appendix A.  State Machine
>
> It would be helpful if the state diagrams were extended to describe
> the activity on the "control channel" (handshake and alert content
> types) after CONNECTED, that is, what happens while the connection is
> established and how connections are shut down.

I took a look at this and concluded it would make matters worse.


> Appendix B.  Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values
>
> There is no listing of the value structure corresponding to each
> extension type.  Extensions collectively are only defined as:
>
>    struct {
>        ExtensionType extension_type;
>        opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
>    } Extension;
>
> This is a problem because the name of the value struct is not
> systematically derived from the name of the extension_type value!
> E.g., "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" use
> SignatureSchemeList as a value, and you can only reliably discover
> that by searching through the whole of the text.

I have not found other places where we did this particularly
helpful.


> B.4.  Cipher Suites
>
>    A symmetric cipher suite defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and
>    hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.
>
> Better phrased:
>
>    A symmetric cipher suite is the pair of an AEAD algorithm and a
>    hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.

Disagree.


> C.3.  Implementation Pitfalls
>
>    -  As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which
>       support a compatible (EC)DHE group but do not predict it in the
>       "key_share" extension?o
>
> This needs an additional condition:
>
>    -  As a server, if you select an (EC)DHE group which the client
>       supports but for which the client did not provide a
>       KeyShareEntry, do you send a HelloRetryRequest?

These are the same.



> Appendix D.  Backward Compatibility
>
>    Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for
>    various purposes.  (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
>    TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field is
>    [...]
>
> I think this was intended to be formatted thusly:
>
>    Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number
>    (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and
>    TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) for various purposes.  As of
>    TLS 1.3, this field is [...]

Done.


> D.5.  Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions
>
>    The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the
>    reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and MUST NOT be negotiated for any
>    reason.
>
> s/and MUST NOT/and it MUST NOT/, with "it" referring to "SSL 3.0", as
> otherwise the verb "MUST NOT" is parallel to the verb "is" and the
> subject of "MUST NOT" is "the security of SSL 3.0".

Done.


> E.1.  Handshake
>
>    -  A set of "session keys" (the various secrets derived from the
>       master secret) from which can be derived a set of working keys.
>
> Is this consistent with the usual meaning of "session key"?  My
> understanding (which may be wrong) is that a "session key" is the key
> for a "session", i.e., an entire connection.  Perhaps there is already
> a defined term in the text that covers the use you intend.

The reason for scare quotes is that this is the term of art in
the cryptographic literature.


>
>    Note that these
>    properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the protocol
>    consumers' needs.
>
> The significance of "but" is not clear here, as it seems to be placing
> in opposition "reflect the ... needs" and "independent".  I think this
> is probably closer to what you meant:
>
>    Note that these properties are not necessarily independent, but
>    together they cover the protocol consumers' needs.

Disagree. The point is that this is from the consumer's perspective.


> --
>
>    Uniqueness of the session keys:  Any two distinct handshakes should
>       produce distinct, unrelated session keys.  Individual session keys
>       produced by a handshake should also be distinct and unrelated.
>
> It's not clear how two session keys produced by a single handshake can
> be "unrelated".  I suspect there's a known technical term for this,
> like "cryptographically independent" (to parallel "cryptographically
> random").

I've changed this to "independent"


>
> A similar term is needed in section E.1.4.
>
>    If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each
>    connection, then the output keys are forward secret.
>
> When it is used as an adjective, you hyphenate "forward-secret".

Diagree.



> E.1.3.  0-RTT
>
>    See Section 4.2.10 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to replay.
>
> This discussion is now in section 8.
>
> [END]
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Re-sending hopefully smalle.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">Hi Dale,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">Thanks your your review.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Please provide a PR adding yoursel=
f to contributors, as in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 <a href=3D"=
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1152">https://github.com/tlswg/tls=
13-spec/pull/1152</a></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Detailed responses below.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">-Ekr</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - There is inexactness about &quot;=
transcript&quot;, &quot;handshake context&quot;, and</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;context&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I&#39;m not sure what to do with =
this. We have a bunch of interoperable</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">impl=
ementations, so this seems clear enough that people can implement</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">it.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - When a ser=
ver receives ClientHello, is it obligated to promptly send</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0not just the ServerHello, but all first-f=
light messages from</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Server=
Hello through Finished?=C2=A0 (section 4.2.11.3)=C2=A0 I ask this</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0because the client is only obligate=
d/permitted to send</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0EndOfE=
arlyData when it receives the server&#39;s Finished.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No, it&#39;s not obligated t=
o every send anything. It&#39;s just that it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">has to send things in a specific order.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; - It seems inconsistent that the client can send an empty Certificate</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0message, but the server cann=
ot, even though the server can omit</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0sending the Certificate message.=C2=A0 (section 4.4.2.4)</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">This is a long=
standing property of TLS that had consensus in the WG,</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">so I don&#39;t expect we&#39;re going to change it now.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - Comparing sections 4.2.10 and 4.6.1, when a =
PSK was established in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0an =
earlier connection, exactly what are the limitations on the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0cryptographic parameters that can be used=
 when the PSK is used in a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0resumption connection?=C2=A0 4.2.10 suggests that the following must be<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the same in both connectio=
ns:=C2=A0 TLS version, cipher suite, ALPN.=C2=A0 But</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A04.6.1 suggests that different cipher suites can =
be used, as long as</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0they u=
se the same hash algorithm.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">4.6.1. refers to the use of PSKs for ordinary 1-RTT h=
andshakes</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">whereas 4.2.10 is for 0-RTT and s=
o also specifies the cipher suite</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">because t=
his cannot be negotiated in 0-RTT. Note the title of</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">4.2.10: &quot;Early Data Indication&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; - In regard to section 4.6.1, it seems to require that a clien=
t MAY</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0NOT resume a connect=
ion using a ticket issued during a connection in</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0which the server did not present a certificate for i=
tself, because</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0in the hand=
shake of the resumption connection, the client is required</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0to verify that the SNI is compatible with=
 the certificate the server</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0presented in the original connection.=C2=A0 But that constraint isn&#39;=
t</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0stated in section 2.2, d=
espite being a global constraint on the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0structure of sessions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Section 2 is a Protocol Overview, so it does=
n&#39;t describe everything.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - Presumab=
ly implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of alert</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0messages for the same reasons that th=
ey cannot send zero-length</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0fragments of handshake messages (whatever those reasons are).</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Correct. S 5.1:<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0Alert messages (Section 6) MUST NOT be fragmented across records and=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0multiple Alert messages MUST =
NOT be coalesced into a single</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0TLSPlaintext record.=C2=A0 In other words, a record with an Alert type</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST contain exactly one messag=
e.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - There are about 28 error codes but=
 nearly 150 places where the text</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0require the connection to be aborted with an error -- and hence,<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0nearly 150 distinct constr=
aints that can be violated.=C2=A0 There are 19</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0alone for &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;.=C2=A0 I would=
 like to see an &quot;alert</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0extension value&quot; which assigns a distinct &quot;minor&quot; code to=
 each</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0statement in the tex=
t that requires an error response (with</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementations being allowed to be a bit sloppy in providing=
 the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0correct minor code).<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The st=
ructure of TLS alerts dates all the way back to SSLv3, spanning</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">three separate IETF Standards Track RFCs, and several =
WGLCs for TLS 1.3,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">so I don&#39;t think thi=
s is a reasonable change to propose at this time.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - I take it that there is =
no &quot;close read side&quot; operation.=C2=A0 (If that</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0existed, TLS could generate the &quot;broken=
 pipe&quot; error.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">Yes, it does not exist.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; There are a number of issues which spa=
n the whole text:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The interaction of this draft with extensions define=
d for previous</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; versions of TLS is not =
laid out clearly.=C2=A0 It seems safe enough for</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; this draft to import data structures from earlier extensions wit=
h only</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; a reference to the earlier RFC,=
 but if an extension defines behavior</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
(e.g., a negotiation process), exactly what is the specification of</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; that behavior in TLS 1.3, given that the refe=
renced RFC only defines</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; its use in TLS=
 1.2 or earlier?=C2=A0 At the least, there should be an</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; explicit statement that the behaviors are carried forward=
 in the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;obvious way&quot;.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
It&#39;s also not clear exactly which previously defined extensions are</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; brought forward into TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 I sus=
pect that they are all listed in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; secti=
on 4.2, but is it clearly stated that those, and only those, are</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; grandfathered in?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The table in 4.2 is intended to be e=
xhaustive, but I can add some</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">text.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Presumably, for any referenced extension, the =
placement of values in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; messages in TLS=
 1.2 has a &quot;natural&quot; analog in TLS 1.3 that at most</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; involves moving the value from one field to another=
 in certain</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; messages.=C2=A0 But it wou=
ld be reassuring to have a clear statement of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; this, and an enumeration of any more complex cases.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I don&#39;t understan=
d the question. The table in 4.2 explicitly states</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">which messages extensions may appear in, and each such message</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">includes an extension block.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; There are about 28 error codes but nearly 150 places wher=
e the text</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; require the connection to b=
e aborted with an error.=C2=A0 There are 19</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; alone for &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;.=C2=A0 I would like to see an=
 &quot;alert</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; extension value&quot; whi=
ch assigns a distinct &quot;minor&quot; code to each</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt; statement in the text that requires an error response.=C2=A0=
 This code</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; would make it a lot easier =
to diagnose what is going wrong with a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
 handshake.=C2=A0 To avoid making specifying and implementing these codes</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; too difficult, implementations should b=
e allowed to deviate to a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; degree from =
the specification regarding minor codes, and there should</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; be a range of codes reserved for implementation-defin=
ed uses.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Conversely, there are a coupl=
e of places where the implementation MUST</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; NOT distinguish between different causes of an alert, but I believe</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; that those are explicitly mentioned in th=
e text.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">See above.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The terms &quot;side&quot;=
, &quot;server side&quot;, and &quot;client side&quot; are used in various<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; places, despite that &quot;endpoint&qu=
ot; is the defined term.=C2=A0 I suggest</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; replacing these terms with &quot;endpoint&quot;, &quot;server&quot;, and=
 &quot;client&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">I believe this is within editor discretion.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; There are a number of places where &quot;fatal alert&=
quot; is used, but &quot;error</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; alert&q=
uot; seems to be the defined term.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The Alert protocol specifically defines the te=
rm &quot;fatal&quot; in S 6.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Detail ite=
ms are:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; 1.=C2=A0 Introduction</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 TLS is application pr=
otocol independent; higher-level protocols can</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 layer on top of TLS transparently.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It might be i=
nformative to describe the nature of the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; currently-defined application protocol (a bidirectional, reliable byte</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; stream) and similarly, to describe the =
requirements on the underlying</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; transpo=
rt (as far as I can tell, also a bidirectional, reliable byte</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; stream).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">I&#39;ll see what I can do.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt; flight -- it seems to be thought that messages are grouped =
into</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;flights&quot;, where the me=
ssages of flight N from one sender cannot be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; sent until (more or less) it receives all messages of flights M (1 &=
lt;=3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; M &lt;=3D N) from the peer.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.=
 I think it&#39;s clear enough.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; MAC and=
 HMAC -- by a simple count, both of these terms are used</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; exactly 11 times in the document.=C2=A0 Is there any fun=
ctional difference</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; between them?</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes. MAC is=
 the generic term; HMAC is a specific MAC algorithm.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">These are terms of art.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; ticke=
t -- it&#39;s not clear what this means concretely.=C2=A0 Abstractly, it</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; seems to include the set of cryptographi=
c parameters needed to send</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; applicatio=
n data, but concretely I can&#39;t figure out if it is the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; entire block of parameters (struct NewSessionTicket),=
 or whether it is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (or can be) just a k=
ey that points to the parameters in some database</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; (the ticket *field* of struct NewSessionTicket).</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I&#39;ll add some te=
xt.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; A related issue is that there is a =
field &quot;ticket&quot; in the structure</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; &quot;NewSessionTicket&quot;, and, at least conceptually, that structur=
e is also</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; considered a &quot;ticket&qu=
ot;.=C2=A0 I strongly suggest you change the name of the</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; field, and then revise uses of &quot;ticket&quot; to ind=
icate whether they refer</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; to the struct=
ure or to the field.=C2=A0 Comparing to other parts of the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; text, I think you may have intended to call the field=
 &quot;identity&quot;, as</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the value in=
 NewSessionTicket.ticket seems to be intended to be copied</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; into PreSharedKeyExtension.OfferedPsks.PskIdentity.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagre=
e. People don&#39;t seem to have found this confusing in practice.</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; RTT, 0-RTT, 1-RTT -- Can these be defined more =
rigorously?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">I&#39;ll add some text.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; server na=
me, SNI -- These two terms seem to be used interchangeably</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; and as if the reader already understands their meanin=
g and use.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Suggest you standardize on =
one (and list the other as a synonym in the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; glossary).=C2=A0 Also include how &quot;server name&quot; interacts w=
ith the server&#39;s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; certificate.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The first =
use of SNI that&#39;s not in the changelog is in Section 4.2.11,</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">where it&#39;s defined as follows:</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0In TLS vers=
ions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0(SNI) value was intended to be associated with the =
session (Section 3</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0of [RFC6066=
]), with the server being required to enforce that the SNI</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; advertise -- I think this means when an endpoint send=
s a message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; containing an extension sa=
ying that it implements a feature or option,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; soliciting the peer to send a message containing the same extension<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (and thus agreeing to use the feature/=
option during this connection).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, we&#39;re usign the ordinary meaning of the =
term.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; transcript -- It might be useful =
to put the definition of this in this</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
section.=C2=A0 Also, define the &quot;context&quot; or &quot;handshake cont=
ext&quot;, which</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; seems to be the seque=
nce of messages included in the transcript hash</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt; (or the concatenation thereof).=C2=A0 But doesn&#39;t seem clear =
what messages</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; are in the &quot;handsha=
ke context&quot; for any single usage.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">It&#39;s in the table in S 4.4.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; handshake -- This has two meanings:=C2=A0 (1) mes=
sages whose content type</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; is &quot;hand=
shake&quot; (see section 5), and (2) messages with content type</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;handshake&quot; that are part of the initia=
l exchange of such messages.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The probl=
em is that there are messages that are (1) but not (2), and</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; so you get confusing language like the title of secti=
on 4.6.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">Disagree. This seems clear enough to me.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; establish vs. provision -- The document mostly adheres to the</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; convention that pre-shared keys are &quot;provi=
sioned&quot; whereas keys that</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; are set=
 up using TLS (possibly in a previous session) are</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; &quot;established&quot;.=C2=A0 In particular, &quot;provisione=
d&quot; is only used as an</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; attribute o=
f keys, whereas &quot;establishing&quot; is an action and</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;established&quot; keys are ones created by that=
 action.=C2=A0 But there are</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; places wh=
ere the two terms aren&#39;t used distinctly.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Feel free to point out some specifi=
c cases.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; ALPN -- This is used sporadica=
lly throughout the document.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, I see that a reference crept in in 4.2.10 befor=
e the first citation.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I&#39;ll fix that.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;hash over&quot; -- A personal gripe=
 of mine is that I look at a hash as a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
 function, and so its value is a &quot;hash of (some string)&quot;.=C2=A0 I=
 don&#39;t mind</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;hash over X&quot=
;, &quot;hash protects X&quot;, and &quot;hash covers X&quot;n when X is</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; conceptualized as a substring of some la=
rger string, that is, there&#39;s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; a Y =
that is explicitly being excluded.=C2=A0 But in a lot of cases in this</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; document, X is explicitly constructed from=
 various fragments, so</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; there&#39;s no =
Y.=C2=A0 But maybe all these usages are conventional in</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; cryptography.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, this is conventional.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; 2.=C2=A0 Protocol Overview</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The cryptographi=
c parameters used by the secure channel are produced</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 by the TLS handshake protocol.=C2=A0 This sub-p=
rotocol of TLS [...]</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you want to s/This sub-protocol/The TLS h=
andshake protocol/,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; since a naive read=
er (me!) could consider &quot;the secure channel&quot; as a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; plausible antecedent of &quot;this&quot;.</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. I think=
 it&#39;s clear.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 2.1.=C2=A0 Incorrect D=
HE Share</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note: The handshake transcript includes the init=
ial ClientHello/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRet=
ryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;tr=
anscript&quot; has not been defined yet.=C2=A0 Perhaps:</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 N=
ote: The handshake transcript (the message input to the MAC in the</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Finished message) starts with ...=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Trans=
cript is a term of art.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 2.2.=C2=A0 Resu=
mption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Figure 3 shows a pair of =
handshakes in which the first establishes a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 PSK and the second uses it:</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The first handshake doe=
s not point out where the PSK is established.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; Better would be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Figure 3 shows a pair of handshak=
es in which the first establishes</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 a PSK and the second uses it.=C2=A0 In the first, a PSK is carri=
ed from</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the server to the=
 client in the NewSessionTicket message.=C2=A0 In the</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 second, the identity of the PSK is sent by the=
 client to the server</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 in =
the ClientHello.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Yes, I&#39;ll add something here.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; 3.1.=C2=A0 Basic Block Size</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The representation of=
 all data items is explicitly specified.=C2=A0 The</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits).=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; &quot;byte&quot; appears in the text 91 times, and &quot;octet&quot; =
appears 20 times.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; You probably want to=
 change the uses of &quot;octet&quot; to &quot;byte&quot; for</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; consistency.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">We use them interchangeably. I think that&#3=
9;s fine.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 3.3.=C2=A0 Vectors</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; You m=
ay want to move section 3.4 to before section 3.3, because</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; section 3.3 implicitly depends on all numeric fields =
being unsigned,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; whereas the fact that =
all numeric fields are unsigned is only stated</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; in section 3.4.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 3.5.=C2=A0 Enu=
merateds</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 An additional sparse data type is available call=
ed enum.=C2=A0 Each</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; You probably want s/called enum/called enum or enu=
merated/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Future extension=
s or additions to the protocol may define new values.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Add &quot;... of=
 a previously existing enumerated.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Not needed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; 4.1.2.=C2=A0 Client Hello</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 In that case, the cli=
ent MUST send the same</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Cl=
ientHello (without modification) except:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/(without modification) exce=
pt:/without modification, except:/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST contain exactly=
 one byte set to zero, which corresponds to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the &quot;null&quot; compression method in =
prior versions of TLS.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; There is an ambiguity in English, where this mi=
ght mean &quot;the number of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; bytes in =
this field which are zero is exactly one&quot;.=C2=A0 It&#39;s a bit hard</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; avoiding the ambiguity, but this seems =
to work:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this=
 vector MUST have exactly one</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0member.=C2=A0 The member MUST be zero, which correspond=
s to the &quot;null&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0compression method in prior versions of TLS.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I did something here.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The actual &quot;Extension&quot; format is defin=
ed in Section 4.2.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably delete &quot;actual&quot;.=C2=A0 Most uses=
 of &quot;actual&quot; in current writing</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; (including mine) can be profitably deleted.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. This is fine.</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.1.4.=C2=A0 Hello Retry Request</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 This allows the client to avoid having to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes i=
n the second</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHello.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; This seems to be correct but I found it very hard to decode.=C2=A0 Th=
is is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; clearer:</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 This =
allows the client to avoid having to compute hashes of partial</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 transcripts using multiple hash funct=
ions, to be used in binders in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 the second ClientHello.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree: I think this is clear enough to implemen=
tors.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.=C2=A0 Extensions</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, unlike TLS 1.2, extensions are negotiated for each</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake even when in resumpt=
ion-PSK mode.=C2=A0 However, 0-RTT</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 parameters are those negotiated in the previous handshake; misma=
tches</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 may require rejecti=
ng 0-RTT (see Section 4.2.10).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think what you mean is:</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 Even for a session that is resumed using a PSK established in an</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 earlier session, the applica=
ble extensions are negotiated in its</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 initial handshake and aren&#39;t carried over from the handsh=
ake of the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 session which =
established the PSK.=C2=A0 However, the parameters</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 applicable to 0-RTT data are those negotiated in =
the previous</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake; i=
f those parameters are unacceptable to the server, it</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 may reject use of 0-RTT in the session (see Se=
ction 4.2.10).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, I think this says that,</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Servers should be prepared to receive</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHellos that include this extension=
 but do not include 0x0304 in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 the list of versions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/should/SHOULD/</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">This ended up as a MUST due to=
 in Adam&#39;s review.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.2.=C2=A0 Coo=
kie</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clients MUST NOT use cookies in their initial ClientH=
ello in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 subsequent connec=
tions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; I think this becomes cleaner if you omit &quot;in subsequent co=
nnections&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Disagree, I think this is clearer.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; 4.2.3.=C2=A0 Signature Algorithms</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Items &quot;RSASSA-PSS RSAE a=
lgorithms&quot; and &quot;RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms&quot;</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; both contain:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0If the p=
ublic key is carried in an X.509 certificate,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC528=
0].</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; I think &quot;it&quot; references &quot;certificate&quot;, so it w=
ould be clearer to say</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0If the public key is =
carried in an X.509 certificate,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the certificate MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC528=
0].</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Di=
sagree. It&#39;s the public key structure (SPKI) certificate that</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">has the OID. Your rephrase makes it unclear which of=
 the many</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">OIDs in a certificate it refers t=
o.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0If=
 the corresponding public key&#39;s parameters present, [...]</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/parame=
ters present/parameters are present/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (w=
hich is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0mand=
atory in TLS 1.3), [...]</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The phrase &quot;Implementations that adverti=
se&quot; makes me think of the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; label o=
n the box.=C2=A0 I think you mean &quot;Endpoints that advertise&quot;.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.=
 We use implementation and endpoint interchangeable for</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">the most part.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The &quot;extension_data&quot; field=
 of these extension contains a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 SignatureSchemeList value:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think s/these extension/these ex=
tensions/ (rather than s/these</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; extensi=
on/this extension/).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.7.=C2=A0 Neg=
otiated Groups</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Items in named_group_list are ordered ac=
cording to the client&#39;s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 preferences (most preferred choice first).</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This can be simplified =
to &quot;Items in named_group_list are in descending</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt; order of the client&#39;s preferences.&quot;</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">This seems like a mat=
ter of editorial discretion.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.8.=C2=
=A0 Key Share</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 group=C2=A0 The named group for the key bei=
ng exchanged.=C2=A0 Finite Field</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Sectio=
n 4.2.8.1;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0E=
lliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.2.8.2.</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think =
this should be capitalized as &quot;Finite field Diffie-Hellman</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; ...&quot; and &quot;Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman=
 ...&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">Disagree. The convention is FFDH and ECDH</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 key_exchange=C2=A0 Key exchange information.=C2=A0 Th=
e contents of this field</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are determined by the specified group and its corresponding</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0definition.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; This could be better defined by rearranging the two items, since the</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; parameters don&#39;t describe the group, =
they describe the key being</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; exchanged:=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 group=C2=A0 The value designating the named group for th=
e keys being</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0exchanged, as defined in section 4.2.7.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 key_exchange=
=C2=A0 The key exchange information.=C2=A0 Finite field</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters =
are described in Section 4.2.8.1;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are descri=
bed in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Secti=
on 4.2.8.2.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">I made a change here.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Each KeyShareEntry value MUST corre=
spond to a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 group offered =
in the &quot;supported_groups&quot; extension and MUST appear in</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the same order.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you me=
an to require that for a given group there can be only</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; one KeyShareEntry.=C2=A0 So you could say</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a distinct group</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 offered in the &quot;supported_grou=
ps&quot; extension, and the KeyShareEntrys</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST appear in the order their groups appear (possibly</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 non-consecutively) in &quot=
;supported_groups&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">We state later that you can&#39;t offer duplicates:</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 Cli=
ents MUST NOT offer multiple</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0K=
eyShareEntry values for the same group.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
 4.2.8.1.=C2=A0 Diffie-Hellman Parameters</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 This check ensu=
res that the remote peer is properly behaved</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 and isn&#39;t forcing the local system into a small sub=
group.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; s/into a small subgroup/into insecure operation/?</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No. A small subgrou=
p is a specific condition.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.8.2.=C2=
=A0 ECDHE Parameters</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 =
and secp521r1, peers MUST</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 validate each other&#39;s public value Y by ensuring that the point is a</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 valid point on the ellipti=
c curve.=C2=A0 The appropriate validation</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of [X962] and alte=
rnatively</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 in Section 5.6.=
2.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT].=C2=A0 This process consists of three</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 steps: (1) verify that Y is not the poin=
t at infinity (O), (2) verify</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 that for Y =3D (x, y) both integers are in the correct interval, (3)=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ensure that (x, y) is a =
correct solution to the elliptic curve</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 equation.=C2=A0 For these curves, implementers do not need to=
 verify</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 membership in the=
 correct subgroup.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It seems that the language of this paragraph is a v=
ersion behind,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; particularly in that th=
is paragraph seems to use &quot;Y&quot; differently from</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; the definition of UncompressedPointRepresentation.=C2=A0=
 Comparing with</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; [KEYAGREEMENT], it see=
ms like it ought to read (with changes marked</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;...&lt;&lt;&lt;):</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For the curves sec=
p256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, peers MUST</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 validate each other&#39;s public value &gt;&gt;&gt;Q =3D=
 (X, Y)&lt;&lt;&lt; by ensuring</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve.=C2=A0 The</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 appropriate validation proce=
dures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [X962] &gt;&gt;&gt;or&lt;&lt;&lt; alternatively in Section &g=
t;&gt;&gt;5.6.2.3.3&lt;&lt;&lt; of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 [KEYAGREEMENT].=C2=A0 This process consists of three steps: (1) =
verify</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 that &gt;&gt;&gt;Q=
&lt;&lt;&lt; is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify that</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &gt;&gt;&gt;both integers X and Y &lt=
;&lt;&lt; are in the correct interval, &gt;&gt;&gt;and&lt;&lt;&lt;</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (3) ensure that &gt;&gt;&gt;Q&lt;=
&lt;&lt; is a correct solution to the elliptic curve</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 equation.=C2=A0 For these curves, implementers =
do not need to verify</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 mem=
bership in the correct subgroup.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (You can s/or alternatively/and also/=
)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I di=
d some of this,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; In particular, 5.6.2.3.=
3 of [KEYAGREEMENT] is &quot;validation without</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt; verifying subgroup membership&quot;, so it needs to be verified t=
hat this</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; procedure expresses the autho=
r&#39;s intent.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.9.=C2=A0 Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 psk_dhe_ke=C2=A0 PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment.=C2=A0 In this =
mode, the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0cl=
ient and servers MUST supply &quot;key_share&quot; values as described in</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.2.8=
.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; s/servers/server/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.10.=C2=A0 =
Early Data Indication</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 externally established PSKs, the associated values are t=
hose</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 provisioned along wi=
th the key.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; Probably s/externally established/provisioned/.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionT=
icket, a server MUST validate</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 that the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 subtracting ticket_age_add fro=
m PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 modulo 2^32) is within a small tolerance of the time since the t=
icket</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 was issued (see Sec=
tion 8).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; s/provisioned/established/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I actually think provisioned is better =
here, b/c NST doesn&#39;t</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">quite establish t=
hem.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/ticket_age_add/ticket_age_add in=
 the ticket/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">Disagree. I think this is clear enough.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same=
 (encrypted)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 content type=
s as their corresponding messages sent in other flights</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (handshake and application_data) but are pro=
tected under different</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ke=
ys.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; s/as their corresponding messages sent in/as messages of the same =
types sent in/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 After recei=
ving the server&#39;s Finished message, if the server</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 has accepted early data, an EndOfEarlyData mes=
sage will be sent to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 indi=
cate the key change.=C2=A0 This message will be encrypted with the</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0-RTT traffic keys.</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This is =
awkward.=C2=A0 Perhaps</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 After receiving the server&#39;s F=
inished message, if the server</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 has accepted early data, the client will send an EndOfEarlyData mess=
age</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 indicate that followi=
ng (non-early) application data uses the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 negotiated keys.=C2=A0 The EndOfEarlyData message is be enc=
rypted with the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0-RTT tra=
ffic keys.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 Return its own extension in Encr=
yptedExtensions, indicating that</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0it intends to process the early data.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/its own =
extension/an early_data extension/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;pre_shared_key&quot; extension.=C2=A0 In addition, it =
MUST verify that the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 foll=
owing values are consistent with those associated with the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 selected PSK:</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/consistent with/the=
 same as/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the server chooses to accept the &quot;early_data&=
quot; extension, then it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 all records when processing earl=
y data records.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It seems like this could be misread by binding &quot;=
when processing...&quot; to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;spec=
ified&quot;.=C2=A0 This avoids that:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the server choo=
ses to accept the &quot;early_data&quot; extension, then it</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST apply to early data records the sam=
e error handling</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 requirem=
ents specified for other data records.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I think this is clear enough.</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Specifically, if the</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server fails to decrypt any 0-RTT =
record following an accepted</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 &quot;early_data&quot; extension it MUST terminate the connection with =
a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;bad_record_mac&qu=
ot; alert as per Section 5.2.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; But probably better to s/any/an/.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Actually &qu=
ot;a&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the server r=
ejects the &quot;early_data&quot; extension, the client</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 application MAY opt to retransmit early data=
 once the handshake has</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b=
een completed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Better:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...] MAY opt to retransmit=
 as non-early data the application data</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 contained in the early data records</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note=
 that automatic re-transmission of early data</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 could result in assumptions about the status of the co=
nnection being</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 incorrect.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; This doesn&#39;t quite say what you want.=C2=A0 Better</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 Note that after connection establishment, the application may</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 consider the status of the connect=
ion to be different than it was</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 for early data, and so transmitting the same bytes as non-early</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 application data may not have=
 the same effect as transmitting them</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 as early application data.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Similarly,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be sent in error after th=
e handshake completes.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; A bit awkward.=C2=A0 Perhaps</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
Similarly,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 if early data =
assumes anything about the connection state, it might</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be erroneous to re-send the same data after th=
e handshake completes.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.11.=C2=
=A0 Pre-Shared Key Extension</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The &quot;pre_shared_key&quo=
t; extension is used to indicate the identity of</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshak=
e in association</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 with PSK=
 key establishment.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/indicate/negotiate/ -- because more than one can=
 be offered.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 selected_iden=
tity=C2=A0 The server&#39;s chosen identity expressed as a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(0-based) index into the id=
entities in the client&#39;s list.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think this is intended as an ind=
ex into the (abstract) vectors</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Offered=
Psks.identities and OfferedPsks.binders, as opposed to an</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; offset into the serialized data structures.=C2=A0 You=
 could be clearer with</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 selected_identity=C2=A0 The server=
&#39;s chosen identity expressed as a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(0-based) index into the vector of identities in=
 OfferedPsks.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">I think this is clear enough.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 identity=C2=A0 A =
label for a key.=C2=A0 For instance, a ticket defined in</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Appendix B.3.4 or a label for =
a pre-shared key established</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0externally.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; See issues regarding &quot;ticket&quot; i=
n section 1.1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">See above response.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (SNI) value was intended to be =
associated with the session (Section 3</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that=
 the SNI</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 value associated=
 with the session matches the one specified in the</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 resumption handshake.=C2=A0 However, in reality t=
he implementations were</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 n=
ot consistent on which of two supplied SNI values they would use,</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 leading to the consistency require=
ment being de-facto enforced by the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 clients.=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the SNI value is always explicitly sp=
ecified in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the resumption=
 handshake, and there is no need for the server to</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 associate an SNI value with the ticket.=C2=A0 Cli=
ents, however, SHOULD</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 sto=
re the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.6.1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; See issue regarding &quot=
;SNI&quot; in section 1.1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">See above response.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Implementor&#39;s note: the most straightforward way to impl=
ement the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 PSK/cipher suit=
e matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSK=
s.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; I think you mean:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Implementor&#39;s note: the mos=
t straightforward way for the server to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 implement the PSK/cipher suite choice requirements is to cho=
ose the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cipher suite firs=
t and then exclude any PSKs incompatible with the</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 chosen cipher suite.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I believe it is sufficiently clear.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; since this doesn&#39;t seem to =
describe an interaction between the server</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt; and the client, but simply how the server responds to one message.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 In order to accept PSK key</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 establishment, the server sends a &quot;pre_shared_key&quo=
t; extension</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 indicating t=
he selected identity.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think this sentence would read better as a sep=
arate paragraph.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Thi=
s extension MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. (This</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 facilitates implementation as descr=
ibed below.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; Given that the previous paragraph discussed the early_dat=
a extension,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;This extension&quot=
; isn&#39;t clear.=C2=A0 So s/This extension/The</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; &quot;pre_shared_key&quot; extension/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If this</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST ab=
ort the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s=
/does not validate/is not valid/=C2=A0 (An actor validates a value; a</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; value is validated.)</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.11.1.=C2=A0 Ticket Age</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The &quot;ob=
fuscated_ticket_age&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ticket age formed by taking the age=
 in milliseconds and adding the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 &quot;ticket_age_add&quot; value that was included with the ticket, =
see</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.6.1 modulo =
2^32.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; Clearer would be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...] &quot;ticket_age_add&qu=
ot; value that was in the NewSessionTicket for</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the ticket, modulo 2^32.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">This was fixed in a different way.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the &quot;ticket_lifetime&quot; field in=
 the NewSessionTicket message is in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 seconds but the &quot;obfuscated_ticket_age&quot; is in millisec=
onds.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; Expand to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the &quot;ticket_lifetime&quot; field in the NewSes=
sionTicket message is in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
seconds but the &quot;obfuscated_ticket_age&quot; and &quot;ticket_age_add&=
quot; fields</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 are in milli=
seconds.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">No, ticket_age_add is not in any units. It&#39;s just a number.</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.2.11.3.=
=C2=A0 Processing Order</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clients are permitted to &quot;st=
ream&quot; 0-RTT data until they receive the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server&#39;s Finished, only then sending the EndOfEarly=
Data message,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 followed by=
 the rest of the handshake.=C2=A0 In order to avoid deadlocks,</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 when accepting &quot;early_data&quot;=
, servers MUST process the client&#39;s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHello and then immediately send the ServerHello, rathe=
r than</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 waiting for the cl=
ient&#39;s EndOfEarlyData message.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This is awkward, and omits the rem=
ainder of the servers&#39; first flight</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
; messages.=C2=A0 Better is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clients are permitted to &quo=
t;stream&quot; 0-RTT data until they receive the</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server&#39;s Finished message, only then sending th=
e EndOfEarlyData</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 message,=
 and the rest of the handshake.=C2=A0 In order to avoid</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 deadlocks, when accepting early data, server=
s MUST process the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 client=
&#39;s ClientHello immediately upon receipt, and immediately send</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 all of its first flight messages f=
rom ServerHello through Finished,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 rather than waiting for the client&#39;s EndOfEarlyData message.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Chang=
ed differently.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.=C2=A0 Authenticati=
on Messages</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Certificate=C2=A0 The certificate to be used =
for authentication, and any</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supporting certificates in the chain.=C2=A0 Note that cert=
ificate-based</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0client authentication is not available in 0-RTT mode.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably bett=
er to say s/in 0-RTT mode/for 0-RTT data/ -- or perhaps</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;early data&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No. It&#39;s not available at all if yo=
u do 0-RTT, or even in PSK. I</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">updated accor=
dingly.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The following table defines the Handshake Context =
and MAC Base Key</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 for each=
 scenario:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt; Eh, what?=C2=A0 I think what you mean is that this table sp=
ecifies what</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; base keys are used for wh=
ich messages.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">No. It specifies which messages go into the various CV and</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">Finished computations.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; But &quot;Mode&quot; and &quot;Handshake</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; Context&quot; don&#39;t seem to be defined terms.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Handshake context is=
 defined immediately above.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&quot;A Handshake Context consisting of the set of me=
ssages to be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 included in the transcr=
ipt hash.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.1.=C2=A0 The Transcript Hash</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 M=
any of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 transcript hash.=C2=A0 This value is com=
puted by hashing the concatenation</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 of each included handshake message, including the handshake mess=
age</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 header carrying the h=
andshake message type and length fields, but not</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 including record layer headers.=C2=A0 I.e.,</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Th=
ere are a number of awkward spots in how this is phrased.=C2=A0 Better:</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 transcript hash.=C2=A0 Th=
is value is computed by hashing the concatenation</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of a sequence of messages in the handshake, with e=
ach message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 including the=
 TLS message type and length fields, but not any</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 headers of the underlying transport protocol.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No. This is=
 incorrect, because the TLS records are not included.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Left as-is.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... MN) =
=3D Hash(M1 || M2 ... MN)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Usually, symbol for &quot;the n-th message&q=
uot; would use lower-case &quot;n&quot; as the</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; index, and one usually puts the operator before and after &quot;..=
.&quot;.=C2=A0 Also</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; add verbal explana=
tion:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The transcript hash of messages M1 through Mn is:</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Transcript-Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) =3D Hash(M1 |=
| M2 || ... || Mn)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">I changed to Mn and added the ||s. I don&#39;t think the text =
is needed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; Continue,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 As an exception to this general rule, =
when the server has responded to a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the first ClientHello is</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 replaced with a special sy=
nthetic handshake message of message type</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;message_hash&quot; whose data part is Hash(first Cli=
entHello).=C2=A0 I.e.,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, Hello=
RetryRequest, ... Mn) =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Hash(message_hash ||=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 /* Handshake =
type (1 byte) */</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 00 00 Hash.length ||=C2=A0 =C2=A0/* Handshake message =
length, in bytes (3 bytes) */</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Hash(ClientHello1) ||=C2=A0 /* Hash of C=
lientHello1 */</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest || ... || Mn)</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The rea=
son for this construction is to allow the server not</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 store state after sending HelloRetryRequest by =
storing just the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 hash of =
the first ClientHello in the cookie, rather than requiring</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 it to store all of the ClientHello or th=
e entire intermediate hash</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 state (see Section 4.2.2).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For concreteness, =
the transcript hash is always taken from the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 following sequence of handshake messages, starting at t=
he first</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; This is awkward.=C2=A0 Perhaps</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the transcri=
pt hash is always of the following sequence of</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello=
 and including</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 only those=
 messages that we sent/received:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keep=
ing a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 running transcript =
hash value based on the negotiated hash.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably s/negotiated hash/ne=
gotiated hash function/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Also, this needs to include the modification =
of truncating the last</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; message if it i=
s to include the transcript hash.=C2=A0 I think you need</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; something like:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the last message, =
Mn, is to include the transcript hash, then</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the transcript hash is always the last field of the mess=
age, and</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 that message is =
first truncated by removing that field from the</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 message.=C2=A0 (The message length field of Mn is un=
modified; it includes</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the=
 length of the transcript hash.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Transcript-=
Hash(M1, M2, ... Mn) =3D Hash(M1 || M2 || ... || Truncate(Mn))</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Messages never inc=
lude themselves in the transcript hash. There</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">is a truncated case, but it is handled differently, with the</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">message passed in as pre-truncated.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.2.=C2=A0 Certificate</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the c=
orresponding certificate type extension</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (&quot;server_certificate_type&quot; or &quot;client_certifi=
cate_type&quot;) was not</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type was</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 negotiated, then each Certific=
ateEntry contains a DER-encoded X.509</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificate.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This needs a reference to RFC 7250 to defin=
e certificate type</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; extension.=C2=A0 Al=
so, see the general issues regarding extensions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. It is cited earlier.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 Each following certificate SHOULD</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 directly certify one preceding it.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The phrase &quo=
t;one preceding it&quot; allows extraneous certificates in the</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; list, as &quot;one preceding it&quot; doesn&#39;t =
usually require that it be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; immediately=
 preceding.=C2=A0 I think you mean &quot;the one preceding it&quot;, which<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; does require it to be immediately prec=
eding, and thus does not allow</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; extrane=
ous certificates in the chain.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, although the real world is much messier.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.2.1.=C2=A0 OCSP Status and SCT Extensio=
ns</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 CertificateStatus message.=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the serve=
r&#39;s OCSP information</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
is carried in an extension in the CertificateEntry containing the</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 associated certificate.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Clear=
er to phrase it:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...] in the CertificateEntry containing=
 the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 associated certifica=
te in the Certificate message.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 CertificateRequest=
 message.=C2=A0 If the client opts to send an OCSP</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 response, the body of its &quot;status_request&qu=
ot; extension MUST be a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 C=
ertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066].</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/its &quot;status=
_request&quot; extension&quot;/the &quot;status_request&quot; extension in<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; its Certificate message/.</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.2.2.=C2=A0 Server Certificate Selection</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a =
signature</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm adver=
tised by the client, if they are able to provide such</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 a chain (see Section 4.2.3).</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably b=
etter a/All certificates/Each certificate/.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/they are/the server is/</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">s/they/i=
t/</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using [..=
.]</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
; The purpose of this paragraph is not clear.=C2=A0 Was &quot;server&quot; =
meant?=C2=A0 If</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; so, it seems to be red=
undant.=C2=A0 I think it is intended to discuss how</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; the client processes the (alleged) certificate chain presente=
d by the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; server, in which case, it&#39=
;s a sharp change of focus for this section.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; That could be aided by moving this paragraph to the end of the secti=
on</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; and adding some words:</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">It&#39;s not. This=
 is about how the server decides what to send and</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">directly follows from the previous paragraph.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the cli=
ent cannot construct an acceptable chain from the</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificates provided by the server and decides to=
 abort the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 handshake, the=
n it MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificate-related alert (by default, &quot;unsup=
ported_certificate&quot;;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 see Section 6.2 for more).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; But it would probably be better to integra=
te it into section 4.4.2.4.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.2.3.=C2=A0 Client Certificate Selectio=
n</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 If the CertificateRequest message contained a n=
on-empty</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&qu=
ot;oid_filters&quot; extension, the end-entity certificate MUST match the</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0extension OID=
s recognized by the client, as described in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.2.5.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; More exact would be &qu=
ot;must match the extension OID/value pairs that are</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt; recognized by the client.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4.2.4.=C2=A0 Receiving a Ce=
rtificate Message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It seems inconsistent that the client can send an em=
pty Certificate</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; message, but the serve=
r cannot, even though the server can omit</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; sending the Certificate message.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">That&#39;s the way it has been since TLS 1.0=
 at least. We&#39;re not changing</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">it now.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.4=
.3.=C2=A0 Certificate Verify</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 This message is used to prov=
ide explicit proof that an endpoint</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
 I&#39;d prefer s/to its certificate/to the certificate it has presented/.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagr=
ee.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The discussion of how &quot;signatu=
re&quot; is formed is awkward and I&#39;m not</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; sure I understand it.=C2=A0 E.g., the digital signature is computed=
 &quot;over&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; a string, but one pa=
rt of that string is &quot;the content to be signed&quot;.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think it could be made clearer as:</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.2.3 for the definition=
 of this field).=C2=A0 The signature is a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 digital signature using that algorithm.=C2=A0 The string t=
hat is signed</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 is the conc=
atenation of:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A string that consists of octet 32 =
(0x20) repeated 64 times</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 The context string</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A single 0 byte which serves as a separator</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; But=
 that leaves unclear what &quot;context string&quot; and &quot;Handshake Co=
ntext&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; are.=C2=A0 I think you wan=
t to define those back in 4.4.1 (and probably</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; also in 1.1)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">The both are defined clearly in 4.4.1.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; as both being the concatenation of the messages that are</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; in the transcript to this point.=C2=A0 =
I also assume that the Certificate</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Ver=
ify message is truncated when it is put into the Transcript-Hash</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; and &quot;context string&quot;, but that needs t=
o be stated.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">That&#39;s not how it&#39;s done. I believe a close reading of 4.4.1=
 will</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">make this clear.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt; 4.4.4.=C2=A0 Finished</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The key used to co=
mpute the finished message is computed from the</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/finished/Finished/</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The key used to compute the finished message is computed f=
rom the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Base key defined =
in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This is correct, but you =
have to read further to understand the key</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt; described here isn&#39;t the key that encrypts the finished message.=
=C2=A0 It</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; would be easier to understan=
d if the text was rearranged:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Structure of this message:<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0struct {</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque verify_data[Hash.length];<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} Finished;<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The verify_data value is computed as follows:</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0finished_key =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, &quot;f=
inished&quot;, &quot;&quot;, Hash.length)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ve=
rify_data =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0HMAC(finished_key,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Transcript-Hash(Handsh=
ake Context,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0* Only included if present.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; And this is another instance where=
 the poorly-defined &quot;Handshake</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Co=
ntext&quot; appears.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. 4.4.1 appropriately sets the context for this.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Any records following a 1-R=
TT Finished message MUST be encrypted</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 under the appropriate application traffic key as described in=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 7.2.</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Are th=
ere any non-1-RTT Finished messages?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">There used to be. I updated a bit.</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; And aren&#=
39;t all application</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; data records encr=
ypted under the &quot;appropriate&quot; key?=C2=A0 Or is an</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;application traffic key&quot; different from th=
e keys used for application</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; data early=
 in the connection?=C2=A0 This needs to be rephrased somehow, but</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I can&#39;t guess in what way.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.6.=C2=A0=
 Post-Handshake Messages</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This section name is awkward.=C2=A0 Of course=
, there are messages after the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; handsha=
ke.=C2=A0 I think the problem is that there are &quot;handshake</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; messages&quot;, messages with handshake types (or=
 content type</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;handshake&quot;), =
that are not part of &quot;the handshake&quot;, the initial</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; exchange of handshake-type messages.=C2=A0 In the end=
, you need to decide</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; what terminology =
to use so that the title of this section makes sense.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The WG decided on the termi=
nology that appears here.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 the appropriate application traffic key.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Is there a strict acco=
unting of what messages are encrypted using</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; which key?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">I think so.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.6.1.=C2=A0 New=
 Session Ticket Message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 message, it MAY send a NewSession=
Ticket message.=C2=A0 This message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 creates a unique association between the ticket value and a secr=
et</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 PSK derived from the r=
esumption master secret.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It would be useful to mention that the resump=
tion_master_secret is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; defined/computed=
 in section 7.1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Does &quot;ticket valu=
e&quot; mean the NewSessionTicket structure or the</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; &quot;ticket&quot; field within it.=C2=A0 See issues regarding=
 &quot;ticket&quot; for section</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 1.1.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">It mean=
s the ticket field. I don&#39;t think this is particularly confusing.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 (Section 4.2.11).=C2=A0 Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a singl=
e</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; Note the conflation here of &quot;ticket&quot; with &quot;NewSession=
Ticket message&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Any ticket MUST only be resumed wit=
h a cipher suite that has the same</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 KDF hash algorithm as that used to establish the original connec=
tion.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; How is a ticket &quot;resumed&quot;?</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">See S 2.2, where we define &quot;=
resumption&quot; I added some text there.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; Also, since in a &quot;resumption&quot; connection, the ticket that is u=
sed is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (or refers to) a PSK, the above=
 statement corresponds to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the statemen=
t &quot;In addition, it MUST verify that the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; following values are consistent with those associated with the</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; selected PSK:&quot; in section 4.2.10.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for th=
e server</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificate pres=
ented in the original session, and SHOULD only resume</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 if the SNI value matches the one used in the o=
riginal session.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; What does it mean to say a client &quot;resumes&quot;=
?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">See =
above.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Here we suddenly descend into th=
e usage of what seems to be an</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; extensi=
on, server_name, which is presumably optional and logically</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; added on to TLS rather than being an integral part of=
 it.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">A=
s with many IETF protocols, extensions are an integral part</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">of TLS, though some extensions are actually not needed</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">for basic operations.</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; Also the logic isn&#39;t described very cleanly; I think it mea=
ns &quot;A</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; client must abort resuming =
a connection if the ServerHello message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
; does not contain a server_name extension whose value is a valid SNI</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; for the server certificate presented in the=
 original session ...&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">That&#39;s not how SNI works. It&#39;s not a negotia=
tion, it&#39;s a statement.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; All of this seems to require that a client MAY N=
OT resume a connection</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; using a ticket =
issued during a connection in which the server did not</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; present a certificate for itself.=C2=A0 But that constrain=
t wasn&#39;t stated</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; in section 2.2, de=
spite being a global constraint on the structure of</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; sessions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">That&#39;s not a requirement, and I&#39;m not sure how yo=
u&#39;re getting</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">that.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt; Or am I wrong in believing that the client chooses to resum=
e the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; connection by placing the ticket=
 in the ClientHello *before* it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; receiv=
es the ServerHello (which contains the SNI)?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">You&#39;re right about how the clien=
t does it, but wrong about where</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">SNI goes. =
It&#39;s a statement by the client.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Thi=
s paragraph</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; seems to be written as if =
the client decides to resume after receiving</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; ServerHello.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ticket_lifetime=C2=A0 Indicates the l=
ifetime in seconds as a 32-bit</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of=
 ticket</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0issu=
ance.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; Probably better to s/the time of ticket issuance/the time the</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; NewSessionTicket was sent to the client/=
, unless &quot;issuance&quot;/&quot;to issue&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; is explicitly defined somewhere.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. This is plenty clear.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ticket=C2=A0 The value of the=
 ticket to be used as the PSK identity.=C2=A0 The</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ticket itself is an opaque label.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
; This shows the ambiguities around &quot;ticket&quot;; this specification =
says</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; that &quot;&#39;ticket&#39; is th=
e value of the ticket to be used as the PSK</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; identity&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Yes, that&#39;s what it is.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; Is it intended that the &quot;ticket&quot; field of NewSessionTicket =
will become</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the &quot;identity&quot; f=
ield of PskIdentity.OfferedPsks.PreSharedKeyExtension?</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Yep.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 max_early_data_size=C2=A0 The maximum amount of=
 0-RTT data that the client</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is allowed to send when using this ticket, in bytes.=C2=A0=
 Only</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Applic=
ation Data payload (i.e., plaintext but not padding or the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0inner content type byte) is=
 counted.=C2=A0 A server receiving more than</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data SH=
OULD terminate the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0connection with an &quot;unexpected_message&quot; alert.=C2=A0 Note =
that servers</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0that reject early data due to lack of cryptographic material will</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0be unable to diffe=
rentiate padding from content, so clients SHOULD</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0NOT depend on being able to send large=
 quantities of padding in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0early data records.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The last sentence assumes that a s=
erver that &quot;reject early data due to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; lack of cryptographic material&quot; will be strict and count all bytes=
 in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; early data messages against the ma=
x_early_data_size quota.=C2=A0 However, a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; server in such a situation could be liberal and not bother counting</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; any bytes -- since it will be discarding =
early data messages</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (immediately after=
 discovering that it can&#39;t decrypt them), it never</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; has to buffer more than one of them.=C2=A0 Unless I&#39;m =
overlooking</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; something, this advice isn=
&#39;t needed, since a server in this situation</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt; isn&#39;t buffering early data.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No, because you don&#39;t know what a s=
erver will do.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 4.6.2.=C2=A0 Post-Handsh=
ake Authentication</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 All of the client&#39;s</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 messages for a given response MUST appe=
ar consecutively on the wire</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 with no intervening messages of other types.</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Better, &quot;consecu=
tively in the underlying transport stream&quot;.=C2=A0 But that</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; is a little vague given the message/fragment/reco=
rd mechanism.=C2=A0 More</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; exactly,</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 All of the client&#39;s messages for a given response MUST ap=
pear</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 consecutively on the=
 wire, that is, the records containing the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 fragments of the messages composing the client&#39;s resp=
onse must</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 appear consecut=
ively in the underlying transport stream.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; 4.6.3.=C2=A0 Key and IV Update</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you want to promote the=
 first paragraph before the data</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; struc=
ture definition.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 5.=C2=A0 Record =
Protocol</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; and</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; 5.1.=C2=A0 Record Layer</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The text isn&#39;t very clear abou=
t the message/fragment/record mechanism.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; The text wants to consider the data for each content type to consist</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; of a series of messages.=C2=A0 The messag=
es are cut into fragments.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Adjacent fr=
agments within one content type stream can be concatenated</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; to form the content of TLSPlaintext structures.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
One problem is that despite this model, the boundary between messages</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; isn&#39;t carried through the transport.=C2=
=A0 For application data, message</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; boun=
daries are lost entirely.=C2=A0 For handshake and alert content types,</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; there are some complex restrictions how th=
eir message boundaries show</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; up as reco=
rd boundaries, but the actual framing of messages is done</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;in band&quot; by the message length fields.=C2=
=A0 A closer description of the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; servic=
es TLS provides is that the data for each content type is a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; stream that can be broken arbitrarily into fragments =
that are the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; content of records, excep=
t:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; - The boundaries of alert messages must be boundaries of the record=
s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0that carry them and no r=
ecord boundary can be introduced into an</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0alert message.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - If two records contain fragments of th=
e same handshake message, all</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0records between them must contain only fragments of that handshake</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0message.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - If there is =
a key change between the sending of two handshake</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0messages, there must be a record boundary between t=
hem.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes=
.=C2=A0 Implementations</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key chan=
ge</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0align wit=
h a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0connection with an &quot;un=
expected_message&quot; alert.=C2=A0 Because the</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHell=
o, Finished, and KeyUpdate</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0messages can immediately precede a key change, implementat=
ions</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST se=
nd these messages in alignment with a record boundary.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Is this descrip=
tion correct?=C2=A0 As written, it says &quot;because a key</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; change can happen after message X, there must be a re=
cord boundary</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; after message X&quot;, w=
hich isn&#39;t exactly the same as &quot;Handshake messages</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; MUST NOT span key changes&quot; -- unless there is al=
ways a key change</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; following these mess=
age types, in which case s/can immediately</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt; precede/always precede/.=C2=A0 I think the three points listed above g=
ive a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; clearer and more accurate versio=
n.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Cli=
entHello and ServerHello may not appear before a key change.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">Left as-is.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 types, even if those fragments =
contain padding.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Presumably implementations MUST NOT send zero-length =
fragments of alert</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; messages also.</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">That&#39;s=
 stated elsewhere.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When re=
cord protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 structures are written directly onto the wire=
.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; Better &quot;... sent directly using the underlying transport protoc=
ol&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">Editor discretion.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 5.2.=C2=A0 Recor=
d Payload Protection</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I *think* what&#39;s going on with record protect=
ion is:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; - The TLSPlaintext is turned into a TLSInnerPlaintext by movin=
g the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0type field, removing=
 the length field, and copying &quot;fragment&quot; to</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;content&quot;.=C2=A0 (Why do the structu=
res use different names for the data</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0fragment?)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - The encryption is done by:</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0AEADEncrypted =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, plaint=
ext)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0where plaintext is TLSInnerPlaintext and AEADEncrypte=
d becomes</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSCiphertext.en=
crypted_record.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; - TLSCiphertext is transmitted.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; But the text doe=
sn&#39;t say this at all plainly.=C2=A0 I would add before</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;AEAD algorithms take...&quot;:</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 The TLSPlaintext is converted into a TLSInnerPlaintext by copying the</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 type field, removing the l=
ength field, and copying the fragment</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 field.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">I made a few changes, but I don&#39;t believe this text is=
 necessary.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (assuming we rename &quot;c=
ontent&quot; to &quot;fragment&quot;)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Then replace the equation by:</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 encrypted_record =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0AEAD-Encrypt(endpoint_write_key, n=
once, TLSInnerPlaintext)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The key is either the</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 client_write_key or the serve=
r_write_key, the nonce is derived from</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the sequence number (see Section 5.3) and the client_write_iv=
 or</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server_write_iv, and =
the additional data input is empty (zero</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 length).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It would be clearer to move the reference to =
read &quot;the nonce is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; derived from t=
he sequence number and the client_write_iv or</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; server_write_iv (see Section 5.3)&quot; as section 5.3 describes bo=
th the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; sequence number and the derivat=
ion.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">D=
one.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; Similarly, the decryption algorithm is better expressed by</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSInnerPlaintext =3D</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0AEAD-Decrypt(peer_write_key, no=
nce, encrypted_record)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 This limit</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 is derived from the maximum TLSPlaintext=
 length of 2^14 octets + 1</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
s/TLSPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- the maximum length of</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; TLSPlaintext is 2^14 + 5.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; 5.3.=C2=A0 Per-Record Nonce</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The appropriate se=
quence number is incremented by one after reading</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 or writing each record.=C2=A0 The first record tra=
nsmitted under a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 particul=
ar traffic key MUST use sequence number 0.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think the first and secon=
d paragraphs could be profitably combined:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A 64-bit seque=
nce number is maintained separately for reading and</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 writing records and is incremented by one after =
reading or writing</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 each r=
ecord.=C2=A0 Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of a connection and whenever the k=
ey for that direction is changed;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key uses=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 sequence number 0.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should =
not wrap.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt; The sense of &quot;should&quot; is not clear.=C2=A0 I think =
what you want to say is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Because the size of sequence numb=
ers is 64 bits, there is no need to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 allow sequence numbers to wrap.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. This is a statement about th=
e future.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Each AEAD algori=
thm will specify a range of possible lengths for the</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 per-record nonce, from N_MIN bytes to N_MAX byt=
es of input</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; I think this is clearer (as it makes clear where N_MIN com=
es from):</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Each AEAD algorithm specifies an N_MIN and N_MA=
X, which give the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 range o=
f possible lengths in bytes of the per-record nonce.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt; 5.4.=C2=A0 Record Padding</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Padding is a =
string of zero-valued bytes appended to the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ContentType field before encryption.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; More exact wou=
ld be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes following =
the type field</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 in TLSInne=
rPlaintext.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The presen=
ce of padding does not change the overall record size</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 limitations - the full encoded TLSInnerPlainte=
xt MUST NOT exceed 2^14</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 +=
 1 octets.=C2=A0 If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 example by the max_fragment_lengt=
h extension from [RFC6066], then the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the co=
ntent</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 type and padding.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; I think you want s/encoded TLSInnerPlaintext/TLSInnerPlaintext/ -- all<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; data structures are defined with a con=
crete representation, so</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;encoded=
&quot; is redundant, but &quot;encoded&quot; could be confused with</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;encrypted&quot; and the encrypted plain=
text can be longer than the plaintext.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">People know what encoded versus encrypted =
means.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the maximum frag=
ment length is reduced, as for</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 example by the max_fragment_length extension from [RFC6066], then th=
e</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 reduced limit applies t=
o the full plaintext, including the content</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 type and padding.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This needs clarification.=C2=A0=
 I think you mean that if the m.f.l. is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
; reduced, then the limit on TLSInnerPlaintext is reduced to m.f.l.+1,</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; but that&#39;s not what this says.=C2=A0 O=
TOH, if this text is accurate, the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; max=
imum length of the fragment proper is m.f.l.-1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No, that&#39;s never been the cas=
e. MFL starts as 2^14 + 1.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 6.=C2=A0 Ale=
rt Protocol</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Alert messages convey a description of the al=
ert and a legacy field</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 th=
at conveyed the severity of the message in previous versions of</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 TLS.=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, the severity =
is implicit in the type of alert being</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 sent, and the &#39;level&#39; field can safely be ignored.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; I think at this point you want to insert &quot;Alerts are divided into t=
wo</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; classes: closure alerts and error a=
lerts.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Stateful implementations of tickets (as in m=
any clients)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD disca=
rd tickets associated with failed connections.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; What is a &quot;ticket&=
quot; here?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">It&#39;s synechdoche for &quot;PSKs and the associated ticket name&qu=
ot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; And what are the &quot;associations=
&quot; in question?=C2=A0 E.g., presumably it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; includes the ticket used when attempting to establish a connection =
if</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the attempt fails.=C2=A0 But if a N=
ewSessionTicket is received during a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; c=
onnection, and the connection is later aborted, does the client have</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; to discard the remembered NewSessionTicket?<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I clar=
ified this somewhat.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 All=
 the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent as fatal and MUST</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be treated as fatal regardless of t=
he AlertLevel in the message.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 Unknown alert types MUST be treated as fatal.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This was remarkab=
ly confusing until I figured out that the first</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt; &quot;fatal&quot; means &quot;with AlertLevel &quot;fatal&quot;&q=
uot; and the second and third</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;fa=
tal&quot; mean &quot;indicates abortive closure&quot;!=C2=A0 Better:</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent with AlertL=
evel</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;fatal&quot; an=
d when received MUST be treated as error alerts</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 regardless of the AlertLevel in the message.=C2=A0 U=
nknown alert types</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST b=
e treated as error alerts.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 6.1.=C2=A0 Closure Alerts</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 user_=
canceled=C2=A0 This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0canceling the hands=
hake for some reason unrelated to a protocol</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0failure.=C2=A0 If a user cancels an operat=
ion after the handshake is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0complete, just closing the connection by sending a &quot;c=
lose_notify&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0is more appropriate.=C2=A0 This alert SHOULD be followed by a</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;close_notify&=
quot;.=C2=A0 This alert is generally a warning.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; What does &quot;This a=
lert is generally a warning.&quot; mean?=C2=A0 What is it a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; warning of?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Changed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Each party MUST send a &qu=
ot;close_notify&quot; alert before closing its write</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 side of the connection, unless it has already s=
ent some other fatal</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 aler=
t.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt; This implies that close_notify is a &quot;fatal alert&quot; (proper=
ly, error</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; alert).=C2=A0 And &quot;befo=
re closing the write side of the connection&quot; is not</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; clear, since sending close_notify *is* closing the write=
 side of the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; connection.=C2=A0 Better:=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Each party MUST send a &quot;close_notify&quot; alert be=
fore closing the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 write si=
de of the underlying transport connection, unless it has</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 already sent some other error alert.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; (Unless I&#39;m mistaken regarding what is in=
tended.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; I take it that there is no &quot;close read side&quot; operat=
ion.=C2=A0 (If that</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; existed, TLS could=
 generate the &quot;broken pipe&quot; error -- the sender</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; wants to transmit more data but the receiver is unwil=
ling to receive</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; it.)</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Yes.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the application protocol using TLS pr=
ovides that any data may be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 closed, the TLS implementation=
 MUST receive a &quot;close_notify&quot; alert</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 before indicating end-of-data to the application-laye=
r.=C2=A0 No part of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 this =
standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 profile for TLS manages its data tra=
nsport, including when</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 co=
nnections are opened or closed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This isn&#39;t clear too me.=C2=A0 The=
 second sentence seems to mean:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A usage profile for TLS s=
pecified how it manages its data</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 transport, including when connections are opened or closed.=C2=A0 N=
o</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 part of this standard s=
hould be taken to dictate the manner in</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 which a usage profile for TLS manages its data transport.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t; But I can&#39;t figure out what the first sentence means.=C2=A0 It seems=
 to</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; mean &quot;If ... a TLS implementa=
tion MUST receive a &quot;close_notify&quot; alert</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; before indicating end-of-data to its application-layer.&quot;,=
 but that&#39;s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; obvious behavior, what=
 else would cause it to signal EOD?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Some non-TLS traffic.</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note: It is assumed that closing the write side o=
f a connection</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 reliably d=
elivers pending data before destroying the transport.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you mean=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a con=
nection</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 will cause the pe=
er TLS implementation to reliably deliver all</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 transmitted data before [what?]</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No, that&#39;s not what it m=
eans. It means that you deliver the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">close_n=
otify before sending FIN (if on TCP).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 7.=C2=A0 Cryptographic Computations</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets whi=
ch are</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 combined to create=
 the actual working keying material, as detailed</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 below.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably delete &quot;actual&quot;.=C2=
=A0 Most uses of &quot;actual&quot; in current writing</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt; (including mine) can be profitably deleted.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 7.1.=C2=A0 Key Schedule</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Given the terminolog=
y in RFC 5869, struct HkdfLabel probably should be</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; called HkdfInfo, as it is the &quot;info&quot; argument to HKD=
F-Expand.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Messages are=
 the concatenation of the indicated handshake messages,</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/Messages are=
/Messages is/!</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Given a set=
 of n InputSecrets, the final &quot;master secret&quot; is computed</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 by iteratively invoking HKDF-Ext=
ract with InputSecret_1, [...]</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This is hard to follow.=C2=A0 If I unde=
rstand correctly, this is a general</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; de=
scription of the mechanism that is diagrammed below.=C2=A0 But, e.g.,</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; &quot;secret&quot; is used for at least two=
 categories of quantities.=C2=A0 It would</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; be clearer to phrase this:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Generally, we use a constr=
uction that takes as input a sequence of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 n InputSecrets and from them computes a sequence of derived=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 secrets.=C2=A0 The initi=
al derived secret is simply a string of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Hash.length bytes set to zeros.=C2=A0 Each successive derive=
d secret is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 computed by i=
nvoking HKDF-Extract with an InputSecret and the</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 preceding derived secret as inputs.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, the construction</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 proceeds as diagrammed below, w=
ith the InputSecrets on the left</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 side and the derived secrets passing as shown by the downward</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 arrows.=C2=A0 The InputSecrets=
 are added in the following order, where</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 if a given InputSecret is not available, then the 0-value i=
s used</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 in its place:</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&lt;---</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I have u=
pdated this somewhat.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 -=C2=A0 HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the t=
op and</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the I=
KM argument from the left.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Append &quot;with its output to the bottom =
and the name of the output at</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the righ=
t&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt; 7.2.=C2=A0 Updating Traffic Keys and IVs</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you wan=
t to remove &quot;and IVs&quot; here.=C2=A0 IVs aren&#39;t mentioned in</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; this section.=C2=A0 Of course, changing t=
he traffic key changes the IV, but</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; it =
also changes the write key, and the write key isn&#39;t mentioned in</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; the section title.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; 7.3.=C2=A0 Traffic Key Calculation</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you want to titl=
e the section &quot;Write Key and IV Calculation&quot;.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">No. These are the traffic=
 keys, which are derived from traffic secrets.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; And you want to (again) de-ge=
nericize the text:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The traffic keying material (*_write_k=
ey and *_write_iv) is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">o&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ge=
nerated from the following input values:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A secret=
 value, the applicable *_traffic_secret</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A purpose=
 value indicating the specific value being generated</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=
=A0 The length of the key</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 7.4.1.=C2=
=A0 Finite Field Diffie-Hellman</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 For finite field groups, =
a conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 performed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think you need a reference for this!<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">TODO.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 7.5.=C2=A0 Exporters</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
A separate</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 interface for =
the early exporter is RECOMMENDED, especially on a</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server where a single interface can make the earl=
y exporter</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 inaccessible.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt; What does &quot;where a single interface can make the early exporter</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; inaccessible&quot; mean?=C2=A0 If you d=
on&#39;t have a separate interface for the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt; early exporter, how does &quot;a single interface&quot; make it inacce=
ssible?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">The handshake might complete in the meantime.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; 8.1.=C2=A0 Single-Use Tickets</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the tickets are=
 not self-contained but rather are database keys,</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 and the corresponding PSKs are deleted upon use, t=
hen connections</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 establish=
ed using one PSK enjoy forward secrecy.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; What does &quot;one PSK&quot; =
mean here?=C2=A0 Do you mean &quot;established using such a</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; PSK&quot; (equivalently &quot;established using such =
a ticket&quot;)?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">I just changed it to &quot;a PSK&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Also, the question again ar=
ises as to what a &quot;ticket&quot; *is*.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Because this m=
echanism requires sharing the session database between</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server nodes in environments with multiple di=
stributed servers, it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Probably more conventional to say &quot;requires=
 a shared database between</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; all server =
instances&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 8.2.=C2=A0 Clien=
t Hello Recording</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The first paragraph is hard to follow.=C2=A0 I think=
 it could be clarified</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; along these lin=
es:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 An alternative form of anti-replay is to record a uni=
que value</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 derived from th=
e ClientHello (generally either the random value or</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the PSK binder) and reject duplicates.=C2=A0 Rec=
ording all ClientHellos</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 c=
auses state to grow without bound, but a server can instead retain</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHellos only within a given =
time window and use the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &=
quot;obfuscated_ticket_age&quot; to determine whether the ClientHello was</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 generated by the client re=
cently.=C2=A0 Thus, the server can ensure that</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 it only allows 0-RTT data in connections established =
by</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 non-duplicate ClientHe=
llos which were generated by the client</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 within the recording window.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The server=
 MUST derive the storage key only from validated sections</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of the ClientHello.=C2=A0 If the ClientH=
ello contains multiple PSK</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 identities, then an attacker can create multiple ClientHellos with</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 different binder values for t=
he less-preferred identity on the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 assumption that the server will not verify it, as recommended by=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.2.11.=C2=A0 I.=
e., if the client sends PSKs A and B but the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server prefers A, then the attacker can change the bind=
er for B</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 without affectin=
g the binder for A.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; At this point, a conditional needs to be inserted;=
 otherwise the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; argument you&#39;re mak=
ing is only implicit.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the server uses the binder for B=
 as part of the storage key,</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 these variations on the ClientHello will not be detected by the</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 server as duplicates of each oth=
er, and the server will accept all</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 of them.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Then continue with:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 This may cau=
se side effects such as replay cache</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 pollution, although any 0-RTT data will not be decryptable be=
cause it</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 will use differe=
nt keys.=C2=A0 If the validated binder or the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientHello.random are used as the storage key, then t=
his attack is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 not possibl=
e.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I r=
ewrote this a little bit.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 When implementations are freshly started, they SHOULD reject 0-RTT a=
s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 long as any portion of =
their recording window overlaps the startup</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 time.=C2=A0 Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting re=
plays which were</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 original=
ly sent during that period.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think this needs a couple of changes of =
phrasing:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 When an implementation is restarted with a clea=
red recording</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 memory, it =
SHOULD reject 0-RTT as long as the startup time is</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 within the recording window.=C2=A0 Otherwise, it =
runs the risk of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 acceptin=
g replays of ClientHellos which were sent during the</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 previous execution.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; 8.3.=C2=A0 Freshness Checks</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Variations in cl=
ient and server clock rates are likely to be minimal,</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 though potentially with gross time corrections=
.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; What does &quot;gross time corrections&quot; mean?=C2=A0 I think you=
 mean &quot;with</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; moments of large chan=
ge in the clock time&quot;, but that isn&#39;t a feature</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt; of the clock *rate*.=C2=A0 I think this is more accurate=
:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Differences between client and server clock times are l=
ikely to be</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 minimal, thou=
gh there will sometimes be gross differences due to</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 uninitialized clocks and misconfigured time zone=
s.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I r=
ewrote this a little bit</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A=
fter early data is accepted, records may continue to be streamed</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 to the server over a longer time pe=
riod.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt; More clear as</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 After the server accepts early d=
ata is accepted, the client may</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 continue to send early data to the server over a longer time period<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 than the freshness window=
 for ClientHellos.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">Not necessary.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 9.1.=C2=A0 =
Mandatory-to-Implement Cipher Suites</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A TLS-compliant ap=
plication MUST support digital signatures with</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha=
256 (for</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 CertificateVerif=
y and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256.</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It seems that ecdsa_s=
ecp256r1_sha256 is missing a statement of what</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; uses it must be supported for.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">That is because it must simply be support=
ed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 9.2.=C2=A0 Mandatory-to-Implement E=
xtensions</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 If containing a &quot;supported_groups&=
quot; extension, it MUST also contain</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0a &quot;key_share&quot; extension, and vice vers=
a.=C2=A0 An empty</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0KeyShare.client_shares vector is permitted.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think this is a bi=
t better expressed as:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 If containing a &quot;supp=
orted_groups&quot; extension, it MUST also contain</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0a &quot;key_share&quot; extension (w=
hich may contain an empty</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0KeyShare.client_shares vector), and vice versa.</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;server_name&quot; extensi=
on with applications capable of using it.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I&#39;m not clear what the t=
est is for &quot;applications capable of using</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt; SNI&quot;.=C2=A0 I think you want to turn the conditional around:<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 An application profile MAY require that the endpoint&#39;=
s TLS</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 implementation supp=
orts use of the &quot;server_name&quot; extension.</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree. This was subject to =
WG consensus.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 9.3.=C2=A0 Protocol Invar=
iants</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A server receiving a ClientHello MUST corre=
ctly ignore all</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Otherwise, it may f=
ail to interoperate with newer clients.=C2=A0 In TLS</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A01.3, a client receiving a Certific=
ateRequest or NewSessionTicket</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This=
 needs to be split, because the two parts are about different roles:</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignor=
e all</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0unreco=
gnized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Otherwise, it may fail to inter=
operate with newer clients.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 -=C2=A0 In TLS 1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0NewSessionTicket =
MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; 11.=C2=A0 IANA Considera=
tions</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 TLS Alert Registry: Future values are alloc=
ated via Standards</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0Action [RFC8126].=C2=A0 IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registr=
y</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to include=
 values for &quot;missing_extension&quot; and</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;certificate_required&quot;.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It=
 would be nice to add a finer-grained &quot;minor alert code&quot; registry=
.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">As n=
oted, I do not believe this change is appropriate.</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; Appendix A.=C2=A0 State Machine</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; It would be helpful if the=
 state diagrams were extended to describe</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; the activity on the &quot;control channel&quot; (handshake and alert co=
ntent</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; types) after CONNECTED, that is,=
 what happens while the connection is</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; =
established and how connections are shut down.</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I took a look at this and conclude=
d it would make matters worse.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Appendix=
 B.=C2=A0 Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; There is no lis=
ting of the value structure corresponding to each</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt; extension type.=C2=A0 Extensions collectively are only defined =
as:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ExtensionType extension_type;</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque extension_data&lt;0..2^16-1&=
gt;;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 } Extension;</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Th=
is is a problem because the name of the value struct is not</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; systematically derived from the name of the extension=
_type value!</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; E.g., &quot;signature_alg=
orithms&quot; and &quot;signature_algorithms_cert&quot; use</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; SignatureSchemeList as a value, and you can only reli=
ably discover</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; that by searching throug=
h the whole of the text.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">I have not found other places where we did this particul=
arly</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">helpful.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt; B.4.=C2=A0 Cipher Suites</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A symmetric cipher suite =
defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 hash algorithm to be used with HKDF.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Better phrased:=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 A symmetric cipher suite is the pair of an AEAD algorith=
m and a</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 hash algorithm to=
 be used with HKDF.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">Disagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; C.3.=C2=A0 Impl=
ementation Pitfalls</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 As a server, do you send a He=
lloRetryRequest to clients which</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0support a compatible (EC)DHE group but do not predict =
it in the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&q=
uot;key_share&quot; extension?o</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; This needs an additional condition:</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 As a server, if you select an (EC)DHE group which t=
he client</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0su=
pports but for which the client did not provide a</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0KeyShareEntry, do you send a HelloRet=
ryRequest?</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra">These are the same.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Appendix D.=C2=A0 Backward Compatibility</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number for</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 various purposes.=C2=A0 (TLSPl=
aintext.legacy_record_version and</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) As of TLS 1.3, this field i=
s</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...]</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; I think th=
is was intended to be formatted thusly:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Prior versions of=
 TLS used the record layer version number</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) for va=
rious purposes.=C2=A0 As of</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 TLS 1.3, this field is [...]</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; D.5.=
=C2=A0 Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The =
security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and M=
UST NOT be negotiated for any</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 reason.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; s/and MUST NOT/and it MUST NOT/, with &quot;it&quot; =
referring to &quot;SSL 3.0&quot;, as</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; o=
therwise the verb &quot;MUST NOT&quot; is parallel to the verb &quot;is&quo=
t; and the</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; subject of &quot;MUST NOT&q=
uot; is &quot;the security of SSL 3.0&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Done.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>&gt; E.1.=C2=A0 Handshake</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -=C2=A0 A set of &quot;session=
 keys&quot; (the various secrets derived from the</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0master secret) from which can be deri=
ved a set of working keys.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; Is this consistent with the usual meaning o=
f &quot;session key&quot;?=C2=A0 My</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; un=
derstanding (which may be wrong) is that a &quot;session key&quot; is the k=
ey</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; for a &quot;session&quot;, i.e., an=
 entire connection.=C2=A0 Perhaps there is already</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; a defined term in the text that covers the use you intend.</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">The reaso=
n for scare quotes is that this is the term of art in</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_extra">the cryptographic literature.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that these</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 properties are not necessa=
rily independent, but reflect the protocol</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 consumers&#39; needs.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; The significance of &quot;but&=
quot; is not clear here, as it seems to be placing</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; in opposition &quot;reflect the ... needs&quot; and &quot;inde=
pendent&quot;.=C2=A0 I think this</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; is p=
robably closer to what you meant:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that these prope=
rties are not necessarily independent, but</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 together they cover the protocol consumers&#39; needs.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Disagree=
. The point is that this is from the consumer&#39;s perspective.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; --</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Uniqueness of the session ke=
ys:=C2=A0 Any two distinct handshakes should</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0produce distinct, unrelated session keys.=
=C2=A0 Individual session keys</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0produced by a handshake should also be distinct and unr=
elated.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra">&gt; It&#39;s not clear how two session keys produced by a single h=
andshake can</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; be &quot;unrelated&quot;.=
=C2=A0 I suspect there&#39;s a known technical term for this,</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; like &quot;cryptographically independent&quot; (to =
parallel &quot;cryptographically</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; rando=
m&quot;).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra">I&#39;ve changed this to &quot;independent&quot;</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; A similar term is =
needed in section E.1.4.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used f=
or each</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 connection, then =
the output keys are forward secret.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; When it is used as an adjective, y=
ou hyphenate &quot;forward-secret&quot;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Diagree.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; E.1.3.=C2=A0 0-RTT</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 See Section 4.2.10 for one mechanism to limit the exposure to replay.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&=
gt; This discussion is now in section 8.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&g=
t;=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">&gt; [END]</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra">&gt;=C2=A0</div></div></div>

--001a113b032865c706056703ba61--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Okay so the OIDs can=E2=80=99t appear twice in the certificate, because =
certificate extensions are only supposed to appear once so why don=E2=80=99=
t we just follow suit and require no dupes?

spt

> On Mar 9, 2018, at 16:44, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> (See also https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1179)
>=20
> On 03/09/2018 03:35 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> See issue #1166.
>>=20
>> The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID appearing
>> twice. We should do one or the other.
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On 3/9/18 12:57 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> The hummed answer to that question was very close to 50/50 in the
> room, inconclusive.

=46rom the perspective of consensus decision-making that's
actually very clear - there's no consensus.  What that
means in practice depends on the question that was asked,
but at any rate I think what matters here is a lack of
consensus.

Also, there's been basically no discussion of the draft
on the mailing list, and I'm not sure why.

Melinda

--=20
Software longa, hardware brevis

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From nobody Sat Mar 10 07:03:01 2018
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Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 17:02:50 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Duplicate oid_filters
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On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 07:35:09PM -0500, Sean Turner wrote:
> 
> > On 03/09/2018 03:35 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >> 
> >> The current text neither allows nor prohibits the same OID
> >> appearing twice. We should do one or the other.
>
> Okay so the OIDs can’t appear twice in the certificate, because
> certificate extensions are only supposed to appear once so why
> don’t we just follow suit and require no dupes?

Duplicate OIDs do not look to be useful either:

- All of currently defined filters have "all of" behavior.
- Duplicate filters would presumably intersect.
- Thus, one can rewrite a filter that has duplicate OIDs with just
  each OID once.



-Ilari


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From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
To: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org,  Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls-chairs" <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 10:24:53 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi,

On Wed, Feb 21, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Shumon Huque wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:>> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 1:22 PM, Alexey Melnikov
>> <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> wrote:
>>> Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-
>>> 06: Discuss
>>>
>>>  -----------------------------------------------------------------
>>>  -----
>>>  DISCUSS:
>>>  -----------------------------------------------------------------
>>>  -----
>>>
>>>  I think this is a useful document and I will ballot Yes once my
>>>  small issues are resolved:
>>>
>>>  1) In 3.4:
>>>
>>>     The first RRset in the chain MUST contain the TLSA record set
>>>     being presented.  However, if the owner name of the TLSA record
>>>     set is an alias (CNAME or DNAME), then it MUST be preceded by
>>>     the chain of alias records needed to resolve it.  DNAME chains
>>>     should omit
>>>
>>>  SHOULD? What are the implications if this is not followed?>> 
>> Ok. I guess we need the upper case word here, yes.
>> 
>> Implication: If the synthesized CNAME records are included in
>> the chain>> then the client will have to ignore them (they aren't signed and thus
>> can't be>> validated) - the signed DNAME record is sufficient for the client to
>> securely>> validate the mapping and continue processing.
>> 
>> It might make things simpler to just make this a MUST. I would
>> guess this>> would not raise any objections from the working group.
> 
> A quick follow-up on this. I think we just keep this as a SHOULD.
> I looked> at what an existing DNS library implementation does, and it
> includes the> synthesized CNAME. It's easy enough for the client to just
> ignore it when> validating the chain.

I think adding some text explaining this would be a good addition to
the document.
Best Regards,
Alexey

--_----------=_152085029323918720
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<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title></title>
<style type=3D"text/css">p.MsoNormal,p.MsoNoSpacing{margin:0}</style>
</head>
<body><div>Hi,<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>On Wed, Feb 21, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Shumon Huque wrote:<br></div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div defang_data-gmailquote=
=3D"yes"><div>On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Shumon Huque <span dir=3D"ltr=
">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:shuque@gmail.com">shuque@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote=3D"yes" style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-r=
ight:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-l=
eft-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div><div defang_data-gmailquote=3D"yes"><div><span>On Wed, F=
eb 7, 2018 at 1:22 PM, Alexey Melnikov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:aamelnikov@fastmail.fm">aamelnikov@fastmail.fm</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
></span></div>
<blockquote defang_data-gmailquote=3D"yes" style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-r=
ight:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-l=
eft-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><sp=
an>Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for<br> draft-=
ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-ex<wbr>tension-06: Discuss<br><br></span><span> -----=
-------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>----------=
<br> DISCUSS:<br> ------------------------------<wbr>----------------------=
--------<wbr>----------<br> <br> I think this is a useful document and I wi=
ll ballot Yes once my small issues are resolved:<br> <br> 1) In 3.4:<br> <b=
r> &nbsp; &nbsp;The first RRset in the chain MUST contain the TLSA record s=
et being<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;presented.&nbsp; However, if the owner name of th=
e TLSA record set is an<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;alias (CNAME or DNAME), then it MU=
ST be preceded by the chain of<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;alias records needed to res=
olve it.&nbsp; DNAME chains should omit<br> <br> SHOULD? What are the impli=
cations if this is not followed?</span></blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Ok. I guess we need the upper case word here, yes.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Implication: If the synthesized CNAME records are included in the chai=
n<br></div>
<div>then the client will have to ignore them (they aren't signed and thus =
can't be&nbsp;<br></div>
<div>validated) - the signed DNAME record is sufficient for the client to s=
ecurely&nbsp;<br></div>
<div>validate the mapping and continue processing.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>It might make things simpler to just make this a MUST. I would guess t=
his<br></div>
<div>would not raise any objections from the working group.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>A quick follow-up on this. I think we just keep this as a SHOULD. I lo=
oked<br></div>
<div>at what an existing DNS library implementation does, and it includes t=
he<br></div>
<div>synthesized CNAME. It's easy enough for the client to just ignore it w=
hen<br></div>
<div>validating the chain.<br></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>I think adding some text explaining this would be a good addition to t=
he document.<br></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Best Regards,<br></div>
<div>Alexey<br></div>
</body>
</html>

--_----------=_152085029323918720--


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Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable=20
identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text makes i=
t=20
trivial to perform enumeration attack.

The proposed fix was identified as conflicting with the "Client Hello=20
Recording" security section, the severity of that conflict wasn't quantifie=
d=20
though.


Issue in detail:

Problematic paragraph as it stands in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (section=20
4.2.11):
   Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
   the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
   value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
   handshake.  Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multiple binders;
   rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the binder
   that corresponds to that PSK.  In order to accept PSK key
   establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
   indicating the selected identity.

That means, given a server with both PSK and PKI authentication, if attacke=
r=20
sends multiple PSK identities with garbage binders, the server will abort t=
he=20
connection if and only if at least one of the identities was recognised by=
=20
server. Applying the well known binary search method allows the attacker to=
=20
then narrow it down to a single identity in O(log_2(n)) steps.

The solution to ignore that one selected binder, and continuing the connect=
ion=20
in case that binder does not validate (this is the version in the PR mentio=
ned=20
below), unfortunately doesn't solve this issue either;

If the attacker is in possession of a known good PSK secret (established=20
either through session resumption mechanism or of a less-privileged identit=
y),=20
it can list the known good one as the very last one in the PSK extension. I=
f=20
server recognises one of the identities earlier in the list it will choose =
no=20
identity (as the binder didn't validate) or the known good identity if none=
 of=20
the previous identities were recognised. Again, applying binary search meth=
od=20
allows the attacker to narrow the list to a single entry in just O(log_2(n)=
)=20
steps.


Proposed solution:

in paragraph above, in description of `binders`:
  binders
  : A series of HMAC values, one for
   each PSK offered in the "pre_shared_keys" extension and in the same
   order, computed as described below. If the number of binders does not ma=
tch
   number of identities the server MUST abort the connection with
   "illegal_parameter" alert.

problematic paragraph after changes:
   Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
   the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
   value does not validate, the server MUST ignore the
   associated identity and retry selection of identity. If no identity is=20
   recognised or, for recognised identities, no binder could be validated
   the server MUST continue connection as if PSK key establishment wasn't
   attempted.  In order to accept PSK key
   establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
   indicating the selected identity.

Unfortunately that solution was identified as conflicting with "Client Hell=
o=20
Recording" section.

Do we consider that conflict to be severe enough to block this change?

Or should we just add more information to that security section, that it ne=
eds=20
to deal with this kind of attack?

PS: some discussion on this issue already happened in the github PR:=20
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1167
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 14:29:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>
cc: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,  TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org,  The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Willem Toorop wrote:

> No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.  The
> only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifier is
> the question.  From the question, validation starts and the relevant
> records are followed and verified.  But the question section is also not
> needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of the
> service, i.e. <port>._tcp.<name>. TLSA
>
> The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce the
> number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes the
> content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.
>
> Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also a
> verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message header.
> Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs in
> the message body/sections too.

Willem (and Shumon and Viktor) have convinced me the DNS Header and
Sections are not needed.

> The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., because
> it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).

The issue here is the requirement of the TLS server to send these
records in the absence of any TLS record. This allows the clients to
detect a rogue webserver cert that is valid in webPKI but not valid
based on DANE. Without this commitment, the TLS extension does not
really work, as it can be omitted by an attacker.

Paul


From nobody Mon Mar 12 12:23:29 2018
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 15:22:45 -0400
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,  draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,  Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hello,

Can you please provide updated text that addresses EKR's discuss while
this additional discussion continues?  I'd like to see if it's
possible to get this wrapped up before the plenary in London.
Eliminating discuss points and resolving this additional issue are
required for that.  If this does not get wrapped up before then, it is
likely the draft will have to go on another IESG telechat with Ben as
AD, which is fine if that's needed, but better to avoid.

Thank you,
Kathleen

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Willem Toorop wrote:
>
>> No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.  The
>> only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifier is
>> the question.  From the question, validation starts and the relevant
>> records are followed and verified.  But the question section is also not
>> needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of the
>> service, i.e. <port>._tcp.<name>. TLSA
>>
>> The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce the
>> number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes the
>> content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.
>>
>> Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also a
>> verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message header.
>> Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs in
>> the message body/sections too.
>
>
> Willem (and Shumon and Viktor) have convinced me the DNS Header and
> Sections are not needed.
>
>> The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., because
>> it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).
>
>
> The issue here is the requirement of the TLS server to send these
> records in the absence of any TLS record. This allows the clients to
> detect a rogue webserver cert that is valid in webPKI but not valid
> based on DANE. Without this commitment, the TLS extension does not
> really work, as it can be omitted by an attacker.
>
> Paul
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


From nobody Mon Mar 12 12:59:11 2018
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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On 3/7/18 12:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > >  -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
> > >     range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
> > >     [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are
> > >     reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte in
> > >     the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are
> > >     not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.
> >
> > Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the 
> reservation of
> > first byte=0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will be 
> made from
> > the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is 
> the case, I
> > would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request 
> that the IANA
> > close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies 
> to TLS
> > SignatureAlgorithm Registry.
>
> Agreed, but I'd like to hear from the chairs.


I think we're still waiting to hear from the chairs on this topic.

/a


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Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 22:01:03 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 02:29:55PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Willem Toorop wrote:
> 
> > No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.  The
> > only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifier is
> > the question.  From the question, validation starts and the relevant
> > records are followed and verified.  But the question section is also not
> > needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of the
> > service, i.e. <port>._tcp.<name>. TLSA
> > 
> > The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce the
> > number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes the
> > content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.
> > 
> > Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also a
> > verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message header.
> > Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs in
> > the message body/sections too.
> 
> Willem (and Shumon and Viktor) have convinced me the DNS Header and
> Sections are not needed.
> 
> > The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., because
> > it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).
> 
> The issue here is the requirement of the TLS server to send these
> records in the absence of any TLS record. This allows the clients to
> detect a rogue webserver cert that is valid in webPKI but not valid
> based on DANE. Without this commitment, the TLS extension does not
> really work, as it can be omitted by an attacker.


One idea for adding pinning:

- Add pinned flag to the client request structure. This is set if
  the client has the server pinned, otherwise clear.
- Add max_age field to the server response structure.
- If max_age=0, the payload can either be authenticated TLSA RRset or
  proof no such thing exists. Any sent RRset applies to current
  connection. In either case, the pin breaks immediately.
- If max_age>0, the payload must be TLSA RRset. The TLSA RRset
  appiles to this connection. Pin the name as requiring this extension
  for next max_age seconds.
- Add security consideration that sending TLSA RRsets with max_age=0
  is vulernable to downgrade attacks.

The reason for the flag in client request is to tell the server if
it should bother sending ADoE back or not.


Also, could cached_info extension be extended to cover data for this
extension? It would save some bandwidth...


-Ilari


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 22:33:03 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 12, 2018, at 19:58, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>=20
> On 3/7/18 12:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > >  -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in =
the
>> > >     range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
>> > >     [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) =
are
>> > >     reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first =
byte in
>> > >     the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that =
are
>> > >     not currently allocated are reserved for backwards =
compatibility.
>> >
>> > Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the =
reservation of
>> > first byte=3D0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will =
be made from
>> > the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is =
the case, I
>> > would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request =
that the IANA
>> > close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies =
to TLS
>> > SignatureAlgorithm Registry.
>>=20
>> Agreed, but I'd like to hear from the chairs.
>=20
>=20
> I think we're still waiting to hear from the chairs on this topic.
>=20
> /a

I think this got lost somewhere in the flurry of emails:

See s17 of =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/
We don=E2=80=99t close the registry because technically, if somebody =
really, really wanted to they could register values for earlier =
versions.

spt=


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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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On 3/12/18 5:33 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
>
>> On Mar 12, 2018, at 19:58, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 3/7/18 12:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>>>   -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the
>>>>>      range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
>>>>>      [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are
>>>>>      reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte in
>>>>>      the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are
>>>>>      not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility.
>>>> Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the reservation of
>>>> first byte=0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will be made from
>>>> the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is the case, I
>>>> would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request that the IANA
>>>> close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies to TLS
>>>> SignatureAlgorithm Registry.
>>> Agreed, but I'd like to hear from the chairs.
>>
>> I think we're still waiting to hear from the chairs on this topic.
>>
>> /a
> I think this got lost somewhere in the flurry of emails:
>
> See s17 of https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/
> We don’t close the registry because technically, if somebody really, really wanted to they could register values for earlier versions.

Ah, thanks for the pointer. I don't agree with your evaluation that 
draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates preserves the ability to register 
values for earlier versions, as it marks all remaining available 
codepoints "reserved." That's effectively equivalent to what I'm asking 
for, though, so my comment is addressed. There's still a potential mess 
brewing for the HashAlgorithm codepoints 224 though 253 colliding with 
SignatureScheme values of 0xE000 - 0xFDFF, but it seems pretty unlikely 
that SignatureScheme allocations will reach that point before 1.2 and 
previous versions disappear.

/a


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 23:05:35 +0000
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)
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> On Mar 12, 2018, at 22:46, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>=20
> On 3/12/18 5:33 PM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Mar 12, 2018, at 19:58, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On 3/7/18 12:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>>>>  -  TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in =
the
>>>>>>     range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required
>>>>>>     [RFC8126].  Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) =
are
>>>>>>     reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].  Values with the first =
byte in
>>>>>>     the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that =
are
>>>>>>     not currently allocated are reserved for backwards =
compatibility.
>>>>> Unless I misunderstand the compatibility mechanisms here, the =
reservation of
>>>>> first byte=3D0-6 seems to assume that no further assignments will =
be made from
>>>>> the "TLS HashAlgorithm Registry" (after 4492bis lands). If this is =
the case, I
>>>>> would expect the IANA considerations section to include a request =
that the IANA
>>>>> close the table to further registrations. The same comment applies =
to TLS
>>>>> SignatureAlgorithm Registry.
>>>> Agreed, but I'd like to hear from the chairs.
>>>=20
>>> I think we're still waiting to hear from the chairs on this topic.
>>>=20
>>> /a
>> I think this got lost somewhere in the flurry of emails:
>>=20
>> See s17 of =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/
>> We don=E2=80=99t close the registry because technically, if somebody =
really, really wanted to they could register values for earlier =
versions.
>=20
> Ah, thanks for the pointer. I don't agree with your evaluation that =
draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates preserves the ability to register =
values for earlier versions, as it marks all remaining available =
codepoints "reserved." That's effectively equivalent to what I'm asking =
for, though, so my comment is addressed.

Subtly different but I=E2=80=99m glad you=E2=80=99re good with this ;)

> There's still a potential mess brewing for the HashAlgorithm =
codepoints 224 though 253 colliding with SignatureScheme values of =
0xE000 - 0xFDFF, but it seems pretty unlikely that SignatureScheme =
allocations will reach that point before 1.2 and previous versions =
disappear.

i may have been lazy when I just did 9-223.  We could obviously remove =
this by marking 224-253 reserved for both the HashAlgorithm and =
SignatureAlgorithm registries.  Note that there are also other =
unassigned values in 4-6 in SignatureAlgorithms and 7 in HashAlgorithm =
that should/could also be marked reserved.  But, we can do that on the =
IANA draft in early April.

spt=


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From: "Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)" <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:06:54 +0100
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Hi Ekr,

just one more comment on this part

> Am 07.03.2018 um 20:03 schrieb Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>:
>=20
> > > 3) I know previous versions of TLS didn't say that much either, =
but I
> > > find it a bit wired that there are NO requirements for the =
underlaying
> > > transport in this document. Previous version this at least said in =
the
> > > intro that a reliable transport (like TCP) is assumed, but even =
this
> > > minimal information seems to have gotten lost in this
> > > document. However, I would usually also expect to seen some =
minimal
> > > text about connection handling, e.g. is it okay to transparently =
try
> > > to reestablish the connection by the underlying transport protocol =
if
> > > it broke for some reason? Or it is okay to use the same TCP =
connection
> > > to first send other data and then start the TLS handshake?
> >
> > This is pretty explicitly outside the scope of TLS. It's just the =
job
> > of the underlying transport to simulate a reliable stream. I can add
> > some text that that's expected.
>=20
> If that is the only requirement, it would still be good to spell that =
out.
>=20
>=20
> Sure, I can add something.

Just to double-check, there is also no requirement or maybe recommend to =
not send cleartext and 0-RTT data in the same packet?

Mirja



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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 08:30:33 +0000
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Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org,  "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
<ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:
> Just to double-check, there is also no requirement or maybe recommend to not send cleartext and 0-RTT data in the same packet?

You mean in the same TCP segment?  We do nothing to prevent that, and
nor should we.  It would mess with intended uses of TCP fast open.  In
DTLS, that extends to having a ClientHello and 0-RTT in the same UDP
datagram, which is permitted and similarly beneficial.


From nobody Tue Mar 13 02:22:21 2018
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From: "Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)" <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13@ietf.org, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Okay, just wanted to check!

> Am 13.03.2018 um 09:30 schrieb Martin Thomson =
<martin.thomson@gmail.com>:
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
> <ietf@kuehlewind.net> wrote:
>> Just to double-check, there is also no requirement or maybe recommend =
to not send cleartext and 0-RTT data in the same packet?
>=20
> You mean in the same TCP segment?  We do nothing to prevent that, and
> nor should we.  It would mess with intended uses of TCP fast open.  In
> DTLS, that extends to having a ClientHello and 0-RTT in the same UDP
> datagram, which is permitted and similarly beneficial.
>=20


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Hiya,

Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
-00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
my objection has been answered.

In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.

Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting
it.

Thanks,
Stephen.


me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a
bargepole."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24493.html

Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24539.html

Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24542.html

Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24544.html

Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approach
taken in this draft."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24562.html

Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24578.html

Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-party
into the E2E TLS process."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24585.html

Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is
needed."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24607.html

Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24620.html

Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24639.html

Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
applications and servers without breaking TLS..."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24643.html

Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24649.html

Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."
(On "industry need")

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24656.html

Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am not
able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24660.html

Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24667.html

Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24670.html
	Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)
	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/perlustrator

Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this group=

continues to spend time on this."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24712.html

Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one
company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like
to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24715.html

Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this thre=
ad,
it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24720.html

Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close down
the discussion)

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24734.html

Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
1.3 standard."

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24885.html

Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to th=
e TLS
1.3 design to accomplish any of this"

	https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24903.html


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> On 13 Mar 2018, at 14:21, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:
>=20
> Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
> AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
> is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
> the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
> to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
> -00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
> my objection has been answered.

Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in =
Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly =
divided.

IIRC the supporters of draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13 agreed to drop =
that draft and come back with a new one which would hopefully be more =
likely to get WG consensus. That draft has now arrived. It=E2=80=99s =
unreasonable to deny the new I-D a fair hearing and even worse to reject =
it out of hand.



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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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It's my fault for the ambiguous wording, but in this context the quote from
me reads as the opposite of my intent.  To be more clear: what I meant was
that while the proposals aren't making much progress, I don't mind that
it's being discussed.

I'm happy to have mailing list threads on the topic and agenda time devoted
to it (I don't go in person, but I do watch the videos). Since it's an area
of such disagreement, I'd prefer to see /more/ discussion, not less.
There's always hope of movement and progress on either side, and I think
good discourse lessens the risk of dozens of fragmentary DIY solutions,
which I think will be the worst kind of outcome of non-engagement.

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.i=
e
> wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
> AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
> is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
> the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
> to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
> -00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
> my objection has been answered.
>
> In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
> at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
> and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
> the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
> opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
> also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
> manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
> to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
> before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.
>
> Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
> of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting
> it.
>
> Thanks,
> Stephen.
>
>
> me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a
> bargepole."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24493.html
>
> Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
> watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24539.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24542.html
>
> Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24544.html
>
> Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approach
> taken in this draft."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24562.html
>
> Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24578.html
>
> Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-party
> into the E2E TLS process."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24585.html
>
> Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is
> needed."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24607.html
>
> Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24620.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24639.html
>
> Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
> applications and servers without breaking TLS..."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24643.html
>
> Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24649.html
>
> Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
> PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."
> (On "industry need")
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24656.html
>
> Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am not
> able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24660.html
>
> Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24667.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
> other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24670.html
>         Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)
>         https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/perlustrator
>
> Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this group
> continues to spend time on this."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24712.html
>
> Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one
> company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like
> to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
> self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24715.html
>
> Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this thre=
ad,
> it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24720.html
>
> Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close down
> the discussion)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24734.html
>
> Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
> 1.3 standard."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24885.html
>
> Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to th=
e TLS
> 1.3 design to accomplish any of this"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24903.html
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
Colm

--001a114fb14ad4ae7405674c9b19
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div>It&#39;s my fault for the ambiguous wording, but =
in this context the quote from me reads as the opposite of my intent.=C2=A0=
 To be more clear: what I meant was that while the proposals aren&#39;t mak=
ing much progress, I don&#39;t mind that it&#39;s being discussed.=C2=A0</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m happy to have mailing list threads on the to=
pic and agenda time devoted to it (I don&#39;t go in person, but I do watch=
 the videos). Since it&#39;s an area of such disagreement, I&#39;d prefer t=
o see /more/ discussion, not less. There&#39;s always hope of movement and =
progress on either side, and I think good discourse lessens the risk of doz=
ens of fragmentary DIY solutions, which I think will be the worst kind of o=
utcome of non-engagement.=C2=A0</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Stephen Farrell=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=
=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
Just to be clear: I&#39;m still waiting for the chairs and/or<br>
AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft<br>
is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of<br>
the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus<br>
to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the<br>
-00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don&#39;t consider<br>
my objection has been answered.<br>
<br>
In case people haven&#39;t got all the mails from last year<br>
at the front of their minds, I went through them for you<br>
and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,<br>
the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the<br>
opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were<br>
also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this<br>
manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates<br>
to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as<br>
before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.<br>
<br>
Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any<br>
of this fits our process, because I&#39;m just not getting<br>
it.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Stephen.<br>
<br>
<br>
me, &quot;IMO the WG shouldn&#39;t touch this terrible proposal with a<br>
bargepole.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24493.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24493.html</a><br>
<br>
Randy Bush: &quot;there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified<br=
>
watching this wg go off the rails.&quot; (Different thread, but same topic)=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24539.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24539.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;+1 to Stephen&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24542.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24542.html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done&q=
uot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24544.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24544.html</a><br>
<br>
Ion Larranaga Azcue, &quot;I really don&#39;t feel confortable with the app=
roach<br>
taken in this draft.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24562.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24562.html</a><br>
<br>
Hubert Kario: &quot;to be clear: me too&quot; (replying about hating the id=
ea)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24578.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24578.html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-par=
ty<br>
into the E2E TLS process.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24585.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24585.html</a><br>
<br>
Florian Weimer: &quot;I don&#39;t understand why this complicated approach =
is<br>
needed.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24607.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24607.html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;I do not see any potential for a workable solution.&quot;<=
br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24620.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24620.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;why do we spend time discussing this draft?&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24639.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24639.html</a><br>
<br>
Christian Huitema: &quot;Maybe they have found ways to manage their<br>
applications and servers without breaking TLS...&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24643.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24643.html</a><br>
<br>
Ted Lemon: &quot;I think we should stop.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24649.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24649.html</a><br>
<br>
Andrei Popov: &quot;deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without<=
br>
PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements.&quot;=
<br>
(On &quot;industry need&quot;)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24656.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24656.html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am no=
t<br>
able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24660.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24660.html</a><br>
<br>
Dave Garrett: &quot;Please, let&#39;s just let this mess die. &quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24667.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24667.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal &quot;I&#39;m against weakening the protocol, since there ar=
e<br>
other ways to accomplish the perlustrator&#39;s mission&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24670.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24670.html</a><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/de=
finition/us/perlustrator" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://en.o=
xforddictionaries.<wbr>com/definition/us/perlustrator</a><br>
<br>
Adam Caudill: &quot;To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this gr=
oup<br>
continues to spend time on this.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24712.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24712.html</a><br>
<br>
Tony Arcieri, &quot;Having worked (and presently working) for more than one=
<br>
company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like<br>
to restate that it&#39;s incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for<br>
self-MitM capability as an &quot;industry&quot; concern.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24715.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24715.html</a><br>
<br>
Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: &quot;I don&#39;t have too strong an interest in th=
is thread,<br>
it&#39;s not going anywhere, and I don&#39;t mind that.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24720.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24720.html</a><br>
<br>
Peter Saint-Andre: &quot;+1 to Stephen&#39;s request.&quot; (for chairs to =
close down<br>
the discussion)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24734.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24734.html</a><br>
<br>
Cas Cremers: &quot; I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS<=
br>
1.3 standard.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24885.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24885.html</a><br>
<br>
Karthikeyan Bhargavan: &quot;I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to=
 the TLS<br>
1.3 design to accomplish any of this&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24903.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24903.html</a><br>
<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div>

--001a114fb14ad4ae7405674c9b19--


From nobody Tue Mar 13 08:18:56 2018
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 17:18:48 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 04:27:46PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable 
> identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text makes it 
> trivial to perform enumeration attack.

What would be impact of such enumeration attack? It seems to me that
not disclosing identities is to make weak passwords more difficult to
attack, but here there are no weak passwords.


Note that:

- There is no protection for the PSK identity, so putting anything
  sensitive in it is a bad idea.
- The identity can not be used without the associated secret, which
  needs to withstand serious offline cracking attempts anyway.
- Passive attack gives attacker not only a valid PSK identity, but
  enough information to mount high-speed offline cracking attack on the
  PSK secret. Only one captured key exchange is needed, and (EC)DHE
  does not help.

The last point is why PSK secrets need to have enough entropy to resist
high-speed offline cracking.



-Ilari


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 08:58:45 -0700
Message-ID: <CAPsNn2XCNtqZaQM6Bg8uoMZRJE+qQakEwvw8Cn9fBm-5H+Xn_A@mail.gmail.com>
To: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Stephen (and TLS group)

We need to look at the bigger picture.

The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure
for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlying
motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.  These
are all laudable goals.

But, the Internet is much more than that.  The Internet is the
underpinnings of much of the business community which is utilized by
consumers (end users).   Making a change which makes businesses less secure
because crucial functions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and
disruption.   Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or
seek unique DIY type alternatives.  In fact, we have already heard of some
planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.  So, the main thing
to acknowledge is that the enterprise use case is different than the
Internet use case.  As such, it needs its own solution.  Please note that
the endpoint is the intended recipient of the session and the owner and
responsible party for the security of the data.

The presentation in London is to present a use case solution =E2=80=93 alon=
g with
TLS WG recommendations/updates from Prague where half of the room hummed
that an internal solution is needed.

This rift is not good for the TLS Working Group, it is not good for the
IETF, it is not good for the business community and it is not good for the
Internet.  We need to have some type of methodology so that we can continue
to protect ourselves.  Therefore, we are asking for WG help with a solution
to the enterprise use case.

This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.  If you haven=E2=
=80=99t
had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the London meeting.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/

Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
wrote:

>
> It's my fault for the ambiguous wording, but in this context the quote
> from me reads as the opposite of my intent.  To be more clear: what I mea=
nt
> was that while the proposals aren't making much progress, I don't mind th=
at
> it's being discussed.
>
> I'm happy to have mailing list threads on the topic and agenda time
> devoted to it (I don't go in person, but I do watch the videos). Since it=
's
> an area of such disagreement, I'd prefer to see /more/ discussion, not
> less. There's always hope of movement and progress on either side, and I
> think good discourse lessens the risk of dozens of fragmentary DIY
> solutions, which I think will be the worst kind of outcome of
> non-engagement.
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
>> AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
>> is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
>> the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
>> to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
>> -00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
>> my objection has been answered.
>>
>> In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
>> at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
>> and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
>> the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
>> opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
>> also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
>> manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
>> to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
>> before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.
>>
>> Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
>> of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting
>> it.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Stephen.
>>
>>
>> me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a
>> bargepole."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24493.html
>>
>> Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
>> watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24539.html
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24542.html
>>
>> Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24544.html
>>
>> Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approach
>> taken in this draft."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24562.html
>>
>> Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24578.html
>>
>> Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-party
>> into the E2E TLS process."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24585.html
>>
>> Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is
>> needed."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24607.html
>>
>> Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24620.html
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24639.html
>>
>> Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
>> applications and servers without breaking TLS..."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24643.html
>>
>> Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24649.html
>>
>> Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
>> PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."
>> (On "industry need")
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24656.html
>>
>> Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am not
>> able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24660.html
>>
>> Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24667.html
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
>> other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24670.html
>>         Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)
>>         https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/perlustrator
>>
>> Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this grou=
p
>> continues to spend time on this."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24712.html
>>
>> Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one
>> company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like
>> to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
>> self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24715.html
>>
>> Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this thr=
ead,
>> it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24720.html
>>
>> Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close down
>> the discussion)
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24734.html
>>
>> Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
>> 1.3 standard."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24885.html
>>
>> Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to t=
he TLS
>> 1.3 design to accomplish any of this"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24903.html
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Colm
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11479e5e62e17e05674d551e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Stephen (and TLS group)</div><div><br></div><div>We n=
eed to look at the bigger picture.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><=
div>The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet sec=
ure for the individual user.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We feel that there is also an und=
erlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident=
.=C2=A0 These are all laudable goals.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>=
But, the Internet is much more than that.=C2=A0 The Internet is the underpi=
nnings of much of the business community which is utilized by consumers (en=
d users).=C2=A0 =C2=A0Making a change which makes businesses less secure be=
cause crucial functions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and disr=
uption.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 =
or seek unique DIY type alternatives.=C2=A0 In fact, we have already heard =
of some planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.=C2=A0 So, t=
he main thing to acknowledge is that the enterprise use case is different t=
han the Internet use case.=C2=A0 As such, it needs its own solution.=C2=A0 =
Please note that the endpoint is the intended recipient of the session and =
the owner and responsible party for the security of the data.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>The presentation in London is to present a use case solut=
ion =E2=80=93 along with TLS WG recommendations/updates from Prague where h=
alf of the room hummed that an internal solution is needed.=C2=A0 =C2=A0</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>This rift is not good for the TLS Working Group, it =
is not good for the IETF, it is not good for the business community and it =
is not good for the Internet.=C2=A0 We need to have some type of methodolog=
y so that we can continue to protect ourselves.=C2=A0 Therefore, we are ask=
ing for WG help with a solution to the enterprise use case.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.=C2=A0 If=
 you haven=E2=80=99t had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it befor=
e the London meeting.=C2=A0</div><div><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft=
-fenter-tls-decryption/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>=
Nalini Elkins</div><div>President</div><div>Enterprise Data Center Operator=
s</div><div><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><b=
r></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allcosts.net</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>=
<div>It&#39;s my fault for the ambiguous wording, but in this context the q=
uote from me reads as the opposite of my intent.=C2=A0 To be more clear: wh=
at I meant was that while the proposals aren&#39;t making much progress, I =
don&#39;t mind that it&#39;s being discussed.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><di=
v>I&#39;m happy to have mailing list threads on the topic and agenda time d=
evoted to it (I don&#39;t go in person, but I do watch the videos). Since i=
t&#39;s an area of such disagreement, I&#39;d prefer to see /more/ discussi=
on, not less. There&#39;s always hope of movement and progress on either si=
de, and I think good discourse lessens the risk of dozens of fragmentary DI=
Y solutions, which I think will be the worst kind of outcome of non-engagem=
ent.=C2=A0</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.fa=
rrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br=
>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
Just to be clear: I&#39;m still waiting for the chairs and/or<br>
AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft<br>
is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of<br>
the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus<br>
to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the<br>
-00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don&#39;t consider<br>
my objection has been answered.<br>
<br>
In case people haven&#39;t got all the mails from last year<br>
at the front of their minds, I went through them for you<br>
and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,<br>
the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the<br>
opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were<br>
also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this<br>
manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates<br>
to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as<br>
before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.<br>
<br>
Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any<br>
of this fits our process, because I&#39;m just not getting<br>
it.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Stephen.<br>
<br>
<br>
me, &quot;IMO the WG shouldn&#39;t touch this terrible proposal with a<br>
bargepole.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24493.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24493.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Randy Bush: &quot;there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified<br=
>
watching this wg go off the rails.&quot; (Different thread, but same topic)=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24539.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24539.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;+1 to Stephen&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24542.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24542.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done&q=
uot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24544.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24544.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Ion Larranaga Azcue, &quot;I really don&#39;t feel confortable with the app=
roach<br>
taken in this draft.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24562.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24562.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Hubert Kario: &quot;to be clear: me too&quot; (replying about hating the id=
ea)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24578.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24578.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-par=
ty<br>
into the E2E TLS process.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24585.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24585.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Florian Weimer: &quot;I don&#39;t understand why this complicated approach =
is<br>
needed.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24607.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24607.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;I do not see any potential for a workable solution.&quot;<=
br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24620.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24620.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;why do we spend time discussing this draft?&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24639.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24639.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Christian Huitema: &quot;Maybe they have found ways to manage their<br>
applications and servers without breaking TLS...&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24643.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24643.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Ted Lemon: &quot;I think we should stop.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24649.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24649.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Andrei Popov: &quot;deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without<=
br>
PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements.&quot;=
<br>
(On &quot;industry need&quot;)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24656.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24656.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am no=
t<br>
able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24660.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24660.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Dave Garrett: &quot;Please, let&#39;s just let this mess die. &quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24667.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24667.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal &quot;I&#39;m against weakening the protocol, since there ar=
e<br>
other ways to accomplish the perlustrator&#39;s mission&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24670.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24670.<wbr>html</a><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/de=
finition/us/perlustrator" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://en.o=
xforddictionaries.<wbr>com/definition/us/perlustrator</a><br>
<br>
Adam Caudill: &quot;To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this gr=
oup<br>
continues to spend time on this.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24712.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24712.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Tony Arcieri, &quot;Having worked (and presently working) for more than one=
<br>
company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like<br>
to restate that it&#39;s incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for<br>
self-MitM capability as an &quot;industry&quot; concern.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24715.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24715.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: &quot;I don&#39;t have too strong an interest in th=
is thread,<br>
it&#39;s not going anywhere, and I don&#39;t mind that.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24720.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24720.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Peter Saint-Andre: &quot;+1 to Stephen&#39;s request.&quot; (for chairs to =
close down<br>
the discussion)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24734.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24734.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Cas Cremers: &quot; I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS<=
br>
1.3 standard.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24885.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24885.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
Karthikeyan Bhargavan: &quot;I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to=
 the TLS<br>
1.3 design to accomplish any of this&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24903.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-arch<wbr>ive/web/tls/current/msg24903.<wbr>html</a><br>
<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br><=
br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"m_-2397659360403967505=
gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</font></span></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=
President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Opera=
tors</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><=
/div>
</div>

--001a11479e5e62e17e05674d551e--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>, =?utf-8?B?Q29sbSBNYWNDw6FydGhhaWdo?= <colm@allcosts.net>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,  Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hi Stephen,

It is not accurate to say that there was consensus to stop discussion of
this topic in Prague.  There are vocal contingents both for an against this
topic.  We did not have discussion of this draft in Singapore because the
authors could not make the meeting due to several issues and we did not not
think it would be appropriate to have a discussion without them present.
We are going to continue forward and have discussion on this topic in the
Monday TLS meeting in London.


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie=
>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
> AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
> is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
> the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
> to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
> -00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
> my objection has been answered.
>
> In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
> at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
> and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
> the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
> opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
> also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
> manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
> to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
> before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.
>
> Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
> of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting
> it.
>
> Thanks,
> Stephen.
>
>
> me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a
> bargepole."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24493.html
>
> Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
> watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24539.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24542.html
>
> Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24544.html
>
> Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approach
> taken in this draft."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24562.html
>
> Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24578.html
>
> Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-party
> into the E2E TLS process."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24585.html
>
> Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is
> needed."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24607.html
>
> Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24620.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24639.html
>
> Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
> applications and servers without breaking TLS..."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24643.html
>
> Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24649.html
>
> Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
> PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."
> (On "industry need")
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24656.html
>
> Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am not
> able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24660.html
>
> Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24667.html
>
> Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
> other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24670.html
>         Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)
>         https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/perlustrator
>
> Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this group
> continues to spend time on this."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24712.html
>
> Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one
> company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like
> to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
> self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24715.html
>
> Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this thre=
ad,
> it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24720.html
>
> Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close down
> the discussion)
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24734.html
>
> Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
> 1.3 standard."
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24885.html
>
> Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to th=
e TLS
> 1.3 design to accomplish any of this"
>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24903.html
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--f403045cc99c5ee7c505674d7b57
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-=
variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;=
text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoratio=
n-color:initial">Hi Stephen,</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fa=
mily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligat=
ures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wor=
d-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initi=
al;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">It is not accurate to say that =
there was consensus to stop discussion of this topic in Prague.=C2=A0<span>=
=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-vari=
ant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text=
-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-co=
lor:initial;float:none;display:inline">There are vocal contingents both for=
 an against this topic.=C2=A0=C2=A0</span>We did not have discussion of thi=
s draft in Singapore because the authors could not make the meeting due to =
several issues and we did not not think it would be appropriate to have a d=
iscussion without them present.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We are going to continue forwa=
rd and have discussion on this topic in the Monday TLS meeting in London.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"lt=
r">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">steph=
en.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
Just to be clear: I&#39;m still waiting for the chairs and/or<br>
AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft<br>
is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of<br>
the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus<br>
to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the<br>
-00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don&#39;t consider<br>
my objection has been answered.<br>
<br>
In case people haven&#39;t got all the mails from last year<br>
at the front of their minds, I went through them for you<br>
and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,<br>
the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the<br>
opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were<br>
also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this<br>
manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates<br>
to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as<br>
before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.<br>
<br>
Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any<br>
of this fits our process, because I&#39;m just not getting<br>
it.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Stephen.<br>
<br>
<br>
me, &quot;IMO the WG shouldn&#39;t touch this terrible proposal with a<br>
bargepole.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24493.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24493.html</a><br>
<br>
Randy Bush: &quot;there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified<br=
>
watching this wg go off the rails.&quot; (Different thread, but same topic)=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24539.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24539.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;+1 to Stephen&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24542.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24542.html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done&q=
uot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24544.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24544.html</a><br>
<br>
Ion Larranaga Azcue, &quot;I really don&#39;t feel confortable with the app=
roach<br>
taken in this draft.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24562.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24562.html</a><br>
<br>
Hubert Kario: &quot;to be clear: me too&quot; (replying about hating the id=
ea)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24578.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24578.html</a><br>
<br>
Rich Salz: &quot;I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-par=
ty<br>
into the E2E TLS process.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24585.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24585.html</a><br>
<br>
Florian Weimer: &quot;I don&#39;t understand why this complicated approach =
is<br>
needed.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24607.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24607.html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;I do not see any potential for a workable solution.&quot;<=
br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24620.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24620.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal: &quot;why do we spend time discussing this draft?&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24639.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24639.html</a><br>
<br>
Christian Huitema: &quot;Maybe they have found ways to manage their<br>
applications and servers without breaking TLS...&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24643.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24643.html</a><br>
<br>
Ted Lemon: &quot;I think we should stop.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24649.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24649.html</a><br>
<br>
Andrei Popov: &quot;deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without<=
br>
PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements.&quot;=
<br>
(On &quot;industry need&quot;)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24656.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24656.html</a><br>
<br>
Ben Kaduk: &quot;The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am no=
t<br>
able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24660.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24660.html</a><br>
<br>
Dave Garrett: &quot;Please, let&#39;s just let this mess die. &quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24667.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24667.html</a><br>
<br>
Uri Blumenthal &quot;I&#39;m against weakening the protocol, since there ar=
e<br>
other ways to accomplish the perlustrator&#39;s mission&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24670.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24670.html</a><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/de=
finition/us/perlustrator" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://en.o=
xforddictionaries.<wbr>com/definition/us/perlustrator</a><br>
<br>
Adam Caudill: &quot;To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this gr=
oup<br>
continues to spend time on this.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24712.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24712.html</a><br>
<br>
Tony Arcieri, &quot;Having worked (and presently working) for more than one=
<br>
company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like<br>
to restate that it&#39;s incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for<br>
self-MitM capability as an &quot;industry&quot; concern.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24715.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24715.html</a><br>
<br>
Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: &quot;I don&#39;t have too strong an interest in th=
is thread,<br>
it&#39;s not going anywhere, and I don&#39;t mind that.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24720.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24720.html</a><br>
<br>
Peter Saint-Andre: &quot;+1 to Stephen&#39;s request.&quot; (for chairs to =
close down<br>
the discussion)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24734.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24734.html</a><br>
<br>
Cas Cremers: &quot; I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS<=
br>
1.3 standard.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24885.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24885.html</a><br>
<br>
Karthikeyan Bhargavan: &quot;I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to=
 the TLS<br>
1.3 design to accomplish any of this&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/tls/current/msg24903.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archive/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg24903.html</a><br>
<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--f403045cc99c5ee7c505674d7b57--


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Thanks for the correction, Rich.

I agree that the room hummed to "continue the discussion".  I hope that we
can all work together to craft a solution.   We don't want fragmentation
and multiple DIY solutions.

Nalini

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:05 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - Prague where half of the room hummed that an internal solution is
>    needed.
>
>
>
> No, this is not accurate.
>
>
>
> Half the room hummed **to continue discussion.**  The discussion could
> still end with no action.
>
>
>



-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a1147413867198405674d7ba6
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the correction, Rich.<div><br></div><div>I agre=
e that the room hummed to &quot;continue the discussion&quot;.=C2=A0 I hope=
 that we can all work together to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We don&#39;=
t want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.</div><div><br></div><div>N=
alini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:05 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-3362752685268109759WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-3362752685268109759MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0=
in"><a name=3D"m_-3362752685268109759__MailOriginalBody">Prague where half =
of the room hummed that an internal solution is needed.=C2=A0 =C2=A0<u></u>=
<u></u></a></li></ul>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>No, this is not accurate.<u></u><u></u></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Half the room hummed *<b>to continue discussio=
n.</b>*=C2=A0 The discussion could still end with no action.<u></u><u></u><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--001a1147413867198405674d7ba6--


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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:09:20 -0700
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The consensus (as judge by the chairs) was that there no clear consensus to
shut the discussion down.  It was not that work on internal solution is
needed.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">




<span></span>





<p class=3D"gmail-p1" style=3D"margin:0px;font-style:normal;font-variant:no=
rmal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;line-height:norm=
al;font-family:Helvetica">The consensus (as judge by the chairs) was that t=
here no clear consensus to shut the discussion down.=C2=A0=C2=A0It was not =
that work on internal solution is needed.</p>


<br><div><br></div><br></div>

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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:12:15 -0700
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As I wrote to Rich, thanks for the correction.

I hope that we can work together to craft a solution.   We don't want
fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.

Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:09 AM, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:

> The consensus (as judge by the chairs) was that there no clear consensus
> to shut the discussion down.  It was not that work on internal solution is
> needed.
>
>
>
>


-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11446d98aa097a05674d85e9
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">As I wrote to Rich, t</spa=
n><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">hanks for the correction.</span></div><d=
iv><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I hope that we can wor=
k together to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We don&#39;t want fragmentation=
 and multiple DIY solutions.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fa=
mily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligat=
ures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wor=
d-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initi=
al;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Nalini</div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 9:09 AM, Joseph Salowey <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:joe@salowey.net" target=3D"_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">




<span></span>





<p class=3D"m_1928299744786102404gmail-p1" style=3D"margin:0px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:=
12px;line-height:normal;font-family:Helvetica">The consensus (as judge by t=
he chairs) was that there no clear consensus to shut the discussion down.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0It was not that work on internal solution is needed.</p>


<br><div><br></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 16:31:53 +0000
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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hi Nalini,

=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 11:59 nalini elkins <nal=
ini.elkins@e-dco.com>:

> The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secur=
e
> for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlying
> motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.
>

This isn't about dissidents, this is all about the proper design.

This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.  If you haven=E2=
=80=99t
> had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the London meetin=
g.
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/
>

I've read this document and have already proposed spawning a separate
thread discussing that before we'll land in London. Probably even before
the agenda will be confirmed. Or even better, discussing draft-fenter there
instead of draft-rhrd.

IMO draft-fenter is much more important, because it is a problem statement,
and it's better to settle on a problem statement before discussing solution
which is "tls visibility". And, for me, personally, the problem statement
in draft-fenter is not convincing.

>

--001a1143937886573605674dcc49
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<span>Hi Nalini,</span><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 11:59 nalini elkins &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;:=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv>The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secu=
re for the individual user.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We feel that there is also an unde=
rlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.=
</div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>This isn&#39;t about dis=
sidents, this is all about the proper design.</div><div><br></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>This=
 ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.=C2=A0 If you haven=E2=
=80=99t had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the London =
meeting.=C2=A0</div><div><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-=
fenter-tls-decryption/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/=
draft-fenter-tls-decryption/</a></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>I&#39;ve read this document and have already proposed spawning a se=
parate thread discussing that before we&#39;ll land in London. Probably eve=
n before the agenda will be confirmed. Or even better, discussing draft-fen=
ter there instead of draft-rhrd.</div><div><br></div><div>IMO draft-fenter =
is much more important, because it is a problem statement, and it&#39;s bet=
ter to settle on a problem statement before discussing solution which is &q=
uot;tls visibility&quot;. And, for me, personally, the problem statement in=
 draft-fenter is not convincing.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div>

--001a1143937886573605674dcc49--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
CC: =?utf-8?B?Q29sbSBNYWNDw6FydGhhaWdo?= <colm@allcosts.net>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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On 3/13/18 8:09 AM, nalini elkins wrote:
> I agree that the room hummed to "continue the discussion".

This might be a good time to review RFC 7282 ("On Consensus
and Humming in the IETF") so that everybody is more-or-less
on the same page with respect to what a roughly 50/50 split
hum means.

Melinda

--=20
Software longa, hardware brevis

PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
                 34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:37:12 -0700
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--001a11441cd4e1c52605674dde0a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

*>>* I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution.   We don't
want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.



> Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only =
sold and
deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky
for the public Internet.


We would be fine with that also.  We are looking for something only INSIDE
the enterprise.



> So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?


"We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so far.  They
operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing, insurance,
finance, and others.


Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> *>* I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution.   We don't
> want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.
>
>
>
> Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only =
sold and
> deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky
> for the public Internet.
>
>
>
> So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D? =E2=98=BA
>
>
>



--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11441cd4e1c52605674dde0a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial"><a name=3D"m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginal=
Body" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">&gt;&=
gt;</span></b></a><span><span>=C2=A0</span>I hope that we can all work toge=
ther to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We don&#39;t want fragmentation and m=
ultiple DIY solutions.<u></u><u></u></span></p><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,3=
4,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-=
variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spa=
ce:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoratio=
n-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin:0px"><span>&gt; Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of =
point solutions that were only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, =
as I said last time, this is too risky for the public Internet.<u></u><u></=
u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span><br></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span>We would be fine with =
that also.=C2=A0 We are looking for something only INSIDE the enterprise.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span><u=
></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><s=
pan>&gt;=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">So then, who is =E2=
=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px">&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0I would say over 50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, and others.=C2=A0=C2=
=A0</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" style=3D"margin:0px">Nalini</p></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote=
:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_3993850908458172338WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginalBody">=
<b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">&gt;</span></b></a><span> I hope that w=
e can all work together to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We don&#39;t want =
fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of poin=
t solutions that were only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, as I=
 said last time, this is too risky for the public Internet.<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?
</span><span><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Apple Color Emoji&quot;">=E2=
=98=BA</span></span><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--001a11441cd4e1c52605674dde0a--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:51:01 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Rich,


A clarification:


> Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only =
sold and
deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky
for the public Internet.


What I meant about being fine with is a solution INSIDE the enterprise.
But, we need a STANDARD because we need to have multiple vendors implement
it.  And, if there is a problem, then the vendors will point first to that
non-standard solution as being the possible problem - which it certainly
could be!


We need to be able to solve problems for end users rapidly.  Some of our
members provide services to hundreds of thousands or millions of end users,
so uptime is critical.


Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:37 AM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

> *>>* I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution.   We don't
> want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.
>
>
>
> > Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were onl=
y sold
> and deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too
> risky for the public Internet.
>
>
> We would be fine with that also.  We are looking for something only INSID=
E
> the enterprise.
>
>
>
> > So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?
>
>
> "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so far.  The=
y
> operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing, insurance,
> finance, and others.
>
>
> Nalini
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> *>* I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution.   We don't
>> want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.
>>
>>
>>
>> Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only=
 sold and
>> deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risk=
y
>> for the public Internet.
>>
>>
>>
>> So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D? =E2=98=BA
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Thanks,
> Nalini Elkins
> President
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
> www.e-dco.com
>
>


--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11479e5e52d24905674e10e3
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<div dir=3D"ltr">

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span=
>Rich,</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial"><span><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px=
;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-sty=
le:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial"><span>A clarification:</span></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span><br></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-famil=
y:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligature=
s:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;tex=
t-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-s=
pacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><sp=
an>&gt; Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were=
 only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this=
 is too risky for the public Internet.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-=
variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;=
text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span><br></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fam=
ily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatu=
res:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;t=
ext-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word=
-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><=
span>What I meant about being fine with is a solution=C2=A0</span><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.8px">INSIDE the enterprise.=C2=A0 But, we need a STANDAR=
D because we need to have multiple vendors implement it.=C2=A0 And, if ther=
e is a problem, then the vendors will point first to that non-standard solu=
tion as being the possible problem - which it certainly could be!</span></p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family=
:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures=
:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text=
-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-sp=
acing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fam=
ily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatu=
res:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;t=
ext-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word=
-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">W=
e need to be able to solve problems for end users rapidly.=C2=A0 Some of ou=
r members provide services to hundreds of thousands or millions of end user=
s, so uptime is critical.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:40=
0;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-de=
coration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight=
:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:=
none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text=
-decoration-color:initial">Nalini</p>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 9:37 AM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial"><a name=3D"m_-4003531215856163410_m_3993850908=
458172338__MailOriginalBody" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)"><b><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt">&gt;&gt;</span></b></a><span><span>=C2=A0</span>I hope =
that we can all work together to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We don&#39;t=
 want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.<u></u><u></u></span></p><di=
v style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span>&gt; Well, I=E2=80=99d=
 be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only sold and deployed i=
n an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky for the pub=
lic Internet.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n:0px"><span><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><sp=
an>We would be fine with that also.=C2=A0 We are looking for something only=
 INSIDE the enterprise.=C2=A0=C2=A0</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin:0px"><span>&gt;=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8p=
x">So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px">&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of orga=
nizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over 50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate large=
 data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, a=
nd others.=C2=A0=C2=A0</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><br><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px">Nalini</p></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote=
:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-4003531215856163410m_3993850908458172338WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"m_-4003531215856163410_m_3993850908458172=
338__MailOriginalBody"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">&gt;</span></b><=
/a><span> I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution.=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0We don&#39;t want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions.<u></u><u>=
</u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Well, I=E2=80=99d be fine with a bunch of poin=
t solutions that were only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, as I=
 said last time, this is too risky for the public Internet.<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>So then, who is =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D?
</span><span><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Apple Color Emoji&quot;">=E2=
=98=BA</span></span><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font colo=
r=3D"#888888"><u></u></font></span></span></p><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font =
color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
</font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">

</font></span></blockquote></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888=
888"><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"m_-400353121=
5856163410gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div=
 style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8=
px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center O=
perators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.c=
om" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></d=
iv></div>
</font></span></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--001a11479e5e52d24905674e10e3--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:56:28 -0700
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To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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 > This might be a good time to review RFC 7282

Thanks, Melinda!  Re-reading!

Nalini

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net
> wrote:

> On 3/13/18 8:09 AM, nalini elkins wrote:
> > I agree that the room hummed to "continue the discussion".
>
> This might be a good time to review RFC 7282 ("On Consensus
> and Humming in the IETF") so that everybody is more-or-less
> on the same page with respect to what a roughly 50/50 split
> hum means.
>
> Melinda
>
> --
> Software longa, hardware brevis
>
> PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
>                  34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11c15168c2d5f005674e239b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">&gt; This might be a good time to review RFC 728=
2</span>

<br></div><div><br></div>Thanks, Melinda!=C2=A0 Re-reading!<div><br></div><=
div>Nalini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Melinda Shore <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:melinda.shore@nomountain.net" target=3D"_blank">melinda.sh=
ore@nomountain.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
On 3/13/18 8:09 AM, nalini elkins wrote:<br>
&gt; I agree that the room hummed to &quot;continue the discussion&quot;.<b=
r>
<br>
This might be a good time to review RFC 7282 (&quot;On Consensus<br>
and Humming in the IETF&quot;) so that everybody is more-or-less<br>
on the same page with respect to what a roughly 50/50 split<br>
hum means.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Melinda<br>
<br>
--<br>
Software longa, hardware brevis<br>
<br>
PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A034C0 DFB8 917=
2 9A76 DB8F<br>
<br>
</font></span><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=
President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Opera=
tors</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><=
/div>
</div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:13:04 -0700
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   - >>"We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
   far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
   insurance, finance, and others.


> See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since you
are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals,
not corporations or consortia.  Right?


Sure.  I see your point.  From now on, I will stop using the pronoun "we"
and say "I".  Is that better?   And others can speak for themselves also.


Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>    insurance, finance, and others.
>
>
>
> See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since you
> are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals,
> not corporations or consortia.  Right?
>



-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34);background:white"><a =
name=3D"m_-8677031477316556320_m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginalBody" sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family=
:Arial,sans-serif">&gt;&gt;&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizations.=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over 50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate large data cent=
ers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, and others.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></span></a></li></ul><div><font face=3D"Ar=
ial, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:12.6667px"><br></span></font></di=
v><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size=
:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:n=
ormal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0p=
x;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initia=
l"></span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;f=
ont-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varian=
t-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-i=
ndent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgroun=
d-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-colo=
r:initial;float:none;display:inline"></span><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin:0px"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-se=
rif"><u></u>&gt;=C2=A0</span></span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">See, I=
 have a bit of a problem with that.=C2=A0 As you should know (since you are=
 a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals, not c=
orporations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Sure.=
=C2=A0 I see your point.=C2=A0 From now on, I will stop using the pronoun &=
quot;we&quot; and say &quot;I&quot;.=C2=A0 Is that better?=C2=A0 =C2=A0And =
others can speak for themselves also.</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px">Nalini</p></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrot=
e:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-8677031477316556320WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-8677031477316556320MsoListParagraph" style=3D"color:#222222=
;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<a name=3D"m_-8677031477316556320__MailOriginalBody"></a><a name=3D"m_-8677=
031477316556320_m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginalBody"><span><span style=
=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">&quot;We&quot=
; is a consortium of organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over 50 so far.=
=C2=A0
 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, in=
surance, finance, and others.=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></span></a></=
li></ul>
<span></span>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>See, I have a bit of a problem with that.=C2=
=A0 As you should know (since you are a Mentor coordinator), participation =
is on the basis of individuals, not corporations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?=
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--94eb2c05e3982b854905674e5f59--


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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 13:19:52 -0400
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--001a1145b20e7d6e5b05674e7750
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

It would be far better if the concerned organizations could come forth
directly.  That helps the community see that there are real people who care
enough about this to engage, and will hopefully allow more direct
discussions of the problems and possible solutions.

Kudos to the US Bank guys for leading the way here.

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:13 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

>
>    - >>"We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>    insurance, finance, and others.
>
>
> > See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since
> you are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of
> individuals, not corporations or consortia.  Right?
>
>
> Sure.  I see your point.  From now on, I will stop using the pronoun "we"
> and say "I".  Is that better?   And others can speak for themselves also.
>
>
> Nalini
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>    - "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>>    insurance, finance, and others.
>>
>>
>>
>> See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since you
>> are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals,
>> not corporations or consortia.  Right?
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Thanks,
> Nalini Elkins
> President
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
> www.e-dco.com
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--001a1145b20e7d6e5b05674e7750
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>It would be far better if the concerned organizations=
 could come forth directly.=C2=A0 That helps the community see that there a=
re real people who care enough about this to engage, and will hopefully all=
ow more direct discussions of the problems and possible solutions.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Kudos to the US Bank guys for leading the way here.<br></d=
iv></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, =
Mar 13, 2018 at 1:13 PM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span =
class=3D"">

<ul style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-=
variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;=
text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoratio=
n-color:initial;margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc"><li class=3D"m_-4680880918321=
332689gmail-m_-8677031477316556320MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in=
 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;background:white"><a name=3D"m_-4680880918321332689_m_-8677031477316556320=
_m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginalBody" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)"><sp=
an><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">&gt;&gt;&qu=
ot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over =
50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in m=
anufacturing, insurance, finance, and others.=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></sp=
an></span></a></li></ul><div><font face=3D"Arial, sans-serif"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12.6667px"><br></span></font></div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fo=
nt-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-=
space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"></span><span style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:40=
0;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display=
:inline"></span></span><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial"><span class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif"=
><u></u>&gt;=C2=A0</span></span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">See, I hav=
e a bit of a problem with that.=C2=A0 As you should know (since you are a M=
entor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals, not corpo=
rations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p></span><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Su=
re.=C2=A0 I see your point.=C2=A0 From now on, I will stop using the pronou=
n &quot;we&quot; and say &quot;I&quot;.=C2=A0 Is that better?=C2=A0 =C2=A0A=
nd others can speak for themselves also.</span></p><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><=
font color=3D"#888888"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px">Nalini</p></font></span></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><span class=3D""><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"m_-4680880918321332689m_-8677031477316556320WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-4680880918321332689m_-8677031477316556320MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"color:#222222;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<a name=3D"m_-4680880918321332689_m_-8677031477316556320__MailOriginalBody"=
></a><a name=3D"m_-4680880918321332689_m_-8677031477316556320_m_39938509084=
58172338__MailOriginalBody"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-famil=
y:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizat=
ions.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over 50 so far.=C2=A0
 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, in=
surance, finance, and others.=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></span></a></=
li></ul>
<span></span>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>See, I have a bit of a problem with that.=C2=
=A0 As you should know (since you are a Mentor coordinator), participation =
is on the basis of individuals, not corporations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?=
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div></span><span class=
=3D"">-- <br><div class=3D"m_-4680880918321332689gmail_signature" data-smar=
tmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini E=
lkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">President</div><div style=3D"fon=
t-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operators</div><div style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com<=
/a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div>
</span></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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On 3/13/18 6:48 AM, Jim Reid wrote:
> Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in
> Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly
> divided.

To clarify, this isn't voting.  If there's no agreement in
either direction there's no agreement (and I hope the default
in the IETF is not that in the absence of agreement, work
goes forward).  The problem is how to come to agreement, and
what that typically involves is refining the proposal to
address objections.

> IIRC the supporters of draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13 agreed to
> drop that draft and come back with a new one which would hopefully be
> more likely to get WG consensus. That draft has now arrived. It=E2=80=99=
s
> unreasonable to deny the new I-D a fair hearing and even worse to
> reject it out of hand.

It's surprising that it got agenda time without mailing list
discussion.  Aside from the changes to the key
exchange there are some clear usability problems.  While
usability usually lies outside the purview of the IETF's
technical work, in this case the work is premised on the
ability of the user to consent (or not) to sharing keying
material with a third party, which in turn suggests that
they're presented with the question at the time the
session is initiated, so that the extension isn't sent in
the ClientHello.  Sounds like a click-through problem,
tbh, where the user has little practical control over whether
or not their data are shared with a third party.

Melinda


--=20
Software longa, hardware brevis

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:23:21 -0700
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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

> Stephen (and TLS group)
>
> We need to look at the bigger picture.
>
> The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure
> for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlying
> motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.  These
> are all laudable goals.
>
> But, the Internet is much more than that.  The Internet is the
> underpinnings of much of the business community which is utilized by
> consumers (end users).   Making a change which makes businesses less secure
> because crucial functions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and
> disruption.   Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or
> seek unique DIY type alternatives.  In fact, we have already heard of some
> planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.
>

As a break from the meta-discussion about whether this topic should be
on the agenda, I'd like to make a technical point. There are two
separate settings where TLS 1.3 makes inspection more difficult:

1. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the server and does
   passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates PFS and so designs
   which involve having a copy of the server's RSA key won't work

2. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the client and does
   MITM: TLS 1.3 encrypts the certificate and so conditional
   inspection based on the server cert doesn't work (though see [0]
   for some of the reasons this is problematic.)

The two drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and not to
case #2. However, for case #1, because you control the server, there's
no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need to not enable it
on your server, so this framing is a bit confusing.


-Ekr

[0] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-=
dco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Stephen (and TLS group)</div><div><br></div><=
div>We need to look at the bigger picture.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br=
></div><div>The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Inte=
rnet secure for the individual user.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We feel that there is als=
o an underlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the political d=
issident.=C2=A0 These are all laudable goals.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>But, the Internet is much more than that.=C2=A0 The Internet is the=
 underpinnings of much of the business community which is utilized by consu=
mers (end users).=C2=A0 =C2=A0Making a change which makes businesses less s=
ecure because crucial functions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos =
and disruption.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt=
 TLS1.3 or seek unique DIY type alternatives.=C2=A0 In fact, we have alread=
y heard of some planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.=C2=
=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As a break from the meta-di=
scussion about whether this topic should be</div><div>on the agenda, I&#39;=
d like to make a technical point. There are two</div><div>separate settings=
 where TLS 1.3 makes inspection more difficult:</div><div><br></div><div>1.=
 Cases where the inspecting entity controls the server and does</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates PFS and so designs</div><=
div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0which involve having a copy of the server&#39;s RSA key wo=
n&#39;t work</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>2. Cases where the inspectin=
g entity controls the client and does</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0MITM: TLS 1.3 =
encrypts the certificate and so conditional</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0inspecti=
on based on the server cert doesn&#39;t work (though see [0]</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0for some of the reasons this is problematic.)</div><div><br></div=
><div>The two drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and not to=
</div><div>case #2. However, for case #1, because you control the server, t=
here&#39;s</div><div>no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need t=
o not enable it</div><div>on your server, so this framing is a bit confusin=
g.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>[0=
] <a href=3D"https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html">https://=
www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html</a>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--001a114ac01c589cb005674e86c4--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:24:57 -0700
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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--001a1140f5e6a0a18505674e8977
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

 >It would be far better if the concerned organizations could come forth
directly.  That helps the community see that there are real people who care
enough about this to engage, and will hopefully allow more direct
discussions of >the problems and possible solutions.

>Kudos to the US Bank guys for leading the way here.

There will be at least 10 other concerned organizations in London.   More
attending remotely.

I am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and talk
quietly.   Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday breakfast
or during a break?  Just let me know if you are interested & we can make
intros.

Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> It would be far better if the concerned organizations could come forth
> directly.  That helps the community see that there are real people who care
> enough about this to engage, and will hopefully allow more direct
> discussions of the problems and possible solutions.
>
> Kudos to the US Bank guys for leading the way here.
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:13 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>    - >>"We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>>    insurance, finance, and others.
>>
>>
>> > See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since
>> you are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of
>> individuals, not corporations or consortia.  Right?
>>
>>
>> Sure.  I see your point.  From now on, I will stop using the pronoun "we"
>> and say "I".  Is that better?   And others can speak for themselves also.
>>
>>
>> Nalini
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>    - "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>>>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>>>    insurance, finance, and others.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> See, I have a bit of a problem with that.  As you should know (since you
>>> are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the basis of individuals,
>>> not corporations or consortia.  Right?
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Thanks,
>> Nalini Elkins
>> President
>> Enterprise Data Center Operators
>> www.e-dco.com
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>


-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a1140f5e6a0a18505674e8977
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12=
.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">=
&gt;It would be far better if the concerned organizations could come forth =
directly.=C2=A0 That helps the community see that there are real people who=
 care enough about this to engage, and will hopefully allow more direct dis=
cussions of &gt;the problems and possible solutions.</div><div style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:40=
0;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font=
-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tra=
nsform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt;Kud=
os to the US Bank guys for leading the way here.</div><div style=3D"color:r=
gb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norma=
l;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-de=
coration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">There will=
 be<span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=C2=A0at least 10 other concerned organ=
izations in London.=C2=A0 =C2=A0More attending remotely.</span></div><div s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;f=
ont-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tr=
ansform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></=
div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al">I am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and talk qu=
ietly.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday br=
eakfast or during a break?=C2=A0 Just let me know if you are interested &am=
p; we can make intros.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial">Nalini</div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Richard Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>It would be far better i=
f the concerned organizations could come forth directly.=C2=A0 That helps t=
he community see that there are real people who care enough about this to e=
ngage, and will hopefully allow more direct discussions of the problems and=
 possible solutions.</div><div><br></div><div>Kudos to the US Bank guys for=
 leading the way here.<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:13 PM, nalini elkins <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span>

<ul style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-s=
erif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-=
variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;=
text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoratio=
n-color:initial;margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc"><li class=3D"m_-6086711516243=
821808m_-4680880918321332689gmail-m_-8677031477316556320MsoListParagraph" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-ser=
if;color:rgb(34,34,34);background:white"><a name=3D"m_-6086711516243821808_=
m_-4680880918321332689_m_-8677031477316556320_m_3993850908458172338__MailOr=
iginalBody" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.=
5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">&gt;&gt;&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of=
 organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over 50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate =
large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, insurance, finan=
ce, and others.=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></span></a></li></ul><div><=
font face=3D"Arial, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:12.6667px"><br></s=
pan></font></div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial"></span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ari=
al,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:nor=
mal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-ali=
gn:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacin=
g:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-=
decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"></span></span><div styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5=
pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u>&gt;=C2=A0</span></span><span style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">See, I have a bit of a problem with that.=C2=A0 As yo=
u should know (since you are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the=
 basis of individuals, not corporations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?</span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8=
px"><br></span></p></span><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Sure.=C2=A0 I see your point.=C2=A0 From now on=
, I will stop using the pronoun &quot;we&quot; and say &quot;I&quot;.=C2=A0=
 Is that better?=C2=A0 =C2=A0And others can speak for themselves also.</spa=
n></p><span class=3D"m_-6086711516243821808HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px=
"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px">Nalini</p></fo=
nt></span></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><span><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">O=
n Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"m_-6086711516243821808m_-4680880918321332689m_-86770314773165=
56320WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-6086711516243821808m_-4680880918321332689m_-867703147731655=
6320MsoListParagraph" style=3D"color:#222222;margin-left:0in;background:whi=
te">
<a name=3D"m_-6086711516243821808_m_-4680880918321332689_m_-867703147731655=
6320__MailOriginalBody"></a><a name=3D"m_-6086711516243821808_m_-4680880918=
321332689_m_-8677031477316556320_m_3993850908458172338__MailOriginalBody"><=
span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-seri=
f">&quot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say=
 over 50 so far.=C2=A0
 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in manufacturing, in=
surance, finance, and others.=C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></span></a></=
li></ul>
<span></span>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>See, I have a bit of a problem with that.=C2=
=A0 As you should know (since you are a Mentor coordinator), participation =
is on the basis of individuals, not corporations or consortia.=C2=A0 Right?=
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div></span><span>-- <br=
><div class=3D"m_-6086711516243821808m_-4680880918321332689gmail_signature"=
 data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px=
">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">President</div><div st=
yle=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operators</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">ww=
w.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div>
</span></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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+1

> On 13 Mar 2018, at 17:23, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com> w=
rote:
>> Stephen (and TLS group)
>>=20
>> We need to look at the bigger picture.   =20
>>=20
>> The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secur=
e for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlying motiv=
ation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.  These are a=
ll laudable goals. =20
>>=20
>> But, the Internet is much more than that.  The Internet is the underpinni=
ngs of much of the business community which is utilized by consumers (end us=
ers).   Making a change which makes businesses less secure because crucial f=
unctions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and disruption.   Many b=
usinesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or seek unique DIY type alt=
ernatives.  In fact, we have already heard of some planning to block TLS 1.3=
 traffic just for this reason.=20
>=20
> As a break from the meta-discussion about whether this topic should be
> on the agenda, I'd like to make a technical point. There are two
> separate settings where TLS 1.3 makes inspection more difficult:
>=20
> 1. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the server and does
>    passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates PFS and so designs
>    which involve having a copy of the server's RSA key won't work
>   =20
> 2. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the client and does
>    MITM: TLS 1.3 encrypts the certificate and so conditional
>    inspection based on the server cert doesn't work (though see [0]
>    for some of the reasons this is problematic.)
>=20
> The two drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and not to
> case #2. However, for case #1, because you control the server, there's
> no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need to not enable it
> on your server, so this framing is a bit confusing.
>=20
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
> [0] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div></div><div>+1</div><div><br>On 13 Mar 2=
018, at 17:23, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.co=
m</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 1=
3, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:na=
lini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div>Stephen (and TLS group)</div><div><br></div><div>We need to look at t=
he bigger picture.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>The TLS worki=
ng group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure for the indivi=
dual user.&nbsp; &nbsp; We feel that there is also an underlying motivation t=
o help the underdog and protect the political dissident.&nbsp; These are all=
 laudable goals.&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>But, the Internet is m=
uch more than that.&nbsp; The Internet is the underpinnings of much of the b=
usiness community which is utilized by consumers (end users).&nbsp; &nbsp;Ma=
king a change which makes businesses less secure because crucial functions c=
annot be done will lead to enormous chaos and disruption.&nbsp; &nbsp;Many b=
usinesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or seek unique DIY type alt=
ernatives.&nbsp; In fact, we have already heard of some planning to block TL=
S 1.3 traffic just for this reason.&nbsp;</div></div></blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div>As a break from the meta-discussion about whether this topic shoul=
d be</div><div>on the agenda, I'd like to make a technical point. There are t=
wo</div><div>separate settings where TLS 1.3 makes inspection more difficult=
:</div><div><br></div><div>1. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the=
 server and does</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates=
 PFS and so designs</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;which involve having a copy of th=
e server's RSA key won't work</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div>2. Cases whe=
re the inspecting entity controls the client and does</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp=
;MITM: TLS 1.3 encrypts the certificate and so conditional</div><div>&nbsp; &=
nbsp;inspection based on the server cert doesn't work (though see [0]</div><=
div>&nbsp; &nbsp;for some of the reasons this is problematic.)</div><div><br=
></div><div>The two drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and n=
ot to</div><div>case #2. However, for case #1, because you control the serve=
r, there's</div><div>no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need to=
 not enable it</div><div>on your server, so this framing is a bit confusing.=
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>[0] <=
a href=3D"https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html">https://www.=
imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html</a>&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>____________________=
___________________________</span><br><span>TLS mailing list</span><br><span=
><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D=
"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/lis=
tinfo/tls</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=

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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 17:32:05 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Hi Eric,

The author probably refers to a case where an infosec dept of an enterprise
will not just disable TLSv1.3 on the servers, but will also set up some
deep-juju DPI for filtering v1.3 in transit to make sure no one will enable
v1.3 accidentally somewhere.

As those DPI solutions are often of questionable reliability, that may
affect other transit users of that network.

=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 13:24 Eric Rescorla <ekr=
@rtfm.com>:

> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen (and TLS group)
>>
>> We need to look at the bigger picture.
>>
>> The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet
>> secure for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underly=
ing
>> motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.  Th=
ese
>> are all laudable goals.
>>
>> But, the Internet is much more than that.  The Internet is the
>> underpinnings of much of the business community which is utilized by
>> consumers (end users).   Making a change which makes businesses less sec=
ure
>> because crucial functions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and
>> disruption.   Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or
>> seek unique DIY type alternatives.  In fact, we have already heard of so=
me
>> planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.
>>
>
> As a break from the meta-discussion about whether this topic should be
> on the agenda, I'd like to make a technical point. There are two
> separate settings where TLS 1.3 makes inspection more difficult:
>
> 1. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the server and does
>    passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates PFS and so designs
>    which involve having a copy of the server's RSA key won't work
>
> 2. Cases where the inspecting entity controls the client and does
>    MITM: TLS 1.3 encrypts the certificate and so conditional
>    inspection based on the server cert doesn't work (though see [0]
>    for some of the reasons this is problematic.)
>
> The two drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and not to
> case #2. However, for case #1, because you control the server, there's
> no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need to not enable it
> on your server, so this framing is a bit confusing.
>
>
> -Ekr
>
> [0] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--f403043ee33cd084cb05674ea317
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<span>Hi Eric,</span><div><br></div><div>The author probably refers to a ca=
se where an infosec dept of an enterprise will not just disable TLSv1.3 on =
the servers, but will also set up some deep-juju DPI for filtering v1.3 in =
transit to make sure no one will enable v1.3 accidentally somewhere.</div><=
div><br></div><div>As those DPI solutions are often of questionable reliabi=
lity, that may affect other transit users of that network.<br><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 201=
8 =D0=B3., 13:24 Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm=
.com</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8=
:58 AM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins=
@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
>Stephen (and TLS group)</div><div><br></div><div>We need to look at the bi=
gger picture.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The TLS working g=
roup has been concentrating on making the Internet secure for the individua=
l user.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We feel that there is also an underlying motivation to=
 help the underdog and protect the political dissident.=C2=A0 These are all=
 laudable goals.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>But, the Internet is =
much more than that.=C2=A0 The Internet is the underpinnings of much of the=
 business community which is utilized by consumers (end users).=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Making a change which makes businesses less secure because crucial funct=
ions cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and disruption.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Many businesses are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or seek unique DI=
Y type alternatives.=C2=A0 In fact, we have already heard of some planning =
to block TLS 1.3 traffic just for this reason.=C2=A0</div></div></blockquot=
e><div><br></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>As a break from the meta-discussion abo=
ut whether this topic should be</div><div>on the agenda, I&#39;d like to ma=
ke a technical point. There are two</div><div>separate settings where TLS 1=
.3 makes inspection more difficult:</div><div><br></div><div>1. Cases where=
 the inspecting entity controls the server and does</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
passive inspection: TLS 1.3 mandates PFS and so designs</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0which involve having a copy of the server&#39;s RSA key won&#39;t wor=
k</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>2. Cases where the inspecting entity co=
ntrols the client and does</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0MITM: TLS 1.3 encrypts th=
e certificate and so conditional</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0inspection based on=
 the server cert doesn&#39;t work (though see [0]</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0fo=
r some of the reasons this is problematic.)</div><div><br></div><div>The tw=
o drafts under discussion here only apply to case #1 and not to</div><div>c=
ase #2. However, for case #1, because you control the server, there&#39;s</=
div><div>no need to look at blocking TLS 1.3, you merely need to not enable=
 it</div><div>on your server, so this framing is a bit confusing.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>[0] <a href=3D=
"https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/03/10/tls13.html</a>=C2=A0</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--f403043ee33cd084cb05674ea317--


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To: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K9I-WEfU4OIzOxDe0i8v25CzHno>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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> On Mar 13, 2018, at 16:31, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi Nalini,
>=20
> =D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 11:59 nalini elkins =
<nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>:   =20
> The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet =
secure for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an =
underlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the political =
dissident.
>=20
> This isn't about dissidents, this is all about the proper design.
>=20
> This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.  If you =
haven=E2=80=99t had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before =
the London meeting.=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/
>=20
> I've read this document and have already proposed spawning a separate =
thread discussing that before we'll land in London. Probably even before =
the agenda will be confirmed. Or even better, discussing draft-fenter =
there instead of draft-rhrd.
>=20
> IMO draft-fenter is much more important, because it is a problem =
statement, and it's better to settle on a problem statement before =
discussing solution which is "tls visibility". And, for me, personally, =
the problem statement in draft-fenter is not convincing.

I meant to answer your question: draft-fenter is referred to in Russ=E2=80=
=99s slides it=E2=80=99s not specifically on the agenda.  The chairs =
have seen the slides you haven=E2=80=99t yet (Russ gets a gold start for =
submitting slides early).

This is not the first time the topic (both the motivations and =
solutions) has been discussed.  This time tracks back to IETF 97.  You =
can find the presentation somewhere on the TLS row:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/97/agenda.html
There was also some discussion in Prague, which can found somewhere near =
the TLS row at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/proceedings

There have also been hundreds of message related to this topic that you =
can search for on the list to get a sense (use the search tool with =
something like =E2=80=9Cdatacenter" OR "Data Center" OR draft-green OR =
RHRD OR draft-rhrd OR "Industry Concerns"):
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=3Dtls

I hope that folks who come to the session will take the time to review =
the previous discussion.=20

spt


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:44:39 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 16:18:48 CET Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 04:27:46PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable
> > identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text mak=
es
> > it trivial to perform enumeration attack.
>=20
> What would be impact of such enumeration attack? It seems to me that
> not disclosing identities is to make weak passwords more difficult to
> attack, but here there are no weak passwords.

the usernames themselves can be confidential information

behaviour like that was considered a vulnerability before, irrespective of=
=20
robustness of passwords:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2003-0190
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=3DCVE-2006-5229

> Note that:
>=20
> - There is no protection for the PSK identity, so putting anything
>   sensitive in it is a bad idea.

the server can be accessible both through Internet and through encrypted=20
connections (e.g. IPsec), and while it exposing identities may not lead to =
an=20
exploit, it very likely will make social engineering easier; it is informat=
ion=20
disclosure one way or the other

> - Passive attack gives attacker not only a valid PSK identity, but
>   enough information to mount high-speed offline cracking attack on the
>   PSK secret. Only one captured key exchange is needed, and (EC)DHE
>   does not help.

that does require you to be on-route of a connection and to capture it, tha=
t's=20
much harder to do than firing up a simple script against any given server w=
ith=20
PSK enabled.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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On Mar 13, 2018, at 12:37 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com> =
wrote:
> "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so far.  =
They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing, insurance, =
finance, and others. =20

Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?

The reason I ask is that you are essentially asking us (the security =
folks) to bless something that is pretty obviously a bad idea, and of =
course we're resisting, and we're going to continue to resist.   I don't =
think you are ever going to get consensus on a document in the IETF that =
says what you want it to say.   And this is perfectly fine.   Your =
consortium can publish its own document that says what you want it to =
say.

Then when this goes badly wrong, it will be your consortium that is =
responsible, not the IETF.   Or if it doesn't go badly wrong, you can =
claim the credit.   But either way, you aren't going to have to keep =
arguing with us about this.   I don't think there's any reason for you =
to think that the argument is going to end in consensus; this is the =
reason that some of us are asking for it to stop.

Also, if what you produce isn't an IETF standard, then a browser can =
identify whether it implements IETF tls 1.3, or =
business-consortium-wtls-1.0.   We would hope that browsers that =
implement the latter would not exist, and that this would be okay for =
you because you don't actually need this hack in the browser.   That's =
the value of not doing this work in the IETF.

Also, I just wanted to mention a problem with something you said =
earlier:

> We feel that there is also an underlying motivation to help the =
underdog and protect the political dissident.=20

This is not a correct description of the situation.   TLS security is =
needed by whose information is communiced information over the network =
when revealing that information to an adversary would put them at risk.  =
 When you make TLS security weaker, the set of people who is at risk is =
everyone, and the risks go from "twitter account compromised" all the =
way up to "teen with 'shameful secret' commits suicide when outed" or =
"my aging mom loses her retirement savings."

In addition, you are reducing compartmentalization with your keying =
strategy=E2=80=94in order to make communications easily decryptable, you =
have to have broadly-shared keys, and that reduces the amount of =
compartmentalization that TLS can provide between disparate elements in =
your networks.

We have seen the result of poor compartmentalization on network =
security=E2=80=94the most recent really egregious example being the =
Equifax, which would have been a lot less bad if Equifax had employed =
the sort of basic compartmentalization precautions that the NIST =
recommends.   Reducing compartmentalization inevitably makes it easier =
for an adversary to infiltrate your network and exfiltrate private user =
data.   Maybe it will never happen if you are careful enough.

The point is that your characterization of our objections as being about =
a certain special corner case is simply not an accurate =
characterization.   What you are proposing to do will weaken your =
network security too, and this weakening is quite likely to result in my =
personal data being compromised.

It would be really great if we could start talking seriously about ways =
to solve your problem, but that conversation can't take the form "how =
can we avoid making any changes?"   When I've tried to have serious =
conversations with you and others in your consortium about how to solve =
this problem in the past, any solution that requires you to implement =
new technology is always off the table.   That's no good.


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 13, 2018, at 12:37 PM, nalini elkins &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" =
class=3D"">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"color: rgb(34, =
34, 34); font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: =
12.800000190734863px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: =
rgb(255, 255, 255); margin: 0px;" class=3D"">"We" is a consortium of =
organizations.&nbsp; &nbsp;I would say over 50 so far.&nbsp; They =
operate large data centers.&nbsp; &nbsp;They are in manufacturing, =
insurance, finance, and others. &nbsp;</div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the =
standard, then?</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>The reason I ask is =
that you are essentially asking us (the security folks) to bless =
something that is pretty obviously a bad idea, and of course we're =
resisting, and we're going to continue to resist. &nbsp; I don't think =
you are ever going to get consensus on a document in the IETF that says =
what you want it to say. &nbsp; And this is perfectly fine. &nbsp; Your =
consortium can publish its own document that says what you want it to =
say.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Then when this goes badly =
wrong, it will be your consortium that is responsible, not the IETF. =
&nbsp; Or if it doesn't go badly wrong, you can claim the credit. &nbsp; =
But either way, you aren't going to have to keep arguing with us about =
this. &nbsp; I don't think there's any reason for you to think that the =
argument is going to end in consensus; this is the reason that some of =
us are asking for it to stop.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Also, =
if what you produce isn't an IETF standard, then a browser can identify =
whether it implements IETF tls 1.3, or business-consortium-wtls-1.0. =
&nbsp; We would hope that browsers that implement the latter would not =
exist, and that this would be okay for you because you don't actually =
need this hack in the browser. &nbsp; That's the value of <i =
class=3D"">not</i>&nbsp;doing this work in the IETF.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Also, I just wanted to mention a problem with =
something you said earlier:</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"display: inline !important;">We feel that there is =
also an underlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the =
political dissident.&nbsp;</span></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></div><div>This is not a correct description of the =
situation. &nbsp; TLS security is needed by whose information is =
communiced information over the network when revealing that information =
to an adversary would put them at risk. &nbsp; When you make TLS =
security weaker, the set of people who is at risk is everyone, and the =
risks go from "twitter account compromised" all the way up to "teen with =
'shameful secret' commits suicide when outed" or "my aging mom loses her =
retirement savings."</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>In addition, =
you are reducing compartmentalization with your keying strategy=E2=80=94in=
 order to make communications easily decryptable, you have to have =
broadly-shared keys, and that reduces the amount of compartmentalization =
that TLS can provide between disparate elements in your =
networks.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>We have seen the result of =
poor compartmentalization on network security=E2=80=94the most recent =
really egregious example being the Equifax, which would have been a lot =
less bad if Equifax had employed the sort of basic compartmentalization =
precautions that the NIST recommends. &nbsp; Reducing =
compartmentalization inevitably makes it easier for an adversary to =
infiltrate your network and exfiltrate private user data. &nbsp; Maybe =
it will never happen if you are careful enough.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>The point is that your characterization of our =
objections as being about a certain special corner case is simply not an =
accurate characterization. &nbsp; What you are proposing to do will =
weaken <i class=3D"">your</i> network security too, and this weakening =
is quite likely to result in my personal data being =
compromised.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>It would be really =
great if we could start talking seriously about ways to solve your =
problem, but that conversation can't take the form "how can we avoid =
making any changes?" &nbsp; When I've tried to have serious =
conversations with you and others in your consortium about how to solve =
this problem in the past, any solution that requires you to implement =
new technology is always off the table. &nbsp; That's no =
good.</div><div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_E43A0E8C-AFCB-45DD-AE6E-524FAC866567--


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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 17:52:21 +0000
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--94eb2c07ec22bc2d3705674eedd1
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Yes, I've read all that through, and I've been in Prague, and I still feel
that the problem statement lacks some clarification.

This is, by the way, the reason draft-fenter is published; who would need
that if the reasons all this visibility thing is proposed would have been
transparent for anyone?

=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 13:39 Sean Turner <sean@=
sn3rd.com>:

>
>
> > On Mar 13, 2018, at 16:31, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Nalini,
> >
> > =D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 11:59 nalini elkins =
<nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>:
> > The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet
> secure for the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlyi=
ng
> motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissident.
> >
> > This isn't about dissidents, this is all about the proper design.
> >
> > This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.  If you haven=
=E2=80=99t
> had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the London meetin=
g.
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryption/
> >
> > I've read this document and have already proposed spawning a separate
> thread discussing that before we'll land in London. Probably even before
> the agenda will be confirmed. Or even better, discussing draft-fenter the=
re
> instead of draft-rhrd.
> >
> > IMO draft-fenter is much more important, because it is a problem
> statement, and it's better to settle on a problem statement before
> discussing solution which is "tls visibility". And, for me, personally, t=
he
> problem statement in draft-fenter is not convincing.
>
> I meant to answer your question: draft-fenter is referred to in Russ=E2=
=80=99s
> slides it=E2=80=99s not specifically on the agenda.  The chairs have seen=
 the
> slides you haven=E2=80=99t yet (Russ gets a gold start for submitting sli=
des early).
>
> This is not the first time the topic (both the motivations and solutions)
> has been discussed.  This time tracks back to IETF 97.  You can find the
> presentation somewhere on the TLS row:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/97/agenda.html
> There was also some discussion in Prague, which can found somewhere near
> the TLS row at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/proceedings
>
> There have also been hundreds of message related to this topic that you
> can search for on the list to get a sense (use the search tool with
> something like =E2=80=9Cdatacenter" OR "Data Center" OR draft-green OR RH=
RD OR
> draft-rhrd OR "Industry Concerns"):
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=3Dtls
>
> I hope that folks who come to the session will take the time to review th=
e
> previous discussion.
>
> spt
>
>

--94eb2c07ec22bc2d3705674eedd1
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Yes, I&#39;ve read all that through, and I&#39;ve been in Prague, and I sti=
ll feel that the problem statement lacks some clarification.<div><br></div>=
<div>This is, by the way, the reason draft-fenter is published; who would n=
eed that if the reasons all this visibility thing is proposed would have be=
en transparent for anyone?</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div di=
r=3D"ltr">=D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 13:39 Sean Tur=
ner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt;:<br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Mar 13, 2018, at 16:31, Artyom Gavrichenkov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:x=
imaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi Nalini,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =D0=B2=D1=82, 13 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 11:59 nalini elkins=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.el=
kins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;:<br>
&gt; The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet se=
cure for the individual user.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 We feel that there is also an un=
derlying motivation to help the underdog and protect the political dissiden=
t.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This isn&#39;t about dissidents, this is all about the proper design.<=
br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.=C2=A0 If you =
haven=E2=80=99t had a chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the=
 London meeting.<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fenter-tls-decryptio=
n/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/d=
raft-fenter-tls-decryption/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve read this document and have already proposed spawning a separ=
ate thread discussing that before we&#39;ll land in London. Probably even b=
efore the agenda will be confirmed. Or even better, discussing draft-fenter=
 there instead of draft-rhrd.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; IMO draft-fenter is much more important, because it is a problem state=
ment, and it&#39;s better to settle on a problem statement before discussin=
g solution which is &quot;tls visibility&quot;. And, for me, personally, th=
e problem statement in draft-fenter is not convincing.<br>
<br>
I meant to answer your question: draft-fenter is referred to in Russ=E2=80=
=99s slides it=E2=80=99s not specifically on the agenda.=C2=A0 The chairs h=
ave seen the slides you haven=E2=80=99t yet (Russ gets a gold start for sub=
mitting slides early).<br>
<br>
This is not the first time the topic (both the motivations and solutions) h=
as been discussed.=C2=A0 This time tracks back to IETF 97.=C2=A0 You can fi=
nd the presentation somewhere on the TLS row:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/97/agenda.html" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/97/agenda.ht=
ml</a><br>
There was also some discussion in Prague, which can found somewhere near th=
e TLS row at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/proceedings" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/proceedin=
gs</a><br>
<br>
There have also been hundreds of message related to this topic that you can=
 search for on the list to get a sense (use the search tool with something =
like =E2=80=9Cdatacenter&quot; OR &quot;Data Center&quot; OR draft-green OR=
 RHRD OR draft-rhrd OR &quot;Industry Concerns&quot;):<br>
<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=3Dtls" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/=
?email_list=3Dtls</a><br>
<br>
I hope that folks who come to the session will take the time to review the =
previous discussion.<br>
<br>
spt<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--94eb2c07ec22bc2d3705674eedd1--


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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 14:15:51 -0400
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Cc: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
> In addition, you are reducing compartmentalization with your keying
> strategy=E2=80=94in order to make communications easily decryptable, you =
have to
> have broadly-shared keys, and that reduces the amount of
> compartmentalization that TLS can provide between disparate elements in y=
our
> networks.
>
> We have seen the result of poor compartmentalization on network security=
=E2=80=94the
> most recent really egregious example being the Equifax, which would have
> been a lot less bad if Equifax had employed the sort of basic
> compartmentalization precautions that the NIST recommends.   Reducing
> compartmentalization inevitably makes it easier for an adversary to
> infiltrate your network and exfiltrate private user data.

+1
And I wonder how come that after all hundreds of discussions the
compartmentalization issue is not addressed properly in draft-fenter.
Because simply stating that "typically, only select groups within an
organization [are able to see decrypted traffic]" doesn't seem enough.

(this is just a single example of an issue with that draft)

| Artyom Gavrichenkov
| gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191
| mailto: ximaera@gmail.com
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| telegram: xima_era
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| tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 14:44:23 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Melinda Shore
<melinda.shore@nomountain.net> wrote:
> On 3/13/18 6:48 AM, Jim Reid wrote:
>> Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in
>> Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly
>> divided.
>
> To clarify, this isn't voting.  If there's no agreement in
> either direction there's no agreement (and I hope the default
> in the IETF is not that in the absence of agreement, work
> goes forward).  The problem is how to come to agreement, and
> what that typically involves is refining the proposal to
> address objections.

And then there are other options too, like another WG.  Even from
Stephen's list of who is in agreement with him, I've received a few
messages saying their text wasn't what he thinks it was.  More
discussion here would be good to figure out a way forward.  The chairs
have not agreed to allow the work to go forward, but just the
discussions to determine next steps.

>
>> IIRC the supporters of draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13 agreed to
>> drop that draft and come back with a new one which would hopefully be
>> more likely to get WG consensus. That draft has now arrived. It=E2=80=99=
s
>> unreasonable to deny the new I-D a fair hearing and even worse to
>> reject it out of hand.
>
> It's surprising that it got agenda time without mailing list
> discussion.  Aside from the changes to the key
> exchange there are some clear usability problems.  While
> usability usually lies outside the purview of the IETF's
> technical work, in this case the work is premised on the
> ability of the user to consent (or not) to sharing keying
> material with a third party, which in turn suggests that
> they're presented with the question at the time the
> session is initiated, so that the extension isn't sent in
> the ClientHello.  Sounds like a click-through problem,
> tbh, where the user has little practical control over whether
> or not their data are shared with a third party.

This should have had discussion time in Singapore, as the chairs
mentioned.  I'm mostly responding though because their use cases are
entirely server-to-server from what I understand.  The client
connection to the enterprise can terminate at the network edge, then
anything within the enterprise is from another encrypted session
(which could be TLS 1.2 or another protocol, or this proposal, or
something else including methods that eliminate the architectural
design for monitoring on the wire within the datacenter).  If there
were a way to limit this extension to server-to-server, that would
eliminate the click through problem you mention and the server admin
would be aware on either end of this usage.  I don't know if there is
a way to do this without using another protocol, but making the use
case clear may help with ideas.

Best,
Kathleen

>
> Melinda
>
>
> --
> Software longa, hardware brevis
>
> PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
>                  34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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On 3/13/18 10:44 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> And then there are other options too, like another WG.  Even from
> Stephen's list of who is in agreement with him, I've received a few
> messages saying their text wasn't what he thinks it was.  More
> discussion here would be good to figure out a way forward.  The chairs
> have not agreed to allow the work to go forward, but just the
> discussions to determine next steps.

Part of the problem here, I think, is that it's not clear
what's under discussion - the general problem or this
specific draft.  I tend to think that discussions of the
general problem will probably be unproductive and
polarizing, and that if there is a way forward on this
it's to have credible and specific technical proposals.
Remember that in terms of process we don't need to have
unanimity on a decision, but all serious technical
objections need to be addressed and resolved.  So,
if someone has a draft that can eventually clear that
bar, proponents of allowing third parties to decrypt
TLS sessions have a way forward.  (Unfortunately I
don't think this draft can make it through).  At any
rate I would regret (a lot) seeing discussion meander
on over to the broader should-we-or-shouldn't-we question.

Melinda

--=20
Software longa, hardware brevis

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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 12:20:00 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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All,

The time has gotten away from me.   I have to leave for the airport. I am
taking my daughter to London & need to get us all packed & out of the house=
.

I will write respond to all at length either from the airport or in London.

Rich, so sorry about your health issues.  My best wishes for a full and
complete recovery.

Nalini

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:39 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - I am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and talk
>    quietly.   Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday break=
fast
>    or during a break?  Just let me know if you are interested & we can ma=
ke
>    intros.
>
>
>
> I won=E2=80=99t be there (health issues), but I=E2=80=99ve already turned=
 down such
> private invites before.
>
>
>
> Standing up in front of a WG and talking about unpopular topics is hard.
> As Richard said, kudo=E2=80=99s to USBank (and a BCBS org) for doing so. =
 But if
> you=E2=80=99re not willing to do the hard work, then you don=E2=80=99t ge=
t to have the IETF
> address your concerns.
>
>
>
> I remember saying before that I firmly believe that the main, and
> unstated, reason for wanting an IETF RFC on this is so that would-be
> customers can point to vendors and ask for a common solution at a lower
> price because the ability is now commoditized.  With all due respect to t=
he
> people involved, I believe that is still the case.
>
>
>
> I have heard concerns that it is necessary to have a =E2=80=9Cspeedy=E2=
=80=9D solution.
> Again, I strongly disagree with this. The standard organizations haven=E2=
=80=99t
> even made TLS 1.0 illegal yet, as I said last time.  What makes you think
> that something is needed in under five years?  I asked that question
> before, too.
>
>
>
>
>



--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>The time has gotten away from me.=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0I have to leave for the airport. I am taking my daughter to Lo=
ndon &amp; need to get us all packed &amp; out of the house.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>I will write respond to all at length either from the airport or=
 in London.</div><div><br></div><div>Rich, so sorry about your health issue=
s.=C2=A0 My best wishes for a full and complete recovery.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Nalini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:39 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





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;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<a name=3D"m_-4530942349504110930__MailOriginalBody"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">I am happy to set up an =
informal session where all can meet and talk quietly.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not every=
one will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday breakfast or during a break?=
=C2=A0 Just
 let me know if you are interested &amp; we can make intros.<u></u><u></u><=
/span></a></li></ul>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I won=E2=80=99t be there (health issues), but =
I=E2=80=99ve already turned down such private invites before.<u></u><u></u>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Standing up in front of a WG and talking about=
 unpopular topics is hard.=C2=A0 As Richard said, kudo=E2=80=99s to USBank =
(and a BCBS org) for doing so.=C2=A0 But if you=E2=80=99re not willing to d=
o the hard work, then
 you don=E2=80=99t get to have the IETF address your concerns.<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I remember saying before that I firmly believe=
 that the main, and unstated, reason for wanting an IETF RFC on this is so =
that would-be customers can point to vendors and ask for a common solution
 at a lower price because the ability is now commoditized.=C2=A0 With all d=
ue respect to the people involved, I believe that is still the case.<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I have heard concerns that it is necessary to =
have a =E2=80=9Cspeedy=E2=80=9D solution. Again, I strongly disagree with t=
his. The standard organizations haven=E2=80=99t even made TLS 1.0 illegal y=
et, as I said last
 time.=C2=A0 What makes you think that something is needed in under five ye=
ars?=C2=A0 I asked that question before, too.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--94eb2c0b9ee414ed6405675025be--


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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 15:37:22 -0400
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To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:08 PM, Melinda Shore
<melinda.shore@nomountain.net> wrote:
> On 3/13/18 10:44 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
>> And then there are other options too, like another WG.  Even from
>> Stephen's list of who is in agreement with him, I've received a few
>> messages saying their text wasn't what he thinks it was.  More
>> discussion here would be good to figure out a way forward.  The chairs
>> have not agreed to allow the work to go forward, but just the
>> discussions to determine next steps.
>
> Part of the problem here, I think, is that it's not clear
> what's under discussion - the general problem or this
> specific draft.  I tend to think that discussions of the
> general problem will probably be unproductive and
> polarizing, and that if there is a way forward on this
> it's to have credible and specific technical proposals.
> Remember that in terms of process we don't need to have
> unanimity on a decision, but all serious technical
> objections need to be addressed and resolved.  So,
> if someone has a draft that can eventually clear that
> bar, proponents of allowing third parties to decrypt
> TLS sessions have a way forward.  (Unfortunately I
> don't think this draft can make it through).  At any
> rate I would regret (a lot) seeing discussion meander
> on over to the broader should-we-or-shouldn't-we question.

I think the chairs made it clear that it is on the specific draft and
they just have 10 minutes to present.  I believe the slides are
already posted and include the use cases within them.  We've all spent
way more than 10 in this discussion ;-)

It's up to the WG to decide and it seems a few want to discuss it,
even from the list that Stephen says are not interested.  I think it's
better to let the discussion happen.

Best,
Kathleen

>
> Melinda
>
> --
> Software longa, hardware brevis
>
> PGP fingerprint: 4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
>                  34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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To: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Mar 13, 2018, at 3:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com> =
wrote:
> I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how =
can we avoid making any changes?"

With respect, Michael, when I have conversed with you about this in the =
past, that is precisely what you have asked for.   You do not want to =
have to change your operational methodology, and any change to TLS that =
forces you to change your operational methodology is unacceptable to =
you.  I understand why that is, and I sympathize, but let's please be =
clear that this is your precise goal.

> But we would seek to avoid unnecessary,  wholesale, infrastructure =
architectural changes.

There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security =
geek I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.

Of course, you've also explained why that isn't acceptable to you=E2=80=94=
you are afraid that the payment card industry will eventually force you =
to use TLS 1.3, just as they have, rather ineffectively, tried to insist =
that you use TLS 1.2.

Now why would they do that?


From nobody Tue Mar 13 14:01:55 2018
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> On Mar 13, 2018, at 3:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com> wro=
te:
>=20
> I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how can=
 we avoid making any changes?"  =20
> But we would seek to avoid unnecessary,  wholesale, infrastructure archite=
ctural changes.=20
> We want to stay with standards wherever/whenever possible and keep the num=
ber of standards to the lowest common denominator.

*Common* being the pivotal word.


Stan

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<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div><br></div><div>On Mar 13, 2018, at 3:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael &lt;<a href="mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div>

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<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal">I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how can we avoid making any changes?" &nbsp;&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But we would seek to avoid unnecessary,&nbsp; wholesale, infrastructure architectural changes.&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">We want to stay with standards wherever/whenever possible and keep the number of standards to the lowest common denominator.</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>*Common* being the pivotal word.<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Stan</div><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="WordSection1"><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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From nobody Tue Mar 13 14:49:54 2018
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>> Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in
>> Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly
>> divided.
>=20
> To clarify, this isn't voting.  If there's no agreement in
> either direction there's no agreement (and I hope the default
> in the IETF is not that in the absence of agreement, work
> goes forward).  The problem is how to come to agreement, and
> what that typically involves is refining the proposal to
> address objections.

The Prague discussion was about draft-green-...  Nick Sullivan =
summarized four concerns with that approach.  See =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg>

draft-rhrd-... addresses all four of these concerns.  We had some =
discussion on the mail list, which lead to -01 being posted.

I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach.  I would =
like to find out.

Russ=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">Stephen, the opposite PoV is =
equally valid. There was no consensus in<br class=3D"">Prague NOT to =
work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly<br =
class=3D"">divided.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">To clarify, this isn't voting. =
&nbsp;If there's no agreement in</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">either direction there's no =
agreement (and I hope the default</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">in the IETF is not that in the =
absence of agreement, work</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">goes forward). &nbsp;The problem =
is how to come to agreement, and</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">what that typically involves is =
refining the proposal to</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">address =
objections.</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">The Prague discussion was about draft-green-... &nbsp;Nick =
Sullivan summarized four concerns with that approach. &nbsp;See&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL=
-dg" =
class=3D"">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_l=
DnL-dg</a></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">draft-rhrd-... addresses all four of these concerns. &nbsp;We =
had some discussion on the mail list, which lead to -01 being =
posted.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I do =
not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach. &nbsp;I would =
like to find out.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ</div></body></html>=

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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NPCeqvzJNiIFaqm8QdOWljP5k9A>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 22:07:47 +0000
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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
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--001a114e302ab4489a0567527d7a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Richard Barnes and Rich Salz,
Thank you for the kind words.   They are much appreciated!  Best of luck to
Rich with the health concerns too.

It=E2=80=99s been an interesting journey with a lot of great folks.  Will r=
eply to
the issues later as I need to head out at the moment.

-Darin


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:20 PM nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

> All,
>
> The time has gotten away from me.   I have to leave for the airport. I am
> taking my daughter to London & need to get us all packed & out of the hou=
se.
>
> I will write respond to all at length either from the airport or in Londo=
n.
>
> Rich, so sorry about your health issues.  My best wishes for a full and
> complete recovery.
>
> Nalini
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:39 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>    - I am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and
>>    talk quietly.   Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday
>>    breakfast or during a break?  Just let me know if you are interested =
& we
>>    can make intros.
>>
>>
>>
>> I won=E2=80=99t be there (health issues), but I=E2=80=99ve already turne=
d down such
>> private invites before.
>>
>>
>>
>> Standing up in front of a WG and talking about unpopular topics is hard.
>> As Richard said, kudo=E2=80=99s to USBank (and a BCBS org) for doing so.=
  But if
>> you=E2=80=99re not willing to do the hard work, then you don=E2=80=99t g=
et to have the IETF
>> address your concerns.
>>
>>
>>
>> I remember saying before that I firmly believe that the main, and
>> unstated, reason for wanting an IETF RFC on this is so that would-be
>> customers can point to vendors and ask for a common solution at a lower
>> price because the ability is now commoditized.  With all due respect to =
the
>> people involved, I believe that is still the case.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have heard concerns that it is necessary to have a =E2=80=9Cspeedy=E2=
=80=9D solution.
>> Again, I strongly disagree with this. The standard organizations haven=
=E2=80=99t
>> even made TLS 1.0 illegal yet, as I said last time.  What makes you thin=
k
>> that something is needed in under five years?  I asked that question
>> before, too.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Thanks,
> Nalini Elkins
> President
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
> www.e-dco.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114e302ab4489a0567527d7a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">Richard Barnes and Rich Salz,</div><div dir=3D"auto">Than=
k you for the kind words. =C2=A0 They are much appreciated!=C2=A0 Best of l=
uck to Rich with the health concerns too. =C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br=
></div><div dir=3D"auto">It=E2=80=99s been an interesting journey with a lo=
t of great folks.=C2=A0 Will reply to the issues later as I need to head ou=
t at the moment. =C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=
-Darin</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div>On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:20 PM nalini elkins &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:n=
alini.elkins@e-dco.com">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>All,<div><br></div><div>The time has gotte=
n away from me.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I have to leave for the airport. I am taking my=
 daughter to London &amp; need to get us all packed &amp; out of the house.=
</div><div><br></div><div>I will write respond to all at length either from=
 the airport or in London.</div><div><br></div><div>Rich, so sorry about yo=
ur health issues.=C2=A0 My best wishes for a full and complete recovery.</d=
iv></div><div><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:39 AM, Salz, =
Rich <span>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@=
akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-1447617446618610872m_-4530942349504110930WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-1447617446618610872m_-4530942349504110930MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"color:#222222;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<a name=3D"m_-1447617446618610872_m_-4530942349504110930__MailOriginalBody"=
><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">I=
 am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and talk quietly=
.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday breakfa=
st or during a break?=C2=A0 Just
 let me know if you are interested &amp; we can make intros.<u></u><u></u><=
/span></a></li></ul>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I won=E2=80=99t be there (health issues), but =
I=E2=80=99ve already turned down such private invites before.<u></u><u></u>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Standing up in front of a WG and talking about=
 unpopular topics is hard.=C2=A0 As Richard said, kudo=E2=80=99s to USBank =
(and a BCBS org) for doing so.=C2=A0 But if you=E2=80=99re not willing to d=
o the hard work, then
 you don=E2=80=99t get to have the IETF address your concerns.<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I remember saying before that I firmly believe=
 that the main, and unstated, reason for wanting an IETF RFC on this is so =
that would-be customers can point to vendors and ask for a common solution
 at a lower price because the ability is now commoditized.=C2=A0 With all d=
ue respect to the people involved, I believe that is still the case.<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>I have heard concerns that it is necessary to =
have a =E2=80=9Cspeedy=E2=80=9D solution. Again, I strongly disagree with t=
his. The standard organizations haven=E2=80=99t even made TLS 1.0 illegal y=
et, as I said last
 time.=C2=A0 What makes you think that something is needed in under five ye=
ars?=C2=A0 I asked that question before, too.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div></div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra">-- <br><div class=3D"m_-1447617446618610872gmail_signature" d=
ata-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div><div><div><div style=3D"font-size:12=
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style=3D"font-size:12.8px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">E=
nterprise Data Center Operators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a hre=
f=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><b=
r></div></div></div></div></div>
</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
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<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
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</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Ted:

> There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security =
geek I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.

This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol version =
often leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.  =
Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the =
client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the =
visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.

Russ


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Ted:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">There's an easy way to do this, although =
as a sometime bank security geek I would strongly advise you to not do =
it: keep using TLS 1.2.</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>This is a bogus =
argument. &nbsp;First, staying with an old protocol version often leads =
to locking in unmaintained versions of old software. &nbsp;Second, using =
TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. &nbsp;If the client were =
to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility =
techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/lO7eKWCdr-XxiCVZz-so0Cb_q2M>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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  *   If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then =
the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.
TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the client does not send the =
empty "tls_visibility" extension, right?
(Assuming the server chooses to play by the rules, of course.)

Cheers,

Andrei

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Russ Housley
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2018 3:17 PM
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Ted:

There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security geek I=
 would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.

This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol version ofte=
n leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.  Second, using=
 TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the client were to excl=
usively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques that h=
ave been used in the past are thwarted.

Russ


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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then =
the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.<o:p=
></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the cl=
ient does not send the empty &#8220;<span lang=3D"EN">tls_visibility&#8221;=
 extension, right?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">(Assuming the server chooses to pl=
ay by the rules, of course.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN">Andrei<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@ietf.org&gt; <b>On =
Behalf Of </b>
Russ Housley<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 13, 2018 3:17 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Ted Lemon &lt;mellon@fugue.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> IETF TLS &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ted:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Hel=
vetica&quot;,sans-serif">There's an easy way to do this, although as a some=
time bank security geek I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep usin=
g TLS 1.2.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This is a bogus argument. &nbsp;First, staying with =
an old protocol version often leads to locking in unmaintained versions of =
old software. &nbsp;Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the i=
ssue. &nbsp;If the client were to exclusively offer
 DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques that have been used=
 in the past are thwarted.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Russ<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
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Joe,

On 13/03/18 16:09, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>=20
> It is not accurate to say that there was consensus to stop discussion o=
f
> this topic in Prague. =20

I did not say that.

I said numerous times that there was a clear lack of consensus
in Prague.

Based on the question *you* asked, which was much more general
than one about draft-green, that means that work in this space
is not being undertaken by the WG. I hope we agree on that.

> There are vocal contingents both for an against this
> topic.=20
I could quibble there too - Nalini calls her folks a consortium,
and it certainly seems that there were a bunch of them in the room.
AFAIK, there's no well-organised other set of folks, just a bunch
of people who have significant overlapping technical concerns with
proposals to break TLS. But that's an aside.

> We did not have discussion of this draft in Singapore because the
> authors could not make the meeting due to several issues and we did not=
 not
> think it would be appropriate to have a discussion without them present=
=2E
> We are going to continue forward and have discussion on this topic in t=
he
> Monday TLS meeting in London.

My problem is that we *did* have significant discussion on the
list (of Russ and Ralph's -00 draft). I can see no way in which
anyone could read that mega-thread and conclude that this draft
is likely to garner rough consensus on the list.

And since the list is the place where we do real work, and we're
not in any case working on this topic as a WG (see above), allocating
a presentation slot for the -01 version of Russ and Ralph's draft
seems to me to be ignoring the WG participants' postings to the list,
and hence violating our processes.

I think you and Sean, as chairs, should have read the thread on
Russ and Ralph's -00 and said whether or not you think it could
achieve rough consensus. That requires no presentation from Russ.

I mean, do you *really* think there's any chance of reaching rough
consensus on the list for this draft? If not, then ISTM you're
putting meeting attendees and list participants through a bunch
of pain for no gain.

Lastly, to be clear: if Nalini's consortium's next set of authors
turn up with yet another attempt, then I would not ask you to
immediately shut down that *list* discussion, but just as in this
case, I would expect you to *not* schedule WG session time for such
a proposal, if significant list discussion has demonstrated that
folks' sets of opinions have not really changed. (Which is pretty
likely, isn't it?) Similarly, if such a proposal hasn't had any
list discussion then I also think it ought not get WG session
time. ISTM, that if you (chairs) don't start to impose that kind
of (normal actually) discipline on these efforts, we risk an
endless round of iterations of this overall discussion.

S.


>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:21 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tc=
d.ie>
> wrote:
>=20
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
>> AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
>> is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
>> the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
>> to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
>> -00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
>> my objection has been answered.
>>
>> In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
>> at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
>> and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
>> the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
>> opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
>> also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
>> manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
>> to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
>> before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.
>>
>> Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
>> of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting
>> it.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Stephen.
>>
>>
>> me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a
>> bargepole."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24493.htm=
l
>>
>> Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
>> watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)=

>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24539.htm=
l
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24542.htm=
l
>>
>> Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24544.htm=
l
>>
>> Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approac=
h
>> taken in this draft."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24562.htm=
l
>>
>> Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24578.htm=
l
>>
>> Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-par=
ty
>> into the E2E TLS process."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24585.htm=
l
>>
>> Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is
>> needed."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24607.htm=
l
>>
>> Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24620.htm=
l
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24639.htm=
l
>>
>> Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
>> applications and servers without breaking TLS..."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24643.htm=
l
>>
>> Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24649.htm=
l
>>
>> Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
>> PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."=

>> (On "industry need")
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24656.htm=
l
>>
>> Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am no=
t
>> able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24660.htm=
l
>>
>> Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24667.htm=
l
>>
>> Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
>> other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24670.htm=
l
>>         Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)
>>         https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/perlustrator
>>
>> Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I=E2=80=99m rather surprised that this gr=
oup
>> continues to spend time on this."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24712.htm=
l
>>
>> Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one=

>> company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like=

>> to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
>> self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24715.htm=
l
>>
>> Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this t=
hread,
>> it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24720.htm=
l
>>
>> Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close dow=
n
>> the discussion)
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24734.htm=
l
>>
>> Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
>> 1.3 standard."
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24885.htm=
l
>>
>> Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don=E2=80=99t recommend any change to=
 the TLS
>> 1.3 design to accomplish any of this"
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg24903.htm=
l
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>=20

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
Thread-Index: AQHTtvl2jdjB7/0TLECBbBkkzUJLO6PG6bYAgABgygCAAXVYgIAACUMAgACBwICAAEcAAIAE8GYAgAAMrwCAAA5/gP//vtmAgABEIID//8M5gIAARI0AgAAVGgCAABigAIAAEqmAgAAefoD//7+lgA==
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 22:26:42 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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> On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:21 PM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then =
the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.
> TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the client does not send =
the empty =E2=80=9Ctls_visibility=E2=80=9D extension, right?
> (Assuming the server chooses to play by the rules, of course.)

Two points:

1) Yes, the server cannot use the "tls_visibility" extension unless the =
client offers it.  This is to enable client opt-in.

2) If the server sends the "tls_visibility" extension without the client =
first offering it, by the normal TLS extension processing rules, the =
client MUST close the connection.

Russ


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:21 PM, Andrei Popov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" =
class=3D"">Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><ul type=3D"disc" =
style=3D"margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in;" class=3D""><li =
class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">If the client were to =
exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques =
that have been used in the past are thwarted.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></li></ul><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the client does =
not send the empty =E2=80=9C<span lang=3D"EN" class=3D"">tls_visibility=E2=
=80=9D extension, right?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN" class=3D"">(Assuming =
the server chooses to play by the rules, of =
course.)</span></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Two points:</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>1) Yes, =
the server cannot use the "tls_visibility" extension unless the client =
offers it. &nbsp;This is to enable client opt-in.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>2) If the server sends the "tls_visibility" =
extension without the client first offering it, by the normal TLS =
extension processing rules, the client MUST close the =
connection.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Cc: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <986797a7-81b0-7874-5f39-afe83c86635b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoDpreyWcaLG_bMvEmMk1KvMQEGhXB+Ro+f1BKf3p_DxOA@mail.gmail.com> <4e1ab8ca-e977-7273-358b-3df3670d0ee5@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:22 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:
> I mean, do you *really* think there's any chance of reaching rough
> consensus on the list for this draft? If not, then ISTM you're
> putting meeting attendees and list participants through a bunch
> of pain for no gain.

It's actually worse than that=E2=80=94it costs us time to do this, and =
those of us who are not given free money to work on stuff like this have =
to choose between billing for work our employers want us to do, or =
participating in conversations like this.  Today this has cost me =
several billable hours.   When the working group is allowed to continue =
discussing issues like this that are never going to get consensus, ad =
infinitum, we have to choose between participating in the discussion, =
which is just a rehash of the previous discussion, or doing work we can =
get paid for.

One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad =
ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can =
afford to continue doing so.   So whether or not to allow this =
conversation to continue is not simply a question of propriety or of =
protecting the working group's real work, although those are important =
considerations as well.  It really is a violation of the spirit of the =
consensus process to allow conversations like this to just go on and on =
and on and on.


--Apple-Mail=_71952439-E508-46FA-86D4-9F560A14B3C6
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 13, 2018, at 6:22 PM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" =
class=3D"">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">I mean, do you *really* think there's any =
chance of reaching rough</span><br style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">consensus on the =
list for this draft? If not, then ISTM you're</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">putting meeting attendees and list participants =
through a bunch</span><br style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">of pain for no =
gain.</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">It's =
actually worse than that=E2=80=94it costs us time to do this, and those =
of us who are not given free money to work on stuff like this have to =
choose between billing for work our employers want us to do, or =
participating in conversations like this. &nbsp;Today this has cost me =
several billable hours. &nbsp; When the working group is allowed to =
continue discussing issues like this that are never going to get =
consensus, ad infinitum, we have to choose between participating in the =
discussion, which is just a rehash of the previous discussion, or doing =
work we can get paid for.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance =
to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it =
can afford to continue doing so. &nbsp; So whether or not to allow this =
conversation to continue is not simply a question of propriety or of =
protecting the working group's real work, although those are important =
considerations as well. &nbsp;It really is a violation of the spirit of =
the consensus process to allow conversations like this to just go on and =
on and on and on.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_71952439-E508-46FA-86D4-9F560A14B3C6--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K8cIwaf2pTG4fkaY0ZG3v0U3YkU>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:40:45 -0400
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <986797a7-81b0-7874-5f39-afe83c86635b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAF6GDcaG7nousyQ6wotEg4dW8PFuXi=riH2702eZZn2fwfLQw@mail.gmail.com> <CAPsNn2XCNtqZaQM6Bg8uoMZRJE+qQakEwvw8Cn9fBm-5H+Xn_A@mail.gmail.com> <3F8142DE-EADB-4AB9-A204-7D87ACDCD3E3@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2VE_7+rWT0fp9rrVnZrgcY7ORLWTee+kf_Av1dqm4CiDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CB55AABB-8937-4F6B-B5AC-B6F262F08A4F@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2U_xG28Tumo3oRkQ+6=BHzgv-6YtgNSpwvhdFFRWc7EQQ@mail.gmail.com> <2DC45296-244E-4C72-8B3C-DE47EADAC2DE@fugue.com> <BN7PR14MB23696A2767FF9C1A410110AFD7D20@BN7PR14MB2369.namprd14.prod.outlook.com> <090F06AF-371D-4B11-91AA-BD80C1ADB4E9@fugue.com> <C1970611-C781-41A8-87CA-D00629AC41E7@vigilsec.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/zZ0Im7TOVuq8Sxt5Y4wnyCQY2tE>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:16 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> This is a bogus argument.

I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't =
belabor the point.

> First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in =
unmaintained versions of old software.

Right, that's one of the stated goals of this work: to be able to =
continue to use software that the operator can't upgrade.

> Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the =
client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the =
visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.

The client in this case is under the control of the operator, so this is =
a non-issue.


--Apple-Mail=_9ADE9EBB-092C-4938-95EC-345EA40676F2
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 13, 2018, at 6:16 PM, Russ Housley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">This is a =
bogus argument.</div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>I'm =
pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't belabor =
the point.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">First, =
staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in =
unmaintained versions of old software.</div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Right, that's one of the stated goals of this work: to =
be able to continue to use software that the operator can't =
upgrade.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">Second, =
using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. &nbsp;If the client =
were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility =
techniques that have been used in the past are =
thwarted.</div></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>The client =
in this case is under the control of the operator, so this is a =
non-issue.</div><div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Hi Russ,

On 13/03/18 21:49, Russ Housley wrote:
> The Prague discussion was about draft-green-...

Much more was discussed than just that one dead draft. In particular
see the minutes for the more general question posed by the chairs.

> Nick Sullivan summarized four concerns with that approach.  See=20
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg
>
>=20
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg>
>=20
> draft-rhrd-... addresses all four of these concerns.  We had some=20
> discussion on the mail list, which lead to -01 being posted.

The problem you have however is that you're trying to square a
circle, so picking any set of N objections to try to address will
still leave you ending up with something unacceptable, for at
least one of a bunch of reasons. Partly, that's because you need
there to be a boundary between a data centre and the rest of the
Internet that's meaningful to TLS, and no such boundary exists.

(So the answer to Nalini's problems is: for applications causing
you this particular pain within a data centre don't use TLS,
find another way and while that might be painful for Nalini's
consortium, it's the right answer, given the overall costs of
anything else.)

> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach.  I=20
> would like to find out.

Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how
you can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your
draft has not caused a lot of people to change their minds. Do
you agree? If so, then the conclusion is obvious, isn't it?

S.

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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 23:45:14 +0000
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>:

> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad ideas
> is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford to
> continue doing so.
>

There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion". (On
the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue within
ICANN.)

>

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<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted=
 Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue.com">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt;:<br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;li=
ne-break:after-white-space">One strategy that&#39;s very effective for over=
coming resistance to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who=
&#39;s resisting it can afford to continue doing so.</div></blockquote></di=
v><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#39;s called =
&quot;consensus by exhaustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting this was b=
riefly discussed as an issue within ICANN.)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div>

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From: Stan Kalisch <stan@glyphein.mailforce.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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> On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:38 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> The second paragraph talks about how quickly PCI DSS moved. As a counterpo=
int, how quickly did they move to delay TLS 1.0 when organizations pushed ba=
ck?   SSL3 was "safe" to remove.  So far they can't even follow industry bes=
t practices and remove TLS 1.0!  The last part of the paragraph repeats the p=
revious concern and adds nothing new.

+1.  That paragraph is bizarre and defies explanation.


Stan=


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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 21:02:10 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
would require discovering a valid key/password as well.

Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.

-Ben(jamin)

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Ted:

I do not follow.

>> This is a bogus argument.
>=20
> I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't =
belabor the point.

I'll avoid asking how many sparrows are needed ;-)

>> First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in =
unmaintained versions of old software.
>=20
> Right, that's one of the stated goals of this work: to be able to =
continue to use software that the operator can't upgrade.

No, the enterprise wants to use maintained server implementations.

>> Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the =
client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the =
visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.
>=20
> The client in this case is under the control of the operator, so this =
is a non-issue.

In some cases, the client in the load balancer is under the control of =
the enterprise.  In other cases, the client is in the customer browser, =
and opt-in is very significant.

Russ


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Ted:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I do =
not follow.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"=
 content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii" class=3D""><div =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">This is a =
bogus argument.</div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, =
so I won't belabor the point.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>I'll avoid asking how many sparrows are needed =
;-)</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to =
locking in unmaintained versions of old =
software.</div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>Right, that's one of the stated goals of this work: to =
be able to continue to use software that the operator can't =
upgrade.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>No, =
the enterprise wants to use maintained server implementations.</div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">Second, =
using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. &nbsp;If the client =
were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility =
techniques that have been used in the past are =
thwarted.</div></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The=
 client in this case is under the control of the operator, so this is a =
non-issue.</div></div></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>In =
some cases, the client in the load balancer is under the control of the =
enterprise. &nbsp;In other cases, the client is in the customer browser, =
and opt-in is very significant.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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Stephen:

>> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach.  I=20
>> would like to find out.
>=20
> Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how
> you can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your
> draft has not caused a lot of people to change their minds. Do
> you agree? If so, then the conclusion is obvious, isn't it?

I see a handfull of very vocal people on this topic and many quiet ones. =
 I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out what the quiet =
people are thinking.

Russ


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Stephen:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"Singleton"><blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">I do not know if the TLS WG =
will want to adopt this approach. &nbsp;I<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">would like =
to find out.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Did you read the list traffic =
from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">you can be in doubt if you did. =
It's readily apparent that your</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">draft has not caused a lot of =
people to change their minds. Do</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">you agree? If so, then the =
conclusion is obvious, isn't =
it?</span></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I see a handfull of very vocal people on this topic and many =
quiet ones. &nbsp;I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out =
what the quiet people are thinking.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 23:29:55 -0400
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Clarifying question

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:55 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> Ted:
>
> I do not follow.
>
> This is a bogus argument.
>
>
> I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't belabor
> the point.
>
>
> I'll avoid asking how many sparrows are needed ;-)
>
> First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in
> unmaintained versions of old software.
>
>
> Right, that's one of the stated goals of this work: to be able to continue
> to use software that the operator can't upgrade.
>
>
> No, the enterprise wants to use maintained server implementations.
>
> Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the client
> were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility
> techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.
>
>
> The client in this case is under the control of the operator, so this is a
> non-issue.
>
>
> In some cases, the client in the load balancer is under the control of the
> enterprise.  In other cases, the client is in the customer browser, and
> opt-in is very significant.

When you say customer browser, do you mean the users on the enterprise
network behind the firewall, all within the control of the enterprise
that owns the data?  I think this is what is meant since the Internet
sessions from customers could be terminated at a load balancer on the
enterprise edge and then this extension may be used between servers
internal to the enterprise and from what you are saying, browsers as
well.  Or is the plan for this to be opt-in from the customer external
to the enterprise (I didn't think that was the case and it would be
good to clarify).  This distinction would be helpful to know where
traffic may be intercepted if there were another party that might be
malicious.

Thanks,
Kathleen

>
> Russ
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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>>>> Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If =
the client
>>>> were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the =
visibility
>>>> techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.
>>>=20
>>> The client in this case is under the control of the operator, so =
this is a
>>> non-issue.
>>=20
>> In some cases, the client in the load balancer is under the control =
of the
>> enterprise.  In other cases, the client is in the customer browser, =
and
>> opt-in is very significant.
>=20
> When you say customer browser, do you mean the users on the enterprise
> network behind the firewall, all within the control of the enterprise
> that owns the data?  I think this is what is meant since the Internet
> sessions from customers could be terminated at a load balancer on the
> enterprise edge and then this extension may be used between servers
> internal to the enterprise and from what you are saying, browsers as
> well.  Or is the plan for this to be opt-in from the customer external
> to the enterprise (I didn't think that was the case and it would be
> good to clarify).  This distinction would be helpful to know where
> traffic may be intercepted if there were another party that might be
> malicious.

I was trying to separate these two cases.  If the TLS session is =
terminated at a load balancer, then the client within the load balancer =
is (as Ted says) under control of the operator.  The operator can =
include any extensions that it wishes.  If the TLS session is not =
terminated at a load balancer, then the client needs to opt-in for =
decryption points in the enterprise data center to get the needed keying =
material.

Russ


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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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Hi,

> On Mar 13, 2018, at 11:03 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>=20
> Stephen:
>=20
>>> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach.  I=20
>>> would like to find out.
>>=20
>> Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how
>> you can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your
>> draft has not caused a lot of people to change their minds. Do
>> you agree? If so, then the conclusion is obvious, isn't it?
>=20
> I see a handfull of very vocal people on this topic and many quiet ones.

I see at least seventeen people (This properly excludes the one recent clari=
fication) who have articulated an opinion against what the draft proposes:

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25643.html


Thanks,
Stan

> I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out what the quiet people=
 are thinking.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div>Hi,</div><div><br>On Mar 13, 2018, at 1=
1:03 PM, Russ Housley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vi=
gilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><meta h=
ttp-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html charset=3Dus-ascii">Stephen:=
<div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><di=
v class=3D""><div class=3D"Singleton"><blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"fon=
t-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps:=
 normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-al=
ign: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; wid=
ows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-s=
troke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt=
 this approach. &nbsp;I<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><b=
r class=3D"">would like to find out.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D=
"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-c=
aps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;=
 text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0=
px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: H=
elvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; fo=
nt-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0=
px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-te=
xt-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">D=
id you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how</span><br styl=
e=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-varia=
nt-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: st=
art; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spaci=
ng: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-fam=
ily: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: norm=
al; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-ind=
ent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -web=
kit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D=
"">you can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your</span><br=
 style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-=
variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-alig=
n: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-=
spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"fon=
t-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps:=
 normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; tex=
t-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;=
 -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" c=
lass=3D"">draft has not caused a lot of people to change their minds. Do</sp=
an><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;=
 font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; tex=
t-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;=
 word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D=
"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-c=
aps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;=
 text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0=
px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;=
" class=3D"">you agree? If so, then the conclusion is obvious, isn't it?</sp=
an></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I see=
 a handfull of very vocal people on this topic and many quiet ones.</div></d=
iv></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I see at least seventeen people (This pr=
operly excludes the one recent clarification) who have articulated an opinio=
n against what the draft proposes:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https=
://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25643.html">https://www.ietf=
.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25643.html</a></div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Stan</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><d=
iv><div class=3D"">I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out what=
 the quiet people are thinking.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><d=
iv class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>___________________________________=
____________</span><br><span>TLS mailing list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mai=
lto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></=
span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 08:48:13 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:49 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> Nick Sullivan summarized
> four concerns with that approach.  See
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg
>
> draft-rhrd-... addresses all four of these concerns.

This isn't quite right.  One of the goals Nick outlined was
"Decryption service only gets session keys, not master secret".  The
current design causes them to gain the handshake secrets, from which
it is trivial to derive the master secret and other secrets [1].  This
includes the resumption master secret and exporter secret.

So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption by
the decryption service, something that the security considerations
neglects to include in its list.  What, if anything, can be done with
the exporter secret will need more thought.

[1] draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00 and its OPTLS-based
insertion of another DH exchange would prevent the decryption service
from working for anything other than the handshake and 0-RTT.


From nobody Wed Mar 14 02:01:43 2018
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Russ,

On 14/03/18 03:03, Russ Housley wrote:
> Stephen:
>=20
>>> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach.  I
>>>  would like to find out.
>>=20
>> Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how you
>> can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your draft
>> has not caused a lot of people to change their minds. Do you agree?
>> If so, then the conclusion is obvious, isn't it?
>=20
> I see a handfull of very vocal people on this topic and many quiet
> ones.=20

Handful? I don't think that's at all accurate.

But we know head-counting doesn't count of course.

My question to you, that you've not answered, was whether you agree
that your draft has not caused any significant shift in positions.

> I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out what the
> quiet people are thinking.

And of course also any people who try pack out the room for any
reason;-(

S






>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20

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From nobody Wed Mar 14 04:46:39 2018
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03:02:10 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> would require discovering a valid key/password as well.

but identity/binder may be invalid only because the server was restarted an=
d=20
generated a new in-memory key; we don't want to abort connection in such=20
situation, continuing to a regular handshake is necessary then for good use=
r=20
experience (and likely, even security, given the history of TLS version=20
fallbacks)
=20
> Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.

not only migration, but session resumption and regular PSK at the same time=
=20
too - for session resumption you may not do DH, while for initial handshake=
=20
with PSK you may want to to gain PFS...

so as tempting as the removal of multiple PSKs from ClientHello is, I'm afr=
aid=20
the fallout is far too large to do it
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <986797a7-81b0-7874-5f39-afe83c86635b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <57A8E13A-AC4D-49F3-A356-4C94AC6ABFCA@rfc1035.com> <757b5c43-e346-47e7-9fc1-c64b901202e2@nomountain.net> <B1BB47D7-46D2-461D-A074-5DDE257CB07D@vigilsec.com> <e88765b7-8944-d360-02bc-bd9c7d4e906a@cs.tcd.ie> <7C233E68-6BF8-4BF9-B245-1F479DE62F31@vigilsec.com> <30e8d4ea-ab30-3c98-4dff-6799dd6731bb@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101
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On Mar 14, 2018, at 5:01 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:
>> I hum in the meeting is a meaningful way to find out what the
>> quiet people are thinking.
>=20
> And of course also any people who try pack out the room for any
> reason;-(

As long as the hum is treated as Pete describes in RFC 7282, this =
shouldn't be an issue.   However, I tend to agree with you that we won't =
learn anything new by doing this.  Do we really think that there are =
people who will hum in favor of this who haven't thus far been willing =
to say why?


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 14, 2018, at 5:01 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" =
class=3D"">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">I hum in the meeting is a =
meaningful way to find out what the<br class=3D"">quiet people are =
thinking.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: =
Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">And of course also =
any people who try pack out the room for any</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">reason;-(</span></div></div></blockquote></div><br=
 class=3D""><div class=3D"">As long as the hum is treated as Pete =
describes in RFC 7282, this shouldn't be an issue. &nbsp; However, I =
tend to agree with you that we won't learn anything new by doing this. =
&nbsp;Do we really think that there are people who will hum in favor of =
this who haven't thus far been willing to say why?</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_67C97BE8-CBF8-47F8-8699-A7192F2B388A--


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 08:32:10 -0400
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <986797a7-81b0-7874-5f39-afe83c86635b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAF6GDcaG7nousyQ6wotEg4dW8PFuXi=riH2702eZZn2fwfLQw@mail.gmail.com> <CAPsNn2XCNtqZaQM6Bg8uoMZRJE+qQakEwvw8Cn9fBm-5H+Xn_A@mail.gmail.com> <3F8142DE-EADB-4AB9-A204-7D87ACDCD3E3@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2VE_7+rWT0fp9rrVnZrgcY7ORLWTee+kf_Av1dqm4CiDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CB55AABB-8937-4F6B-B5AC-B6F262F08A4F@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2U_xG28Tumo3oRkQ+6=BHzgv-6YtgNSpwvhdFFRWc7EQQ@mail.gmail.com> <2DC45296-244E-4C72-8B3C-DE47EADAC2DE@fugue.com> <BN7PR14MB23696A2767FF9C1A410110AFD7D20@BN7PR14MB2369.namprd14.prod.outlook.com> <090F06AF-371D-4B11-91AA-BD80C1ADB4E9@fugue.com> <C1970611-C781-41A8-87CA-D00629AC41E7@vigilsec.com> <35A28548-B200-447A-A3EC-365AAD491858@fugue.com> <7AD6659C-C85E-4AD1-A85A-3789471258FA@vigilsec.com> <CAHbuEH4Sby-6Mi+5cWg7tvYSsL4Z6ALgUjpWNzbe-Ou2o0XmsA@mail.gmail.com> <773EFF8D-4227-454D-AA1A-EA934C7042A4@vigilsec.com>
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On Mar 13, 2018, at 11:49 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> I was trying to separate these two cases.  If the TLS session is =
terminated at a load balancer, then the client within the load balancer =
is (as Ted says) under control of the operator.  The operator can =
include any extensions that it wishes.  If the TLS session is not =
terminated at a load balancer, then the client needs to opt-in for =
decryption points in the enterprise data center to get the needed keying =
material.

I had thought that we had agreement in Prague that this proposal did not =
require special browsers to be widely available in the wild.   If it =
does, that seems like a mildly stronger argument against it, since if =
the requirement for this behavior successfully infects browsers in the =
wild, the damage done will be to connections in addition to the ones =
that you are trying to wiretap.

Is there still confusion on the question of whether click-through =
warnings can ever be part of an effective user interface design?


--Apple-Mail=_48B9E162-B6BE-4EB8-B317-092E8A446A8B
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Mar 13, 2018, at 11:49 PM, Russ Housley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">I was trying to separate these two cases. =
&nbsp;If the TLS session is terminated at a load balancer, then the =
client within the load balancer is (as Ted says) under control of the =
operator. &nbsp;The operator can include any extensions that it wishes. =
&nbsp;If the TLS session is not terminated at a load balancer, then the =
client needs to opt-in for decryption points in the enterprise data =
center to get the needed keying material.</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Menlo-Regular; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">I had =
thought that we had agreement in Prague that this proposal did not =
require special browsers to be widely available in the wild. &nbsp; If =
it does, that seems like a mildly stronger argument against it, since if =
the requirement for this behavior successfully infects browsers in the =
wild, the damage done will be to connections <i class=3D"">in addition =
to</i>&nbsp;the ones that you are trying to wiretap.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Is there still confusion =
on the question of whether click-through warnings can ever be part of an =
effective user interface design?</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_48B9E162-B6BE-4EB8-B317-092E8A446A8B--


From nobody Wed Mar 14 05:40:09 2018
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On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 23:16:47 CET Russ Housley wrote:
> Ted:
> > There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security ge=
ek
> > I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.
> This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol version of=
ten
> leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.

this is simply not true, the newest versions of OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS and=20
schannel allow you to disable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 protocol support to=20
effectively only support TLS 1.0!

if your vendor can't implement that feature, I can hardly call such softwar=
e=20
"maintained" in the first place

>  Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the cli=
ent
>  were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility
>  techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted.

sorry, but this is a complete non-sequitur; that client behaviour has nothi=
ng=20
to do with TLS 1.3 existence or the way it works

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Wed Mar 14 06:42:30 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 10:21:52 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHbuEH74J_wxTSocN1PeDA9NW_NwwxDopVCw4L_Nzz2F=MeBbA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 8:32 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
> On Mar 13, 2018, at 11:49 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>
> I was trying to separate these two cases.  If the TLS session is terminated
> at a load balancer, then the client within the load balancer is (as Ted
> says) under control of the operator.  The operator can include any
> extensions that it wishes.  If the TLS session is not terminated at a load
> balancer, then the client needs to opt-in for decryption points in the
> enterprise data center to get the needed keying material.
>
>
> I had thought that we had agreement in Prague that this proposal did not
> require special browsers to be widely available in the wild.   If it does,
> that seems like a mildly stronger argument against it, since if the
> requirement for this behavior successfully infects browsers in the wild, the
> damage done will be to connections in addition to the ones that you are
> trying to wiretap.
>
> Is there still confusion on the question of whether click-through warnings
> can ever be part of an effective user interface design?
>

I think you'd get further (not sure how far), if this were limited to
within the datacenter and without a need for browser implementations.
If it were specific to browsers for use within an enterprise, that
would be one option, but another would be to see if this could be
limited to server-to-server only connections with no need for a
browser.  If you're terminating at a load balancer and then starting a
new session with the extension, this could be done for internal and
external users.



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 12:04:59 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ATLS side meeting
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

In case folks are interested in discussing the "application-layer TLS"
ideas that were presented in the TLS WG meeting at the last IETF, details
for a side meeting next Monday are below.

--Richard

On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> Hey all,
>
> FYI, we have a room booked for a side meeting at the IETF meeting, during
> the lunch break on Monday.  The assigned room is Hilton Meeting Rooms 1-4.
>
> There will not be catering, so lunch is BYO.
>
> --Richard
>
>

--001a1145b20e7d59c80567618935
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>In case folks are interested in discussing the &quot;=
application-layer TLS&quot; ideas that were presented in the TLS WG meeting=
 at the last IETF, details for a side meeting next Monday are below.</div><=
div><br></div><div>--Richard<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Richard Barnes=
 <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@=
ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div>Hey all,</div><div><br></div><div>FYI, we have a room booked for =
a side meeting at the IETF meeting, during the lunch break on Monday.=C2=A0=
 The assigned room is Hilton Meeting Rooms 1-4.<br></div><div><br></div><di=
v>There will not be catering, so lunch is BYO.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font =
color=3D"#888888"><br></font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font colo=
r=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><br></font></span></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1145b20e7d59c80567618935--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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> On Mar 14, 2018, at 8:39 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 23:16:47 CET Russ Housley wrote:
>> Ted:
>>> There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security =
geek
>>> I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.
>> This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol =
version often
>> leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.
>=20
> this is simply not true, the newest versions of OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS =
and=20
> schannel allow you to disable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 protocol support to=20=

> effectively only support TLS 1.0!

After TLS 1.3 is approved, I have heard a desire from software =
maintainers to drop support for some of the older versions over time. =
Support for SSL 3.0 has been dropped in some cases, and for good =
reasons.

Russ


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 15:11:16 -0400
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Perhaps this would be a good time to put in a plug for additional funding
for openssl et al...

On Mar 14, 2018 14:53, "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

>
> > On Mar 14, 2018, at 8:39 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 23:16:47 CET Russ Housley wrote:
> >> Ted:
> >>> There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security
> geek
> >>> I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.
> >> This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol version
> often
> >> leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.
> >
> > this is simply not true, the newest versions of OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS and
> > schannel allow you to disable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 protocol support to
> > effectively only support TLS 1.0!
>
> After TLS 1.3 is approved, I have heard a desire from software maintainers
> to drop support for some of the older versions over time. Support for SSL
> 3.0 has been dropped in some cases, and for good reasons.
>
> Russ
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000bd5dd605676423b6
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<div dir=3D"auto">Perhaps this would be a good time to put in a plug for ad=
ditional funding for openssl et al...</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mar 14, 2018 14:53, &quot;Russ Housley&quot; &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
&gt; On Mar 14, 2018, at 8:39 AM, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario=
@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 23:16:47 CET Russ Housley wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Ted:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; There&#39;s an easy way to do this, although as a sometime ban=
k security geek<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.<=
br>
&gt;&gt; This is a bogus argument.=C2=A0 First, staying with an old protoco=
l version often<br>
&gt;&gt; leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; this is simply not true, the newest versions of OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS a=
nd<br>
&gt; schannel allow you to disable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 protocol support to<=
br>
&gt; effectively only support TLS 1.0!<br>
<br>
After TLS 1.3 is approved, I have heard a desire from software maintainers =
to drop support for some of the older versions over time. Support for SSL 3=
.0 has been dropped in some cases, and for good reasons.<br>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000bd5dd605676423b6--


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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 19:53:21 CET Russ Housley wrote:
> > On Mar 14, 2018, at 8:39 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 23:16:47 CET Russ Housley wrote:
> >> Ted:
> >>> There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security
> >>> geek
> >>> I would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2.
> >>=20
> >> This is a bogus argument.  First, staying with an old protocol version
> >> often leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software.
> >=20
> > this is simply not true, the newest versions of OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS and
> > schannel allow you to disable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.1 protocol support to
> > effectively only support TLS 1.0!
>=20
> After TLS 1.3 is approved, I have heard a desire from software maintainers
> to drop support for some of the older versions over time. Support for SSL
> 3.0 has been dropped in some cases, and for good reasons.

there's a long road from "desire to drop support for TLS 1.0", through=20
"marking the TLS 1.0 support as deprecated", "making the TLS 1.0 support a=
=20
compile only option" to "removing TLS 1.0 code completely"

while sure, both TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 likely will be removed from those afor=
e-
mentioned libraries at _some_ point, it is disingenuous to suggest it will=
=20
happen in a matter of just few years, especially for the latter of the two=
=20
protocols
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From nobody Wed Mar 14 12:25:44 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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> On Mar 14, 2018, at 4:48 AM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:49 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> =
wrote:
>> Nick Sullivan summarized
>> four concerns with that approach.  See
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/NJEsyOZ8S3m8fiGk3bJ_lDnL-dg
>>=20
>> draft-rhrd-... addresses all four of these concerns.
>=20
> This isn't quite right.  One of the goals Nick outlined was
> "Decryption service only gets session keys, not master secret".  The
> current design causes them to gain the handshake secrets, from which
> it is trivial to derive the master secret and other secrets [1].  This
> includes the resumption master secret and exporter secret.
>=20
> So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption by
> the decryption service, something that the security considerations
> neglects to include in its list.  What, if anything, can be done with
> the exporter secret will need more thought.
>=20
> [1] draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00 and its OPTLS-based
> insertion of another DH exchange would prevent the decryption service
> from working for anything other than the handshake and 0-RTT.

You are right.  It would be a significant improvement to narrow the =
portions of the key schedule that are shared.

To avoid the issue with resumption that you raise, is seems that these =
entries in the key schedule are needed:
	client_early_traffic_secret
	client_handshake_traffic_secret
	server_handshake_traffic_secret
	client_application_traffic_secret_0
	server_application_traffic_secret_0

Russ


From nobody Wed Mar 14 12:28:52 2018
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> On Mar 14, 2018, at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>>   So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption =
by
>    the decryption service, something that the security considerations
>    neglects to include in its list.
>=20
> So I think this is an important point.  I assume the authors did not =
realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right.  =
In the US, we have been having arguments where the national police force =
(FBI) is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden key" that =
only they can use, and the security people are saying it is impossible.  =
This seems like another instance, no?
>=20
> Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:  Russ, did you know =
this or was Martin's point new to you?

I think my reply to Martin already sows that I missed the point about =
resumption.  I was trying to send the smallest amount of data, I should =
have made sure the things needed for resumption were not included.

Russ


From nobody Wed Mar 14 12:56:05 2018
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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 12:55:58 -0700
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:16 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> Second, using
> TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the client were to
> exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques
> that have been used in the past are thwarted.

I expect this configuration to become more common in the future.  In
November 2017, US NIST published draft SP 800-52 r2
(https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-52/rev-2/draft )
which explicitly disallows all non-DH cipher suites.  The comment
period closed on 1 Feb 2018, and none of the published comments pushed
back on this.  Given that PCI DSS and many other standards refer to
the NIST Special Publications for implementation requirements, I would
not be surprised to see DH-only (including ECDH/ECDHE/DHE) become
prevalent.

Based on the comments from the proponents of the various drafts, it
would seem that this should be a bigger concern than any changes in
TLS 1.3, as it is implementable today.  I highly suspect that the
currently deployed systems will not handle handshakes that only offer
DH suites, right?

Thanks,
Peter


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Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 15:13:29 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:46:25PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03:02:10 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> > failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> > would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
> 
> but identity/binder may be invalid only because the server was restarted and 
> generated a new in-memory key; we don't want to abort connection in such 

For an external PSK?  That hardly sounds like "external" to me...

> situation, continuing to a regular handshake is necessary then for good user 
> experience (and likely, even security, given the history of TLS version 
> fallbacks)
>  
> > Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> > little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
> 
> not only migration, but session resumption and regular PSK at the same time 
> too - for session resumption you may not do DH, while for initial handshake 
> with PSK you may want to to gain PFS...
> 
> so as tempting as the removal of multiple PSKs from ClientHello is, I'm afraid 
> the fallout is far too large to do it

I did not say removal of multiple PSKs, rather removal of multiple
*external* PSKs.

-Ben(jamin)


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From: Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 18:08:44 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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The requirements for visibility exist in an array of regulated environments
worldwide.  It is one of the presentation areas in the Hot Middlebox
Workshop.
http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=1

The Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can
experience how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be used in
conjunction with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for Middlebox
discovery and controlled visibility by an end-user in a way that meets both
user and regulatory interests.  The draft specification will be published
in two weeks.

--the Hot Middlebox organizers

On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
> >    So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption by
>     the decryption service, something that the security considerations
>     neglects to include in its list.
>
> So I think this is an important point.  I assume the authors did not
> realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right.  In
> the US, we have been having arguments where the national police force (FBI)
> is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden key" that only they
> can use, and the security people are saying it is impossible.  This seems
> like another instance, no?
>
> Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:  Russ, did you know this
> or was Martin's point new to you?
>
>         /r$
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The requirements for visibility exist in an array of =
regulated environments worldwide.=C2=A0 It is one of the presentation areas=
 in the Hot Middlebox Workshop.=C2=A0 <a href=3D"http://www.etsi.org/etsi-s=
ecurity-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=3D1">http://www.etsi.org/etsi-secu=
rity-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=3D1</a></div><div><br></div><div>The =
Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can experience=C2=
=A0how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be used in conjunction=
 with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for Middlebox discovery an=
d controlled visibility by an end-user in a way that meets both user and re=
gulatory interests.=C2=A0 The draft specification=C2=A0will be published in=
 two weeks.</div><div><br></div><div>--the Hot Middlebox organizers</div></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 1=
4, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsal=
z@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session re=
sumption by<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the decryption service, something that the security considera=
tions<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 neglects to include in its list.<br>
<br>
</span>So I think this is an important point.=C2=A0 I assume the authors di=
d not realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right=
.=C2=A0 In the US, we have been having arguments where the national police =
force (FBI) is insisting that tech companies can create a &quot;golden key&=
quot; that only they can use, and the security people are saying it is impo=
ssible.=C2=A0 This seems like another instance, no?<br>
<br>
Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:=C2=A0 Russ, did you know th=
is or was Martin&#39;s point new to you?<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 /r$<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank" rel=
=3D"noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--f403045ea6b2583e210567669ec6--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
CC: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
Thread-Index: AQHTu3E/vxrzKY2eGU+X0cwp6J3VjqPPvawAgADQiAD//7+GAA==
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 22:17:59 +0000
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at
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Hi Rich (and Tony Rutkowski =3D=3D hot_middlebox I assume?)

On 14/03/18 22:17, Salz, Rich wrote:
>   *   The requirements for visibility exist in an array of regulated en=
vironments worldwide.  It is one of the presentation areas in the Hot Mid=
dlebox Workshop.  http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-s=
ecurity?tab=3D1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttp-3A__www=
=2Eetsi.org_etsi-2Dsecurity-2Dweek-2D2018_middlebox-2Dsecurity-3Ftab-3D1&=
d=3DDwMFaQ&c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3DYz_0=
b8nsA9CDyOxIGLCsjdmfsbcx2aanAH-oeuvMpkk&s=3DNW0inE5_1gzb4brUZGMm47dZyrYtk=
YXtAXf7Ii6S8kk&e=3D>
>=20
> Do you know if they require packet traces to be decoded, or if one of t=
he nodes can just log the traffic?  Do they require this to be true for t=
raffic over the public Internet or just within an enterprise?
>=20
>=20

I see no content at that URL. This seems to be another case of
claiming regulations exist but yet again being unable to point
to any such regulation that others can read. (And yes, we did
this before for PCI-DSS so let's not repeat that if there's no
new information offered.)

S.

>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 15:52:55 -0700
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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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All,

In London now & back on email:


   - >> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?



> Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be define=
d, it would make
sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.



I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:



1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.


Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them started
with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native language!)
to communicate.


I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a happy
thought for interoperability.



2.  The TLS WG of the IETF has many of the world's experts in defining such
protocols.  The years of collective expertise is remarkable.   We want to
work with the TLS group not try to recreate it.



3.   The reason I support the enterprises and their voice in TLS is because
I am naive enough to actually believe in the IETF.  I believe that
technical truth matters.  That it is not actually the Vendor Engineering
Task Force.  That is a group of the vendors, by the vendors and for the
vendors.   I could see when this whole thing with taking away RSA was
happening that correct though it may be, it was going to cause enormous
disruption for many, many people in the commercial world.  You may not
believe it, but I am actually doing this because I really believe that we
need one set of standards that everyone can use.  I want it to be in the
TLS WG.  I want the TLS WG to be credible and succeed and I want the IETF
to succeed.  I believe that the Internet needs it.



4.  Again, believe it or not, the TLS WG needs the enterprises.  Of course,
this is all my opinion only.   These enterprises are a huge group of users
of the IETF protocols and TLS in particular.   The feedback of users is
irreplaceable.  Who are we building the protocols for if not the users?
Sure, there are multiple sets, but these are a very large group.


And, OK, maybe they don't state every need properly, let's try to help
them.   When I was designing products, I didn't expect the customer to come
up with the design for the screen or the code.  They don't have the skills
to do that.  They provide feedback and come up with requirements.  I do the
code design.


Any organism which does not take feedback is not likely to thrive in the
long term.


Again, I am asking everyone to be open to working together.


Nalini





On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 11:27 AM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

>
>    - "We" is a consortium of organizations.   I would say over 50 so
>    far.  They operate large data centers.   They are in manufacturing,
>    insurance, finance, and others.
>
>
>
>    - Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
>
>
>
> Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be define=
d, it would make
> sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Andrei
>



--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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<div dir=3D"ltr">

<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
><br></span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:14.6667px">All,</span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibr=
i, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><br></span></font></div>=
<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
>In London now &amp; back on email:</span></font></div><div><font face=3D"C=
alibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><br></span></font><=
/div><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-=
family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-lig=
atures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;w=
ord-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:ini=
tial;text-decoration-color:initial;margin-top:0in"><li class=3D"gmail-m_-21=
96164496691152133MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-si=
ze:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">&gt;&gt; Nalini, why don&#39;t you =
(the consortium) define the standard, then?<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"=
>&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be de=
fined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to d=
efine it.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varian=
t-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:nor=
mal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-styl=
e:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I completely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Here is why I would not prefer that route:</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size=
:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:n=
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x;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initia=
l"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant=
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ont-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white=
-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decor=
ation-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Take the case of India, =
we have over 700 dialects.=C2=A0 Many of them started with the same root la=
nguage.=C2=A0 It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart cannot talk to each =
other.=C2=A0 We use English (a clearly non-native language!) to communicate=
.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fa=
mily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligat=
ures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wor=
d-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initi=
al;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"m=
argin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px=
;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I co=
uld see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a h=
appy thought for interoperability.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fon=
t-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tran=
sform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin=
:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">2.=C2=A0 =
The TLS WG of the IETF has many of the world&#39;s experts in defining such=
 protocols.=C2=A0 The years of collective expertise is remarkable.=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0We want to work with the TLS group not try to recreate it.</p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:s=
tart;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-deco=
ration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial">3.=C2=A0 =C2=A0The reason I support the enterprises an=
d their voice in TLS is because I am naive enough to actually believe in th=
e IETF.=C2=A0 I believe that technical truth matters.=C2=A0 That it is not =
actually the Vendor Engineering Task Force.=C2=A0 That is a group of the ve=
ndors, by the vendors and for the vendors.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I could see when thi=
s whole thing with taking away RSA was happening that correct though it may=
 be, it was going to cause enormous disruption for many, many people in the=
 commercial world.=C2=A0 You may not believe it, but I am actually doing th=
is because I really believe that we need one set of standards that everyone=
 can use.=C2=A0 I want it to be in the TLS WG.=C2=A0 I want the TLS WG to b=
e credible and succeed and I want the IETF to succeed.=C2=A0 I believe that=
 the Internet needs it.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:=
rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-d=
ecoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">4.=C2=A0 Again, beli=
eve it or not, the TLS WG needs the enterprises.=C2=A0 Of course, this is a=
ll my opinion only.=C2=A0 =C2=A0These enterprises are a huge group of users=
 of the IETF protocols and TLS in particular.=C2=A0 =C2=A0The feedback of u=
sers is irreplaceable.=C2=A0 Who are we building the protocols for if not t=
he users?=C2=A0 Sure, there are multiple sets, but these are a very large g=
roup.=C2=A0=C2=A0</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fo=
nt-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-=
space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varia=
nt-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial">And, OK, maybe they don&#39;t state every need properly, let&#3=
9;s try to help them.=C2=A0 =C2=A0When I was designing products, I didn&#39=
;t expect the customer to come up with the design for the screen or the cod=
e.=C2=A0 They don&#39;t have the skills to do that.=C2=A0 They provide feed=
back and come up with requirements.=C2=A0 I do the code design.</p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:40=
0;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Any organism whic=
h does not take feedback is not likely to thrive in the long term.</p><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial=
,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norma=
l;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align=
:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:=
0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-de=
coration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight=
:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:=
none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Again, I am as=
king everyone to be open to working together.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size=
:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:n=
ormal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0p=
x;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initia=
l"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant=
-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norm=
al;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style=
:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Nalini</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varian=
t-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:nor=
mal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-styl=
e:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size=
:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:n=
ormal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0p=
x;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initia=
l"><br></p></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 11:27 AM, Andrei Popov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">Andrei.Popov@micr=
osoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-2196164496691152133WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-2196164496691152133MsoListParagraph" style=3D"color:#222222=
;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">&q=
uot;We&quot; is a consortium of organizations.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I would say over=
 50 so far.=C2=A0 They operate large data centers.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They are in =
manufacturing, insurance, finance, and others. =C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span><=
/li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-2196164496691152133MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0=
in">Nalini, why don&#39;t you (the consortium) define the standard, then?<u=
></u><u></u></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D stan=
dard has to be defined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather than=
 the TLS WG) to define it.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Cheers,<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888=
"><u></u><u></u></font></span></p><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#88=
8888">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Andrei<u></u><u></u></p>
</font></span></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--000000000000600ff40567673c12--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:00:07 -0700
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To: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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>
> >>One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad
> ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can
> afford to continue doing so.
>

>There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion".
(On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue within
ICANN.)


Guys, I know it is a lot of fun to talk about how others do not have the
brains that God gave a termite and that maybe they are even the spawn of
the devil.

But, let's just use Occam's razor.   Or as I tell my daughter, "if you hear
hoof beats, it is likely not a zebra, it is a horse".

The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious issues
with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.

Nalini


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
wrote:

> 13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>:
>
>> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad idea=
s
>> is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford t=
o
>> continue doing so.
>>
>
> There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion".
> (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue within
> ICANN.)
>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11474138211f0705676756d9
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:s=
tart;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-deco=
ration-color:initial"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><di=
v style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">&gt;&gt;One strategy that&#39;s very effec=
tive for overcoming resistance to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea unt=
il nobody who&#39;s resisting it can afford to continue doing so.</div></bl=
ockquote></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:aria=
l,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norm=
al;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-alig=
n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-d=
ecoration-color:initial">&gt;There&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#39;s =
called &quot;consensus by exhaustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting thi=
s was briefly discussed as an issue within ICANN.)</div><div style=3D"color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div=
><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"=
>Guys, I know it is a lot of fun to talk about how others do not have the b=
rains that God gave a termite and that maybe they are even the spawn of the=
 devil.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif=
;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-vari=
ant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text=
-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-co=
lor:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial">But, let&#39;s just use Occam&#39;s razor.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Or as I tell my daughter, &quot;if you hear hoof beats, it is likely not=
 a zebra, it is a horse&quot;.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-=
family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-lig=
atures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;w=
ord-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:ini=
tial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration=
-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">The simple explanation is tha=
t people think they will have serious issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1=
.2 when it is DH only.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial">Nalini</div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
 Mar 13, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt;</=
span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div dir=3D"ltr">13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:mellon@fugue.com" target=3D"_blank">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt;:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:a=
fter-white-space">One strategy that&#39;s very effective for overcoming res=
istance to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who&#39;s res=
isting it can afford to continue doing so.</div></blockquote></div><div><br=
></div><div>There&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#39;s called &quot;cons=
ensus by exhaustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly dis=
cussed as an issue within ICANN.)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=
President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Opera=
tors</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><=
/div>
</div>

--001a11474138211f0705676756d9--


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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 19:07:38 -0400
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On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 6:52 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

>
> All,
>
> In London now & back on email:
>
>
>    - >> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
>
>
>
> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defi=
ned, it would
> make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>
>
>
> I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:
>
>
>
> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.
>
>
> Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them started
> with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
> cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native language=
!)
> to communicate.
>
>
> I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a happy
> thought for interoperability.
>

Why is there any need for interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS?
TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it's clear that
Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why that's a
problem, since the claimed goal is that Consortium-TLS would only be used
within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need to
interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.

--94eb2c0560a808aa0205676771f1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 6:52 PM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-=
dco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr">

<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
><br></span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:14.6667px">All,</span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibr=
i, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><br></span></font></div>=
<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
>In London now &amp; back on email:</span></font></div><span class=3D""><di=
v><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><b=
r></span></font></div><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;margin-top:0in"><li cla=
ss=3D"m_-5427049422125855701gmail-m_-2196164496691152133MsoListParagraph" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-ser=
if">&gt;&gt; Nalini, why don&#39;t you (the consortium) define the standard=
, then?<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style=
:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:n=
one;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);t=
ext-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visi=
bility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defined, it would make sense for the con=
sortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varian=
t-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:nor=
mal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-styl=
e:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p></span><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant=
-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color=
:initial">I completely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Here is why I would not prefer=
 that route:</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,=
34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-va=
riant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spac=
ing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space=
:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-=
style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-ca=
ps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inden=
t:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:in=
itial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">1.=C2=A0 Multiple standards are=
 likely to diverge.<br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial">Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.=C2=A0 =
Many of them started with the same root language.=C2=A0 It has gotten so vi=
llages 10 miles apart cannot talk to each other.=C2=A0 We use English (a cl=
early non-native language!) to communicate.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"=
><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial">I could see the same happening with T=
LS and Consortium-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a happy thought for interoperability=
.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Why is there any need for inter=
operability between TLS and Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to be secure an=
d reliable, and it&#39;s clear that Consortium-TLS finds such goals problem=
atic. Yet I fail to see why that&#39;s a problem, since the claimed goal is=
 that Consortium-TLS would only be used within a single enterprise/datacent=
er, and thus would never need to interoperate with a world that valued secu=
rity and privacy.</div></div></div></div>

--94eb2c0560a808aa0205676771f1--


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On 14/03/18 23:00, nalini elkins wrote:
> The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious
> issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.

Of course some people who are used to MitMing connections will
have problems and will have to change.

But that does not mean that their problems ought to be solved
by any change to TLS.

IMO the costs to the broader Internet of breaking TLS like that
are far too high to optimse for these folks. It's understandable
that they'd prefer otherwise.

People with such problems should IMO look elsewhere for
solutions and not be fixated on breaking TLS.

Lastly, bear in mind that even if the people with whom you
are dealing have the best intentions, there really are people
who are paid large amounts of money to weaken Internet security
(see [1] for scant detail of just one country's efforts in
that regard) and that we have IETF consensus to oppose such
efforts, as far as it's in the IETF's remit to do so.

So it doesn't really help the discussion to claim that
such-and-such a (set of person(s) is/are good actors - we do
assume that, but also that there are others who would like
the same changes to happen who do not share the IETF's goals
of making Internet security better as far as we can.

S.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)

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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:17:04 -0700
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To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Cc: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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>
>
>    - > Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
>
>
>
> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defi=
ned, it would
> make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>
>
>
> I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:
>
>
>
> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.
>
>
> Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them started
> with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
> cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native language=
!)
> to communicate.
>
>
> I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a happy
> thought for interoperability.
>

>Why is there any need for interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS?
TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it's clear that
Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why that's a
problem, since the claimed goal >is that Consortium-TLS would only be used
within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need to
interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.


Enterprises value security and privacy.   They have a different job to do.
What they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, do fraud
monitoring, protect against malware and many other things.   When this gets
into the medical arena, it can even be lives.  I don't even see how you can
say what you are saying.

Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you find to be valid?  Saying
that enterprises don't value security and privacy is really not terribly
useful to resolving any discussion.

Nalini







On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:07 PM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 6:52 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> All,
>>
>> In London now & back on email:
>>
>>
>>    - >> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then=
?
>>
>>
>>
>> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be def=
ined, it would
>> make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>>
>>
>>
>> I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:
>>
>>
>>
>> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.
>>
>>
>> Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them started
>> with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
>> cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native languag=
e!)
>> to communicate.
>>
>>
>> I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a happ=
y
>> thought for interoperability.
>>
>
> Why is there any need for interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS=
?
> TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it's clear that
> Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why that's=
 a
> problem, since the claimed goal is that Consortium-TLS would only be used
> within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need to
> interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.
>



--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
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 style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-var=
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in:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">&gt; Nal=
ini, why don&#39;t you (the consortium) define the standard, then?<u></u><u=
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standard has to be defined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather =
than the TLS WG) to define it.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0p=
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n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-d=
ecoration-color:initial"><br></p></span><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;f=
ont-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tr=
ansform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I comp=
letely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Here is why I would not prefer that route:</p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin=
:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial">1.=C2=A0 Multiple standards are likely to diver=
ge.<br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant=
-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norm=
al;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style=
:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:no=
rmal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px=
;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial=
">Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.=C2=A0 Many of them sta=
rted with the same root language.=C2=A0 It has gotten so villages 10 miles =
apart cannot talk to each other.=C2=A0 We use English (a clearly non-native=
 language!) to communicate.</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style=
:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:n=
one;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);t=
ext-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:s=
tart;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-deco=
ration-color:initial">I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortiu=
m-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a happy thought for interoperability.</p></div></blo=
ckquote><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:i=
nitial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial">&gt;Why is there any need for interoperability between TL=
S and Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it&#39=
;s clear that Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to se=
e why that&#39;s a problem, since the claimed goal &gt;is that Consortium-T=
LS would only be used within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would=
 never need to interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.<=
/div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-si=
ze:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps=
:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:=
0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-colo=
r:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:init=
ial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:aria=
l,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norm=
al;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-alig=
n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-d=
ecoration-color:initial">Enterprises value security and privacy.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0They have a different job to do.=C2=A0 What they are trying to do is to =
protect against leakage of data, do fraud monitoring, protect against malwa=
re and many other things.=C2=A0 =C2=A0When this gets into the medical arena=
, it can even be lives.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t even see how you can say what you=
 are saying.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial">Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you=
 find to be valid?=C2=A0 Saying that enterprises don&#39;t value security a=
nd privacy is really not terribly useful to resolving any discussion.</div>=
<div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12=
.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">=
<br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant=
-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color=
:initial">Nalini</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:s=
tart;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-deco=
ration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fami=
ly:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatur=
es:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-=
spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial=
;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-deco=
ration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-sty=
le:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed,=
 Mar 14, 2018 at 4:07 PM, Ryan Sleevi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com" target=3D"_blank">ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018=
 at 6:52 PM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.e=
lkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">

<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
><br></span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:14.6667px">All,</span></font></div><div><font face=3D"Calibr=
i, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><br></span></font></div>=
<div><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"=
>In London now &amp; back on email:</span></font></div><span><div><font fac=
e=3D"Calibri, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:14.6667px"><br></span></=
font></div><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;margin-top:0in"><li class=3D"m_753=
5699302310795101m_-5427049422125855701gmail-m_-2196164496691152133MsoListPa=
ragraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibr=
i,sans-serif">&gt;&gt; Nalini, why don&#39;t you (the consortium) define th=
e standard, then?<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fo=
nt-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-t=
ransform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font=
-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-s=
pacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-sp=
ace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorati=
on-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9C=
TLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defined, it would make sense f=
or the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.</p><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-var=
iant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;tex=
t-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-c=
olor:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(=
34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;f=
ont-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white=
-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decor=
ation-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p></span><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial">I completely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Here is why I would=
 not prefer that route:</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:=
rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-d=
ecoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">1.=C2=A0 Multiple st=
andards are likely to diverge.<br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fon=
t-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tran=
sform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial">Take the case of India, we have over 700 diale=
cts.=C2=A0 Many of them started with the same root language.=C2=A0 It has g=
otten so villages 10 miles apart cannot talk to each other.=C2=A0 We use En=
glish (a clearly non-native language!) to communicate.</p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varia=
nt-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34=
,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fon=
t-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I could see the same happe=
ning with TLS and Consortium-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a happy thought for inter=
operability.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Why is there any nee=
d for interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to b=
e secure and reliable, and it&#39;s clear that Consortium-TLS finds such go=
als problematic. Yet I fail to see why that&#39;s a problem, since the clai=
med goal is that Consortium-TLS would only be used within a single enterpri=
se/datacenter, and thus would never need to interoperate with a world that =
valued security and privacy.</div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 19:30:47 -0400
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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 7:17 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
wrote:

>
>>    - > Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
>>
>>
>>
>> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be def=
ined, it would
>> make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>>
>>
>>
>> I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:
>>
>>
>>
>> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.
>>
>>
>> Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them started
>> with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
>> cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native languag=
e!)
>> to communicate.
>>
>>
>> I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a happ=
y
>> thought for interoperability.
>>
>
> >Why is there any need for interoperability between TLS and
> Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it's clear
> that Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why
> that's a problem, since the claimed goal >is that Consortium-TLS would on=
ly
> be used within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need =
to
> interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.
>
>
> Enterprises value security and privacy.   They have a different job to
> do.  What they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, do
> fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other things.   When
> this gets into the medical arena, it can even be lives.  I don't even see
> how you can say what you are saying.
>
> Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you find to be valid?  Saying
> that enterprises don't value security and privacy is really not terribly
> useful to resolving any discussion.
>

Isn't it the core of the discussion though? Whether the enterprise case -
which understandably and fundamentally weakens the security assurances,
both to servers and to clients - is justified, given the ecosystem risk it
poses? And the specific proposals, as demonstrated, have negative impacts
both in the design and deployment of TLS.

Given that, and given the ample discussion on-list motivating PFS, and
given the stated reasoning, it doesn't seem that "inter-protocol
interoperability" is necessary nor desirable. It's true that enterprises
don't value the same security and privacy properties that have been
discussed on the list - we wouldn't be having this discussion if that was
not the case. This isn't unproductive or not useful - this is based on the
statements from those advocating for the weakening of security of the
protocol.

As such, the need for interoperability is not a goal that's supported by
the discussion to date, and thus the concerns - that TLS and consortium-TLS
would diverge - does not seem supported by the arguments. So I do hope you
can answer - why is interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS
necessary, given that the use cases to date of Consortium-TLS state they'll
be limited to the enterprise or datacenter, for which the only
interoperability concerns that arise are between devices supporting
Consortium-TLS, which by speccing in a Consortium as suggested, you could
resolve?

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 7:17 PM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-=
dco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><span class=3D"">

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial;margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span><ul type=3D"disc"=
 style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-var=
iant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;tex=
t-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-c=
olor:initial;margin-top:0in"><li class=3D"m_-1185079282866185621gmail-m_753=
5699302310795101m_-5427049422125855701gmail-m_-2196164496691152133MsoListPa=
ragraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibr=
i,sans-serif">&gt; Nalini, why don&#39;t you (the consortium) define the st=
andard, then?<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin=
:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration=
-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTL=
S13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defined, it would make sense for=
 the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.</p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varia=
nt-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34=
,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fon=
t-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p></span><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial">I completely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Here is why I would no=
t prefer that route:</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-deco=
ration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">1.=C2=A0 Multiple stand=
ards are likely to diverge.<br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0=
px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-wei=
ght:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ari=
al,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:nor=
mal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-ali=
gn:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacin=
g:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-=
decoration-color:initial">Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects=
.=C2=A0 Many of them started with the same root language.=C2=A0 It has gott=
en so villages 10 miles apart cannot talk to each other.=C2=A0 We use Engli=
sh (a clearly non-native language!) to communicate.</p><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-ind=
ent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration=
-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I could see the same happenin=
g with TLS and Consortium-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a happy thought for interope=
rability.</p></div></blockquote><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fami=
ly:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatur=
es:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-=
spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial=
;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt;Why is there any need for int=
eroperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to be secure =
and reliable, and it&#39;s clear that Consortium-TLS finds such goals probl=
ematic. Yet I fail to see why that&#39;s a problem, since the claimed goal =
&gt;is that Consortium-TLS would only be used within a single enterprise/da=
tacenter, and thus would never need to interoperate with a world that value=
d security and privacy.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fo=
nt-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div></span><div style=3D"color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Enterprises value s=
ecurity and privacy.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They have a different job to do.=C2=A0 Wha=
t they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, do fraud mon=
itoring, protect against malware and many other things.=C2=A0 =C2=A0When th=
is gets into the medical arena, it can even be lives.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t eve=
n see how you can say what you are saying.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,=
34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font=
-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-s=
pacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-sp=
ace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorati=
on-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:40=
0;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Let me ask you th=
en, what are the use cases you find to be valid?=C2=A0 Saying that enterpri=
ses don&#39;t value security and privacy is really not terribly useful to r=
esolving any discussion.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Isn&#3=
9;t it the core of the discussion though? Whether the enterprise case - whi=
ch understandably and fundamentally weakens the security assurances, both t=
o servers and to clients - is justified, given the ecosystem risk it poses?=
 And the specific proposals, as demonstrated, have negative impacts both in=
 the design and deployment of TLS.</div><div><br></div><div>Given that, and=
 given the ample discussion on-list motivating PFS, and given the stated re=
asoning, it doesn&#39;t seem that &quot;inter-protocol interoperability&quo=
t; is necessary nor desirable. It&#39;s true that enterprises don&#39;t val=
ue the same security and privacy properties that have been discussed on the=
 list - we wouldn&#39;t be having this discussion if that was not the case.=
 This isn&#39;t unproductive or not useful - this is based on the statement=
s from those advocating for the weakening of security of the protocol.</div=
><div><br></div><div>As such, the need for interoperability is not a goal t=
hat&#39;s supported by the discussion to date, and thus the concerns - that=
 TLS and consortium-TLS would diverge - does not seem supported by the argu=
ments. So I do hope you can answer - why is interoperability between TLS an=
d Consortium-TLS necessary, given that the use cases to date of Consortium-=
TLS state they&#39;ll be limited to the enterprise or datacenter, for which=
 the only interoperability concerns that arise are between devices supporti=
ng Consortium-TLS, which by speccing in a Consortium as suggested, you coul=
d resolve?</div></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c0efbbad58bd2056767c35c--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:32:25 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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--001a1140f5e69f1f88056767c987
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Stephen,

>So it doesn't really help the discussion to claim that
>such-and-such a (set of person(s) is/are good actors - we do
>assume that, but also that there are others who would like
>the same changes to happen who do not share the IETF's goals
>of making Internet security better as far as we can.

You know, I actually find myself in agreement with some of your points (not
all!)

I lived for a number of years in a country which was a military
dictatorship with no freedom of speech.  I am well aware of what some
people who want to hang on to power at all costs and place no value on
human life are prepared to do to others.  And, their power can be
multiplied and further weaponized with the Internet.

I know that you and many others in the TLS WG are saying what you are
saying because you are trying to protect others who cannot protect
themselves.   I know.  I respect that.  I spent two of the happiest years
of my life in sub-saharan Africa in the Peace Corps.  I totally get the
point of view of trying to help people and keep them safe.

But, it is a very difficult issue.   If I can use a different analogy, if
the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to connect
to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!

TLS is used in many, many places.  The Internet is critical to the
businesses of the world.   You can't just say use something other than
TLS.   Or don't use the Internet.  It's not so easy.

I wish we could actually talk to each other quietly and reasonably.  This
is a very, very difficult problem.

Nalini






On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 14/03/18 23:00, nalini elkins wrote:
> > The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious
> > issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.
>
> Of course some people who are used to MitMing connections will
> have problems and will have to change.
>
> But that does not mean that their problems ought to be solved
> by any change to TLS.
>
> IMO the costs to the broader Internet of breaking TLS like that
> are far too high to optimse for these folks. It's understandable
> that they'd prefer otherwise.
>
> People with such problems should IMO look elsewhere for
> solutions and not be fixated on breaking TLS.
>
> Lastly, bear in mind that even if the people with whom you
> are dealing have the best intentions, there really are people
> who are paid large amounts of money to weaken Internet security
> (see [1] for scant detail of just one country's efforts in
> that regard) and that we have IETF consensus to oppose such
> efforts, as far as it's in the IETF's remit to do so.
>
> So it doesn't really help the discussion to claim that
> such-and-such a (set of person(s) is/are good actors - we do
> assume that, but also that there are others who would like
> the same changes to happen who do not share the IETF's goals
> of making Internet security better as far as we can.
>
> S.
>
> [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)
>



-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a1140f5e69f1f88056767c987
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Stephen,</span></div><div>=
<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div>

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">&gt;So it doesn&#39;t really help the discussion=
 to claim that</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,san=
s-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fo=
nt-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decora=
tion-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;such-and-such a (set of =
person(s) is/are good actors - we do</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34=
);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-vari=
ant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:n=
ormal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;as=
sume that, but also that there are others who would like</span><br style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-sty=
le:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;=
display:inline">&gt;the same changes to happen who do not share the IETF&#3=
9;s goals</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-v=
ariant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration=
-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;of making Internet security b=
etter as far as we can.</span><div><br></div><div>You know, I actually find=
 myself in agreement with some of your points (not all!)</div><div><br></di=
v><div>I lived for a number of years in a country which was a military dict=
atorship with no freedom of speech.=C2=A0 I am well aware of what some peop=
le who want to hang on to power at all costs and place no value on human li=
fe are prepared to do to others.=C2=A0 And, their power can be multiplied a=
nd further weaponized with the Internet.</div><div><br></div><div>I know th=
at you and many others in the TLS WG are saying what you are saying because=
 you are trying to protect others who cannot protect themselves.=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0I know.=C2=A0 I respect that.=C2=A0 I spent two of the happiest years of=
 my life in sub-saharan Africa in the Peace Corps.=C2=A0 I totally get the =
point of view of trying to help people and keep them safe.</div><div><br></=
div><div>But, it is a very difficult issue.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If I can use a diff=
erent analogy, if the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me=
 that to connect to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>TLS is used in many, many places.=C2=A0 The Internet is c=
ritical to the businesses of the world.=C2=A0 =C2=A0You can&#39;t just say =
use something other than TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Or don&#39;t use the Internet.=C2=
=A0 It&#39;s not so easy.</div><div><br></div><div>I wish we could actually=
 talk to each other quietly and reasonably.=C2=A0 This is a very, very diff=
icult problem.</div><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ari=
al,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:nor=
mal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-ali=
gn:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacin=
g:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-=
decoration-color:initial">

<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">O=
n Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@c=
s.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 14/03/18 23:00, nalini elkins wrote:<br>
&gt; The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious<br>
&gt; issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.<br>
<br>
Of course some people who are used to MitMing connections will<br>
have problems and will have to change.<br>
<br>
But that does not mean that their problems ought to be solved<br>
by any change to TLS.<br>
<br>
IMO the costs to the broader Internet of breaking TLS like that<br>
are far too high to optimse for these folks. It&#39;s understandable<br>
that they&#39;d prefer otherwise.<br>
<br>
People with such problems should IMO look elsewhere for<br>
solutions and not be fixated on breaking TLS.<br>
<br>
Lastly, bear in mind that even if the people with whom you<br>
are dealing have the best intentions, there really are people<br>
who are paid large amounts of money to weaken Internet security<br>
(see [1] for scant detail of just one country&#39;s efforts in<br>
that regard) and that we have IETF consensus to oppose such<br>
efforts, as far as it&#39;s in the IETF&#39;s remit to do so.<br>
<br>
So it doesn&#39;t really help the discussion to claim that<br>
such-and-such a (set of person(s) is/are good actors - we do<br>
assume that, but also that there are others who would like<br>
the same changes to happen who do not share the IETF&#39;s goals<br>
of making Internet security better as far as we can.<br>
<br>
S.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<wbr>Bul=
lrun_(decryption_program)</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--001a1140f5e69f1f88056767c987--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:43:30 -0700
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--00000000000048b33e056767f1b5
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   - >The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious
   issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.





>They have a problem with a protocol that doesn=E2=80=99t use static-RSA ke=
y
exchange.  And they would rather not pay for a solution to that problem.



I would not agree with that.  People understand that sometimes they have to
pay when there are protocol and other changes.  It is a question of if you
could do everything that you needed to do to protect your customers even if
you re-built your network from the ground up.


Nalini


On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:33 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious
>    issues with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.
>
>
>
>
>
> They have a problem with a protocol that doesn=E2=80=99t use static-RSA k=
ey
> exchange.  And they would rather not pay for a solution to that problem.
>
>
>



--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--00000000000048b33e056767f1b5
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">

<ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-famil=
y:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligature=
s:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;tex=
t-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-s=
pacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;=
text-decoration-color:initial;margin-top:0in"><li class=3D"gmail-m_11322346=
77803877902MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11p=
t;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34);background:white"><a n=
ame=3D"m_1132234677803877902__MailOriginalBody" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34=
)"><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">&gt;The sim=
ple explanation is that people think they will have serious issues with TLS=
1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.<u></u><u></u></span></a></li><=
/ul><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;background:white"><span><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></=
u></span></span></p></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ari=
al,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:nor=
mal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-ali=
gn:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacin=
g:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-=
decoration-color:initial"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span=
><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0=
<u></u></span></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span>=
&gt;They have a problem with a protocol that doesn=E2=80=99t use static-RSA=
 key exchange.=C2=A0 And they would rather not pay for a solution to that p=
roblem.</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><br></p><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin:0px"><span>I would not agree with that.=C2=A0 People understand =
that sometimes they have to pay when there are protocol and other changes.=
=C2=A0 It is a question of if you could do everything that you needed to do=
 to protect your customers even if you re-built your network from the groun=
d up.</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span><br></spa=
n></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px"><span>Nalini</span></p></=
div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed,=
 Mar 14, 2018 at 4:33 PM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote=
:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_1132234677803877902WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_1132234677803877902MsoListParagraph" style=3D"color:#222222;=
margin-left:0in;background:white">
<a name=3D"m_1132234677803877902__MailOriginalBody"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">The simple explanation is=
 that people think they will have serious issues with TLS1.3 and actually, =
TLS1.2 when it is DH only.<u></u><u></u></span></a></li></ul>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span><span style=3D"font=
-size:9.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><span style=3D"font-size:9.5pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>They have a problem with a protocol that doesn=
=E2=80=99t use static-RSA key exchange.=C2=A0 And they would rather not pay=
 for a solution to that problem.<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--00000000000048b33e056767f1b5--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:46:40 -0700
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To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Cc: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/HYeHW36JdPJHgSR-nzrjG4JzliM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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 >>Enterprises value security and privacy.   They have a different job to
do.  What they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, do
fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other things.   When
this gets into the medical arena, >>it can even be lives.  I don't even see
how you can say what you are saying.

>>Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you find to be valid?  Saying
that enterprises don't value security and privacy is really not terribly
useful to resolving any discussion.


> Isn't it the core of the discussion though?

I think the core of the discussion is that no matter how many times I say
that enterprises are trying to protect their customers, you do not consider
that a valid use case.

It is not possible to discuss something when the other person does not
think you have a valid point of view.

Nalini



On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:30 PM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 7:17 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>>    - > Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then=
?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be de=
fined, it would
>>> make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I completely disagree.   Here is why I would not prefer that route:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.
>>>
>>>
>>> Take the case of India, we have over 700 dialects.  Many of them starte=
d
>>> with the same root language.  It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart
>>> cannot talk to each other.  We use English (a clearly non-native langua=
ge!)
>>> to communicate.
>>>
>>>
>>> I could see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.   Not a
>>> happy thought for interoperability.
>>>
>>
>> >Why is there any need for interoperability between TLS and
>> Consortium-TLS? TLS is designed to be secure and reliable, and it's clea=
r
>> that Consortium-TLS finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why
>> that's a problem, since the claimed goal >is that Consortium-TLS would o=
nly
>> be used within a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need=
 to
>> interoperate with a world that valued security and privacy.
>>
>>
>> Enterprises value security and privacy.   They have a different job to
>> do.  What they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, d=
o
>> fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other things.   When
>> this gets into the medical arena, it can even be lives.  I don't even se=
e
>> how you can say what you are saying.
>>
>> Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you find to be valid?  Sayin=
g
>> that enterprises don't value security and privacy is really not terribly
>> useful to resolving any discussion.
>>
>
> Isn't it the core of the discussion though? Whether the enterprise case -
> which understandably and fundamentally weakens the security assurances,
> both to servers and to clients - is justified, given the ecosystem risk i=
t
> poses? And the specific proposals, as demonstrated, have negative impacts
> both in the design and deployment of TLS.
>
> Given that, and given the ample discussion on-list motivating PFS, and
> given the stated reasoning, it doesn't seem that "inter-protocol
> interoperability" is necessary nor desirable. It's true that enterprises
> don't value the same security and privacy properties that have been
> discussed on the list - we wouldn't be having this discussion if that was
> not the case. This isn't unproductive or not useful - this is based on th=
e
> statements from those advocating for the weakening of security of the
> protocol.
>
> As such, the need for interoperability is not a goal that's supported by
> the discussion to date, and thus the concerns - that TLS and consortium-T=
LS
> would diverge - does not seem supported by the arguments. So I do hope yo=
u
> can answer - why is interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS
> necessary, given that the use cases to date of Consortium-TLS state they'=
ll
> be limited to the enterprise or datacenter, for which the only
> interoperability concerns that arise are between devices supporting
> Consortium-TLS, which by speccing in a Consortium as suggested, you could
> resolve?
>
>


--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">

<div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12=
.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-styl=
e:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
&gt;&gt;Enterprises value security and privacy.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They have a dif=
ferent job to do.=C2=A0 What they are trying to do is to protect against le=
akage of data, do fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other =
things.=C2=A0 =C2=A0When this gets into the medical arena, &gt;&gt;it can e=
ven be lives.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t even see how you can say what you are sayin=
g.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start=
;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255)">&gt;&gt;Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you f=
ind to be valid?=C2=A0 Saying that enterprises don&#39;t value security and=
 privacy is really not terribly useful to resolving any discussion.</div>

<br></span></div>

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fam=
ily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatu=
res:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;t=
ext-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word=
-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initia=
l;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div=
><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-ca=
ps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inden=
t:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:in=
itial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;=C2=A0</span>Isn&#39;t it the core of =
the discussion though?<span style=3D"font-size:small"></span></div><div><br=
></div><div>I think the core of the discussion is that no matter how many t=
imes I say that enterprises are trying to protect their customers, you do n=
ot consider that a valid use case.</div><div><br></div><div>It is not possi=
ble to discuss something when the other person does not think you have a va=
lid point of view.</div><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div></span></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:30 PM, Ryan Sleevi <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com" target=3D"_blank">ryan-ietftls@sl=
eevi.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On W=
ed, Mar 14, 2018 at 7:17 PM, nalini elkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><s=
pan>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:=
arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:=
normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spa=
cing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;te=
xt-decoration-color:initial;margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span><ul type=3D"disc"=
 style=3D"margin-bottom:0in;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-var=
iant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;tex=
t-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-c=
olor:initial;margin-top:0in"><li class=3D"m_4159823577104297514m_-118507928=
2866185621gmail-m_7535699302310795101m_-5427049422125855701gmail-m_-2196164=
496691152133MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11=
pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">&gt; Nalini, why don&#39;t you (the cons=
ortium) define the standard, then?<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varia=
nt-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:=
0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt; Indee=
d, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be defined, it w=
ould make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.</=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-famil=
y:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligature=
s:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;tex=
t-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-s=
pacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;=
text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font=
-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tra=
nsform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p=
></span><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font=
-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial">I completely disagree.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Her=
e is why I would not prefer that route:</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"=
margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-fa=
mily:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligat=
ures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wor=
d-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initi=
al;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"m=
argin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px=
;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">1.=
=C2=A0 Multiple standards are likely to diverge.<br></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant=
-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color=
:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,3=
4,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-=
variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spa=
ce:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoratio=
n-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Take the case of India, we h=
ave over 700 dialects.=C2=A0 Many of them started with the same root langua=
ge.=C2=A0 It has gotten so villages 10 miles apart cannot talk to each othe=
r.=C2=A0 We use English (a clearly non-native language!) to communicate.</p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family=
:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures=
:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text=
-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-sp=
acing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;t=
ext-decoration-color:initial"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n:0px;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fon=
t-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tran=
sform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I could =
see the same happening with TLS and Consortium-TLS.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Not a happy=
 thought for interoperability.</p></div></blockquote><div style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">&gt;Why is=
 there any need for interoperability between TLS and Consortium-TLS? TLS is=
 designed to be secure and reliable, and it&#39;s clear that Consortium-TLS=
 finds such goals problematic. Yet I fail to see why that&#39;s a problem, =
since the claimed goal &gt;is that Consortium-TLS would only be used within=
 a single enterprise/datacenter, and thus would never need to interoperate =
with a world that valued security and privacy.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-deco=
ration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-sty=
le:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div></s=
pan><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al">Enterprises value security and privacy.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They have a differe=
nt job to do.=C2=A0 What they are trying to do is to protect against leakag=
e of data, do fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other thin=
gs.=C2=A0 =C2=A0When this gets into the medical arena, it can even be lives=
.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t even see how you can say what you are saying.</div><div=
 style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px=
;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br>=
</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial">Let me ask you then, what are the use cases you find to be valid?=C2=
=A0 Saying that enterprises don&#39;t value security and privacy is really =
not terribly useful to resolving any discussion.</div></div></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Isn&#39;t it the core of the discussion though? Whether t=
he enterprise case - which understandably and fundamentally weakens the sec=
urity assurances, both to servers and to clients - is justified, given the =
ecosystem risk it poses? And the specific proposals, as demonstrated, have =
negative impacts both in the design and deployment of TLS.</div><div><br></=
div><div>Given that, and given the ample discussion on-list motivating PFS,=
 and given the stated reasoning, it doesn&#39;t seem that &quot;inter-proto=
col interoperability&quot; is necessary nor desirable. It&#39;s true that e=
nterprises don&#39;t value the same security and privacy properties that ha=
ve been discussed on the list - we wouldn&#39;t be having this discussion i=
f that was not the case. This isn&#39;t unproductive or not useful - this i=
s based on the statements from those advocating for the weakening of securi=
ty of the protocol.</div><div><br></div><div>As such, the need for interope=
rability is not a goal that&#39;s supported by the discussion to date, and =
thus the concerns - that TLS and consortium-TLS would diverge - does not se=
em supported by the arguments. So I do hope you can answer - why is interop=
erability between TLS and Consortium-TLS necessary, given that the use case=
s to date of Consortium-TLS state they&#39;ll be limited to the enterprise =
or datacenter, for which the only interoperability concerns that arise are =
between devices supporting Consortium-TLS, which by speccing in a Consortiu=
m as suggested, you could resolve?</div></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Pr=
esident</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Operato=
rs</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>
</div>

--001a1147413899c566056767fcbe--


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On 14/03/18 23:32, nalini elkins wrote:
> But, it is a very difficult issue.   If I can use a different analogy, =
if
> the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to conne=
ct
> to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!

Analogies cannot be used to draw conclusions, merely to illustrate.
That analogy doesn't help illustrate anything for me fwiw.

> TLS is used in many, many places.  The Internet is critical to the
> businesses of the world.=20

Yes. Both fine reasons to not mess about with, weaken or
try break the TLS protocol.

BTW - while you and others may constantly over-claim and
say your consortium represents "enterprises," I assume you
do not claim to represent all "business." ;-)

>  You can't just say use something other than
> TLS.  =20

Yes. I can. Kerberos and IPsec are used within many enterprise
networks. TLS is not the only tool in the toolbox.

If your consortium want a multi-party security protocol that
does not affect other folks' security as you seem to claim,
then that is the obvious route to explore. And that protocol
needs to be non-interoperable with TLS (maybe even non-confusable
in some stronger sense) IMO in order to avoid the risks that
breaking TLS would result in us all taking.

> Or don't use the Internet.  It's not so easy.

I never said that. Why invent something like that?

> I wish we could actually talk to each other quietly and reasonably.  Th=
is
> is a very, very difficult problem.

I am just fine with talking openly on the mailing list, as
per IETF processes. I see no benefit in smokey back room
discussions here at all, and only downsides to such.

S.



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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 17:05:52 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Stephen,

More on other points later. I am getting pretty tired as am jet lagged.

>I am just fine with talking openly on the mailing list, as
>per IETF processes. I see no benefit in smokey back room
>discussions here at all, and only downsides to such.

You know, this issue of side or quiet conversations keeps coming up.   Let
me try to clarify what I feel is a misunderstanding.

In other WGs, we talk to each other sometimes in small groups, sometimes
one to one to try to clarify things.  The result ends up in the draft or
the public email list, as appropriate.

There is no question of a smokey back room.

I remember a while back when I had a lengthy disagreement with someone
which kept not getting resolved, someone (actually, Al Morton - dear sweet
guy!) took me by the scruff of the neck and made the two of us sit down
together with him.  In half an hour, we resolved the point and were able to
continue with the draft.  If we had kept throwing things at each other, as
it is easy to do via email, who knows how long the conflict would have
lasted.  I learned a valuable lesson that day.

So, I am not trying to subvert the process as some seem to imply.   Talking
to each other f2f actually seems to me to be one of the points of
journeying quite so far and spending so much money to come to an IETF
meeting.  (Having said that, the "journeying so far part" or plane trip is
catching up with me!   More tomorrow.)

Nalini









On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:49 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 14/03/18 23:32, nalini elkins wrote:
> > But, it is a very difficult issue.   If I can use a different analogy, if
> > the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to connect
> > to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!
>
> Analogies cannot be used to draw conclusions, merely to illustrate.
> That analogy doesn't help illustrate anything for me fwiw.
>
> > TLS is used in many, many places.  The Internet is critical to the
> > businesses of the world.
>
> Yes. Both fine reasons to not mess about with, weaken or
> try break the TLS protocol.
>
> BTW - while you and others may constantly over-claim and
> say your consortium represents "enterprises," I assume you
> do not claim to represent all "business." ;-)
>
> >  You can't just say use something other than
> > TLS.
>
> Yes. I can. Kerberos and IPsec are used within many enterprise
> networks. TLS is not the only tool in the toolbox.
>
> If your consortium want a multi-party security protocol that
> does not affect other folks' security as you seem to claim,
> then that is the obvious route to explore. And that protocol
> needs to be non-interoperable with TLS (maybe even non-confusable
> in some stronger sense) IMO in order to avoid the risks that
> breaking TLS would result in us all taking.
>
> > Or don't use the Internet.  It's not so easy.
>
> I never said that. Why invent something like that?
>
> > I wish we could actually talk to each other quietly and reasonably.  This
> > is a very, very difficult problem.
>
> I am just fine with talking openly on the mailing list, as
> per IETF processes. I see no benefit in smokey back room
> discussions here at all, and only downsides to such.
>
> S.
>
>
>


-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--94eb2c1148b64ac7d905676841c8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,=
sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Stephen,</span></div><div>=
<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fo=
nt-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-=
space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"=
>More on other points later. I am getting pretty tired as am jet lagged.</s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-v=
ariant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration=
-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div>

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">&gt;I am just fine with talking openly on the ma=
iling list, as</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,san=
s-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fo=
nt-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decora=
tion-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;per IETF processes. I se=
e no benefit in smokey back room</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fo=
nt-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;discus=
sions here at all, and only downsides to such.</span>

<br><div><br></div><div>You know, this issue of side or quiet conversations=
 keeps coming up.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Let me try to clarify what I feel is a misund=
erstanding.</div><div><br></div><div>In other WGs, we talk to each other so=
metimes in small groups, sometimes one to one to try to clarify things.=C2=
=A0 The result ends up in the draft or the public email list, as appropriat=
e.</div><div><br></div><div>There is no question of a smokey back room.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>I remember a while back when I had a lengthy disagree=
ment with someone which kept not getting resolved, someone (actually, Al Mo=
rton - dear sweet guy!) took me by the scruff of the neck and made the two =
of us sit down together with him.=C2=A0 In half an hour, we resolved the po=
int and were able to continue with the draft.=C2=A0 If we had kept throwing=
 things at each other, as it is easy to do via email, who knows how long th=
e conflict would have lasted.=C2=A0 I learned a valuable lesson that day.</=
div><div><br></div><div>So, I am not trying to subvert the process as some =
seem to imply.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Talking to each other f2f actually seems to me t=
o be one of the points of journeying quite so far and spending so much mone=
y to come to an IETF meeting.=C2=A0 (Having said that, the &quot;journeying=
 so far part&quot; or plane trip is catching up with me!=C2=A0 =C2=A0More t=
omorrow.)</div><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 4:49 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.fa=
rrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br=
>
<br>
On 14/03/18 23:32, nalini elkins wrote:<br>
&gt; But, it is a very difficult issue.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If I can use a differen=
t analogy, if<br>
&gt; the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to conn=
ect<br>
&gt; to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!<br>
<br>
Analogies cannot be used to draw conclusions, merely to illustrate.<br>
That analogy doesn&#39;t help illustrate anything for me fwiw.<br>
<br>
&gt; TLS is used in many, many places.=C2=A0 The Internet is critical to th=
e<br>
&gt; businesses of the world.<br>
<br>
Yes. Both fine reasons to not mess about with, weaken or<br>
try break the TLS protocol.<br>
<br>
BTW - while you and others may constantly over-claim and<br>
say your consortium represents &quot;enterprises,&quot; I assume you<br>
do not claim to represent all &quot;business.&quot; ;-)<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 You can&#39;t just say use something other than<br>
&gt; TLS.<br>
<br>
Yes. I can. Kerberos and IPsec are used within many enterprise<br>
networks. TLS is not the only tool in the toolbox.<br>
<br>
If your consortium want a multi-party security protocol that<br>
does not affect other folks&#39; security as you seem to claim,<br>
then that is the obvious route to explore. And that protocol<br>
needs to be non-interoperable with TLS (maybe even non-confusable<br>
in some stronger sense) IMO in order to avoid the risks that<br>
breaking TLS would result in us all taking.<br>
<br>
&gt; Or don&#39;t use the Internet.=C2=A0 It&#39;s not so easy.<br>
<br>
I never said that. Why invent something like that?<br>
<br>
&gt; I wish we could actually talk to each other quietly and reasonably.=C2=
=A0 This<br>
&gt; is a very, very difficult problem.<br>
<br>
I am just fine with talking openly on the mailing list, as<br>
per IETF processes. I see no benefit in smokey back room<br>
discussions here at all, and only downsides to such.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
S.<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</di=
v><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.8px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Ce=
nter Operators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e=
-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></d=
iv></div></div>
</div>

--94eb2c1148b64ac7d905676841c8--


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
CC: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:
> There is no question of a smokey back room.

I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an
AD some of the people involved here requested that I
meet them in private to discuss this topic before it
had been raised on the list, and without telling me
ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be
in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always
happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about
how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of
how to get something done, I definitely did draw a
line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow
established WG consensus.

While that all might be put down to a tactical error
in which advice to follow with whom when initially
engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome
of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.

So yes, I do find that there are questions here about
smokey back rooms indeed.

S.

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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 00:14:22 +0000
Message-ID: <CALZ3u+aG6n_OaM4VDLiwUVFG5Py0GOPPe5yUoCwBSsVn0Tz5jg@mail.gmail.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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a) Nalini, I haven't posted anything even slightly close to the examples of
offending messages you've just written.

b) Is this the only message of mine that deserves a response?

14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 19:00 nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>:

> >>One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad
>> ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can
>> afford to continue doing so.
>>
>
> >There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion".
> (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue within
> ICANN.)
>
>
> Guys, I know it is a lot of fun to talk about how others do not have the
> brains that God gave a termite and that maybe they are even the spawn of
> the devil.
>
> But, let's just use Occam's razor.   Or as I tell my daughter, "if you
> hear hoof beats, it is likely not a zebra, it is a horse".
>
> The simple explanation is that people think they will have serious issues
> with TLS1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.
>
> Nalini
>
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> 13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>:
>>
>>> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad
>>> ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can
>>> afford to continue doing so.
>>>
>>
>> There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion".
>> (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue withi=
n
>> ICANN.)
>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
> --
> Thanks,
> Nalini Elkins
> President
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
> www.e-dco.com
>
>

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<span>a) Nalini, I haven&#39;t posted anything even slightly close to the e=
xamples of offending messages you&#39;ve just written.</span><div><br></div=
><div>b) Is this the only message of mine that deserves a response?<br><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 19:00 nal=
ini elkins &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com">nalini.elkins@e-d=
co.com</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">

<div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:s=
tart;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0p=
x;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-deco=
ration-color:initial"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><di=
v style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">&gt;&gt;One strategy that&#39;s very effec=
tive for overcoming resistance to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea unt=
il nobody who&#39;s resisting it can afford to continue doing so.</div></bl=
ockquote></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:aria=
l,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norm=
al;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-alig=
n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-d=
ecoration-color:initial">&gt;There&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#39;s =
called &quot;consensus by exhaustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting thi=
s was briefly discussed as an issue within ICANN.)</div><div style=3D"color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div=
></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial=
,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norma=
l;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align=
:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:=
0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-de=
coration-color:initial">Guys, I know it is a lot of fun to talk about how o=
thers do not have the brains that God gave a termite and that maybe they ar=
e even the spawn of the devil.</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-=
family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-lig=
atures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;w=
ord-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:ini=
tial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration=
-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">But, let&#39;s just use Occam=
&#39;s razor.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Or as I tell my daughter, &quot;if you hear hoof =
beats, it is likely not a zebra, it is a horse&quot;.</div><div style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></div><div s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;f=
ont-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tr=
ansform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">The si=
mple explanation is that people think they will have serious issues with TL=
S1.3 and actually, TLS1.2 when it is DH only.</div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.=
8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norma=
l;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;te=
xt-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><=
br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-ind=
ent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial">Nalini</div>

<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar=
 13, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue=
.com" target=3D"_blank">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-sp=
ace">One strategy that&#39;s very effective for overcoming resistance to ba=
d ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who&#39;s resisting it can=
 afford to continue doing so.</div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>T=
here&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#39;s called &quot;consensus by exha=
ustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an =
issue within ICANN.)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div>
<br></blockquote></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">____________________________________=
___________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div><br></div>-- <=
br><div class=3D"m_-7075260850151168460gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"g=
mail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-s=
ize:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div=
><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.=
8px">Enterprise Data Center Operators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=
<a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><=
div><br></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div></div>

--f403043ee33c8e810605676860fd--


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 17:16:30 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on the
servers and export them, or log all the data on the servers.

These options don't require any change to the wire protocol: they just
require vendors supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs cited?

Sincerely,
Watson


From nobody Wed Mar 14 17:58:17 2018
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 00:58:09 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On 14/03/18 23:16, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> Of course some people who are used to MitMing connections will
> have problems and will have to change.

I got an offlist message correcting me about the above.

I do agree that it's odd to describe post-facto decryption
of a TLS session that used RSA key transport (via a copy of
the RSA private key) as a MitM. (The off list message didn't
say "odd" - it said "wrong":-)

It'd have been better if I'd said that all these approaches
*enable* MitM rather than *are* MitMing - even if the holder
of the copy of the RSA private key might never actually mount
an MitM, they always do have the capability to MitM whenever
they choose to do that. The same is true of Russ and Ralph's
draft as well, though of course the on-path nature of that
proposal makes an actual MitM attack more likely I'd guess,
given it requires both the cryptographic and the topological
capability to MitM whereas RSA based schemes only have to
provide the cryptographic capability.

So I accept the correction, it's a fair cop.

That said, I find using the term MitM as a shorthand for all
of the above to be waaaay more accurate than abusing the word
"visibility" to describe standardising a MitM capability.

S.

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From: Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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> On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> 13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com =
<mailto:mellon@fugue.com>>:
> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad =
ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can =
afford to continue doing so.
>=20
> There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by =
exhaustion". (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as =
an issue within ICANN.)

And there is a name for this sort of labeling - it's called an "ad =
hominem attack".  I don't believe anyone is employing "consensus by =
exhaustion".  Please don't attach unwarranted labels to honest attempts =
to explain requirements and develop solutions.

- Ralph

> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" class=3D"">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., =
18:38 Ted Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue.com" =
class=3D"">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt;:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" class=3D"">One=
 strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad ideas =
is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford =
to continue doing so.</div></blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">There's a name for that tactics, it's =
called "consensus by exhaustion". (On the recent GNSO meeting this was =
briefly discussed as an issue within ICANN.)<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>And there =
is a name for this sort of labeling - it's called an "ad hominem =
attack". &nbsp;I don't believe anyone is employing "consensus by =
exhaustion". &nbsp;Please don't attach unwarranted labels to honest =
attempts to explain requirements and develop solutions.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>- Ralph</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 02:52:17 +0000
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To: Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 22:32 Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>:

>
> On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> 13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>:
>
>> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad idea=
s
>> is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford t=
o
>> continue doing so.
>>
>
> There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by exhaustion".
> (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as an issue within
> ICANN.)
>
> And there is a name for this sort of labeling - it's called an "ad homine=
m
> attack".  I don't believe anyone is employing "consensus by exhaustion".
> Please don't attach unwarranted labels to honest attempts to explain
> requirements and develop solutions.
>

I didn't! Ted has just pointed out that there's some strategy which is by
the way effective under some circumstances, and I've just recalled it has a
name. No labels attached!

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<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 22:32 Ral=
ph Droms &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdroms.ietf@gmail.com">rdroms.ietf@gmail.com=
</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:b=
reak-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">=
<div>On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div=
><br class=3D"m_-7517370466450021547Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue.com" target=3D"_blank">mellon@fugue.com<=
/a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:br=
eak-word;line-break:after-white-space">One strategy that&#39;s very effecti=
ve for overcoming resistance to bad ideas is to keep pushing the idea until=
 nobody who&#39;s resisting it can afford to continue doing so.</div></bloc=
kquote></div><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s a name for that tactics, it&#3=
9;s called &quot;consensus by exhaustion&quot;. (On the recent GNSO meeting=
 this was briefly discussed as an issue within ICANN.)</div></div></blockqu=
ote></div></div><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-s=
pace"><div>And there is a name for this sort of labeling - it&#39;s called =
an &quot;ad hominem attack&quot;.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t believe anyone is emplo=
ying &quot;consensus by exhaustion&quot;.=C2=A0 Please don&#39;t attach unw=
arranted labels to honest attempts to explain requirements and develop solu=
tions.</div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>I didn&#39;t! Ted =
has just pointed out that there&#39;s some strategy which is by the way eff=
ective under some circumstances, and I&#39;ve just recalled it has a name. =
No labels attached!</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"></div>

--001a114e1ff24247c205676a954c--


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From: Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 23:09:37 -0400
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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
To: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <986797a7-81b0-7874-5f39-afe83c86635b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <CAOgPGoDpreyWcaLG_bMvEmMk1KvMQEGhXB+Ro+f1BKf3p_DxOA@mail.gmail.com> <4e1ab8ca-e977-7273-358b-3df3670d0ee5@cs.tcd.ie> <D1FFA72D-28B8-4435-B069-5EE1563E26B2@fugue.com> <CALZ3u+Z6DWMwKF6eoDJ2h5ABRGpeYrqZUyesnYhHP5g1d8rQ1Q@mail.gmail.com> <9BBDCA0E-7D64-4461-A00F-9F0BC567D471@gmail.com> <CALZ3u+Z-1uOANqkxGRY=iVNSHM_Yy-kthPB16rXpPLJxpJy1aA@mail.gmail.com>
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> On Mar 14, 2018, at 10:52 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> 14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 22:32 Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com =
<mailto:rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>>:
>=20
>> On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com =
<mailto:ximaera@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>> 13 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com =
<mailto:mellon@fugue.com>>:
>> One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad =
ideas is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can =
afford to continue doing so.
>>=20
>> There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by =
exhaustion". (On the recent GNSO meeting this was briefly discussed as =
an issue within ICANN.)
>=20
> And there is a name for this sort of labeling - it's called an "ad =
hominem attack".  I don't believe anyone is employing "consensus by =
exhaustion".  Please don't attach unwarranted labels to honest attempts =
to explain requirements and develop solutions.
>=20
> I didn't! Ted has just pointed out that there's some strategy which is =
by the way effective under some circumstances, and I've just recalled it =
has a name. No labels attached!

Ah, OK, sorry for the incorrect inference!

In my opinion some people may be misreading a good faith effort to =
explain the problem, listen to feedback and develop a solution as =
pushing an idea until the opponents can't afford to keep participating.  =
Please accept that good faith effort at face value...

- Ralph


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Mar 14, 2018, at 10:52 PM, Artyom Gavrichenkov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" class=3D"">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">14 Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., =
22:32 Ralph Droms &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdroms.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">rdroms.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Mar 13, 2018, at 7:45 PM, Artyom =
Gavrichenkov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"m_-7517370466450021547Apple-interchange-newline"><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">13 =
Mar. 2018 =D0=B3., 18:38 Ted Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue.com"=
 target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt;:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" class=3D"">One=
 strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad ideas =
is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford =
to continue doing so.</div></blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">There's a name for that tactics, it's =
called "consensus by exhaustion". (On the recent GNSO meeting this was =
briefly discussed as an issue within =
ICANN.)</div></div></blockquote></div></div><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">And there is a name for this sort of labeling =
- it's called an "ad hominem attack".&nbsp; I don't believe anyone is =
employing "consensus by exhaustion".&nbsp; Please don't attach =
unwarranted labels to honest attempts to explain requirements and =
develop solutions.</div></div></blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I didn't! Ted has just pointed out that =
there's some strategy which is by the way effective under some =
circumstances, and I've just recalled it has a name. No labels =
attached!</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">Ah, OK, sorry =
for the incorrect inference!</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In my opinion some people may be =
misreading a good faith effort to explain the problem, listen to =
feedback and develop a solution as pushing an idea until the opponents =
can't afford to keep participating. &nbsp;Please accept that good faith =
effort at face value...</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">- Ralph</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 03:15:00 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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From: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 03:33:48 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc, or we'll start a new thread
dedicated to that? Because I strongly believe I also have some suggestions
for that draft.

=D1=81=D1=80, 14 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 23:30 Salz, Rich <rsalz@=
akamai.com>:

> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to
> protect customers.
>
>
>
> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their
> personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing
> regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
>
>    - retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
>    - Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
>    - Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently not
>    regulated)
>    - Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (one would
>    think they know better)
>
> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>
>
>
> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>
>
>
> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking =
TLS?  And what
> benefits and increased protection will customers see?
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc, or we&#39;ll start a new threa=
d dedicated to that? Because I strongly believe I also have some suggestion=
s for that draft.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">=D1=81=
=D1=80, 14 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 23:30 Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"m_-8849715767467464781WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Some on this list h=
ave said that they need to break into TLS in order to protect customers.<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The thing customers=
 seem to need the most protection is having their personal data stolen.=C2=
=A0 It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing regularity on astound=
ing scales.=C2=A0 Some examples include<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:.=
25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">retailer Target, presumably subject =
to PCI-DSS rules<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class=3D"m_-88497157674674647=
81MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11=
.0pt">Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry<u></u><u></u=
></span></li><li class=3D"m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"=
margin-left:.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Equifax, a financial-bu=
siness organization (but apparently not regulated)<u></u><u></u></span></li=
><li class=3D"m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:=
.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Yahoo, a company created on and by =
and for the Internet (one would think they know better)<u></u><u></u></span=
></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">We could, of course=
, go on and on and on.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">NONE of those organ=
izations are using TLS 1.3.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">So what kind of =E2=
=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking TLS?=C2=A0 And what b=
enefits and increased protection will customers see?<u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--001a114e1ff27df48705676b2932--


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At the risk of stating the obvious, it=E2=80=99s because server owners =
want to use the same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the =
Java library that everybody else uses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, =
actively maintained, and essentially free.

None of these libraries support any of this functionality.

> On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on the
> servers and export them, or log all the data on the servers.
>=20
> These options don't require any change to the wire protocol: they just
> require vendors supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs cited?
>=20
> Sincerely,
> Watson
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Hi, Rich.

You are conflating customers and users. The customer that may be =
protected by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is the bank =
itself. An IPS system with visibility into the traffic may detect bots =
that are there to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever.

If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=99s a happy side =
effect (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect the system =
integrity and the data.

Yoav

> On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order =
to protect customers.
>=20
> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their =
personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing =
regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
> retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
> Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
> Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently not =
regulated)
> Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (one would =
think they know better)
> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>=20
> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>=20
> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires =
breaking TLS?  And what benefits and increased protection will customers =
see?
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>

--Apple-Mail=_57B477FD-B4CD-4FC9-AEA9-CFE7869AA349
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi, =
Rich.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">You are =
conflating customers and users. The customer that may be protected by =
breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is the bank itself. An IPS =
system with visibility into the traffic may detect bots that are there =
to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If the customers of the =
bank are protected, it=E2=80=99s a happy side effect (collateral =
benefit?). The object is to protect the system integrity and the =
data.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Yoav<br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">Some on this list =
have said that they need to break into TLS in order to protect =
customers.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">The thing =
customers seem to need the most protection is having their personal data =
stolen.&nbsp; It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing =
regularity on astounding scales.&nbsp; Some examples include<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom: =
0in; margin-top: 0in;" class=3D""><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">retailer=
 Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">Anthem =
health insurance, presumably a regulated industry<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">Equifax,=
 a financial-business organization (but apparently not regulated)<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">Yahoo, =
a company created on and by and for the Internet (one would think they =
know better)<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></li></ul><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">We could, of =
course, go on and on and on.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">NONE of those =
organizations are using TLS 1.3.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">So what kind of =
=E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking TLS?&nbsp; And =
what benefits and increased protection will customers see?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 01:47:11 -0700
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 On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:
>> There is no question of a smokey back room.

>I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an
>AD some of the people involved here requested that I
>meet them in private to discuss this topic before it
>had been raised on the list, and without telling me
>ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be
>in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always
>happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about
>how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of
>how to get something done, I definitely did draw a
>line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow
>established WG consensus.

>While that all might be put down to a tactical error
>in which advice to follow with whom when initially
>engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome
>of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.

>So yes, I do find that there are questions here about
>smokey back rooms indeed.

1.  With respect, I contend that you are conflating what happened then with
what I am suggesting now.

2.  Also, your description of what happened then does not match with my
memory.  We may
have an honest disagreement or recollection of events.  I believe I have
the original
email chain somewhere & can try to find it, if necessary.

My version of the events is:

1.  A couple of years ago, I was involved with some "enterprises" who felt
they had an
issue with the upcoming TLS1.3 standard.  In particular, the deprecation of
RSA.


2.   They were concerned about the reputational risk to their company of
speaking
in a public forum.   (This is a huge issue for many companies.)  Also, they
were not used to writing Internet Drafts or presenting at an IETF group.


3.  I had no experience with such a situation so I was not sure what to do
either.
My own work is in IPPM (if anyone is interested, you can look at my work
in RFC8250), so I was not involved with the TLS group very much either.
(A situation which has since been corrected.  I now am happy to know
many of you quite well.) (Still no claims to being a crypto expert, though!)

I asked a former Chair of the IETF for advice.  He suggested asking for a
session with the leadership of the TLS group under Chatham House rules.

I did so.

As I recall, I asked to have a discussion of the issues to see what we
should do.
I never asked for any consensus of the WG to be overturned.  I may be a dim
bulb but I am not a complete idiot.   I do have some idea of how things
work as
far as WG consensus.

Again, as I recall, you replied at some length about "subverting the
process".
After a few more somewhat emotional emails back and forth, where I was not
able to convey
my point adequately or to reach an understanding, I gave up on that route.

It is completely possible that I did not ask correctly or convey the right
information.
It was a new situation to me & as I say, I was not sure what to do.  I did
my best.

If needed, I can look for the original email chain.


4.  Then, I went back to these "enterprises".  They had to go all the way
to the
CEO of their company to get authority to speak publicly.   They did so at
the Chicago IETF.

And, you know what, I am going to do everything I can to help these guys.
They have a point of view that deserves to be represented.  They have
put in a huge amount of time and effort to try to present what they feel
will be a real problem for their company.  They are not doing it for any
other reason.

Again, they are not used to writing Internet drafts.  And, I am not as much
as help as I could be to them in writing drafts for TLS as that is not
where
I live, so to speak.  If this was an issue in performance metrics, I could
write the drafts for them.  But, this is TLS, so we have to get others to
help.
We have tried as much as we can to follow the process.   We are all
imperfect, we are doing our best.


5.  This issue with people being able to speak publicly is real.  It needs
to
be recognized.  Not everyone works for an academic institution or
companies which support speaking openly about network architecture
issues.

Even some of the network product vendors who are starting to speak
openly on this issue have had to talk to their CEOs before commenting.
Not everyone will go to such lengths.  They will mostly just give up.
Which is unfortunate for everyone.  Including the IETF.

I completely understand why deliberations of something as important
as TLS need to be public and in the open.  I support that.  I am just
saying that there is an important constituency for whom speaking in
an open forum is a real issue.  Frankly, this is why we formed the
"consortium".

Nalini

On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:
> > There is no question of a smokey back room.
>
> I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an
> AD some of the people involved here requested that I
> meet them in private to discuss this topic before it
> had been raised on the list, and without telling me
> ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be
> in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always
> happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about
> how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of
> how to get something done, I definitely did draw a
> line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow
> established WG consensus.
>
> While that all might be put down to a tactical error
> in which advice to follow with whom when initially
> engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome
> of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.
>
> So yes, I do find that there are questions here about
> smokey back rooms indeed.
>
> S.
>



-- 
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

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<div dir=3D"ltr">

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:</span><b=
r style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8=
px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal=
;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;flo=
at:none;display:inline">&gt;&gt; There is no question of a smokey back room=
.</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-ca=
ps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inden=
t:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:in=
itial"><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-=
size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-ca=
ps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inden=
t:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:in=
itial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;I&#39;m sorry to disagree so bluntly, =
but while I was an</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial=
,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:norma=
l;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align=
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0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-de=
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ecoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;AD some of the peopl=
e involved here requested that I</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-l=
igatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal=
;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:i=
nitial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fo=
nt-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
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l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;meet t=
hem in private to discuss this topic before it</span><br style=3D"color:rgb=
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font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lett=
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;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
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ne">&gt;had been raised on the list, and without telling me</span><br style=
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255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none=
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would be</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-var=
iant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;tex=
t-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-c=
olor:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;in the room looking for what. =
As an AD I was always</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:ar=
ial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:no=
rmal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-al=
ign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spaci=
ng:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text=
-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;happy to meet fol=
ks and have quiet discussions about</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);=
font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varian=
t-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:nor=
mal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-styl=
e:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;how=
 to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of</span><br style=3D"color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-=
decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:no=
rmal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400=
;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none=
;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text=
-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:=
inline">&gt;how to get something done, I definitely did draw a</span><br st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font=
-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tra=
nsform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;f=
ont-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tr=
ansform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:n=
one;display:inline">&gt;line well before private meetings aiming to overthr=
ow</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:i=
nitial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-ind=
ent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;established WG consensus.</span><br =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fo=
nt-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-t=
ransform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;f=
ont-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tr=
ansform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fo=
nt-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-t=
ransform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:=
none;display:inline">&gt;While that all might be put down to a tactical err=
or</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:i=
nitial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-ind=
ent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;in which advice to follow with whom =
when initially</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,san=
s-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fo=
nt-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decora=
tion-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;engaging with the IETF, =
from my POV it was the epitome</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-=
family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-lig=
atures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;w=
ord-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:ini=
tial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font=
-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;of a req=
uest for a smokey-back room discussion.</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,=
34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-va=
riant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spac=
ing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space=
:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-=
style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-var=
iant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,=
34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-va=
riant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spac=
ing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space=
:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-=
style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;=
So yes, I do find that there are questions here about</span><br style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style=
:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:n=
one;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);t=
ext-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;displ=
ay:inline">&gt;smokey back rooms indeed.</span>

<br><div><br></div><div>1.=C2=A0 With respect, I contend that you are confl=
ating what happened then with what I am suggesting now.</div><div><br></div=
><div>2.=C2=A0 Also, your description of what happened then does not match =
with my memory.=C2=A0 We may</div><div>have an honest disagreement or recol=
lection of events.=C2=A0 I believe I have the original</div><div>email chai=
n somewhere &amp; can try to find it, if necessary.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>My version of the events is:</div><div><br></div><div>1.=C2=A0 A couple o=
f years ago, I was involved with some &quot;enterprises&quot; who felt they=
 had an=C2=A0</div><div>issue with the upcoming TLS1.3 standard.=C2=A0 In p=
articular, the deprecation of RSA.=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><b=
r></div><div>2.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They were concerned about the reputational risk=
 to their company of speaking</div><div>in a public forum.=C2=A0 =C2=A0(Thi=
s is a huge issue for many companies.)=C2=A0 Also, they</div><div>were not =
used to writing Internet Drafts or presenting at an IETF group.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div>3.=C2=A0 I had no experience with such a situa=
tion so I was not sure what to do either.</div><div>My own work is in IPPM =
(if anyone is interested, you can look at my work=C2=A0</div><div>in RFC825=
0), so I was not involved with the TLS group very much either.=C2=A0</div><=
div>(A situation which has since been corrected.=C2=A0 I now am happy to kn=
ow=C2=A0</div><div>many of you quite well.) (Still no claims to being a cry=
pto expert, though!)</div><div><br></div><div>I asked a former Chair of the=
 IETF for advice.=C2=A0 He suggested asking for a=C2=A0<br></div><div>sessi=
on with the leadership of the TLS group under Chatham House rules.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>I did so.</div><div><br></div><div>As I recall, I asked to=
 have a discussion of the issues to see what we should do.</div><div>I neve=
r asked for any consensus of the WG to be overturned.=C2=A0 I may be a dim<=
/div><div>bulb but I am not a complete idiot.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I do have some id=
ea of how things work as</div><div>far as WG consensus.</div><div><br></div=
><div>Again, as I recall, you replied at some length about &quot;subverting=
 the process&quot;.</div><div>After a few more somewhat emotional emails ba=
ck and forth, where I was not able to convey=C2=A0</div><div>my point adequ=
ately or to reach an understanding, I gave up on that route.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>It is completely possible that I did not ask correctly or convey=
 the right information.</div><div>It was a new situation to me &amp; as I s=
ay, I was not sure what to do.=C2=A0 I did my best.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>If needed, I can look for the original email chain.</div><div><br></div><=
div><br></div><div>4.=C2=A0 Then, I went back to these &quot;enterprises&qu=
ot;.=C2=A0 They had to go all the way to the</div><div>CEO of their company=
 to get authority to speak publicly.=C2=A0 =C2=A0They did so at=C2=A0</div>=
<div>the Chicago IETF.</div><div><br></div><div>And, you know what, I am go=
ing to do everything I can to help these guys.<br></div><div>They have a po=
int of view that deserves to be represented.=C2=A0 They have=C2=A0</div><di=
v>put in a huge amount of time and effort to try to present what they feel<=
/div><div>will be a real problem for their company.=C2=A0 They are not doin=
g it for any</div><div>other reason.</div><div><br></div><div>Again, they a=
re not used to writing Internet drafts.=C2=A0 And, I am not as much</div><d=
iv>as help as I could be to them in writing drafts for TLS as that is not w=
here=C2=A0</div><div>I live, so to speak.=C2=A0 If this was an issue in per=
formance metrics, I could=C2=A0</div><div>write the drafts for them.=C2=A0 =
But, this is TLS, so we have to get others to help.</div><div>We have tried=
 as much as we can to follow the process.=C2=A0 =C2=A0We are all</div><div>=
imperfect, we are doing our best.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>5=
.=C2=A0 This issue with people being able to speak publicly is real.=C2=A0 =
It needs to<br></div><div>be recognized.=C2=A0 Not everyone works for an ac=
ademic institution or=C2=A0</div><div>companies which support speaking open=
ly about network architecture</div><div>issues.=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div><br>=
</div><div>Even some of the network product vendors who are starting to spe=
ak</div><div>openly on this issue have had to talk to their CEOs before com=
menting.</div><div>Not everyone will go to such lengths.=C2=A0 They will mo=
stly just give up.</div><div>Which is unfortunate for everyone.=C2=A0 Inclu=
ding the IETF.</div><div><br></div><div>I completely understand why deliber=
ations of something as important=C2=A0</div><div>as TLS need to be public a=
nd in the open.=C2=A0 I support that.=C2=A0 I am just</div><div>saying that=
 there is an important constituency for whom speaking in</div><div>an open =
forum is a real issue.=C2=A0 Frankly, this is why we formed the</div><div>&=
quot;consortium&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div></div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 5:=
13 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farr=
ell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:<br>
&gt; There is no question of a smokey back room.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an<br>
AD some of the people involved here requested that I<br>
meet them in private to discuss this topic before it<br>
had been raised on the list, and without telling me<br>
ahead of time who, from what &quot;enterprises,&quot; would be<br>
in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always<br>
happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about<br>
how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of<br>
how to get something done, I definitely did draw a<br>
line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow<br>
established WG consensus.<br>
<br>
While that all might be put down to a tactical error<br>
in which advice to follow with whom when initially<br>
engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome<br>
of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.<br>
<br>
So yes, I do find that there are questions here about<br>
smokey back rooms indeed.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
S.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</di=
v><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.8px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Ce=
nter Operators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e=
-dco.com" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></d=
iv></div></div>
</div>

--001a11441cd4ac2cbd05676f8931--


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From: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 08:52:18 +0000
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To: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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 > Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc, or we'll start a new thread
dedicated to that? Because I strongly believe I also have some suggestions
for that draft.

Artyom, yes, as far as I am concerned at least, please start a new thread.
Sorry I am getting behind on responding to all the emails.   But, I am very
interested in what you have to say.  I just can't keep up.   Will do my
best to respond as promptly as possible but there are many of you and not
so many of me.

Nalini

On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:33 AM, Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc, or we'll start a new thread
> dedicated to that? Because I strongly believe I also have some suggestion=
s
> for that draft.
>
> =D1=81=D1=80, 14 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 23:30 Salz, Rich <rsal=
z@akamai.com>:
>
>> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to
>> protect customers.
>>
>>
>>
>> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their
>> personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing
>> regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
>>
>>    - retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
>>    - Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
>>    - Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently not
>>    regulated)
>>    - Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (one would
>>    think they know better)
>>
>> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>>
>>
>>
>> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>>
>>
>>
>> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking=
 TLS?  And what
>> benefits and increased protection will customers see?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
Thanks,
Nalini Elkins
President
Enterprise Data Center Operators
www.e-dco.com

--001a11372550f5497505676f9b47
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<div dir=3D"ltr">

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">&gt; Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc=
, or we&#39;ll start a new thread dedicated to that? Because I strongly bel=
ieve I also have some suggestions for that draft.</span>

<br><div><br></div><div>Artyom, yes, as far as I am concerned at least, ple=
ase start a new thread.=C2=A0 Sorry I am getting behind on responding to al=
l the emails.=C2=A0 =C2=A0But, I am very interested in what you have to say=
.=C2=A0 I just can&#39;t keep up.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Will do my best to respond as=
 promptly as possible but there are many of you and not so many of me.</div=
><div><br></div><div>Nalini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:33 AM, Artyom Gavrichenkov =
<span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ximaera@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank=
">ximaera@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>Are we going to discuss draft-fenter ad hoc, or we&#39;ll start a new thre=
ad dedicated to that? Because I strongly believe I also have some suggestio=
ns for that draft.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">=D1=
=81=D1=80, 14 =D0=BC=D0=B0=D1=80. 2018 =D0=B3., 23:30 Salz, Rich &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;:<b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"m_5057232976947907325m_-8849715767467464781WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Some on this list h=
ave said that they need to break into TLS in order to protect customers.<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The thing customers=
 seem to need the most protection is having their personal data stolen.=C2=
=A0 It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing regularity on astound=
ing scales.=C2=A0 Some examples include<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_5057232976947907325m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" s=
tyle=3D"margin-left:.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">retailer Target=
, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class=3D=
"m_5057232976947907325m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"marg=
in-left:.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Anthem health insurance, pr=
esumably a regulated industry<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class=3D"m_50572=
32976947907325m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:=
.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Equifax, a financial-business organ=
ization (but apparently not regulated)<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class=
=3D"m_5057232976947907325m_-8849715767467464781MsoListParagraph" style=3D"m=
argin-left:.25in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Yahoo, a company created=
 on and by and for the Internet (one would think they know better)<u></u><u=
></u></span></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">We could, of course=
, go on and on and on.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">NONE of those organ=
izations are using TLS 1.3.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">So what kind of =E2=
=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking TLS?=C2=A0 And what b=
enefits and increased protection will customers see?<u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
</div>

______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">=
President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Opera=
tors</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com" =
target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><=
/div>
</div>

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My responses for today are all in this message, including a response to =
Ralph.  I'm going to try not to engage on this again until tomorrow.

On Mar 14, 2018, at 6:52 PM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com> =
wrote:
> 1.  Multiple standards are likely to diverge.

We don't need multiple standards, so this isn't an issue.   What you =
need is to define the behavior that you need from your TLS =
implementation to give you the visibility that you want.

> 2.  The TLS WG of the IETF has many of the world's experts in defining =
such protocols.  The years of collective expertise is remarkable.   We =
want to work with the TLS group not try to recreate it.

Of course, it would be ideal for you if you could get the TLS working =
group to do this work for you.

> 3.   The reason I support the enterprises and their voice in TLS is =
because I am naive enough to actually believe in the IETF.  I believe =
that technical truth matters.  That it is not actually the Vendor =
Engineering Task Force.  That is a group of the vendors, by the vendors =
and for the vendors.   I could see when this whole thing with taking =
away RSA was happening that correct though it may be, it was going to =
cause enormous disruption for many, many people in the commercial world. =
 You may not believe it, but I am actually doing this because I really =
believe that we need one set of standards that everyone can use.  I want =
it to be in the TLS WG.  I want the TLS WG to be credible and succeed =
and I want the IETF to succeed.  I believe that the Internet needs it.

The problem isn't that we don't believe that it will involve significant =
work for you to secure your customer's data.

> 4.  Again, believe it or not, the TLS WG needs the enterprises.  Of =
course, this is all my opinion only.   These enterprises are a huge =
group of users of the IETF protocols and TLS in particular.   The =
feedback of users is irreplaceable.  Who are we building the protocols =
for if not the users?  Sure, there are multiple sets, but these are a =
very large group. =20

This is the crux of the question: who are the users whose needs the TLS =
working group is serving?   Any discussion that doesn't begin by =
answering this question is going to be non-terminal.   I believe it's =
your position that the "user" is the large corporation; an alternate =
view, which appears to be shared by quite a few participants here, is =
that the user is the end user: the person who, if their data security is =
compromised, will wind up bearing the cost of that compromise.

> Enterprises value security and privacy.   They have a different job to =
do.  What they are trying to do is to protect against leakage of data, =
do fraud monitoring, protect against malware and many other things.   =
When this gets into the medical arena, it can even be lives.  I don't =
even see how you can say what you are saying.

None of these applications require changes to TLS 1.3.   If you think =
they do, you need to walk us through your reasoning.  The reason we can =
say what we are saying is that we understand that none of what you have =
mentioned here requires that TLS 1.3 be weakened.

> But, it is a very difficult issue.   If I can use a different analogy, =
if the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to =
connect to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!

That's a great analogy, but we are talking about software, not houses.   =
There is no technical reason why switching to TLS 1.3 requires you to =
build a new house.   It does require you to update your software, and =
there is no doubt a real cost to that.  There may even be software that =
you will have to stop using.  But any software that you would have to =
stop using is software you already should not be using, because it's not =
supported.

> I would not agree with that.  People understand that sometimes they =
have to pay when there are protocol and other changes.  It is a question =
of if you could do everything that you needed to do to protect your =
customers even if you re-built your network from the ground up.

I don't think there's any question that if you rebuilt your network from =
the ground up, you could use TLS 1.3.   If you think this is not the =
case, it would help if you could say what precisely stands in the way.

On Mar 14, 2018, at 10:32 PM, Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> And there is a name for this sort of labeling - it's called an "ad =
hominem attack".  I don't believe anyone is employing "consensus by =
exhaustion".  Please don't attach unwarranted labels to honest attempts =
to explain requirements and develop solutions.

Ralph, the problem is not that these attempts to explain requirements =
are not honest.  It is that until we agree on who we are protecting, =
talking about requirements doesn't really help: the requirements of =
people who are not our priority are interesting, but not important.

And because we are discussing requirements before we have agreed as to =
whether or not it is okay to weaken the security of the protocol, the =
discussion is non-terminal.   I've just quoted from three of the five =
long messages Ms. Elkins sent to the mailing list today, for example.

This is a serious problem: the working group cannot afford to debate =
this point indefinitely when the discussion is non-terminal.   It is not =
"ad hominem" (an argument about a person) to say that it would be better =
if the working group chairs were to declare this issue closed.   There =
is a clear benefit to doing so.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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--_000_F81530E8CFBB4688AB5667C003D7BCC2akamaicom_--


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Subject: [TLS] Chair -Moderated: Fwd: Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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I have placed this poster in the moderator queue based on RFC2418: =
Participation is by individual technical contributors, rather than by =
formal representatives of organizations [0].  They can rejoin using a =
personal account or identify who they are in their email=E2=80=99s =
signature.

spt

[0] https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D2418#section-1


> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> From: Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: =
draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
> Date: March 14, 2018 at 22:08:44 GMT
> To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
> Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
>=20
> The requirements for visibility exist in an array of regulated =
environments worldwide.  It is one of the presentation areas in the Hot =
Middlebox Workshop.  =
http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=3D1 =
<http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=3D1>
>=20
> The Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can =
experience how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be used in =
conjunction with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for =
Middlebox discovery and controlled visibility by an end-user in a way =
that meets both user and regulatory interests.  The draft specification =
will be published in two weeks.
>=20
> --the Hot Middlebox organizers
>=20
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com =
<mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
>=20
> >    So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption =
by
>     the decryption service, something that the security considerations
>     neglects to include in its list.
>=20
> So I think this is an important point.  I assume the authors did not =
realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right.  =
In the US, we have been having arguments where the national police force =
(FBI) is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden key" that =
only they can use, and the security people are saying it is impossible.  =
This seems like another instance, no?
>=20
> Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:  Russ, did you know =
this or was Martin's point new to you?
>=20
>         /r$
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


--Apple-Mail=_45F2D826-D251-4874-9065-B073B393B78B
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I =
have placed this poster in the moderator queue based on RFC2418: =
Participation is by individual technical contributors, rather than by =
formal representatives of organizations [0]. &nbsp;They can rejoin using =
a personal account or identify who they are in their email=E2=80=99s =
signature.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">spt<br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">[0]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D2418#section-1" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D2418#section-1</a><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Begin =
forwarded message:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">From: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Hot Middlebox &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hot.middlebox@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">hot.middlebox@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><div=
 style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Re: [TLS] Four =
concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)</b><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Date: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">March 14, 2018 at 22:08:44 =
GMT<br class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; =
margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">"Salz, Rich" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Cc: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">IETF TLS &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""></span></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">The requirements for visibility exist in an =
array of regulated environments worldwide.&nbsp; It is one of the =
presentation areas in the Hot Middlebox Workshop.&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=
=3D1" =
class=3D"">http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?=
tab=3D1</a></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The =
Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can =
experience&nbsp;how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be =
used in conjunction with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for =
Middlebox discovery and controlled visibility by an end-user in a way =
that meets both user and regulatory interests.&nbsp; The draft =
specification&nbsp;will be published in two weeks.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">--the Hot Middlebox =
organizers</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <span =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">
&gt;&nbsp; &nbsp; So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session =
resumption by<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp; the decryption service, something that the security =
considerations<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp; neglects to include in its list.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</span>So I think this is an important point.&nbsp; I assume the authors =
did not realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this =
right.&nbsp; In the US, we have been having arguments where the national =
police force (FBI) is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden =
key" that only they can use, and the security people are saying it is =
impossible.&nbsp; This seems like another instance, no?<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:&nbsp; Russ, did you know =
this or was Martin's point new to you?<br class=3D"">
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888" class=3D""><br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; /r$<br class=3D"">
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 21:13:29 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:46:25PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03:02:10 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > > external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> > > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> > > failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> > > would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
> >=20
> > but identity/binder may be invalid only because the server was restarted
> > and generated a new in-memory key; we don't want to abort connection in
> > such
> For an external PSK?  That hardly sounds like "external" to me...

not my fault that what we called just "PSK"s in TLS 1.2 is now "external PS=
Ks"=20
in TLS 1.3... I wanted to be unambiguous, so please, can we discuss the iss=
ue,=20
not semiotics?

> > situation, continuing to a regular handshake is necessary then for good
> > user experience (and likely, even security, given the history of TLS
> > version fallbacks)
> >=20
> > > Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> > > little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
> >=20
> > not only migration, but session resumption and regular PSK at the same
> > time
> > too - for session resumption you may not do DH, while for initial
> > handshake
> > with PSK you may want to to gain PFS...
> >=20
> > so as tempting as the removal of multiple PSKs from ClientHello is, I'm
> > afraid the fallout is far too large to do it
>=20
> I did not say removal of multiple PSKs, rather removal of multiple
> *external* PSKs.

we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external and=
=20
resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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On Thursday, 15 March 2018 05:51:31 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> At the risk of stating the obvious, it=E2=80=99s because server owners wa=
nt to use
> the same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the Java library th=
at
> everybody else uses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, actively maintained=
, and
> essentially free.
>=20
> None of these libraries support any of this functionality.

huh? Sure, it is not nicely packaged in to allow integration with 3rd party=
=20
systems, and sometimes disabled by default, but it's hardly missing...

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477

> > On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on the
> > servers and export them, or log all the data on the servers.
> >=20
> > These options don't require any change to the wire protocol: they just
> > require vendors supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs cited?
> >=20
> > Sincerely,
> > Watson
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 4:53 AM, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> wr=
ote:
> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility to =
an
> IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=A6
>
>

In an effort to help clear up the use case and not weighing in on the
discussion...

I think what Yoav is referring to by detecting BOTS within the
network, is really so called advance persistent threat (APT) actors
that are moving around the internal network leveraging existing access
rights of compromised accounts and privilege escalation
vulnerabilities.  These might be detectable with 'visibility'.
Patterns and behavior might be used to detect the APT use case whether
or not encryption protects the stream, but it is more difficult.

If an attacker was using their own server and the fingerprints were
different, detection with encryption would be possible even if it is
more difficult. Threat sharing groups do exchange detection techniques
that involve encrypted traffic for the latter case.  And I think
everyone agrees, that this is not a use case the proponents are trying
to cover.

Best,
Kathleen

>
> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=99=
s trying to
> exfiltrate data, so this capability would never get activated. And even i=
f
> the bot was nice enough as to opt-in for visibility, the party responsibl=
e
> for providing the IPS with the required information is the server, which =
in
> this case is under control of the attacker. There is no way the attacker=
=E2=80=99s
> server will negotiate with the IPS the required keys to decrypt the chann=
el
> (most likely it can=E2=80=99t even communicate with it).
>
>
>
> And if you decide to close that connection because of the lack of
> visibility, well=E2=80=A6 99% of TLS servers in internet will not negotia=
te
> visibility keys with your specific IPS, so you could as well close all TL=
S
> traffic going outside. And you don=E2=80=99t need visibility for this, on=
ly a
> well-configured firewall.
>
>
>
> So, maybe I=E2=80=99m wrong, but I think that this specific use case (ana=
lysis of
> either malicious or legitimate clients=E2=80=99 traffic going from the en=
terprise
> network to outside servers) is not covered by the draft under discussion
> because the remote server will never negotiate the encryption keys with t=
he
> IPS. For me, the only way to provide visibility within this case is by
> actively proxying every connection, something that proponents of the need
> for visibility don=E2=80=99t seem to be comfortable with, and which in my=
 opinion
> does not require lowering the TLS protocol security level.
>
>
>
> Or maybe I misunderstood the use case altogether=E2=80=A6
>
>
>
>
>
> De: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] En nombre de Yoav Nir
> Enviado el: jueves, 15 de marzo de 2018 5:58
> Para: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
> CC: tls@ietf.org
> Asunto: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
>
>
>
> Hi, Rich.
>
>
>
> You are conflating customers and users. The customer that may be protecte=
d
> by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is the bank itself. An IP=
S system
> with visibility into the traffic may detect bots that are there to steal
> data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever.
>
>
>
> If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=99s a happy side eff=
ect
> (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect the system integrity and =
the
> data.
>
>
>
> Yoav
>
>
>
> On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to
> protect customers.
>
>
>
> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their
> personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing
> regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
>
> =C2=B7         retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
>
> =C2=B7         Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
>
> =C2=B7         Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently=
 not
> regulated)
>
> =C2=B7         Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (o=
ne would
> think they know better)
>
> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>
>
>
> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>
>
>
> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking =
TLS?  And what
> benefits and increased protection will customers see?
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Stan Kalisch <stan@glyphein.mailforce.net>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 11:04:43 -0400
To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/d9Wo4gBaM2hahyGUIEhO1iUs5cM>
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[top-posted because the bulk of the quoted material really is necessary for c=
ontext]

Hi Nalini,

It seems to me your and Stephen's recollections of events have two essential=
 points in common (well, in my view they do) that I'd like to highlight here=
:

1.  A number of your consortium's parties are, at minimum, reticent to come,=
 or are restricted from coming, forward in this large public IETF forum.

2.  Your consortium is trying to prove a negative:  that some fundamental fe=
ature doesn't exist in the TLS 1.3 draft.  I say "some fundamental feature" b=
ecause I'm not sure those for or opposed can say exactly what that technical=
 feature is.  We know it allows the inspection of data, and we know there ar=
e theories on how that would securely work.

Here, I think, is a substantial part of the problem:  your consortium isn't p=
ushing a specific technical feature, and the WG doesn't know specifically wh=
o they are.  I think this speaks to much of the difficulty the WG has in eng=
aging with you regarding the TLS 1.3 and so-called "visibility" drafts.


Thanks,
Stan

> On Mar 15, 2018, at 4:47 AM, nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com> wrote=
:
>=20
> On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:
> >> There is no question of a smokey back room.
>=20
> >I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an
> >AD some of the people involved here requested that I
> >meet them in private to discuss this topic before it
> >had been raised on the list, and without telling me
> >ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be
> >in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always
> >happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about
> >how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of
> >how to get something done, I definitely did draw a
> >line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow
> >established WG consensus.
>=20
> >While that all might be put down to a tactical error
> >in which advice to follow with whom when initially
> >engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome
> >of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.
>=20
> >So yes, I do find that there are questions here about
> >smokey back rooms indeed.=20
>=20
> 1.  With respect, I contend that you are conflating what happened then wit=
h what I am suggesting now.
>=20
> 2.  Also, your description of what happened then does not match with my me=
mory.  We may
> have an honest disagreement or recollection of events.  I believe I have t=
he original
> email chain somewhere & can try to find it, if necessary.
>=20
> My version of the events is:
>=20
> 1.  A couple of years ago, I was involved with some "enterprises" who felt=
 they had an=20
> issue with the upcoming TLS1.3 standard.  In particular, the deprecation o=
f RSA.  =20
>=20
>=20
> 2.   They were concerned about the reputational risk to their company of s=
peaking
> in a public forum.   (This is a huge issue for many companies.)  Also, the=
y
> were not used to writing Internet Drafts or presenting at an IETF group.
>=20
>=20
> 3.  I had no experience with such a situation so I was not sure what to do=
 either.
> My own work is in IPPM (if anyone is interested, you can look at my work=20=

> in RFC8250), so I was not involved with the TLS group very much either.=20=

> (A situation which has since been corrected.  I now am happy to know=20
> many of you quite well.) (Still no claims to being a crypto expert, though=
!)
>=20
> I asked a former Chair of the IETF for advice.  He suggested asking for a=20=

> session with the leadership of the TLS group under Chatham House rules.
>=20
> I did so.
>=20
> As I recall, I asked to have a discussion of the issues to see what we sho=
uld do.
> I never asked for any consensus of the WG to be overturned.  I may be a di=
m
> bulb but I am not a complete idiot.   I do have some idea of how things wo=
rk as
> far as WG consensus.
>=20
> Again, as I recall, you replied at some length about "subverting the proce=
ss".
> After a few more somewhat emotional emails back and forth, where I was not=
 able to convey=20
> my point adequately or to reach an understanding, I gave up on that route.=

>=20
> It is completely possible that I did not ask correctly or convey the right=
 information.
> It was a new situation to me & as I say, I was not sure what to do.  I did=
 my best.
>=20
> If needed, I can look for the original email chain.
>=20
>=20
> 4.  Then, I went back to these "enterprises".  They had to go all the way t=
o the
> CEO of their company to get authority to speak publicly.   They did so at=20=

> the Chicago IETF.
>=20
> And, you know what, I am going to do everything I can to help these guys.
> They have a point of view that deserves to be represented.  They have=20
> put in a huge amount of time and effort to try to present what they feel
> will be a real problem for their company.  They are not doing it for any
> other reason.
>=20
> Again, they are not used to writing Internet drafts.  And, I am not as muc=
h
> as help as I could be to them in writing drafts for TLS as that is not whe=
re=20
> I live, so to speak.  If this was an issue in performance metrics, I could=
=20
> write the drafts for them.  But, this is TLS, so we have to get others to h=
elp.
> We have tried as much as we can to follow the process.   We are all
> imperfect, we are doing our best.
>=20
>=20
> 5.  This issue with people being able to speak publicly is real.  It needs=
 to
> be recognized.  Not everyone works for an academic institution or=20
> companies which support speaking openly about network architecture
> issues.  =20
>=20
> Even some of the network product vendors who are starting to speak
> openly on this issue have had to talk to their CEOs before commenting.
> Not everyone will go to such lengths.  They will mostly just give up.
> Which is unfortunate for everyone.  Including the IETF.
>=20
> I completely understand why deliberations of something as important=20
> as TLS need to be public and in the open.  I support that.  I am just
> saying that there is an important constituency for whom speaking in
> an open forum is a real issue.  Frankly, this is why we formed the
> "consortium".
>=20
> Nalini
>=20
>> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.=
ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:
>> > There is no question of a smokey back room.
>>=20
>> I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an
>> AD some of the people involved here requested that I
>> meet them in private to discuss this topic before it
>> had been raised on the list, and without telling me
>> ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be
>> in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always
>> happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about
>> how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of
>> how to get something done, I definitely did draw a
>> line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow
>> established WG consensus.
>>=20
>> While that all might be put down to a tactical error
>> in which advice to follow with whom when initially
>> engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome
>> of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.
>>=20
>> So yes, I do find that there are questions here about
>> smokey back rooms indeed.
>>=20
>> S.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Thanks,
> Nalini Elkins
> President
> Enterprise Data Center Operators
> www.e-dco.com
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--Apple-Mail-97BB3C72-F69D-4C78-B3CE-8E082A0FFC09
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div><span></span></div><div><meta http-equ=
iv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"><div><span></span=
></div><div><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"><div>[top-posted because the bulk of the quoted material really is ne=
cessary for context]</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br></div><div id=3D=
"AppleMailSignature">Hi Nalini,</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br></di=
v><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">It seems to me your and Stephen's recollect=
ions of events have two essential points in common (well, in my view they do=
) that I'd like to highlight here:</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br><=
/div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">1. &nbsp;A number of your consortium's p=
arties are, at minimum, reticent to come, or are restricted from coming, for=
ward in this large public IETF forum.</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><b=
r></div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">2. &nbsp;Your consortium is trying to=
 prove a negative: &nbsp;that some fundamental feature doesn't exist in the T=
LS 1.3 draft. &nbsp;I say "some fundamental feature" because I'm not sure th=
ose for or opposed can say exactly what that technical feature is. &nbsp;We k=
now it allows the inspection of data, and we know there are theories on how t=
hat would securely work.</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br></div><div i=
d=3D"AppleMailSignature">Here, I think, is a substantial part of the problem=
: &nbsp;your consortium isn't pushing a specific technical feature, and the W=
G doesn't know specifically who they are. &nbsp;I think this speaks to much o=
f the difficulty the WG has in engaging with you regarding the TLS 1.3 and s=
o-called "visibility" drafts.</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br></div>=
<div id=3D"AppleMailSignature"><br></div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">Than=
ks,</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">Stan</div><div id=3D"AppleMailSignat=
ure"><br></div><div>On Mar 15, 2018, at 4:47 AM, nalini elkins &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:nalini.elkins@e-dco.com">nalini.elkins@e-dco.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12=
.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norma=
l;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float=
:none;display:inline">On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:</span><br styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-wei=
ght:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfor=
m:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:=
inline">&gt;&gt; There is no question of a smokey back room.</span><br style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weig=
ht:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400=
;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-d=
ecoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:=
rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norma=
l;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decor=
ation-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"=
>&gt;I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an</span><br style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:no=
rmal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-de=
coration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inli=
ne">&gt;AD some of the people involved here requested that I</span><br style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weig=
ht:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style=
:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text=
-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:i=
nline">&gt;meet them in private to discuss this topic before it</span><br st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fon=
t-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:=
inline">&gt;had been raised on the list, and without telling me</span><br st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fon=
t-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:=
400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);tex=
t-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:=
inline">&gt;ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be</span><br s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weig=
ht:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;displ=
ay:inline">&gt;in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always</span><br=
 style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tra=
nsform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255=
);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;dis=
play:inline">&gt;happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about</span>=
<br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8=
px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;d=
isplay:inline">&gt;how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of</sp=
an><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;te=
xt-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-t=
ransform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:no=
ne;display:inline">&gt;how to get something done, I definitely did draw a</s=
pan><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><s=
pan style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8=
px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:n=
one;display:inline">&gt;line well before private meetings aiming to overthro=
w</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps=
:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial=
"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;t=
ext-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;flo=
at:none;display:inline">&gt;established WG consensus.</span><br style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:no=
rmal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-de=
coration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br style=3D"color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;f=
ont-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorati=
on-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,=
34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-=
variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space=
:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-s=
tyle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;Wh=
ile that all might be put down to a tactical error</span><br style=3D"color:=
rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norma=
l;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decor=
ation-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(=
34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;fo=
nt-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-sp=
ace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoratio=
n-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt=
;in which advice to follow with whom when initially</span><br style=3D"color=
:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-deco=
ration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;f=
ont-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorati=
on-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&g=
t;engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome</span><br style=3D"=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style=
:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:non=
e;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text=
-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inlin=
e">&gt;of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.</span><br style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:n=
ormal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400=
;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-d=
ecoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-=
space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rgb(34=
,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font=
-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-=
style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt;S=
o yes, I do find that there are questions here about</span><br style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:nor=
mal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wh=
ite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-=
space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decorat=
ion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&=
gt;smokey back rooms indeed.</span>

<br><div><br></div><div>1.&nbsp; With respect, I contend that you are confla=
ting what happened then with what I am suggesting now.</div><div><br></div><=
div>2.&nbsp; Also, your description of what happened then does not match wit=
h my memory.&nbsp; We may</div><div>have an honest disagreement or recollect=
ion of events.&nbsp; I believe I have the original</div><div>email chain som=
ewhere &amp; can try to find it, if necessary.</div><div><br></div><div>My v=
ersion of the events is:</div><div><br></div><div>1.&nbsp; A couple of years=
 ago, I was involved with some "enterprises" who felt they had an&nbsp;</div=
><div>issue with the upcoming TLS1.3 standard.&nbsp; In particular, the depr=
ecation of RSA.&nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>2.&nbsp=
; &nbsp;They were concerned about the reputational risk to their company of s=
peaking</div><div>in a public forum.&nbsp; &nbsp;(This is a huge issue for m=
any companies.)&nbsp; Also, they</div><div>were not used to writing Internet=
 Drafts or presenting at an IETF group.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>3.&nbsp; I had no experience with such a situation so I was not sure wha=
t to do either.</div><div>My own work is in IPPM (if anyone is interested, y=
ou can look at my work&nbsp;</div><div>in RFC8250), so I was not involved wi=
th the TLS group very much either.&nbsp;</div><div>(A situation which has si=
nce been corrected.&nbsp; I now am happy to know&nbsp;</div><div>many of you=
 quite well.) (Still no claims to being a crypto expert, though!)</div><div>=
<br></div><div>I asked a former Chair of the IETF for advice.&nbsp; He sugge=
sted asking for a&nbsp;<br></div><div>session with the leadership of the TLS=
 group under Chatham House rules.</div><div><br></div><div>I did so.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>As I recall, I asked to have a discussion of the issues to=
 see what we should do.</div><div>I never asked for any consensus of the WG t=
o be overturned.&nbsp; I may be a dim</div><div>bulb but I am not a complete=
 idiot.&nbsp; &nbsp;I do have some idea of how things work as</div><div>far a=
s WG consensus.</div><div><br></div><div>Again, as I recall, you replied at s=
ome length about "subverting the process".</div><div>After a few more somewh=
at emotional emails back and forth, where I was not able to convey&nbsp;</di=
v><div>my point adequately or to reach an understanding, I gave up on that r=
oute.</div><div><br></div><div>It is completely possible that I did not ask c=
orrectly or convey the right information.</div><div>It was a new situation t=
o me &amp; as I say, I was not sure what to do.&nbsp; I did my best.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>If needed, I can look for the original email chain.</div><=
div><br></div><div><br></div><div>4.&nbsp; Then, I went back to these "enter=
prises".&nbsp; They had to go all the way to the</div><div>CEO of their comp=
any to get authority to speak publicly.&nbsp; &nbsp;They did so at&nbsp;</di=
v><div>the Chicago IETF.</div><div><br></div><div>And, you know what, I am g=
oing to do everything I can to help these guys.<br></div><div>They have a po=
int of view that deserves to be represented.&nbsp; They have&nbsp;</div><div=
>put in a huge amount of time and effort to try to present what they feel</d=
iv><div>will be a real problem for their company.&nbsp; They are not doing i=
t for any</div><div>other reason.</div><div><br></div><div>Again, they are n=
ot used to writing Internet drafts.&nbsp; And, I am not as much</div><div>as=
 help as I could be to them in writing drafts for TLS as that is not where&n=
bsp;</div><div>I live, so to speak.&nbsp; If this was an issue in performanc=
e metrics, I could&nbsp;</div><div>write the drafts for them.&nbsp; But, thi=
s is TLS, so we have to get others to help.</div><div>We have tried as much a=
s we can to follow the process.&nbsp; &nbsp;We are all</div><div>imperfect, w=
e are doing our best.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>5.&nbsp; This i=
ssue with people being able to speak publicly is real.&nbsp; It needs to<br>=
</div><div>be recognized.&nbsp; Not everyone works for an academic instituti=
on or&nbsp;</div><div>companies which support speaking openly about network a=
rchitecture</div><div>issues.&nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Even som=
e of the network product vendors who are starting to speak</div><div>openly o=
n this issue have had to talk to their CEOs before commenting.</div><div>Not=
 everyone will go to such lengths.&nbsp; They will mostly just give up.</div=
><div>Which is unfortunate for everyone.&nbsp; Including the IETF.</div><div=
><br></div><div>I completely understand why deliberations of something as im=
portant&nbsp;</div><div>as TLS need to be public and in the open.&nbsp; I su=
pport that.&nbsp; I am just</div><div>saying that there is an important cons=
tituency for whom speaking in</div><div>an open forum is a real issue.&nbsp;=
 Frankly, this is why we formed the</div><div>"consortium".</div><div><br></=
div><div>Nalini</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote">On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">=
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.f=
arrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 15/03/18 00:05, nalini elkins wrote:<br>
&gt; There is no question of a smokey back room.<br>
<br>
I'm sorry to disagree so bluntly, but while I was an<br>
AD some of the people involved here requested that I<br>
meet them in private to discuss this topic before it<br>
had been raised on the list, and without telling me<br>
ahead of time who, from what "enterprises," would be<br>
in the room looking for what. As an AD I was always<br>
happy to meet folks and have quiet discussions about<br>
how to engage with the IETF or explore some detail of<br>
how to get something done, I definitely did draw a<br>
line well before private meetings aiming to overthrow<br>
established WG consensus.<br>
<br>
While that all might be put down to a tactical error<br>
in which advice to follow with whom when initially<br>
engaging with the IETF, from my POV it was the epitome<br>
of a request for a smokey-back room discussion.<br>
<br>
So yes, I do find that there are questions here about<br>
smokey back rooms indeed.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
S.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br=
><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Thanks,</div><di=
v style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Nalini Elkins</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8=
px">President</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">Enterprise Data Center Op=
erators</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><a href=3D"http://www.e-dco.com=
" target=3D"_blank">www.e-dco.com</a></div><div><br></div></div></div></div>=
</div>
</div>
</div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>____________________=
___________________________</span><br><span>TLS mailing list</span><br><span=
><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D=
"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/lis=
tinfo/tls</a></span><br></div></blockquote></div></div></body></html>=

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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 9:59 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think what Yoav is referring to by detecting BOTS within the
> network, is really so called advance persistent threat (APT) actors
> that are moving around the internal network leveraging existing access
> rights of compromised accounts and privilege escalation
> vulnerabilities.  These might be detectable with 'visibility'.
> Patterns and behavior might be used to detect the APT use case whether
> or not encryption protects the stream, but it is more difficult.

Yes, they might, however, the best place for malware detection is on the
edge (which is out of scope for "in the Datacenter" type connections) and
the endpoint, where an agent is able to run that does not need to 'break
in' to the TLS session. Yes, the Fenter draft talks about how malware
endpoints can be anywhere in the network, and that they can delete logs as
a reason to require out of band network decryption. However, if "breaking
TLS" becomes an effective malware mitigation means, more malware makers may
move to using app-level encryption (as some already have). Therefore, the
conclusion we can draw is that malware is not a reasonable reason requiring
this enhanced "visibility".


-carl

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br>On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 9:59 AM, Kathleen Moriarty=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com">kathleen.moriarty.=
ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt; I think what Yoav is referring to by =
detecting BOTS within the<br>&gt; network, is really so called advance pers=
istent threat (APT) actors<br>&gt; that are moving around the internal netw=
ork leveraging existing access<br>&gt; rights of compromised accounts and p=
rivilege escalation<br>&gt; vulnerabilities.=C2=A0 These might be detectabl=
e with &#39;visibility&#39;.<br>&gt; Patterns and behavior might be used to=
 detect the APT use case whether<br>&gt; or not encryption protects the str=
eam, but it is more difficult.<br><br>Yes, they might, however, the best pl=
ace for malware detection is on the edge (which is out of scope for &quot;i=
n the Datacenter&quot; type connections) and the endpoint, where an agent i=
s able to run that does not need to &#39;break in&#39; to the TLS session. =
Yes, the=C2=A0Fenter draft talks about how malware endpoints can be anywher=
e in the network, and that they can delete logs as a reason to require out =
of band network decryption. However, if &quot;breaking TLS&quot; becomes an=
 effective malware mitigation means, more malware makers may move to using =
app-level encryption (as some already have). Therefore, the conclusion we c=
an draw is that malware is not a reasonable reason requiring this enhanced =
&quot;visibility&quot;.<br><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>-carl</div></=
div>

--94eb2c1494ac1ff0fa05677668f1--


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>> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
=20
> Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be =
defined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) =
to define it.

In fact, my mistake that was caught by Martin is exactly the reason that =
we want the experts in the TLS WG to review the document.

Russ


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0in; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: arial, =
sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px; font-variant-ligatures: normal; =
background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); margin-top: 0in;" class=3D""><li =
class=3D"gmail-m_-2196164496691152133MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;">&gt;&gt; Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the =
standard, then?<u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></li></ul><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; margin: 0px; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, =
255);"><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; margin: 0px; color: rgb(34, 34, 34); =
font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, =
255);">&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has =
to be defined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather than the =
TLS WG) to define it.</p><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">In fact, my mistake that was caught by Martin is exactly the =
reason that we want the experts in the TLS WG to review the =
document.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/I-ecl_hGuIrj5Ha4qRtvJAuPE0Q>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 13:42:20 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:58 PM, Carl Mehner <c@cem.me> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 9:59 AM, Kathleen Moriarty
> <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I think what Yoav is referring to by detecting BOTS within the
>> network, is really so called advance persistent threat (APT) actors
>> that are moving around the internal network leveraging existing access
>> rights of compromised accounts and privilege escalation
>> vulnerabilities.  These might be detectable with 'visibility'.
>> Patterns and behavior might be used to detect the APT use case whether
>> or not encryption protects the stream, but it is more difficult.
>
> Yes, they might, however, the best place for malware detection is on the
> edge (which is out of scope for "in the Datacenter" type connections) and
> the endpoint, where an agent is able to run that does not need to 'break in'
> to the TLS session. Yes, the Fenter draft talks about how malware endpoints
> can be anywhere in the network, and that they can delete logs as a reason to
> require out of band network decryption. However, if "breaking TLS" becomes
> an effective malware mitigation means, more malware makers may move to using
> app-level encryption (as some already have). Therefore, the conclusion we
> can draw is that malware is not a reasonable reason requiring this enhanced
> "visibility".

The example I provided is not about malware, it was about lateral
movement by threat actors within a network.  The initial compromise
that led to access within the network may have been through malware or
some other vulnerability, but I do think monitoring on an internal
network (encrypted or not, through logs or on the wire) is the use
case for attack detection that is plausible with the proposed
approach.

Best regards,
Kathleen

>
>
> -carl



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 20:07:54 +0200
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Cc: tls@ietf.org, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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So what=E2=80=99s the flag in openssl.conf that makes it generate a file =
with all the keys?  There isn=E2=80=99t one.  I guess the presumption is =
that if there was an RFC it would be easier to get the powers that be to =
make it happen. It likely needs to be in the main branch to be =
ubiquitous, because many products come with their own OpenSSL package.

TBH I don=E2=80=99t think an RFC would have that effect. Not every RFC =
gets implemented.


> On 15 Mar 2018, at 13:38, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Thursday, 15 March 2018 05:51:31 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>> At the risk of stating the obvious, it=E2=80=99s because server =
owners want to use
>> the same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the Java =
library that
>> everybody else uses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, actively =
maintained, and
>> essentially free.
>>=20
>> None of these libraries support any of this functionality.
>=20
> huh? Sure, it is not nicely packaged in to allow integration with 3rd =
party
> systems, and sometimes disabled by default, but it's hardly missing...
>=20
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646 =
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646>
>=20
> =
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Form=
at =
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_For=
mat>
>=20
> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477 =
<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477>
>=20
>>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on the
>>> servers and export them, or log all the data on the servers.
>>>=20
>>> These options don't require any change to the wire protocol: they =
just
>>> require vendors supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs =
cited?
>>>=20
>>> Sincerely,
>>> Watson
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>=20
>=20
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com <http://www.cz.redhat.com/>
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic


--Apple-Mail=_9DF1E008-7EF2-4987-884E-57D2906D6E57
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Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">So =
what=E2=80=99s the flag in openssl.conf that makes it generate a file =
with all the keys? &nbsp;There isn=E2=80=99t one. &nbsp;I guess the =
presumption is that if there was an RFC it would be easier to get the =
powers that be to make it happen. It likely needs to be in the main =
branch to be ubiquitous, because many products come with their own =
OpenSSL package.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">TBH =
I don=E2=80=99t think an RFC would have that effect. Not every RFC gets =
implemented.<br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 15 Mar 2018, at 13:38, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">On Thursday, 15 March 2018 =
05:51:31 CET Yoav Nir wrote:</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">At the risk of stating the =
obvious, it=E2=80=99s because server owners want to use<br class=3D"">the =
same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the Java library =
that<br class=3D"">everybody else uses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, =
actively maintained, and<br class=3D"">essentially free.<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">None of these libraries support any of this =
functionality.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">huh? Sure, it is not nicely =
packaged in to allow integration with 3rd party<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">systems, and sometimes disabled by default, but =
it's hardly missing...</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646</a><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br=
 style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_=
Log_Format" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/K=
ey_Log_Format</a><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477<=
/a><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, =
Watson Ladd &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">watsonbladd@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on =
the<br class=3D"">servers and export them, or log all the data on the =
servers.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">These options don't require any =
change to the wire protocol: they just<br class=3D"">require vendors =
supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs cited?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Sincerely,<br class=3D"">Watson<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">--<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">Regards,</span><br style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Hubert Kario</span><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security =
team</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">Web:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><a =
href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com/" style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;" class=3D"">Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 =
&nbsp;Brno, Czech Republic</span></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></body></html>=

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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Carl Mehner <c@cem.me>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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To: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
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> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility =
to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=A6=

>=20
> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=99=
s trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6

The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so the =
IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ilarra@s21sec.com" class=3D"">ilarra@s21sec.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide =
visibility to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the =
bank=E2=80=A6<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if =
it=E2=80=99s trying to exfiltrate =
data=E2=80=A6&nbsp;</div></div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></div><div>The presumption is that any legitimate application =
would opt-in, so the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt =
in.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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Am 15.03.2018 um 17:58 schrieb Carl Mehner:
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 9:59 AM, Kathleen Moriarty 
> <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com 
> <mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > I think what Yoav is referring to by detecting BOTS within the
> > network, is really so called advance persistent threat (APT) actors
> > that are moving around the internal network leveraging existing access
> > rights of compromised accounts and privilege escalation
> > vulnerabilities.  These might be detectable with 'visibility'.
> > Patterns and behavior might be used to detect the APT use case whether
> > or not encryption protects the stream, but it is more difficult.
>
> Yes, they might, however, the best place for malware detection is on 
> the edge (which is out of scope for "in the Datacenter" type 
> connections) and the endpoint, where an agent is able to run that does 
> not need to 'break in' to the TLS session. Yes, the Fenter draft talks 
> about how malware endpoints can be anywhere in the network, and that 
> they can delete logs as a reason to require out of band network 
> decryption. However, if "breaking TLS" becomes an effective malware 
> mitigation means, more malware makers may move to using app-level 
> encryption (as some already have). Therefore, the conclusion we can 
> draw is that malware is not a reasonable reason requiring this 
> enhanced "visibility".
>
I don't think you can make this conclusion when the fact that app-level 
encryption is used can be detected and blocked. However there might be 
ways to hide like steganography.

>
> -carl
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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    Am 15.03.2018 um 17:58 schrieb Carl Mehner:<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAEa9xj46VWWQzuHG0=s6pavaXMQ7=PFuKTWANhn_tmnRQ1rDJQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <br>
        On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 9:59 AM, Kathleen Moriarty &lt;<a
          href="mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com"
          moz-do-not-send="true">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
        &gt; I think what Yoav is referring to by detecting BOTS within
        the<br>
        &gt; network, is really so called advance persistent threat
        (APT) actors<br>
        &gt; that are moving around the internal network leveraging
        existing access<br>
        &gt; rights of compromised accounts and privilege escalation<br>
        &gt; vulnerabilities.  These might be detectable with
        'visibility'.<br>
        &gt; Patterns and behavior might be used to detect the APT use
        case whether<br>
        &gt; or not encryption protects the stream, but it is more
        difficult.<br>
        <br>
        Yes, they might, however, the best place for malware detection
        is on the edge (which is out of scope for "in the Datacenter"
        type connections) and the endpoint, where an agent is able to
        run that does not need to 'break in' to the TLS session. Yes,
        the Fenter draft talks about how malware endpoints can be
        anywhere in the network, and that they can delete logs as a
        reason to require out of band network decryption. However, if
        "breaking TLS" becomes an effective malware mitigation means,
        more malware makers may move to using app-level encryption (as
        some already have). Therefore, the conclusion we can draw is
        that malware is not a reasonable reason requiring this enhanced
        "visibility".<br>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    I don't think you can make this conclusion when the fact that
    app-level encryption is used can be detected and blocked. However
    there might be ways to hide like steganography.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAEa9xj46VWWQzuHG0=s6pavaXMQ7=PFuKTWANhn_tmnRQ1rDJQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>-carl</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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=20
>> >> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then?
>> =20
>> > Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be =
defined, it would make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) =
to define it.
>> =20
>> In fact, my mistake that was caught by Martin is exactly the reason =
that we want the experts in the TLS WG to review the document.
>=20
> Doesn=E2=80=99t IETF have a liaison process that is used to work with =
other standards bodies?
> And the bigger question, since the ask is essentially for a =
multi-party security protocol: Is TLS WG the right place to discuss =
this?

In my experience, technical review via the liaison process does not =
offer the same quality as an IETF WG.

I hope that your "bigger" question is clearly answered at the meeting =
next week.

Russ



--Apple-Mail=_25D7C85D-9E85-47FD-8C20-913B3190F100
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><div><span style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
font-size: 11pt;" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><ul =
type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in;" =
class=3D""><li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(34, 34, =
34); background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; =
background-repeat: initial initial;">&gt;&gt; Nalini, why don't you (the =
consortium) define the standard, then?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></li></ul><div=
 style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; background-color: white; font-variant-caps: normal; =
text-align: start; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9.5pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(34, 34, 34);" class=3D"">&nbsp;<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div=
 style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; background-color: white; font-variant-caps: normal; =
text-align: start; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9.5pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; color: =
rgb(34, 34, 34);" class=3D"">&gt; Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=
=80=9D standard has to be defined, it would make sense for the =
consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to define it.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">In fact, my mistake that was caught by =
Martin is exactly the reason that we want the experts in the TLS WG to =
review the document.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;">Doesn=E2=80=99t IETF have a liaison process that =
is used to work with other standards bodies?<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in =
0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">And the =
bigger question, since the ask is essentially for a multi-party security =
protocol: Is TLS WG the right place to discuss =
this?</div></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>In my =
experience, technical review via the liaison process does not offer the =
same quality as an IETF WG.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>I hope =
that your "bigger" question is clearly answered at the meeting next =
week.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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References: <6140B7A6-A1C7-44BC-9C65-9BE0D5E1B580@sn3rd.com> <CAOgPGoBYc7O+qmjM-ptkRkE6mRsOYgc5O7Wu9pm3drFp3TVa6Q@mail.gmail.com> <d7dfdc1a-2c96-fd88-df1b-3167fe0f804b@cs.tcd.ie> <CAHbuEH7E8MhFcMt2GSngSrGxN=6bU6LD49foPC-mdoUZboH_0Q@mail.gmail.com> <1a024320-c674-6f75-ccc4-d27b75e3d017@nomountain.net> <2ed0gc.p5dcxd.31eoyz-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <d7ec110f-2a0b-cf97-94a3-eeb5594d8c24@cs.tcd.ie> <CAAF6GDcaG7nousyQ6wotEg4dW8PFuXi=riH2702eZZn2fwfLQw@mail.gmail.com> <CAPsNn2XCNtqZaQM6Bg8uoMZRJE+qQakEwvw8Cn9fBm-5H+Xn_A@mail.gmail.com> <3F8142DE-EADB-4AB9-A204-7D87ACDCD3E3@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2VE_7+rWT0fp9rrVnZrgcY7ORLWTee+kf_Av1dqm4CiDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CB55AABB-8937-4F6B-B5AC-B6F262F08A4F@akamai.com> <CAPsNn2U_xG28Tumo3oRkQ+6=BHzgv-6YtgNSpwvhdFFRWc7EQQ@mail.gmail.com> <2DC45296-244E-4C72-8B3C-DE47EADAC2DE@fugue.com> <MWHPR21MB018978EDE7EA49B3D55B65268CD20@MWHPR21MB0189.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> <25354088-1C2F-47D3-916B-898F238BB943@vigilsec.com>
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Russ,

On 15/03/18 17:29, Russ Housley wrote:
>>> Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard,
>>> then?
>=20
>> Indeed, if a =E2=80=9CTLS13-visibility=E2=80=9D standard has to be def=
ined, it
>> would make sense for the consortium (rather than the TLS WG) to
>> define it.
>=20
> In fact, my mistake that was caught by Martin is exactly the reason
> that we want the experts in the TLS WG to review the document.

Two things:-

1. I disagree with your assertion. Broad review to improve
security is well worthwhile and is a reason to bring work
to the IETF. Figuring out the how to controversially yet
diligently make TLS (or any IETF protocol) *weaker* is not
part of our process, and would IMO be extremely long-term
damaging to the argument that IETF security review is a
benefit of work being done via the IETF's processes.

2. Having had that fairly fundamental error pointed out,
and given the serious amount of analysis done for TLS1.3,
and *not done* for this MitM enabler, (e.g. the >1 snooper
issue has some showstoppers IMO no matter how any MitM
capability proposal tries to tackle or avoid it) - would you
not now agree that your draft is far too far from baked to
be worth the WG's f2f time in London, even if the WG had
consensus to consider the topic, which I think we've all
acknowledged is not the case? (*)

Thanks,
S.

(*) I considered not making this point - it could suit my
arguments better if the WG have a sequence of drafts like
this and draft-green to dismiss I guess but in fairness
and just in case you're now happy to withdraw your request
for a slot, I figured it worth asking, as I continue to
think that the way this topic is being mishandled is a bad
plan for all concerned.

>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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From: "Ackermann, Michael" <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/wm0RFl2fu7NsIHvO9hNIDQ1AF18>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 16:51:49 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
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References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <2062943.8cTCpni5Dm@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180314201328.GF55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <1937539.vLgMNW4b7C@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 21:13:29 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:46:25PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03:02:10 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > > > external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> > > > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> > > > failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> > > > would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
> > >=20
> > > but identity/binder may be invalid only because the server was restar=
ted
> > > and generated a new in-memory key; we don't want to abort connection =
in
> > > such
> > For an external PSK?  That hardly sounds like "external" to me...
>=20
> not my fault that what we called just "PSK"s in TLS 1.2 is now "external =
PSKs"=20
> in TLS 1.3... I wanted to be unambiguous, so please, can we discuss the i=
ssue,=20
> not semiotics?

Sure!  (I still don't see how an ephemeral in-server key would be
used as/with an external PSK.)

> > > situation, continuing to a regular handshake is necessary then for go=
od
> > > user experience (and likely, even security, given the history of TLS
> > > version fallbacks)
> > >=20
> > > > Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> > > > little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
> > >=20
> > > not only migration, but session resumption and regular PSK at the same
> > > time
> > > too - for session resumption you may not do DH, while for initial
> > > handshake
> > > with PSK you may want to to gain PFS...
> > >=20
> > > so as tempting as the removal of multiple PSKs from ClientHello is, I=
'm
> > > afraid the fallout is far too large to do it
> >=20
> > I did not say removal of multiple PSKs, rather removal of multiple
> > *external* PSKs.
>=20
> we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external a=
nd=20
> resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello

Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't gotten
to think through whether there is still potential for information
leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there would
not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-PSK
full handshakes.

-Benjamin

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 18:16:04 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:

- TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the library
- Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys elsewhere (`tail -f
$SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)

So all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do the
shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.


On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> This is what OpenSSL provides:
>     https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_
> keylog_callback.html
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the di=
scussion here:</div><div><br></div><div>- TLS libraries have facilities to =
export keys from the library</div><div>- Obviously, it&#39;s possible to sh=
ip these exported keys elsewhere (`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>So all we&#39;re really talking about is whether to =
define a way to do the shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS ses=
sion.=C2=A0 <br></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsal=
z@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This i=
s what OpenSSL provides:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CT=
X_get_keylog_callback.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://ww=
w.openssl.org/docs/<wbr>manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_<wbr>keylog_callback.htm=
l</a><br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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(We have many related discussions currently.. this seemed like the most app=
ropriate thread for my response)

=20

Enterprises are asking for out-of-band TLS decryption, per use-cases outlin=
ed in draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00 (and others before that). The current p=
roposal for said out-of-band TLS decryption is draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibili=
ty-01, which requires opt-in from the TLS server by way of a new =E2=80=9CTLS Visi=
bility=E2=80=9D extension. If draft-fenter has all the requirements and draft-rhd =
is supposed to be the solution then the implication is that every TLS endpoi=
nt in the enterprise datacenter (and possibly outside the datacenter if thos=
e TLS endpoints do not enter via some TLS termination node) must support the=
 proposed TLS extension.=C2=A0 I am also assuming that some enterprise key manag=
ement solution product is already deployed in the datacenter, and that those=
 products remotely manage the full lifecycle of the TLS endpoint RSA keys an=
d certificates.=C2=A0 Summary: all endpoints must change, and all endpoints are =
managed.

=20

So, why are we not discussing dynamic out-of-band TLS session secret sharin=
g or TLS secret escrow as solutions? (I call it secrets instead of keys beca=
use TLS 1.3 gives us the ability to share different parts of the session sec=
ret hierarchy, e.g. sharing =E2=80=9Cclient/server_application_traffic_secret0=E2=80=9D =
instead of sharing =E2=80=9CMaster Secret=E2=80=9D).=C2=A0 The secrets would be shared by th=
e actual TLS endpoints, so it requires no changes to TLS.=C2=A0 I do understand =
that it would introduce new connectivity requirements for datacenter TLS nod=
es, but that is why I have the paragraph above where I list my assumptions: =
those nodes would have to change anyway and those nodes are remotely managed=
.

=20

--Roelof

=20

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.c=
om>
Date: Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 7:38 AM
To: <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS =
1.3

=20

On Thursday, 15 March 2018 05:51:31 CET Yoav Nir wrote:

At the risk of stating the obvious, it=E2=80=99s because server owners want to us=
e

the same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the Java library that

everybody else uses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, actively maintained, and

essentially free.

None of these libraries support any of this functionality.

=20

huh? Sure, it is not nicely packaged in to allow integration with 3rd party=
=20

systems, and sometimes disabled by default, but it's hardly missing...

=20

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646

=20

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Forma=
t

=20

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477

=20

> On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>=20

> One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals on the

> servers and export them, or log all the data on the servers.

>=20

> These options don't require any change to the wire protocol: they just

> require vendors supporting them. Why don't they meet the needs cited?

>=20

> Sincerely,

> Watson

>=20

> _______________________________________________

> TLS mailing list

> TLS@ietf.org

> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

_______________________________________________

TLS mailing list

TLS@ietf.org

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

=20

=20

--=20

Regards,

Hubert Kario

Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team

Web: www.cz.redhat.com

Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic_________=
______________________________________

TLS mailing list

TLS@ietf.org

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

=20


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<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schema=
s-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/20=
04/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=3DC=
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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSe=
ction1><p class=3DMsoNormal>(We have many related discussions currently.. this=
 seemed like the most appropriate thread for my response)<o:p></o:p></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Enterprises are askin=
g for out-of-band TLS decryption, per use-cases outlined in draft-fenter-tls=
-decryption-00 (and others before that). The current proposal for said out-o=
f-band TLS decryption is draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01, which requires =
opt-in from the TLS server by way of a new =E2=80=9CTLS Visibility=E2=80=9D extension. I=
f draft-fenter has all the requirements and draft-rhd is supposed to be the =
solution then the implication is that every TLS endpoint in the enterprise d=
atacenter (and possibly outside the datacenter if those TLS endpoints do not=
 enter via some TLS termination node) must support the proposed TLS extensio=
n.=C2=A0 I am also assuming that some enterprise key management solution product=
 is already deployed in the datacenter, and that those products remotely man=
age the full lifecycle of the TLS endpoint RSA keys and certificates.=C2=A0 Summ=
ary: all endpoints must change, and all endpoints are managed.<o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>So, why are we n=
ot discussing dynamic out-of-band TLS session secret sharing or TLS secret e=
scrow as solutions? (I call it <b>secrets</b> instead of <b>keys</b> because=
 TLS 1.3 gives us the ability to share different parts of the session secret=
 hierarchy, e.g. sharing =E2=80=9Cclient/server_application_traffic_secret0=E2=80=9D ins=
tead of sharing =E2=80=9CMaster Secret=E2=80=9D).=C2=A0 The secrets would be shared by the a=
ctual TLS endpoints, so it requires no changes to TLS.=C2=A0 I do understand tha=
t it would introduce new connectivity requirements for datacenter TLS nodes,=
 but that is why I have the paragraph above where I list my assumptions: tho=
se nodes would have to change anyway and those nodes are remotely managed.<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>--Ro=
elof<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div style=3D'borde=
r:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:blac=
k'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>TLS &lt;tls-b=
ounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Hubert Kario &lt;hkario@redhat.com&gt;<br><=
b>Date: </b>Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 7:38 AM<br><b>To: </b>&lt;tls@ietf.o=
rg&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can b=
e used with TLS 1.3<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=
=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=
=3D'margin-left:.5in'><a name=3D"_MailOriginalBody">On Thursday, 15 March 2018 0=
5:51:31 CET Yoav Nir wrote:<o:p></o:p></a></p></div><blockquote style=3D'borde=
r:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left=
:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLO=
OK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>At the risk of stating the obvi=
ous, it=E2=80=99s because server owners want to use<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Mai=
lOriginalBody'>the same OpenSSL, NSS, SChannel, or whatever you call the Jav=
a library that<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mar=
gin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>everybody else u=
ses. They=E2=80=99re all widely used, actively maintained, and<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bo=
okmark:_MailOriginalBody'>essentially free.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailO=
riginalBody'>None of these libraries support any of this functionality.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-le=
ft:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'ms=
o-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>huh? Sure, it is not nicely packaged in to all=
ow integration with 3rd party <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>=
systems, and sometimes disabled by default, but it's hardly missing...<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span=
 style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Ma=
ilOriginalBody'></span><a href=3D"https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1646=
"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>https://github.com/openssl/op=
enssl/pull/1646</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></=
a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_M=
ailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span>=
<a href=3D"https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_L=
og_Format"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>https://developer.mo=
zilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format</span><span style=3D'=
mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOr=
iginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margi=
n-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=
=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span><a href=3D"https://bugs.chromium.org/=
p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalB=
ody'>https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=3D393477</span><spa=
n style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmar=
k:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B=
5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;ma=
rgin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE">=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_=
MailOriginalBody'>&gt; On 15 Mar 2018, at 2:16, Watson Ladd &lt;</span><a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBod=
y'>watsonbladd@gmail.com</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>=
</span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span st=
yle=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOr=
iginalBody'>&gt; One can either use a static DH share, save the ephemerals o=
n the<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; servers and export t=
hem, or log all the data on the servers.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOrig=
inalBody'>&gt; <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'ma=
rgin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; These opti=
ons don't require any change to the wire protocol: they just<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'ms=
o-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; require vendors supporting them. Why don'=
t they meet the needs cited?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&g=
t; <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; Sincerely,<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=
=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; Watson<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Mai=
lOriginalBody'>&gt; <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; _____=
__________________________________________<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOr=
iginalBody'>&gt; TLS mailing list<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBod=
y'>&gt; </span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Mail=
OriginalBody'>TLS@ietf.org</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody=
'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-=
bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; </span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailma=
n/listinfo/tls"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody=
'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-=
bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>_______________________________________________<=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>TLS mailing list<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'm=
so-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org"><span st=
yle=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>TLS@ietf.org</span><span style=3D'mso-boo=
kmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalB=
ody'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span><a href=3D"https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBod=
y'>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark=
:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'marg=
in-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span styl=
e=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOri=
ginalBody'>-- <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mar=
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 00:41:36 +0200
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Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/aEmb0-HRdWCI83tLMiwcFJ15k1Y>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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IIUC not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the =
library can get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, =
send it to a central repository, send it to the government, or whatever =
else it might want to do.

There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, =
nor do applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.

It should not be difficult to write, but is not provided in =
off-the-shelf software.

Making the library send this in-band in some protocol extension is a far =
bigger endeavor. It=E2=80=99s also a dangerous switch to leave lying =
around.

> On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>=20
> Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:
>=20
> - TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the library
> - Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys elsewhere =
(`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)
>=20
> So all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do the =
shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com =
<mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
> This is what OpenSSL provides:
>     =
https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.ht=
ml =
<https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.h=
tml>
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>=20


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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">IIUC =
not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the library can =
get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, send it to a =
central repository, send it to the government, or whatever else it might =
want to do.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">There is =
no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, nor do =
applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It should not be difficult to write, =
but is not provided in off-the-shelf software.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Making the library send this in-band in =
some protocol extension is a far bigger endeavor. It=E2=80=99s also a =
dangerous switch to leave lying around.<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 16 =
Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" =
class=3D"">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">Just to confirm that I understand the scope =
of the discussion here:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">- TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the =
library</div><div class=3D"">- Obviously, it's possible to ship these =
exported keys elsewhere (`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc =
$LOGBOX`)</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">So =
all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do the =
shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.&nbsp; <br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, =
Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <span dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">This is what OpenSSL =
provides:<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_cal=
lback.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.openssl.org/docs/<wbr =
class=3D"">manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_<wbr =
class=3D"">keylog_callback.html</a><br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
______________________________<wbr class=3D"">_________________<br =
class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">=

<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr =
class=3D"">listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
</div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
CC: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/08IHLUxXuH7Jh0FXIIQcYNmG7lY>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 18:45:24 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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--94eb2c06d6565ee8fb05677b3f0a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
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Well, exactly.  It seems like the following have equivalent security
properties:

- Shipping out each session's keys as lines in SSLKEYLOGFILE over an ECDHE
TLS connection
- Shipping out each session's keys as an ECIES-encrypted package carried in
a TLS extension

Either way, you're doing a DH with the key recipient's public key and using
that to encrypt the keys.

On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 6:42 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure socket layer we
> should be okay, right?
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 6:41 PM
> *To: *Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
> *Cc: *Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, "
> tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with
> TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> IIUC not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the library
> can get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, send it to =
a
> central repository, send it to the government, or whatever else it might
> want to do.
>
>
>
> There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, nor
> do applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.
>
>
>
> It should not be difficult to write, but is not provided in off-the-shelf
> software.
>
>
>
> Making the library send this in-band in some protocol extension is a far
> bigger endeavor. It=E2=80=99s also a dangerous switch to leave lying arou=
nd.
>
>
>
> On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>
>
> Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:
>
>
>
> - TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the library
>
> - Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys elsewhere (`tail -=
f
> $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)
>
>
>
> So all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do the
> shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
> This is what OpenSSL provides:
>     https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_
> keylog_callback.html
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
>
>

--94eb2c06d6565ee8fb05677b3f0a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Well, exactly.=C2=A0 It seems like the following have=
 equivalent security properties:<br></div><div><br></div><div>- Shipping ou=
t each session&#39;s keys as lines in SSLKEYLOGFILE over an ECDHE TLS conne=
ction</div><div>- Shipping out each session&#39;s keys as an ECIES-encrypte=
d package carried in a TLS extension</div><div><br></div><div>Either way, y=
ou&#39;re doing a DH with the key recipient&#39;s public key and using that=
 to encrypt the keys.<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 6:42 PM, Salz, Rich <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@ak=
amai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"m_-8478028807920368512WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure=
 socket layer we should be okay, right?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">Yoav Nir &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a=
>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 6:41 PM<br>
<b>To: </b>Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt;<br>
<b>Cc: </b>Rich Salz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@red=
hat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mail=
to:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<span class=3D""><=
br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used wi=
th TLS 1.3<u></u><u></u></span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"m_-8478028807920368512__MailOriginalBody"=
>IIUC not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the library =
can get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, send it to a =
central repository, send it to the government, or whatever
 else it might want to do.<u></u><u></u></a></p><div><div class=3D"h5">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL wri=
tes the keys to a file, nor do applications such as web servers do this AFA=
IK.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>It should not be difficult to write, but is no=
t provided in off-the-shelf software.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Making the library send this in-band in some p=
rotocol extension is a far bigger endeavor. It=E2=80=99s also a dangerous s=
witch to leave lying around.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes &lt;</=
span><a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank"><span>rlb@ipv.sx</span=
><span></span></a><span>&gt;
 wrote:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Just to confirm that I understand the scope of=
 the discussion here:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>- TLS libraries have facilities to export keys=
 from the library<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>- Obviously, it&#39;s possible to ship these e=
xported keys elsewhere (`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>So all we&#39;re really talking about is wheth=
er to define a way to do the shipment of the exported keys in-band to the T=
LS session.=C2=A0
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich &l=
t;</span><a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank"><span>rsalz@=
akamai.com</span><span></span></a><span>&gt;
 wrote:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>This is what OpenSSL provides:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 </span><a href=3D"https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3=
/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.html" target=3D"_blank"><span>https://www.open=
ssl.org/docs/<wbr>manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_<wbr>keylog_callback.html</spa=
n><span></span></a><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
</span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span>TLS@ietf.org=
</span><span></span></a><span><br>
</span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bla=
nk"><span>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</span><span></span=
></a><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c06d6565ee8fb05677b3f0a--


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 00:49:52 +0200
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To: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Yeah, as log as we know who we=E2=80=99re shipping it to and the user =
intends for us to send it to this entity.

For the debugging case that we were talking about in Prague, sending the =
keys out-of-band should work fine.

For some middlebox that needs to decrypt the traffic online, it needs =
the keys before the first data record goes out. I don=E2=80=99t see how =
we can do that without interleaving it with the handshake.



> On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:42, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure socket layer we =
should be okay, right?
>=20
>=20
> From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
> Date: Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 6:41 PM
> To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
> Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, =
"tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with =
TLS 1.3
>=20
> IIUC not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the =
library can get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, =
send it to a central repository, send it to the government, or whatever =
else it might want to do. <>
>=20
> There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, =
nor do applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.
>=20
> It should not be difficult to write, but is not provided in =
off-the-shelf software.
>=20
> Making the library send this in-band in some protocol extension is a =
far bigger endeavor. It=E2=80=99s also a dangerous switch to leave lying =
around.
>=20
>=20
>> On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx =
<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>> wrote:
>>=20
>> Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:
>>=20
>> - TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the library
>> - Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys elsewhere =
(`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)
>>=20
>> So all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do =
the shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com =
<mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
>>> This is what OpenSSL provides:
>>>     =
https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.ht=
ml =
<https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.h=
tml>
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>

--Apple-Mail=_DCC30D41-60DF-4DF0-A322-09E24102A915
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Yeah,=
 as log as we know who we=E2=80=99re shipping it to and the user intends =
for us to send it to this entity.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D"">For the debugging case that we were talking about in Prague, =
sending the keys out-of-band should work fine.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">For some middlebox that needs to =
decrypt the traffic online, it needs the keys before the first data =
record goes out. I don=E2=80=99t see how we can do that without =
interleaving it with the handshake.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 16 =
Mar 2018, at 0:42, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" =
class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure socket =
layer we should be okay, right?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div =
style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-width: 1pt; =
border-top-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); padding: 3pt 0in 0in;" =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">From:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">Yoav Nir &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Date:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Thursday, March 15, =
2018 at 6:41 PM<br class=3D""><b class=3D"">To:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" class=3D"">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;<br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Cc:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Rich =
Salz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" =
class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt;, =
"<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">tls@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject:<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Re: [TLS] TLS =
interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><a name=3D"_MailOriginalBody" class=3D"">IIUC not quite. =
There is an API, so the application that uses the library can get the =
keys. The application can then save it to a file, send it to a central =
repository, send it to the government, or whatever else it might want to =
do.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></a></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">There is no built-in =
setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, nor do applications =
such as web servers do this AFAIK.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">It should not be =
difficult to write, but is not provided in off-the-shelf software.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">Making the library =
send this in-band in some protocol extension is a far bigger endeavor. =
It=E2=80=99s also a dangerous switch to leave lying around.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; =
margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D"" type=3D"cite"><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">On 16 Mar 2018, at =
0:16, Richard Barnes &lt;</span><a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D""><span =
class=3D"">rlb@ipv.sx</span><span class=3D""></span></a><span =
class=3D"">&gt; wrote:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">Just to =
confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">- TLS libraries have =
facilities to export keys from the library<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D"">- Obviously, it's possible to ship these =
exported keys elsewhere (`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">So all we're really =
talking about is whether to define a way to do the shipment of the =
exported keys in-band to the TLS session.&nbsp;<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span class=3D"">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich =
&lt;</span><a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank" =
style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;" class=3D""><span =
class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</span><span class=3D""></span></a><span =
class=3D"">&gt; wrote:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><blockquote =
style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-width: 1pt; =
border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt; =
margin-left: 4.8pt; margin-right: 0in;" class=3D"" type=3D"cite"><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">This is what OpenSSL =
provides:<br class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><a =
href=3D"https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_cal=
lback.html" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: =
underline;" class=3D""><span =
class=3D"">https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_=
callback.html</span><span class=3D""></span></a><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""></span><a =
href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: =
underline;" class=3D""><span class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</span><span =
class=3D""></span></a><span class=3D""><br class=3D""></span><a =
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From nobody Thu Mar 15 16:26:13 2018
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From: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3
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Unless I'm wrong, with the visibility draft the client side is also unable =
to identify who the key material is being transferred to. Only the server-s=
ide can know it, so I think it's a similar case.

Imagine a malicious user is able to subvert the communication between the s=
erver and the middlebox. If this user manages to convince the server that i=
t should use its own keys instead of the ones the middlebox owns, the attac=
ker is able to happily decrypt all traffic by using a mechanism we have pro=
vided him with, and nobody would realize it (because the client has no way =
to know who the key material is being shared with)

And yes, if the key material is shared out-of-band we have a similar proble=
m, I don't deny it. I think that this comes down to a philosophycal dylemma=
. We have two different mechanisms that amount to a similar security level:

- key material is shared out-of-band using some additional mechanism, defin=
ed outside of TLS
- key material is shared in-band using the TLS extension

Both mechanisms seem to provide, in theory, similar security levels. The di=
fference is that if TLS extensions handle it, it's TLS the responsible for =
the security downgrade, whereas in the other case... well, we can't prevent=
 anyone from doing what they want with their key material so...

I would vote for out-of-band sharing if enterprises need it, delegating thi=
s in a completely different protocol. TLS should be as clean and as secure =
as possible.

________________________________
De: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> en nombre de Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Enviado: jueves, 15 de marzo de 2018 23:49
Para: Rich Salz
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Asunto: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1=
.3

Yeah, as log as we know who we're shipping it to and the user intends for u=
s to send it to this entity.

For the debugging case that we were talking about in Prague, sending the ke=
ys out-of-band should work fine.

For some middlebox that needs to decrypt the traffic online, it needs the k=
eys before the first data record goes out. I don't see how we can do that w=
ithout interleaving it with the handshake.



On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:42, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com<mailto:rsalz@akamai.c=
om>> wrote:

I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure socket layer we should=
 be okay, right?


From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com<mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com>>
Date: Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 6:41 PM
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>>
Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com<mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>>, Hubert Kario <hk=
ario@redhat.com<mailto:hkario@redhat.com>>, "tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.o=
rg>" <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS =
1.3

IIUC not quite. There is an API, so the application that uses the library c=
an get the keys. The application can then save it to a file, send it to a c=
entral repository, send it to the government, or whatever else it might wan=
t to do.

There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys to a file, nor d=
o applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.

It should not be difficult to write, but is not provided in off-the-shelf s=
oftware.

Making the library send this in-band in some protocol extension is a far bi=
gger endeavor. It's also a dangerous switch to leave lying around.


On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>> wro=
te:

Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discussion here:

- TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the library
- Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys elsewhere (`tail -f =
$SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)

So all we're really talking about is whether to define a way to do the ship=
ment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.


On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com<mailto:rsalz@=
akamai.com>> wrote:
This is what OpenSSL provides:
    https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback=
.html


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
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--_000_152115636357984825s21seccom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none"><!-- p { margin-top: 0px; m=
argin-bottom: 0px; }--></style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:#000000;background-color:#F=
FFFFF;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">
<p></p>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif=
; font-size: 16px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
Unless I'm wrong, with the visibility draft&nbsp;the client side is also un=
able to identify who the key material&nbsp;is being transferred to. Only th=
e server-side can know it, so I think it's a similar case.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Imagine a malicious user is able to subvert the communication between =
the server and the middlebox. If this user manages to convince the server t=
hat it should use its own keys instead of the ones the middlebox owns, the =
attacker&nbsp;is able to happily decrypt
 all traffic by using a mechanism we have provided him with, and nobody wou=
ld realize it (because the client has no way to know who the key material i=
s being shared with)<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>And yes, if the&nbsp;key material is shared&nbsp;out-of-band we have a=
 similar problem, I don't deny it.&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">I =
think that this comes down to a phi</span><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">=
losophy</span><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">cal dylemma.
 We have two different mechanisms that amount to a similar security level:<=
/span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>- key material is shared out-of-band using some additional mechanism, =
defined outside of TLS<br>
</div>
<div>- key material is shared in-band using the TLS extension<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Both mechanisms seem to&nbsp;provide, in theory, similar security leve=
ls. The difference is that if&nbsp;TLS extensions&nbsp;handle it, it's TLS =
the responsible for the security downgrade, whereas in the other case... we=
ll, we can't prevent anyone from doing what they
 want with their key material so...<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would vote for out-of-band sharing if enterprises need it, delegatin=
g this in a completely different protocol. TLS should be as clean and as se=
cure as possible.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word; line-break:after-white-space">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" co=
lor=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>De:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@iet=
f.org&gt; en nombre de Yoav Nir &lt;ynir.ietf@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Enviado:</b> jueves, 15 de marzo de 2018 23:49<br>
<b>Para:</b> Rich Salz<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Asunto:</b> Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used wit=
h TLS 1.3</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>Yeah, as log as we know who we&#8217;re shipping it to and the user in=
tends for us to send it to this entity.
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">For the debugging case that we were talking about in Prague=
, sending the keys out-of-band should work fine.</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">For some middlebox that needs to decrypt the traffic online=
, it needs the keys before the first data record goes out. I don&#8217;t se=
e how we can do that without interleaving it with the handshake.</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
<div><br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:42, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:r=
salz@akamai.com" class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica; font-size:12px;=
 font-style:normal; font-weight:normal; letter-spacing:normal; text-align:s=
tart; text-indent:0px; text-transform:none; white-space:normal; word-spacin=
g:0px">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
I think if we ship the keys over some kind of secure socket layer we should=
 be okay, right?</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"border-style:solid none none; border-top-width:1pt=
; border-top-color:rgb(181,196,223); padding:3pt 0in 0in">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<b class=3D""><span class=3D"" style=3D"font-size:12pt">From:<span class=3D=
"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span></b><span class=3D"" style=3D"f=
ont-size:12pt">Yoav Nir &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" class=3D=
"">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Date:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>T=
hursday, March 15, 2018 at 6:41 PM<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">To:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Ric=
hard Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" class=3D"">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;=
<br class=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Cc:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></b>Ric=
h Salz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com<=
/a>&gt;, Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">h=
kario@redhat.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">=
tls@ietf.org</a>&quot;
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" class=3D"">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br cla=
ss=3D"">
<b class=3D"">Subject:<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></=
b>Re: [TLS] TLS interception technologies that can be used with TLS 1.3</sp=
an></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<a name=3D"_MailOriginalBody" class=3D"">IIUC not quite. There is an API, s=
o the application that uses the library can get the keys. The application c=
an then save it to a file, send it to a central repository, send it to the =
government, or whatever else it might
 want to do.</a></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">There is no built-in setting where OpenSSL writes the keys=
 to a file, nor do applications such as web servers do this AFAIK.</span></=
div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">It should not be difficult to write, but is not provided i=
n off-the-shelf software.</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">Making the library send this in-band in some protocol exte=
nsion is a far bigger endeavor. It&#8217;s also a dangerous switch to leave=
 lying around.</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D""><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</span></div>
<blockquote class=3D"" type=3D"cite" style=3D"margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom=
:5pt">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">On 16 Mar 2018, at 0:16, Richard Barnes &lt;</span><a href=
=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" class=3D"" style=3D"color:purple; text-decoration:un=
derline"><span class=3D"">rlb@ipv.sx</span><span class=3D""></span></a><spa=
n class=3D"">&gt; wrote:</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">Just to confirm that I understand the scope of the discuss=
ion here:</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">- TLS libraries have facilities to export keys from the li=
brary</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">- Obviously, it's possible to ship these exported keys els=
ewhere (`tail -f $SSLKEYLOGFILE | nc $LOGBOX`)</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">So all we're really talking about is whether to define a w=
ay to do the shipment of the exported keys in-band to the TLS session.&nbsp=
;</span></div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Salz, Rich &lt;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank" class=3D"" style=3D"colo=
r:purple; text-decoration:underline"><span class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</spa=
n><span class=3D""></span></a><span class=3D"">&gt; wrote:</span></div>
<blockquote class=3D"" type=3D"cite" style=3D"border-style:none none none s=
olid; border-left-width:1pt; border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204); padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6pt; margin-left:4.8pt; margin-right:0in">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D"">This is what OpenSSL provides:<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><a h=
ref=3D"https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callb=
ack.html" target=3D"_blank" class=3D"" style=3D"color:purple; text-decorati=
on:underline"><span class=3D"">https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/=
SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback.html</span><span class=3D""></span></a><span cl=
ass=3D""></span></div>
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"" style=3D"margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size:11pt; font-fami=
ly:Calibri,sans-serif">
<span class=3D""><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
</span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" class=3D"" style=3D"color:purple; te=
xt-decoration:underline"><span class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</span><span class=3D=
""></span></a><span class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bla=
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s=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</span></a></div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Thursday, 15 March 2018 22:51:49 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 21:13:29 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:46:25PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03:02:10 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > > > > external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> > > > > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> > > > > failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid ident=
ity
> > > > > would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
> > > >=20
> > > > but identity/binder may be invalid only because the server was
> > > > restarted
> > > > and generated a new in-memory key; we don't want to abort connection
> > > > in
> > > > such
> > >=20
> > > For an external PSK?  That hardly sounds like "external" to me...
> >=20
> > not my fault that what we called just "PSK"s in TLS 1.2 is now "external
> > PSKs" in TLS 1.3... I wanted to be unambiguous, so please, can we discu=
ss
> > the issue, not semiotics?
>=20
> Sure!  (I still don't see how an ephemeral in-server key would be
> used as/with an external PSK.)

aah, that's were the confusion is, I was talking ("only because the server =
was=20
restarted") about resumption PSKs, I didn't think you were proposing ("then=
=20
aborting the handshake on binder failure would be the correct choice") that=
=20
behaviour only for external PSKs =E2=80=94 you can't differentiate resumpti=
on PSKs=20
based on being able to verify the identify (assuming it's a RFC 5077-style=
=20
ticket) because you can't be sure you have all the keys to verify them
(not to mention that the tickets could have been established by a TLS=20
implementation that was used on this server yesterday or the identity can b=
e a=20
database lookup key, session_id style)

so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is not a=20
resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it

> > > > situation, continuing to a regular handshake is necessary then for
> > > > good
> > > > user experience (and likely, even security, given the history of TLS
> > > > version fallbacks)
> > > >=20
> > > > > Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios=
 a
> > > > > little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
> > > >=20
> > > > not only migration, but session resumption and regular PSK at the s=
ame
> > > > time
> > > > too - for session resumption you may not do DH, while for initial
> > > > handshake
> > > > with PSK you may want to to gain PFS...
> > > >=20
> > > > so as tempting as the removal of multiple PSKs from ClientHello is,
> > > > I'm
> > > > afraid the fallout is far too large to do it
> > >=20
> > > I did not say removal of multiple PSKs, rather removal of multiple
> > > *external* PSKs.
> >=20
> > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external
> > and
> > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
>=20
> Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't gotten
> to think through whether there is still potential for information
> leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there would
> not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-PSK
> full handshakes.

SHOULD means we can't depend on it =E2=80=94 it's not reliable

if we say that resumption PSKs MUST have zero age and resumption ticket MUS=
T=20
NOT be zero (even if that means fudging the time a bit), then yes, there wo=
uld=20
be a way to differentiate them

that doesn't help against attackers that have one valid identity and want t=
o=20
find out other identities configured on the server though

I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing support=
=20
for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide PSK=20
selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
(I do admit that requiring one external PSK, having way to identify them wi=
th=20
no false positives and negatives, and ignoring it completely in case of bin=
der=20
verification failure does look solid)
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Fri Mar 16 04:59:16 2018
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-04
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Reviewer: Stefan Santesson
Review result: Ready

The document handles IANA registration of identifiers.
Aspects and properties identified by these identifiers are relevant for
security, but for the most part that is outside the scope of this document that
deals only with registration.

The provided security considerations section seems relevant and sufficient.


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On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> ...
>> we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between externa=
l and=20
>> resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't gotten
> to think through whether there is still potential for information
> leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there would
> not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-PSK
> full handshakes.
>

I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external PSK
identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy is
improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities from
resumption tickets.

If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt a
different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients with a
set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a lot
like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with the
public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set of
issues.

-- Christian Huitema



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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:01:48 +0000
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kc4UhXy_XBvnSL7XyM908fQKO9w>
Subject: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted =
something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was =
said in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis =
assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as =
reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65

One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if =
we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms =
registry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these =
are marked as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we =
mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?

spt=


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Hi all,

We have recently submitted an updated version of the draft based on
comments at IETF100.

Also, a proof-of-concept implementation for DTLS 1.2 in
Californium/Scandium is available at [1].

Best,
/Marco

[1] https://bitbucket.org/sicssec/dos_dtls


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	New Version Notification for
draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt
Date: 	Mon, 5 Mar 2018 10:36:49 -0800
From: 	internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: 	Maarten Hoeve <maarten.hoeve@encs.eu>, Ludwig Seitz
<ludwig.seitz@ri.se>, Olaf Bergmann <bergmann@tzi.org>, Marco Tiloca
<marco.tiloca@ri.se>



A new version of I-D, draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Marco Tiloca and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake
Revision:	02
Title:		Extension for protecting (D)TLS handshakes against Denial of Serv=
ice
Document date:	2018-03-05
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		15
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-tls-dos=
-handshake-02.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-han=
dshake/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshak=
e-02
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-tls-do=
s-handshake-02
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-tiloca-tls-dos-=
handshake-02

Abstract:
   This document describes an extension for TLS and DTLS to protect the
   server from Denial of Service attacks against the handshake protocol,
   carried out by an on-path adversary.  The extension includes a nonce
   and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over that nonce, encoded as a
   Handshake Token that a Trust Anchor entity computes and provides to
   the client.  The server registered at the Trust Anchor verifies the
   MAC to determine whether continuing or aborting the handshake.

                                                                         =
        =20


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat




--------------040703030209090408030807
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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf=
-8">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Hi all,<br>
    <br>
    We have recently submitted an updated version of the draft based on
    comments at IETF100.<br>
    <br>
    Also, a proof-of-concept implementation for DTLS 1.2 in
    Californium/Scandium is available at [1].<br>
    <br>
    Best,<br>
    /Marco<br>
    <br>
    [1] <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://bitbucket.org/=
sicssec/dos_dtls">https://bitbucket.org/sicssec/dos_dtls</a><br>
    <div class=3D"moz-forward-container"><br>
      <br>
      -------- Forwarded Message --------
      <table class=3D"moz-email-headers-table" border=3D"0" cellpadding=3D=
"0"
        cellspacing=3D"0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"BASELINE">Sub=
ject:
            </th>
            <td>New Version Notification for
              draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"BASELINE">Dat=
e: </th>
            <td>Mon, 5 Mar 2018 10:36:49 -0800</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"BASELINE">Fro=
m: </th>
            <td><a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:inte=
rnet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"BASELINE">To:=
 </th>
            <td>Maarten Hoeve <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href=3D"=
mailto:maarten.hoeve@encs.eu">&lt;maarten.hoeve@encs.eu&gt;</a>, Ludwig
              Seitz <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href=3D"mailto:lud=
wig.seitz@ri.se">&lt;ludwig.seitz@ri.se&gt;</a>, Olaf Bergmann
              <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href=3D"mailto:bergmann@=
tzi.org">&lt;bergmann@tzi.org&gt;</a>, Marco Tiloca
              <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href=3D"mailto:marco.til=
oca@ri.se">&lt;marco.tiloca@ri.se&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <br>
      <br>
      <pre>A new version of I-D, draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Marco Tiloca and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake
Revision:	02
Title:		Extension for protecting (D)TLS handshakes against Denial of Serv=
ice
Document date:	2018-03-05
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		15
URL:            <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt">https://www=
=2Eietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02.txt</a>
Status:         <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://datatr=
acker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake/">https://datatracker.i=
etf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake/</a>
Htmlized:       <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://tools.=
ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02">https://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02</a>
Htmlized:       <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://datatr=
acker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02">https://datatr=
acker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02</a>
Diff:           <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.ie=
tf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02">https://www.ietf=
=2Eorg/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02</a>

Abstract:
   This document describes an extension for TLS and DTLS to protect the
   server from Denial of Service attacks against the handshake protocol,
   carried out by an on-path adversary.  The extension includes a nonce
   and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over that nonce, encoded as a
   Handshake Token that a Trust Anchor entity computes and provides to
   the client.  The server registered at the Trust Anchor verifies the
   MAC to determine whether continuing or aborting the handshake.

                                                                         =
        =20


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat
</pre>
      <br>
    </div>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Tickets after key update/post handshake auth
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What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
and not used?

Matt


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:36:25 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Tickets after key update/post handshake auth
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On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:19 PM, Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> wrote:

> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?
>

There is no good reason to discard tickets received post KeyUpdate. The
KeyUpdate
has no impact on their security.

It's probably reasonable to discard tickets received after Post-Handshake
Auth if a new
ticket is received, as that ticket might incorporate the client's
authenticated identity. Otherwise
I wouldn't bother.

-Ekr


> Matt
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On F=
ri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:19 PM, Matt Caswell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:matt@openssl.org" target=3D"_blank">matt@openssl.org</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bord=
er-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">What is reasonable behaviour for a=
 client to do with any tickets it has<br>
previously received following a key update or a post-handshake<br>
authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date<br>
and not used?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There is no good reason t=
o discard tickets received post KeyUpdate. The KeyUpdate</div><div>has no i=
mpact on their security.</div><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s probably reasona=
ble to discard tickets received after Post-Handshake Auth if a new</div><di=
v>ticket is received, as that ticket might incorporate the client&#39;s aut=
henticated identity. Otherwise</div><div>I wouldn&#39;t bother.</div><div><=
br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Matt<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
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</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114797c6fee2f405678a372a--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Tickets after key update/post handshake auth
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On Friday, 16 March 2018 17:19:49 CET Matt Caswell wrote:
> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?

as far as I can tell KeyUpdate does affect only `application traffic secret=
`,=20
not `resumption master secret` so the tickets should be kept in this case,=
=20
they'd generate the same PSK resumption secret anyway (all else being equal)

regarding authentication:
Section E.1.2:
   If the client needs to determine if the server considers the
   connection to be unilaterally or mutually authenticated, this has to
   be provisioned by the application layer.
so it doesn't look like it should affect what TLS implementation does.
(I mean, I don't see anything related to recalculation of the secrets and=20
encryption keys post-authentication)
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:53:46 +0000
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Tickets after key update/post handshake auth
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That's only because there is some chance that the ticket binds in more
contextual information.  In practice, this might also happen as a
result of application-layer changes.  At the TLS layer, it's hard to
know exactly why the new ticket was issued.  If it was just adding
another ticket to the pile of available tickets, or whether it
replaced previous tickets.  As the consequences of using an invalid
ticket aren't serious, I would suggest that you simply use the most
recent one.  If you only use each ticket once, then use the most
recent one and hope that it's still current.

As ekr says, the old ticket isn't invalid from the perspective of TLS.
That only happens at the expiration time, and as the server decides.
You know the former, and can only guess at the latter.

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:36 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:19 PM, Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> wrote:
>>
>> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
>> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
>> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
>> and not used?
>
>
> There is no good reason to discard tickets received post KeyUpdate. The
> KeyUpdate
> has no impact on their security.
>
> It's probably reasonable to discard tickets received after Post-Handshake
> Auth if a new
> ticket is received, as that ticket might incorporate the client's
> authenticated identity. Otherwise
> I wouldn't bother.
>
> -Ekr
>
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:45:20 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20180316194519.GZ55987@kduck.kaduk.org>
References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <2062943.8cTCpni5Dm@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180314201328.GF55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <1937539.vLgMNW4b7C@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180315215147.GP55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <c7427ccf-51fc-235d-4555-a0c3d7d6f846@huitema.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > ...
> >> we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external and 
> >> resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't gotten
> > to think through whether there is still potential for information
> > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there would
> > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-PSK
> > full handshakes.
> >
> 
> I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external PSK
> identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy is
> improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities from
> resumption tickets.

Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSKs
having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designing
things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
channel.


> If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt a
> different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients with a
> set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a lot
> like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
> identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with the
> public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set of
> issues.
> 

But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do
well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's also
not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design
this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)

So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note that
the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
document.


Hubert also says:

% so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is not a
% resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it

Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.

It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)
The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.

So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we know
that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
differentiator between resumption and external.

The privacy issues remain terrible, of course.

% I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing support
% for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide PSK
% selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.

I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
PSKs, personally.

-Benjamin


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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 15:07:19 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 02:01:48PM +0000, Sean Turner wrote:
> During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
> 
> One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?

With no hats, yes, we should mark those ranges as deprecated, since
there is no warning about them in the SignatureScheme registry and
the latter is the way of the future.

-Ben


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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 10:11:17 +0000
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>,  Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org,  The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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--001a113f3a7ef0b7aa0567ad0f77
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Hi Kathleen,

Sorry for the delay. We'll have an updated draft addressing the IESG
discuss/comments shortly after the I-D submission window opens early
this week.

The one other sticking point is the issue that Viktor has raised about
extending
the protocol to provide pinning to prevent downgrade to PKIX. That has not
been resolved on list yet, so I assume will be discussed at Wednesday's TLS
session.

Shumon.

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Can you please provide updated text that addresses EKR's discuss while
> this additional discussion continues?  I'd like to see if it's
> possible to get this wrapped up before the plenary in London.
> Eliminating discuss points and resolving this additional issue are
> required for that.  If this does not get wrapped up before then, it is
> likely the draft will have to go on another IESG telechat with Ben as
> AD, which is fine if that's needed, but better to avoid.
>
> Thank you,
> Kathleen
>
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> > On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Willem Toorop wrote:
> >
> >> No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.  The
> >> only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifier is
> >> the question.  From the question, validation starts and the relevant
> >> records are followed and verified.  But the question section is also not
> >> needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of the
> >> service, i.e. <port>._tcp.<name>. TLSA
> >>
> >> The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce the
> >> number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes the
> >> content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.
> >>
> >> Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also a
> >> verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message header.
> >> Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs in
> >> the message body/sections too.
> >
> >
> > Willem (and Shumon and Viktor) have convinced me the DNS Header and
> > Sections are not needed.
> >
> >> The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., because
> >> it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).
> >
> >
> > The issue here is the requirement of the TLS server to send these
> > records in the absence of any TLS record. This allows the clients to
> > detect a rogue webserver cert that is valid in webPKI but not valid
> > based on DANE. Without this commitment, the TLS extension does not
> > really work, as it can be omitted by an attacker.
> >
> > Paul
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>

--001a113f3a7ef0b7aa0567ad0f77
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Kathleen,<div><br></div><div>Sorry for the delay. We&#3=
9;ll have an updated draft addressing the IESG</div><div>discuss/comments s=
hortly after the I-D submission window opens early=C2=A0</div><div>this wee=
k.</div><div><br></div><div>The one other sticking point is the issue that =
Viktor has raised about extending</div><div>the protocol to provide pinning=
 to prevent downgrade to PKIX. That has not=C2=A0</div><div>been resolved o=
n list yet, so I assume will be discussed at Wednesday&#39;s TLS</div><div>=
session.</div><div><br></div><div>Shumon.<br><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Kathleen =
Moriarty <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gma=
il.com" target=3D"_blank">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hello,<br>
<br>
Can you please provide updated text that addresses EKR&#39;s discuss while<=
br>
this additional discussion continues?=C2=A0 I&#39;d like to see if it&#39;s=
<br>
possible to get this wrapped up before the plenary in London.<br>
Eliminating discuss points and resolving this additional issue are<br>
required for that.=C2=A0 If this does not get wrapped up before then, it is=
<br>
likely the draft will have to go on another IESG telechat with Ben as<br>
AD, which is fine if that&#39;s needed, but better to avoid.<br>
<br>
Thank you,<br>
Kathleen<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@no=
hats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; On Mon, 5 Mar 2018, Willem Toorop wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; No Paul, the division in sections is irrelevant for a verifier.=C2=
=A0 The<br>
&gt;&gt; only bit of information in a DNS message that is used by a verifie=
r is<br>
&gt;&gt; the question.=C2=A0 From the question, validation starts and the r=
elevant<br>
&gt;&gt; records are followed and verified.=C2=A0 But the question section =
is also not<br>
&gt;&gt; needed as the question can be derived from the name and port of th=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; service, i.e. &lt;port&gt;._tcp.&lt;name&gt;. TLSA<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; The order described in the draft is both an optimization to reduce=
 the<br>
&gt;&gt; number of times a verifier has to go over the RRs, and it makes th=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; content easier to read (and understand) for humans too.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Also, for non existence answers, DNSSEC validators (and thus also =
a<br>
&gt;&gt; verifier for the chain extension) simply ignore the DNS message he=
ader.<br>
&gt;&gt; Proof of non-existence can and must be derived from the set of RRs=
 in<br>
&gt;&gt; the message body/sections too.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Willem (and Shumon and Viktor) have convinced me the DNS Header and<br=
>
&gt; Sections are not needed.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; The extension already supports Denial of Existence proof b.t.w., b=
ecause<br>
&gt;&gt; it is also needed for wildcard expansions (which are supported).<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The issue here is the requirement of the TLS server to send these<br>
&gt; records in the absence of any TLS record. This allows the clients to<b=
r>
&gt; detect a rogue webserver cert that is valid in webPKI but not valid<br=
>
&gt; based on DANE. Without this commitment, the TLS extension does not<br>
&gt; really work, as it can be omitted by an attacker.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Paul<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Kathleen<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div>

--001a113f3a7ef0b7aa0567ad0f77--


From nobody Sun Mar 18 06:20:26 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27.txt
	Pages           : 155
	Date            : 2018-03-18

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

   This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs
   5077, 5246, and 6961.  This document also specifies new requirements
   for TLS 1.2 implementations.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 13:36:28 +0000
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--001a11430b2823520a0567aff0c0
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As you can see, -27 is out.

Sorry that I forgot to add a ChangeLog to this document. There should be no
technical changes, but a lot of editorial ones.

There is, I believe, one normative change, which is given here:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26&url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27#diff0059

"Servers MUST be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include this
extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions."

This MUST used to be a "should", but I think it's reasonably clear it
actually needs to be a MUST.

-Ekr


On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 1:20 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
> Version 1.3
>         Author          : Eric Rescorla
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27.txt
>         Pages           : 155
>         Date            : 2018-03-18
>
> Abstract:
>    This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
>    (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
>    over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
>    tampering, and message forgery.
>
>    This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs
>    5077, 5246, and 6961.  This document also specifies new requirements
>    for TLS 1.2 implementations.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/
>
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a11430b2823520a0567aff0c0
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<div dir=3D"ltr">As you can see, -27 is out.<div><br></div><div>Sorry that =
I forgot to add a ChangeLog to this document. There should be no technical =
changes, but a lot of editorial ones.</div><div><br></div><div>There is, I =
believe, one normative change, which is given here:</div><div><a href=3D"ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-tls13-26&amp;url2=3Ddraft-=
ietf-tls-tls13-27#diff0059">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-=
tls-tls13-26&amp;url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-tls13-27#diff0059</a><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div><div>&quot;Servers MUST be prepared to receive ClientHellos =
that include this</div><div>extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list=
 of versions.&quot;</div></div><div><br></div><div>This MUST used to be a &=
quot;should&quot;, but I think it&#39;s reasonably clear it actually needs =
to be a MUST.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 a=
t 1:20 PM,  <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.or=
g" target=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.<b=
r>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Author=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Eric=
 Rescorla<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-tls-tls13-27.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 155<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2018-03-18<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Sec=
urity<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(TLS) protocol.=C2=A0 TLS allows client/server applications to=
 communicate<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdr=
opping,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0tampering, and message forgery.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsolet=
es RFCs<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A05077, 5246, and 6961.=C2=A0 This document also specifies new r=
equirements<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0for TLS 1.2 implementations.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
There are also htmlized versions available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/<wbr>draft-ietf-tls-t=
ls13-27</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>doc/h=
tml/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-<wbr>27</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-tls13-27" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?<wbr>url2=3D=
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-<wbr>drafts/</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a11430b2823520a0567aff0c0--


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From: Lanlan Pan <abbypan@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 15:24:02 +0000
Message-ID: <CANLjSvVbrJLVX8L2jx2KVAygeZiWzQtQO4Njeq6chr_EtKD9UQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LXelUgXu4VYiNyUK2NI1MSBwFwc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>=E4=BA=8E2018=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=
=E5=91=A8=E4=B8=89 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=8810:02=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A

> It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
>
> Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
>

what about each external PSK's survival time ?

It seems should be updated in period.


>
> -Ben(jamin)
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
--=20
=E8=87=B4=E7=A4=BC  Best Regards

=E6=BD=98=E8=93=9D=E5=85=B0  Pan Lanlan

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">Benjam=
in Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt;=E4=BA=
=8E2018=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=E5=91=A8=E4=B8=89 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=881=
0:02=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">It =
seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple<br>
external PSKs to be present.=C2=A0 If we allowed at most one external<br>
PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder<br>
failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity<br>
would require discovering a valid key/password as well.<br>
<br>
Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a<br>
little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.<br></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>what about each external PSK&#39;s survival time ?=C2=A0 <br><br=
>It seems should be updated in period.<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
-Ben(jamin)<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" =
data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=E8=87=B4=E7=A4=BC=C2=
=A0 Best Regards<br><br>=E6=BD=98=E8=93=9D=E5=85=B0=C2=A0 Pan Lanlan<br></d=
iv></div>

--94eb2c1cd1aa057e920567b16f8b--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 15:27:34 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add a
section
that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get it
into -27
due to fumble fingering).

-Ekr


On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:27 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable
> identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text makes
> it
> trivial to perform enumeration attack.
>
> The proposed fix was identified as conflicting with the "Client Hello
> Recording" security section, the severity of that conflict wasn't
> quantified
> though.
>
>
> Issue in detail:
>
> Problematic paragraph as it stands in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (section
> 4.2.11):
>    Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
>    the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
>    value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
>    handshake.  Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multiple binders;
>    rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the binder
>    that corresponds to that PSK.  In order to accept PSK key
>    establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
>    indicating the selected identity.
>
> That means, given a server with both PSK and PKI authentication, if
> attacker
> sends multiple PSK identities with garbage binders, the server will abort
> the
> connection if and only if at least one of the identities was recognised b=
y
> server. Applying the well known binary search method allows the attacker =
to
> then narrow it down to a single identity in O(log_2(n)) steps.
>
> The solution to ignore that one selected binder, and continuing the
> connection
> in case that binder does not validate (this is the version in the PR
> mentioned
> below), unfortunately doesn't solve this issue either;
>
> If the attacker is in possession of a known good PSK secret (established
> either through session resumption mechanism or of a less-privileged
> identity),
> it can list the known good one as the very last one in the PSK extension.
> If
> server recognises one of the identities earlier in the list it will choos=
e
> no
> identity (as the binder didn't validate) or the known good identity if
> none of
> the previous identities were recognised. Again, applying binary search
> method
> allows the attacker to narrow the list to a single entry in just
> O(log_2(n))
> steps.
>
>
> Proposed solution:
>
> in paragraph above, in description of `binders`:
>   binders
>   : A series of HMAC values, one for
>    each PSK offered in the "pre_shared_keys" extension and in the same
>    order, computed as described below. If the number of binders does not
> match
>    number of identities the server MUST abort the connection with
>    "illegal_parameter" alert.
>
> problematic paragraph after changes:
>    Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
>    the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
>    value does not validate, the server MUST ignore the
>    associated identity and retry selection of identity. If no identity is
>    recognised or, for recognised identities, no binder could be validated
>    the server MUST continue connection as if PSK key establishment wasn't
>    attempted.  In order to accept PSK key
>    establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
>    indicating the selected identity.
>
> Unfortunately that solution was identified as conflicting with "Client
> Hello
> Recording" section.
>
> Do we consider that conflict to be severe enough to block this change?
>
> Or should we just add more information to that security section, that it
> needs
> to deal with this kind of attack?
>
> PS: some discussion on this issue already happened in the github PR:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1167
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--001a114c91aa712c740567b17db2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted =
to just add a section<div>that explains the attack. I just merged that (but=
 managed not to get it into -27</div><div>due to fumble fingering).</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:27 AM, Hubert Kario <sp=
an dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">h=
kario@redhat.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Wh=
en the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable<br>
identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text makes i=
t<br>
trivial to perform enumeration attack.<br>
<br>
The proposed fix was identified as conflicting with the &quot;Client Hello<=
br>
Recording&quot; security section, the severity of that conflict wasn&#39;t =
quantified<br>
though.<br>
<br>
<br>
Issue in detail:<br>
<br>
Problematic paragraph as it stands in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (section<br>
4.2.11):<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST vali=
date<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).=
=C2=A0 If this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abo=
rt the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake.=C2=A0 Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multip=
le binders;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the=
 binder<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0that corresponds to that PSK.=C2=A0 In order to accept PSK key=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0establishment, the server sends a &quot;pre_shared_key&quot; e=
xtension<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0indicating the selected identity.<br>
<br>
That means, given a server with both PSK and PKI authentication, if attacke=
r<br>
sends multiple PSK identities with garbage binders, the server will abort t=
he<br>
connection if and only if at least one of the identities was recognised by<=
br>
server. Applying the well known binary search method allows the attacker to=
<br>
then narrow it down to a single identity in O(log_2(n)) steps.<br>
<br>
The solution to ignore that one selected binder, and continuing the connect=
ion<br>
in case that binder does not validate (this is the version in the PR mentio=
ned<br>
below), unfortunately doesn&#39;t solve this issue either;<br>
<br>
If the attacker is in possession of a known good PSK secret (established<br=
>
either through session resumption mechanism or of a less-privileged identit=
y),<br>
it can list the known good one as the very last one in the PSK extension. I=
f<br>
server recognises one of the identities earlier in the list it will choose =
no<br>
identity (as the binder didn&#39;t validate) or the known good identity if =
none of<br>
the previous identities were recognised. Again, applying binary search meth=
od<br>
allows the attacker to narrow the list to a single entry in just O(log_2(n)=
)<br>
steps.<br>
<br>
<br>
Proposed solution:<br>
<br>
in paragraph above, in description of `binders`:<br>
=C2=A0 binders<br>
=C2=A0 : A series of HMAC values, one for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0each PSK offered in the &quot;pre_shared_keys&quot; extension =
and in the same<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0order, computed as described below. If the number of binders d=
oes not match<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0number of identities the server MUST abort the connection with=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;illegal_parameter&quot; alert.<br>
<br>
problematic paragraph after changes:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST vali=
date<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).=
=C2=A0 If this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0value does not validate, the server MUST ignore the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0associated identity and retry selection of identity. If no ide=
ntity is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0recognised or, for recognised identities, no binder could be v=
alidated<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the server MUST continue connection as if PSK key establishmen=
t wasn&#39;t<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attempted.=C2=A0 In order to accept PSK key<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0establishment, the server sends a &quot;pre_shared_key&quot; e=
xtension<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0indicating the selected identity.<br>
<br>
Unfortunately that solution was identified as conflicting with &quot;Client=
 Hello<br>
Recording&quot; section.<br>
<br>
Do we consider that conflict to be severe enough to block this change?<br>
<br>
Or should we just add more information to that security section, that it ne=
eds<br>
to deal with this kind of attack?<br>
<br>
PS: some discussion on this issue already happened in the github PR:<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1167" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tls13<wbr>-spec/pull/1167</a><=
br>
<span class=3D"m_-8545945963054212470m_6898714306170337795m_-53578688836132=
7188HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00=C2=A0 Brno, Czech Republic=
</font></span><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--001a114c91aa712c740567b17db2--


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> On Mar 18, 2018, at 11:27 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add =
a section
> that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get =
it into -27
> due to fumble fingering).

It seems to me that privacy considerations for external PSKs are a =
rather
secondary issue.  These are infinitely more likely to be used by IOT =
devices
calling the mothership than by users browsing content they'd rather keep
private.  I've never used an external PSK, nor do I expect have any of =
the
posters pointing out the privacy issues.

The devices that might use external PSKs will likely be unavoidably
fingerprinted by source IP address and the target mothership.

So I agree with the above approach.  It is better to keep external PSKs
simple, with understood limitations, that to attempt (and fail) to turn
privacy up to eleven.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Agreed.   I know a lot of good work has gone into TLS 1.3 and having
visibility to the data once it hits the data center seems like a new
capability to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 in mind for the
last couple years.   But to enterprises, they have visibility to their data
today and have become dependent on that visibility to utilize security and
troubleshooting tools.

This actually speaks to the fact the there is a different use case for the
Internet vs the data center.  Hopefully we can agree on that point.

On the Internet, data is transitory in nature and the focus of E2E
security.   Conversely, when the enterprise is the actual recipient of the
data, there is an expectation of security and performance of that data.
 If anything happens to that data, then the enterprise is pointed to - so
we need to see the data to run the needed services.  Initially regulated
companies have been pushed to encrypt internally which then in-turn
requires that data must be decrypted for tools and a select group of folks
can provided the required services.

Additionally, bad actors will have the ability to utilize TLS 1.3
decryption for command and control and data exfiltration purposes.
Security services need to see the data to combat that.

Finally, I wanted to make the clear that we utilize the term "visibility"
because it is the correct term for the outcome that is needed - regardless
of the technology solution that enables it.  Not to inflame anyone at all.
I know it's a contentious issue but appreciate everyone's input and
thoughts to come to a solution as pushing this to another technology or WG
isn't going to solve the current problem in time.  Kuddo's to EDCO for
sharing in both directions.

Thanks,
Darin

On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com>
wrote:

> Good point Yoav.
>
>
>
> And this positive side effect holds true in the health care and insurance
> industries as well,  and is not an accident.  It is one of the primary
> reasons this monitoring is performed.
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Yoav Nir
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 15, 2018 12:58 AM
> *To:* Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
>
>
>
> Hi, Rich.
>
>
>
> You are conflating customers and users. The customer that may be protecte=
d
> by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is the bank itself. An IP=
S system
> with visibility into the traffic may detect bots that are there to steal
> data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever.
>
>
>
> If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=99s a happy side eff=
ect
> (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect the system integrity and
> the data.
>
>
>
> Yoav
>
>
>
> On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to
> protect customers.
>
>
>
> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their
> personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing
> regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
>
> =C2=B7         retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
>
> =C2=B7         Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
>
> =C2=B7         Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently=
 not
> regulated)
>
> =C2=B7         Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (o=
ne
> would think they know better)
>
> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>
>
>
> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>
>
>
> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking =
TLS?  And what
> benefits and increased protection will customers see?
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential an=
d
> is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this
> communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
> hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of
> this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic
> mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original
> message without making any copies.
>
> Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are
> nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Bl=
ue
> Shield Association.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--001a114eccc2f0d4a90567b20fe5
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Agreed.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I know a lot of good work has gone int=
o TLS 1.3 and having visibility to the data once it hits the data center se=
ems like a new capability to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 i=
n mind for the last couple years.=C2=A0 =C2=A0But to enterprises, they have=
 visibility to their data today and have become dependent on that visibilit=
y to utilize security and troubleshooting tools.<div><br></div><div>This ac=
tually speaks to the fact the there is a different use case for the Interne=
t vs the data center.=C2=A0 Hopefully we can agree on that point.=C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>On the Internet, data is transitory in nature =
and the focus of E2E security.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Conversely, when the enterprise =
is the actual recipient of the data, there is an expectation of security an=
d performance of that data.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If anything happens to that data, t=
hen the enterprise is pointed to - so we need to see the data to run the ne=
eded services.=C2=A0 Initially regulated companies have been pushed to encr=
ypt internally which then in-turn requires that data must be decrypted for =
tools and a select group of folks can provided the required services.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>Additionally, bad actors will have the ability to utili=
ze TLS 1.3 decryption for command and control and data exfiltration purpose=
s.=C2=A0 Security services need to see the data to combat that.=C2=A0</div>=
<div><br></div><div>Finally, I wanted to make the clear that we utilize the=
 term &quot;visibility&quot; because it is the correct term for the outcome=
 that is needed - regardless of the technology solution that enables it.=C2=
=A0 Not to inflame anyone at all.=C2=A0 I know it&#39;s a contentious issue=
 but appreciate everyone&#39;s input and thoughts to come to a solution as =
pushing this to another technology or WG isn&#39;t going to solve the curre=
nt problem in time.=C2=A0 Kuddo&#39;s to EDCO for sharing in both direction=
s.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Darin</div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 2:5=
0 PM, Ackermann, Michael <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann=
@bcbsm.com" target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bcbsm.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_-3515420625120905668WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Good point Yoav.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">And this positive side effect holds true in the heal=
th care and insurance industries as well,=C2=A0 and is not an accident.=C2=
=A0 It is one of the primary reasons this monitoring is performed.=C2=A0
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"m_-3515420625120905668__MailEndCompose"><=
u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></a></p>
<span></span>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounc=
es@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of
</b>Yoav Nir<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 15, 2018 12:58 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Rich Salz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi, Rich.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You are conflating customers and users. The customer=
 that may be protected by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is t=
he bank itself. An IPS system with visibility into the traffic may detect b=
ots that are there to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies
 or whatever.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=
=99s a happy side effect (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect th=
e system integrity and the data.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Yoav<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u=
></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some on this list have said that they need to break =
into TLS in order to protect customers.<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The thing customers seem to need the most protection=
 is having their personal data stolen.=C2=A0 It seems to happen with amazin=
g and disappointing regularity on astounding scales.=C2=A0 Some examples in=
clude<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS =
rules<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated=
 industry<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Equifax, a financial-business organization (but=
 apparently not regulated)<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the =
Internet (one would think they know better)<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"=
><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We could, of course, go on and on and on.<span style=
=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.<span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=
=9D requires breaking TLS?=C2=A0 And what benefits and increased protection=
 will customers see?<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Hel=
vetica&quot;,sans-serif">______________________________<wbr>_______________=
__<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
</span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif;color:#954f72">TL=
S@ietf.org</span></a><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helve=
tica&quot;,sans-serif"><br>
</span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bla=
nk"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:#954f72">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</span></=
a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>



<br>

 <p>The information contained in this communication is highly confidential =
and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this commun=
ication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby =
notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this info=
rmation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or tele=
phone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without ma=
king any copies.</p>
 <p>Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan ar=
e nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Bl=
ue Shield Association.</p>
 =20

<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:09 PM, Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com> wrote:

> Agreed.   I know a lot of good work has gone into TLS 1.3 and having
> visibility to the data once it hits the data center seems like a new
> capability to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 in mind for th=
e
> last couple years.   But to enterprises, they have visibility to their da=
ta
> today and have become dependent on that visibility to utilize security an=
d
> troubleshooting tools.
>
> This actually speaks to the fact the there is a different use case for th=
e
> Internet vs the data center.  Hopefully we can agree on that point.
>

We maybe can agree that enterprises feel they have become dependent on
their current set of security and troubleshooting tools, which rely on pass=
ive
decryption for visibility. That doesn't mean that that the enterprise is
actually dependent on that current set of tools.


> Additionally, bad actors will have the ability to utilize TLS 1.3
> decryption for command and control and data exfiltration purposes.
> Security services need to see the data to combat that.
>

Passive decryption is not necessary to do this. Active
decryption/termination can also accomplish this, where all outbound network
traffic is required to pass through trusted proxies -- an active approach
is necessary anyway to actually stop data from being exfiltrated.
Presumably stopping the data is superior to just being able to see it
leaving later when looking through forensics.


> Finally, I wanted to make the clear that we utilize the term "visibility"
> because it is the correct term for the outcome that is needed - regardles=
s
> of the technology solution that enables it.
>

Totally agree, though it's still not obvious why the tools to enable this
don't already exist.

-- Eric


>
> Thanks,
> Darin
>
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Ackermann, Michael <MAckermann@bcbsm.com=
>
> wrote:
>
>> Good point Yoav.
>>
>>
>>
>> And this positive side effect holds true in the health care and insuranc=
e
>> industries as well,  and is not an accident.  It is one of the primary
>> reasons this monitoring is performed.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Yoav Nir
>> *Sent:* Thursday, March 15, 2018 12:58 AM
>> *To:* Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
>> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi, Rich.
>>
>>
>>
>> You are conflating customers and users. The customer that may be
>> protected by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is the bank it=
self. An
>> IPS system with visibility into the traffic may detect bots that are the=
re
>> to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever.
>>
>>
>>
>> If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=99s a happy side ef=
fect
>> (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect the system integrity and
>> the data.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yoav
>>
>>
>>
>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to
>> protect customers.
>>
>>
>>
>> The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their
>> personal data stolen.  It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing
>> regularity on astounding scales.  Some examples include
>>
>> =C2=B7         retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules
>>
>> =C2=B7         Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry
>>
>> =C2=B7         Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparentl=
y not
>> regulated)
>>
>> =C2=B7         Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (=
one
>> would think they know better)
>>
>> We could, of course, go on and on and on.
>>
>>
>>
>> NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.
>>
>>
>>
>> So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=9D requires breaking=
 TLS?  And what
>> benefits and increased protection will customers see?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>>
>> The information contained in this communication is highly confidential
>> and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this
>> communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you ar=
e
>> hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of
>> this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic
>> mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original
>> message without making any copies.
>>
>> Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are
>> nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and B=
lue
>> Shield Association.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone>

--94eb2c0bd56288489c0567b74180
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:09 PM, Darin Pettis <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:dpp.edco@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dpp.edco@gmail.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Agre=
ed.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I know a lot of good work has gone into TLS 1.3 and having =
visibility to the data once it hits the data center seems like a new capabi=
lity to the good folks working that have had TLS 1.3 in mind for the last c=
ouple years.=C2=A0 =C2=A0But to enterprises, they have visibility to their =
data today and have become dependent on that visibility to utilize security=
 and troubleshooting tools.<div><br></div><div>This actually speaks to the =
fact the there is a different use case for the Internet vs the data center.=
=C2=A0 Hopefully we can agree on that point.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>We maybe can agree that enterprises feel they hav=
e become dependent on their current set of security and troubleshooting too=
ls, which rely on=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial=
,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal=
;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:=
start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0=
px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-dec=
oration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">passive decryption for vis=
ibility</span>. That doesn&#39;t mean that that the enterprise is actually =
dependent on that current set of tools.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Additionally, bad actors will have =
the ability to utilize TLS 1.3 decryption for command and control and data =
exfiltration purposes.=C2=A0 Security services need to see the data to comb=
at that.=C2=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Passive decrypti=
on is not necessary to do this. Active decryption/termination can also acco=
mplish this, where all outbound network traffic is required to pass through=
 trusted proxies -- an active approach is necessary anyway to actually stop=
 data from being exfiltrated. Presumably stopping the data is superior to j=
ust being able to see it leaving later when looking through forensics.</div=
><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Fina=
lly, I wanted to make the clear that we utilize the term &quot;visibility&q=
uot; because it is the correct term for the outcome that is needed - regard=
less of the technology solution that enables it.</div></div></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Totally agree, though it&#39;s still not obvious why the =
tools to enable this don&#39;t already exist.</div><div><br></div><div>-- E=
ric</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Darin</div></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"=
><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 2:50 PM, Ackermann, Michael <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:MAckermann@bcbsm.com" target=3D"_blank">MAckermann@bcbsm=
.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"m_6842038121980660040m_-3515420625120905668WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Good point Yoav.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">And this positive side effect holds true in the heal=
th care and insurance industries as well,=C2=A0 and is not an accident.=C2=
=A0 It is one of the primary reasons this monitoring is performed.=C2=A0
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"m_6842038121980660040_m_-3515420625120905=
668__MailEndCompose"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></a></p>
<span></span>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounc=
es@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of
</b>Yoav Nir<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 15, 2018 12:58 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Rich Salz &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi, Rich.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">You are conflating customers and users. The customer=
 that may be protected by breaking TLS in a bank=E2=80=99s server farm is t=
he bank itself. An IPS system with visibility into the traffic may detect b=
ots that are there to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies
 or whatever.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the customers of the bank are protected, it=E2=80=
=99s a happy side effect (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect th=
e system integrity and the data.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Yoav<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u=
></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some on this list have said that they need to break =
into TLS in order to protect customers.<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The thing customers seem to need the most protection=
 is having their personal data stolen.=C2=A0 It seems to happen with amazin=
g and disappointing regularity on astounding scales.=C2=A0 Some examples in=
clude<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS =
rules<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated=
 industry<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Equifax, a financial-business organization (but=
 apparently not regulated)<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.75in">
<u></u><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Symbol"><span>=C2=B7<spa=
n style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
</span></span></span><u></u>Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the =
Internet (one would think they know better)<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"=
><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We could, of course, go on and on and on.<span style=
=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3.<span =
style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So what kind of =E2=80=9Cprotect the customer=E2=80=
=9D requires breaking TLS?=C2=A0 And what benefits and increased protection=
 will customers see?<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span><=
/p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Hel=
vetica&quot;,sans-serif">______________________________<wbr>_______________=
__<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
</span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif;color:#954f72">TL=
S@ietf.org</span></a><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helve=
tica&quot;,sans-serif"><br>
</span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bla=
nk"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:#954f72">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</span></=
a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>



<br>

 <p>The information contained in this communication is highly confidential =
and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this commun=
ication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby =
notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this info=
rmation is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or tele=
phone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without ma=
king any copies.</p>
 <p>Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan ar=
e nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Bl=
ue Shield Association.</p>
 =20

<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><a href=3D"https://konklon=
e.com" target=3D"_blank">konklone.com</a> | <a href=3D"https://twitter.com/=
konklone" target=3D"_blank">@konklone</a><br></div></div></div></div></div>=
</div></div>
</div></div>

--94eb2c0bd56288489c0567b74180--


From nobody Sun Mar 18 17:40:39 2018
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Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2018 19:40:25 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Lanlan Pan <abbypan@gmail.com>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20180319004025.GE55745@kduck.kaduk.org>
References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180313151848.GA26250@LK-Perkele-VII> <3060420.fu6fxUo7fv@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180314020207.GY55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <CANLjSvVbrJLVX8L2jx2KVAygeZiWzQtQO4Njeq6chr_EtKD9UQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/9XIR1H7YFASx-4J9KZRtOWLs29U>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 03:24:02PM +0000, Lanlan Pan wrote:
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>于2018年3月14日周三 上午10:02写道：
> 
> > It seems like we get ourselves in trouble by allowing multiple
> > external PSKs to be present.  If we allowed at most one external
> > PSK in a given ClientHello, then aborting the handshake on binder
> > failure would be the correct choice, as discovering a valid identity
> > would require discovering a valid key/password as well.
> >
> > Disallowing multiple external PSKs would make migration scenarios a
> > little more annoying, but perhaps not fatally so.
> >
> 
> what about each external PSK's survival time ?
> 
> It seems should be updated in period.

It should, but that has always been the case and nothing has changed
in that regard in TLS 1.3 vs TLS 1.2.  (In practice, they are not,
and nothing we say in the document is likely to produce substantial
change in that regard.)

-Ben


From nobody Mon Mar 19 01:29:10 2018
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/bbBgD7SdQt3zKdMDHCXBsYWDJXE>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Hi Darin,

> On 18 Mar 2018, at 16:09, Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> pushing this to another technology or WG isn't going to solve the =
current problem in time.

In time for what?

Mat=


From nobody Mon Mar 19 02:42:43 2018
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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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--=-=-=
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On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
>> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=
=A6
>>=20
>> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=
=99s
>> trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6
>
> The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
> the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.

Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.

So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?

Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
across potentially adversarial networks?

datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
regardless of mechanism).

Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
protocol.

Regards,

     --dkg

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From nobody Mon Mar 19 03:39:10 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Sun 2018-03-18 12:08:13 -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> The devices that might use external PSKs will likely be unavoidably
> fingerprinted by source IP address and the target mothership.

I'm not convinced that this is the case -- it's not at all clear that
IoT devices will be attached to a stable network (so the source IP may
change), and for large deployments, the devices might all share the same
"mothership".  But the device might still present significant privacy
concerns (for example, if it's a device that travels with a person, its
presence on the network could be used to track that person). 

> So I agree with the above approach.  It is better to keep external PSKs
> simple, with understood limitations, that to attempt (and fail) to turn
> privacy up to eleven.

fwiw, i agree that a big fat warning about the privacy implications of
reused (if you don't reuse, there is no problem) external PSKs is about
all we can do at this stage of TLS 1.3.

    --dkg


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From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 06:53:13 -0400
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+1

On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 3:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> wrote=
:
>>>
>>> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
>>> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=
=A6
>>>
>>> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=
=99s
>>> trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6
>>
>> The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
>> the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.
>
> Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.
>
> So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
>
> Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
> the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
> Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
> across potentially adversarial networks?
>
> datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
> machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
> to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
> their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
> regardless of mechanism).
>
> Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
> the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
> protocol.
>
> Regards,
>
>      --dkg
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



--=20
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
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From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 07:02:46 -0400
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> On Sun 2018-03-18 12:08:13 -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
>> The devices that might use external PSKs will likely be unavoidably
>> fingerprinted by source IP address and the target mothership.
>
> I'm not convinced that this is the case -- it's not at all clear that
> IoT devices will be attached to a stable network (so the source IP may
> change), and for large deployments, the devices might all share the same
> "mothership".  But the device might still present significant privacy
> concerns (for example, if it's a device that travels with a person, its
> presence on the network could be used to track that person).

In addition to locative privacy threats, the nature of the IoT device
itself might expose something sensitive about the user (e.g., a
connected pleasure device, medical device, or solid platinum espresso
maker).


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Hi, Daniel

Inline...

> On 19 Mar 2018, at 7:32, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide =
visibility
>>> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=
=A6
>>>=20
>>> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=
=99s
>>> trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6
>>=20
>> The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
>> the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.
>=20
> Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.
>=20
> So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?

I see it a little differently. Your computer or my computer, both of =
which are not configured to opt-in, should not be on such networks. In =
the corporate world, there could be a production network that enforces =
this and has access to corporate resources. There will usually also be a =
=E2=80=9Cguest=E2=80=9D network with unfiltered connectivity, but no =
access to internal databases. This is where visitors go, but also where =
employee phones connect.

Of course the government of Elbonia might require all networks to have =
this feature, and then you=E2=80=99ll have to decide if you want to =
configure your laptop to opt-in.  I would prefer to stay off-line while =
I=E2=80=99m in Elbonia in that case.

> Designing mechanism for the Internet that =
allows/facilitates/encourages
> the network operator to force this choice on the user seems =
problematic.
> Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be =
used
> across potentially adversarial networks?

This is for hosts using network owned by the same entity that owns the =
hosts. When such hosts communicate outside this network, it=E2=80=99s =
for the leg of the connection that is within this network. I don=E2=80=99t=
 see any use for it across an adversarial network.  If you trust it =
enough to give it your keys, it=E2=80=99s not adversarial.

> datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
> machines they already control already have mechanisms at their =
disposal
> to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
> their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
> regardless of mechanism).

I don=E2=80=99t think these mechanisms are currently available.  =
That=E2=80=99s a good subject for discussion.  If such mechanisms can be =
written without extending TLS, that=E2=80=99s obviously better.
>=20
> Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
> the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
> protocol.
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
>     --dkg


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From nobody Mon Mar 19 06:34:08 2018
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 14:33:52 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > ...
> > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between
> > > > external and 
> > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > > 
> > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
> > > gotten
> > > to think through whether there is still potential for information
> > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
> > > would
> > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-
> > > PSK
> > > full handshakes.
> > > 
> > 
> > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
> > PSK
> > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy is
> > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
> > from
> > resumption tickets.
> 
> Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
> PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSKs
> having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designing
> things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
> the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
> only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
> Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
> and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
> channel.

I agree.

> > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt
> > a
> > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients
> > with a
> > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a
> > lot
> > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
> > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with
> > the
> > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set
> > of
> > issues.
> > 
> 
> But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do
> well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's also
> not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design
> this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> 
> So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note that
> the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
> of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> document.

That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.

> Hubert also says:
> 
> % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is
> not a
> % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> 
> Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.

I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protocol
mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may use
software from different vendors which may use different conventions if
the protocol is not clear enough.

> It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
> back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)
> The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
> triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> 
> So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we know
> that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> differentiator between resumption and external.

That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to the
same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
used in one implementation would not apply to another.

> % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing
> support
> % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide
> PSK
> % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> 
> I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
> PSKs, personally.

The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and I
guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed to
handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionally
ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security for
TLS1.3.

regards,
Nikos


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 13:38:05 +0000
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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
wrote:

> On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > ...
> > > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between
> > > > > external and
> > > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > > >
> > > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> > > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
> > > > gotten
> > > > to think through whether there is still potential for information
> > > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
> > > > would
> > > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-
> > > > PSK
> > > > full handshakes.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
> > > PSK
> > > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> > > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> > > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy is
> > > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
> > > from
> > > resumption tickets.
> >
> > Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
> > PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSKs
> > having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designing
> > things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
> > the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
> > only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
> > Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
> > and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
> > channel.
>
> I agree.
>
> > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt
> > > a
> > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients
> > > with a
> > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a
> > > lot
> > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
> > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with
> > > the
> > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set
> > > of
> > > issues.
> > >
> >
> > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do
> > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's also
> > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design
> > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> >
> > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note that
> > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
> > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> > document.
>
> That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
> vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.
>
> > Hubert also says:
> >
> > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is
> > not a
> > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> >
> > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
>
> I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protocol
> mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may use
> software from different vendors which may use different conventions if
> the protocol is not clear enough.
>
> > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
> > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)
> > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
> > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> >
> > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we know
> > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> > differentiator between resumption and external.
>
> That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to the
> same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
> used in one implementation would not apply to another.
>
> > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing
> > support
> > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide
> > PSK
> > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> >
> > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
> > PSKs, personally.
>
> The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and I
> guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
> explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed to
> handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
> that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionally
> ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security for
> TLS1.3.
>

Nikos,

Just as a clarification, I believe it's possible for a PSK-only
implementation to
avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for "unknown ID" and "invalid
binder"

-Ekr


> regards,
> Nikos
>
>

--94eb2c062738b8e8460567c41386
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOE=
nZb"><div class=3D"h5">On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wr=
ote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote=
:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; ...<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating =
between<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; external and<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of cou=
rse<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; &gt; obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.=C2=A0 I hav=
en&#39;t<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; gotten<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; to think through whether there is still potential for inform=
ation<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like the=
re<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; would<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to exter=
nal-<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; full handshakes.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these &quot;exte=
rnal<br>
&gt; &gt; PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; identities&quot;. If a system is set so that clients use static P=
SK<br>
&gt; &gt; identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client&#39=
;s<br>
&gt; &gt; movements and connections can be tracked. I don&#39;t think priva=
cy is<br>
&gt; &gt; improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities<=
br>
&gt; &gt; from<br>
&gt; &gt; resumption tickets.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external<br>
&gt; PSK scheme are terrible!=C2=A0 This follows naturally from external PS=
Ks<br>
&gt; having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designing<b=
r>
&gt; things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for<br>
&gt; the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and<br>
&gt; only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.<br>
&gt; Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,<br>
&gt; and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation<br>
&gt; channel.<br>
<br>
</div></div>I agree.<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; &gt; If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adop=
t<br>
&gt; &gt; a<br>
&gt; &gt; different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients=
<br>
&gt; &gt; with a<br>
&gt; &gt; set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a=
<br>
&gt; &gt; lot<br>
&gt; &gt; like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external P=
SK<br>
&gt; &gt; identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce wit=
h<br>
&gt; &gt; the<br>
&gt; &gt; public key of the server, a design which of course has its own se=
t<br>
&gt; &gt; of<br>
&gt; &gt; issues.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do<b=
r>
&gt; well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.=C2=A0 (It&#39=
;s also<br>
&gt; not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design<b=
r>
&gt; this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of<br>
&gt; external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably<br>
&gt; at this stage of the document&#39;s lifecycle at all.=C2=A0 (I also no=
te that<br>
&gt; the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not<br>
&gt; necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for<br>
&gt; situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes<br=
>
&gt; of the software authors.)=C2=A0 I don&#39;t think anyone has proposed =
a<br>
&gt; minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given<br>
&gt; that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems<br>
&gt; like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this<br>
&gt; document.<br>
<br>
</div></div>That&#39;s a good general remark, but not really the case for t=
he<br>
vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; Hubert also says:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; % so there&#39;s no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or=
 is<br>
&gt; not a<br>
&gt; % resumption ticket, if I can&#39;t decrypt it<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Mostly.=C2=A0 External PSKs are established out of band, and that<br>
&gt; provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the<br>
&gt; obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in<br>
&gt; use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.<br>
<br>
</span>I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protoc=
ol<br>
mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may use<br>
software from different vendors which may use different conventions if<br>
the protocol is not clear enough.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; It&#39;s probably also worth considering the two cases for server<br>
&gt; behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known<br>
&gt; external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could<br>
&gt; either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption<br>
&gt; ticket that fails to decrypt.=C2=A0 The latter case fails because the<=
br>
&gt; attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls<br=
>
&gt; back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.=C2=A0 (Well, maybe=
<br>
&gt; the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)<b=
r>
&gt; The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious<br=
>
&gt; triggering of the proposed &quot;at most one external PSK&quot; check.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So, in addition to the &quot;we provision external PSKs only when we k=
now<br>
&gt; that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero&quot;, deployments could also<=
br>
&gt; agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and<br>
&gt; resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable<br>
&gt; differentiator between resumption and external.<br>
<br>
</span>That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to =
the<br>
same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions<br>
used in one implementation would not apply to another.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; % I&#39;d really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrific=
ing<br>
&gt; support<br>
&gt; % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide<=
br>
&gt; PSK<br>
&gt; % selection, now we&#39;re left with just server IP or hostname.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think that &quot;do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a=
<br>
&gt; risk&quot; is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple extern=
al<br>
&gt; PSKs, personally.<br>
<br>
</span>The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and=
 I<br>
guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did<br>
explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed to<br>
handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning<br>
that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionally<br>
ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security for<br>
TLS1.3.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Nikos,</div><div><br></div><div=
>Just as a clarification, I believe it&#39;s possible for a PSK-only implem=
entation to</div><div>avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for &quot;unk=
nown ID&quot; and &quot;invalid binder&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr<=
/div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
regards,<br>
Nikos<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c062738b8e8460567c41386--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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It's true that breaking open cleartext runs counter to the mission of
end-to-end TLS, but it also seems like operators are going to do it if they
can. Whether by staying on plain RSA, using static-DH, MITM through
installing a private trusted CA, or exporting session secrets, they can
certainly do it.  I worry that we'll lose a good opportunity to improve the
security and transparency of things by turning our nose up at that.

Here's a straw-man suggestion:

Suppose we took on a draft that adds a new optional handshake message. The
message could go immediately before FINISHED, in either direction (or
both), and contain an encrypted version of the soon-to-be-session-key.  For
back-compat: it could be encrypted with RSA, or whatever else the endpoints
want to support. This is basically what STEK encrypted tickets look like
today with TLS1.2 anyway, though usually with symmetric encryption, so it's
not that wild a departure.

Obviously this breaks forward secrecy, and allows passive tapping and
session hi-jacking, but then that's the point. But I think there are some
security advantages too:

1/ By making the functionality part of the handshake transcript, it is
unforgeably evident to both sides that it is happening. The proponents of
this functionality claim that everything is opt-in, but this gives some
cryptographic teeth to it.

2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by
default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configurations
and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - how
private root CAs can be inserted.

Wouldn't those be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly
exporting transcripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA
installed which breaks all sorts of certificate verification
infrastructure?

I think the existence of a "standard" here could also serve to encourage
providers to do things the more transparent way, and create less likelihood
of a mass-market of products that could also be used for more surreptitious
tapping.


On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.ne=
t
> wrote:

> On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
> >> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
> >> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=
=80=A6
> >>
> >> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=
=99s
> >> trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6
> >
> > The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
> > the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.
>
> Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.
>
> So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
>
> Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
> the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
> Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
> across potentially adversarial networks?
>
> datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
> machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
> to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
> their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
> regardless of mechanism).
>
> Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
> the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
> protocol.
>
> Regards,
>
>      --dkg
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>


--=20
Colm

--94eb2c064ede8776130567c4a725
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s true that breaking open clear=
text runs counter to the mission of end-to-end TLS, but it also seems like =
operators are going to do it if they can. Whether by staying on plain RSA, =
using static-DH, MITM through installing a private trusted CA, or exporting=
 session secrets, they can certainly do it.=C2=A0 I worry that we&#39;ll lo=
se a good opportunity to improve the security and transparency of things by=
 turning our nose up at that.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Here&#39;s a s=
traw-man suggestion:</div><div><br></div><div>Suppose we took on a draft th=
at adds a new optional handshake message. The message could go immediately =
before FINISHED, in either direction (or both), and contain an encrypted ve=
rsion of the soon-to-be-session-key.=C2=A0 For back-compat: it could be enc=
rypted with RSA, or whatever else the endpoints want to support. This is ba=
sically what STEK encrypted tickets look like today with TLS1.2 anyway, tho=
ugh usually with symmetric encryption, so it&#39;s not that wild a departur=
e.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Obviously this breaks forward secrecy, an=
d allows passive tapping and session hi-jacking, but then that&#39;s the po=
int. But I think there are some security advantages too:=C2=A0</div><div><b=
r></div><div>1/ By making the functionality part of the handshake transcrip=
t, it is unforgeably evident to both sides that it is happening. The propon=
ents of this functionality claim that everything is opt-in, but this gives =
some cryptographic teeth to it.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>2/ clients a=
nd browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by default. This w=
ould mean that adopters would have to deploy configurations and mechanisms =
to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - how private root CA=
s can be inserted.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Wouldn&#39;t those be goo=
d properties to have? Compared to servers secretly exporting transcripts or=
 session keys, or just having a private root CA installed which breaks all =
sorts of certificate verification infrastructure?=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>I think the existence of a &quot;standard&quot; here could also serve=
 to encourage providers to do things the more transparent way, and create l=
ess likelihood of a mass-market of products that could also be used for mor=
e surreptitious tapping.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:32 AM, Daniel =
Kahn Gillmor <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net"=
 target=3D"_blank">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-widt=
h:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div class=3D"gmail-HOEnZb"><div class=3D"gmail-h5">On Thu 2018-03-=
15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ilarra@s21sec.com">ilarra@s21sec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibil=
ity<br>
&gt;&gt; to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=
=E2=80=A6<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=
=E2=80=99s<br>
&gt;&gt; trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so<br=
>
&gt; the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.<br>
<br>
</div></div>Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.<br>
<br>
So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties<br>
are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between<br>
surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on<br>
the other (opt-out and be blocked).=C2=A0 Is that right?<br>
<br>
Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages<br>
the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.<br=
>
Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used<br>
across potentially adversarial networks?<br>
<br>
datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through<br>
machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal<br>
to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing<br>
their customers&#39; data to further risks is maybe an open question,<br>
regardless of mechanism).<br>
<br>
Mechanisms that increase &quot;visibility&quot; of the cleartext run counte=
r to<br>
the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications<br>
protocol.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0--dkg<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

--94eb2c064ede8776130567c4a725--


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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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Dear TLS WG,

Enterprise "visibility" is a network issue, not an Internet issue, and =
thus, to my _limited_ understanding, should be out of scope of IETF.

Nonetheless, enterprise security is important, and enterprise networks =
use Internet technology internally, so the topic is perhaps still =
procedurally discussable, so I continue.  I (naively) worry that =
"visibility" is also "siphonability", creating an incentive for a =
Snowden-sized (but malicious) leak, which could hurt enterprises and =
their customers.  In other words: who watches the watchers; avoid a =
single point of weakness; prevent social engineering opportunities; =
decentralize power; make sure the cure is not worse than the ailment; =
etc.  It is not yet clear (to me) which attackers "visibility" would =
thwart, but if it is just na=C3=AFve (but plentiful) insiders, then I =
imagine the optimal solution would be better endpoint management (which =
may be a more difficult road than "visibility", but should still be the =
long-term solution).

Best regards,

Dan

PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just =
think about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall =
hearing about such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security =
work of colleagues (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used =
forward-secure ECMQV to establish a connection between smartphones and =
the enterprise network.




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From: R du Toit <r@nerd.ninja>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Commenting purely on the straw-man proposal:

How would passive tools get to the new message if it is sent before the TLS=
 1.3 server Finished, given that the handshake is already encrypted by that =
point?

You could send it as plaintext before client Finished, but that changes the=
 properties of resumption_master_secret, and impacts the TLS state machine o=
n the server end, which now has to accept plaintext records after switching =
to protected handshake records.

=20

--Roelof

=20

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allc=
osts.net>
Date: Monday, March 19, 2018 at 10:21 AM
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers

=20

=20

It's true that breaking open cleartext runs counter to the mission of end-t=
o-end TLS, but it also seems like operators are going to do it if they can. =
Whether by staying on plain RSA, using static-DH, MITM through installing a =
private trusted CA, or exporting session secrets, they can certainly do it. =
 I worry that we'll lose a good opportunity to improve the security and tran=
sparency of things by turning our nose up at that.=20

=20

Here's a straw-man suggestion:

=20

Suppose we took on a draft that adds a new optional handshake message. The =
message could go immediately before FINISHED, in either direction (or both),=
 and contain an encrypted version of the soon-to-be-session-key.  For back-c=
ompat: it could be encrypted with RSA, or whatever else the endpoints want t=
o support. This is basically what STEK encrypted tickets look like today wit=
h TLS1.2 anyway, though usually with symmetric encryption, so it's not that =
wild a departure.=20

=20

Obviously this breaks forward secrecy, and allows passive tapping and sessi=
on hi-jacking, but then that's the point. But I think there are some securit=
y advantages too:=20

=20

1/ By making the functionality part of the handshake transcript, it is unfo=
rgeably evident to both sides that it is happening. The proponents of this f=
unctionality claim that everything is opt-in, but this gives some cryptograp=
hic teeth to it.=20

=20

2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by def=
ault. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configurations and =
mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - how priva=
te root CAs can be inserted.=20

=20

Wouldn't those be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly exp=
orting transcripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA install=
ed which breaks all sorts of certificate verification infrastructure?=20

=20

I think the existence of a "standard" here could also serve to encourage pr=
oviders to do things the more transparent way, and create less likelihood of=
 a mass-market of products that could also be used for more surreptitious ta=
pping.=20

=20

=20

On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.ne=
t> wrote:

On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> wrote:
>>
>> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
>> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank=E2=80=A6
>>
>> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it=E2=80=99s
>> trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6
>
> The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
> the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.

Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.

So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?

Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
across potentially adversarial networks?

datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
regardless of mechanism).

Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
protocol.

Regards,

     --dkg

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



=20

--=20

Colm

_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.o=
rg https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=20


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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSe=
ction1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Commenting purely on the straw-man proposal:<o:p><=
/o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>How would passive tools get to the new message i=
f it is sent before the TLS 1.3 server Finished, given that the handshake is=
 already encrypted by that point?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>You could=
 send it as plaintext before client Finished, but that changes the propertie=
s of resumption_master_secret, and impacts the TLS state machine on the serv=
er end, which now has to accept plaintext records after switching to protect=
ed handshake records.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal>--Roelof<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0=
in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;col=
or:black'>TLS &lt;tls-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh &=
lt;colm@allcosts.net&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Monday, March 19, 2018 at 10:21 AM<=
br><b>To: </b>Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;dkg@fifthhorseman.net&gt;<br><b>Cc: </=
b>&quot;tls@ietf.org&quot; &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS]=
 Breaking into TLS to protect customers<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><a name=3D"_MailOriginalBody"><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></a></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'=
><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>It's true that breaking open c=
leartext runs counter to the mission of end-to-end TLS, but it also seems li=
ke operators are going to do it if they can. Whether by staying on plain RSA=
, using static-DH, MITM through installing a private trusted CA, or exportin=
g session secrets, they can certainly do it.&nbsp; I worry that we'll lose a=
 good opportunity to improve the security and transparency of things by turn=
ing our nose up at that.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>Here's a straw-man sugge=
stion:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-=
bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>Suppose we took on a draft that adds a new optio=
nal handshake message. The message could go immediately before FINISHED, in =
either direction (or both), and contain an encrypted version of the soon-to-=
be-session-key.&nbsp; For back-compat: it could be encrypted with RSA, or wh=
atever else the endpoints want to support. This is basically what STEK encry=
pted tickets look like today with TLS1.2 anyway, though usually with symmetr=
ic encryption, so it's not that wild a departure.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-boo=
kmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'=
>Obviously this breaks forward secrecy, and allows passive tapping and sessi=
on hi-jacking, but then that's the point. But I think there are some securit=
y advantages too:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>1/ By making the functionality =
part of the handshake transcript, it is unforgeably evident to both sides th=
at it is happening. The proponents of this functionality claim that everythi=
ng is opt-in, but this gives some cryptographic teeth to it.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span sty=
le=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOr=
iginalBody'>2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions inse=
cure by default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configur=
ations and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond =
- how private root CAs can be inserted.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Mai=
lOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>Wouldn't =
those be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly exporting tra=
nscripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA installed which b=
reaks all sorts of certificate verification infrastructure?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span styl=
e=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOri=
ginalBody'>I think the existence of a &quot;standard&quot; here could also s=
erve to encourage providers to do things the more transparent way, and creat=
e less likelihood of a mass-market of products that could also be used for m=
ore surreptitious tapping.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody=
'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-le=
ft:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-book=
mark:_MailOriginalBody'>On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmo=
r &lt;</span><a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" target=3D"_blank"><span st=
yle=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>dkg@fifthhorseman.net</span><span style=
=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Mail=
OriginalBody'>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote style=3D'border:non=
e;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8p=
t;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:0=
in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-=
bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote=
:<br>&gt;&gt; On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue &lt;</span><a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ilarra@s21sec.com"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>i=
larra@s21sec.com</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span><=
/a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&=
gt;&gt; I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibilit=
y<br>&gt;&gt; to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the b=
ank=E2=80=A6<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in f=
or visibility if it=E2=80=99s<br>&gt;&gt; trying to exfiltrate data=E2=80=A6<br>&gt;<br>=
&gt; The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so<br>=
&gt; the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-ri=
ght:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_Ma=
ilOriginalBody'>Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.<br><br>=
So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties<br>ar=
e mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between<br>survei=
llance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on<br>the othe=
r (opt-out and be blocked).&nbsp; Is that right?<br><br>Designing mechanism =
for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages<br>the network operator =
to force this choice on the user seems problematic.<br>Why do we want this f=
or a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used<br>across potentially adv=
ersarial networks?<br><br>datacenter operators who want access to the cleart=
ext passing through<br>machines they already control already have mechanisms=
 at their disposal<br>to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely wit=
hout exposing<br>their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open que=
stion,<br>regardless of mechanism).<br><br>Mechanisms that increase &quot;vi=
sibility&quot; of the cleartext run counter to<br>the goals of TLS as an end=
-to-end two-party secure communications<br>protocol.<br><br>Regards,<br><br>=
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;--dkg<br><br>___________________________________________=
____<br>TLS mailing list<br></span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org"><span style=
=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>TLS@ietf.org</span><span style=3D'mso-bookma=
rk:_MailOriginalBody'></span></a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody=
'><br></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_bl=
ank"><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>https://www.ietf.org/mailm=
an/listinfo/tls</span><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'></span></=
a><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'><o:p></o:p></span></p></block=
quote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-boo=
kmark:_MailOriginalBody'><br><br clear=3Dall><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOrigina=
lBody'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-le=
ft:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody'>-- <o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmar=
k:_MailOriginalBody'>Colm<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'mso-bookmark:_MailOriginalBody=
'>_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.=
org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls </span><o:p></o:p></p></div></=
body></html>

--B_3604305058_1095003250--




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On Sunday, 18 March 2018 16:27:34 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add a
> section
> that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get it
> into -27
> due to fumble fingering).

If there is no consensus on the recommended fix for the issue, I wonder if =
we=20
shouldn't then soften the language in the section about PSK binder handling=
,=20
from SHOULD to MAY.

Though, I'd say that the reference to that newly added section is definitel=
y=20
missing.

> -Ekr
>=20
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:27 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable
> > identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text mak=
es
> > it
> > trivial to perform enumeration attack.
> >=20
> > The proposed fix was identified as conflicting with the "Client Hello
> > Recording" security section, the severity of that conflict wasn't
> > quantified
> > though.
> >=20
> >=20
> > Issue in detail:
> >=20
> > Problematic paragraph as it stands in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (section
> >=20
> > 4.2.11):
> >    Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
> >    the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
> >    value is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the
> >    handshake.  Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multiple binders;
> >    rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the binder
> >    that corresponds to that PSK.  In order to accept PSK key
> >    establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
> >    indicating the selected identity.
> >=20
> > That means, given a server with both PSK and PKI authentication, if
> > attacker
> > sends multiple PSK identities with garbage binders, the server will abo=
rt
> > the
> > connection if and only if at least one of the identities was recognised=
 by
> > server. Applying the well known binary search method allows the attacker
> > to
> > then narrow it down to a single identity in O(log_2(n)) steps.
> >=20
> > The solution to ignore that one selected binder, and continuing the
> > connection
> > in case that binder does not validate (this is the version in the PR
> > mentioned
> > below), unfortunately doesn't solve this issue either;
> >=20
> > If the attacker is in possession of a known good PSK secret (established
> > either through session resumption mechanism or of a less-privileged
> > identity),
> > it can list the known good one as the very last one in the PSK extensio=
n.
> > If
> > server recognises one of the identities earlier in the list it will cho=
ose
> > no
> > identity (as the binder didn't validate) or the known good identity if
> > none of
> > the previous identities were recognised. Again, applying binary search
> > method
> > allows the attacker to narrow the list to a single entry in just
> > O(log_2(n))
> > steps.
> >=20
> >=20
> > Proposed solution:
> >=20
> > in paragraph above, in description of `binders`:
> >   binders
> >  =20
> >   : A series of HMAC values, one for
> >   =20
> >    each PSK offered in the "pre_shared_keys" extension and in the same
> >    order, computed as described below. If the number of binders does not
> >=20
> > match
> >=20
> >    number of identities the server MUST abort the connection with
> >    "illegal_parameter" alert.
> >=20
> > problematic paragraph after changes:
> >    Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate
> >    the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below).  If this
> >    value does not validate, the server MUST ignore the
> >    associated identity and retry selection of identity. If no identity =
is
> >    recognised or, for recognised identities, no binder could be validat=
ed
> >    the server MUST continue connection as if PSK key establishment wasn=
't
> >    attempted.  In order to accept PSK key
> >    establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension
> >    indicating the selected identity.
> >=20
> > Unfortunately that solution was identified as conflicting with "Client
> > Hello
> > Recording" section.
> >=20
> > Do we consider that conflict to be severe enough to block this change?
> >=20
> > Or should we just add more information to that security section, that it
> > needs
> > to deal with this kind of attack?
> >=20
> > PS: some discussion on this issue already happened in the github PR:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1167
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 10:20 AM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net=
>
wrote:

> 2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by
> default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configuration=
s
> and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - ho=
w
> private root CAs can be inserted.
>

I thought the use case was that this was not for clients and browsers, but
for server<->server interactions.


> Wouldn't those be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly
> exporting transcripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA
> installed which breaks all sorts of certificate verification
> infrastructure?
>

A number of platforms are moving away from the ability to install private
root CAs. Platforms such as Android, ChromeOS, and iOS are three examples
of modern 'consumer' platforms that restrict or prevent such ability. On
the consumer electronics space, you have a variety of TLS-using clients
without such capability at all.

In these cases, servers secretly exporting transcripts achieves the
properties desired, but the other solutions would preclude such devices.
For the use cases described, could you clarify why this would be
undesirable?


> I think the existence of a "standard" here could also serve to encourage
> providers to do things the more transparent way, and create less likeliho=
od
> of a mass-market of products that could also be used for more surreptitio=
us
> tapping.
>

It's difficult to speculate here about the potential impact, but isn't
another possibility that it would legitimize a mass-market of such
products, particularly if such capabilities were introduced into clients
and browsers? You could, for example, see governments encouraging and/or
requiring the use of such protocols, which otherwise would not be
technically possible on the aforementioned platforms.

--001a11494c80760e380567c65e29
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 10:20 AM, Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:colm@allcosts.net" target=3D"_blank">colm@allcost=
s.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div>2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecu=
re by default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configura=
tions and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond =
- how private root CAs can be inserted.=C2=A0<br></div></div></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>I thought the use case was that this was not for clients=
 and browsers, but for server&lt;-&gt;server interactions.</div><div>=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Wouldn&#39;t tho=
se be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly exporting trans=
cripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA installed which br=
eaks all sorts of certificate verification infrastructure?=C2=A0=C2=A0</div=
></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);f=
ont-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-=
ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:no=
rmal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:norma=
l;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:=
initial;text-decoration-color:initial">A number of platforms are moving awa=
y from the ability to install private root CAs. Platforms such as Android, =
ChromeOS, and iOS are three examples of modern &#39;consumer&#39; platforms=
 that restrict or prevent such ability. On the consumer electronics space, =
you have a variety of TLS-using clients without such capability at all.</di=
v><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"=
><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;f=
ont-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant=
-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color=
:initial">In these cases, servers secretly exporting transcripts achieves t=
he properties desired, but the other solutions would preclude such devices.=
 For the use cases described, could you clarify why this would be undesirab=
le?</div></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div>I think the existence of a &quot;standard&quot; here could also s=
erve to encourage providers to do things the more transparent way, and crea=
te less likelihood of a mass-market of products that could also be used for=
 more surreptitious tapping.=C2=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>It&#39;s difficult to speculate here about the potential impact, but is=
n&#39;t another possibility that it would legitimize a mass-market of such =
products, particularly if such capabilities were introduced into clients an=
d browsers? You could, for example, see governments encouraging and/or requ=
iring the use of such protocols, which otherwise would not be technically p=
ossible on the aforementioned platforms.</div></div></div></div>

--001a11494c80760e380567c65e29--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 01:23:30PM +0000, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi, Daniel
> 
> Inline...
> 
> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 7:32, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> > are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> > surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> > the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
> 
> I see it a little differently. Your computer or my computer, both of which are not configured to opt-in, should not be on such networks. In the corporate world, there could be a production network that enforces this and has access to corporate resources. There will usually also be a “guest” network with unfiltered connectivity, but no access to internal databases. This is where visitors go, but also where employee phones connect.
> 
> Of course the government of Elbonia might require all networks to have this feature, and then you’ll have to decide if you want to configure your laptop to opt-in.  I would prefer to stay off-line while I’m in Elbonia in that case.
> 
> > Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
> > the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
> > Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
> > across potentially adversarial networks?
> 
> This is for hosts using network owned by the same entity that owns the hosts. When such hosts communicate outside this network, it’s for the leg of the connection that is within this network. I don’t see any use for it across an adversarial network.  If you trust it enough to give it your keys, it’s not adversarial.

If the network is actually trusted, then there is no need for
transport encryption at all.  So, whether due to real risk or risk
perceived by compliance regimes, the network must be considered to
potentially be adversarial.  Perhaps this could be rephrased as "the
intended network is operated by a trusted entity", but is the
network authenticated?  With an attacker potentially in play, is the
network compromised?  It's hardly a home run to blithely claim that
the network is trusted, without further exposition.

-Ben


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Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 11:38:43 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:22:48PM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 10:20 AM, Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
> wrote:
> 
> > 2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by
> > default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configurations
> > and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - how
> > private root CAs can be inserted.
> >
> 
> I thought the use case was that this was not for clients and browsers, but
> for server<->server interactions.

This is an important question the answer to which remains unclear,
to me.

-Ben


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>, =?utf-8?B?Q29sbSBNYWNDw6FydGhhaWdo?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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From: Eric Mill <eric@konklone.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 17:59:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 9:23 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip]

> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 7:32, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
> wrote:
> > So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> > are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> > surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> > the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
>
> I see it a little differently. Your computer or my computer, both of whic=
h
> are not configured to opt-in, should not be on such networks. In the
> corporate world, there could be a production network that enforces this a=
nd
> has access to corporate resources. There will usually also be a =E2=80=9C=
guest=E2=80=9D
> network with unfiltered connectivity, but no access to internal databases=
.
> This is where visitors go, but also where employee phones connect.
>
> Of course the government of Elbonia might require all networks to have
> this feature, and then you=E2=80=99ll have to decide if you want to confi=
gure your
> laptop to opt-in.  I would prefer to stay off-line while I=E2=80=99m in E=
lbonia in
> that case.
>

That seems like notably less of an option for the citizens of Elbonia.

-- Eric
--=20
konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone>

--94eb2c05a4e6c2fd1e0567cb13d6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Mar 19, 2018 at 9:23 AM, Yoav Nir <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br><div>[snip]=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><span class=3D"gmail-">
&gt; On 19 Mar 2018, at 7:32, Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg=
@fifthhorseman.net">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties=
<br>
&gt; are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between<b=
r>
&gt; surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on=
<br>
&gt; the other (opt-out and be blocked).=C2=A0 Is that right?<br>
<br>
</span>I see it a little differently. Your computer or my computer, both of=
 which are not configured to opt-in, should not be on such networks. In the=
 corporate world, there could be a production network that enforces this an=
d has access to corporate resources. There will usually also be a =E2=80=9C=
guest=E2=80=9D network with unfiltered connectivity, but no access to inter=
nal databases. This is where visitors go, but also where employee phones co=
nnect.<br>
<br>
Of course the government of Elbonia might require all networks to have this=
 feature, and then you=E2=80=99ll have to decide if you want to configure y=
our laptop to opt-in.=C2=A0 I would prefer to stay off-line while I=E2=80=
=99m in Elbonia in that case.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That seem=
s like notably less of an option for the citizens of Elbonia.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>-- Eric</div></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><a href=
=3D"https://konklone.com" target=3D"_blank">konklone.com</a> | <a href=3D"h=
ttps://twitter.com/konklone" target=3D"_blank">@konklone</a><br></div></div=
></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div>

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Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 17:53:16 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20180319225316.GP55745@kduck.kaduk.org>
References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBOFvdfV3b5+yfJbeYxHLi_uDY34X7u3cbpiLa6RtnmFkQ@mail.gmail.com> <6535335.hpFIu7S1IC@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 05:00:51PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Sunday, 18 March 2018 16:27:34 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add a
> > section
> > that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get it
> > into -27
> > due to fumble fingering).
>=20
> If there is no consensus on the recommended fix for the issue, I wonder i=
f we=20
> shouldn't then soften the language in the section about PSK binder handli=
ng,=20
> from SHOULD to MAY.

I think on the balance I am happier retaining SHOULD.

> Though, I'd say that the reference to that newly added section is definit=
ely=20
> missing.

I expect that can be done as an RFC Editor note or during AUTH48.

-Benjamin

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Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 18:01:43 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20180319230141.GQ55745@kduck.kaduk.org>
References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <2062943.8cTCpni5Dm@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180314201328.GF55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <1937539.vLgMNW4b7C@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <20180315215147.GP55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <c7427ccf-51fc-235d-4555-a0c3d7d6f846@huitema.net> <20180316194519.GZ55987@kduck.kaduk.org> <1521466432.30491.16.camel@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 02:33:52PM +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > > 
> > 
> > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt
> > > a
> > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients
> > > with a
> > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a
> > > lot
> > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
> > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with
> > > the
> > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set
> > > of
> > > issues.
> > > 
> > 
> > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do
> > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's also
> > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design
> > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> > 
> > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note that
> > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
> > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> > document.
> 
> That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
> vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.

I think you are just referring to the bit about CVE numbers not
necessarily indicating much of anything?

I would like to hear your opinion on the "open question" I
identified...

> > Hubert also says:
> > 
> > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is
> > not a
> > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> > 
> > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
> 
> I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protocol
> mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may use
> software from different vendors which may use different conventions if
> the protocol is not clear enough.

The convention for PSK-only deployments in the text Ekr added seems
clear enough to me, so it seems that only deployments willing to do
either Certificate or PSK in the same server instance are at risk.

> > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
> > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)
> > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
> > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> > 
> > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we know
> > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> > differentiator between resumption and external.
> 
> That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to the
> same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
> used in one implementation would not apply to another.

You think there will be a server using resumption PSK identifiers
shorter than 128 bits??

> > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing
> > support
> > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide
> > PSK
> > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> > 
> > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
> > PSKs, personally.
> 
> The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and I
> guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
> explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed to
> handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
> that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionally
> ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security for
> TLS1.3.

Especially in light of subsequent updates on the thread, this does
not seem to be a strong enough argument to merit a change after IESG
approval.  There seem to be some options for future updates in
backwards-compatible ways, in any case.

-Benjamin


From nobody Tue Mar 20 05:52:32 2018
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Monday, 19 March 2018 23:53:16 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 05:00:51PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Sunday, 18 March 2018 16:27:34 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just add=
 a
> > > section
> > > that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to get =
it
> > > into -27
> > > due to fumble fingering).
> >=20
> > If there is no consensus on the recommended fix for the issue, I wonder=
 if
> > we shouldn't then soften the language in the section about PSK binder
> > handling, from SHOULD to MAY.
>=20
> I think on the balance I am happier retaining SHOULD.
>=20
> > Though, I'd say that the reference to that newly added section is
> > definitely missing.
>=20
> I expect that can be done as an RFC Editor note or during AUTH48.
>=20
> -Benjamin

https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1189 filed as a reminder

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 12:55:31 +0000
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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> On Mar 20, 2018, at 12:52, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Monday, 19 March 2018 23:53:16 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 05:00:51PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
>>> On Sunday, 18 March 2018 16:27:34 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>> After discussion with the chairs and the AD, I have opted to just =
add a
>>>> section
>>>> that explains the attack. I just merged that (but managed not to =
get it
>>>> into -27
>>>> due to fumble fingering).
>>>=20
>>> If there is no consensus on the recommended fix for the issue, I =
wonder if
>>> we shouldn't then soften the language in the section about PSK =
binder
>>> handling, from SHOULD to MAY.
>>=20
>> I think on the balance I am happier retaining SHOULD.
>>=20
>>> Though, I'd say that the reference to that newly added section is
>>> definitely missing.
>>=20
>> I expect that can be done as an RFC Editor note or during AUTH48.
>>=20
>> -Benjamin
>=20
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1189 filed as a reminder

Thanks!

spt=


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From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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Hi Sean:

Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict catering towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out? 

My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private extensions (since IETF will just have killed this off).

I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can already do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate (if a weakness is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).

As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A" scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards the sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for implementation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS if the signaling required has just been removed?

NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does question though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zulu hour arrives, one should have tools to act...

Best regards, Rene

On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>
> One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?
>
> spt
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


-- 
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 14:54:24 +0000
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To: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
Cc: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/xBL0XOe5jBXT5TmK5ChfnXDSaW4>
Subject: Re: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Sean:
>
> Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict catering
> towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another
> signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private
> field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled
> out?
>

No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate these code points, so
you should use them without coordination".

The key point here is that this is a big space and so we're instead going
to make it easy for people to reserve code points by writing a stable spec,
that need not be an IETF standard, and that's what they should do.


-Ekr


>
> My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is
> "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private extensions
> (since IETF will just have killed this off).
>
> I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF
> standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can already
> do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate (=
if
> a weakness is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and
> won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).
>
> As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A" scheme=
,
> or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards the sensor wor=
ld
> (which operates in quite a hostile environment for implementation
> security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS if the signaling
> required has just been removed?
>
> NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of
> whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does
> question though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zulu
> hour arrives, one should have tools to act...
>
> Best regards, Rene
>
> On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> > During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted
> something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was sa=
id
> in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis assigned
> some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as
> reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
> >
> > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we=
=E2=80=99re
> really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need
> to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as Reserv=
ed
> for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated
> in these two registries?
> >
> > spt
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> --
> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Sean:<br>
<br>
Quick question: does &quot;closing the registry&quot; not contradict cateri=
ng towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another =
signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private field=
, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out?<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No. Private just means &quot;we&#39;re n=
ot going to allocate these code points, so you should use them without coor=
dination&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>The key point here is that this is=
 a big space and so we&#39;re instead going to make it easy for people to r=
eserve code points by writing a stable spec, that need not be an IETF stand=
ard, and that&#39;s what they should do.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
><div>-Ekr</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is &quot;=
verboten&quot;, there is no chance for people to signal private extensions =
(since IETF will just have killed this off).<br>
<br>
I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF standard=
ization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can already do this w=
ithout waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate (if a weakne=
ss is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and won&#39;t wa=
it for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).<br>
<br>
As case in point, suppose US Gov&#39;t wants to roll its own &quot;Suite A&=
quot; scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards th=
e sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for implement=
ation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS if the signa=
ling required has just been removed?<br>
<br>
NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of wh=
oever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does ques=
tion though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zulu hour =
arrives, one should have tools to act...<br>
<br>
Best regards, Rene<br>
<br>
On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
&gt; During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he note=
d something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was sa=
id in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates.=C2=A0 Turns out that 4492b=
is assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates was marki=
ng as reserved.=C2=A0 I have fixed that up in:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updat=
es/pull/65" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/<=
wbr>draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates/pull/65</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we=
=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms regist=
ry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.=C2=A0 Currently these are ma=
rked as Reserved for Private Use.=C2=A0 So the question is should we mark 2=
24-255 as deprecated in these two registries?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; spt<br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
--<br>
email: <a href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> |=
 Skype: rstruik<br>
cell: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658" value=3D"+16478675658">+1=
 (647) 867-5658</a> | US: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28415%29%20690-7363" value=
=3D"+14156907363">+1 (415) 690-7363</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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Hi Eric:

I may have an incorrect impression about the code points, but, let us
say, one finds out an attack on one of the TLS1.3 algorithms and wishes
to swap the algorithm set for a new one (that is clearly specified, say,
"RS-Alg-X"). How does one do this if one marks 224-255 as deprecated.
How does one signal private use of "RS-Alg-X" now. If you could tell me,
please let me know, so that I feel more at ease with this. {This should
not be something where reliability is impossible to achieve).

Thanks!

Rene

> One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if
we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry
we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked
as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255
as deprecated in these two registries?

On 3/20/2018 10:54 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com
> <mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Sean:
>
>     Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict
>     catering towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes
>     to add another signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If
>     there is no private field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI
>     Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out?
>
>
> No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate these code points,
> so you should use them without coordination".
>
> The key point here is that this is a big space and so we're instead
> going to make it easy for people to reserve code points by writing a
> stable spec, that need not be an IETF standard, and that's what they
> should do.
>
>
> -Ekr
>  
>
>
>     My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case
>     is "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private
>     extensions (since IETF will just have killed this off).
>
>     I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF
>     standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can
>     already do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and
>     heated debate (if a weakness is discovered, dark forces will
>     exploit this right away and won't wait for IETF to catch up to
>     exploit an issue).
>
>     As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A"
>     scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards
>     the sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment
>     for implementation security), how is one going to do this in
>     context of TLS if the signaling required has just been removed?
>
>     NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the
>     legitimacy of whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private
>     after all), it does question though the wisdom of removing the
>     option for using this. If Zulu hour arrives, one should have tools
>     to act...
>
>     Best regards, Rene
>
>     On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>     > During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted
>     something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what
>     was said in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that
>     4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
>     was marking as reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
>     >
>     https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>     <https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65>
>     >
>     > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that
>     if we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms
>     registry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently
>     these are marked as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is
>     should we mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?
>     >
>     > spt
>     > _______________________________________________
>     > TLS mailing list
>     > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>     > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>
>
>     --
>     email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com <mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com> |
>     Skype: rstruik
>     cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 <tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658> | US: +1
>     (415) 690-7363 <tel:%2B1%20%28415%29%20690-7363>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     TLS mailing list
>     TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
>
>

-- 
email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi Eric:<br>
      <br>
      I may have an incorrect impression about the code points, but, let
      us say, one finds out an attack on one of the TLS1.3 algorithms
      and wishes to swap the algorithm set for a new one (that is
      clearly specified, say, "RS-Alg-X"). How does one do this if one
      marks 224-255 as deprecated. How does one signal private use of
      "RS-Alg-X" now. If you could tell me, please let me know, so that
      I feel more at ease with this. {This should not be something where
      reliability is impossible to achieve).<br>
      <br>
      Thanks!<br>
      <br>
      Rene<br>
      <br>
      &gt; One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was
      that if we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and
      SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark 224-255 as
      deprecated.  Currently these are marked as Reserved for Private
      Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated in
      these two registries?<br>
      <br>
      On 3/20/2018 10:54 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CABcZeBOW9rJUqcx9NBnE9iy_xp14K_i=CN2LVrGe1cUwNCkv4Q@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene
            Struik <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target="_blank"
                moz-do-not-send="true">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Sean:<br>
              <br>
              Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict
              catering towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one
              wishes to add another signature scheme, besides Ed25519,
              to the mix. If there is no private field, does this mean
              that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out?<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate
              these code points, so you should use them without
              coordination".</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>The key point here is that this is a big space and so
              we're instead going to make it easy for people to reserve
              code points by writing a stable spec, that need not be an
              IETF standard, and that's what they should do.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>-Ekr</div>
            <div> </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <br>
              My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private
              Use case is "verboten", there is no chance for people to
              signal private extensions (since IETF will just have
              killed this off).<br>
              <br>
              I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in
              place (IETF standardization) to effectuate crypto agility,
              if private use can already do this without waiting for
              3-year public discussions and heated debate (if a weakness
              is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away
              and won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).<br>
              <br>
              As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own
              "Suite A" scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with
              something tailored towards the sensor world (which
              operates in quite a hostile environment for implementation
              security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS
              if the signaling required has just been removed?<br>
              <br>
              NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the
              legitimacy of whoever may wish a private extensions (it is
              private after all), it does question though the wisdom of
              removing the option for using this. If Zulu hour arrives,
              one should have tools to act...<br>
              <br>
              Best regards, Rene<br>
              <br>
              On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
              &gt; During Adam Roach’s AD review of
              draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something about the
              HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in
              draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates.  Turns out that
              4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates
              was marking as reserved.  I have fixed that up in:<br>
              &gt; <a
href="https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65"
                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://github.com/tlswg/<wbr>draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-<wbr>updates/pull/65</a><br>
              &gt;<br>
              &gt; One further point brought out in discussions with
              Adam was that if we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm
              and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark
              224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as
              Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we
              mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?<br>
              &gt;<br>
              &gt; spt<br>
              &gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
              &gt; TLS mailing list<br>
              &gt; <a href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org" moz-do-not-send="true">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
              &gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls"
                rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
              <span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
                  <br>
                  --<br>
                  email: <a href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com"
                    moz-do-not-send="true">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> |
                  Skype: rstruik<br>
                  cell: <a href="tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658"
                    value="+16478675658" moz-do-not-send="true">+1 (647)
                    867-5658</a> | US: <a
                    href="tel:%2B1%20%28415%29%20690-7363"
                    value="+14156907363" moz-do-not-send="true">+1 (415)
                    690-7363</a><br>
                  <br>
                  ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
                  TLS mailing list<br>
                  <a href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org" moz-do-not-send="true">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
                  <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls"
                    rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
                    moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
                </font></span></blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363</pre>
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On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:06 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Eric:
>
> I may have an incorrect impression about the code points, but, let us say=
,
> one finds out an attack on one of the TLS1.3 algorithms and wishes to swa=
p
> the algorithm set for a new one (that is clearly specified, say,
> "RS-Alg-X"). How does one do this if one marks 224-255 as deprecated.
>

I don't understand the question. There are plenty of other code points, we
just no longer break them up into signature/hash pairs.



> How does one signal private use of "RS-Alg-X" now.
>

You publish a specification that meets the specification bar and file for a
code point.

-Ekr



> If you could tell me, please let me know, so that I feel more at ease wit=
h
> this. {This should not be something where reliability is impossible to
> achieve).
>




> Thanks!
>
> Rene
>
> > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we=
=E2=80=99re
> really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need
> to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as Reserv=
ed
> for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated
> in these two registries?
>
> On 3/20/2018 10:54 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Sean:
>>
>> Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict catering
>> towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another
>> signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private
>> field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now rule=
d
>> out?
>>
>
> No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate these code points, so
> you should use them without coordination".
>
> The key point here is that this is a big space and so we're instead going
> to make it easy for people to reserve code points by writing a stable spe=
c,
> that need not be an IETF standard, and that's what they should do.
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is
>> "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private extensions
>> (since IETF will just have killed this off).
>>
>> I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF
>> standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can alread=
y
>> do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate =
(if
>> a weakness is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and
>> won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).
>>
>> As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A"
>> scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards the
>> sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for
>> implementation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS =
if
>> the signaling required has just been removed?
>>
>> NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of
>> whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does
>> question though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zul=
u
>> hour arrives, one should have tools to act...
>>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>> On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>> > During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he note=
d
>> something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was s=
aid
>> in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis
>> assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as
>> reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
>> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>> >
>> > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if
>> we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms r=
egistry we
>> need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as
>> Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as
>> deprecated in these two registries?
>> >
>> > spt
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>> --
>> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
>> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 <%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658> | US: +1 (415)
>> 690-7363 <%2B1%20%28415%29%20690-7363>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
>
> --
> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 <(647)%20867-5658> | US: +1 (415) 690-7363 <(415)=
%20690-7363>
>
>

--001a113e9164c9a9a70567db6351
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:06 PM, Rene Struik <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <div class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584971057159803moz-cite-pref=
ix">Hi Eric:<br>
      <br>
      I may have an incorrect impression about the code points, but, let
      us say, one finds out an attack on one of the TLS1.3 algorithms
      and wishes to swap the algorithm set for a new one (that is
      clearly specified, say, &quot;RS-Alg-X&quot;). How does one do this i=
f one
      marks 224-255 as deprecated. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>=
<div>I don&#39;t understand the question. There are plenty of other code po=
ints, we just no longer break them up into signature/hash pairs.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"=
#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584=
971057159803moz-cite-prefix">How does one signal private use of
      &quot;RS-Alg-X&quot; now. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>You publish a specification that meets the specification bar and file for=
 a code point.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#F=
FFFFF"><div class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584971057159803moz-cite-p=
refix">If you could tell me, please let me know, so that
      I feel more at ease with this. {This should not be something where
      reliability is impossible to achieve).<br></div></div></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><=
div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"m_-39636411731435017=
47m_-4275584971057159803moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      Thanks!<span class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#8=
88888"><br>
      <br>
      Rene</font></span><span><br>
      <br>
      &gt; One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was
      that if we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and
      SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark 224-255 as
      deprecated.=C2=A0 Currently these are marked as Reserved for Private
      Use.=C2=A0 So the question is should we mark 224-255 as deprecated in
      these two registries?<br>
      <br></span><div><div class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747h5">
      On 3/20/2018 10:54 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
    </div></div></div><div><div class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747h5">
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene
            Struik <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmai=
l.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Sean:<br>
              <br>
              Quick question: does &quot;closing the registry&quot; not con=
tradict
              catering towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one
              wishes to add another signature scheme, besides Ed25519,
              to the mix. If there is no private field, does this mean
              that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out?<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>No. Private just means &quot;we&#39;re not going to alloca=
te
              these code points, so you should use them without
              coordination&quot;.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>The key point here is that this is a big space and so
              we&#39;re instead going to make it easy for people to reserve
              code points by writing a stable spec, that need not be an
              IETF standard, and that&#39;s what they should do.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>-Ekr</div>
            <div>=C2=A0</div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <br>
              My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private
              Use case is &quot;verboten&quot;, there is no chance for peop=
le to
              signal private extensions (since IETF will just have
              killed this off).<br>
              <br>
              I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in
              place (IETF standardization) to effectuate crypto agility,
              if private use can already do this without waiting for
              3-year public discussions and heated debate (if a weakness
              is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away
              and won&#39;t wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).=
<br>
              <br>
              As case in point, suppose US Gov&#39;t wants to roll its own
              &quot;Suite A&quot; scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with
              something tailored towards the sensor world (which
              operates in quite a hostile environment for implementation
              security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS
              if the signaling required has just been removed?<br>
              <br>
              NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the
              legitimacy of whoever may wish a private extensions (it is
              private after all), it does question though the wisdom of
              removing the option for using this. If Zulu hour arrives,
              one should have tools to act...<br>
              <br>
              Best regards, Rene<br>
              <br>
              On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
              &gt; During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of
              draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something about the
              HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in
              draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-u<wbr>pdates.=C2=A0 Turns out th=
at
              4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-u<w=
br>pdates
              was marking as reserved.=C2=A0 I have fixed that up in:<br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-=
registry-updates/pull/65" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft<wbr>-ietf-tls-iana-registry-update<wbr>s/pull/65</a><br>
              &gt;<br>
              &gt; One further point brought out in discussions with
              Adam was that if we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorit=
hm
              and SignatureAlgorithms registry we need to also mark
              224-255 as deprecated.=C2=A0 Currently these are marked as
              Reserved for Private Use.=C2=A0 So the question is should we
              mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?<br>
              &gt;<br>
              &gt; spt<br>
              &gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
              &gt; TLS mailing list<br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ie=
tf.org</a><br>
              &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istin=
fo/tls</a><br>
              <span class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584971057159803HO=
EnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
                  <br>
                  --<br>
                  email: <a href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a> |
                  Skype: rstruik<br>
                  cell: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658" value=
=3D"+16478675658" target=3D"_blank">+1 (647)
                    867-5658</a> | US: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28415%29%2069=
0-7363" value=3D"+14156907363" target=3D"_blank">+1 (415)
                    690-7363</a><br>
                  <br>
                  ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
                  TLS mailing list<br>
                  <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@iet=
f.org</a><br>
                  <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinf=
o/tls</a><br>
                </font></span></blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <pre class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584971057159803moz-signature=
" cols=3D"72">--=20
email: <a class=3D"m_-3963641173143501747m_-4275584971057159803moz-txt-link=
-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstru=
ik.ext@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik
cell: <a href=3D"tel:(647)%20867-5658" value=3D"+16478675658" target=3D"_bl=
ank">+1 (647) 867-5658</a> | US: <a href=3D"tel:(415)%20690-7363" value=3D"=
+14156907363" target=3D"_blank">+1 (415) 690-7363</a></pre>
  </div></div></div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113e9164c9a9a70567db6351--


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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
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--001a11442348b1ccf70567db856e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

I don't think Connection-ID is really required for ATLS.  As Carsten and
Owen mentioned in the side meeting, there are a few ways to use HTTP to
correlate the relevant messages.

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) <
thomas.fossati@nokia.com> wrote:

> On 20/03/2018, 16:38, "TLS on behalf of John Mattsson" <
> tls-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of john.mattsson@ericsson.com> wrote:
> > At the Monday afternoon TLS session, it was stated that Connection ID
> > in TLS was unemployable in the wild due to middleboxes. Couldn't that
> > be solved by placing the cid field after the length field?
>
> Are you referring to slide 13 of [1]?
>
> If so, the problem is not CID-specific.  It's more generally what
> could happen if we try and reuse the top bit of the length field
> for other purposes.
>
> Yoav brought up the case of an intercepting middlebox - one that needs to
> pretend to be a fully-fledged TLS server.  That kind of box might
> either:
> - let the extension that enables repurposing the length's MSB pass
>   through, and subsequently choke on the invalid length [HARD FAIL];
> - eat up the unknown extension and therefore break the feature
>   negotiation [SOFT FAIL].
>
> Cheers
>
>
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/slides-
> 101-tls-sessb-record-header-extensions-for-dtls-00
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a11442348b1ccf70567db856e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I don&#39;t think Connection-ID is really required for ATL=
S.=C2=A0 As Carsten and Owen mentioned in the side meeting, there are a few=
 ways to use HTTP to correlate the relevant messages.<br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:1=
5 PM, Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:thomas.fossati@nokia.com" target=3D"_blank">thomas.fossati@nokia=
.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D=
"">On 20/03/2018, 16:38, &quot;TLS on behalf of John Mattsson&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of =
<a href=3D"mailto:john.mattsson@ericsson.com">john.mattsson@ericsson.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; At the Monday afternoon TLS session, it was stated that Connection ID<=
br>
&gt; in TLS was unemployable in the wild due to middleboxes. Couldn&#39;t t=
hat<br>
&gt; be solved by placing the cid field after the length field?<br>
<br>
</span>Are you referring to slide 13 of [1]?<br>
<br>
If so, the problem is not CID-specific.=C2=A0 It&#39;s more generally what<=
br>
could happen if we try and reuse the top bit of the length field<br>
for other purposes.<br>
<br>
Yoav brought up the case of an intercepting middlebox - one that needs to<b=
r>
pretend to be a fully-fledged TLS server.=C2=A0 That kind of box might<br>
either:<br>
- let the extension that enables repurposing the length&#39;s MSB pass<br>
=C2=A0 through, and subsequently choke on the invalid length [HARD FAIL];<b=
r>
- eat up the unknown extension and therefore break the feature<br>
=C2=A0 negotiation [SOFT FAIL].<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/slides-10=
1-tls-sessb-record-header-extensions-for-dtls-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/<wbr>meeting/101/materials/slides-=
<wbr>101-tls-sessb-record-header-<wbr>extensions-for-dtls-00</a><br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection ID in TLS
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> On Mar 20, 2018, at 11:38, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> I think Connection ID is an important enabler for end-to-end security =
with (D)TLS. There seems to be important use cases for connection ID in =
TLS as well, see https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/atlas. At the =
Monday afternoon TLS session, it was stated that Connection ID in TLS =
was unemployable in the wild due to middleboxes. Couldn't that be solved =
by placing the cid field after the length field? E.g.
>=20
>   struct {
>      ContentType opaque_type =3D application_data; /* 23 */
>      ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version =3D 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
>      uint16 length;
>      opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
>      opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
>   } TLSCiphertext;
>=20
>   length  The sum of cid_length and TLSCiphertext.length

This defines length in terms of itself since length is =
TLSCiphertext.length.

--=20
Stephen Checkoway






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On Monday, 19 March 2018 14:38:05 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
>=20
> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > > > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > > ...
> > > > >=20
> > > > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between
> > > > > > external and
> > > > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> > > > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > > > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
> > > > > gotten
> > > > > to think through whether there is still potential for information
> > > > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
> > > > > would
> > > > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external-
> > > > > PSK
> > > > > full handshakes.
> > > >=20
> > > > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
> > > > PSK
> > > > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> > > > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> > > > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy is
> > > > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
> > > > from
> > > > resumption tickets.
> > >=20
> > > Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
> > > PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSKs
> > > having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designing
> > > things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
> > > the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
> > > only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
> > > Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
> > > and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
> > > channel.
> >=20
> > I agree.
> >=20
> > > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adopt
> > > > a
> > > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients
> > > > with a
> > > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a
> > > > lot
> > > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external PSK
> > > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce with
> > > > the
> > > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own set
> > > > of
> > > > issues.
> > >=20
> > > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to do
> > > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's also
> > > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to design
> > > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> > >=20
> > > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> > > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> > > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note that
> > > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> > > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> > > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
> > > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> > > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> > > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> > > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> > > document.
> >=20
> > That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
> > vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.
> >=20
> > > Hubert also says:
> > >=20
> > > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or is
> > > not a
> > > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> > >=20
> > > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> > > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> > > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> > > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
> >=20
> > I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protocol
> > mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may use
> > software from different vendors which may use different conventions if
> > the protocol is not clear enough.
> >=20
> > > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> > > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> > > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> > > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> > > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> > > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
> > > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> > > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.)
> > > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
> > > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> > >=20
> > > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we know
> > > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> > > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> > > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> > > differentiator between resumption and external.
> >=20
> > That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to the
> > same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
> > used in one implementation would not apply to another.
> >=20
> > > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrificing
> > > support
> > > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to guide
> > > PSK
> > > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> > >=20
> > > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> > > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
> > > PSKs, personally.
> >=20
> > The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and I
> > guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
> > explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed to
> > handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
> > that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionally
> > ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security for
> > TLS1.3.
>=20
> Nikos,
>=20
> Just as a clarification, I believe it's possible for a PSK-only
> implementation to
> avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for "unknown ID" and "invalid
> binder"

supporting both external PSK authentication and certificate based=20
authentication for a single IoT gateway would be quite expected, I'd say

so just because PSK-only implementations are not vulnerable, I don't think =
we=20
can expect all servers that deploy external PSKs will also disable certific=
ate=20
based authentication (not to mention that it's rather unlikely that users w=
ill=20
expect that adding certificate will suddenly make their server vulnerable)

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 21:21:06 +0000
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMxHQTmQnAkoukTbHwT1zWO69pA0c6v=bdWLCaidvK9Ag@mail.gmail.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 7:42 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 19 March 2018 14:38:05 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <
> nmav@redhat.com>
> >
> > wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > > > > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating betwee=
n
> > > > > > > external and
> > > > > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of course
> > > > > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > > > > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
> > > > > > gotten
> > > > > > to think through whether there is still potential for informati=
on
> > > > > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
> > > > > > would
> > > > > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to external=
-
> > > > > > PSK
> > > > > > full handshakes.
> > > > >
> > > > > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
> > > > > PSK
> > > > > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> > > > > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> > > > > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy i=
s
> > > > > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
> > > > > from
> > > > > resumption tickets.
> > > >
> > > > Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
> > > > PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSKs
> > > > having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designin=
g
> > > > things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
> > > > the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
> > > > only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
> > > > Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
> > > > and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
> > > > channel.
> > >
> > > I agree.
> > >
> > > > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might adop=
t
> > > > > a
> > > > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clients
> > > > > with a
> > > > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks a
> > > > > lot
> > > > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external P=
SK
> > > > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce wit=
h
> > > > > the
> > > > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own se=
t
> > > > > of
> > > > > issues.
> > > >
> > > > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to d=
o
> > > > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's als=
o
> > > > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to desig=
n
> > > > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> > > >
> > > > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> > > > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> > > > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note tha=
t
> > > > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> > > > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> > > > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishes
> > > > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> > > > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> > > > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> > > > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> > > > document.
> > >
> > > That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
> > > vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.
> > >
> > > > Hubert also says:
> > > >
> > > > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or =
is
> > > > not a
> > > > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> > > >
> > > > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> > > > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> > > > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> > > > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
> > >
> > > I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protoco=
l
> > > mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may u=
se
> > > software from different vendors which may use different conventions i=
f
> > > the protocol is not clear enough.
> > >
> > > > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> > > > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> > > > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> > > > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> > > > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> > > > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server falls
> > > > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> > > > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be.=
)
> > > > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurious
> > > > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> > > >
> > > > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we kno=
w
> > > > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> > > > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> > > > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> > > > differentiator between resumption and external.
> > >
> > > That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to t=
he
> > > same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
> > > used in one implementation would not apply to another.
> > >
> > > > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before sacrifici=
ng
> > > > support
> > > > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to gui=
de
> > > > PSK
> > > > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> > > >
> > > > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> > > > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple external
> > > > PSKs, personally.
> > >
> > > The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and =
I
> > > guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
> > > explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed =
to
> > > handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
> > > that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentionall=
y
> > > ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security f=
or
> > > TLS1.3.
> >
> > Nikos,
> >
> > Just as a clarification, I believe it's possible for a PSK-only
> > implementation to
> > avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for "unknown ID" and "invalid
> > binder"
>
> supporting both external PSK authentication and certificate based
> authentication for a single IoT gateway would be quite expected, I'd say
>
> so just because PSK-only implementations are not vulnerable, I don't thin=
k
> we
> can expect all servers that deploy external PSKs will also disable
> certificate
> based authentication (not to mention that it's rather unlikely that users
> will
> expect that adding certificate will suddenly make their server vulnerable=
)


I'm not making an argument, I'm merely stating what I believe to be the
facts.

-Ekr

--
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
>

--001a113e91646e096b0567dea91f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 7:42 PM, Hubert Kario <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><d=
iv class=3D"h5">On Monday, 19 March 2018 14:38:05 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:<=
br>
&gt; On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:nmav@redhat.com">nmav@redhat.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema =
wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert K=
ario wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; ...<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we do not have a reliable mechanism of differ=
entiating between<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; external and<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello<br=
>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server w=
ill of course<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement =
that the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.=
=C2=A0 I haven&#39;t<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; gotten<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to think through whether there is still potential =
for information<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; leakage about external PSK identities, but it seem=
s like there<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; would<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; not be, provided that the server prefers resumptio=
n to external-<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; full handshakes.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these =
&quot;external<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; identities&quot;. If a system is set so that clients us=
e static PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; identities, then the identity is an identifier and the =
client&#39;s<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; movements and connections can be tracked. I don&#39;t t=
hink privacy is<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; improved if we make it easy to differentiate external i=
dentities<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; from<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; resumption tickets.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current ext=
ernal<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; PSK scheme are terrible!=C2=A0 This follows naturally from e=
xternal PSKs<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; having not really been a first-class citizen while we were d=
esigning<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PS=
Ks for<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the convenience of having them use the same binder construct=
 and<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientH=
ello.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preserva=
tion,<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlatio=
n<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; channel.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I agree.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you =
might adopt<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; different setup. For example, servers could provision t=
he clients<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; with a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, th=
at looks a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; lot<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use =
external PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; identities by encrypting their long term identity and a=
 nonce with<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; public key of the server, a design which of course has =
its own set<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; of<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; issues.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for h=
ow to do<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.=C2=
=A0 (It&#39;s also<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place t=
o design<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do =
so.)<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeratio=
n of<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reas=
onably<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; at this stage of the document&#39;s lifecycle at all.=C2=A0 =
(I also note that<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not<br=
>
&gt; &gt; &gt; necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; &gt; situations with no actual security impact and/or against the=
 wishes<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; of the software authors.)=C2=A0 I don&#39;t think anyone has=
 proposed a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and=
 given<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it s=
eems<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for th=
is<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; document.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; That&#39;s a good general remark, but not really the case for the=
<br>
&gt; &gt; vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Hubert also says:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; % so there&#39;s no reliable way to say that, yes, this iden=
tity is or is<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; not a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; % resumption ticket, if I can&#39;t decrypt it<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Mostly.=C2=A0 External PSKs are established out of band, and=
 that<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs a=
re in<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.<=
br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the pro=
tocol<br>
&gt; &gt; mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties m=
ay use<br>
&gt; &gt; software from different vendors which may use different conventio=
ns if<br>
&gt; &gt; the protocol is not clear enough.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; It&#39;s probably also worth considering the two cases for s=
erver<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a know=
n<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server cou=
ld<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resump=
tion<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; ticket that fails to decrypt.=C2=A0 The latter case fails be=
cause the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; attacker can try candidate external identities and the serve=
r falls<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.=C2=A0 (W=
ell, maybe<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket wo=
uld be.)<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; The first case is not really usable since it would lead to s=
purious<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; triggering of the proposed &quot;at most one external PSK&qu=
ot; check.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; So, in addition to the &quot;we provision external PSKs only=
 when we know<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero&quot;, deployments c=
ould also<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length =
and<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reli=
able<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; differentiator between resumption and external.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering =
to the<br>
&gt; &gt; same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventi=
ons<br>
&gt; &gt; used in one implementation would not apply to another.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; % I&#39;d really prefer we exhaust other possibilities befor=
e sacrificing<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; support<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint=
 to guide<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; % selection, now we&#39;re left with just server IP or hostn=
ame.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; I think that &quot;do nothing and accept external PSK enumer=
ation as a<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; risk&quot; is more likely than sacrificing support for multi=
ple external<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; PSKs, personally.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk =
and I<br>
&gt; &gt; guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK di=
d<br>
&gt; &gt; explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proc=
eed to<br>
&gt; &gt; handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), mean=
ing<br>
&gt; &gt; that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentio=
nally<br>
&gt; &gt; ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK securi=
ty for<br>
&gt; &gt; TLS1.3.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Nikos,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Just as a clarification, I believe it&#39;s possible for a PSK-only<br=
>
&gt; implementation to<br>
&gt; avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for &quot;unknown ID&quot; and=
 &quot;invalid<br>
&gt; binder&quot;<br>
<br>
</div></div>supporting both external PSK authentication and certificate bas=
ed<br>
authentication for a single IoT gateway would be quite expected, I&#39;d sa=
y<br>
<br>
so just because PSK-only implementations are not vulnerable, I don&#39;t th=
ink we<br>
can expect all servers that deploy external PSKs will also disable certific=
ate<br>
based authentication (not to mention that it&#39;s rather unlikely that use=
rs will<br>
expect that adding certificate will suddenly make their server vulnerable)<=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not making an argument, I&#39;m mer=
ely stating what I believe to be the facts.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</=
div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><di=
v class=3D"h5">
--<br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00=C2=A0 Brno, Czech Republic=
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113e91646e096b0567dea91f--


From nobody Tue Mar 20 14:26:21 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt
	Pages           : 156
	Date            : 2018-03-20

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

   This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs
   5077, 5246, and 6961.  This document also specifies new requirements
   for TLS 1.2 implementations.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection ID in TLS
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On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 11:29:09PM +0000, John Mattsson wrote:
> I don’t think it is required either, the mechanisms in draft-schmertmann-dice-codtls and draft-friel-tls-over-http clearly wotks, but Hannes Tschofenig brought it up as a new mechanism that can be used to simplify things in ATLS, I tend to agree. I don’t think we should invent new mechanism for ATLS if we can use Connection ID.

My personal opinion is that it will be easier for ATLS to use DLS
natively than to produce a reliable in-order stream abstraction for
TLS's use.  (I say, as someone who is not going to be doing the
work, so take that for what it is.)

-Ben


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Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 18:57:42 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
Cc: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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References: <1C32782E-02E4-4743-9E26-E5C0593C1BCF@ericsson.com> <6964A867-2406-4190-AFFE-E52C15A10A8A@pahtak.org> <EF62879E-C621-4E51-8006-727328E69BF7@ericsson.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection ID in TLS
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The issue is that the "TLSCiphertext.length" is the same field as
the "uint16 length", so you are saying that this field has the value
of "cid_length plus itself", which is impossible in integers modulo
[a value larger than cid_length].  In the "formal" grammar, you'd
need to define a new field.

-Ben

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 11:45:59PM +0000, John Mattsson wrote:
> Correct, I just copied pasted the length of the arrays, should be length = cid_length + encrypted_record.length.
> 
> The example was taken from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27. If I understand correctly, It seems like the same circular definition is done there as well....
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------
>       struct {
>           ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
>           ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
>           uint16 length;
>           opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
>       } TLSCiphertext;
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> Shouldn't this be...
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------
>       struct {
>           ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
>           ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
>           uint16 length;
>           opaque encrypted_record[encrypted_record.length];
>       } TLSCiphertext;
> -----------------------------------------------------
> 
> Does this mean the 
> ﻿On 2018-03-20, 19:29, "Stephen Checkoway" <s@pahtak.org> wrote:
> 
>     
>     
>     > On Mar 20, 2018, at 11:38, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> wrote:
>     > 
>     > I think Connection ID is an important enabler for end-to-end security with (D)TLS. There seems to be important use cases for connection ID in TLS as well, see https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/atlas. At the Monday afternoon TLS session, it was stated that Connection ID in TLS was unemployable in the wild due to middleboxes. Couldn't that be solved by placing the cid field after the length field? E.g.
>     > 
>     >   struct {
>     >      ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
>     >      ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
>     >      uint16 length;
>     >      opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
>     >      opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
>     >   } TLSCiphertext;
>     > 
>     >   length  The sum of cid_length and TLSCiphertext.length
>     
>     This defines length in terms of itself since length is TLSCiphertext.length.
>     
>     -- 
>     Stephen Checkoway
>     
>     
>     
>     
>     
>     
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection ID in TLS
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> On Mar 20, 2018, at 18:45, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Correct, I just copied pasted the length of the arrays, should be =
length =3D cid_length + encrypted_record.length.
>=20
> The example was taken from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-27. If I understand =
correctly, It seems like the same circular definition is done there as =
well....
>=20
> -----------------------------------------------------
>      struct {
>          ContentType opaque_type =3D application_data; /* 23 */
>          ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version =3D 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 =
*/
>          uint16 length;
>          opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
>      } TLSCiphertext;
> -----------------------------------------------------
>=20
> Shouldn't this be...
>=20
> -----------------------------------------------------
>      struct {
>          ContentType opaque_type =3D application_data; /* 23 */
>          ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version =3D 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 =
*/
>          uint16 length;
>          opaque encrypted_record[encrypted_record.length];
>      } TLSCiphertext;
> -----------------------------------------------------

There is no field called encrypted_record.length. TLSCiphertext.length =
refers to the length field in the TLSCiphertext struct rather than the =
length of the TLSCiphertext itself (which is a few bytes longer). See =
Section 3, Presentation Language, for the precise definitions.

Steve

>=20
> Does this mean the=20
> =EF=BB=BFOn 2018-03-20, 19:29, "Stephen Checkoway" <s@pahtak.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Mar 20, 2018, at 11:38, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>> I think Connection ID is an important enabler for end-to-end security =
with (D)TLS. There seems to be important use cases for connection ID in =
TLS as well, see https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/atlas. At the =
Monday afternoon TLS session, it was stated that Connection ID in TLS =
was unemployable in the wild due to middleboxes. Couldn't that be solved =
by placing the cid field after the length field? E.g.
>>=20
>>  struct {
>>     ContentType opaque_type =3D application_data; /* 23 */
>>     ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version =3D 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
>>     uint16 length;
>>     opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
>>     opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
>>  } TLSCiphertext;
>>=20
>>  length  The sum of cid_length and TLSCiphertext.length
>=20
>    This defines length in terms of itself since length is =
TLSCiphertext.length.
>=20
>    --=20
>    Stephen Checkoway
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20

--=20
Stephen Checkoway




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References: <6112806.hxzZ6NivhB@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <1521466432.30491.16.camel@redhat.com> <CABcZeBPThERW6NnOKkTZ7gxPpq+7Xno+7nEkLr612kt_7FcHEw@mail.gmail.com> <3744627.MaMIWlZzZe@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com> <CABcZeBMxHQTmQnAkoukTbHwT1zWO69pA0c6v=bdWLCaidvK9Ag@mail.gmail.com>
From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:08:46 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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The document has been approved for publication and the outstanding
reference will be added in the RFC editor process during Auth48.

Thank you all for your work on this protocol.

Best regards,
Kathleen

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 7:42 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, 19 March 2018 14:38:05 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
>> > <nmav@redhat.com>
>> >
>> > wrote:
>> > > On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> > > > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> > > > > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> > > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
>> > > > > > ...
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating betwe=
en
>> > > > > > > external and
>> > > > > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of cours=
e
>> > > > > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
>> > > > > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
>> > > > > > gotten
>> > > > > > to think through whether there is still potential for
>> > > > > > information
>> > > > > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
>> > > > > > would
>> > > > > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to externa=
l-
>> > > > > > PSK
>> > > > > > full handshakes.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
>> > > > > PSK
>> > > > > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
>> > > > > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
>> > > > > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy =
is
>> > > > > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
>> > > > > from
>> > > > > resumption tickets.
>> > > >
>> > > > Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
>> > > > PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PSK=
s
>> > > > having not really been a first-class citizen while we were designi=
ng
>> > > > things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
>> > > > the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
>> > > > only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
>> > > > Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
>> > > > and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
>> > > > channel.
>> > >
>> > > I agree.
>> > >
>> > > > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might ado=
pt
>> > > > > a
>> > > > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the client=
s
>> > > > > with a
>> > > > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks =
a
>> > > > > lot
>> > > > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external
>> > > > > PSK
>> > > > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce wi=
th
>> > > > > the
>> > > > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own s=
et
>> > > > > of
>> > > > > issues.
>> > > >
>> > > > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to =
do
>> > > > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's al=
so
>> > > > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to desi=
gn
>> > > > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
>> > > >
>> > > > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
>> > > > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
>> > > > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note th=
at
>> > > > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
>> > > > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
>> > > > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wishe=
s
>> > > > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
>> > > > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
>> > > > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
>> > > > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
>> > > > document.
>> > >
>> > > That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
>> > > vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.
>> > >
>> > > > Hubert also says:
>> > > >
>> > > > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or
>> > > > is
>> > > > not a
>> > > > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
>> > > >
>> > > > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
>> > > > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
>> > > > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
>> > > > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
>> > >
>> > > I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the protoc=
ol
>> > > mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may
>> > > use
>> > > software from different vendors which may use different conventions =
if
>> > > the protocol is not clear enough.
>> > >
>> > > > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
>> > > > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
>> > > > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
>> > > > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
>> > > > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
>> > > > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server fall=
s
>> > > > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
>> > > > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would be=
.)
>> > > > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spuriou=
s
>> > > > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
>> > > >
>> > > > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we kn=
ow
>> > > > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
>> > > > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
>> > > > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
>> > > > differentiator between resumption and external.
>> > >
>> > > That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to
>> > > the
>> > > same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
>> > > used in one implementation would not apply to another.
>> > >
>> > > > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before
>> > > > sacrificing
>> > > > support
>> > > > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to
>> > > > guide
>> > > > PSK
>> > > > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
>> > > >
>> > > > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
>> > > > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple externa=
l
>> > > > PSKs, personally.
>> > >
>> > > The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk and=
 I
>> > > guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
>> > > explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed
>> > > to
>> > > handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
>> > > that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentional=
ly
>> > > ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security
>> > > for
>> > > TLS1.3.
>> >
>> > Nikos,
>> >
>> > Just as a clarification, I believe it's possible for a PSK-only
>> > implementation to
>> > avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for "unknown ID" and "invalid
>> > binder"
>>
>> supporting both external PSK authentication and certificate based
>> authentication for a single IoT gateway would be quite expected, I'd say
>>
>> so just because PSK-only implementations are not vulnerable, I don't thi=
nk
>> we
>> can expect all servers that deploy external PSKs will also disable
>> certificate
>> based authentication (not to mention that it's rather unlikely that user=
s
>> will
>> expect that adding certificate will suddenly make their server vulnerabl=
e)
>
>
> I'm not making an argument, I'm merely stating what I believe to be the
> facts.
>
> -Ekr
>
>> --
>> Regards,
>> Hubert Kario
>> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
>> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
>> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
>
>



--=20

Best regards,
Kathleen


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Subject: [TLS] Protocol Action: 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3'
  (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt) as Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Kathleen Moriarty and Eric Rescorla.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/




Technical Summary

   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

Working Group Summary

  The document is the work product of the members of the TLS
  WG.  There is strong consensus in the working group for this
  document.  The area that was most controversial was around
  the inclusion of a 0-RTT mode that has different security
  properties than the rest of TLS.  s1.3 lists the major differences
  from TLS1.2, as agreed by the contributors; we do not think
  that the RFC needs to list the changes that occurred between
  each draft.

  The draft has had 3 WGLCs to address various issues and the
  chairs assessment was fair in each of these discussions.  At this
  point there are no known outstanding issue.

  While I personally do not agree with inclusion of 0-RTT because
  there are bound to be successful attacks against the mitigations
  in the future, I do agree with the chair's assessment of the WG
  consensus and am pleased with the additional text on mitigating
  the associated risks with 0-RTT.

Document Quality

  There are over 10 interoperable implementations of the
  protocol from different sources written in different
  languages.  The major web browser vendors and TLS
  libraries vendors have draft implementations or have
  indicated they will support the protocol in the future.  In
  addition to having extensive review in the TLS working
  group, the protocol has received unprecedented security
  review by the academic community.  Several TRON (TLS
  Ready or Not) conferences were held with academic
  community to give them a chance to present their
  findings for TLS.  This has resulted in improvements to
  the protocol.  There was also much consideration and 
  discussion around any contentious points, resolved through
  polls and working group last calls.

  Please note that ID-nits complains about the obsoleted/
  updated RFCs not being listed in the abstract. This is
  intentional because the abstract is now a concise and
  comprehensive overview and is free form citations, as
  per RFC7322.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd is Sean Turner.
   The responsible AD is Kathleen Moriarty.
   
   The IANA Expert(s) for the registries
   in this document are 
     Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, 
     Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, and 
     Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com> .

IANA Note

  This document requests the creation of the TLS SignatureScheme
  Registry with values assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126].

  This document requests the reference for several registries be 
  updated to point to this document.  The registries include:
  - TLS Cipher Suite Registry, updated via via Specification Required [RFC8126]
  - TLS ContentType Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126]
  - TLS Alert Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126]
  - TLS HandshakeType Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126]
  - TLS ExtensionType Registry, the policy is changed in ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates and this will be reflected in version 25 of the draft


RFC Editor Note

Please ensure a reference is added prior to final publication for the
text added in section
E.6. PSK Identity Exposure
of draft-ietf-tls-tls13


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Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, shuque@gmail.com, tls-chairs@ietf.org, joe@salowey.net, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with COMMENT)
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Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for handling my DISCUSS points.



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Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 09:05:35 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] proposed text for draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06
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I think the below change would address my issue, without stepping on the
things people brought up today (other then suggesting, not mandating,
to send proof of non-existence when halting TLSA support in the zone)

Paul

diff --git a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml b/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
index 333d2fc..0701b22 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
+++ b/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
@@ -508,6 +508,15 @@
        does not exceed the DNS TTLs or signature validity periods of the
        component records in the chain.
      </t>
+    <t>
+      If the zone using TLSA records stops using TLSA records, those TLS servers
+      that presented TLSA records using this extension SHOULD serve the authenticated
+      denial of existence of TLSA records for some time so their deployment remains
+      distinguishable from an attack. Ending the use of this extension SHOULD NOT be
+      done at the same time as changing the certificate being used on the server. This
+      helps clients from recognising that the current changed deployment is not
+      an attack performed using a different mis-issued PKIX certificate.
+    </t>
    </section>


@@ -580,26 +588,14 @@
        specific servers, clients could maintain a whitelist of sites where
        the use of this extension is forced. The client would refuse to
        authenticate such servers if they failed to deliver this extension.
+      Those clients should interpret authenticated denial of existence proofs
+      as valid use of this extension and continue to establish the TLS connection,
+      even if this connection uses a different PKIX certificate.
        Client applications could also employ a Trust on First Use (TOFU) like
        strategy, whereby they would record the fact that a server offered the
        extension and use that knowledge to require it for subsequent connections.
      </t>

-    <t>
-      This protocol currently provides no way for a server to prove that
-      it doesn't have a TLSA record. Hence absent whitelists, a client
-      misdirected to a server that has fraudulently acquired a public CA
-      issued certificate for the real server's name, could be induced to
-      establish a PKIX verified connection to the rogue server that precluded
-      DANE authentication. This could be solved by enhancing this protocol
-      to require that servers without TLSA records need to provide a DNSSEC
-      authentication chain that proves this (i.e. the chain includes NSEC or
-      NSEC3 records that demonstrate either the absence of the TLSA record,
-      or the absence of a secure delegation to the associated zone). Such an
-      enhancement would be impossible to deploy incrementally though since it
-      requires all TLS servers to support this protocol.
-    </t>
-
    </section>

    <section title="Security Considerations">


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 13:42:12 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] proposed text for draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06
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--001a114797c6251c600567ec5efb
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Speaking as an individual, as I said in the meeting, I don't think this is
a helpful change.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 1:05 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

>
> I think the below change would address my issue, without stepping on the
> things people brought up today (other then suggesting, not mandating,
> to send proof of non-existence when halting TLSA support in the zone)
>
> Paul
>
> diff --git a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
> b/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
> index 333d2fc..0701b22 100644
> --- a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
> +++ b/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.xml
> @@ -508,6 +508,15 @@
>        does not exceed the DNS TTLs or signature validity periods of the
>        component records in the chain.
>      </t>
> +    <t>
> +      If the zone using TLSA records stops using TLSA records, those TLS
> servers
> +      that presented TLSA records using this extension SHOULD serve the
> authenticated
> +      denial of existence of TLSA records for some time so their
> deployment remains
> +      distinguishable from an attack. Ending the use of this extension
> SHOULD NOT be
> +      done at the same time as changing the certificate being used on the
> server. This
> +      helps clients from recognising that the current changed deployment
> is not
> +      an attack performed using a different mis-issued PKIX certificate.
> +    </t>
>    </section>
>
>
> @@ -580,26 +588,14 @@
>        specific servers, clients could maintain a whitelist of sites where
>        the use of this extension is forced. The client would refuse to
>        authenticate such servers if they failed to deliver this extension.
> +      Those clients should interpret authenticated denial of existence
> proofs
> +      as valid use of this extension and continue to establish the TLS
> connection,
> +      even if this connection uses a different PKIX certificate.
>        Client applications could also employ a Trust on First Use (TOFU)
> like
>        strategy, whereby they would record the fact that a server offered
> the
>        extension and use that knowledge to require it for subsequent
> connections.
>      </t>
>
> -    <t>
> -      This protocol currently provides no way for a server to prove that
> -      it doesn't have a TLSA record. Hence absent whitelists, a client
> -      misdirected to a server that has fraudulently acquired a public CA
> -      issued certificate for the real server's name, could be induced to
> -      establish a PKIX verified connection to the rogue server that
> precluded
> -      DANE authentication. This could be solved by enhancing this protocol
> -      to require that servers without TLSA records need to provide a
> DNSSEC
> -      authentication chain that proves this (i.e. the chain includes NSEC
> or
> -      NSEC3 records that demonstrate either the absence of the TLSA
> record,
> -      or the absence of a secure delegation to the associated zone). Such
> an
> -      enhancement would be impossible to deploy incrementally though
> since it
> -      requires all TLS servers to support this protocol.
> -    </t>
> -
>    </section>
>
>    <section title="Security Considerations">
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a114797c6251c600567ec5efb
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Speaking as an individual, as I said in the meeting, I don=
&#39;t think this is a helpful change.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><b=
r></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 1:05 PM, Paul Wouters <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
I think the below change would address my issue, without stepping on the<br=
>
things people brought up today (other then suggesting, not mandating,<br>
to send proof of non-existence when halting TLSA support in the zone)<br>
<br>
Paul<br>
<br>
diff --git a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-<wbr>extension-07.xml b/draft-ietf=
-tls-dnssec-chain-<wbr>extension-07.xml<br>
index 333d2fc..0701b22 100644<br>
--- a/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-<wbr>extension-07.xml<br>
+++ b/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-<wbr>extension-07.xml<br>
@@ -508,6 +508,15 @@<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0does not exceed the DNS TTLs or signature validi=
ty periods of the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0component records in the chain.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/t&gt;<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;t&gt;<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the zone using TLSA records stops using TLSA recor=
ds, those TLS servers<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 that presented TLSA records using this extension SHOU=
LD serve the authenticated<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 denial of existence of TLSA records for some time so =
their deployment remains<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 distinguishable from an attack. Ending the use of thi=
s extension SHOULD NOT be<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 done at the same time as changing the certificate bei=
ng used on the server. This<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 helps clients from recognising that the current chang=
ed deployment is not<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 an attack performed using a different mis-issued PKIX=
 certificate.<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;/t&gt;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/section&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
@@ -580,26 +588,14 @@<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specific servers, clients could maintain a white=
list of sites where<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the use of this extension is forced. The client =
would refuse to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0authenticate such servers if they failed to deli=
ver this extension.<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Those clients should interpret authenticated denial o=
f existence proofs<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 as valid use of this extension and continue to establ=
ish the TLS connection,<br>
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 even if this connection uses a different PKIX certifi=
cate.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Client applications could also employ a Trust on=
 First Use (TOFU) like<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0strategy, whereby they would record the fact tha=
t a server offered the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0extension and use that knowledge to require it f=
or subsequent connections.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/t&gt;<br>
<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;t&gt;<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 This protocol currently provides no way for a server =
to prove that<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 it doesn&#39;t have a TLSA record. Hence absent white=
lists, a client<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 misdirected to a server that has fraudulently acquire=
d a public CA<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 issued certificate for the real server&#39;s name, co=
uld be induced to<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 establish a PKIX verified connection to the rogue ser=
ver that precluded<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DANE authentication. This could be solved by enhancin=
g this protocol<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 to require that servers without TLSA records need to =
provide a DNSSEC<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 authentication chain that proves this (i.e. the chain=
 includes NSEC or<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 NSEC3 records that demonstrate either the absence of =
the TLSA record,<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 or the absence of a secure delegation to the associat=
ed zone). Such an<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 enhancement would be impossible to deploy incremental=
ly though since it<br>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 requires all TLS servers to support this protocol.<br=
>
-=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;/t&gt;<br>
-<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/section&gt;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;section title=3D&quot;Security Considerations&quot;&gt;<br=
>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114797c6251c600567ec5efb--


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Apologies to Russ, but we ran out of time today during the session.  =
Here=E2=80=99s a link to presentation that got bumped:
=
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/slides-101-tls-sessa-certificate-based-au=
thentication-with-external-psk/

spt



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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration
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On Tuesday, 20 March 2018 22:21:06 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 7:42 PM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, 19 March 2018 14:38:05 CET Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <
> >=20
> > nmav@redhat.com>
> >=20
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2018-03-16 at 14:45 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > > > > > On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > > we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating betw=
een
> > > > > > > > external and
> > > > > > > > resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> > > > > > >=20
> > > > > > > Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will of cour=
se
> > > > > > > recognize, and we have a SHOULD-level requirement that the
> > > > > > > obfuscated_ticket_age is zero for external PSKs.  I haven't
> > > > > > > gotten
> > > > > > > to think through whether there is still potential for
> > > > > > > information
> > > > > > > leakage about external PSK identities, but it seems like there
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > not be, provided that the server prefers resumption to extern=
al-
> > > > > > > PSK
> > > > > > > full handshakes.
> > > > > >=20
> > > > > > I am concerned with the privacy issues linked to these "external
> > > > > > PSK
> > > > > > identities". If a system is set so that clients use static PSK
> > > > > > identities, then the identity is an identifier and the client's
> > > > > > movements and connections can be tracked. I don't think privacy=
 is
> > > > > > improved if we make it easy to differentiate external identities
> > > > > > from
> > > > > > resumption tickets.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Oh, of course, the privacy considerations of the current external
> > > > > PSK scheme are terrible!  This follows naturally from external PS=
Ks
> > > > > having not really been a first-class citizen while we were design=
ing
> > > > > things; we stuffed resumption PSKs together with external PSKs for
> > > > > the convenience of having them use the same binder construct and
> > > > > only needing to have one extension at the end of the ClientHello.
> > > > > Resumption flows get single-use tickets for privacy preservation,
> > > > > and external PSKs get infinite use and a gigantic correlation
> > > > > channel.
> > > >=20
> > > > I agree.
> > > >=20
> > > > > > If you want to use PSK with some level of privacy, you might ad=
opt
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > different setup. For example, servers could provision the clien=
ts
> > > > > > with a
> > > > > > set of single-use external PSK identities. But then, that looks=
 a
> > > > > > lot
> > > > > > like resumption. Or, clients could generate single-use external
> > > > > > PSK
> > > > > > identities by encrypting their long term identity and a nonce w=
ith
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > public key of the server, a design which of course has its own =
set
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > issues.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > But, as you note, this is something of an open problem for how to=
 do
> > > > > well, and this document is already approved by the IESG.  (It's a=
lso
> > > > > not entirely clear that the TLS WG would be the best place to des=
ign
> > > > > this sort of scheme, though of course it could choose to do so.)
> > > > >=20
> > > > > So to me the open question is whether we consider enumeration of
> > > > > external PSK identifiers to be something we can address reasonably
> > > > > at this stage of the document's lifecycle at all.  (I also note t=
hat
> > > > > the presence of a CVE number for a similar issue does not
> > > > > necessarily mean anything -- CVE assignments can occur for
> > > > > situations with no actual security impact and/or against the wish=
es
> > > > > of the software authors.)  I don't think anyone has proposed a
> > > > > minimal change that would close the enumeration channel, and given
> > > > > that external PSKs already have bad privacy properties, it seems
> > > > > like we may just have to accept this state of affairs for this
> > > > > document.
> > > >=20
> > > > That's a good general remark, but not really the case for the
> > > > vulnerabilities that Hubert pointed out.
> > > >=20
> > > > > Hubert also says:
> > > > >=20
> > > > > % so there's no reliable way to say that, yes, this identity is or
> > > > > is
> > > > > not a
> > > > > % resumption ticket, if I can't decrypt it
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Mostly.  External PSKs are established out of band, and that
> > > > > provisioning process *could* include knowledge that the
> > > > > obfuscated_ticket_age would always be zero when those PSKs are in
> > > > > use, and that would be reliable for those specific parties.
> > > >=20
> > > > I believe that this can happen in an interoperable way if the proto=
col
> > > > mandates it (which is not the case now). These specific parties may
> > > > use
> > > > software from different vendors which may use different conventions=
 if
> > > > the protocol is not clear enough.
> > > >=20
> > > > > It's probably also worth considering the two cases for server
> > > > > behavior when presented with a PSK id that is neither a known
> > > > > external PSK nor a known resumption ticket -- the server could
> > > > > either treat it as an unknown external PSK id or as a resumption
> > > > > ticket that fails to decrypt.  The latter case fails because the
> > > > > attacker can try candidate external identities and the server fal=
ls
> > > > > back to a full handshake unless the PSK ID is good.  (Well, maybe
> > > > > the server rejects PSK IDs that are shorter than a ticket would b=
e.)
> > > > > The first case is not really usable since it would lead to spurio=
us
> > > > > triggering of the proposed "at most one external PSK" check.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > So, in addition to the "we provision external PSKs only when we k=
now
> > > > > that obfuscated_ticket_age will be zero", deployments could also
> > > > > agree that external PSK ids are shorter than a given length and
> > > > > resumption PSKs are larger, which would again provide a reliable
> > > > > differentiator between resumption and external.
> > > >=20
> > > > That cannot easily happen. I can have multiple servers answering to
> > > > the
> > > > same hostname each using a different implementation. Any conventions
> > > > used in one implementation would not apply to another.
> > > >=20
> > > > > % I'd really prefer we exhaust other possibilities before
> > > > > sacrificing
> > > > > support
> > > > > % for multiple external PSK. With TLS 1.2 we had ticket_hint to
> > > > > guide
> > > > > PSK
> > > > > % selection, now we're left with just server IP or hostname.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > I think that "do nothing and accept external PSK enumeration as a
> > > > > risk" is more likely than sacrificing support for multiple extern=
al
> > > > > PSKs, personally.
> > > >=20
> > > > The problem is that you personally are not affected by that risk an=
d I
> > > > guess that makes it easy for you to accept it. TLS1.2 with PSK did
> > > > explicitly prevent enumeration (by asking implementations to proceed
> > > > to
> > > > handshake even with unknown usernames, and making up a key), meaning
> > > > that this is a risk that the designers of PSK (external) intentiona=
lly
> > > > ruled out. Going that path, it would be a step back in PSK security
> > > > for
> > > > TLS1.3.
> > >=20
> > > Nikos,
> > >=20
> > > Just as a clarification, I believe it's possible for a PSK-only
> > > implementation to
> > > avoid this attack by behaving uniformly for "unknown ID" and "invalid
> > > binder"
> >=20
> > supporting both external PSK authentication and certificate based
> > authentication for a single IoT gateway would be quite expected, I'd say
> >=20
> > so just because PSK-only implementations are not vulnerable, I don't th=
ink
> > we
> > can expect all servers that deploy external PSKs will also disable
> > certificate
> > based authentication (not to mention that it's rather unlikely that use=
rs
> > will
> > expect that adding certificate will suddenly make their server vulnerab=
le)
>=20
> I'm not making an argument, I'm merely stating what I believe to be the
> facts.

ok, then I agree with those facts :)

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Wed Mar 21 07:47:06 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : A DANE Record and DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension for TLS
        Authors         : Melinda Shore
                          Richard Barnes
                          Shumon Huque
                          Willem Toorop
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.txt
	Pages           : 24
	Date            : 2018-03-21

Abstract:
   This draft describes a new TLS extension for transport of a DNS
   record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures needed to
   authenticate that record set.  The intent of this proposal is to
   allow TLS clients to perform DANE authentication of a TLS server
   without needing to perform additional DNS record lookups.  It is not
   intended to be used to validate the TLS server's address records.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Wed Mar 21 07:57:02 2018
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From: Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm>
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Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, shuque@gmail.com, tls-chairs@ietf.org, joe@salowey.net, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07: (with COMMENT)
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Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07: Yes

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The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Now that TLS 1.3 is approved for publication, I think adding a Normative
Reference to TLS 1.3 is no brainer. I am clearing my DISCUSS on the assumption
that this would be fixed before publication of the RFC.

1) TLS 1.3 needs to be a normative reference, but it is not even listed in
References.

2) The first mention of NSEC3 need a normative reference.



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Subject: [TLS] Protocol Action: 'A DANE Record and DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension for TLS' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'A DANE Record and DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension for TLS'
  (draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07.txt) as Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Kathleen Moriarty and Eric Rescorla.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension/





Technical Summary

   This draft describes a new TLS extension for transport of a DNS
   record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures needed to
   authenticate that record set.  The intent of this proposal is to
   allow TLS clients to perform DANE authentication of a TLS server
   without needing to perform additional DNS record lookups.  It will
   typically not be used for general DNSSEC validation of TLS endpoint
   names.

Working Group Summary

   There was good support and no controversy on list or in meetings.

Document Quality

   The draft has had a fair amount of review.  I am not aware of 
   implementations as it wasn't reported by the document
   shepherd. 

Personnel

   The document shepherd is Joseph Salowey and the 
   responsible AD is Kathleen Moriarty.

IANA Note

     A new value in the TLS ExtensionsType registry




RFC Editor Note

Please ensure a normative reference is added for NSEC3 in the final publication.
Please ensure Richard Barnes affiliation is corrected from Mozilla to Cisco.


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Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 05:03:45 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Colm =?iso-8859-1?Q?MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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[Apparently this was stuck in my 'drafts' folder; sorry if it has
since become stale...]

On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 07:20:04AM -0700, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> It's true that breaking open cleartext runs counter to the mission of
> end-to-end TLS, but it also seems like operators are going to do it if they
> can. Whether by staying on plain RSA, using static-DH, MITM through
> installing a private trusted CA, or exporting session secrets, they can
> certainly do it.  I worry that we'll lose a good opportunity to improve the
> security and transparency of things by turning our nose up at that.
> 
> Here's a straw-man suggestion:

The straw man is indeed made of straw, but some observations
regardless...

> Suppose we took on a draft that adds a new optional handshake message. The
> message could go immediately before FINISHED, in either direction (or
> both), and contain an encrypted version of the soon-to-be-session-key.  For
> back-compat: it could be encrypted with RSA, or whatever else the endpoints
> want to support. This is basically what STEK encrypted tickets look like
> today with TLS1.2 anyway, though usually with symmetric encryption, so it's
> not that wild a departure.
> 
> Obviously this breaks forward secrecy, and allows passive tapping and
> session hi-jacking, but then that's the point. But I think there are some
> security advantages too:
> 
> 1/ By making the functionality part of the handshake transcript, it is
> unforgeably evident to both sides that it is happening. The proponents of
> this functionality claim that everything is opt-in, but this gives some
> cryptographic teeth to it.

It's not entirely clear that this scheme is forced into the
handshake, e.g., if the server collaborates with the network to drop
the new message, the server will not include it in the transcript
and the client will never see it, so the client would not
necessarily know about it.

But there are other ways to modify the key schedule that would
require both parties' consent (and potentially preconfiguration).
The most obvious ones would not technically be TLS anymore, but
would be very close; one could do this sort of thing with or without
a network-visible signal that it is in use, provided that both
endpoints agree that it is to be used.  For server-to-server, this
may be tolerable.


> 2/ clients and browsers could easily consider such sessions insecure by
> default. This would mean that adopters would have to deploy configurations
> and mechanisms to enable this functionality, similar to - but beyond - how
> private root CAs can be inserted.
> 
> Wouldn't those be good properties to have? Compared to servers secretly
> exporting transcripts or session keys, or just having a private root CA
> installed which breaks all sorts of certificate verification
> infrastructure?
> 
> I think the existence of a "standard" here could also serve to encourage
> providers to do things the more transparent way, and create less likelihood
> of a mass-market of products that could also be used for more surreptitious
> tapping.

Right, the claim has been made that a standard is useful so that
multiple vendors' products can interoperate within a single
enterprise.

-Ben

> 
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 12:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net
> > wrote:
> 
> > On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > >> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
> > wrote:
> > >>
> > >> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
> > >> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank…
> > >>
> > >> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it’s
> > >> trying to exfiltrate data…
> > >
> > > The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
> > > the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.
> >
> > Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.
> >
> > So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> > are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> > surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> > the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
> >
> > Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
> > the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
> > Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
> > across potentially adversarial networks?
> >
> > datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
> > machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
> > to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
> > their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
> > regardless of mechanism).
> >
> > Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
> > the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
> > protocol.
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> >      --dkg
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> >
> 
> 
> -- 
> Colm

> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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I had a quick chat with the iANA folks about the HashAlgorithm and =
SignatureAlgorithm, which we are effectively closing by marking all =
unregistered bits as either reserved or depcreated.  IANA suggested =
another way which is to just close the registry,   An example for the =
registry follows:

	TLS HashAlgorithm Registry

	Registration Procedure(s)

	Closed see [this-to-be-rfc]

	Reference

	[RFC5246][this-to-be-rfc]

We=E2=80=99d make the following changes to the draft:

OLD:
    [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry to list
    values 7-223 as "Reserved" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registry
    to list values 4-223 as "Reserved=E2=80=9D.

NEW:
    [SHALL close/has closed] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry and
    the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries for new assignments.

I personally think this is cleaner that reserving the values.  But, it =
does mean that this registries are closed for assignments.

spt

> On Mar 16, 2018, at 14:01, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he =
noted something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what =
was said in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that =
4492bis assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was =
marking as reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>=20
> One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if =
we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms =
registry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these =
are marked as Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we =
mark 224-255 as deprecated in these two registries?
>=20
> spt


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 10:10:36 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>I had a quick chat with the iANA folks about the HashAlgorithm and=0A=
>SignatureAlgorithm, which we are effectively closing by marking all=0A=
>unregistered bits as either reserved or depcreated.  IANA suggested anothe=
r=0A=
>way which is to just close the registry,=0A=
=0A=
This seems a bit of a strange thing to do, if it's going to be closed as so=
on=0A=
as the RFC is published then why have it?  A registry implies you can regis=
ter=0A=
things in it, while this will be just a publication of existing values with=
 no=0A=
ability to register new ones.  If it's that then it's a List of Algorithm I=
Ds,=0A=
not a Registry.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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> On Mar 22, 2018, at 10:10, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>=20
> Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> writes:
>=20
>> I had a quick chat with the iANA folks about the HashAlgorithm and
>> SignatureAlgorithm, which we are effectively closing by marking all
>> unregistered bits as either reserved or depcreated.  IANA suggested =
another
>> way which is to just close the registry,
>=20
> This seems a bit of a strange thing to do, if it's going to be closed =
as soon
> as the RFC is published then why have it?  A registry implies you can =
register
> things in it, while this will be just a publication of existing values =
with no
> ability to register new ones.  If it's that then it's a List of =
Algorithm IDs,
> not a Registry.

Peter,

I think you=E2=80=99re saying that once the registries are closed we =
don=E2=80=99t call them registries?  I think I can get the registry =
title to be:

TLS HashAlgorithm - Registry Closed

spt


From nobody Thu Mar 22 05:56:01 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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From: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: potential attack on TLS cert compression
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/FNFAcCV6btB3zLWqMQ_nA11Fp5I>
Subject: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
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Antoine and I were discussing draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression over l=
unch today and we think there could be a potential attack on the current sc=
heme which could be fixed with some changes.


Currently the CompressedCertificate is included in the handshake transcript=
. However let's say a server fragments it's compressed certificate message =
into multiple records, and an attacker has found a vulnerability in the dec=
ompression function based on the timing in which the data is delivered to t=
he decompression function due to a race condition. They could manipulate th=
e CompressedCertificate message to manipulate the peer to decompress someth=
ing other than what the sender sent even though the handshake transcript re=
mains the same.

Normally this wouldn't matter if there were only certificates, however we h=
ave extensions in certificates which could manipulate how certificates can =
be interpreted. This creates a time to check to time to use bug which relie=
s on the security of the decompression function to determine the security o=
f the TLS exchange.


This is definitely a far fetched attack I don't think this is desirable to =
base the security of TLS on the security of a decompression function. This =
is probably solvable by hashing in the uncompressed cert message into the T=
LS transcript rather than the compressed message which seems more secure be=
cause it enforces that the client and server have the same state of the unc=
ompressed message.


Subodh


--_000_MWHPR15MB1821D5D75667B3C8F4132A1EB6A90MWHPR15MB1821namp_
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"><!-- P {margin-top:0;margi=
n-bottom:0;} --></style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size: 12pt; colo=
r: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif, &quot;EmojiFo=
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ols;">
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0">Antoine and I were discussing&nb=
sp;<span>draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression</span> over lunch today and=
 we think there could be a potential attack on the current scheme which cou=
ld be fixed with some changes.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0">Currently the CompressedCertific=
ate is included in the handshake transcript. However let's say a server fra=
gments it's compressed certificate message into multiple records, and an at=
tacker has found a vulnerability in
 the decompression function based on the timing in which the data is delive=
red to the decompression function due to a race condition. They could manip=
ulate the&nbsp;<span>CompressedCertificate</span> message to manipulate the=
 peer to decompress something other than
 what the sender sent even though the handshake transcript remains the same=
. <br>
<br>
Normally this wouldn't matter if there were only certificates, however we h=
ave extensions in certificates which could manipulate how certificates can =
be interpreted. This creates a time to check to time to use bug which relie=
s on the security of the decompression
 function to determine the security of the TLS exchange.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0">This is definitely a far fetched=
 attack I don't think this is desirable to base the security of TLS on the =
security of a decompression function. This is probably&nbsp;solvable by has=
hing in the uncompressed cert message into
 the TLS transcript rather than the compressed message which seems more sec=
ure because it enforces that the client and server have the same state of t=
he uncompressed message.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0">Subodh<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_MWHPR15MB1821D5D75667B3C8F4132A1EB6A90MWHPR15MB1821namp_--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 16:58:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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To make sure I understand the issue, the concern is that your decompression
function provides a chunk-by-chunk interface, there's a bug and the
division into chunks produces a different result? Or are you suggesting
that, with the same chunking pattern, the result is still non-deterministic
somehow? I could imagine the former kind of bug, but I'm not sure about the
latter.

If the former, I don't see follow how an attacker might control the
division into records. It's easy in TLS 1.2, but we punted compression from
1.2, and in TLS 1.3, the handshake records are encrypted.

Either way, I'm also not sure I've ever seen a TLS stack that processes
messages chunk-by-chunk. Usually the message is reassembled from multiple
records, if necessary, and then only processed when complete. I'm sure, in
the vast space of implementations, such a stack exists, but it seems the
same transcript consideration then applies without compression. Otherwise
you'd need a correct streaming version of all TLS message parsing, ASN.1,
and whatever else TLS calls into. Those are ad-hoc whereas decompression
implementations are at least intended to stream correctly. (Then again,
decompression is also a bit more complicated, probably.)

Did I understand the issue correctly?

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 12:04 PM Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com> wrote:

> Antoine and I were discussing draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression over
> lunch today and we think there could be a potential attack on the current
> scheme which could be fixed with some changes.
>
>
> Currently the CompressedCertificate is included in the handshake
> transcript. However let's say a server fragments it's compressed
> certificate message into multiple records, and an attacker has found a
> vulnerability in the decompression function based on the timing in which
> the data is delivered to the decompression function due to a race
> condition. They could manipulate the CompressedCertificate message to
> manipulate the peer to decompress something other than what the sender sent
> even though the handshake transcript remains the same..
>
> Normally this wouldn't matter if there were only certificates, however we
> have extensions in certificates which could manipulate how certificates can
> be interpreted. This creates a time to check to time to use bug which
> relies on the security of the decompression function to determine the
> security of the TLS exchange.
>
>
> This is definitely a far fetched attack I don't think this is desirable to
> base the security of TLS on the security of a decompression function. This
> is probably solvable by hashing in the uncompressed cert message into the
> TLS transcript rather than the compressed message which seems more secure
> because it enforces that the client and server have the same state of the
> uncompressed message.
>
>
> Subodh
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--94eb2c122928e77e79056803393f
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<div dir=3D"ltr">To make sure I understand the issue, the concern is that y=
our decompression function provides a chunk-by-chunk interface, there&#39;s=
 a bug and the division into chunks produces a different result? Or are you=
 suggesting that, with the same chunking pattern, the result is still non-d=
eterministic somehow? I could imagine the former kind of bug, but I&#39;m n=
ot sure about the latter.<div><br></div><div>If the former, I don&#39;t see=
 follow how an attacker might control the division into records. It&#39;s e=
asy in TLS 1.2, but we punted compression from 1.2, and in TLS 1.3, the han=
dshake records are encrypted.</div><div><br></div><div>Either way, I&#39;m =
also not sure I&#39;ve ever seen a TLS stack that processes messages chunk-=
by-chunk. Usually the message is reassembled from multiple records, if nece=
ssary, and then only processed when complete. I&#39;m sure, in the vast spa=
ce of implementations, such a stack exists, but it seems the same transcrip=
t consideration then applies without compression. Otherwise you&#39;d need =
a correct streaming version of all TLS message parsing, ASN.1, and whatever=
 else TLS calls into. Those are ad-hoc whereas decompression implementation=
s are at least intended to stream correctly. (Then again, decompression is =
also a bit more complicated, probably.)</div><div><br></div><div>Did I unde=
rstand the issue correctly?</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 12:04 PM Subodh I=
yengar &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:subodh@fb.com" target=3D"_blank">subodh@fb.com=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">




<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div id=3D"m_-4785672893364503760m_-1559802906553782761divtagdefaultwrapper=
" dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Calibri,=
Helvetica,sans-serif,&quot;EmojiFont&quot;,&quot;Apple Color Emoji&quot;,&q=
uot;Segoe UI Emoji&quot;,NotoColorEmoji,&quot;Segoe UI Symbol&quot;,&quot;A=
ndroid Emoji&quot;,EmojiSymbols">
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0">Antoine and I were discussing=C2=
=A0<span>draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression</span> over lunch today and=
 we think there could be a potential attack on the current scheme which cou=
ld be fixed with some changes.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0">Currently the CompressedCertifica=
te is included in the handshake transcript. However let&#39;s say a server =
fragments it&#39;s compressed certificate message into multiple records, an=
d an attacker has found a vulnerability in
 the decompression function based on the timing in which the data is delive=
red to the decompression function due to a race condition. They could manip=
ulate the=C2=A0<span>CompressedCertificate</span> message to manipulate the=
 peer to decompress something other than
 what the sender sent even though the handshake transcript remains the same=
.. <br>
<br>
Normally this wouldn&#39;t matter if there were only certificates, however =
we have extensions in certificates which could manipulate how certificates =
can be interpreted. This creates a time to check to time to use bug which r=
elies on the security of the decompression
 function to determine the security of the TLS exchange.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0">This is definitely a far fetched =
attack I don&#39;t think this is desirable to base the security of TLS on t=
he security of a decompression function. This is probably=C2=A0solvable by =
hashing in the uncompressed cert message into
 the TLS transcript rather than the compressed message which seems more sec=
ure because it enforces that the client and server have the same state of t=
he uncompressed message.</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0">Subodh<br>
</p>
<p style=3D"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0"><br>
</p>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>

--94eb2c122928e77e79056803393f--


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Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 19:10:00 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 04:58:57PM +0000, David Benjamin wrote:
> To make sure I understand the issue, the concern is that your decompression
> function provides a chunk-by-chunk interface, there's a bug and the
> division into chunks produces a different result? Or are you suggesting
> that, with the same chunking pattern, the result is still non-deterministic
> somehow? I could imagine the former kind of bug, but I'm not sure about the
> latter.

As I read it, it was the latter: Nondeterministic result with the same
chunking.
 
> Either way, I'm also not sure I've ever seen a TLS stack that processes
> messages chunk-by-chunk. Usually the message is reassembled from multiple
> records, if necessary, and then only processed when complete. I'm sure, in
> the vast space of implementations, such a stack exists, but it seems the
> same transcript consideration then applies without compression. Otherwise
> you'd need a correct streaming version of all TLS message parsing, ASN.1,
> and whatever else TLS calls into. Those are ad-hoc whereas decompression
> implementations are at least intended to stream correctly. (Then again,
> decompression is also a bit more complicated, probably.)

I think BearSSL processes messages chunk-by-chunk. I think it even can
process individual X.509 certificates chunk-by-chunk.

The reason why chunk-by-chunk processing is so rare is how difficult it
is to program.


-Ilari


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From: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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From: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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From nobody Thu Mar 22 10:20:07 2018
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Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 19:19:59 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>
Cc: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] potential attack on TLS cert compression
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On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 05:11:33PM +0000, Subodh Iyengar wrote:
> Ya I think you have the right idea. The former attack is the one
> that I'm more concerned about, i.e. compression libraries almost
> always provide streaming interfaces. Another case is that TLS
> implementations which are the users of some decompression api
> might also provide the frames to the decompression library in
> non-deterministic order.

I could understand bugs like that in DTLS (and those are unlikely
even there), but not TLS 1.3. The TLS 1.3 datastream is always
processed in-order. 

> With draft-25 we've authenticated the record header so the
> attacker can't force the data to be processed in a different
> chunking than the server which is why I mentioned that the only
> leverage the attacker has is timing. We missed the draft-23
> bus on pointing out the attack 😊

The fixes in draft-25 only concern changing the ignored parts
of the record header. The implicit sequence numbers prevent
reordering in TLS 1.3 (and have for a long time).

> Compression libraries can get complicated especially ones
> that use multiple cores do speed up decompression. 

Multithreading with language that can not reason about multithreading
(or other forms of concurrency) is hard. And very few languages can
reason about multithreading.
 
> I admit this depends on the implementation and various other magic
> factors, however it seems unfortunate to base the security of TLS
> on the security of the decompression function and the way that an
> implementation might use the decompression function, when there
> seems to be a simple? way to solve it.

AFAIK, Altering handshake messages for handshake transcript in the
middle of it is unprecidented in TLS.


-Ilari


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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:10:00PM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> I think BearSSL processes messages chunk-by-chunk. I think it even can
> process individual X.509 certificates chunk-by-chunk.

That's correct. In fact, it can process a complete handshake, including
the X.509 certificate chain, even if each individual byte is sent in its
own record. The only elements that are reassembled in memory are public
keys and signature values, on which I can enforce strict size limits
(e.g. at most 512 bytes for a signature, which is good for up to
RSA-4096).


> The reason why chunk-by-chunk processing is so rare is how difficult it
> is to program.

BearSSL does that by doing all the parsing in a dedicated coroutine,
which is itself implemented with a Forth-like language. This allows a
"normal", nested parsing that can be interrupted and resumed at will, as
data bytes become available.


Certificate compression would be challenging to implement, though.
Usually, compression relies on at least a "window" over the decompressed
data (32 kB for Zlib/Deflate). Some rudimentary forms of compression
don't need that (e.g. run-length encoding) but usually offer poor
compression ratios. A 32 kB window is a lot for the kind of architecture
that BearSSL targets.


	--Thomas Pornin


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Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 07:57:59 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 12:53:22PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> I am inclined to agree with Peter.  It doesn't quite seem like a registry if the very first time there is a list of things in it, that list is now frozen.
> 
> Why are we closing/reserving all the bits?

Huh?  These are for the old TLS 1.2 separately negotiated Hash and
Signature registries, that have been pouplated for quite some time.
We need to close them or reserve "all" free values in order to not
conflict with the new TLS 1.3 SignatureScheme registry that uses
combined 16-bit codepoints, but share space on the wire.

Closing the registries does seem to be a better match for our
intended future for these registries, but I am curious if you asked
what the procedure would be on the off chance that we did need to
reopen them for some reason.

-Ben


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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Subject: Re: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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I'm hesitant to call a 16-bit registry "big" in any context.
But if allocating a value requires a specification, that's probably okay.
(There aren't even close to 2^16 RFCs in total)

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 3:54 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Sean:
>>
>> Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict catering
>> towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another
>> signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private
>> field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now rule=
d
>> out?
>>
>
> No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate these code points, so
> you should use them without coordination".
>
> The key point here is that this is a big space and so we're instead going
> to make it easy for people to reserve code points by writing a stable spe=
c,
> that need not be an IETF standard, and that's what they should do.
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is
>> "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private extensions
>> (since IETF will just have killed this off).
>>
>> I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF
>> standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can alread=
y
>> do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate =
(if
>> a weakness is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and
>> won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).
>>
>> As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A"
>> scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards the
>> sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for
>> implementation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS =
if
>> the signaling required has just been removed?
>>
>> NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of
>> whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does
>> question though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zul=
u
>> hour arrives, one should have tools to act...
>>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>> On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>> > During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he note=
d
>> something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was s=
aid
>> in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis
>> assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as
>> reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
>> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>> >
>> > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if
>> we=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms r=
egistry we
>> need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as
>> Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as
>> deprecated in these two registries?
>> >
>> > spt
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>> --
>> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
>> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I&#39;m hesitant to call a 16-bit registry &quot;big&=
quot; in any context.<br></div>But if allocating a value requires a specifi=
cation, that&#39;s probably okay. (There aren&#39;t even close to 2^16 RFCs=
 in total)<br><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 3:54 AM, Eric Rescorla <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On Tue, Mar 20=
, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rstr=
uik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.ext@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Sean:<br>
<br>
Quick question: does &quot;closing the registry&quot; not contradict cateri=
ng towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another =
signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private field=
, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled out?<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>No. Private just means &quot;we&#=
39;re not going to allocate these code points, so you should use them witho=
ut coordination&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>The key point here is that =
this is a big space and so we&#39;re instead going to make it easy for peop=
le to reserve code points by writing a stable spec, that need not be an IET=
F standard, and that&#39;s what they should do.</div><div><br></div><div><b=
r></div><div>-Ekr</div><span class=3D""><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
<br>
My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is &quot;=
verboten&quot;, there is no chance for people to signal private extensions =
(since IETF will just have killed this off).<br>
<br>
I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF standard=
ization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can already do this w=
ithout waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate (if a weakne=
ss is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and won&#39;t wa=
it for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).<br>
<br>
As case in point, suppose US Gov&#39;t wants to roll its own &quot;Suite A&=
quot; scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards th=
e sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for implement=
ation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS if the signa=
ling required has just been removed?<br>
<br>
NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of wh=
oever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does ques=
tion though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zulu hour =
arrives, one should have tools to act...<br>
<br>
Best regards, Rene<br>
<br>
On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
&gt; During Adam Roach=E2=80=99s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he note=
d something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was sa=
id in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-u<wbr>pdates.=C2=A0 Turns out that 4492b=
is assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-u<wbr>pdates was marki=
ng as reserved.=C2=A0 I have fixed that up in:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updat=
es/pull/65" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/d=
raft<wbr>-ietf-tls-iana-registry-update<wbr>s/pull/65</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if we=
=E2=80=99re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms regist=
ry we need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.=C2=A0 Currently these are ma=
rked as Reserved for Private Use.=C2=A0 So the question is should we mark 2=
24-255 as deprecated in these two registries?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; spt<br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
<span class=3D"m_812421637500745895HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
--<br>
email: <a href=3D"mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">rstruik.e=
xt@gmail.com</a> | Skype: rstruik<br>
cell: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28647%29%20867-5658" value=3D"+16478675658" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">+1 (647) 867-5658</a> | US: <a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20%28415%29=
%20690-7363" value=3D"+14156907363" target=3D"_blank">+1 (415) 690-7363</a>=
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/tls</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></span></div><br></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

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From: Alex C <immibis@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 19:26:11 +1300
Message-ID: <CAMqknA4rE_R08_2abVYP2ii5CFn_PuC22+tHxi0hxt=OEDp0NQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system on
the network that monitors all traffic in cleartext.
It's fundamentally impossible to prevent someone from copying all their
traffic to another system in cleartext. If they're going to do it, they
will.
The functionality is exactly the same as what could be achieved by
installing monitoring software on each endpoint, but the logistics are
different since the monitoring is centralized.

The debate seems to be around: whether it should be standardized, and
whether the other endpoint (outside the monitored network) should know
about it.

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 4:18 AM, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote=
:

> Dear TLS WG,
>
> Enterprise "visibility" is a network issue, not an Internet issue, and
> thus, to my _limited_ understanding, should be out of scope of IETF.
>
> Nonetheless, enterprise security is important, and enterprise networks us=
e
> Internet technology internally, so the topic is perhaps still procedurall=
y
> discussable, so I continue.  I (naively) worry that "visibility" is also
> "siphonability", creating an incentive for a Snowden-sized (but malicious=
)
> leak, which could hurt enterprises and their customers.  In other words:
> who watches the watchers; avoid a single point of weakness; prevent socia=
l
> engineering opportunities; decentralize power; make sure the cure is not
> worse than the ailment; etc.  It is not yet clear (to me) which attackers
> "visibility" would thwart, but if it is just na=C3=AFve (but plentiful)
> insiders, then I imagine the optimal solution would be better endpoint
> management (which may be a more difficult road than "visibility", but
> should still be the long-term solution).
>
> Best regards,
>
> Dan
>
> PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just think
> about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall hearing
> about such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security work of
> colleagues (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used forward-secu=
re
> ECMQV to establish a connection between smartphones and the enterprise
> network.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly=
 to have a single system on the network that monitors all traffic in cleart=
ext.<br></div>It&#39;s fundamentally impossible to prevent someone from cop=
ying all their traffic to another system in cleartext. If they&#39;re going=
 to do it, they will.</div><div>The functionality is exactly the same as wh=
at could be achieved by installing monitoring software on each endpoint, bu=
t the logistics are different since the monitoring is centralized.</div><di=
v><br></div>The debate seems to be around: whether it should be standardize=
d, and whether the other endpoint (outside the monitored network) should kn=
ow about it.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 4:18 AM, Dan Brown <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:danibrown@blackberry.com" target=3D"_blank">danibrown@blackber=
ry.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Dear TLS WG,=
<br>
<br>
Enterprise &quot;visibility&quot; is a network issue, not an Internet issue=
, and thus, to my _limited_ understanding, should be out of scope of IETF.<=
br>
<br>
Nonetheless, enterprise security is important, and enterprise networks use =
Internet technology internally, so the topic is perhaps still procedurally =
discussable, so I continue.=C2=A0 I (naively) worry that &quot;visibility&q=
uot; is also &quot;siphonability&quot;, creating an incentive for a Snowden=
-sized (but malicious) leak, which could hurt enterprises and their custome=
rs.=C2=A0 In other words: who watches the watchers; avoid a single point of=
 weakness; prevent social engineering opportunities; decentralize power; ma=
ke sure the cure is not worse than the ailment; etc.=C2=A0 It is not yet cl=
ear (to me) which attackers &quot;visibility&quot; would thwart, but if it =
is just na=C3=AFve (but plentiful) insiders, then I imagine the optimal sol=
ution would be better endpoint management (which may be a more difficult ro=
ad than &quot;visibility&quot;, but should still be the long-term solution)=
.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
Dan<br>
<br>
PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just think a=
bout the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don&#39;t recall hearing a=
bout such a &quot;visibility&quot; feature in the enterprise security work =
of colleagues (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used forward-sec=
ure ECMQV to establish a connection between smartphones and the enterprise =
network.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 08:31:49 -0700
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To: Alex C <immibis@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <immibis@gmail.com> wrote:

> As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system
> on the network that monitors all traffic in cleartext.
>

And more specifically: to be able to *passively* intercept traffic and
allow it to be decrypted by a central system. "Visibility" with an active
MitM is a solved problem: have the MitM appliance double as an on-the-fly
CA and install its root certificate in the trust stores of all the clients
you intend to MitM.

It's fundamentally impossible to prevent someone from copying all their
> traffic to another system in cleartext. If they're going to do it, they
> will.
> The functionality is exactly the same as what could be achieved by
> installing monitoring software on each endpoint, but the logistics are
> different since the monitoring is centralized.
>

The response from "visibility" proponents is "endpoint agents are hard".
However, it seems like there is a simple solution to this problem which
should be compatible with their existing monitoring architectures and
require no changes to TLS:

Instrument TLS servers and/or client libraries used by internal enterprise
applications with a little shim that extracts the session master secret,
then makes another TLS connection to a TLS session key escrow service, and
goes "here's the session master secret for a session between X.X.X.X and
Y.Y.Y.Y with nonce ZZZZ...". It could even be encrypted-at-rest to a
particular public key in advance (which could correspond to e.g. an
HSM-backed decryption key).

Enterprises could continue to passively collect TLS sessions in whatever
manner they already do, and decrypt traffic at will, it would just require
looking up the session key for a particular session in a key escrow
database rather than having a single key-to-the-kingdom.

This approach requires no changes to TLS, no changes to how "visibility"
systems collect traffic, and should provide better security in that using
session master secrets better scope the authority conferred to the
decryption service than D-H keys which can grant authority to e.g. resume
TLS sessions.

The downsides are you have to instrument clients and/or servers and have
the decryption service maintain a key escrow database.

However, "visibility" proponents seem unwilling to accept any changes to
anything they presently do today. This is coupled with a sort of artificial
emergency where they claim (or outright lie) that compliance with industry
standards will require them to ship TLS 1.3 everywhere tomorrow. There is a
total unwillingness to compromise, and all sorts of weasel words being
thrown around, from the "visibility" euphemism itself to claims that TLS
1.3 will make them less secure because it makes implementing a
single-point-of-compromise for all their encrypted traffic more difficult.

The reality is for these slow-to-change enterprises, the industry standards
are also slow-to-change. There is no emergency. Many of them are still
using TLS 1.0. The PCI-DSS deadline to adopt TLS 1.1 isn't until this June.
I would challenge any "visibility" proponent to cite *any* industry
standard which will mandate TLS 1.3 any time in the next 5 years.

There is lots of time to solve this problem and better ways to solve it
than introducing codepaths which deliberately break the security of the
protocol.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--001a114067be7c2aad05682a3ea7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On F=
ri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:immibis@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">immibis@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>As I under=
stand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system on the netwo=
rk that monitors all traffic in cleartext.<br></div></div></div></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>And more specifically: to be able to *passively* inte=
rcept traffic and allow it to be decrypted by a central system. &quot;Visib=
ility&quot; with an active MitM is a solved problem: have the MitM applianc=
e double as an on-the-fly CA and install its root certificate in the trust =
stores of all the clients you intend to MitM.</div><div><br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div></div>It&#39;s fundamental=
ly impossible to prevent someone from copying all their traffic to another =
system in cleartext. If they&#39;re going to do it, they will.</div><div>Th=
e functionality is exactly the same as what could be achieved by installing=
 monitoring software on each endpoint, but the logistics are different sinc=
e the monitoring is centralized.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>The response from &quot;visibility&quot; proponents is &quot;endpoint age=
nts are hard&quot;. However, it seems like there is a simple solution to th=
is problem which should be compatible with their existing monitoring archit=
ectures and require no changes to TLS:</div><div><br></div><div>Instrument =
TLS servers and/or client libraries used by internal enterprise application=
s with a little shim that extracts the session master secret, then makes an=
other TLS connection to a TLS session key escrow service, and goes &quot;he=
re&#39;s the session master secret for a session between X.X.X.X and Y.Y.Y.=
Y with nonce ZZZZ...&quot;. It could even be encrypted-at-rest to a particu=
lar public key in advance (which could correspond to e.g. an HSM-backed dec=
ryption key).</div><div><br></div><div>Enterprises could continue to passiv=
ely collect TLS sessions in whatever manner they already do, and decrypt tr=
affic at will, it would just require looking up the session key for a parti=
cular session in a key escrow database rather than having a single key-to-t=
he-kingdom.</div></div><div><br></div><div>This approach requires no change=
s to TLS, no changes to how &quot;visibility&quot; systems collect traffic,=
 and should provide better security in that using session master secrets be=
tter scope the authority conferred to the decryption service than D-H keys =
which can grant authority to e.g. resume TLS sessions.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>The downsides are you have to instrument clients and/or servers and ha=
ve the decryption service maintain a key escrow database.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>However, &quot;visibility&quot; proponents seem unwilling to accept=
 any changes to anything they presently do today. This is coupled with a so=
rt of artificial emergency where they claim (or outright lie) that complian=
ce with industry standards will require them to ship TLS 1.3 everywhere tom=
orrow. There is a total unwillingness to compromise, and all sorts of wease=
l words being thrown around, from the &quot;visibility&quot; euphemism itse=
lf to claims that TLS 1.3 will make them less secure because it makes imple=
menting a single-point-of-compromise for all their encrypted traffic more d=
ifficult.</div><div><br></div><div>The reality is for these slow-to-change =
enterprises, the industry standards are also slow-to-change. There is no em=
ergency. Many of them are still using TLS 1.0. The PCI-DSS deadline to adop=
t TLS 1.1 isn&#39;t until this June. I would challenge any &quot;visibility=
&quot; proponent to cite *any* industry standard which will mandate TLS 1.3=
 any time in the next 5 years.</div><div><br></div><div>There is lots of ti=
me to solve this problem and better ways to solve it than introducing codep=
aths which deliberately break the security of the protocol.</div><div><br><=
/div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signatur=
e">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

--001a114067be7c2aad05682a3ea7--


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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
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> On 19 Mar 2018, at 15:18, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote:
>=20
> PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just =
think about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall =
hearing about such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security =
work of colleagues (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used =
forward-secure ECMQV to establish a connection between smartphones and =
the enterprise network.

Hearsay anecdote is not evidence. :-)

There are use cases in enterprise networks, notably in banking and =
finance. Some of these were presented to the TLS WG. [See Steve =
Fenter=E2=80=99s presentation at IETF97.] However the WG did not reach =
consensus on adopting the relevant drafts as work items.


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From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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From:  TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Tony Arcieri
<bascule@gmail.com>
Date:  Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 11:31 AM
Subject:  Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do
it)

> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <immibis@gmail.com> wrote:
>> As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system on
>> the network that monitors all traffic in cleartext.
> 
> And more specifically: to be able to *passively* intercept traffic and allow
> it to be decrypted by a central system. "Visibility" with an active MitM is a
> solved problem: have the MitM appliance double as an on-the-fly CA and install
> its root certificate in the trust stores of all the clients you intend to
> MitM.

It's not a solved problem for mutual authentication scenarios even if you
drop the passive requirement (as should be done in such cases anyway).




--B_3604740419_2159102
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><div><br></div><div><br></div><spa=
n id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;=
 text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medi=
um none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-=
TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ie=
tf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:bascule@gmail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-wei=
ght:bold">Date: </span> Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 11:31 AM<br><span style=3D=
"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterpri=
se "visibility" (don't do it)<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OU=
TLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0=
 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:immibis@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">immibis@gmail.com</a>&gt;<=
/span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>As I und=
erstand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system on the netw=
ork that monitors all traffic in cleartext.<br></div></div></div></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>And more specifically: to be able to *passively* inter=
cept traffic and allow it to be decrypted by a central system. "Visibility" =
with an active MitM is a solved problem: have the MitM appliance double as a=
n on-the-fly CA and install its root certificate in the trust stores of all =
the clients you intend to MitM.</div></div></div></div></blockquote></span><=
div><br></div><div>It's not a solved problem for mutual authentication scena=
rios even if you drop the passive requirement (as should be done in such cas=
es anyway).</div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div></div></div><=
/div></span></body></html>

--B_3604740419_2159102--



From nobody Sat Mar 24 12:37:42 2018
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From: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
Thread-Index: AQHTw6eOMnwc4T8JRDihe6zQIW66uA==
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 19:37:34 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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I recognize I may lack context, because I have only seen Steve Fenter's sli=
des, but apart from it not reaching consensus, the scenario it presents (us=
er connecting to online banking service) seems to be visibility of connecti=
ons from the internet to internal servers. =0A=
=0A=
I think that not even visibility proponents agree between them, as sometime=
s they seem to require "server-to-server" visibility within the data center=
 while periodically use cases appear (such as the one you mention) where tr=
affic to be decrypted goes from internet to the internal network (or even v=
iceversa). I'm starting to understand someone who some months ago said this=
 looked like playing "whack-a-mole".=0A=
=0A=
Besides, from what I understand from Steve Fenter's proposal (I may be wron=
g because I have seen only the slides) , they seem to go for non-visible TL=
S 1.3 connections from the client to the external layers of the network, an=
d visible TLS 1.3 connections within their internal network. This would mat=
ch the idea of "visibility only within the datacenter" but in my opinion it=
 requires a finalization of the external tunnel and creation of a new inter=
nal one. At that point you obviously have the clear text and you could move=
 your monitor tasks to that point.=0A=
=0A=
So maybe it's because the presentation is obsolete or because I lack contex=
t but... no, I don't think those specific slides are a valid example today.=
=0A=
=0A=
________________________________________=0A=
De: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> en nombre de Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>=0A=
Enviado: s=E1bado, 24 de marzo de 2018 16:56=0A=
Para: Dan Brown=0A=
Cc: tls@ietf.org=0A=
Asunto: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do i=
t)=0A=
=0A=
> On 19 Mar 2018, at 15:18, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote:=0A=
>=0A=
> PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just think=
 about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall hearing abo=
ut such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security work of colleague=
s (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used forward-secure ECMQV to=
 establish a connection between smartphones and the enterprise network.=0A=
=0A=
Hearsay anecdote is not evidence. :-)=0A=
=0A=
There are use cases in enterprise networks, notably in banking and finance.=
 Some of these were presented to the TLS WG. [See Steve Fenter=92s presenta=
tion at IETF97.] However the WG did not reach consensus on adopting the rel=
evant drafts as work items.=0A=
=0A=


From nobody Mon Mar 26 04:30:00 2018
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From: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 12:29:54 +0100
To: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-cywgcKMsrUJDNz74FpkbRWPrCg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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To clarify for anyone who has confusion on the enterprise TLS visibility use=
 case, I think enterprises need to be able to do out-of-band decryption anyw=
here in the network that they own.  It would be reasonable to terminate TLS o=
n the enterprise's Internet connection, both inbound TLS and outbound TLS, a=
s well as on business to business connections.  We could run standard TLS 1.=
3 on these external connections, and then run our modified TLS on the inside=
.

We also have internal browsers as well as other internal clients going to in=
ternal TLS servers, and these need deep packet inspection as well.  Terminat=
ing TLS on the internal WAN head-end=20
is less attractive, because there are significant sites outside of the data c=
enter that need troubleshooting and network security monitoring.  For exampl=
e, a large metropolitan area may have many office buildings with thousands o=
f users as well as local servers.  There can also be thousands of branch-typ=
e offices.  We don't want to be blind to these large areas of our enterprise=
 network.  I think "scoping the solution to the data center" is the wrong wa=
y to phrase this, but rather it should be scoping to the internal enterprise=
 network, owned and operated by the enterprise.

Also, while there are some enterprises who terminate TLS coming in from the I=
nternet and then run clear text on the inside, there are others who run new T=
LS sessions internally.  There is a need for packet decryption and inspectio=
n at many layers of this internal TLS network.

Steve Fenter

> On Mar 24, 2018, at 7:37 PM, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> wrote=
:
>=20
> I recognize I may lack context, because I have only seen Steve Fenter's sl=
ides, but apart from it not reaching consensus, the scenario it presents (us=
er connecting to online banking service) seems to be visibility of connectio=
ns from the internet to internal servers.=20
>=20
> I think that not even visibility proponents agree between them, as sometim=
es they seem to require "server-to-server" visibility within the data center=
 while periodically use cases appear (such as the one you mention) where tra=
ffic to be decrypted goes from internet to the internal network (or even vic=
eversa). I'm starting to understand someone who some months ago said this lo=
oked like playing "whack-a-mole".
>=20
> Besides, from what I understand from Steve Fenter's proposal (I may be wro=
ng because I have seen only the slides) , they seem to go for non-visible TL=
S 1.3 connections from the client to the external layers of the network, and=
 visible TLS 1.3 connections within their internal network. This would match=
 the idea of "visibility only within the datacenter" but in my opinion it re=
quires a finalization of the external tunnel and creation of a new internal o=
ne. At that point you obviously have the clear text and you could move your m=
onitor tasks to that point.
>=20
> So maybe it's because the presentation is obsolete or because I lack conte=
xt but... no, I don't think those specific slides are a valid example today.=

>=20
> ________________________________________
> De: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> en nombre de Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
> Enviado: s=C3=A1bado, 24 de marzo de 2018 16:56
> Para: Dan Brown
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Asunto: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do i=
t)
>=20
>> On 19 Mar 2018, at 15:18, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just think=
 about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall hearing abou=
t such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security work of colleagues (=
whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used forward-secure ECMQV to est=
ablish a connection between smartphones and the enterprise network.
>=20
> Hearsay anecdote is not evidence. :-)
>=20
> There are use cases in enterprise networks, notably in banking and finance=
. Some of these were presented to the TLS WG. [See Steve Fenter=E2=80=99s pr=
esentation at IETF97.] However the WG did not reach consensus on adopting th=
e relevant drafts as work items.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Mon Mar 26 04:49:00 2018
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From: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 12:48:52 +0100
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Gix4E4YYO1s3wBrSkKbRWwcPS8c>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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MITM as a solution doesn't scale for the needs of the enterprise.  Packet de=
cryption and inspection is needed at many locations within the data center: a=
t many tiers of an application, within the virtual environment, and within t=
he cloud environment, all of which may be TLS encrypted.  Speaking as a trou=
bleshooter, a problem can happen anywhere in the enterprise network, and the=
re are thousands of locations where I need to be able to take a packet trace=
 and decrypt it in order to find a slow or failing transaction.

The biggest problem I see with the key escrow solutions being suggested is t=
hat decryption is in some cases taking place in real time, even though it's o=
ut of band. This is being done, for example, for security inspection, for fr=
aud monitoring, and for application performance monitoring.  TLS decryption a=
ppliances are going to be getting packets off of 100 gig links, and when the=
 packet arrives the keys have to be there.  At this speed there's not a lot o=
f time for queuing packets and waiting for keys. If we are going to use expo=
rted ephemeral keys, I think placing them in the packet as in draft-rhrd is t=
he only scalable way to accomplish this.

In response to unwillingness to change, enterprises are doing things today t=
hat work and that solve our business problems. The alternative suggestions b=
eing made, like MITM and endpoint monitoring, don't solve our business probl=
ems.

In response to how much time we have, it was recently stated on the list tha=
t NIST has published a draft that disallows all non-DH cipher suites, which i=
ncludes TLS 1.2.  TLS 1.2 with Diffie-Hellman only will be just as big of a p=
roblem for enterprises as TLS 1.3 is.  I don't have a crystal ball, but I do=
n't I think the RSA key exchange is going to last five years as has been sug=
gested.  And whenever RSA is deprecated, it takes a long time to implement a=
 new solution in a large enterprise, so we have to be well out in front of t=
he problem,

Steve Fenter

> On Mar 24, 2018, at 3:31 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <immibis@gmail.com> wrote:
>> As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system o=
n the network that monitors all traffic in cleartext.
>=20
> And more specifically: to be able to *passively* intercept traffic and all=
ow it to be decrypted by a central system. "Visibility" with an active MitM i=
s a solved problem: have the MitM appliance double as an on-the-fly CA and i=
nstall its root certificate in the trust stores of all the clients you inten=
d to MitM.
>=20
>> It's fundamentally impossible to prevent someone from copying all their t=
raffic to another system in cleartext. If they're going to do it, they will.=

>> The functionality is exactly the same as what could be achieved by instal=
ling monitoring software on each endpoint, but the logistics are different s=
ince the monitoring is centralized.
>=20
> The response from "visibility" proponents is "endpoint agents are hard". H=
owever, it seems like there is a simple solution to this problem which shoul=
d be compatible with their existing monitoring architectures and require no c=
hanges to TLS:
>=20
> Instrument TLS servers and/or client libraries used by internal enterprise=
 applications with a little shim that extracts the session master secret, th=
en makes another TLS connection to a TLS session key escrow service, and goe=
s "here's the session master secret for a session between X.X.X.X and Y.Y.Y.=
Y with nonce ZZZZ...". It could even be encrypted-at-rest to a particular pu=
blic key in advance (which could correspond to e.g. an HSM-backed decryption=
 key).
>=20
> Enterprises could continue to passively collect TLS sessions in whatever m=
anner they already do, and decrypt traffic at will, it would just require lo=
oking up the session key for a particular session in a key escrow database r=
ather than having a single key-to-the-kingdom.
>=20
> This approach requires no changes to TLS, no changes to how "visibility" s=
ystems collect traffic, and should provide better security in that using ses=
sion master secrets better scope the authority conferred to the decryption s=
ervice than D-H keys which can grant authority to e.g. resume TLS sessions.
>=20
> The downsides are you have to instrument clients and/or servers and have t=
he decryption service maintain a key escrow database.
>=20
> However, "visibility" proponents seem unwilling to accept any changes to a=
nything they presently do today. This is coupled with a sort of artificial e=
mergency where they claim (or outright lie) that compliance with industry st=
andards will require them to ship TLS 1.3 everywhere tomorrow. There is a to=
tal unwillingness to compromise, and all sorts of weasel words being thrown a=
round, from the "visibility" euphemism itself to claims that TLS 1.3 will ma=
ke them less secure because it makes implementing a single-point-of-compromi=
se for all their encrypted traffic more difficult.
>=20
> The reality is for these slow-to-change enterprises, the industry standard=
s are also slow-to-change. There is no emergency. Many of them are still usi=
ng TLS 1.0. The PCI-DSS deadline to adopt TLS 1.1 isn't until this June. I w=
ould challenge any "visibility" proponent to cite *any* industry standard wh=
ich will mandate TLS 1.3 any time in the next 5 years.
>=20
> There is lots of time to solve this problem and better ways to solve it th=
an introducing codepaths which deliberately break the security of the protoc=
ol.
>=20
> --=20
> Tony Arcieri
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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	charset=utf-8
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div>MITM as a solution doesn't scale for t=
he needs of the enterprise. &nbsp;Packet decryption and inspection is needed=
 at many locations within the data center: at many tiers of an application, w=
ithin the virtual environment, and within the cloud environment, all of whic=
h may be TLS encrypted. &nbsp;Speaking as a troubleshooter, a problem can ha=
ppen anywhere in the enterprise network, and there are thousands of location=
s where I need to be able to take a packet trace and decrypt it in order to f=
ind a slow or failing transaction.</div><div><br></div><div>The biggest prob=
lem I see with the key escrow solutions being suggested is that decryption i=
s in some cases taking place in real time, even though it's out of band. Thi=
s is being done, for example, for security inspection, for fraud monitoring,=
 and for application performance monitoring. &nbsp;TLS decryption appliances=
 are going to be getting packets off of 100 gig links, and when the packet a=
rrives the keys have to be there. &nbsp;At this speed there's not a lot of t=
ime for queuing packets and waiting for keys. If we are going to use exporte=
d ephemeral keys, I think placing them in the packet as in draft-rhrd is the=
 only scalable way to accomplish this.</div><div><br></div><div>In response t=
o unwillingness to change, enterprises are doing things today that work and t=
hat solve our business problems. The alternative suggestions being made, lik=
e MITM and endpoint monitoring, don't solve our business problems.</div><div=
><br></div><div>In response to how much time we have, it was recently stated=
 on the list that NIST has published a draft that disallows all non-DH ciphe=
r suites, which includes TLS 1.2. &nbsp;TLS 1.2 with Diffie-Hellman only wil=
l be just as big of a problem for enterprises as TLS 1.3 is. &nbsp;I don't h=
ave&nbsp;a crystal ball, but I don't I think the RSA key exchange is going t=
o last five years as has been suggested. &nbsp;And whenever RSA is deprecate=
d, it takes a long time to implement a new solution in a large enterprise, s=
o we have to be well out in front of the problem,<br><br>Steve Fenter</div><=
div><br>On Mar 24, 2018, at 3:31 PM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:basc=
ule@gmail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:26 PM, Alex C <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:immibis@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">immibis@gmail.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>=
As I understand it (poorly!) the idea is exactly to have a single system on t=
he network that monitors all traffic in cleartext.<br></div></div></div></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>And more specifically: to be able to *passively=
* intercept traffic and allow it to be decrypted by a central system. "Visib=
ility" with an active MitM is a solved problem: have the MitM appliance doub=
le as an on-the-fly CA and install its root certificate in the trust stores o=
f all the clients you intend to MitM.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div></div>It's fundamentally impossible to p=
revent someone from copying all their traffic to another system in cleartext=
. If they're going to do it, they will.</div><div>The functionality is exact=
ly the same as what could be achieved by installing monitoring software on e=
ach endpoint, but the logistics are different since the monitoring is centra=
lized.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The response from "visibi=
lity" proponents is "endpoint agents are hard". However, it seems like there=
 is a simple solution to this problem which should be compatible with their e=
xisting monitoring architectures and require no changes to TLS:</div><div><b=
r></div><div>Instrument TLS servers and/or client libraries used by internal=
 enterprise applications with a little shim that extracts the session master=
 secret, then makes another TLS connection to a TLS session key escrow servi=
ce, and goes "here's the session master secret for a session between X.X.X.X=
 and Y.Y.Y.Y with nonce ZZZZ...". It could even be encrypted-at-rest to a pa=
rticular public key in advance (which could correspond to e.g. an HSM-backed=
 decryption key).</div><div><br></div><div>Enterprises could continue to pas=
sively collect TLS sessions in whatever manner they already do, and decrypt t=
raffic at will, it would just require looking up the session key for a parti=
cular session in a key escrow database rather than having a single key-to-th=
e-kingdom.</div></div><div><br></div><div>This approach requires no changes t=
o TLS, no changes to how "visibility" systems collect traffic, and should pr=
ovide better security in that using session master secrets better scope the a=
uthority conferred to the decryption service than D-H keys which can grant a=
uthority to e.g. resume TLS sessions.</div><div><br></div><div>The downsides=
 are you have to instrument clients and/or servers and have the decryption s=
ervice maintain a key escrow database.</div><div><br></div><div>However, "vi=
sibility" proponents seem unwilling to accept any changes to anything they p=
resently do today. This is coupled with a sort of artificial emergency where=
 they claim (or outright lie) that compliance with industry standards will r=
equire them to ship TLS 1.3 everywhere tomorrow. There is a total unwillingn=
ess to compromise, and all sorts of weasel words being thrown around, from t=
he "visibility" euphemism itself to claims that TLS 1.3 will make them less s=
ecure because it makes implementing a single-point-of-compromise for all the=
ir encrypted traffic more difficult.</div><div><br></div><div>The reality is=
 for these slow-to-change enterprises, the industry standards are also slow-=
to-change. There is no emergency. Many of them are still using TLS 1.0. The P=
CI-DSS deadline to adopt TLS 1.1 isn't until this June. I would challenge an=
y "visibility" proponent to cite *any* industry standard which will mandate T=
LS 1.3 any time in the next 5 years.</div><div><br></div><div>There is lots o=
f time to solve this problem and better ways to solve it than introducing co=
depaths which deliberately break the security of the protocol.</div><div><br=
></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signatu=
re">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>
</div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>____________________=
___________________________</span><br><span>TLS mailing list</span><br><span=
><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D=
"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/lis=
tinfo/tls</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=

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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 06:09:18 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
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I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to
violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.

I am doing a handshake with PSK.  On the second flight from the client it
sends 

[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished

The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the keys.
It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and silently
ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text says
that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.  This means that my
client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it never
gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost in transit.


The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until the
Finished message is received and processed.  I am not sure, but I believe
the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC on the first
block of data in any epoch and must error on those messages.  

I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS 1.3, but it could
easily be.

Jim



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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 06:24:19 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
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--001a113d858a617219056850b33a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

First, just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC on the Finished
rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?

Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is reasonable behavior. It
makes the protocol somewhat more resistant to damaged bits on the wire.
Note that QUIC takes this position even further: every packet is integrity
protected (the initial packets use a key based on the CID). The primary
consequence of this is slower failure detection, but the kind of case you're
talking about primarily happens when there is an implementation error,
so not much in the field anyway.

-Ekr


On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to
> violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.
>
> I am doing a handshake with PSK.  On the second flight from the client it
> sends
>
> [ChangeCipherSpec]
> Finished
>
> The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the keys.
> It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and silently
> ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text says
> that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.  This means that
> my
> client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it never
> gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost in
> transit.
>
>
> The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until
> the
> Finished message is received and processed.  I am not sure, but I believe
> the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC on the first
> block of data in any epoch and must error on those messages.
>
> I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS 1.3, but it could
> easily be.
>
> Jim
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--001a113d858a617219056850b33a
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<div dir=3D"ltr">First, just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC=
 on the Finished<div>rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?</div><div><di=
v><br></div><div>Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is reasonabl=
e behavior. It</div><div>makes the protocol somewhat more resistant to dama=
ged bits on the wire.</div><div>Note that QUIC takes this position even fur=
ther: every packet is integrity</div><div>protected (the initial packets us=
e a key based on the CID). The primary</div><div>consequence of this is slo=
wer failure detection, but the kind of case you&#39;re</div><div>talking ab=
out primarily happens when there is an implementation error,</div><div>so n=
ot much in the field anyway.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Mar 26, 201=
8 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@augus=
tcellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote=
:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I appear to have run across an implemen=
tation that does not appear to<br>
violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.<br>
<br>
I am doing a handshake with PSK.=C2=A0 On the second flight from the client=
 it<br>
sends<br>
<br>
[ChangeCipherSpec]<br>
Finished<br>
<br>
The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the keys.=
<br>
It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and silently<b=
r>
ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text says<b=
r>
that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.=C2=A0 This means t=
hat my<br>
client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it never<br=
>
gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost in transit=
.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until th=
e<br>
Finished message is received and processed.=C2=A0 I am not sure, but I beli=
eve<br>
the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC on the first<=
br>
block of data in any epoch and must error on those messages.<br>
<br>
I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS 1.3, but it could<br>
easily be.<br>
<br>
Jim<br>
<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div>

--001a113d858a617219056850b33a--


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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Eric Rescorla' <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
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------=_NextPart_000_0282_01D3C4CE.690552E0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
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Yes, I am talking about the TLS record MAC.

=20

In my case this was happening because of a misconfiguration on the PSK.  =
When we finally figured out that this was a MAC error on the record, =
then we immediately looked at the values of the PSK knowing that this =
was the most likely failure.  The fact that in the main handshake this =
leads to a large amount of retries by the client I am not sure that this =
is just a slower failure detection.  I agree that this is less of an =
issue for a simple rotate the keys problem.  I am slightly worried about =
having the same problem on a re-negotiation though.

=20

Jim

=20

=20

From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>=20
Sent: Monday, March 26, 2018 6:24 AM
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake

=20

First, just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC on the =
Finished

rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?

=20

Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is reasonable behavior. It

makes the protocol somewhat more resistant to damaged bits on the wire.

Note that QUIC takes this position even further: every packet is =
integrity

protected (the initial packets use a key based on the CID). The primary

consequence of this is slower failure detection, but the kind of case =
you're

talking about primarily happens when there is an implementation error,

so not much in the field anyway.

=20

-Ekr

=20

=20

On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com =
<mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com> > wrote:

I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to
violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.

I am doing a handshake with PSK.  On the second flight from the client =
it
sends

[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished

The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the =
keys.
It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and =
silently
ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text =
says
that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.  This means =
that my
client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it never
gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost in =
transit.


The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until =
the
Finished message is received and processed.  I am not sure, but I =
believe
the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC on the =
first
block of data in any epoch and must error on those messages.

I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS 1.3, but it could
easily be.

Jim


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>=20
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

=20


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vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Yes, I am =
talking about the TLS record MAC.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>In my case =
this was happening because of a misconfiguration on the PSK.=C2=A0 When =
we finally figured out that this was a MAC error on the record, then we =
immediately looked at the values of the PSK knowing that this was the =
most likely failure.=C2=A0 The fact that in the main handshake this =
leads to a large amount of retries by the client I am not sure that this =
is just a slower failure detection.=C2=A0 I agree that this is less of =
an issue for a simple rotate the keys problem.=C2=A0 I am slightly =
worried about having the same problem on a re-negotiation =
though.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> Eric =
Rescorla &lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, March 26, 2018 =
6:24 AM<br><b>To:</b> Jim Schaad =
&lt;ietf@augustcellars.com&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt; =
&lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 =
handshake<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>First, =
just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC on the =
Finished<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>rather than the TLS =
Finished MAC, right?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is =
reasonable behavior. It<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>makes the protocol somewhat more resistant to damaged =
bits on the wire.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Note =
that QUIC takes this position even further: every packet is =
integrity<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>protected (the =
initial packets use a key based on the CID). The =
primary<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>consequence of =
this is slower failure detection, but the kind of case =
you're<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>talking about =
primarily happens when there is an implementation =
error,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>so not much in the =
field anyway.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-Ekr<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, =
Mar 26, 2018 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" =
target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid =
#CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>I appear =
to have run across an implementation that does not appear to<br>violate =
the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.<br><br>I =
am doing a handshake with PSK.&nbsp; On the second flight from the =
client it<br>sends<br><br>[ChangeCipherSpec]<br>Finished<br><br>The =
server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the =
keys.<br>It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message =
and silently<br>ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect =
and the text says<br>that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad =
MAC.&nbsp; This means that my<br>client re-sends the same flight to the =
server on and on because it never<br>gets a response and assumes that =
the packet must be getting lost in transit.<br><br><br>The document does =
not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until the<br>Finished =
message is received and processed.&nbsp; I am not sure, but I =
believe<br>the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC =
on the first<br>block of data in any epoch and must error on those =
messages.<br><br>I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS =
1.3, but it could<br>easily =
be.<br><br>Jim<br><br><br>_______________________________________________=
<br>TLS mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><o:p></o:p=
></p></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></di=
v></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0282_01D3C4CE.690552E0--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 07:14:44 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
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--001a113d858ab275170568516763
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:48 AM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> Yes, I am talking about the TLS record MAC.
>
>
>
> In my case this was happening because of a misconfiguration on the PSK.
> When we finally figured out that this was a MAC error on the record, then
> we immediately looked at the values of the PSK knowing that this was the
> most likely failure.
>

Well, you'll note that TLS 1.3 will not have this problem because the
binder check will fail.



> The fact that in the main handshake this leads to a large amount of
> retries by the client I am not sure that this is just a slower failure
> detection.  I agree that this is less of an issue for a simple rotate the
> keys problem.  I am slightly worried about having the same problem on a
> re-negotiation though.
>

How would that happen unless you had an implementation defect.

-Ekr





>
>
> Jim
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, March 26, 2018 6:24 AM
> *To:* Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> *Cc:* <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
>
>
>
> First, just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC on the Finished
>
> rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?
>
>
>
> Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is reasonable behavior. It
>
> makes the protocol somewhat more resistant to damaged bits on the wire.
>
> Note that QUIC takes this position even further: every packet is integrity
>
> protected (the initial packets use a key based on the CID). The primary
>
> consequence of this is slower failure detection, but the kind of case
> you're
>
> talking about primarily happens when there is an implementation error,
>
> so not much in the field anyway.
>
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> wrote:
>
> I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to
> violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.
>
> I am doing a handshake with PSK.  On the second flight from the client it
> sends
>
> [ChangeCipherSpec]
> Finished
>
> The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the keys.
> It then attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and silently
> ignores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text says
> that it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.  This means that
> my
> client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it never
> gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost in
> transit.
>
>
> The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs does not apply until
> the
> Finished message is received and processed.  I am not sure, but I believe
> the document needs to say that one cannot ignore a failed MAC on the first
> block of data in any epoch and must error on those messages.
>
> I have not looked to see if this is an issue for DTLS 1.3, but it could
> easily be.
>
> Jim
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>

--001a113d858ab275170568516763
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:48 AM, Jim Schaad <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ietf@augustcellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_-1881913602378185401WordSection1"><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">Yes, I am talking about the TLS record MAC.<u></u><u></u=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
In my case this was happening because of a misconfiguration on the PSK.=C2=
=A0 When we finally figured out that this was a MAC error on the record, th=
en we immediately looked at the values of the PSK knowing that this was the=
 most likely failure.=C2=A0</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>Well, you&#39;ll note that TLS 1.3 will not have this problem because the =
binder check will fail.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail=
-m_-1881913602378185401WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"> The fact that =
in the main handshake this leads to a large amount of retries by the client=
 I am not sure that this is just a slower failure detection.=C2=A0 I agree =
that this is less of an issue for a simple rotate the keys problem.=C2=A0 I=
 am slightly worried about having the same problem on a re-negotiation thou=
gh.</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>How would that happen u=
nless you had an implementation defect.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmai=
l-m_-1881913602378185401WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">J=
im<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div style=3D"border-top:none;border=
-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1.5pt solid blue;padding:0in 0in=
 0in 4pt"><div><div style=3D"border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-le=
ft:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, March 26=
, 2018 6:24 AM<br><b>To:</b> Jim Schaad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustce=
llars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt; &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<b=
r><b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake<u></u><u></u></=
p></div></div><div><div class=3D"gmail-h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">First, just for clarification,=
 you mean the TLS record MAC on the Finished<u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?<u></u><u></u></p></=
div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">Assuming that is correct, then I believe this is reason=
able behavior. It<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">makes =
the protocol somewhat more resistant to damaged bits on the wire.<u></u><u>=
</u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Note that QUIC takes this positio=
n even further: every packet is integrity<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">protected (the initial packets use a key based on the CID=
). The primary<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">consequen=
ce of this is slower failure detection, but the kind of case you&#39;re<u><=
/u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">talking about primarily hap=
pens when there is an implementation error,<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">so not much in the field anyway.<u></u><u></u></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal">-Ekr<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 6:09 AM, Jim Schaad &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p><blockquote style=3D"border-top:none;bor=
der-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal">I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to=
<br>violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.=
<br><br>I am doing a handshake with PSK.=C2=A0 On the second flight from th=
e client it<br>sends<br><br>[ChangeCipherSpec]<br>Finished<br><br>The serve=
r sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occurs and moves to use the keys.<br>It th=
en attempts to validate the MAC on the Finished message and silently<br>ign=
ores the Finish message because the MAC is incorrect and the text says<br>t=
hat it is legal to ignore packets which have a bad MAC.=C2=A0 This means th=
at my<br>client re-sends the same flight to the server on and on because it=
 never<br>gets a response and assumes that the packet must be getting lost =
in transit.<br><br><br>The document does not say that ignoring of bad MACs =
does not apply until the<br>Finished message is received and processed.=C2=
=A0 I am not sure, but I believe<br>the document needs to say that one cann=
ot ignore a failed MAC on the first<br>block of data in any epoch and must =
error on those messages.<br><br>I have not looked to see if this is an issu=
e for DTLS 1.3, but it could<br>easily be.<br><br>Jim<br><br><br>__________=
____________________<wbr>_________________<br>TLS mailing list<br><a href=
=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><u></u><u></u></p></blockquote></div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a113d858ab275170568516763--


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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On 03/23/2018 07:59 AM, Salz, Rich wrote:
> So we have two registries that share a number space.
>
> Sounds like the right solution is for the registries to coordinate. 
>

Well, there are three registries involved -- two existing one octet
registries that apply to TLS 1.2 and below, and a new TLS 1.3 registry
with two octets of space.  The original proposal by the authors was to
mark all the unallocated entries in the existing two registries as
either reserved or deprecated.  IANA noted that this is effectively the
same as closing the registries in terms of the difficulty of making
further registrations, though I am not sure that the authors replied to
the question that I think I asked about what the procedure is for
re-opening a registry should a need arise to allocate an additional
codepoint from it.

Anyway, it seems rather challenging to try to keep all three registries
open and coordinate amongst them, given that the new two-octet registry
has a pretty low "specification required" registration policy, and
allocations from the existing registries would apparently both require a
"contiguous" 256 values to be free in the new registry and then "knock
out" those 256 values from further use.  This would eat up the free
space in the new registry relatively quickly, and presumably would not
be compatible with a weak "specification required" policy (which is
currently the policy for values 64-223).  If we agree that
"specification required" is not appropriate for the existing one-octet
registries in a proposed "coordinate" scenario, then I don't see what
the policy would be other than "standards action" (the current policy
for values 0-63).  And if "standards action" is the bar, that would
require the IETF to do work on TLS 1.2 in order to need a new
registration, but this WG is chartered primarily for TLS 1.3 and
"require significant justification" to take on work for older versions. 
So it's extremely unclear to me that there's a plausible scenario in
which a registration in the existing registries would occur.  Such a
case could presumably reopen the existing registries for its use anyway,
given the level of review that would be needed.

So, in summary, closing these registries seems to adequately reflect (my
understanding of) our expectations for what will happen to them.  I'm
curious to know how your understanding differs.

-Ben


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Kaduk, Ben" <bkaduk@akamai.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 1:25 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> Is it now impossible adding new things to TLS 1.2?  I don't believe the WG
> understood that this would be the situation.  So I disagree with your claim
> that this was our understanding of the situation.
>
> Okay, it turns out that David's neat hack make some things harder. So what?
>

The intent was that additions to TLS 1.2 would just use the new registry
too (since the hack can be backported easily), e.g.
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17. Though, yeah, it is a bit awkward text-wise.
:-/

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Mar 26=
, 2018 at 1:25 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=
=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex">Is it now impossible adding new things to TLS 1.2?=C2=A0 I don&#39=
;t believe the WG understood that this would be the situation.=C2=A0 So I d=
isagree with your claim that this was our understanding of the situation.<b=
r>
<br>
Okay, it turns out that David&#39;s neat hack make some things harder. So w=
hat?<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>The intent was that additions to TLS 1.2 w=
ould just use the new registry too (since the hack can be backported easily=
), e.g. draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17. Though, yeah, it is a bit awkward tex=
t-wise. :-/</div></div></div></div></div>

--001a114750604fb17a0568541e66--


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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On 03/26/2018 12:24 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
> Is it now impossible adding new things to TLS 1.2?  I don't believe the WG understood that this would be the situation.  So I disagree with your claim that this was our understanding of the situation.

I was under the impression that the WG was well aware, e.g., in my
comments on the 2nd WGLC, where I say "It looks like we no longer do
anything to obsolete/reserve/similar the HashAlgorithm and
SignatureAlgorithm registries; was that just an editorial mixup or an
intended change?", and Ekr replies with a link to the appropriate
section of draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates, as seen at
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg23865.html

> Okay, it turns out that David's neat hack make some things harder. So what?
>

I thought that's what I was asking you -- you seem to feel that we
should care about this, and I still don't understand why.

-Ben


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Kaduk, Ben" <bkaduk@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 19:04:27 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Formal analysis of Exported Authenticators
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--94eb2c1ea354081cb60568557262
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi all,

A number of people expressed interest in the Tamarin model we made of
Exported Authenticators.
For those interested, you can see the code, along with an explanatory guide
here <https://bitbucket.org/jhoyla/tamarin-exported-authenticators>[0].

The full analysis report is a work-in-progress which we hope to release
soon.

If you have an questions, please feel free to email me.

Regards,

Jonathan

[0] https://bitbucket.org/jhoyla/tamarin-exported-authenticators/overview

--94eb2c1ea354081cb60568557262
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px">Hi all,<=
/div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=
=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px">A number of people expressed intere=
st in the Tamarin model we made of Exported Authenticators.=C2=A0</div><div=
 style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px">For those interested, you can=
 see the code, along with an explanatory guide<span class=3D"inbox-inbox-Ap=
ple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://bitbucket.org/jhoyla/t=
amarin-exported-authenticators" target=3D"_blank">here</a>[0].</div><div st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rg=
b(33,33,33);font-size:13px">The full analysis report is a work-in-progress =
which we hope to release soon.=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33)=
;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px=
">If you have an questions, please feel free to email me. =C2=A0</div><div =
style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"color:=
rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px">Regards,</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,3=
3);font-size:13px"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13=
px">Jonathan</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(33,33,33);font-size:13px"><br></d=
iv><div><font color=3D"#212121">[0] <a href=3D"https://bitbucket.org/jhoyla=
/tamarin-exported-authenticators/overview">https://bitbucket.org/jhoyla/tam=
arin-exported-authenticators/overview</a></font><br></div></div>

--94eb2c1ea354081cb60568557262--


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References: <505FCF83-C92E-4A90-83BF-4B2C4796EBE6@sn3rd.com> <77875DAA-EE63-4EBA-8951-61F89D9FBAD8@sn3rd.com> <1521713417877.45777@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <21D7BBB3-5B19-4721-B08A-9AD887F37F99@sn3rd.com> <EBD5C0A9-FE81-4823-BDBA-88F575467B97@akamai.com> <20180323125758.GE25919@kduck.kaduk.org> <FE8B999F-6A3D-4E7F-93A2-A8A2A20C5BED@akamai.com> <ef364e4b-d8bc-c8fe-5d2a-0e78fb30631c@akamai.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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> On Mar 26, 2018, at 18:18, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
>  IANA noted that this is effectively the
> same as closing the registries in terms of the difficulty of making
> further registrations, though I am not sure that the authors replied =
to
> the question that I think I asked about what the procedure is for
> re-opening a registry should a need arise to allocate an additional
> codepoint from it.

I=E2=80=99ll have to ask, but I suspect that someone who wanted a new =
assignment would draft an I-D that assigned the code point and it would =
go through the process.  I.e., I think it=E2=80=99s mostly symbolic.

spt=


From nobody Wed Mar 28 16:17:24 2018
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To: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 01:17:13 +0200 (CEST)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/5JAwHq5SNeS4Vq1nD1PgcBiXfjg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To clarify for anyone who has confusion on the enterprise TLS visibility
> use case, I think enterprises need to be able to do out-of-band decryption
> anywhere in the network that they own.

This is argument is so lame.

In Germany, monitoring communications between individuals or between
individuals and legal entities, including communications over corporate
networks, was made a serious crime in 2004 (TKG 2004) with a penalty of
up to 5 years in prison for listening into such communication.

The world didn't end.  Really, consider it proven that there is no need.

There may be _desires_.  For me, those desires are no less unethical
as data collections by apple, camebridge analytica, facebook, google,
microsoft, whathaveyou...

... and fortunately, for corporations in germany, such data gathering 
is not just unethical, but truely criminal by law.


-Martin


From nobody Thu Mar 29 07:30:15 2018
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Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 16:30:03 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Can version number 0x304 be used now?
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Hey all,

With draft-ietf-tls13-28 being approved by the IESG, can implementations
already start using the TLS 1.3 version number (0x304) rather than the
draft version indicators? Or should they wait until publication of the
final RFC?

If it can already be used, then I'll ensure that Wireshark 2.6 will have
support for TLS 1.3 (0x304) and close
https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12779
-- 
Kind regards,
Peter Wu
https://lekensteyn.nl


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To: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>, tls@ietf.org
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Can version number 0x304 be used now?
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On 03/29/2018 09:30 AM, Peter Wu wrote:
> Hey all,
>
> With draft-ietf-tls13-28 being approved by the IESG, can implementations
> already start using the TLS 1.3 version number (0x304) rather than the
> draft version indicators? Or should they wait until publication of the
> final RFC?

You/we should wait until the publication of the final RFC.

-Ben

> If it can already be used, then I'll ensure that Wireshark 2.6 will have
> support for TLS 1.3 (0x304) and close
> https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12779


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Can version number 0x304 be used now?
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We (Firefox/NSS) intend to not use 0304 until the RFC is published. Of
course, it might be safe for Wireshark to start earlier as its compat story
is different.

-Ekr


On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 7:38 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> On 03/29/2018 09:30 AM, Peter Wu wrote:
> > Hey all,
> >
> > With draft-ietf-tls13-28 being approved by the IESG, can implementations
> > already start using the TLS 1.3 version number (0x304) rather than the
> > draft version indicators? Or should they wait until publication of the
> > final RFC?
>
> You/we should wait until the publication of the final RFC.
>
> -Ben
>
> > If it can already be used, then I'll ensure that Wireshark 2.6 will have
> > support for TLS 1.3 (0x304) and close
> > https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12779
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000e1a47505688ea55a
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<div dir=3D"ltr">We (Firefox/NSS) intend to not use 0304 until the RFC is p=
ublished. Of course, it might be safe for Wireshark to start earlier as its=
 compat story is different.<div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 29=
, 2018 at 7:38 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:b=
kaduk@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On 03/29/2018 09:30 AM,=
 Peter Wu wrote:<br>
&gt; Hey all,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; With draft-ietf-tls13-28 being approved by the IESG, can implementatio=
ns<br>
&gt; already start using the TLS 1.3 version number (0x304) rather than the=
<br>
&gt; draft version indicators? Or should they wait until publication of the=
<br>
&gt; final RFC?<br>
<br>
</span>You/we should wait until the publication of the final RFC.<br>
<br>
-Ben<br>
<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
&gt; If it can already be used, then I&#39;ll ensure that Wireshark 2.6 wil=
l have<br>
&gt; support for TLS 1.3 (0x304) and close<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D12779=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://bugs.wireshark.org/<wbr>bugz=
illa/show_bug.cgi?id=3D12779</a><br>
<br>
</span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">____________________________=
__<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--000000000000e1a47505688ea55a--


From nobody Thu Mar 29 10:31:21 2018
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Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

1) Section 18: "However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to
publication,
   the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
   satisfied that such a specification will be published."
This sounds like it's simply the early allocation process (rfc7120). Maybe it's
useful to name it like this to avoid confusion.

2) Also section 18: "IANA [...] SHOULD direct all requests for registration to
the review mailing list." Why is this not a MUST?



From nobody Thu Mar 29 10:49:16 2018
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for the well written doc!

One minor comment the title of sec 5: not sure if "deprecating" is the best
word as that maybe be read as "moved to historic" in IETF world...

Tiny typo in sec 5:
s/and "max_fragment_length"/an "max_fragment_length"/



From nobody Thu Mar 29 13:33:46 2018
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Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 16:33:38 -0400
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates@ietf.org, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, tls-chairs@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
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To: =?utf-8?Q?Mirja_K=C3=BChlewind?= <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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> On Mar 29, 2018, at 13:31, Mirja K=C3=BChlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> Mirja K=C3=BChlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-04: No Objection
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut =
this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to =
https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------

I know this is no excuse but I copied the text for the expert pool for =
RFC7519.

> 1) Section 18: "However, to allow for the allocation of values prior =
to
> publication,
>   the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
>   satisfied that such a specification will be published."
> This sounds like it's simply the early allocation process (rfc7120). =
Maybe it's
> useful to name it like this to avoid confusion.

I think what you=E2=80=99re suggesting is:

OLD:

  However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
  the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
  satisfied that such a specification will be published.

NEW:

  However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication
  (i.e., and early allocation), the Designated Experts may approve
  registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will
  be published.


> 2) Also section 18: "IANA [...] SHOULD direct all requests for =
registration to
> the review mailing list." Why is this not a MUST?

Because the IESG :)  The only reason I could think of is that the DE =
pool has been slow, it=E2=80=99s not getting fixed, and IANA is like =
that=E2=80=99s it I=E2=80=99m sending this to the IESG.

spt=


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From: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 19:14:23 -0500
To: "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ferensAGPPSK7pJdZkeiJmLgCwM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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I'd like to echo Dale's sentiments on the error codes.  I've done a fair amo=
unt of TLS handshake troubleshooting, and it's usually long and painful beca=
use the error codes are so vague. Another factor in debugging is that people=
 troubleshooting TLS in the enterprise are typically not the same level of e=
xperts as those who are writing TLS code.  The TLS working group folks seem t=
o have their fingers in TLS every day and know it backwards and forwards, so=
 debugging a problem is not so difficult for them. They can also read code t=
o figure out what is going on. In contrast, I see a TLS handshake problem on=
ce every few months.  The rest of the time I'm looking at HTTP, SQL, SMB, or=
 whatever. So enterprise troubleshooters are not going to be as deep in thei=
r understanding of TLS by the nature of their jobs, and they need all the he=
lp they can get (like from descriptive error messages).  The vague error mes=
sages are leading directly to more downtime, and this should be balanced wit=
h the other security needs. I'm not saying this needs to be fixed immediatel=
y, but it should be considered somewhere down the road.

> On Mar 6, 2018, at 9:35 PM, worley@ariadne.com (Dale R. Worley) wrote:
>=20
> Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> writes:
>> On the specific suggestion of having more granular error codes, I think
>> this is a dangerous direction to take lightly; there's at least one
>> instance where granular TLS alert messages have directly led to security
>> issues by acting as oracles that aided the attacker.
>>=20
>> There's a general conjecture that the more information that is provided t=
o
>> attackers, the more easily they can leverage into a compromise. Personall=
y
>> I believe that conjecture, and would actually prefer to see fewer signals=
,
>> ideally as few as one big error code. There is a trade-off against
>> debugability, but I've only seen a handful of people have the skills to
>> debug low level TLS issues and it doesn't seem worth the risk. Others
>> disagree, which is valid, but it's at least an area of reasonable
>> contention.
>=20
> I believe I've heard that position stated before, and I give it
> credibility.  I retreat to the statement I made at the top of my review,
> that I'm not experienced in security.  OTOH, I've spent a lot of the
> previous couple of decades debugging SIP call flows, so I've learned to
> appreciate any aid to debuggability that exists.
>=20
> I'm tempted to consider this a classic case of conflicting requirements,
> and ask if our cryptographic experience can help us square this circle.
>=20
> Dale
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>
CC: "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>I've done a fair amount of TLS handshake troubleshooting, and it's usually=
=0A=
>long and painful because the error codes are so vague. =0A=
>[...]=0A=
>The vague error messages are leading directly to more downtime, and this=
=0A=
>should be balanced with the other security needs. =0A=
=0A=
This was the reason for the sole new feature that was added to SCEP, an=0A=
optional text-form error message to explain why you didn't get a certificat=
e.=0A=
Prior to that it was pure guesswork, there was just a generic error code=0A=
saying "you didn't get your cert", which made things almost impossible to=
=0A=
debug if you didn't have someone you could phone at the CA who could tell y=
ou=0A=
why you didn't get your cert.=0A=
=0A=
As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there's a problem=
,=0A=
you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no=0A=
information at all.  Having a debug-mode capability to send back a long-for=
m=0A=
error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say "send ba=
ck=0A=
a long-form alert with more than just 'BOOLEAN succeeded =3D FALSE' in it".=
=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
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Hi Martin

> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Martin Rex
> Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2018 4:47 AM
> To: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't d=
o it)
>=20
> Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > To clarify for anyone who has confusion on the enterprise TLS
> > visibility use case, I think enterprises need to be able to do
> > out-of-band decryption anywhere in the network that they own.
>=20
> This is argument is so lame.
>=20
> In Germany, monitoring communications between individuals or between
> individuals and legal entities, including communications over corporate
> networks, was made a serious crime in 2004 (TKG 2004) with a penalty of u=
p
> to 5 years in prison for listening into such communication.
>=20
> The world didn't end.  Really, consider it proven that there is no need.
>=20
=20
Could monitoring could be legally done if user provided his consent at the =
time of=20
login into enterprise managed terminal?=20
I guess that's the case in enterprise managed networks.

> There may be _desires_.  For me, those desires are no less unethical as d=
ata
> collections by apple, camebridge analytica, facebook, google, microsoft,
> whathaveyou...
>=20
> .... and fortunately, for corporations in germany, such data gathering is=
 not
> just unethical, but truely criminal by law.
>=20
>=20
> -Martin
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://emea01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fww
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From nobody Fri Mar 30 13:55:42 2018
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Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 13:55:24 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
cc: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>,  "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org,  draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
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On 3/30/18 at 7:35 PM, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) wrote:

>As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there's a proble=
m,
>you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no
>information at all.  Having a debug-mode capability to send back a long-fo=
rm
>error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say "send b=
ack
>a long-form alert with more than just 'BOOLEAN succeeded =3D FALSE' in it"=
.

We have always avoided the long form error messages in TLS=20
because they can be of great help to attackers as well as=20
debuggers. I think this objection is much weaker if we write the=20
long form error messages into a log that is kept with other=20
server logs.

Cheers - Bill

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | Ham radio contesting is a    | Periwinkle
(408)356-8506      | contact sport.               | 16345=20
Englewood Ave
www.pwpconsult.com |  - Ken Widelitz K6LA / VY2TT | Los Gatos,=20
CA 95032


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--0000000000004a57cd0568a7d360
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks,

TLS 1.3 has been approved by the IESG and it's on its way to the RFC
Editor, so
I don't really see this changing any time soon for the base RFC.

I think there's some debate about whether this is a good idea, but in any
case,
the right way to pursue it would be to publish a new draft, presumably with
some extension that says "I speak extended alerts".

-Ekr




On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> wrote:

> On 3/30/18 at 7:35 PM, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
>
> As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there's a
>> problem,
>> you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no
>> information at all.  Having a debug-mode capability to send back a
>> long-form
>> error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say "send
>> back
>> a long-form alert with more than just 'BOOLEAN succeeded = FALSE' in it"
>
>

--0000000000004a57cd0568a7d360
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<div><br></div><div>TLS 1.3 has been approved by =
the IESG and it&#39;s on its way to the RFC Editor, so=C2=A0</div><div>I do=
n&#39;t really see this changing any time soon for the base RFC.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>I think there&#39;s some debate about whether this is a good=
 idea, but in any case,</div><div>the right way to pursue it would be to pu=
blish a new draft, presumably with</div><div>some extension that says &quot=
;I speak extended alerts&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Bill Frantz <spa=
n dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:frantz@pwpconsult.com" target=3D"_blank=
">frantz@pwpconsult.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">On 3/30/18 at 7:35 PM, <a href=
=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland=
.ac.nz</a> (Peter Gutmann) wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there&#39;s a pro=
blem,<br>
you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no<br>
information at all.=C2=A0 Having a debug-mode capability to send back a lon=
g-form<br>
error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say &quot;se=
nd back<br>
a long-form alert with more than just &#39;BOOLEAN succeeded =3D FALSE&#39;=
 in it&quot;</blockquote>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--0000000000004a57cd0568a7d360--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
CC: Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2018 01:01:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>We have always avoided the long form error messages in TLS because they ca=
n=0A=
>be of great help to attackers as well as debuggers. =0A=
=0A=
That's why I said it was a debug-only capability, not an always-enabled on-=
by-=0A=
default capability.=0A=
=0A=
>I think this objection is much weaker if we write the long form error=0A=
>messages into a log that is kept with other server logs.=0A=
=0A=
That's the worst-case debugging scenario I mentioned where you need to cont=
act=0A=
the server admin on every test run to see what went wrong.  What you've=0A=
described is the (broken) status quo that people in this thread are trying =
to fix.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


From nobody Fri Mar 30 18:57:39 2018
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Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2018 21:57:23 -0400
Cc: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Sent from my mobile device

> On Mar 30, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi folks,
>=20
> TLS 1.3 has been approved by the IESG and it's on its way to the RFC Edito=
r, so=20
> I don't really see this changing any time soon for the base RFC.
>=20
> I think there's some debate about whether this is a good idea, but in any c=
ase,
> the right way to pursue it would be to publish a new draft, presumably wit=
h
> some extension that says "I speak extended alerts".
>=20
I agree with Eric=E2=80=99s assessment, this could be in a new draft as an e=
xtension.

Kathleen=20

> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> wrot=
e:
>> On 3/30/18 at 7:35 PM, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
>>=20
>>> As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there's a prob=
lem,
>>> you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no
>>> information at all.  Having a debug-mode capability to send back a long-=
form
>>> error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say "send=
 back
>>> a long-form alert with more than just 'BOOLEAN succeeded =3D FALSE' in i=
t"
>=20

--Apple-Mail-5413201C-2252-46E2-A275-538F79A88D0B
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><br><br><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature">Sent=
 from my mobile device</div><div><br>On Mar 30, 2018, at 5:20 PM, Eric Resco=
rla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br><=
/div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<div><br></div=
><div>TLS 1.3 has been approved by the IESG and it's on its way to the RFC E=
ditor, so&nbsp;</div><div>I don't really see this changing any time soon for=
 the base RFC.</div><div><br></div><div>I think there's some debate about wh=
ether this is a good idea, but in any case,</div><div>the right way to pursu=
e it would be to publish a new draft, presumably with</div><div>some extensi=
on that says "I speak extended alerts".</div><div><br></div></div></div></bl=
ockquote>I agree with Eric=E2=80=99s assessment, this could be in a new draf=
t as an extension.<div><br></div><div>Kathleen&nbsp;</div><div><br><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><b=
r></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Bill Frantz <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:frantz@pwpconsult.com" target=3D"_blank">frantz@pwpconsu=
lt.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"=
HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">On 3/30/18 at 7:35 PM, <a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@c=
s.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a> (Peter Gut=
mann) wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
As you mention, debugging TLS is unnecessarily painful if there's a problem,=
<br>
you typically just get a handshake-failed alert which is essentially no<br>
information at all.&nbsp; Having a debug-mode capability to send back a long=
-form<br>
error message would be extremely useful, maybe an extension to say "send bac=
k<br>
a long-form alert with more than just 'BOOLEAN succeeded =3D FALSE' in it"</=
blockquote>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>, Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, "General Area Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2018 02:16:39 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>I agree with Eric=92s assessment, this could be in a new draft as an exten=
sion. =0A=
=0A=
Anyone want to work on this?  I can contribute a bit by recycling the EtM=
=0A=
text, which sets out how to communicate a boolean flag (for "I speak extend=
ed=0A=
alerts") as an extension, apart from that you just need to define the alert=
=0A=
format, which I assume just means adding a free-form text field to the=0A=
existing alerts.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24
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References: <1522377304060.20682@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <r470Ps-10133i-7B3DEB3D7CF1410DB2E2FF250A811BB1@Williams-MacBook-Pro.local> <CABcZeBMFrnSUddraBps-b=CujitVfaQuqBFHD9WCAcCKg9M7Tw@mail.gmail.com> <CDC57F65-C88C-43BB-B4DB-77AEE9B437EF@gmail.com> <1522462562850.29528@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>,  Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>,  "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Expanded alert codes. [Was Re: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24]
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--0000000000001117950568b589b9
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Thinking through this some more, I'm skeptical that this is going to be
that useful as a debugging-only feature.

In my experience, there are four major scenarios for diagnosing this kind
of failure. Under the assumption that you control one end, the other end
can be:

1. A live endpoint.
2. A testing endpoint someone has put up.
3. An endpoint that someone is actively working on with you.
4. An endpoint you control (e.g., you're running it on your own machine).

If this is a debug-only feature, then it won't be available in case #1, and
it's not that helpful in case 4, because you can read the logs, errors,
etc. yourself. For the same reason, it's not really that helpful in case
#3, because you can just ask the person you're working with to read the
logs, so this leaves case #2, which I agree can be annoying. However, what
we've started doing with QUIC is just to have the endpoints dump their logs
so that they're available on a co-located Web site. That gives you a lot
more information than you'd probably want to fit in an alert message (e.g.,
you can print out the keying material, etc.)

I guess there might be some intermediate category 1.5 that's kind of in
production so you don't want to print out complete logs, but you'd like
more detail than you would probably want to expose in general, but my
experience is that that's not super-common.

-Ekr



On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 7:16 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >I agree with Eric=E2=80=99s assessment, this could be in a new draft as =
an
> extension.
>
> Anyone want to work on this?  I can contribute a bit by recycling the EtM
> text, which sets out how to communicate a boolean flag (for "I speak
> extended
> alerts") as an extension, apart from that you just need to define the ale=
rt
> format, which I assume just means adding a free-form text field to the
> existing alerts.
>
> Peter.
>

--0000000000001117950568b589b9
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thinking through this some more, I&#39;m skeptical that th=
is is going to be that useful as a debugging-only feature.<div><br></div><d=
iv>In my experience, there are four major scenarios for diagnosing this kin=
d of failure. Under the assumption that you control one end, the other end =
can be:</div><div><br></div><div>1. A live endpoint.</div><div>2. A testing=
 endpoint someone has put up.</div><div>3. An endpoint that someone is acti=
vely working on with you.</div><div>4. An endpoint you control (e.g., you&#=
39;re running it on your own machine).</div><div><br></div><div>If this is =
a debug-only feature, then it won&#39;t be available in case #1, and it&#39=
;s not that helpful in case 4, because you can read the logs, errors, etc. =
yourself. For the same reason, it&#39;s not really that helpful in case #3,=
 because you can just ask the person you&#39;re working with to read the lo=
gs, so this leaves case #2, which I agree can be annoying. However, what we=
&#39;ve started doing with QUIC is just to have the endpoints dump their lo=
gs so that they&#39;re available on a co-located Web site. That gives you a=
 lot more information than you&#39;d probably want to fit in an alert messa=
ge (e.g., you can print out the keying material, etc.)</div><div><br></div>=
<div>I guess there might be some intermediate category 1.5 that&#39;s kind =
of in production so you don&#39;t want to print out complete logs, but you&=
#39;d like more detail than you would probably want to expose in general, b=
ut my experience is that that&#39;s not super-common.</div><div><br></div><=
div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 7:16 PM, Peter Gutmann <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blan=
k">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><span>Kathleen Moriarty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.i=
etf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.<wbr>com</a>&=
gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;I agree with Eric=E2=80=99s assessment, this could be in a new draft as=
 an extension.<br>
<br>
</span>Anyone want to work on this?=C2=A0 I can contribute a bit by recycli=
ng the EtM<br>
text, which sets out how to communicate a boolean flag (for &quot;I speak e=
xtended<br>
alerts&quot;) as an extension, apart from that you just need to define the =
alert<br>
format, which I assume just means adding a free-form text field to the<br>
existing alerts.<br>
<span class=3D"m_-8063348040209096173HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--0000000000001117950568b589b9--


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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

 requires standards action.  Not all parameters defined in standards
   track documents need to be marked as recommended.
It might be useful to capitalize Recommended here.



   been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability,
   or is intended only for specific use cases.
I think technically it has "Recommended = No"



   Note:  Supported Groups marked as "Yes" are those allocated via
      Standards Track RFCs.  Supported Groups marked as "No" are not;
      supported groups marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a
This may need a revision because some have not been allocated that way.



      thus requiring a new construction.  The exporter interface remains
      the same, however the value is computed different.
differently.



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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I apologize for not catching the point about "negotiated" earlier.

   An Authentication Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) ciphers (see
   [RFC5116]) API requires that an entire record be present to decrypt
Nit: "An" .. "ciphers" do not agree.

   incremental processing of records minimally exposes endpoints to the
   risk of forged data.
This seems a bit weak. It's just not an acceptable practices to incrementally
process.

   Unprotected messages - handshake messages in particular - are not
   subject to this limit.
This text is a bit confusing. Consider a case where a server recognizes the
extension and has no limit, but the client offers one.

In that case, the server can either:

Return an extension with a max-size limit
Not return the extension
I think we want the server to conform to the client's limit in any case, but
"negotiated" is unclear.

   they have no need to limit the size of records.  This allows servers
   to apply a limit at their discretion.  If this extension is not
   negotiated, endpoints can send records of any size permitted by the
I think by "apply" you mean "request" or "advertise"



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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>>    format, which I assume just means adding a free-form text field to th=
e=0A=
>>    existing alerts.=0A=
> =0A=
>Doesn't it have to be tagged with language and codeset these days?=0A=
=0A=
Possibly, if you consider being able to say "Invalid length encoding in=0A=
preferred-ECC-curves extension" in Tswana is mission-critical to debugging =
a=0A=
TLS handshake failure.=0A=
=0A=
>I think we're past USASCII =0A=
=0A=
Since this is being used purely as a debugging facility by one set of=0A=
developers to communicate technical details to another set of developers, I=
'd=0A=
say it should use the same language and terminology that the technical spec=
=0A=
that's being implemented is written in.  Let me just check for a second wha=
t=0A=
that could be.=0A=
=0A=
Gosh, it's USASCII.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>, Steve Fenter <steven.fenter58@gmail.com>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Expanded alert codes. [Was Re: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24]
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Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>In my experience, there are four major scenarios for diagnosing this kind =
of=0A=
>failure. Under the assumption that you control one end, the other end can =
be:=0A=
>=0A=
>1. A live endpoint.=0A=
>2. A testing endpoint someone has put up.=0A=
>3. An endpoint that someone is actively working on with you.=0A=
>4. An endpoint you control (e.g., you're running it on your own machine).=
=0A=
>=0A=
>If this is a debug-only feature, then it won't be available in case #1, =
=0A=
=0A=
I have the feeling the people who have commented on this were talking from=
=0A=
real-world experience, and in the example I gave it was exactly case #1.  T=
his=0A=
was a live, large-scale production environment by a major ecommerce=0A=
organisation (details fudged somewhat to avoid identifying anyone, but=0A=
everyone here would know the name), and the only way to get things working =
was=0A=
to spend several weeks randomly tweaking every conceivable option on the=0A=
client until things started working, because the only thing the server woul=
d=0A=
say was "Handshake failure".  The client-side organisation still has no ide=
a=0A=
what made things work, they've narrowed it down by trial and error to about=
=0A=
half a dozen things they had to change, but that's it.=0A=
=0A=
If they'd been able to get the server operators to turn on extended-alert f=
or=0A=
even just a single handshake it would have avoided several weeks' effort an=
d a=0A=
fix that even now is pure guesswork.=0A=
=0A=
>For the same reason, it's not really that helpful in case #3, because you =
can=0A=
>just ask the person you're working with to read the logs, =0A=
=0A=
Except that these people are EDI companies, not TLS experts.  They have=0A=
neither the expertise nor the inclination to help debug TLS issues.  What t=
hey=0A=
will do is enable debug on the server so the client can sort things out, bu=
t=0A=
they're not going to devote any effort to sorting out the problem at their=
=0A=
end.=0A=
=0A=
Note that temporarily enabling debug on a live endpoint isn't a big issue,=
=0A=
everything will continue to operate as before except for the one client tha=
t=0A=
requests debug-level alerts, and that knows what it's up for because it=0A=
explicitly asked for it.=0A=
=0A=
>so this leaves case #2, =0A=
=0A=
Actually it leaves 1, 2, and 3.  4 is kinda pathological, so really the=0A=
problem is "all of the cases".=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=

