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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 15:37:04 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-02
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I have submitted draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-02, which includes the
changes to content type we discussed in Montreal.

Chairs, I think this is the last open issue and we are ready for WGLC.

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I have submitted draft-ietf-tls-dtls-conn=
ection-id-02, which includes the changes to content type we discussed in Mo=
ntreal.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Chairs, I think th=
is is the last open issue and we are ready for WGLC.</div><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>

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From nobody Fri Nov  2 12:57:31 2018
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From: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 15:57:13 -0400
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To: Patrick McManus <mcmanus@ducksong.com>
Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Multi-CDN and ESNI
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Another important scenario that is closely related to multi-cdn is how to
safely enable and disable ESNI, as well as how to handle cases where not
all CDNs in a multi-CDN setup have ESNI turned on.  As some examples:

* A site is using a CDN that has ESNI enabled.  As part of switching off of
that CDN to their own hosting provider or another CDN (which either has no
ESNI or has a different ESNI key) there is the same sort of inconsistency
in the records, or a missing record.

* A site is on a multi-CDN setup.  There is no way to get all CDNs to turn
on ESNI at the same time (or likely even within a reasonable time window,
and there may be cases where only some support it).

For example, with #3 one way to handle it would be to treat an NXDOMAIN for
the _esni ESNI record as a "disable sending ESNI in this case".

Some general commentary on some of the proposed options:

On #1) Experience with coordinating keys across providers suggests this
likely won't work.  (Plus will open up lots of security issues.)   The ESNI
DNS record, ESNI key, and ESNI server-side config likely need to be managed
by the same entity for any given case in order for this to be operationally
maintainable.

On #2) Given the number of addresses involved in some of these cases this
may not work or scale well.  In some cases the number of address candidates
may be more than possible in an rrset.  For CDNs that change their DNS
results frequently and have low TTLs, this is also likely to have a very
high rate of mismatches.

On #3) As Nick mentions this won't help with the address collapsing case.
It also needs a way to handle the offboarding situation described above.

I think there's also an option #4 that has a slightly higher integration
overhead for
sites but solves other problems as well.  If we take a step back, the issue
here is that
DNS is a database but any two given responses lack some sort of primary key
tying them
together.  One approach would be to introduce an intermediate record/object
that explicitly
does tie them together.  Two examples of this are the ALTSVC-in-DNS
proposal as well as
something like a "Service Binding" record (which I wrote up when we were
talking
about this back in 2014 following a brainstorm, in which case the"tlshp"
parameter
in that draft is effectively the ESNI key):
      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-nygren-service-bindings-00.txt

More recently with the ALTSVC DNS record, we'd add an ALTSVC attribute
that contains either the ESNI key or the name of the record containing the
ESNI key:
     https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schwartz-httpbis-dns-alt-svc-02

One big advantage of using an ALTSVC record is that it also addresses the
"http-srv" problem.
(See a discussion thread titled "Alternative to SRV?" on the http-srv list
from back in August.)

Another big advantage of using an ALTSVC record approach here is that it
means
that ESNI could be generally configured by Alt-Svc as well.  For example,
this means that the ESNI key could also just be included when doing an
Alt-Svc to QUIC.

What this ends up looking like is something like is an rrset along the
lines of:

  _443._https.example.com. IN TYPE???  {priority1}
{transportprotocol1} {servername1} {port1} {extension_fieldset_1}

  _443._https.example.com. IN TYPE???  {priority2}
{transportprotocol2} {servername2} {port2} {extension_fieldset_2}

  _443._https.example.com. IN TYPE???  {priority3}
{transportprotocol3} {servername3} {port3} {extension_fieldset_3}


For example:

  _443._https.example.com. IN ALTSVC  10 quic2
example.com.examplecdn.net 443 ( esni=3Dkey124._esni.examplecdn.net )

  _443._https.example.com. IN ALTSVC  20 h2 example.com.examplecdn.net
443 ( esni=3Dkey124._esni.examplecdn.net; ipv6-only=3Dtrue )

  _443._https.example.com. IN ALTSVC  40 http/1.1
legacy.example.com.examplecdn.net 443 (
esni=3Dkey124._esni.examplecdn.net )


I suspect that some CDNs would then have customers CNAME over "_443._
https.example.com."
to some name on the CDN.  For example in the example above it might be that
it actually
CNAMEs to _443._https.example.com.examplecdn.net which then means that the
A and AAAA records for "example.com.examplecdn.net" can be returned as
additionals from the same examplecdn.net authority
along with the ALTSVC record.

So in the multi-CDN case, the multi-CDN switcher is switching on the CNAME
to the ALTSVC record,
allowing each CDN or hosting provider target to provide their own ALTSVC
record.
Tying this back up to the above the ALTSVC record then becomes this
intermediate object
that explicitly ties the server (A/AAAA records) and ESNI key together.

One downside is that ALTSVC is primarily defined for HTTPS today,
but nothing prevents it from being more broadly used as an extensible
SRV alternative.

(Side-note: no matter what we'll also want to think and document
how ESNI and cross-hostname Alt-Svc interact.)

        Erik



On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 5:28 PM Patrick McManus <mcmanus@ducksong.com>
wrote:

> Definitely agree this is something that needs to be addressed..
>
> As Mike notes, the fundamental issue is that there are 2 pieces of
> information that are statefully related (the key and address) but obtaine=
d
> statelessly from each other and can therefore come from un-coordinated
> sources. 2 CDNs are commonly un-coordinated sources.. but I've seen this
> with other kinds of cloud providers too. All of which should be target
> audiences of ESNI (because they terminate a variety of hostnames on a
> smaller number of addresses).
>
> fwiw there is a muddled github issue open on this in the old
> individual-draft repo:
> https://github.com/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-esni/issues/35 .. which I'll
> re-open when the tls-wg repo starts being used for this draft.
>
> I see three solution spaces.
>
> 1] As Rich suggests, you can coordinate the uncoordinated sources to have
> one keying record to rule them all. I suspect that's actually not good fo=
r
> anonymity unless it somehow had a normalized global set .. and given the
> one way nature of a CNAME pointer, I feel like this would be really fragi=
le.
>
> 2] you could scope the keys to only be valid for certain addresses by
> putting the valid addresses in the key record. This wouldn't help you do
> ESNI when they didn't match, but at least you could avoid hard failure. (=
or
> you could ignore the addressing record but that might be a bridge too far=
?)
>
> 3] My preferred approach, you could scope the keys to the same
> intermediate name. So if www.example.com -> cname www.cdn-a.com -> ESNI
> record www.cdn-a.com we could make a rule that the ESNI record would only
> apply to address records with a final intermediate of www.cdn-a.com. (I'm
> presuming we'll shift from TXT to ESNI RRTYPE without a prefix, but I don=
't
> think it matters for this..).. when there is a mismatch you could use the
> addressing intermediate as a place to try a new ESNI query from.. That's =
a
> perf penalty, but its only paid in the hopefully rare case where these
> things are unsyncd.
>
> #3 is admittedly a bit non traditional, but I spent a bit of time looking
> at the features of DNS APIs that already have the necessary surface to ma=
ke
> a query for a new RRTYPE... and the cname intermediates are indeed
> generally available.. its true of getdns, res_query, the IOS and MacOS
> interfaces, DnsQuery* on windows, and of course the custom dns stacks in
> cronet/android and firefox/doh could do it.
>
> I hope to work this into a PR.. my first attempt wasn't very readable, bu=
t
> I'll try again tomorrow.
>
> -P
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 1:59 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> I think perhaps we need to take a step back and explain something that
>> might not be well-known outside the community of CDN=E2=80=99s and their
>> customers.  It is not uncommon for (admittedly larger) origins to use
>> multiple CDN=E2=80=99s, and to switch among them. This can be done on a =
per-request
>> basis, because of things like contractual arrangements that make one
>> preferable, or it can be done globally but switched in a matter of secon=
ds
>> because of a short TTL on the www.example.com entry.
>>
>>
>>
>> The issues that Mike discusses impact on this, somewhat negatively.
>>
>>
>>
>> A quick hack thought is to allow multiple entries in the TXT record,
>> forcing a wee bit more work on the CDN.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">Another impor=
tant scenario that is closely related to multi-cdn is how to safely enable =
and disable ESNI, as well as how to handle cases where not all CDNs in a mu=
lti-CDN setup have ESNI turned on.=C2=A0 As some examples:</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">* A site is =
using a CDN that has ESNI enabled.=C2=A0 As part of switching off of that C=
DN to their own hosting provider or another CDN (which either has no ESNI o=
r has a different ESNI key) there is the same sort of inconsistency in the =
records, or a missing record.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fo=
nt-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">* A site is on a multi-CDN setup.=C2=A0 =
There is no way to get all CDNs to turn on ESNI at the same time (or likely=
 even within a reasonable time window, and there may be cases where only so=
me support it).<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:=
tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fam=
ily:tahoma,sans-serif"></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fam=
ily:tahoma,sans-serif">For example, with #3 one way to handle it would be t=
o treat an NXDOMAIN for the _esni ESNI record as a &quot;disable sending ES=
NI in this case&quot;.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:tahoma,sans-serif">Some general commentary on some of the propos=
ed options:</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,s=
ans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:taho=
ma,sans-serif">On #1) Experience with coordinating keys across providers su=
ggests this likely won&#39;t work.=C2=A0 (Plus will open up lots of securit=
y issues.)=C2=A0=C2=A0 The ESNI DNS record, ESNI key, and ESNI server-side =
config likely need to be managed by the same entity for any given case in o=
rder for this to be operationally maintainable.</div><div class=3D"gmail_de=
fault" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">On #2) Given the number =
of addresses involved in some of these cases this may not work or scale wel=
l.=C2=A0 In some cases the number of address candidates may be more than po=
ssible in an rrset.=C2=A0 For CDNs that change their DNS results frequently=
 and have low TTLs, this is also likely to have a very high rate of mismatc=
hes.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-ser=
if"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans=
-serif">On #3) As Nick mentions this won&#39;t help with the address collap=
sing case.=C2=A0 It also needs a way to handle the offboarding situation de=
scribed above.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahom=
a,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:t=
ahoma,sans-serif">I think there&#39;s also an option #4 that has a slightly=
 higher integration overhead for <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" sty=
le=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">sites but solves other problems as wel=
l.=C2=A0 If we take a step back, the issue here is that</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">DNS is a database bu=
t any two given responses lack some sort of primary key tying them <br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">toge=
ther.=C2=A0 One approach would be to introduce an intermediate record/objec=
t that explicitly</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:ta=
homa,sans-serif">does tie them together.=C2=A0 Two examples of this are the=
 ALTSVC-in-DNS proposal as well as <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">something like a &quot;Service Bindi=
ng&quot; record (which I wrote up when we were talking</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">about this back in 20=
14 following a brainstorm, in which case the&quot;tlshp&quot; parameter</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">in t=
hat draft is effectively the ESNI key):</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <a hr=
ef=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-nygren-service-bindings-00.txt"=
>https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-nygren-service-bindings-00.txt</a></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif=
">More recently with the ALTSVC DNS record, we&#39;d add an ALTSVC attribut=
e</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"=
>that contains either the ESNI key or the name of the record containing the=
 ESNI key:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahom=
a,sans-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/ht=
ml/draft-schwartz-httpbis-dns-alt-svc-02">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft=
-schwartz-httpbis-dns-alt-svc-02</a></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl=
e=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">One big advantage of using an ALTSV=
C record is that it also addresses the &quot;http-srv&quot; problem.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">(See a =
discussion thread titled &quot;Alternative to SRV?&quot; on the http-srv li=
st from back in August.)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">Another big advantage of using an ALTSVC re=
cord approach here is that it means</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">that ESNI could be generally configured =
by Alt-Svc as well.=C2=A0 For example, <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">this means that the ESNI key cou=
ld also just be included when doing an Alt-Svc to QUIC.</div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"">What this ends up looking like is something like is=
 an rrset along the lines of:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D""><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D""><pre class=3D"gmail=
-m_-1222845620482536410gmail-newpage">  _443._<a href=3D"http://https.examp=
le.com" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com</a>. IN TYPE???  {priority1} {t=
ransportprotocol1} {servername1} {port1} {extension_fieldset_1}</pre></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><pre class=3D"gmail-m_-12228456204825364=
10gmail-newpage">  _443._<a href=3D"http://https.example.com" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https.example.com</a>. IN TYPE???  {priority2} {transportprotocol2} {s=
ervername2} {port2} {extension_fieldset_2}</pre></div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><div class=3D"gmail_default=
" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><pre class=3D"gmail-m_-1222845620=
482536410gmail-newpage">  _443._<a href=3D"http://https.example.com" target=
=3D"_blank">https.example.com</a>. IN TYPE???  {priority3} {transportprotoc=
ol3} {servername3} {port3} {extension_fieldset_3}</pre></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">For example:</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">=
<div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><pre c=
lass=3D"gmail-m_-1222845620482536410gmail-newpage">  _443._<a href=3D"http:=
//https.example.com" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com</a>. IN <span clas=
s=3D"gmail-il">ALTSVC</span>  10 quic2 <a href=3D"http://example.com.exampl=
ecdn.net" target=3D"_blank">example.com.examplecdn.net</a> 443 ( <span clas=
s=3D"gmail-il">esni</span>=3Dkey124._<a href=3D"http://esni.examplecdn.net"=
 target=3D"_blank"><span class=3D"gmail-il">esni</span>.examplecdn.net</a> =
)</pre></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-=
serif"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"=
><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><pre =
class=3D"gmail-m_-1222845620482536410gmail-newpage">  _443._<a href=3D"http=
://https.example.com" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com</a>. IN <span cla=
ss=3D"gmail-il">ALTSVC</span>  20 h2 <a href=3D"http://example.com.examplec=
dn.net" target=3D"_blank">example.com.examplecdn.net</a> 443 ( <span class=
=3D"gmail-il">esni</span>=3Dkey124._<a href=3D"http://esni.examplecdn.net" =
target=3D"_blank"><span class=3D"gmail-il">esni</span>.examplecdn.net</a>; =
ipv6-only=3Dtrue )</pre></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fa=
mily:tahoma,sans-serif"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:t=
ahoma,sans-serif"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,=
sans-serif"><pre class=3D"gmail-m_-1222845620482536410gmail-newpage">  _443=
._<a href=3D"http://https.example.com" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com<=
/a>. IN <span class=3D"gmail-il">ALTSVC</span>  40 http/1.1 <a href=3D"http=
://legacy.example.com.examplecdn.net" target=3D"_blank">legacy.example.com.=
examplecdn.net</a> 443 ( <span class=3D"gmail-il">esni</span>=3Dkey124._<a =
href=3D"http://esni.examplecdn.net" target=3D"_blank"><span class=3D"gmail-=
il">esni</span>.examplecdn.net</a> )</pre></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"=
>I suspect that some CDNs would then have customers CNAME over &quot;_443._=
<a href=3D"http://https.example.com" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com</a=
>.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans=
-serif">to some name on the CDN.=C2=A0 For example in the example above it =
might be that it actually <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:tahoma,sans-serif">CNAMEs to _443._<a href=3D"http://https.examp=
le.com.examplecdn.net" target=3D"_blank">https.example.com.examplecdn.net</=
a> which then means that the A and AAAA records for &quot;<a href=3D"http:/=
/example.com.examplecdn.net" target=3D"_blank">example.com.examplecdn.net</=
a>&quot; can be returned as additionals from the same <a href=3D"http://exa=
mplecdn.net" target=3D"_blank">examplecdn.net</a> authority</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">along with the <=
span class=3D"gmail-il">ALTSVC</span> record.</div></div></div></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">So in th=
e multi-CDN case, the multi-CDN switcher is switching on the CNAME to the A=
LTSVC record,</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma=
,sans-serif">allowing each CDN or hosting provider target to provide their =
own ALTSVC record.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:t=
ahoma,sans-serif">Tying this back up to the above the ALTSVC record then be=
comes this intermediate object</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:tahoma,sans-serif">that explicitly ties the server (A/AAAA recor=
ds) and ESNI key together.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">One downside is that ALTSVC is primarily=
 defined for HTTPS today,</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-f=
amily:tahoma,sans-serif">but nothing prevents it from being more broadly us=
ed as an extensible</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:=
tahoma,sans-serif">SRV alternative.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">(Side-note: no matter what we&#3=
9;ll also want to think and document <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default"=
 style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">how ESNI and cross-hostname Alt-Sv=
c interact.)<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tah=
oma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:tahoma,sans-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Erik</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br>=
</div></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 5:28 PM Patrick McManus &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mc=
manus@ducksong.com">mcmanus@ducksong.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Definitely agree this is somethi=
ng that needs to be addressed..</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D=
"ltr">As Mike notes, the fundamental issue is that there are 2 pieces of in=
formation that are statefully related (the key and address) but obtained st=
atelessly from each other and can therefore come from un-coordinated source=
s. 2 CDNs are commonly un-coordinated sources.. but I&#39;ve seen this with=
 other kinds of cloud providers too. All of which should be target audience=
s of ESNI (because they terminate a variety of hostnames on a smaller numbe=
r of addresses).<div><br></div><div>fwiw there is a muddled github issue op=
en on this in the old individual-draft repo:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github=
.com/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-esni/issues/35" target=3D"_blank">https://githu=
b.com/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-esni/issues/35</a> .. which I&#39;ll re-open w=
hen the tls-wg repo starts being used for this draft.</div><div><br></div><=
div>I see three solution spaces.</div><div><br></div><div>1] As Rich sugges=
ts, you can coordinate the uncoordinated sources to have one keying record =
to rule them all. I suspect that&#39;s actually not good for anonymity unle=
ss it somehow had a normalized global set .. and given the one way nature o=
f a CNAME pointer, I feel like this would be really fragile.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>2] you could scope the keys to only be valid for certain address=
es by putting the valid addresses in the key record. This wouldn&#39;t help=
 you do ESNI when they didn&#39;t match, but at least you could avoid hard =
failure. (or you could ignore the addressing record but that might be a bri=
dge too far?)</div><div><br></div><div>3] My preferred approach, you could =
scope the keys to the same intermediate name. So if <a href=3D"http://www.e=
xample.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a> -&gt; cname <a href=3D"ht=
tp://www.cdn-a.com" target=3D"_blank">www.cdn-a.com</a> -&gt; ESNI record <=
a href=3D"http://www.cdn-a.com" target=3D"_blank">www.cdn-a.com</a> we coul=
d make a rule that the ESNI record would only apply to address records with=
 a final intermediate of <a href=3D"http://www.cdn-a.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>www.cdn-a.com</a>. (I&#39;m presuming we&#39;ll shift from TXT to ESNI RRT=
YPE without a prefix, but I don&#39;t think it matters for this..).. when t=
here is a mismatch you could use the addressing intermediate as a place to =
try a new ESNI query from.. That&#39;s a perf penalty, but its only paid in=
 the hopefully rare case where these things are unsyncd.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>#3 is admittedly a bit non traditional, but I spent a bit of time lo=
oking at the features of DNS APIs that already have the necessary surface t=
o make a query for a new RRTYPE... and the cname intermediates are indeed g=
enerally available.. its true of getdns, res_query, the IOS and MacOS inter=
faces, DnsQuery* on windows, and of course the custom dns stacks in cronet/=
android and firefox/doh could do it.</div><div><br></div><div>I hope to wor=
k this into a PR.. my first attempt wasn&#39;t very readable, but I&#39;ll =
try again tomorrow.</div><div><br></div><div>-P</div><div><br></div><div><b=
r></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div></div><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 1:59 PM Salz,=
 Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akama=
i.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"m_-8920742025202765456m_8561186829446775998WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think perhaps we need to take a step back and expl=
ain something that might not be well-known outside the community of CDN=E2=
=80=99s and their customers.=C2=A0 It is not uncommon for (admittedly large=
r) origins to use multiple CDN=E2=80=99s, and to switch
 among them. This can be done on a per-request basis, because of things lik=
e contractual arrangements that make one preferable, or it can be done glob=
ally but switched in a matter of seconds because of a short TTL on the
<a href=3D"http://www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a> en=
try.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The issues that Mike discusses impact on this, somew=
hat negatively.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A quick hack thought is to allow multiple entries in=
 the TXT record, forcing a wee bit more work on the CDN.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000c6675a0579b3f14d--


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Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2018 12:27:09 +0100 (CET)
From: Mounira Msahli <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>
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Thread-Topic: Updating the draft: TLS Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Subject: [TLS] Updating the draft: TLS Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Hi all, 

A new version of TLS Authentication using IEEE 1609.2/ETSI TS 103097 certificates draft is online: 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tls-certieee1609-02 

Kind Regards 
Mounira


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Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2018 12:28:21 +0100 (CET)
From: Mounira Msahli <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>
To: tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Updating the draft: TLS Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/WLaX-V_CGqA1x4akHgui5D_a32E>
Subject: [TLS] Updating the draft: TLS Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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Hi all, 

A new version of TLS Authentication using IEEE 1609.2/ETSI TS 103097 certificates draft is online: 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tls-certieee1609-02 

Kind Regards 
Mounira


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF103 slides
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Additional slides have been going up.

spt

> On Nov 1, 2018, at 10:25, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> I have posted the chairs=E2=80=99 slides and associated drafts with =
the appropriate sessions:
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/session/tls
>=20
> spt
>=20
>> On Oct 31, 2018, at 15:23, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> If you requested time on the agenda please send me your slides ASAP.  =
Our session is Monday afternoon so please send them to me no later than =
Sunday evening (BKK time) so that WG participants will at least have =
some time to review them.
>>=20
>> spt
>=20


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From: Mat Ford <ford@isoc.org>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: TLS talk in IRTF Open today - Chitlada 1, 16h10
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Subject: [TLS] TLS talk in IRTF Open today - Chitlada 1, 16h10
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TLS WG,

After the WG meeting today, in the IRTF Open meeting (right next door in Ch=
itlada 1), we have the following ANR Prize-winning talk which should be of =
great interest:

Johanna Amann: "Mission Accomplished? HTTPS Security after DigiNotar"

Johanna will be including updated material in her talk including results fr=
om recent TLS1.3 measurements.


Mat



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Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, tls-chairs@ietf.org, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, sean@sn3rd.com, kaduk@mit.edu
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Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2018 22:57:21 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Zryv24gJTYgtJsVSzq56uMO-iSA>
Subject: [TLS] Document Action: 'Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-07.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3'
  (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-07.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Benjamin Kaduk and Eric Rescorla.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors/





Technical Summary

This document provides examples TLS 1.3 handshakes.  Private keys and inputs are provided
so that these handshakes might be reproduced with are shown.  As the examples are illustrative
the draft is intended to be Informational.  Earlier versions of the document were widely verified
against multiple implementations, and the latest version has been at least partially verified by
two implementations.

Working Group Summary

There's always interest in having examples and this draft fills that gap for TLS, which some would
say have been sorely need for a very long time.  While there wasn't a lot of list traffic on this draft,
you could argue that there's lots of review because the vectors are automatically generated using the
NSS test suite.  NSS is used to do interop with a number of implementations.

Document Quality

There are at least six interoperable implementations of TLS 1.3, though as mentioned
above these specific test vectors have only been explicitly confirmed on a couple of them.
That said, the vectors are automatically generated, and since the TLS 1.3 implementations
continue to interoperate, it is expected that the accuracy of the test vectors herein are reflected
in that as well.  No specific role reviews were needed for this document

Personnel

Sean Turner is the Document Shepherd.
Benjamin Kaduk is the responsible Area Director.


RFC Editor Note

In Section 4, please insert after the first paragraph:		
 	   Note:  The PSK binder uses the same construction as Finished
              and so is labeled as finished here.


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Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 07:01:57 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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Hi all,

I do not know whether Wednesday's discussions will end up in a place where
these thoughts will be useful, but in the spirit of having discussions on
the list, I decided to write up some thoughts I've been pondering for a
while.  Hopefully the written form will be more clear than if I had to try
to express them in the mic line, and perhaps they will even inspire
thoughts from other people as well.

That said, I recognize that I am posting this pretty late and the one day
between now and then is already packed with meeting sessions, so I do not
expect to have a complete discussion on the list before the Wednesday
session.  (As always, happy to be proven wrong.)  So...

Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from this
extension just being "transport some DNS records" into conveying some
sort of additional semantics.

It seems that we have not really had a structured discussion about what
semantics and information flows we might or might not want to convey in
this extension (in one or both directions!), and I'm reluctant to consider
adding such semantics without such a discussion.

If we accept the premise that the intention of DANE as relevant in this
space is to allow the server to convey to the client the server's
preferences for how the client should authenticate the server, we may also
want to consider the case where a server operator wants to eventually get
to a DANE-only state where it can ignore the web PKI.  (There may not be
many or any servers that actually end up wanting to do this, but it's not
unreasonable to consider the possibility.)  In order for a server to do
that, the server needs to know that all clients are not only willing to do
DANE, but able to get the records they need, whether via this extension or
otherwise!  Without such information, the server risks breaking clients
with the transition, and not knowing what population of clients have been
broken.

Doing some brainstorming on what the client might be able to tell the
server in this space, I can come up with things like:

(1) the client is willing to use DANE to authenticate the server
(2) the client already has the DANE records it needs to do (1)
(3) the client needs the server to give it the DANE records to do (1)
(4) the client requires the server to be DANE authenticated
(5) the client already has the DANE records it needs to do (4)
(6) the client needs the server to give it the DANE records to do (4)
(7) the client is willing to commit to one or more of the above for some
    time period

Similarly, the server may want to indicate things like:

(a) the server wants to be authenticated via DANE (yes, this is just the
    contents of the DNS)
(b) the server can provide DANE/DoE records in a TLS extension
(c) the server will commit to (a) for some time
(d) the server will commit to (b) for some time

Some of these might be always a consequence of or very strongly implied by
the presence of some information (e.g, sending the extension probably
implies (1), and having TLSA records at all probably implies (a)).  My
understanding is that the pinning proponents want a field in the server
response that conveys (d).  Note that this does not necessarily imply (a)
or (c), at least not with the same timer!

I deliberately am not trying to come to a conclusion in this message, as I
am not confident that I have even come up with all the potential semantics
worth thinking about, and I think that any motion in this space should only
be taken with WG consensus.

I would love to hear others' thoughts on what I am missing from the above
lists, reasoning for/against including protocol elements to indicate
the listed semantics, and whether/which existing protocol elements already
convey which of the enumerated semantics.

Thanks,

Ben


From nobody Mon Nov  5 06:00:40 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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> On Nov 5, 2018, at 8:01 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from this
> extension just being "transport some DNS records" into conveying some
> sort of additional semantics.

Transporting some bits *always* carries additional semantics, otherwise
why carry the bits.  For example, already in -07 there is clear text
specifying that the transported records can be cached for their DNS TTL,
and that once delivered DANE records should not be ignored on failure.

   =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07#secti=
on-6

   A TLS client making use of this specification, and which receives a
   DNSSEC authentication chain extension from a server, MUST use this
   information to perform DANE authentication of the server.  In order
   to do this, it uses the mechanism specified by the DNSSEC protocol
   [RFC4035] [RFC5155].  This mechanism is sometimes implemented in a
   DNSSEC validation engine or library.

   Clients MAY cache the server's validated TLSA RRset or other
   validated portions of the chain as an optimization to save signature
   verification work for future connections.  The period of such caching
   MUST NOT exceed the TTL associated with those records.  A client that
   possesses a validated and unexpired TLSA RRset or the full chain in
   its cache does not need to send the dnssec_chain extension for
   subsequent connections to the same TLS server.  It can use the cached
   information to perform DANE authentication.

That rather looks like semantics to me, much more than transport some =
bits.

> It seems that we have not really had a structured discussion about =
what
> semantics and information flows we might or might not want to convey =
in
> this extension (in one or both directions!), and I'm reluctant to =
consider
> adding such semantics without such a discussion.

I really don't think that at this juncture it is productive to wipe the
slate clean and consider all possible proposals, even ones that nobody
has put forward as yet.  Why would we want to do that.  There is clearly
just one primary contentious issue to resolve, and I rather think your
train of thought is a distraction from the issue at hand.

> If we accept the premise that the intention of DANE as relevant in =
this
> space is to allow the server to convey to the client the server's
> preferences for how the client should authenticate the server, we may =
also
> want to consider the case where a server operator wants to eventually =
get
> to a DANE-only state where it can ignore the web PKI.

Nobody is looking for this.  There's no point.  WebPKI certificates are
free (and worth every penny).  DANE adoption is far too light to even
begin to contemplate abandoning WebPKI, and we're probably two decades
away from being able to do that, by which point the quantum computer
apocalypse may have made many of the current designs moot.

> (There may not be
> many or any servers that actually end up wanting to do this, but it's =
not
> unreasonable to consider the possibility.)

It seems unreasonable to me, because no such signalling was for example
proposed for raw public keys or various PSK methods, etc.  And of course
the server operator can log the use of the extension and draw =
conclusions
about client support based on that, and the overall technology =
landscape.
There's no need to include this in the discussion.

> Similarly, the server may want to indicate things like:
>=20
> (a) the server wants to be authenticated via DANE (yes, this is just =
the
>    contents of the DNS)

And any client with a decent network environment can just query the
DNS directly, and never use the extension and have the record hot
in the local cache.  So there's no need for anything to complicated
here.  We just need to provide as much of the downgrade-resistance
that DNSSEC gives automatically, also to clients that for some time
will be able to do DNSSEC.

> I deliberately am not trying to come to a conclusion in this message, =
as I
> am not confident that I have even come up with all the potential =
semantics
> worth thinking about, and I think that any motion in this space should =
only
> be taken with WG consensus.

I think at this point hypothetical semantics is not a helpful direction.
If you have a concrete proposal, that has merit in addition to or in
place of what has been proposed, please explain.  If there are problems
or lack of clarity with what has been proposed, please explain.

I very much fear that the only possible outcome of sky's-the-limit
brainstorming is paralysis.  Please try and focus on actual proposals.

> I would love to hear others' thoughts on what I am missing from the =
above
> lists, reasoning for/against including protocol elements to indicate
> the listed semantics, and whether/which existing protocol elements =
already
> convey which of the enumerated semantics.

The proposal on the table is to a minimal form of time-limited =
commitment
to the extension by mutual agreement between client and server, to =
address
downgrade attacks via extension stripping by attackers with unauthorised
WebPKI credentials.  This is need because while DNS lookups either =
deliver
the relevant DNSSEC data or clearly fail, the extension is optional and
failure to deliver it is a-priori not in any way anomalous.

We're just trying to address that gap.  If you can make a strong case
for addressing some additional gaps, or addressing this gap in a better
way, please do.  Once again, I'm very concerned that the direction =
you're
setting out on is counter-productive.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 09:22:33 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/AcCoZJ31IkujFM1C6jgHJTs_qTQ>
Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 02:37:26PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> Is it fair to describe the draft as enabling a trust model based on DNSSEC, rather than the default X.509 hierarchy and trust store which is implemented by default?
> 
> Please try very hard to keep the answer brief.

In my mind that's one of the things it could do, but need not be the only one.
In https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg27088.html I
tried to consider the possibility for clients that currently default to
the X.509 hierarchy but also clients that use opportunistic TLS or other
default behaviors.  The analysis of the security properties of adding
DANE depends on what we use as a starting point.

-Ben


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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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[ I hope the below is short enough...]

> On Nov 5, 2018, at 9:37 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> Is it fair to describe the draft as enabling a trust model based on =
DNSSEC, rather than the default X.509 hierarchy and trust store which is =
implemented by default?
>=20
> Please try very hard to keep the answer brief.

The original (-07) draft only does the job for applications that
go all in on DANE and statically skip the WebPKI.

What we're trying to do is to make DANE meaningfully available
also to existing applications where the WebPKI still rules the
roost, and where clients can only determine which servers support
DANE "opportunistically", but for that to be useful, the signal
needs some downgrade resistance.

The ultimate goal is to be able to use DANE either instead of,
or in combination with the WebPKI.  Which it is depends on the
DANE certificate usages that the application supports and server
publishes.  We're not trying to kill the WebPKI, rather we want
the *option* to use DANE when client and server opt-in.

Finally, of course, the reason for the extension is last-mile
issues with DNSSEC in captive portals and behind DNS-challenged
home routers, plus a bit of latency concern (that may be overblown,
but still seems an issue for some).

--=20
	Viktor.



--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Mon Nov  5 09:12:15 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 07:01:57AM -0600, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from this
> extension just being "transport some DNS records" into conveying some
> sort of additional semantics.

The I-D lost consensus over one issue.  We should resolve that issue.

There are some minor other things (like the fact that TLSA RR names
include a port number and the TLS server needs to know, or that we
shouldn't specify an RR sort order, or that the age of the chain payload
needs to be included), but they are minor by comparison.  Whether we
discuss those first or the main event is not that interesting to me, but
if we're going to make progress I think we should have time for the main
event.

Nico
-- 


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kHFbIp2sfNsE6GhO96R6yJ-FeOs>
Subject: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00
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--_000_MWHPR15MB182113D79086E2E42B7E19E0B6CA0MWHPR15MB1821namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I brought up an alternate construction in BKK for draft-wood-tls-external-p=
sk-importer-00 which might have some potentially better properties. I didn'=
t get time to explain then, so here it is:

One issue I think with the current construction in the draft with external =
psk is that if the client uses the external psk with a different hash funct=
ion due to configuration error, then it turns into a fatal connection error=
 because TLS endpoints are required to tear down the connections on binder =
mismatch. The client does not recover until it stops using the external psk=
.

An alternate approach to solve this could be to have a construction like:

[hash of (psk identity + ImportedIdentity)] [psk identity]

A server that uses the psk would perform the following steps during the res=
umption


  1.  Negotiate the cipher suite to use
  2.  If an external psk is used, strip off the first hash length of the ps=
k identity where the hash length depends on the cipher suite.
  3.  Compute the hash of pskidentity + imported identity and compare it ag=
ainst (2)
  4.  If it doesn't match, don't use the PSK and fallback to full handshake=
.

I think this a subtle change, because if you treat this case as if you were=
 not willing to use the PSK, then you can ignore the binder. This might be =
operationally easier to deploy and reason about than a hard failure.

Subodh

--_000_MWHPR15MB182113D79086E2E42B7E19E0B6CA0MWHPR15MB1821namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"><!-- P {margin-top:0;margi=
n-bottom:0;} --></style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:#000000;font=
-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;" dir=3D"ltr">
I&nbsp;brought up an alternate construction in BKK for&nbsp;<span>draft-woo=
d-tls-external-psk-importer-00</span>&nbsp;which might have some potentiall=
y better&nbsp;properties. I didn't get time to explain then, so here it is:
<div><br>
</div>
<div>One issue I think with&nbsp;the current construction in the draft with=
 external psk is that if the client uses the external psk with a different&=
nbsp;hash function due to&nbsp;configuration error, then it turns into a fa=
tal connection error because TLS endpoints are
 required to tear down the connections on binder mismatch. The client does =
not recover until it stops using the external psk.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>An alternate approach to solve this could be to&nbsp;have a constructi=
on like:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>[hash of (psk identity &#43; ImportedIdentity)] [psk identity]&nbsp;</=
div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>A server that uses the psk would perform the following steps during th=
e resumption<br>
<br>
<ol style=3D"margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
<li><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"></span>Negotiate the cipher suite to u=
se</li><li>If an external psk is used, strip off the first hash length of t=
he psk identity where the hash length depends on the cipher suite.</li><li>=
Compute the hash of pskidentity &#43; imported identity and compare it agai=
nst (2)</li><li>If it doesn't match, don't use the PSK and fallback to full=
 handshake.</li></ol>
<br>
</div>
<div>I think this a subtle change, because if you treat this case as if you=
 were not willing to use the PSK, then you can ignore the binder. This migh=
t be operationally easier to deploy and reason about than a hard failure.</=
div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Subodh</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_MWHPR15MB182113D79086E2E42B7E19E0B6CA0MWHPR15MB1821namp_--


From nobody Mon Nov  5 10:44:27 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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> On Nov 5, 2018, at 1:22 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> I need to review things some more, but FYI I believe I will say that =
mixing
> trust models is a bad idea, and opportunistic fallback seems both =
premature
> optimization and adding in the risk. I would support bringing back -07 =
semantics.

That's the trouble with "short responses", they are too short to get the =
key
details across.  This is NOT a simple issue that can adequately be =
reduced
to a couple of pithy paragraphs.

The -07 document is broken and has lost consensus.  It has a broken =
unilateral
client-side TOFU pinning downgrade protection mechanism, that nobody =
wants.
Removing it entirely severely limits the scope of the draft to much less =
than
was intended and was promised in the introduction.

We're not "mixing" trust models, DANE explicitly supports either =
augmenting
WebPKI (certificate usage 0/1) with CA or EE certificate assertions, or=20=

bypassing it with usages 2/3.  SMTP does 2/3 only, I would expect =
browsers
to look to do 0/1, which has the benefit of getting both DANE and CT, =
DANE
provides stronger authentication than DV cert issuances, while CT =
provides
some measure of auditability.

There are many problems with -07 beyond just pinning, various gaps in =
the
smaller design that really should be addressed.

I could write more, but then folks are liable to stop reading, I don't =
know
how to get past that, except by becoming an author, and finally issuing
a new version of the draft for review (~25 commits pending on github =
waiting
for the green light), that folks might have to actually read all the way
through... :-(

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Mon Nov  5 18:24:34 2018
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Subject: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
certificate that *only* lists:

            X509v3 Key Usage:=20
                Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment

(which one might take to mean that only RSA key exchange is allowed,
and DHE-RSA is not, for lack of the DigitalSignature bit?

[ In the unlikely case it matters, the record the certificate
  in question is self-signed, and has a DANE TLSA "3 0 1" record. ]

-- Background:

I am somewhat sympathetic to forbidding RSA key exchange when
"Key Encipherment" is not listed, in order to reduce the risk of
Bleichenbacher-type attacks, but it is not obvious at first blush
why one might the converse restriction...

The reason I ask is that the Haskell TLS library has recently added
enforcement in both directions, and I am finding some SMTP servers
with whose STARTTLS implementation my DANE scan engine no longer
interoperates.

And yet, FWIW, OpenSSL 1.1.1 continues to connect just fine.  Is
this an oversight in OpenSSL?  Overly strict enforcement in Haskell's
Network.TLS?  Should the language in RFC8446 apply also to TLS 1.2
and earlier, where no mention of "keyUsage" is to be found in the
relevant specifications?

The text in 8446 is not crystal clear on the intent.  Is keyUsage
enforcement (absent OID filters from the peer) a MUST?  A SHOULD?
A BCP?  And which directions should it apply in?  That is, does
it make sense to require RSA key transport when DHE appears to
be disallowed?

In appendix E.8 of TLS 1.3 RFC8446 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#appendix-E.8=01>
we find:

   E.8.  Attacks on Static RSA

   Although TLS 1.3 does not use RSA key transport and so is not
   directly susceptible to Bleichenbacher-type attacks [Blei98], if TLS
   1.3 servers also support static RSA in the context of previous
   versions of TLS, then it may be possible to impersonate the server
   for TLS 1.3 connections [JSS15].  TLS 1.3 implementations can prevent
   this attack by disabling support for static RSA across all versions
   of TLS.  In principle, implementations might also be able to separate
   certificates with different keyUsage bits for static RSA decryption
   and RSA signature, but this technique relies on clients refusing to
   accept signatures using keys in certificates that do not have the
   digitalSignature bit set, and many clients do not enforce this
   restriction.

In 4.2.5 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.5> we
also find:

   This document defines matching rules for two standard certificate
   extensions defined in [RFC5280]:

   -  The Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the request when
      all key usage bits asserted in the request are also asserted in
      the Key Usage certificate extension.

But that's about explicit OID filters from the peer, not a-priori
constraints.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, 5 Nov 2018, Salz, Rich wrote:

> Is it fair to describe the draft as enabling a trust model based on DNSSEC, rather than the default X.509 hierarchy and trust store which is implemented by default?

The draft tries to enable a trust model based on DNSSEC, but due to
missing pinning, fails to deliver that.

A better way is saying the draft enables a trust model that restricts
the webpki, addressing the problems of too many unrestricted root CA
players being accepted by  TLS clients these days [provided the draft
adds a mechanism like pinning to prevent downgrade attacks]

Paul


From nobody Mon Nov  5 18:57:14 2018
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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 09:56:57 +0700
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/oI19Isb7T7JWz4hT20NC-gtJXkI>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00
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On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 12:56 AM Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com> wrote:
>
> I brought up an alternate construction in BKK for draft-wood-tls-external=
-psk-importer-00 which might have some potentially better properties. I did=
n't get time to explain then, so here it is:
>
> One issue I think with the current construction in the draft with externa=
l psk is that if the client uses the external psk with a different hash fun=
ction due to configuration error, then it turns into a fatal connection err=
or because TLS endpoints are required to tear down the connections on binde=
r mismatch. The client does not recover until it stops using the external p=
sk.
>
> An alternate approach to solve this could be to have a construction like:
>
> [hash of (psk identity + ImportedIdentity)] [psk identity]
>
> A server that uses the psk would perform the following steps during the r=
esumption
>
> Negotiate the cipher suite to use
> If an external psk is used, strip off the first hash length of the psk id=
entity where the hash length depends on the cipher suite.
> Compute the hash of pskidentity + imported identity and compare it agains=
t (2)
> If it doesn't match, don't use the PSK and fallback to full handshake.
>
>
> I think this a subtle change, because if you treat this case as if you we=
re not willing to use the PSK, then you can ignore the binder. This might b=
e operationally easier to deploy and reason about than a hard failure.

Thanks for writing this down! This is certainly an interesting
proposal. That said, in cases where one might use external PSKs,
failing hard seems like a fine (and probably preferred?) outcome. I'd
be happy to hear of cases where one might want to fall back to a full
handshake.

Best,
Chris


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Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 21:27:47 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 09:54:19PM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Nov 2018, Salz, Rich wrote:
> 
> >Is it fair to describe the draft as enabling a trust model based on DNSSEC, rather than the default X.509 hierarchy and trust store which is implemented by default?
> 
> The draft tries to enable a trust model based on DNSSEC, but due to
> missing pinning, fails to deliver that.
> 
> A better way is saying the draft enables a trust model that restricts
> the webpki, addressing the problems of too many unrestricted root CA
> players being accepted by  TLS clients these days [provided the draft
> adds a mechanism like pinning to prevent downgrade attacks]

If we don't agree on what the draft is trying to do, it seems rather
difficult to attempt to claim that there is WG consensus to publish it.

This seems to suggest that we may need more precise text in the
document about what it is (and is not) trying to do.  The slides Sean
posted for the Wednesday session note that fairly early in the timeline
we thought:

    Primarily aimed at making
    DANE practical for HTTPS,
    where last-mile considerations
    on the client end are a
    significant part of the adoption
    barrier.

Paul, are you proposing that this would only be PKIX-{EE,CA} to the
exclusion of DANE-{EE,CA}?  (In terms of "restricts the webpki".)

Thanks,

Ben


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From: Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com>
To: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00
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Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:59:14 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ySQsfrzk9Zmm_hkkdjcVhsM8z8I>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00
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Ya I think failing hard depends on the use case for the external psk. For e=
xample if external psk is your own source of identity then ya you can't rea=
lly fallback, however if you are using external psk as an optimization or s=
omething else, then falling back might be desirable.

Subodh
________________________________
From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, November 5, 2018 6:56:57 PM
To: Subodh Iyengar
Cc: <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00

On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 12:56 AM Subodh Iyengar <subodh@fb.com> wrote:
>
> I brought up an alternate construction in BKK for draft-wood-tls-external=
-psk-importer-00 which might have some potentially better properties. I did=
n't get time to explain then, so here it is:
>
> One issue I think with the current construction in the draft with externa=
l psk is that if the client uses the external psk with a different hash fun=
ction due to configuration error, then it turns into a fatal connection err=
or because TLS endpoints are required to tear down the connections on binde=
r mismatch. The client does not recover until it stops using the external p=
sk.
>
> An alternate approach to solve this could be to have a construction like:
>
> [hash of (psk identity + ImportedIdentity)] [psk identity]
>
> A server that uses the psk would perform the following steps during the r=
esumption
>
> Negotiate the cipher suite to use
> If an external psk is used, strip off the first hash length of the psk id=
entity where the hash length depends on the cipher suite.
> Compute the hash of pskidentity + imported identity and compare it agains=
t (2)
> If it doesn't match, don't use the PSK and fallback to full handshake.
>
>
> I think this a subtle change, because if you treat this case as if you we=
re not willing to use the PSK, then you can ignore the binder. This might b=
e operationally easier to deploy and reason about than a hard failure.

Thanks for writing this down! This is certainly an interesting
proposal. That said, in cases where one might use external PSKs,
failing hard seems like a fine (and probably preferred?) outcome. I'd
be happy to hear of cases where one might want to fall back to a full
handshake.

Best,
Chris

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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"><!-- P {margin-top:0;margi=
n-bottom:0;} --></style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div id=3D"divtagdefaultwrapper" style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:#000000;font=
-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;" dir=3D"ltr">
Ya I think failing hard depends on the use case for the external psk. For e=
xample if external psk is your own source of identity then ya you can't rea=
lly fallback, however if you are using external psk as an optimization or s=
omething else, then falling back
 might be desirable.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Subodh</div>
</div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Christopher Wood &lt;=
christopherwood07@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, November 5, 2018 6:56:57 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Subodh Iyengar<br>
<b>Cc:</b> &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
">
<div class=3D"PlainText">On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 12:56 AM Subodh Iyengar &lt=
;subodh@fb.com&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I brought up an alternate construction in BKK for draft-wood-tls-exter=
nal-psk-importer-00 which might have some potentially better properties. I =
didn't get time to explain then, so here it is:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; One issue I think with the current construction in the draft with exte=
rnal psk is that if the client uses the external psk with a different hash =
function due to configuration error, then it turns into a fatal connection =
error because TLS endpoints are required
 to tear down the connections on binder mismatch. The client does not recov=
er until it stops using the external psk.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An alternate approach to solve this could be to have a construction li=
ke:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [hash of (psk identity &#43; ImportedIdentity)] [psk identity]<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A server that uses the psk would perform the following steps during th=
e resumption<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Negotiate the cipher suite to use<br>
&gt; If an external psk is used, strip off the first hash length of the psk=
 identity where the hash length depends on the cipher suite.<br>
&gt; Compute the hash of pskidentity &#43; imported identity and compare it=
 against (2)<br>
&gt; If it doesn't match, don't use the PSK and fallback to full handshake.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think this a subtle change, because if you treat this case as if you=
 were not willing to use the PSK, then you can ignore the binder. This migh=
t be operationally easier to deploy and reason about than a hard failure.<b=
r>
<br>
Thanks for writing this down! This is certainly an interesting<br>
proposal. That said, in cases where one might use external PSKs,<br>
failing hard seems like a fine (and probably preferred?) outcome. I'd<br>
be happy to hear of cases where one might want to fall back to a full<br>
handshake.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris<br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_MWHPR15MB18216923E04D8A593704390AB6CB0MWHPR15MB1821namp_--


From nobody Mon Nov  5 20:11:18 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:

> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
> certificate that *only* lists:
> 
>             X509v3 Key Usage: 
>                 Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment

Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is
an encryption-only key.

It's much more important in the DHE-ECDSA case, because using an
encryption-only EC key for signing can lead to key compromise (IIRC).
As far as I know there's no similar attack on RSA, but I think this is
not a well-examined area.


From nobody Mon Nov  5 21:02:04 2018
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, 5 Nov 2018, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

>> The draft tries to enable a trust model based on DNSSEC, but due to
>> missing pinning, fails to deliver that.
>>
>> A better way is saying the draft enables a trust model that restricts
>> the webpki, addressing the problems of too many unrestricted root CA
>> players being accepted by  TLS clients these days [provided the draft
>> adds a mechanism like pinning to prevent downgrade attacks]
>
> If we don't agree on what the draft is trying to do, it seems rather
> difficult to attempt to claim that there is WG consensus to publish it.
>
> This seems to suggest that we may need more precise text in the
> document about what it is (and is not) trying to do.  The slides Sean
> posted for the Wednesday session note that fairly early in the timeline
> we thought:

I havent looked at the slides yet, I didnt see anything last time I
looked to see what te Wednesday slot would be like.

>    Primarily aimed at making
>    DANE practical for HTTPS,
>    where last-mile considerations
>    on the client end are a
>    significant part of the adoption
>    barrier.
>
> Paul, are you proposing that this would only be PKIX-{EE,CA} to the
> exclusion of DANE-{EE,CA}?  (In terms of "restricts the webpki".)

No. The restriction of webpki can be to restrict to 0 webpki root CA's
and instead restrict to an EE cert or public key, as per TLSA usage selectors.

I was trying to be as short as possible for Rich, and keep the focus on
ensuring the draft gains support for restricting, for which we currently
have one proposal (pinning).

Paul


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> On Nov 5, 2018, at 10:27 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
> This seems to suggest that we may need more precise text in the
> document about what it is (and is not) trying to do.  The slides Sean
> posted for the Wednesday session note that fairly early in the timeline
> we thought:
> 
>    Primarily aimed at making
>    DANE practical for HTTPS,
>    where last-mile considerations
>    on the client end are a
>    significant part of the adoption
>    barrier.
> 
> Paul, are you proposing that this would only be PKIX-{EE,CA} to the
> exclusion of DANE-{EE,CA}?  (In terms of "restricts the webpki".)

I think that deciding which DANE usage are most appropriate for
browsers is up to the folks who think deeply about Web browsers
and Web servers, and I would not presume to tell them which model
they should find more attractive.  My expectation would be that
they would be more comfortable with PKIX-{EE,TA}, because that
gives both the strongest security guarantee and preserves
certificate transparency as an option.

In SMTP, I got consensus for just specifying DANE-{EE,TA}, but
for HTTP I can well imagine a different outcome.  The key reason
for the divergence is that SMTP security depends critically on
the integrity of MX records, so if you DNS is compromised PKI
does not help much.

HTTP does not use MX, SRV or similar indirection, so the analysis
comes out differently.

This draft will not define a single approach for all applications,
that's up to the various application area specialists to figure out.

-- 
-- 
	Viktor.


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Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:11:39 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 12:01:52AM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Nov 2018, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> 
> >>The draft tries to enable a trust model based on DNSSEC, but due to
> >>missing pinning, fails to deliver that.
> >>
> >>A better way is saying the draft enables a trust model that restricts
> >>the webpki, addressing the problems of too many unrestricted root CA
> >>players being accepted by  TLS clients these days [provided the draft
> >>adds a mechanism like pinning to prevent downgrade attacks]
> >
> >If we don't agree on what the draft is trying to do, it seems rather
> >difficult to attempt to claim that there is WG consensus to publish it.
> >
> >This seems to suggest that we may need more precise text in the
> >document about what it is (and is not) trying to do.  The slides Sean
> >posted for the Wednesday session note that fairly early in the timeline
> >we thought:
> 
> I havent looked at the slides yet, I didnt see anything last time I
> looked to see what te Wednesday slot would be like.
> 
> >   Primarily aimed at making
> >   DANE practical for HTTPS,
> >   where last-mile considerations
> >   on the client end are a
> >   significant part of the adoption
> >   barrier.
> >
> >Paul, are you proposing that this would only be PKIX-{EE,CA} to the
> >exclusion of DANE-{EE,CA}?  (In terms of "restricts the webpki".)
> 
> No. The restriction of webpki can be to restrict to 0 webpki root CA's
> and instead restrict to an EE cert or public key, as per TLSA usage selectors.
> 
> I was trying to be as short as possible for Rich, and keep the focus on
> ensuring the draft gains support for restricting, for which we currently
> have one proposal (pinning).

Okay, thanks.

-Ben


From nobody Mon Nov  5 23:14:18 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30.txt
	Pages           : 51
	Date            : 2018-11-05

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees.  Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are
   preserved by the DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 10:05:14 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 09:00:29AM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On Nov 5, 2018, at 8:01 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> > 
> > Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from this
> > extension just being "transport some DNS records" into conveying some
> > sort of additional semantics.
> 
> Transporting some bits *always* carries additional semantics, otherwise

Of course!  But if we don't precisely specify those semantics, we expect
to get DISCUSS positions at IESG evaluation (as "not interoperably
implementable").

> why carry the bits.  For example, already in -07 there is clear text
> specifying that the transported records can be cached for their DNS TTL,
> and that once delivered DANE records should not be ignored on failure.
[...]
> That rather looks like semantics to me, much more than transport some bits.

Is it new semantics for this TLS extension, or just the semantics of "you
have a DANE record; this is what you do with it"?

> > It seems that we have not really had a structured discussion about what
> > semantics and information flows we might or might not want to convey in
> > this extension (in one or both directions!), and I'm reluctant to consider
> > adding such semantics without such a discussion.
> 
> I really don't think that at this juncture it is productive to wipe the
> slate clean and consider all possible proposals, even ones that nobody
> has put forward as yet.  Why would we want to do that.  There is clearly

When we do work at the IETF, proposals are not presented as a "take it
or leave it" option -- usually, they are starting points for further
analysis and discussion: "is this optimal?", "is it better if we tweak
it in this way?", etc.  I am presenting a framework in which to try to
answer these questions, starting from the proposal on the table.

In other words, I am pointing out that there is a process step that
needs to happen before this draft can be published.  This need not start
from a "clean slate", but we do need to be confident that we understand
what we are publishing.

> just one primary contentious issue to resolve, and I rather think your
> train of thought is a distraction from the issue at hand.

The IETF process requires reaching a consensus understanding of the
technical facts of an issue.  My train of thought is an effort to seek
that understanding in the area of downgrade countermeasures, since in my
judgement it has not been achieved by the previous WG discussions.  If
we have no WG consensus understanding of pinning, we cannot publish
pinning.  That could mean not publishing at all, or publishing something
that lacks pinning.  The latter would of course not preclude other work on
pinning by interested parties.

> > If we accept the premise that the intention of DANE as relevant in this
> > space is to allow the server to convey to the client the server's
> > preferences for how the client should authenticate the server, we may also
> > want to consider the case where a server operator wants to eventually get
> > to a DANE-only state where it can ignore the web PKI.
> 
> Nobody is looking for this.  There's no point.  WebPKI certificates are
> free (and worth every penny).  DANE adoption is far too light to even
> begin to contemplate abandoning WebPKI, and we're probably two decades
> away from being able to do that, by which point the quantum computer
> apocalypse may have made many of the current designs moot.

That's good input; thanks.

> > (There may not be
> > many or any servers that actually end up wanting to do this, but it's not
> > unreasonable to consider the possibility.)
> 
> It seems unreasonable to me, because no such signalling was for example
> proposed for raw public keys or various PSK methods, etc.  And of course
> the server operator can log the use of the extension and draw conclusions
> about client support based on that, and the overall technology landscape.
> There's no need to include this in the discussion.

The chairs should feel free to shut this down if needed.
But I'll note that the server's logging is not going to get any signal
from clients that can get DANE records via their normal resolver, with
the current proposal.

> > Similarly, the server may want to indicate things like:
> > 
> > (a) the server wants to be authenticated via DANE (yes, this is just the
> >    contents of the DNS)
> 
> And any client with a decent network environment can just query the
> DNS directly, and never use the extension and have the record hot
> in the local cache.  So there's no need for anything too complicated
> here.  We just need to provide as much of the downgrade-resistance
> that DNSSEC gives automatically, also to clients that for some time

I think I'm confused about what you mean by "the downgrade-resistance
that DNSSEC gives automatically".

> will be able to do DNSSEC.
> 
> > I deliberately am not trying to come to a conclusion in this message, as I
> > am not confident that I have even come up with all the potential semantics
> > worth thinking about, and I think that any motion in this space should only
> > be taken with WG consensus.
> 
> I think at this point hypothetical semantics is not a helpful direction.

I'm sorry you feel that way.  We've seen a few participants raise a
specific pinning proposal but they seem to have squelched discussion of
any other pinning options.  It seems that in any case the semantics are
hypothetical until we have a consensus and/or deployment experience.

> If you have a concrete proposal, that has merit in addition to or in
> place of what has been proposed, please explain.  If there are problems
> or lack of clarity with what has been proposed, please explain.

I have made my proposals to the list.  The WG as a whole does not have
consensus on a conclusion or the relative merits of the concrete
proposals that have been made to the list.

> I very much fear that the only possible outcome of sky's-the-limit
> brainstorming is paralysis.  Please try and focus on actual proposals.

My original mail, trimmed in your response, did list actual proposals.
Some of them are probably easy to find flaws in, which is the sort of
response I was asking for.  Having a written record of what has been
proposed and how the various proposals compare on a technical basis is
very helpful when judging consensus.

> > I would love to hear others' thoughts on what I am missing from the above
> > lists, reasoning for/against including protocol elements to indicate
> > the listed semantics, and whether/which existing protocol elements already
> > convey which of the enumerated semantics.
> 
> The proposal on the table is to a minimal form of time-limited commitment
> to the extension by mutual agreement between client and server, to address
> downgrade attacks via extension stripping by attackers with unauthorised
> WebPKI credentials.  This is need because while DNS lookups either deliver
> the relevant DNSSEC data or clearly fail, the extension is optional and
> failure to deliver it is a-priori not in any way anomalous.
> 
> We're just trying to address that gap.  If you can make a strong case
> for addressing some additional gaps, or addressing this gap in a better
> way, please do.  Once again, I'm very concerned that the direction you're
> setting out on is counter-productive.

I, on the other hand, am very concerned that you are pushing for the WG
to publish a solution without proper discussion of its merits and
potential alternatives.  I am trying to help you frame such a discussion
and come to a consensus conclusion following IETF process, and you are
avoiding a technical discussion.  Continuing down your path is likely to
either cause the document to die or to revert to the previous consensus
"HTTPS" use case, leaving any particular pinning policy to be determined
outside this TLS extension, whether at the application protocol layer or
in the implementation.

If you believe that I, acting as Area Director, am attempting to abuse
process to stymie consensus work, you have various appeal and recall
options available.  I'm happy to chat further with you about those
options if you want.


From nobody Tue Nov  6 09:20:57 2018
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References: <20181105130157.GF54966@kduck.kaduk.org> <2714F93F-3658-4E2E-8390-284C6D401447@dukhovni.org> <20181106160514.GH4141@akamai.com>
In-Reply-To: <20181106160514.GH4141@akamai.com>
From: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 00:20:55 +0700
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/CydLICSsctcp4vXpH30HANOrckE>
Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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My question would be "what will the HTTP community do if they find this
whole process unwieldy and long"?
Answer  They will come up with a solution that does nothing with DANE.

is that an excuse to do something less than perfect for the better good, or
do we live in the world of smug satisfaction of being perfect?

Sorry, from reading this discussion that's my simple minded view.

Tim


On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 11:07 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 09:00:29AM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > > On Nov 5, 2018, at 8:01 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from this
> > > extension just being "transport some DNS records" into conveying some
> > > sort of additional semantics.
> >
> > Transporting some bits *always* carries additional semantics, otherwise
>
> Of course!  But if we don't precisely specify those semantics, we expect
> to get DISCUSS positions at IESG evaluation (as "not interoperably
> implementable").
>
> > why carry the bits.  For example, already in -07 there is clear text
> > specifying that the transported records can be cached for their DNS TTL,
> > and that once delivered DANE records should not be ignored on failure.
> [...]
> > That rather looks like semantics to me, much more than transport some
> bits.
>
> Is it new semantics for this TLS extension, or just the semantics of "you
> have a DANE record; this is what you do with it"?
>
> > > It seems that we have not really had a structured discussion about what
> > > semantics and information flows we might or might not want to convey in
> > > this extension (in one or both directions!), and I'm reluctant to
> consider
> > > adding such semantics without such a discussion.
> >
> > I really don't think that at this juncture it is productive to wipe the
> > slate clean and consider all possible proposals, even ones that nobody
> > has put forward as yet.  Why would we want to do that.  There is clearly
>
> When we do work at the IETF, proposals are not presented as a "take it
> or leave it" option -- usually, they are starting points for further
> analysis and discussion: "is this optimal?", "is it better if we tweak
> it in this way?", etc.  I am presenting a framework in which to try to
> answer these questions, starting from the proposal on the table.
>
> In other words, I am pointing out that there is a process step that
> needs to happen before this draft can be published.  This need not start
> from a "clean slate", but we do need to be confident that we understand
> what we are publishing.
>
> > just one primary contentious issue to resolve, and I rather think your
> > train of thought is a distraction from the issue at hand.
>
> The IETF process requires reaching a consensus understanding of the
> technical facts of an issue.  My train of thought is an effort to seek
> that understanding in the area of downgrade countermeasures, since in my
> judgement it has not been achieved by the previous WG discussions.  If
> we have no WG consensus understanding of pinning, we cannot publish
> pinning.  That could mean not publishing at all, or publishing something
> that lacks pinning.  The latter would of course not preclude other work on
> pinning by interested parties.
>
> > > If we accept the premise that the intention of DANE as relevant in this
> > > space is to allow the server to convey to the client the server's
> > > preferences for how the client should authenticate the server, we may
> also
> > > want to consider the case where a server operator wants to eventually
> get
> > > to a DANE-only state where it can ignore the web PKI.
> >
> > Nobody is looking for this.  There's no point.  WebPKI certificates are
> > free (and worth every penny).  DANE adoption is far too light to even
> > begin to contemplate abandoning WebPKI, and we're probably two decades
> > away from being able to do that, by which point the quantum computer
> > apocalypse may have made many of the current designs moot.
>
> That's good input; thanks.
>
> > > (There may not be
> > > many or any servers that actually end up wanting to do this, but it's
> not
> > > unreasonable to consider the possibility.)
> >
> > It seems unreasonable to me, because no such signalling was for example
> > proposed for raw public keys or various PSK methods, etc.  And of course
> > the server operator can log the use of the extension and draw conclusions
> > about client support based on that, and the overall technology landscape.
> > There's no need to include this in the discussion.
>
> The chairs should feel free to shut this down if needed.
> But I'll note that the server's logging is not going to get any signal
> from clients that can get DANE records via their normal resolver, with
> the current proposal.
>
> > > Similarly, the server may want to indicate things like:
> > >
> > > (a) the server wants to be authenticated via DANE (yes, this is just
> the
> > >    contents of the DNS)
> >
> > And any client with a decent network environment can just query the
> > DNS directly, and never use the extension and have the record hot
> > in the local cache.  So there's no need for anything too complicated
> > here.  We just need to provide as much of the downgrade-resistance
> > that DNSSEC gives automatically, also to clients that for some time
>
> I think I'm confused about what you mean by "the downgrade-resistance
> that DNSSEC gives automatically".
>
> > will be able to do DNSSEC.
> >
> > > I deliberately am not trying to come to a conclusion in this message,
> as I
> > > am not confident that I have even come up with all the potential
> semantics
> > > worth thinking about, and I think that any motion in this space should
> only
> > > be taken with WG consensus.
> >
> > I think at this point hypothetical semantics is not a helpful direction.
>
> I'm sorry you feel that way.  We've seen a few participants raise a
> specific pinning proposal but they seem to have squelched discussion of
> any other pinning options.  It seems that in any case the semantics are
> hypothetical until we have a consensus and/or deployment experience.
>
> > If you have a concrete proposal, that has merit in addition to or in
> > place of what has been proposed, please explain.  If there are problems
> > or lack of clarity with what has been proposed, please explain.
>
> I have made my proposals to the list.  The WG as a whole does not have
> consensus on a conclusion or the relative merits of the concrete
> proposals that have been made to the list.
>
> > I very much fear that the only possible outcome of sky's-the-limit
> > brainstorming is paralysis.  Please try and focus on actual proposals.
>
> My original mail, trimmed in your response, did list actual proposals.
> Some of them are probably easy to find flaws in, which is the sort of
> response I was asking for.  Having a written record of what has been
> proposed and how the various proposals compare on a technical basis is
> very helpful when judging consensus.
>
> > > I would love to hear others' thoughts on what I am missing from the
> above
> > > lists, reasoning for/against including protocol elements to indicate
> > > the listed semantics, and whether/which existing protocol elements
> already
> > > convey which of the enumerated semantics.
> >
> > The proposal on the table is to a minimal form of time-limited commitment
> > to the extension by mutual agreement between client and server, to
> address
> > downgrade attacks via extension stripping by attackers with unauthorised
> > WebPKI credentials.  This is need because while DNS lookups either
> deliver
> > the relevant DNSSEC data or clearly fail, the extension is optional and
> > failure to deliver it is a-priori not in any way anomalous.
> >
> > We're just trying to address that gap.  If you can make a strong case
> > for addressing some additional gaps, or addressing this gap in a better
> > way, please do.  Once again, I'm very concerned that the direction you're
> > setting out on is counter-productive.
>
> I, on the other hand, am very concerned that you are pushing for the WG
> to publish a solution without proper discussion of its merits and
> potential alternatives.  I am trying to help you frame such a discussion
> and come to a consensus conclusion following IETF process, and you are
> avoiding a technical discussion.  Continuing down your path is likely to
> either cause the document to die or to revert to the previous consensus
> "HTTPS" use case, leaving any particular pinning policy to be determined
> outside this TLS extension, whether at the application protocol layer or
> in the implementation.
>
> If you believe that I, acting as Area Director, am attempting to abuse
> process to stymie consensus work, you have various appeal and recall
> options available.  I'm happy to chat further with you about those
> options if you want.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--00000000000021a7cc057a023948
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">My question would be &quot;what will the HTTP community do=
 if they find this whole process unwieldy and long&quot;?=C2=A0<div>Answer =
=C2=A0They will come up with a solution that does nothing with DANE.=C2=A0<=
/div><div><br></div><div>is that an excuse to do something less than perfec=
t for the better good, or=C2=A0</div><div>do we live in the world of smug s=
atisfaction of being perfect?=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Sorry, from re=
ading this discussion that&#39;s my simple minded view.=C2=A0</div><div><br=
></div><div>Tim</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 11:07 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 09:00:29AM -0500, Vikto=
r Dukhovni wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Nov 5, 2018, at 8:01 AM, Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
kaduk@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Once we start talking about pinning of any sort, we move from thi=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; extension just being &quot;transport some DNS records&quot; into =
conveying some<br>
&gt; &gt; sort of additional semantics.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Transporting some bits *always* carries additional semantics, otherwis=
e<br>
<br>
Of course!=C2=A0 But if we don&#39;t precisely specify those semantics, we =
expect<br>
to get DISCUSS positions at IESG evaluation (as &quot;not interoperably<br>
implementable&quot;).<br>
<br>
&gt; why carry the bits.=C2=A0 For example, already in -07 there is clear t=
ext<br>
&gt; specifying that the transported records can be cached for their DNS TT=
L,<br>
&gt; and that once delivered DANE records should not be ignored on failure.=
<br>
[...]<br>
&gt; That rather looks like semantics to me, much more than transport some =
bits.<br>
<br>
Is it new semantics for this TLS extension, or just the semantics of &quot;=
you<br>
have a DANE record; this is what you do with it&quot;?<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; It seems that we have not really had a structured discussion abou=
t what<br>
&gt; &gt; semantics and information flows we might or might not want to con=
vey in<br>
&gt; &gt; this extension (in one or both directions!), and I&#39;m reluctan=
t to consider<br>
&gt; &gt; adding such semantics without such a discussion.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I really don&#39;t think that at this juncture it is productive to wip=
e the<br>
&gt; slate clean and consider all possible proposals, even ones that nobody=
<br>
&gt; has put forward as yet.=C2=A0 Why would we want to do that.=C2=A0 Ther=
e is clearly<br>
<br>
When we do work at the IETF, proposals are not presented as a &quot;take it=
<br>
or leave it&quot; option -- usually, they are starting points for further<b=
r>
analysis and discussion: &quot;is this optimal?&quot;, &quot;is it better i=
f we tweak<br>
it in this way?&quot;, etc.=C2=A0 I am presenting a framework in which to t=
ry to<br>
answer these questions, starting from the proposal on the table.<br>
<br>
In other words, I am pointing out that there is a process step that<br>
needs to happen before this draft can be published.=C2=A0 This need not sta=
rt<br>
from a &quot;clean slate&quot;, but we do need to be confident that we unde=
rstand<br>
what we are publishing.<br>
<br>
&gt; just one primary contentious issue to resolve, and I rather think your=
<br>
&gt; train of thought is a distraction from the issue at hand.<br>
<br>
The IETF process requires reaching a consensus understanding of the<br>
technical facts of an issue.=C2=A0 My train of thought is an effort to seek=
<br>
that understanding in the area of downgrade countermeasures, since in my<br=
>
judgement it has not been achieved by the previous WG discussions.=C2=A0 If=
<br>
we have no WG consensus understanding of pinning, we cannot publish<br>
pinning.=C2=A0 That could mean not publishing at all, or publishing somethi=
ng<br>
that lacks pinning.=C2=A0 The latter would of course not preclude other wor=
k on<br>
pinning by interested parties.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; If we accept the premise that the intention of DANE as relevant i=
n this<br>
&gt; &gt; space is to allow the server to convey to the client the server&#=
39;s<br>
&gt; &gt; preferences for how the client should authenticate the server, we=
 may also<br>
&gt; &gt; want to consider the case where a server operator wants to eventu=
ally get<br>
&gt; &gt; to a DANE-only state where it can ignore the web PKI.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Nobody is looking for this.=C2=A0 There&#39;s no point.=C2=A0 WebPKI c=
ertificates are<br>
&gt; free (and worth every penny).=C2=A0 DANE adoption is far too light to =
even<br>
&gt; begin to contemplate abandoning WebPKI, and we&#39;re probably two dec=
ades<br>
&gt; away from being able to do that, by which point the quantum computer<b=
r>
&gt; apocalypse may have made many of the current designs moot.<br>
<br>
That&#39;s good input; thanks.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; (There may not be<br>
&gt; &gt; many or any servers that actually end up wanting to do this, but =
it&#39;s not<br>
&gt; &gt; unreasonable to consider the possibility.)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It seems unreasonable to me, because no such signalling was for exampl=
e<br>
&gt; proposed for raw public keys or various PSK methods, etc.=C2=A0 And of=
 course<br>
&gt; the server operator can log the use of the extension and draw conclusi=
ons<br>
&gt; about client support based on that, and the overall technology landsca=
pe.<br>
&gt; There&#39;s no need to include this in the discussion.<br>
<br>
The chairs should feel free to shut this down if needed.<br>
But I&#39;ll note that the server&#39;s logging is not going to get any sig=
nal<br>
from clients that can get DANE records via their normal resolver, with<br>
the current proposal.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; Similarly, the server may want to indicate things like:<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; (a) the server wants to be authenticated via DANE (yes, this is j=
ust the<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 contents of the DNS)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; And any client with a decent network environment can just query the<br=
>
&gt; DNS directly, and never use the extension and have the record hot<br>
&gt; in the local cache.=C2=A0 So there&#39;s no need for anything too comp=
licated<br>
&gt; here.=C2=A0 We just need to provide as much of the downgrade-resistanc=
e<br>
&gt; that DNSSEC gives automatically, also to clients that for some time<br=
>
<br>
I think I&#39;m confused about what you mean by &quot;the downgrade-resista=
nce<br>
that DNSSEC gives automatically&quot;.<br>
<br>
&gt; will be able to do DNSSEC.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; I deliberately am not trying to come to a conclusion in this mess=
age, as I<br>
&gt; &gt; am not confident that I have even come up with all the potential =
semantics<br>
&gt; &gt; worth thinking about, and I think that any motion in this space s=
hould only<br>
&gt; &gt; be taken with WG consensus.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I think at this point hypothetical semantics is not a helpful directio=
n.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m sorry you feel that way.=C2=A0 We&#39;ve seen a few participants ra=
ise a<br>
specific pinning proposal but they seem to have squelched discussion of<br>
any other pinning options.=C2=A0 It seems that in any case the semantics ar=
e<br>
hypothetical until we have a consensus and/or deployment experience.<br>
<br>
&gt; If you have a concrete proposal, that has merit in addition to or in<b=
r>
&gt; place of what has been proposed, please explain.=C2=A0 If there are pr=
oblems<br>
&gt; or lack of clarity with what has been proposed, please explain.<br>
<br>
I have made my proposals to the list.=C2=A0 The WG as a whole does not have=
<br>
consensus on a conclusion or the relative merits of the concrete<br>
proposals that have been made to the list.<br>
<br>
&gt; I very much fear that the only possible outcome of sky&#39;s-the-limit=
<br>
&gt; brainstorming is paralysis.=C2=A0 Please try and focus on actual propo=
sals.<br>
<br>
My original mail, trimmed in your response, did list actual proposals.<br>
Some of them are probably easy to find flaws in, which is the sort of<br>
response I was asking for.=C2=A0 Having a written record of what has been<b=
r>
proposed and how the various proposals compare on a technical basis is<br>
very helpful when judging consensus.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; I would love to hear others&#39; thoughts on what I am missing fr=
om the above<br>
&gt; &gt; lists, reasoning for/against including protocol elements to indic=
ate<br>
&gt; &gt; the listed semantics, and whether/which existing protocol element=
s already<br>
&gt; &gt; convey which of the enumerated semantics.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The proposal on the table is to a minimal form of time-limited commitm=
ent<br>
&gt; to the extension by mutual agreement between client and server, to add=
ress<br>
&gt; downgrade attacks via extension stripping by attackers with unauthoris=
ed<br>
&gt; WebPKI credentials.=C2=A0 This is need because while DNS lookups eithe=
r deliver<br>
&gt; the relevant DNSSEC data or clearly fail, the extension is optional an=
d<br>
&gt; failure to deliver it is a-priori not in any way anomalous.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; We&#39;re just trying to address that gap.=C2=A0 If you can make a str=
ong case<br>
&gt; for addressing some additional gaps, or addressing this gap in a bette=
r<br>
&gt; way, please do.=C2=A0 Once again, I&#39;m very concerned that the dire=
ction you&#39;re<br>
&gt; setting out on is counter-productive.<br>
<br>
I, on the other hand, am very concerned that you are pushing for the WG<br>
to publish a solution without proper discussion of its merits and<br>
potential alternatives.=C2=A0 I am trying to help you frame such a discussi=
on<br>
and come to a consensus conclusion following IETF process, and you are<br>
avoiding a technical discussion.=C2=A0 Continuing down your path is likely =
to<br>
either cause the document to die or to revert to the previous consensus<br>
&quot;HTTPS&quot; use case, leaving any particular pinning policy to be det=
ermined<br>
outside this TLS extension, whether at the application protocol layer or<br=
>
in the implementation.<br>
<br>
If you believe that I, acting as Area Director, am attempting to abuse<br>
process to stymie consensus work, you have various appeal and recall<br>
options available.=C2=A0 I&#39;m happy to chat further with you about those=
<br>
options if you want.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000021a7cc057a023948--


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Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 13:16:22 -0500
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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On Tue, Nov 06, 2018 at 10:05:14AM -0600, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

> Of course!  But if we don't precisely specify those semantics, we expect
> to get DISCUSS positions at IESG evaluation (as "not interoperably
> implementable").

Yes, that's why the draft once updated will need to explain the
semantics, rationale, limitations, risks, ... of any approach it
ultimately takes.

> > why carry the bits.  For example, already in -07 there is clear text
> > specifying that the transported records can be cached for their DNS TTL,
> > and that once delivered DANE records should not be ignored on failure.
> [...]
> > That rather looks like semantics to me, much more than transport some bits.
> 
> Is it new semantics for this TLS extension, or just the semantics of "you
> have a DANE record; this is what you do with it"?

Well, in -07 there is also a TOFU unilateral pinning proposal, added
in a hasty (and little noticed at the end of the original process)
attempt to close the gap between promised and viable scope.  Otherwise,
yes, it mostly tries to parallel what happens when TLSA records are
obtained directly from DNS.

> > I really don't think that at this juncture it is productive to wipe the
> > slate clean and consider all possible proposals, even ones that nobody
> > has put forward as yet.  Why would we want to do that.  There is clearly
> 
> When we do work at the IETF, proposals are not presented as a "take it
> or leave it" option -- usually, they are starting points for further
> analysis and discussion: "is this optimal?", "is it better if we tweak
> it in this way?", etc.  I am presenting a framework in which to try to
> answer these questions, starting from the proposal on the table.

Please pardon my frustration with the recent deadlock.  If my
objection is excessive, I apologise.  That said, I do hope that the
discussion will have some focus.

* We've made a substantive proposal, explaining both the need for
  downgrade protection to make the extension more widely applicable,
  and that risks do not entail anything like an HPKP footgun.
* The chairs have summarized the issues, and asked for any substantive
  objections to the summary... none were made.
* I do think it is time to actually settle two basic questions:

    * Expand the scope to cover existing applications, or
      rewrite the introduction to say this is a DPRIVE-only
      extension to TLS, and explain why the scope should not
      be any wider.

    * Get past instinctive reactions to pinning the extension
      (which bears little resemblance to HPKP), and if so move on
      to figuring out the design parameters.  Maximum duration,
      any gradual scaling to give server operators time to adopt,
      or no scaling because the risk of hostile pinning is minor
      and not worth the complexity, ...

Yes, of course other topics can also be discussed, but I hope not
to the exclusion of moving past the present roadblocks.  This is
not the end of the process, more of a new beginning, which once
progress resumes will leave room for additional considerations.

> > And any client with a decent network environment can just query the
> > DNS directly, and never use the extension and have the record hot
> > in the local cache.  So there's no need for anything too complicated
> > here.  We just need to provide as much of the downgrade-resistance
> > that DNSSEC gives automatically, also to clients that for some time
> 
> I think I'm confused about what you mean by "the downgrade-resistance
> that DNSSEC gives automatically".

When a client using this extension asks the server for a DNSSEC
chain, absent any prior commitment by the server, it cannot expect
the answer, and not getting one will be the default "normal", not
a failure

When a validating DNS resolver asks a DNS question it always expects
a DNS answer, failing to get an answer, or getting an invalid answer
is a failure.  Sadly in some captive portals and behind some crippled
home CPE equipment, failure is more common than we'd like, but still
it is clear that getting no answer, or an invalid answer is a
failure.

> > I think at this point hypothetical semantics is not a helpful direction.
> 
> I'm sorry you feel that way.  We've seen a few participants raise a
> specific pinning proposal but they seem to have squelched discussion of
> any other pinning options.

There have been no substantive alternative pinning proposals.  All
I've seen is suggesting for a "testing" mode, which is not viable
here, as already explained, and out-of-band reporting is also not
a good option, an in-band alert would be far simpler and better.

Once again sorry if you feel shut down, not my intention, just
trying to get some focus on specific refinements or objections, so
we can move forward (or not) and if so then entertain more suggested
refinements.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Nov  6 14:44:09 2018
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] some thoughts on dnssec-chain-extension, pinning, and broader semantics
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We've had a couple of conference calls to discuss the I-D.

One call ended up causing the consensus on the I-D to collapse.

The second call ended too soon, but it was not unproductive.  Indeed, I
think at that call and in the subsequent off-list threads we identified
the concerns with pinning:

 - footgun concerns
 - hostile abuse concerns

Now, I believe we have demonstrated that there is no footgun: whenever
you can set the pin, you can also clear the pin.  At worst one might
first upgrade a server to gain support for the extension, set a pin,
then downgrade for some reason and thus footgun -- but the fix is to
upgrade again, or not set the pin immediately upon upgrade.  We also
have a mitigation for upgrade-set-pin-downgrade case (exponential
scaling of the pin timer with age of the RFC).

The second concern is, IMO, a non-concern, but granting for argument's
sake that it might be anyways, our answer to it is that sufficiently far
into the future the victim's server will support the extension, thus it
will be able to clear a hostile pin, therefore the exponential pin timer
scaling idea will give servers time to gain support for the extension
before anyone could ever make hostile use of the pin.

I believe we have put away those two concerns.  If we have not, please
say so and explain such that we might (or that we might see the errors
of our ways).

Are there any other reasons not to accept the proposed pinning scheme?

If no one can state any such reasons, why shouldn't we just accept the
proposal?

Nico
-- 


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On Tue, 6 Nov 2018, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

> I think I'm confused about what you mean by "the downgrade-resistance
> that DNSSEC gives automatically".

You cannot filter DNSSEC without the target being aware of being
filtered (where filtering == downgrading)

Paul


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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cc: bkaduk@akamai.com, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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On Wed, 7 Nov 2018, Tim Wicinski wrote:

> My question would be "what will the HTTP community do if they find this whole process unwieldy and long"?Â Answer Â They will come up with a
> solution that does nothing with DANE.Â 

They dont need to do anything to not have DANE. They already not have it.

> is that an excuse to do something less than perfect for the better good, orÂ 
> do we live in the world of smug satisfaction of being perfect?Â 

100% downgradable security is not security. It is not about being smug
or perfect.

Paul


From nobody Tue Nov  6 23:12:41 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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[ Quoted text slightly reordered to put the RSA issue first, as that's
  the main thing I'm trying to get clarity on, and enabling keyUsage
  enforcement is causing some interoperability issues now... ]

> On Nov 5, 2018, at 11:11 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
>> certificate that *only* lists:
>>=20
>>            X509v3 Key Usage:=20
>>                Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
>=20
> Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is
> an encryption-only key.
>=20

> As far as I know there's no similar attack on RSA, but I think this is
> not a well-examined area.

Since the vast majority of certificates in the wild are RSA, and
interoperability is a concern, I'd really like to better understand
what risk if any posed if one allows a an *RSA* key with a keyUsage
of "keyEncipherment" (seen on some live servers that then do DHE-RSA)
to be used for "DigitalSignature"?  I am only aware of risks in the
converse direction.  How unreasonable would it be to be more forgiving
and allow *RSA* "DigitalSignature" when the keyUsage indicates =
otherwise?

> It's much more important in the DHE-ECDSA case, because using an
> encryption-only EC key for signing can lead to key compromise (IIRC).

Does anyone have pointers to references for that?  FWIW, I've never seen =
an
encryption-only (ECIES?) ECDSA key, I guess could be intended for CMS...
In TLSA there's no ECDS keyEncipherment, only ECDHE and fixed ECDH =
(obsolete).
The first goes with a keyUsage of DigitalSignature, the second with =
keyAgreement.

Knowing how fragile ECDSA tends to be to key recovery on nonce re-use
or similar issues, I have no reservations enforcing keyUsage for ECDSA.

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Nov  6 23:34:20 2018
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Subject: [TLS] The TLS WG has placed draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests in state "Candidate for WG Adoption"
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The TLS WG has placed draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests in state
Candidate for WG Adoption (entered by Sean Turner)

The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests/


From nobody Tue Nov  6 23:35:14 2018
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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 14:34:57 +0700
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Subject: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator
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This is the working group last call for the "Exported Authenticators
in TLS" draft available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/.
Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359
UTC on 30 November 2018.

Thanks,
Chris, Joe, and Sean


From nobody Tue Nov  6 23:39:31 2018
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Subject: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls13
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This is the working group last call for the "The Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3" draft available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/.  Please
review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on
30 November 2018.

Thanks,
Chris, Joe, and Sean


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--000000000000fcf6e9057a0e3998
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

This is the working group last call for the "Connection Identifiers for
DTLS 1.2" draft available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/. Please
review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on 30
November 2018.

Thanks,
Chris, Joe, and Sean

--000000000000fcf6e9057a0e3998
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<div dir=3D"ltr">This is the working group last call for the &quot;Connecti=
on Identifiers for DTLS 1.2&quot; draft available at=C2=A0<a href=3D"https:=
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/" rel=3D"noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dt=
ls-connection-id/</a>. Please review the document and send your comments to=
 the list by 2359 UTC on 30 November 2018.<br><br>Thanks,<br>Chris, Joe, an=
d Sean<br></div>

--000000000000fcf6e9057a0e3998--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 14:47:38 +0700
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Subject: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt =
draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests.  This message is to confirm that =
consensus.  If you do not support adoption of =
draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item please say so by 2359UTC on 30 =
November 2018 (and say why).

Thanks,
Joe and Sean=


From nobody Tue Nov  6 23:50:28 2018
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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 14:50:09 +0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS, Monday session
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Thanks, Rich!
On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 4:16 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
> Draft minutes attached; please post corrections to the list.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Wed Nov  7 06:48:32 2018
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To: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 15:48:26 +0100 (CET)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> wrote:
> Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:
>> 
>> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
>> certificate that *only* lists:
>> 
>>             X509v3 Key Usage: 
>>                 Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
> 
> Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is
> an encryption-only key.


There is *ZERO* security problem associated with TLS client allowing
a TLS server to do this, but it makes it harder to catch defective
CA software and bogus CA issuing practices when clients do not complain
here -- and the TLS specification says this KeyUsage DigitalSignature
is a MUST for DHE/ECDHE key exchange:

  TLSv1.2:  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#page-49

      DHE_RSA            RSA public key; the certificate MUST allow the
      ECDHE_RSA          key to be used for signing (the
                         digitalSignature bit MUST be set if the key
                         usage extension is present) with the signature
                         scheme and hash algorithm that will be employed
                         in the server key exchange message.
                         Note: ECDHE_RSA is defined in [TLSECC].

  TLSv1.0:  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#page-38


CAs and CA software that issues certificates as TLS server certificates
(i.e. with ExtKeyUsage  id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-clientAuth or both) and
forgets to assert DigitalSignature, prove their own royal brokenness.


Using an RSA key for PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures is *NO* security problem.

Do not get confused by the FUD and snake-oil that resulted in the
needless additional complexity of RSA-PSS in TLSv1.3, that adds ZERO
security value.

   https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/09/evidence_for_th.html

   https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/855


There is some security risk with using an RSA signing-only key
for PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption, i.e. the equivalent of
using a keyUsage without keyEncipherment for static-RSA key exchange 


-Martin


From nobody Wed Nov  7 07:44:57 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement [whose duty, client's or server's?]
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On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 03:48:26PM +0100, Martin Rex wrote:

> There is *ZERO* security problem associated with TLS client allowing
> a TLS server to do this, but it makes it harder to catch defective
> CA software and bogus CA issuing practices when clients do not complain
> here

The interoperability issues I'm seeing are with self-signed
certificates used in opportunistic TLS and DANE in SMTP.  The CA
is some end-user, who "does not know any better", and the question
is how pedantic should the client's TLS stack be in such a case.

Perhaps the correct place to *enforce* any keyUsage requirement is
in the TLS *server*, which should limit *itself* to the algorithms
compatible with the certificate.  That would be both more effective,
and more interoperable.

> -- and the TLS specification says this KeyUsage DigitalSignature
> is a MUST for DHE/ECDHE key exchange:
> 
>   TLSv1.2:  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#page-49
> 
>       DHE_RSA            RSA public key; the certificate MUST allow the
>       ECDHE_RSA          key to be used for signing (the
>                          digitalSignature bit MUST be set if the key
>                          usage extension is present) with the signature
>                          scheme and hash algorithm that will be employed
>                          in the server key exchange message.
>                          Note: ECDHE_RSA is defined in [TLSECC].

What the RFC does not say is whose duty it is (if anyone's) to
*enforce* the restriction.  Perhaps clients should not be the ones
to do so?

-- 
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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--00000000000014bc87057a169f27
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On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 1:12 AM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> [ Quoted text slightly reordered to put the RSA issue first, as that's
>   the main thing I'm trying to get clarity on, and enabling keyUsage
>   enforcement is causing some interoperability issues now... ]
>
> > On Nov 5, 2018, at 11:11 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> wrote:
> >
> >> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
> >> certificate that *only* lists:
> >>
> >>            X509v3 Key Usage:
> >>                Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
> >
> > Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is
> > an encryption-only key.
> >
>
> > As far as I know there's no similar attack on RSA, but I think this is
> > not a well-examined area.
>
> Since the vast majority of certificates in the wild are RSA, and
> interoperability is a concern, I'd really like to better understand
> what risk if any posed if one allows a an *RSA* key with a keyUsage
> of "keyEncipherment" (seen on some live servers that then do DHE-RSA)
> to be used for "DigitalSignature"?  I am only aware of risks in the
> converse direction.  How unreasonable would it be to be more forgiving
> and allow *RSA* "DigitalSignature" when the keyUsage indicates otherwise?
>

This seems flipped to me. Which attacks do you see enforcing
keyEncipherment blocking? If you are concerned about Bleichenbacher-type
private key oracles, it should be more important to enforce
digitalSignature, and even that's not sufficient in itself (cf. DROWN
affecting non-SSLv2 clients too).

A private key oracle allows both ciphertext decryption *and* signature
forgery, so we need clients to know which forged signatures to reject, and
for an uncompromised path to be possible. Thus, if you believe the server's
RSA key exchange implementation admits a private key oracle and that oracle
is efficient enough for online attacks[*], I believe you need all of the
following for the client to not care:

1. The server uses separate keys for RSA encryption and RSA signing. It
will never use its RSA signing key for RSA encryption.
2. The server key separation is reflected in keyUsage bits, which is
enforced by the client in (EC)DHE_RSA modes.
3. The client doesn't accept RSA key exchange at all.

If all are true, the client will never accept the encryption key and the
signing key is uncompromised, so we're fine. If any of the above are false,
I don't think it works.

If the server shares RSA and (EC)DHE_RSA keys (1), as everyone does, its
one and only key is effectively compromised and there's not a whole lot one
can do, short of fixing or disabling the RSA key exchange implementation on
the server.

If the client ignores keyUsage in (EC)DHE_RSA (2), as most do, the server's
key separation is moot. The client doesn't know to reject a
private-key-oracle-forged signature.

If the client still supports RSA key exchange (3), as most do, none of this
key separation matters, because the attacker can just negotiate RSA key
exchange anyway.

My experience is that typically none of (1), (2), or (3) happen, much less
all, so this is all kind of moot. :-)

Re (2), historically we'd seen issues with MITM proxies minting certs
incorrectly, BoringSSL only enforces key usage for RSA starting TLS 1.3 (it
was new, so get it right from the start) and ECDSA at all versions (only
one value in practice, seems to have worked out). I started gathering more
current metrics a while back but haven't had time to follow-up on this yet.
But as most clients sadly still have to support RSA key exchange (3) and
managing two certificates (1) is onerous for most server, I doubt any
fixing that will help in practice for a while, if ever. It's more an
ecosystem health thing.

David

[*] If you believe the oracle isn't efficient enough for online attacks,
you probably can just lean on downgrade protection ratcheting you to
(EC)DHE_RSA and call it a day?

--00000000000014bc87057a169f27
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Nov 7,=
 2018 at 1:12 AM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.o=
rg">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex">[ Quoted text slightly reordered to put the RSA issue first, as that=
&#39;s<br>
=C2=A0 the main thing I&#39;m trying to get clarity on, and enabling keyUsa=
ge<br>
=C2=A0 enforcement is causing some interoperability issues now... ]<br>
<br>
&gt; On Nov 5, 2018, at 11:11 PM, Geoffrey Keating &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ge=
offk@geoffk.org" target=3D"_blank">geoffk@geoffk.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; TL;DR:=C2=A0 Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a pee=
r<br>
&gt;&gt; certificate that *only* lists:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 X509v3 Key Usage: <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Key Enciphe=
rment, Data Encipherment<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is<=
br>
&gt; an encryption-only key.<br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
&gt; As far as I know there&#39;s no similar attack on RSA, but I think thi=
s is<br>
&gt; not a well-examined area.<br>
<br>
Since the vast majority of certificates in the wild are RSA, and<br>
interoperability is a concern, I&#39;d really like to better understand<br>
what risk if any posed if one allows a an *RSA* key with a keyUsage<br>
of &quot;keyEncipherment&quot; (seen on some live servers that then do DHE-=
RSA)<br>
to be used for &quot;DigitalSignature&quot;?=C2=A0 I am only aware of risks=
 in the<br>
converse direction.=C2=A0 How unreasonable would it be to be more forgiving=
<br>
and allow *RSA* &quot;DigitalSignature&quot; when the keyUsage indicates ot=
herwise?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div>This seems flipped to me.=
 Which attacks do you see enforcing keyEncipherment blocking? If you are co=
ncerned about Bleichenbacher-type private key oracles, it should be more im=
portant to enforce digitalSignature, and even that&#39;s not sufficient in =
itself (cf. DROWN affecting non-SSLv2 clients too).</div><div><br></div><di=
v>A private key oracle allows both=C2=A0ciphertext decryption <i>and</i>=C2=
=A0signature forgery, so we need clients to know which forged signatures to=
 reject, and for an uncompromised path to be possible. Thus, if you believe=
 the server&#39;s RSA key exchange implementation admits a private key orac=
le and that oracle is efficient enough for online attacks[*], I believe you=
 need all of the following for the client to not care:</div><div><br></div>=
<div>1. The server uses separate keys for RSA encryption and RSA signing. I=
t will never use its RSA signing key for RSA encryption.</div><div><div>2. =
The server key separation is reflected in keyUsage bits, which is enforced =
by the client in (EC)DHE_RSA modes.</div></div><div>3. The client doesn&#39=
;t accept RSA key exchange at all.</div><div><br></div><div>If all are true=
, the client will never accept the encryption key and the signing key is un=
compromised, so we&#39;re fine. If any of the above are false, I don&#39;t =
think it works.</div><div><br></div><div>If the server shares RSA and (EC)D=
HE_RSA keys (1), as everyone does, its one and only key is effectively comp=
romised and there&#39;s not a whole lot one can do, short of fixing or disa=
bling the RSA key exchange implementation on the server.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>If the client ignores keyUsage in (EC)DHE_RSA (2), as most do, the s=
erver&#39;s key separation is moot. The client doesn&#39;t know to reject a=
 private-key-oracle-forged signature.</div><div><br></div><div>If the clien=
t still supports RSA key exchange (3), as most do, none of this key separat=
ion matters, because the attacker can just negotiate RSA key exchange anywa=
y.</div><div><br></div><div>My experience is that typically none of (1), (2=
), or (3) happen, much less all, so this is all kind of moot. :-)</div><div=
><br></div><div>Re (2), historically we&#39;d seen issues with MITM proxies=
 minting certs incorrectly, BoringSSL only enforces key usage for RSA start=
ing TLS 1.3 (it was new, so get it right from the start) and ECDSA at all v=
ersions (only one value in practice, seems to have worked out). I started g=
athering more current metrics a while back but haven&#39;t had time to foll=
ow-up on this yet. But as most clients sadly still have to support RSA key =
exchange (3) and managing two certificates (1) is onerous for most server, =
I doubt any fixing that will help in practice for a while, if ever. It&#39;=
s more an ecosystem health thing.</div></div><div><br></div><div>David</div=
><div><br></div><div>[*] If you believe the oracle isn&#39;t efficient enou=
gh for online attacks, you probably can just lean on downgrade protection r=
atcheting you to (EC)DHE_RSA and call it a day?</div></div></div>

--00000000000014bc87057a169f27--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:

> [ Quoted text slightly reordered to put the RSA issue first, as that's
>   the main thing I'm trying to get clarity on, and enabling keyUsage
>   enforcement is causing some interoperability issues now... ]
> 
> > On Nov 5, 2018, at 11:11 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> wrote:
> > 
> >> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
> >> certificate that *only* lists:
> >> 
> >>            X509v3 Key Usage: 
> >>                Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
> > 
> > Yes, because in DHE-RSA, the RSA key is used for signing, and this is
> > an encryption-only key.
> > 
> 
> > As far as I know there's no similar attack on RSA, but I think this is
> > not a well-examined area.
> 
> Since the vast majority of certificates in the wild are RSA, and
> interoperability is a concern, I'd really like to better understand
> what risk if any posed if one allows a an *RSA* key with a keyUsage
> of "keyEncipherment" (seen on some live servers that then do DHE-RSA)
> to be used for "DigitalSignature"?  I am only aware of risks in the
> converse direction.  How unreasonable would it be to be more forgiving
> and allow *RSA* "DigitalSignature" when the keyUsage indicates otherwise?

Maybe I should expand on my previous answer.

There is, obviously, an attack with RSA under some circumstances.  If
you have an oracle where the attacker can see the results of any RSA
decryption, then this leads directly to the ability to forge a
signature.

In more practical situations, the attacker doesn't get to see the
results.  Instead, for example in properly-implemented TLS, the
attacker only learns whether the decryption was successful, relative
to a key chosen by the attacker, and a 'successful' decryption
includes a padding check of the output which is highly unlikely to
succeed for a fixed input.  So there doesn't seem to be a direct
attack in this situation.

However, how do you know this is the situation?

There is the obvious question about improper implementations.  How do
you know that this key wasn't configured this way because there's a
known security issue which might leak a key used for encryption, and
the key is intended only to be presented to hosts which will not
accept DHE?

This is particularly relevant because we do know of some attacks on
PKCS#1v1.5 encryption, which make the 'proper implementation' quite
complicated, and you can see the result in RFC 3218.  However these
attacks were concerned primarily with recovering the symmetric key,
and not forging a signature using the RSA key.  I don't think anyone
has deeply investigated the signature-forging issue in this context,
since typically if you can recover the symmetric key, that's bad
enough (you can just force the connection to use an encryption-based
ciphersuite).

In general, though, what you're asking is "The CA signing this key has
instructed that I do not accept signatures made with it.  Is it OK to
accept signatures made with it?" It's really hard to see how the
answer to that could generally be 'yes'.


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 08:07:35 +0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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Adopt it.  It's a small, useful feature.
On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 2:48 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
> At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt draft-wood-tls-t=
icketrequests.  This message is to confirm that consensus.  If you do not s=
upport adoption of draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item please say so b=
y 2359UTC on 30 November 2018 (and say why).
>
> Thanks,
> Joe and Sean
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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As a co-author, I do support adoption, as this will help optimize client connection racing.

Tommy

> On Nov 8, 2018, at 8:07 AM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Adopt it.  It's a small, useful feature.
> On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 2:48 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>> 
>> At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests.  This message is to confirm that consensus.  If you do not support adoption of draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item please say so by 2359UTC on 30 November 2018 (and say why).
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> Joe and Sean
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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To: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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--000000000000e96eb3057a1dcbf4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi everyone,

Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel with
DTLS:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01

It's 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick read and
let us know if we're using DTLS correctly?

Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version to
use?

Thanks,
David

--000000000000e96eb3057a1dcbf4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi everyone,<div><br></div><div>Over in t=
he Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel with DTLS:</div=
><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01">http=
s://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01</a><br></div><div><br></di=
v><div>It&#39;s 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick =
read and let us know if we&#39;re using DTLS correctly?</div><div><br></div=
><div>Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version=
 to use?</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>David</div></div></div>

--000000000000e96eb3057a1dcbf4--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement [whose duty, client's or server's?]
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement [whose duty, client's or server's?]
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Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 03:48:26PM +0100, Martin Rex wrote:=0A=
>> There is *ZERO* security problem associated with TLS client allowing=0A=
>> a TLS server to do this, but it makes it harder to catch defective=0A=
>> CA software and bogus CA issuing practices when clients do not complain=
=0A=
>> here=0A=
>=0A=
>The interoperability issues I'm seeing are with self-signed certificates u=
sed=0A=
>in opportunistic TLS and DANE in SMTP.  The CA is some end-user, who "does=
 not=0A=
>know any better", and the question is how pedantic should the client's TLS=
=0A=
>stack be in such a case.=0A=
=0A=
My code, by default, strictly enforces keyUsage [0], so I end up seeing all=
=0A=
the broken certs out there, and it's complete chaos, (DH) keyAgreement set =
for=0A=
RSA certs, every possible key usage (includings ones the algorithm isn't=0A=
capable of) set, things like email encryption and SSL server set for CA cer=
ts=0A=
(extKeyUsage), keyEncipherment for signing keys, digitalSignature for=0A=
encryption keys, it's the Rule 34 of PKI (if you can think of it, someone's=
=0A=
put it in an extension).  This includes CA-issued certs, not self-signed on=
es.=0A=
I think a significant chunk of TLS PKI only works because implementations=
=0A=
don't strictly enforce keyUsage.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
=0A=
[0] Which probably wasn't the best default setting.  If you think the publi=
c=0A=
    web PKI has broken certs, you should see what turns up in the SCADA =0A=
    world...=0A=


From nobody Wed Nov  7 18:44:54 2018
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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 21:44:31 -0500
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>,  tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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I support the adoption as well, we need it for lurk.
Yours,
Daniel

On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:31 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> I support adoption and I am sure OpenSSL will implement, or I will do it
> and make a PR.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I support the adoption as well, we need it for lurk.<=
/div><div>Yours, <br></div><div>Daniel<br> </div></div><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:31 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I support adoption and I am sure OpenSSL wi=
ll implement, or I will do it and make a PR.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
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From nobody Wed Nov  7 18:59:06 2018
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement [whose duty, client's or server's?]
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Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 02:58:55 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement [whose duty, client's or server's?]
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Peter,=20

I think your code did exactly right. The standard requires honoring KeyUsage=
.

Maybe if more implementations were diligent with this, the cert zoo we're ob=
serving would've been less wild...

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On Nov 7, 2018, at 21:21, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:=

>=20
> Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:
>=20
>>> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 03:48:26PM +0100, Martin Rex wrote:
>>> There is *ZERO* security problem associated with TLS client allowing
>>> a TLS server to do this, but it makes it harder to catch defective
>>> CA software and bogus CA issuing practices when clients do not complain
>>> here
>>=20
>> The interoperability issues I'm seeing are with self-signed certificates u=
sed
>> in opportunistic TLS and DANE in SMTP.  The CA is some end-user, who "doe=
s not
>> know any better", and the question is how pedantic should the client's TL=
S
>> stack be in such a case.
>=20
> My code, by default, strictly enforces keyUsage [0], so I end up seeing al=
l
> the broken certs out there, and it's complete chaos, (DH) keyAgreement set=
 for
> RSA certs, every possible key usage (includings ones the algorithm isn't
> capable of) set, things like email encryption and SSL server set for CA ce=
rts
> (extKeyUsage), keyEncipherment for signing keys, digitalSignature for
> encryption keys, it's the Rule 34 of PKI (if you can think of it, someone'=
s
> put it in an extension).  This includes CA-issued certs, not self-signed o=
nes.
> I think a significant chunk of TLS PKI only works because implementations
> don't strictly enforce keyUsage.
>=20
> Peter.
>=20
> [0] Which probably wasn't the best default setting.  If you think the publ=
ic
>    web PKI has broken certs, you should see what turns up in the SCADA=20
>    world...
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> On Nov 7, 2018, at 6:07 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> =
wrote:
>=20
> n general, though, what you're asking is "The CA signing this key has
> instructed that I do not accept signatures made with it.  Is it OK to
> accept signatures made with it?" It's really hard to see how the
> answer to that could generally be 'yes'.

Thanks for everyone's input, this has been very helpful.  The approach
I'm inclined to take is as follows:

1. Always enforce key usage for your own certificate, ensuring key
   separation as provisioned at the time of key/certificate creation.
   This also maximizes opportunities for problems to be detected early
   and fixed.

2. Always enforce peer certificate key usage (separation) for ECDSA.
   ECDSA keys are more brittle when misused.

3. Enforce RSA peer certificate key usage when RSA key transport is =
locally
   disabled, allowing only (EC)DHE-RSA.  This is always the case with =
TLS 1.3,
   but for TLS <=3D 1.2 subject to the enabled ciphers.

The rationale for 3 is as follows:

   * The primary responsibility for doing key separation right falls on =
the
     key holder (as in 1).  If that's always done correctly, the peer =
has
     nothing to second-guess.

   * If the key holder has no key separation, and makes key recovery
     possible through some sort of side-channel, then the attacker who
     recovers the key can always misuse that key via whichever key
     exchange is allowed by the certificate, when all are accepted by
     the client.

     Therefore, if the client supports both RSA key exchange and =
(EC)DHE-RSA,
     the attacker wins regardless of any effort by the client to enforce =
key
     usages.

     Which leaves the case where the client only accepts (EC)DHE-RSA (as =
with
     TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2 with the RSA key exchange features disabled).  =
In that
     case, if the attacker is able to compromise a server key =
constrained to
     "keyEncipherment", but cannot obtain a fraudulent certificate, then =
he'd have
     a certificate for just "keyEncipherment" which the client will =
refuse to
     honour for "digitalSignature".  And so the client actually gets =
some measure
     of protection by doing keyUsage enforcement.

This approach also has the advantage that legacy cases continue to =
(mis)behave
like they always did, but the strictness rises to match the client's =
protocol
preferences wether through use of TLS 1.3 (fresh start, fresh =
constraints) or
by restricting TLS 1.2 ciphers in a way that makes keyUsage enforcement =
a
practical counter-measure to at least some potential attacks.

--=20
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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<html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;"><div>I took a quick look at the document and I don&#39;t know Babel.&nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>I see that you have two different proposals for securing Babel messages, namely&nbsp;</div>

<div>* DTLS, and&nbsp;</div>

<div>* a custom format offering integrity protection only.&nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>You correctly note in the document that DTLS offers more features. It is an authentication and key exchange protocol.&nbsp;&nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>One option to explore is to use DTLS to perform authentication and key exchange then use your custom format for integrity protection of packets with the keys exported from DTLS. Design-wise this approach is similiar to what we have done with DTLS-SRTP. This would also allow you to cover the multicast security case.&nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>Ciao</div>

<div>Hannes</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>
<div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
<div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b>&nbsp;Donnerstag, 08. November 2018 um 11:30 Uhr<br/>
<b>Von:</b>&nbsp;&quot;Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)&quot; &lt;thomas.fossati@nokia.com&gt;<br/>
<b>An:</b>&nbsp;&quot;David Schinazi&quot; &lt;dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com&gt;<br/>
<b>Cc:</b>&nbsp;&quot;draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org&quot; &lt;draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org&gt;, &quot;tls@ietf.org&quot; &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br/>
<b>Betreff:</b>&nbsp;Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?</div>

<div name="quoted-content">Hi David,<br/>
<br/>
A few quick notes below.<br/>
<br/>
Cheers<br/>
<br/>
The 11/08/2018 09:14, David Schinazi wrote:<br/>
&gt; Hi everyone,<br/>
&gt;<br/>
&gt; Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel with<br/>
&gt; DTLS:<br/>
&gt; <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01" target="_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01</a><br/>
&gt;<br/>
&gt; It&#39;s 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick read and<br/>
&gt; let us know if we&#39;re using DTLS correctly?<br/>
&gt;<br/>
&gt; Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version to<br/>
&gt; use?<br/>
&gt;<br/>
&gt; Thanks,<br/>
&gt; David<br/>
<br/>
Premise: I don&#39;t know Babel -- apologies for any nonsense!<br/>
<br/>
One high level thing which I can&#39;t extrapolate from the draft (which is<br/>
probably due to my ignorance with Babel) is whether you envisage that<br/>
*every* node does DTLS on the unicast channel, IOW that non-DTLS nodes<br/>
are excluded from the mesh? Or would it be acceptable to mesh HMAC and<br/>
DTLS neighbours? What about clear-text speakers? (It&#39;d seem unwise to<br/>
let them in an otherwise secured enclave.)<br/>
<br/>
You should probably provide some guidance about the kind of<br/>
credentials do you plan to use (certs, raw pkeys)?<br/>
<br/>
It seems to me that the P2P nature of the protocol requires mutual<br/>
authentication, could you confirm it? This seems to be a critical thing<br/>
to prevent a rogue node to spoof the lowest (highest, I have already<br/>
forgot, sorry) L-L address in a clear-text multicast Hello and bypass<br/>
authentication.<br/>
<br/>
- s2.1<br/>
&quot;Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS connections use different<br/>
ephemeral ports from recently used connections to allow servers to<br/>
differentiate between the new and old DTLS connections.&quot;<br/>
<br/>
Maybe you could suggest using a sufficiently entropic connection id here<br/>
as a more robust alternative.<br/>
<br/>
- s2.5<br/>
Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are, but I&#39;d<br/>
make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD? It seems more polite<br/>
:-)<br/>
<br/>
- s.3<br/>
Not sure which TLS stack Babel nodes will use (are you targeting<br/>
extremely constrained devices with custom TLS implementations?), but all<br/>
the stacks I know of let the application set the MTU and take care of<br/>
splitting the messages in MTU sized chunks transparently.<br/>
<br/>
--<br/>
Thomas<br/>
_______________________________________________<br/>
TLS mailing list<br/>
TLS@ietf.org<br/>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></div>
</div>
</div></div></body></html>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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+1 to adoption. I found myself unsure of how many tickets to send in the new Go implementation, which is notoriously averse to configuration knobs, and would love to have the client pick.

2018-11-07 14:47 GMT+0700 Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>:
> At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt draft-wood-tls-
> ticketrequests.  This message is to confirm that consensus.  If you do 
> not support adoption of draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item please 
> say so by 2359UTC on 30 November 2018 (and say why).
> 
> Thanks,
> Joe and Sean
> _______________________________________________
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Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 12:04:11 +0700
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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I support adoption, this seems straightforward and is a good solution to a r=
eal world problem I=E2=80=99ve got.=20

Thanks,
Eric


> On Nov 8, 2018, at 9:44 AM, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> w=
rote:
>=20
> I support the adoption as well, we need it for lurk.
> Yours,=20
> Daniel
>=20
>> On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:31 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>> I support adoption and I am sure OpenSSL will implement, or I will do it a=
nd make a PR.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr"></div><div dir=3D"ltr">I s=
upport adoption, this seems straightforward and is a good solution to a real=
 world problem I=E2=80=99ve got.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">Thanks,</div><div dir=3D"ltr">Eric</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></di=
v><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>On Nov 8, 2018, at 9:44 AM, Daniel Migault &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com">daniel.migault@ericsson.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div>I support the adoption as well, we need it for lurk.</div><div>You=
rs, <br></div><div>Daniel<br> </div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:31 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">I support adoption and I am sure OpenSSL will implement, or I=
 will do it and make a PR.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span>________=
_______________________________________</span><br><span>TLS mailing list</sp=
an><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><spa=
n><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=

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From nobody Wed Nov  7 21:28:41 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
                          Stephen Farrell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
	Pages           : 21
	Date            : 2018-11-07

Abstract:
   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
   these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
   for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
   industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
   these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
   IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
   away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
   increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
   for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
   additional effort for library and product maintenance.

   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0 or
   TLS1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525 and
   hence is part of BCP195.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Wed Nov  7 21:35:49 2018
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <62386296-c674-44ef-65b0-e3ced823eb92@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:35:30 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g3EhgkmOgQnD4Dtj5BuM868sePY>
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <62386296-c674-44ef-65b0-e3ced823eb92@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
References: <154165491176.26419.11906807559515385277@ietfa.amsl.com>
In-Reply-To: <154165491176.26419.11906807559515385277@ietfa.amsl.com>

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Hiya,

This version attempts to make the few changes discussed
at the meeting on Monday. I wrote a script that gave me
a list of 76(!) RFCs this might need to update, and may
of course have mucked that up, so if anyone has a chance
to check if (some of) those make sense, that'd be great.

Ta,
S.

On 08/11/2018 05:28, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dire=
ctories.
> This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IET=
F.
>=20
>         Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
>         Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
>                           Stephen Farrell
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 21
> 	Date            : 2018-11-07
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government an=
d
>    industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version fo=
r
>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions=

>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities=

>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also require=
s
>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>=20
>    This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0 or
>    TLS1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525 and=

>    hence is part of BCP195.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/
>=20
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprec=
ate-01
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecat=
e-01
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submi=
ssion
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 00:44:16 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Maybe
we should ask Google.

The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.

This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be
placed in a DNS TXT record. In another DNS TXT record, a list of supported
protocols could be listed.
A DNS SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a
service, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a
domain and after chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains
was unimportant. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.
Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072,
and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.
And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by using the timer
entropy daemon for one second (and which would in theory provide enough
entropy for perpetuity).

This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. The state of cyber security is a horribl=
e
disappointment.

--0000000000007ac9b3057a233d9d
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Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Maybe =
we should ask Google.<div><br></div><div>The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSE=
C exists.</div><div><br></div><div>This might be a radical proposal, but ma=
ybe the certificate hash could be placed in a DNS TXT record. In another DN=
S TXT record, a list of supported protocols could be listed.</div><div>A DN=
S SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a service=
, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a domain and a=
fter chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains was unimporta=
nt. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.</div><div>Alth=
ough, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072, and S=
HAKE-128 as AEAD.</div><div>And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be =
obtained by using the timer entropy daemon for one second (and which would =
in theory provide enough entropy for perpetuity).</div><div><br></div><div>=
This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. The state of cyber security is a horribl=
e disappointment.</div>

--0000000000007ac9b3057a233d9d--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 16:03:30 +0400
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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WG adoption call: draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests
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On Wednesday, November 7, 2018, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt
> draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests.  This message is to confirm that consensus.
> If you do not support adoption of draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item
> please say so by 2359UTC on 30 November 2018 (and say why).
>
> Thanks,
> Joe and Sean

I support adoption of this draft.


> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<br><br>On Wednesday, November 7, 2018, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:s=
ean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex">At TLS@IETF103, there was consensus in the room to adopt draft-wood-tls=
-ticketrequests.=C2=A0 This message is to confirm that consensus.=C2=A0 If =
you do not support adoption of draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests as WG item ple=
ase say so by 2359UTC on 30 November 2018 (and say why).<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Joe and Sean</blockquote><div>I support adoption of this draft.</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
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From nobody Thu Nov  8 06:37:29 2018
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Yes to what Viktor proposed.

=EF=BB=BFOn 11/7/18, 11:27 PM, "TLS on behalf of Viktor Dukhovni" <tls-bounces@ie=
tf.org on behalf of ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:

    > On Nov 7, 2018, at 6:07 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> wrot=
e:
    >=20
    > n general, though, what you're asking is "The CA signing this key has
    > instructed that I do not accept signatures made with it.  Is it OK to
    > accept signatures made with it?" It's really hard to see how the
    > answer to that could generally be 'yes'.
   =20
    Thanks for everyone's input, this has been very helpful.  The approach
    I'm inclined to take is as follows:
   =20
    1. Always enforce key usage for your own certificate, ensuring key
       separation as provisioned at the time of key/certificate creation.
       This also maximizes opportunities for problems to be detected early
       and fixed.
   =20
    2. Always enforce peer certificate key usage (separation) for ECDSA.
       ECDSA keys are more brittle when misused.
   =20
    3. Enforce RSA peer certificate key usage when RSA key transport is loc=
ally
       disabled, allowing only (EC)DHE-RSA.  This is always the case with T=
LS 1.3,
       but for TLS <=3D 1.2 subject to the enabled ciphers.
   =20
    The rationale for 3 is as follows:
   =20
       * The primary responsibility for doing key separation right falls on=
 the
         key holder (as in 1).  If that's always done correctly, the peer h=
as
         nothing to second-guess.
   =20
       * If the key holder has no key separation, and makes key recovery
         possible through some sort of side-channel, then the attacker who
         recovers the key can always misuse that key via whichever key
         exchange is allowed by the certificate, when all are accepted by
         the client.
   =20
         Therefore, if the client supports both RSA key exchange and (EC)DH=
E-RSA,
         the attacker wins regardless of any effort by the client to enforc=
e key
         usages.
   =20
         Which leaves the case where the client only accepts (EC)DHE-RSA (a=
s with
         TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2 with the RSA key exchange features disabled).  =
In that
         case, if the attacker is able to compromise a server key constrain=
ed to
         "keyEncipherment", but cannot obtain a fraudulent certificate, the=
n he'd have
         a certificate for just "keyEncipherment" which the client will ref=
use to
         honour for "digitalSignature".  And so the client actually gets so=
me measure
         of protection by doing keyUsage enforcement.
   =20
    This approach also has the advantage that legacy cases continue to (mis=
)behave
    like they always did, but the strictness rises to match the client's pr=
otocol
    preferences wether through use of TLS 1.3 (fresh start, fresh constrain=
ts) or
    by restricting TLS 1.2 ciphers in a way that makes keyUsage enforcement=
 a
    practical counter-measure to at least some potential attacks.
   =20
    --=20
    	Viktor.
   =20
    _______________________________________________
    TLS mailing list
    TLS@ietf.org
    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
   =20

--B_3624514641_1612729723
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--B_3624514641_1612729723--


From nobody Thu Nov  8 08:49:57 2018
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Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 11:49:45 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: tls@ietf.org
cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: [TLS] Thanks to Benjamin Kaduk
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I wanted to thank Ben for the outreach he did in the last six months on
the tls dnssec chain extension. It has been a difficult issue and I do
wish the outcome was different. But during this time Ben put a lot of
effort in trying to get the issues clarified and resolved both on the
list of offlist. He repeatedly tried to engage more people of the WG
and he made me feel that my opinions were not ignored.

I am going to think a bit more on how we as IETF could have done better
in this case, but I did want to share with the group that I think Ben
made a real difference in trying to get this document out.

Thanks Ben!

Paul


From nobody Thu Nov  8 09:21:35 2018
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Cc: internet-drafts@ietf.org, i-d-announce@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 18:21:23 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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On Thursday, 8 November 2018 06:28:31 CET internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories. This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG
> of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
>         Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
>                           Stephen Farrell
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 21
> 	Date            : 2018-11-07
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
>    industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>=20
>    This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0 or
>    TLS1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525 and
>    hence is part of BCP195.

what was the rationale for dropping the section about deprecating SHA-1 in =
TLS=20
1.2? I see nothing in minutes from IETF103.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: tls@ietf.org, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Thanks to Benjamin Kaduk
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On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 11:49:45AM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
> I wanted to thank Ben for the outreach he did in the last six months on
> the tls dnssec chain extension. It has been a difficult issue and I do
> wish the outcome was different. But during this time Ben put a lot of
> effort in trying to get the issues clarified and resolved both on the
> list of offlist. He repeatedly tried to engage more people of the WG
> and he made me feel that my opinions were not ignored.
> 
> I am going to think a bit more on how we as IETF could have done better
> in this case, but I did want to share with the group that I think Ben
> made a real difference in trying to get this document out.
> 
> Thanks Ben!

I'd like to second this.

I'd also like to state a mea culpa.  I did not understand the extent to
which this controversy would become a DoS on the WG.  Perhaps it would
have been better to not get involved and then later publish a better
version of the extension.  I can't be sure, but certainly avoiding that
large exchange of email would have been better.

Nico
-- 


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
Cc: internet-drafts@ietf.org, i-d-announce@ietf.org
Message-ID: <59e5f6ee-d387-819d-8236-02c36293995b@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
References: <154165491176.26419.11906807559515385277@ietfa.amsl.com>
 <13294858.4eSL3uNVaL@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <13294858.4eSL3uNVaL@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>

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Hiya,

On 08/11/2018 17:21, Hubert Kario wrote:
> what was the rationale for dropping the section about deprecating SHA-1=
 in TLS=20
> 1.2? I see nothing in minutes from IETF103.

I asked during the presentation if the WG wanted to
keep it or not, as it's clearly not quite the same
as the rest of the document. The limited feedback in
the room was that it'd be better to not include this
here but to do it elsewhere, without identifying a
specific document or activity that'd cover it. The
logic was (IIUC) mostly down to keeping this draft
more focused. I don't think it was a desire to keep
using SHA-1. The draft minutes Rich sent do  say:
"Remove SHA-1 deprecation from this document."

As we reckoned the above might be the case (as per
the comment in the version before adoption), I went
ahead and excised that bit for now. If the WG do
prefer to keep it in, I'm fine with that, of
course.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I guess those are draft minutes and we should
make sure this point is clear in 'em - I'll do that


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Always enforce peer certificate key usage (separation) for ECDSA. ECDSA ke=
ys=0A=
>are more brittle when misused.=0A=
=0A=
Since ECDSA can only do signing, isn't this a bit redundant?  In other word=
s=0A=
you can't really not enforce keyUsage for a signature-only algorithm.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> On Nov 8, 2018, at 5:27 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Always enforce peer certificate key usage (separation) for ECDSA. =
ECDSA keys
>> are more brittle when misused.
>=20
> Since ECDSA can only do signing, isn't this a bit redundant?  In other =
words
> you can't really not enforce keyUsage for a signature-only algorithm.

Well, ECDH keys (not really ECDSA) can do key agreement, and EC keys
can be used for encryption with ECIES.  In any case, it seems that
other libraries are already requiring digitalSignature in keyUsage
(when present) for ECDSA that don't yet do so for RSA, and I'm willing
to go along with that.  Trying to make a pragmatic choice...

--=20
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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--0000000000004469b9057a3012ee
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I think I have implied that ClientHello is unneccesary to an extent, it can
be replaced by a DNS TXT record.

I think I implied that self-signed certificates are acceptable given the
precedent of Let=E2=80=99s Encrypt and the use of DNSSEC (has there been ev=
idence
of DNS spoofing attacks against a CA?).

I think my suggestion has the implication that protocol negotiation is
unnecessary, although it can be kept.

I think my suggestion would have automatic backwards compatibility. A TLS
1.2-only client (likely to be found in regulated sectors that requires
middlebox inspection and decryption) would attempt to connect using port
443, while my proposed protocol would attempt to look up using DNS first to
obtain DNS records relevant. By using separate ports for each new protocol,
it maintains a greater level of cross-compatibility and allows for future
development.

These compounded extensions make the protocol less secure by making it
harder to implement, particularly given the recent spate of attacks against
unintuitively implemented state machines for key negotiation.

The entire protocol should be removed and replaced by something far simpler=
.

Is this sufficiently specific?

I hope in the future, the IETF TLS working group will reach out to
middlebox designers to understand what they are exactly doing to TLS so
that these things won=E2=80=99t be unexpected.

I must also say that CBC isn=E2=80=99t bad, as long as the padding is consi=
dered to
be part of the message to be authenticated.

On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> *>*Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex.
>
>
>
> What makes you say that?  Please be specific about what you think should
> be taken out.
>
>
>

--0000000000004469b9057a3012ee
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I think I have implied that ClientHello is unneccesary to an extent, it can=
 be replaced by a DNS TXT record.<div><br></div><div>I think I implied that=
 self-signed certificates are acceptable given the precedent of Let=E2=80=
=99s Encrypt and the use of DNSSEC (has there been evidence of DNS spoofing=
 attacks against a CA?).</div><div><br></div><div>I think my suggestion has=
 the implication that protocol negotiation is unnecessary, although it can =
be kept.</div><div><br></div><div>I think my suggestion would have automati=
c backwards compatibility. A TLS 1.2-only client (likely to be found in reg=
ulated sectors that requires middlebox inspection and decryption) would att=
empt to connect using port 443, while my proposed protocol would attempt to=
 look up using DNS first to obtain DNS records relevant. By using separate =
ports for each new protocol, it maintains a greater level of cross-compatib=
ility and allows for future development.</div><div><br></div><div>These com=
pounded extensions make the protocol less secure by making it harder to imp=
lement, particularly given the recent spate of attacks against unintuitivel=
y implemented state machines for key negotiation.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>The entire protocol should be removed and replaced by something far s=
impler.</div><div><br></div><div>Is this sufficiently specific?</div><div><=
br></div><div>I hope in the future, the IETF TLS working group will reach o=
ut to middlebox designers to understand what they are exactly doing to TLS =
so that these things won=E2=80=99t be unexpected.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>I must also say that CBC isn=E2=80=99t bad, as long as the padding is=
 considered to be part of the message to be authenticated.</div><div><br>On=
 Thursday, November 8, 2018, Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.=
com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">&gt;</span></b>H=
mm. TLS has gotten too complex.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">What makes you say that?=C2=A0 Please be specific ab=
out what you think should be taken out.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 17:04:10 -0800
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Hi Ryan,

Thanks for your comments.

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 12:44 AM Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Maybe
> we should ask Google.
>
> The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.
>
> This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be
> placed in a DNS TXT record.
>

There's actually an RFC for this: https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=6968.
Unfortunately, it is not really a viable option for replacing the WebPKI
for TLS for two reasons:

1. A nontrivial number of network elements will not correctly pass DNSSEC,
and so attempting to use it will cause failures.
2. Essentially all clients and servers only support WebPKI authentication,
so at least for existing applications (such as the Web), endpoints will
need to support WebPKI for a very long time.

There are some specific applications that could potentially use this
method, but that's not going to work for most applications. It's also worth
noting that in practice, many sites are served on multiple CDNs which do
not share keying material. This is a real unsolved problem for Encrypted
SNI and would also likely be a problem if the keys in question were
endpoint keys.


In another DNS TXT record, a list of supported protocols could be listed.
> A DNS SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a
> service, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a
> domain and after chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains
> was unimportant. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.
>

This is an orthogonal question to TLS, I believe. However, in general at
least the Web community has decided that it's not excited about SRV.
However, at least on the Web, the reason for the ubiquity of 443 isn't the
inability to indicate the right port in the URL (which has a slot for
this), but rather that other ports than 443 have much lower middlebox
penetration rates.


Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072,
> and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.
>

This is a fairly surprising proposed set of ciphers, given that the
Internet seems to be rapidly moving towards elliptic curve. This proposal
would certainly have very significantly worse computationsl performance
than the mandatory TLS 1.3 ciphers.


And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by using the timer
> entropy daemon for one second (and which would in theory provide enough
> entropy for perpetuity).
>

This also seems out of scope for TLS.

-Ekr

--0000000000000560fb057a30f0f8
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Ryan,</div><div><br></div><div>Th=
anks for your comments.</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 12:44 AM Ryan Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:ryacko@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ryacko@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hmm. TLS has gotte=
n too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Maybe we should ask Goog=
le.<div><br></div><div>The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificat=
e hash could be placed in a DNS TXT record.</div></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>There&#39;s actually an RFC for this: <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.=
org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D6968" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarku=
p?doc=3D6968</a>. Unfortunately, it is not really a viable option for repla=
cing the WebPKI for TLS for two reasons:</div><div><br></div><div>1. A nont=
rivial number of network elements will not correctly pass DNSSEC, and so at=
tempting to use it will cause failures.</div><div>2. Essentially all client=
s and servers only support WebPKI authentication, so at least for existing =
applications (such as the Web), endpoints will need to support WebPKI for a=
 very long time. <br></div><div><br></div><div>There are some specific appl=
ications that could potentially use this method, but that&#39;s not going t=
o work for most applications. It&#39;s also worth noting that in practice, =
many sites are served on multiple CDNs which do not share keying material. =
This is a real unsolved problem for Encrypted SNI and would also likely be =
a problem if the keys in question were endpoint keys.</div><div><br></div><=
div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div> In an=
other DNS TXT record, a list of supported protocols could be listed.</div><=
div>A DNS SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a=
 service, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a doma=
in and after chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains was u=
nimportant. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.</div><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is an orthogonal question to TLS, I be=
lieve. However, in general at least the Web community has decided that it&#=
39;s not excited about SRV. However, at least on the Web, the reason for th=
e ubiquity of 443 isn&#39;t the inability to indicate the right port in the=
 URL (which has a slot for this), but rather that other ports than 443 have=
 much lower middlebox penetration rates.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>Although, to be=
 radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072, and SHAKE-128 as=
 AEAD.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is a fairly surprising pr=
oposed set of ciphers, given that the Internet seems to be rapidly moving t=
owards elliptic curve. This proposal would certainly have very significantl=
y worse computationsl performance than the mandatory TLS 1.3 ciphers.<br></=
div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><div>And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by =
using the timer entropy daemon for one second (and which would in theory pr=
ovide enough entropy for perpetuity).</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>This also seems out of scope for TLS.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><=
/div></div></div>

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> On Nov 8, 2018, at 4:34 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> What makes you say that?  Please be specific about what you think =
should be taken out.

One example area where the complexity is noticeably high:

 * Certificate selection metadata specificity seems to far exceed
   plausible diversity of choice on the peer end.  Are there
   really clients or servers out there with so many different
   certificates to choose from that we need:

	a.  CA name hints from client to server?
	b.  OID filters in the certificate request from server to =
client?
	c.  signature_algorithms_cert (TLS -> X.509 layer violation, I
            just ignore this one)?

    In TLS 1.2 the signature_algorithms extension needs to be combined
    with the certificate types list, and neither 5246 or 4492 provides
    a means for the client to decide which curves the server supports
    in the client certificate (addressed in TLS 1.3).

TLS 1.2 has fixed-(EC)DH ciphersuites that should probably never have
been defined, and for some unknown reason added MD5 as a valid signature
algorithm hash, even though MD5 had already reached its use-by date...

For simplicity, I am a fan of Mike Hamburg's STROBE (a protocol design
framework, not a finished protocol):

   https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/003

of course one still needs to plug in some sort of PKI to get
a complete system, but it robustly unifies many things that in
TLS need to be built with one's bare hands.  I do hope that
STROBE is getting used somewhere, and not just languishing as
a paper design.

--=20
--=20
	Viktor.


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On 8 Nov 2018, at 08:44, Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could =
be placed in a DNS TXT record.

This is a bad idea.

Overloading TXT records with special semantics rarely, if ever, has a =
happy ending. For instance application software would need to somehow =
work out which of the TXT records for some domain name was your =
hypothetical hash and which were SPF strings or whatever else has been =
dumped into TXT records.

If you need to put this hash in the DNS, you might as well get a type =
code assigned for a specifc RR to do that.


From nobody Thu Nov  8 18:31:34 2018
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Subject: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>  It's also worth noting that in practice, many sites are served on
> multiple CDNs which do not share keying material.
>
>
Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for cryptography. The
files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subresource integrity.
If you are sharing the same data to multiple second parties to serve to a
single third party, the value of encryption is less than zero.


This could create a long drawn out argument which may prove that it is
impossible to change anything about TLS as it has reached a point where too
many people are doing too many things to it, that is outside any original
or rational design.

In any case, Eric, you inadvertently contradict yourself. The whole point
of WebPKI is to certify trust, and has been an issue over the years. But
CDNs act as a intermediary between the creator of the content and the end
user. CDNs do not have as strict requirements as do CAs in terms of
auditing, and have their own issues outside the scope of this conversation.

Like I said, this could go on forever, I=E2=80=99m just making one point, y=
ou
people have made a protocol does very little of what one should expect it
should do, and the internet has evolved to be some sort of non functioning
system, the best example of which would be that everyone has forgotten what
URI standards are supposed to be about.

In any case, TLS 1.3 won=E2=80=99t reach widespread adoption for another fe=
w years,
and any subsequent protocol (independent of Google=E2=80=99s worldwide lab
experiment) won=E2=80=99t be finalized for five years, and depending on how=
 radical
it is, won=E2=80=99t achieve mass adoption for four to fifteen years.

By which point layer 2 protocols might allow for IPv6 jumbo packets to be
used.

--000000000000149d25057a32265b
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<div>On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr=
@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;=
border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>=C2=A0It&#39;s also worth noting t=
hat in practice, many sites are served on multiple CDNs which do not share =
keying material.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div><=
div><br></div><div>Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for =
cryptography. The files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subr=
esource integrity. If you are sharing the same data to multiple second part=
ies to serve to a single third party, the value of encryption is less than =
zero.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>This could create a long draw=
n out argument which may prove that it is impossible to change anything abo=
ut TLS as it has reached a point where too many people are doing too many t=
hings to it, that is outside any original or rational design.</div><div><br=
></div><div>In any case, Eric, you inadvertently contradict yourself. The w=
hole point of WebPKI is to certify trust, and has been an issue over the ye=
ars. But CDNs act as a intermediary between the creator of the content and =
the end user. CDNs do not have as strict requirements as do CAs in terms of=
 auditing, and have their own issues outside the scope of this conversation=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Like I said, this could go on forever, I=E2=80=
=99m just making one point, you people have made a protocol does very littl=
e of what one should expect it should do, and the internet has evolved to b=
e some sort of non functioning system, the best example of which would be t=
hat everyone has forgotten what URI standards are supposed to be about.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>In any case, TLS 1.3 won=E2=80=99t reach widespread a=
doption for another few years, and any subsequent protocol (independent of =
Google=E2=80=99s worldwide lab experiment) won=E2=80=99t be finalized for f=
ive years, and depending on how radical it is, won=E2=80=99t achieve mass a=
doption for four to fifteen years.</div><div><br></div><div>By which point =
layer 2 protocols might allow for IPv6 jumbo packets to be used.</div>

--000000000000149d25057a32265b--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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References: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1811081128260.22244@bofh.nohats.ca> <20181108172134.GE9067@localhost>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, tls@ietf.org, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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> On Nov 9, 2018, at 00:21, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Thu, Nov 08, 2018 at 11:49:45AM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
>> I wanted to thank Ben for the outreach he did in the last six months =
on
>> the tls dnssec chain extension. It has been a difficult issue and I =
do
>> wish the outcome was different. But during this time Ben put a lot of
>> effort in trying to get the issues clarified and resolved both on the
>> list of offlist. He repeatedly tried to engage more people of the WG
>> and he made me feel that my opinions were not ignored.
>>=20
>> I am going to think a bit more on how we as IETF could have done =
better
>> in this case, but I did want to share with the group that I think Ben
>> made a real difference in trying to get this document out.
>>=20
>> Thanks Ben!
>=20
> I'd like to second this.

I would like to thank Ben as well.  He has done an exemplar job as AD.

I would also like to thank my co-chairs Chris and Joe.  Both Chris and =
Joe participated in a side meeting at IETF 102 as well as the virtual =
interim in September solely dedicated to this draft.

> I'd also like to state a mea culpa.  I did not understand the extent =
to
> which this controversy would become a DoS on the WG.  Perhaps it would
> have been better to not get involved and then later publish a better
> version of the extension.  I can't be sure, but certainly avoiding =
that
> large exchange of email would have been better.

As co-chair, I feel like I have not done the greatest job during this =
effort, as I noted at the mic at IETF 103.  I will repeat what I said at =
the mic - this was not my/our finest hour.

The chairs are trying to learn from our mistakes.  We are planning to =
have post mortem discussion with our AD as soon as reasonably possible =
to learn for our mistakes. If anyone wants to provide feedback please do =
so either directly to Ben (mailto:kaduk@MIT.EDU), us =
(mailto:tls-chairs@ietf.org), the IETF chair (mailto:chair@ietf.org), or =
the ombudsteam (see https://www.ietf.org/contact/ombudsteam/).

spt=


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Subject: [TLS] dropping draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension as WG item
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At IETF103, the WG considered the way forward for =
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension.  Based on the attempts at =
discussion on the list and the sense in the room, the chairs believe =
that there is no longer interest in continuing work on =
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension as a WG document.  The chairs will =
be dropping it as a WG item soon.=20

To be clear, work on delivering DNSSEC records via a TLS extension can =
continue.  The authors and/or others are free to progress this draft =
through other avenues or not to obtain IANA code points (see [0]).=20

spt

[0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8447/=


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 18:51:49 -0800
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To: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 6:31 PM Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>  It's also worth noting that in practice, many sites are served on
>> multiple CDNs which do not share keying material.
>>
>>
> Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for cryptography. The
> files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subresource integrit=
y.
> If you are sharing the same data to multiple second parties to serve to a
> single third party, the value of encryption is less than zero.
>

I believe you are misunderstanding me. The issue is not about
confidentiality of the records but about correctness.

Consider the case where example.com which is hosted on two CDNs, X and Y. X
and Y have different private keys (for the reasons you indicate) as well as
different crypto configurations. The client does an A/AAAA lookup for
example.com and gets an A for X and then does a TXT lookup for example.com
and gets the TXT for Y. This creates failures. We've spent quite a while
working on this problem for ESNI and there aren't a lot of great answers
right now. It seems like your proposal would suffer from the same issue.


In any case, Eric, you inadvertently contradict yourself. The whole point
> of WebPKI is to certify trust, and has been an issue over the years. But
> CDNs act as a intermediary between the creator of the content and the end
> user. CDNs do not have as strict requirements as do CAs in terms of
> auditing, and have their own issues outside the scope of this conversatio=
n.
>

Well, I agree that this is out of scope, but the guarantees that the WebPKI
claims to enforce (at least for DV) is effective control of the domain
name, and a CDN acts as the origin server for a given domain and hence
effectively controls it. I appreciate that many people don't like this, but
it's essentially the only design that's consistent with having the CDN act
for the origin, which is at present basically essential for good
performance.


In any case, TLS 1.3 won=E2=80=99t reach widespread adoption for another fe=
w years,
>

I don't know what you consider "widespread", but presently both Chrome and
Firefox support TLS 1.3, and our data shows that about 5% of Firefox
connections use TLS 1.3. Chrome's numbers are similar and the numbers from
the server side perspective are higher (last time I checked, Facebook was
reporting > 50% TLS 1.3).

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Nov 8, 2018 at 6:31 PM Ryan Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.co=
m">ryacko@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div>On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr=
@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;=
border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>=C2=A0It&#39;s also worth noting t=
hat in practice, many sites are served on multiple CDNs which do not share =
keying material.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div><=
div><br></div><div>Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for =
cryptography. The files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subr=
esource integrity. If you are sharing the same data to multiple second part=
ies to serve to a single third party, the value of encryption is less than =
zero.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe you are misunderstand=
ing me. The issue is not about confidentiality of the records but about cor=
rectness.</div><div><br></div><div>Consider the case where <a href=3D"http:=
//example.com">example.com</a> which is hosted on two CDNs, X and Y. X and =
Y have different private keys (for the reasons you indicate) as well as dif=
ferent crypto configurations. The client does an A/AAAA lookup for <a href=
=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> and gets an A for X and then does a=
 TXT lookup for <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> and gets the=
 TXT for Y. This creates failures. We&#39;ve spent quite a while working on=
 this problem for ESNI and there aren&#39;t a lot of great answers right no=
w. It seems like your proposal would suffer from the same issue.<br></div><=
div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>In any cas=
e, Eric, you inadvertently contradict yourself. The whole point of WebPKI i=
s to certify trust, and has been an issue over the years. But CDNs act as a=
 intermediary between the creator of the content and the end user. CDNs do =
not have as strict requirements as do CAs in terms of auditing, and have th=
eir own issues outside the scope of this conversation.</div></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Well, I agree that this is out of scope, but the guarante=
es that the WebPKI claims to enforce (at least for DV) is effective control=
 of the domain name, and a CDN acts as the origin server for a given domain=
 and hence effectively controls it. I appreciate that many people don&#39;t=
 like this, but it&#39;s essentially the only design that&#39;s consistent =
with having the CDN act for the origin, which is at present basically essen=
tial for good performance.</div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex"><div>In any case, TLS 1.3 won=E2=80=99t reach widespread=
 adoption for another few years, </div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I d=
on&#39;t know what you consider &quot;widespread&quot;, but presently both =
Chrome and Firefox support TLS 1.3, and our data shows that about 5% of Fir=
efox connections use TLS 1.3. Chrome&#39;s numbers are similar and the numb=
ers from the server side perspective are higher (last time I checked, Faceb=
ook was reporting &gt; 50% TLS 1.3).<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div=
><div><br></div><br></div></div>

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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 09:53:23 +0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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Hello,

=D0=BF=D1=82, 9 =D0=BD=D0=BE=D1=8F=D0=B1. 2018 =D0=B3., 7:03 Ryan Carboni r=
yacko@gmail.com:

> I think I have implied that ClientHello is unneccesary to an extent, it
> can be replaced by a DNS TXT record.
>
> I think I implied that self-signed certificates are acceptable given the
> precedent of Let=E2=80=99s Encrypt and the use of DNSSEC (has there been =
evidence
> of DNS spoofing attacks against a CA?).
>

Sure.
At least this proof-of-concept one.

https://blog.powerdns.com/2018/09/10/spoofing-dns-with-fragments/

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div>Hello,=C2=A0<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">=D0=BF=D1=82, 9 =D0=BD=D0=BE=D1=8F=D0=B1. 2018 =D0=B3., 7:03 Ry=
an Carboni <a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.com">ryacko@gmail.com</a>:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I think I have implied that ClientHello i=
s unneccesary to an extent, it can be replaced by a DNS TXT record.<div><br=
></div><div>I think I implied that self-signed certificates are acceptable =
given the precedent of Let=E2=80=99s Encrypt and the use of DNSSEC (has the=
re been evidence of DNS spoofing attacks against a CA?).</div></blockquote>=
</div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Sure.=C2=A0</div>=
<div dir=3D"auto">At least this proof-of-concept one.=C2=A0</div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><a href=3D"https://blog.powerdns.com/=
2018/09/10/spoofing-dns-with-fragments/">https://blog.powerdns.com/2018/09/=
10/spoofing-dns-with-fragments/</a></div></div>

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 10:41:14 +0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 2:20 AM Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> On 08/11/2018 17:21, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > what was the rationale for dropping the section about deprecating SHA-1 in TLS
> > 1.2? I see nothing in minutes from IETF103.
>
> I asked during the presentation if the WG wanted to
> keep it or not, as it's clearly not quite the same
> as the rest of the document. The limited feedback in
> the room was that it'd be better to not include this
> here but to do it elsewhere, [...]

This is my understanding also, and I would support that plan.  The
question of versions is enough different that I think that it will
progress on a different timescale.


From nobody Thu Nov  8 19:46:20 2018
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> On Nov 8, 2018, at 9:51 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> I don't know what you consider "widespread", but presently both Chrome =
and Firefox support TLS 1.3, and our data shows that about 5% of Firefox =
connections use TLS 1.3. Chrome's numbers are similar and the numbers =
from the server side perspective are higher (last time I checked, =
Facebook was reporting > 50% TLS 1.3).

Even my SMTP submission server is seeing its fair share of TLS 1.3
connections, from the iPhones of some of its users...

The long tail of TLS 1.2 will persist for quite some time, but TLS
1.3 adoption ramp-up is happening.

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Thu Nov  8 20:17:08 2018
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key
        Author          : Russ Housley
	Filename        : draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03.txt
	Pages           : 10
	Date            : 2018-11-08

Abstract:
   This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
   authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-
   shared key (PSK).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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--000000000000374afb057a33e121
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Minutes from both meetings this week are now posted:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-103-tls/

Please send any updates or corrections to the list. And thanks to Rich,
Mike, and Matt for lending a hand!

Best,
Chris

--000000000000374afb057a33e121
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<div dir=3D"auto">Minutes from both meetings this week are now posted:=C2=
=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-103-tls/">https://datatracker.=
ietf.org/doc/minutes-103-tls/</a><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div=
 dir=3D"auto">Please send any updates or corrections to the list. And thank=
s to Rich, Mike, and Matt for lending a hand!</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></=
div><div dir=3D"auto">Best,</div><div dir=3D"auto">Chris</div>

--000000000000374afb057a33e121--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 06:19:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Well, ECDH keys (not really ECDSA) can do key agreement, and EC keys can b=
e=0A=
>used for encryption with ECIES.=0A=
=0A=
Sure, in theory, but in practice I've never seen an (EC)DH cert used in TLS=
=0A=
(despite actively looking for one, since it'd be a collectors item for the=
=0A=
cert collection [0]), and I doubt most implementations could even deal with=
=0A=
one if they saw one.  Also, I don't think any TLS implementation, or=0A=
specification, does ECIES.  So it's pretty much self-regulating...=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
=0A=
[0] I know some test certs were generated about 20 years ago to demonstrate=
=0A=
    X9.42 use in S/MIME, but that's all I'm aware of.=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> On Nov 9, 2018, at 1:19 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>=20
>> Well, ECDH keys (not really ECDSA) can do key agreement, and EC keys =
can be
>> used for encryption with ECIES.
>=20
> Sure, in theory, but in practice I've never seen an (EC)DH cert used =
in TLS
> (despite actively looking for one,

Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers =
into
TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.

> since it'd be a collectors item for the
> cert collection [0]), and I doubt most implementations could even deal =
with
> one if they saw one.  Also, I don't think any TLS implementation, or
> specification, does ECIES.  So it's pretty much self-regulating...

And yet I guess the possibility exists that some poor slob deploys a TLS =
server
with an exotic EC key, that's supposed to be used for fixed-ECDH or CMS =
key
envelopment.  Does that risk key compromise given how fragile EC =
signatures
when misused?

I guess I am willing to risk failing a tiny fraction of handshakes in =
this
case; and rumour has it I'd have some company, so the Haskell TLS =
library
(where I'm helping the maintainers at the moment) won't stand out from =
the
pack in being overly strict wrt. ECDSA keyUsage.

The idea is to actually relax the rules a bit from what they've recently
become, as based on the specs they're presently a bit too strict, and I
am trying to dial them back to more practical choices.  If you think =
that
ECDSA keyUsage enforcement does more harm than good, I could reconsider,
but I am inclined to be more cautious with EC than with RSA.

--=20
--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 19:26:21 +0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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Hi David,

I couldn't find any description of the threat model involved here, nor
could I find any analysis of the security against that model.  Without
that, I can't really say whether this is right or not.  For instance,
there is specific mention of the certificate status request extension,
but there is no mention of why.

Given the configuration that I might infer from the hmac draft, I'm a
little surprised that this doesn't use PSK.

I'm somewhat dismayed by the firm recommendation to use the HMAC
mechanism, which doesn't seem particularly robust.  Offhand, it seems
like replays are possible if you allow the possibility of the node
crashing and dumping state.  The same applies during a rollover of the
32-bit counter.  Of course, that might not be permitted by the threat
model.
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 9:15 AM David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel with DTLS:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01
>
> It's 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick read and let us know if we're using DTLS correctly?
>
> Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version to use?
>
> Thanks,
> David
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On 2018-11-08 20:41 -0500, Jim Reid wrote:
> On 8 Nov 2018, at 08:44, Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be placed in a DNS TXT record.

[..]

> If you need to put this hash in the DNS, you might as well get a type code assigned for a specifc RR to do that.

Which is exactly what TLSA records are for (RFC 6698), and its type 3:

3 -- Certificate usage 3 is used to specify a certificate, or the
       public key of such a certificate, that MUST match the end entity
       certificate given by the server in TLS.  This certificate usage is
       sometimes referred to as "domain-issued certificate" because it
       allows for a domain name administrator to issue certificates for a
       domain without involving a third-party CA.  The target certificate
       MUST match the TLSA record.  The difference between certificate
       usage 1 and certificate usage 3 is that certificate usage 1
       requires that the certificate pass PKIX validation, but PKIX
       validation is not tested for certificate usage 3.
-- 
Patrick Mevzek


From nobody Fri Nov  9 08:11:04 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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> I'm somewhat dismayed by the firm recommendation to use the HMAC
> mechanism,

Yeah, this could probably be loosened somewhat.

> which doesn't seem particularly robust.

It's designed to be fairly robust.  Of course, we may have done things
wrong.

> Offhand, it seems like replays are possible if you allow the possibility
> of the node crashing and dumping state.

Unless I've missed something -- they are not, assuming you have
a sufficiently strong random number generator.  The challenge mechanism
rebuilds the shared state in a secure manner, and the index mechanism
ensures that an (index, seqno) pair is never reused.

> The same applies during a rollover of the 32-bit counter.

You generate a new index when the counter overflows, and send a new
challenge.  First point of Section 4.2 of the HMAC draft.

-- Juliusz


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> On 9 Nov 2018, at 13:40, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> =
wrote:
>=20
>> On Nov 9, 2018, at 1:19 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> Well, ECDH keys (not really ECDSA) can do key agreement, and EC keys =
can be
>>> used for encryption with ECIES.
>>=20
>> Sure, in theory, but in practice I've never seen an (EC)DH cert used =
in TLS
>> (despite actively looking for one,
>=20
> Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers =
into
> TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.

FWIW RFC 8422 also deprecates them for TLS 1.2 and earlier.

Yoav=


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> On Nov 9, 2018, at 11:52 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers into
>> TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.
> 
> FWIW RFC 8422 also deprecates them for TLS 1.2 and earlier.

Great!  Thanks.  I see that in:

   5.5.  Certificate Request

   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422#section-5.5

Mind you, as that text is in the context of "Certificate Request" some
might not read to understand that they're also deprecated for the server
certificate, but we can hope that'll be understood implicitly.

-- 
	Viktor.


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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 10:20:01 -0800
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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Okay, a modern browser connecting to a server owned by billion dollar
corporations are able to implement the latest version of TLS, I=E2=80=99ll =
concede
that. Regardless, I can only underline one point: any new protocol needs to
break both compatibility and be downgradable, and require a small amount of
code. It probably wasn=E2=80=99t wrong for the average browser implementati=
on to
downgrade upon connection failure before, it certainly seem more sound than
any gritty details of recent protocol design.

Furthermore, TLS 1.2 is perfectly fine, and so is TLS 1.3 by everyone=E2=80=
=99s
statements. If so, a new protocol has no need to quickly replace either one
of them, but instead have a high likelihood of being superior and simpler,
and performs better according to current design of the internet.

And possibly list recommendations for how out of scope issues could be
resolved in a subsection for the inevitable RFC describing it. Boot entropy
can be solved by increasing boot times by one second. Reminders of various
Javascript functions to ensure authenticity. Etc.

Google=E2=80=99s idea to rush out experimental protocols looks disgusting t=
o me.

--00000000000056e5de057a3f66e7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Okay, a modern browser connecting to a server owned by billion dollar corpo=
rations are able to implement the latest version of TLS, I=E2=80=99ll conce=
de that. Regardless, I can only underline one point: any new protocol needs=
 to break both compatibility and be downgradable, and require a small amoun=
t of code. It probably wasn=E2=80=99t wrong for the average browser impleme=
ntation to downgrade upon connection failure before, it certainly seem more=
 sound than any gritty details of recent protocol design.=C2=A0<div><br></d=
iv><div>Furthermore, TLS 1.2 is perfectly fine, and so is TLS 1.3 by everyo=
ne=E2=80=99s statements. If so, a new protocol has no need to quickly repla=
ce either one of them, but instead have a high likelihood of being superior=
 and simpler, and performs better according to current design of the intern=
et.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>And possibly list recommendations for ho=
w out of scope issues could be resolved in a subsection for the inevitable =
RFC describing it. Boot entropy can be solved by increasing boot times by o=
ne second. Reminders of various Javascript functions to ensure authenticity=
. Etc.</div><div><br></div><div>Google=E2=80=99s idea to rush out experimen=
tal protocols looks disgusting to me.</div>

--00000000000056e5de057a3f66e7--


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From: Eric Mill <eric@konklone.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 15:39:25 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 9:31 PM Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>  It's also worth noting that in practice, many sites are served on
>> multiple CDNs which do not share keying material.
>>
>
> Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for cryptography. The
> files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subresource integrity.
> If you are sharing the same data to multiple second parties to serve to a
> single third party, the value of encryption is less than zero.
>

This misunderstands the utility and deployability of SRI. SRI is based on
hashing data exactly, and so sites can only practically use it for files
that do not change (e.g. jQuery x.y.z) and not services that do change
(e.g. an analytics service, or really any live service). Encryption in
transit for public files, between services operated by separate entities,
is a practical necessity to preserve integrity.

--00000000000005e105057a415b7b
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Nov 8, 2018 at 9:31 PM Ryan Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.co=
m">ryacko@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<div>On Thursday, November 8, 2018, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr=
@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;=
border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>=C2=A0It&#39;s also worth noting t=
hat in practice, many sites are served on multiple CDNs which do not share =
keying material.=C2=A0</div></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><=
div>Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for cryptography. T=
he files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subresource integri=
ty. If you are sharing the same data to multiple second parties to serve to=
 a single third party, the value of encryption is less than zero.</div></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>This misunderstands the utility and deployabil=
ity of SRI. SRI is based on hashing data exactly, and so sites can only pra=
ctically use it for files that do not change (e.g. jQuery x.y.z) and not se=
rvices that do change (e.g. an analytics service, or really any live servic=
e). Encryption in transit for public files, between services operated by se=
parate entities, is a practical necessity to preserve integrity.</div></div=
></div>

--00000000000005e105057a415b7b--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2018 02:29:59 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 10:20 AM Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> Okay, a modern browser connecting to a server owned by billion dollar
> corporations are able to implement the latest version of TLS, I=E2=80=99l=
l concede
> that. Regardless, I can only underline one point: any new protocol needs =
to
> break both compatibility and be downgradable, and require a small amount =
of
> code. It probably wasn=E2=80=99t wrong for the average browser implementa=
tion to
> downgrade upon connection failure before, it certainly seem more sound th=
an
> any gritty details of recent protocol design.
>
> Furthermore, TLS 1.2 is perfectly fine, and so is TLS 1.3 by everyone=E2=
=80=99s
> statements. If so, a new protocol has no need to quickly replace either o=
ne
> of them, but instead have a high likelihood of being superior and simpler=
,
> and performs better according to current design of the internet.
>

This thread seems like it has drifted afield of the TLS WG, which is
chartered to work on TLS.

-Ekr

And possibly list recommendations for how out of scope issues could be
> resolved in a subsection for the inevitable RFC describing it. Boot entro=
py
> can be solved by increasing boot times by one second. Reminders of variou=
s
> Javascript functions to ensure authenticity. Etc.
>
> Google=E2=80=99s idea to rush out experimental protocols looks disgusting=
 to me.
>

--000000000000642d62057a4cf59d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 10:20 AM Ryan Carb=
oni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ryacko@gmail.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex">Okay, a modern browser connecting to a server owned by bill=
ion dollar corporations are able to implement the latest version of TLS, I=
=E2=80=99ll concede that. Regardless, I can only underline one point: any n=
ew protocol needs to break both compatibility and be downgradable, and requ=
ire a small amount of code. It probably wasn=E2=80=99t wrong for the averag=
e browser implementation to downgrade upon connection failure before, it ce=
rtainly seem more sound than any gritty details of recent protocol design.=
=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>Furthermore, TLS 1.2 is perfectly fine, and so is=
 TLS 1.3 by everyone=E2=80=99s statements. If so, a new protocol has no nee=
d to quickly replace either one of them, but instead have a high likelihood=
 of being superior and simpler, and performs better according to current de=
sign of the internet.=C2=A0</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This thre=
ad seems like it has drifted afield of the TLS WG, which is chartered to wo=
rk on TLS.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div>And possibly list recommendations for how out of =
scope issues could be resolved in a subsection for the inevitable RFC descr=
ibing it. Boot entropy can be solved by increasing boot times by one second=
. Reminders of various Javascript functions to ensure authenticity. Etc.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Google=E2=80=99s idea to rush out experimental proto=
cols looks disgusting to me.</div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--000000000000642d62057a4cf59d--


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 07:57:16 +0700
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On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 11:10 PM Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr> wrote:
> > Offhand, it seems like replays are possible if you allow the possibility
> > of the node crashing and dumping state.
>
> Unless I've missed something -- they are not, assuming you have
> a sufficiently strong random number generator.  The challenge mechanism
> rebuilds the shared state in a secure manner, and the index mechanism
> ensures that an (index, seqno) pair is never reused.

I had a really hard time understanding this, even with this help.
Right now, I don't know what key is used for HMAC.  I think that the
expectation is that each peer has a fixed HMAC key, but the contents
of the packet always change, thereby ensuring that the resulting MAC
is different for every packet.

Given how non-intuitive this whole thing is, I would suggest that a
formal analysis would be a good idea.  Or you could just use DTLS and
get things like post compromise security and nice things like that.


From nobody Mon Nov 12 01:45:27 2018
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From: Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com>
To: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Victor,

> Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers into
> TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.

Can you please explain to me the problem with (EC)DH ciphers? If it's the
lack of forward secrecy, then I understand. If there are other problems, =

then I would be keen to understand them.

Thanks,
Tony


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From nobody Mon Nov 12 05:57:14 2018
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> On Nov 12, 2018, at 4:45 AM, Tony Putman <Tony.Putman@dyson.com> wrote:
> 
> Can you please explain to me the problem with (EC)DH ciphers? If it's the
> lack of forward secrecy, then I understand. If there are other problems, 
> then I would be keen to understand them.

As much as it was lack of forward-secrecy, it was unnecessary bloat.
Few if any users actually needed these, and they did not get used.

The question is not so much what problem they introduced, but rather
what problem they were supposed to solve, and whether that problem
warranted the added complexity in the protocol.  I think we've had
the answer for some time now...

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Mon Nov 12 06:15:53 2018
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On Thu 2018-11-08 18:31:28 -0800, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> Encrypting common knowledge is cargo cult fetishism for cryptography. The
> files could be sent unencrypted, and protected using subresource integrity.
> If you are sharing the same data to multiple second parties to serve to a
> single third party, the value of encryption is less than zero.

I agree that the widespread move to CDNs makes those CDNs a point of
vulnerability and potential compromise.

But from a harm reduction point of view, encrypting data that transits a
CDN does protect that traffic from surveillance by non-CDN network-based
adversaries.

There is more research and development work to be done to make that
protection even more robust: anti-traffic analysis work, for example.
But simply reverting to cleartext would be a mistake.

Ryan, your posts in this thread suggest an understandable frustration
with cryptographic deployment on the public Internet, and perhaps an
even more understandable frustration with cryptographic *deprecation* on
the public Internet.  However, the web suffers from the same two
problems as much of the public Internet: the curse of the deployed base,
and a small but non-negligible fraction of confused, interfering
middleboxes.

I love proposals that happily ignore these problems, because they tend
to be elegant, and more often correct than janky old stuff!  But, if we
want our protocol designs to actually eventually replace old, worse
protocol designs, we need to look at deployment/upgrade/deprecation
paths, which involves a *lot* of ugliness -- the main job of the TLS WG,
afaict.  Otherwise, our beautiful new designs will get rolled out, and
will simply co-exist alongside the old brokenness :/

     --dkg


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 11:15:53 -0800
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To: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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--00000000000044e4d4057a7c8820
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Ryan, I'm having trouble finding anything you suggest which isn't
significantly inferior to what's in TLS 1.3 at best, or bewilderingly
confused at worst.

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 12:44 AM Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Mayb=
e
> we should ask Google.
> The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.
>

The cryptography employed by the X.509 PKI is substantially more modern
than what's in DNSSEC. Much of DNSSEC's security comes down to 1024-bit or
1280-bit RSA ZSKs.

Furthermore DNSSEC deployment in general lags behind the X.509 PKI
significantly. In general attempts to bolster browser security with DNSSEC
have failed due to DNSSEC misconfigurations or outages.

Regardless, if your goal is to make TLS less complex, shifting from the
X.509 PKI to a DNSSEC/X.509 hybrid seems diametrically opposed to that
goal. And that's the best that you can do, as you can't just wish away the
X.509 PKI.

This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be
> placed in a DNS TXT record.
>

How about instead of that, DNS can be used to deliver a CT log inclusion
proof?

https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns/dra=
ft-ct-over-dns.md

Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072,
> and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.
>

Both RSA and traditional FFDH are difficult to implement in constant time
due to their use of bignums, making both notorious for side channel attacks=
.

Due to its reliance on large random primes, RSA key generation is fraught
with peril.

BB'98 is a recurring problem, and affects not just key encipherment but, in
conjunction with other bugs, also affects PKCS#1v1.5 signatures (e.g.
BERserk). At least TLS 1.3 adds PSS support, I guess.

Elliptic curve cryptography is faster, easier to implement in constant
time, and has comparatively trivial key generation.

For these reasons elliptic curve algorithms are preferred in modern
protocols. By sheer volume, we see many, many more attacks on RSA than we
do on ECC, and the attacks are mostly not novel, but the same sharp edges
coming back to haunt us over and over again. The surest way to avoid BB'98
is to stop using RSA.


> This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. The state of cyber security is a horri=
ble
> disappointment.
>

Your suggestions are not improvements, they are regressions, or simply do
not make sense.

--=20
Tony Arcieri

--00000000000044e4d4057a7c8820
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Ryan, I&#=
39;m having trouble finding anything you suggest which isn&#39;t significan=
tly inferior to what&#39;s in TLS 1.3 at best, or bewilderingly confused at=
 worst.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Nov 8, 201=
8 at 12:44 AM Ryan Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko@gmail.com">ryacko@g=
mail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex">Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol=
? Maybe we should ask Google.<div>The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exist=
s.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The cryptography employed by the X=
.509 PKI is substantially more modern than what&#39;s in DNSSEC. Much of DN=
SSEC&#39;s security comes down to 1024-bit or 1280-bit RSA ZSKs.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>Furthermore DNSSEC deployment in general lags behind the X.5=
09 PKI significantly. In general attempts to bolster browser security with =
DNSSEC have failed due to DNSSEC misconfigurations or outages.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>Regardless, if your goal is to make TLS less complex, shifting=
 from the X.509 PKI to a DNSSEC/X.509 hybrid seems diametrically opposed to=
 that goal. And that&#39;s the best that you can do, as you can&#39;t just =
wish away the X.509 PKI.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex"><div>This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the ce=
rtificate hash could be placed in a DNS TXT record.</div></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>How about instead of that, DNS can be used to deliver a CT l=
og inclusion proof?</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/=
google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns/draft-ct-over-dns.md">=
https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns/dra=
ft-ct-over-dns.md</a><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div>Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-=
2048, ephemeral DH-3072, and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.<br></div></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>Both RSA and traditional FFDH are difficult to implement in =
constant time due to their use of bignums, making both notorious for side c=
hannel attacks.</div><div><br></div><div>Due to its reliance on large rando=
m primes, RSA key generation is fraught with peril.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>BB&#39;98 is a recurring problem, and affects not just key encipherment b=
ut, in conjunction with other bugs, also affects PKCS#1v1.5 signatures (e.g=
. BERserk). At least TLS 1.3 adds PSS support, I guess.</div><div><br></div=
><div>Elliptic curve cryptography is faster, easier to implement in constan=
t time, and has comparatively trivial key generation.</div><div><br></div><=
div>For these reasons elliptic curve algorithms are preferred in modern pro=
tocols. By sheer volume, we see many, many more attacks on RSA than we do o=
n ECC, and the attacks are mostly not novel, but the same sharp edges comin=
g back to haunt us over and over again. The surest way to avoid BB&#39;98 i=
s to stop using RSA.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex"><div>This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. The state of cybe=
r security is a horrible disappointment.</div></blockquote></div><div><br><=
/div><div>Your suggestions are not improvements, they are regressions, or s=
imply do not make sense.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D=
"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div></div>

--00000000000044e4d4057a7c8820--


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[ I agree that this thread is off topic for this WG, thus below
  just a short OT aside on some oft-repeated critiques of DNSSEC. ]

> On Nov 12, 2018, at 2:15 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> The cryptography employed by the X..509 PKI is substantially more =
modern than what's in DNSSEC. Much of DNSSEC's security comes down to =
1024-bit or 1280-bit RSA ZSKs.

It is true that while the KSKs tend to be 2048-bit RSA, ZSKs are =
typically
1024-bits or 1280-bits.

	http://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#keysize

That said, all the TLDs are using 2048-bit KSKs, and we're seeing
increasing adoption of ECDSA in DSSSEC:

	http://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#parameter

and the .CZ and .BR TLDs switched to ECDSA this year, and more will =
likely follow.

Furthermore, the weakest link in the chain for both WebPKI and DNSSEC is =
not the
cryptography.  Rather it is operational weaknesses in the enrollment =
processes.

For WebPKI, we basically have TOFU by the CA based on apparent =
unauthenticated
control of a TCP endpoint as the basis of certificate issuance, =
occasionally
strengthened via DNSSEC(!) validated CAA records and/or ACME challenges.

For DNSSEC, the domain administrator actually has login credentials at =
the
registrar, and domain control does not require a leap of faith, it is a
fundamental fact of the registrant/registrar bilateral relationship, =
there's
no third-party trying to bootstrap trust from indirect evidence.

What's more anyone who can compromise the registrar account and take =
over your
DNS can quickly obtain a WebPKI certificate as a trophy of their =
accomplishment. :-)

So the WebPKI picture isn't especially better, there pros and cons in =
each
space.

> Furthermore DNSSEC deployment in general lags behind the X.509 PKI =
significantly.
> In general attempts to bolster browser security with DNSSEC have =
failed due to
> DNSSEC misconfigurations or outages.

Certificate renewals are also botched from time to time, but we've not =
abandoned
the WebPKI.  The main barriers to DNSSEC are last-mile issues, and poor =
support
for DS record enrollment at some registrars.  Zone signing tools have =
been difficult
to use, but are much improved lately.

--=20
	Viktor.


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Thanks for the feedback Thomas! Responses inline.

On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:30 PM Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) <
thomas.fossati@nokia.com> wrote:

> One high level thing which I can't extrapolate from the draft (which is
> probably due to my ignorance with Babel) is whether you envisage that
> *every* node does DTLS on the unicast channel, IOW that non-DTLS nodes
> are excluded from the mesh?  Or would it be acceptable to mesh HMAC and
> DTLS neighbours?  What about clear-text speakers?  (It'd seem unwise to
> let them in an otherwise secured enclave.)
>

The main use-case would be that the entire mesh runs over DTLS and
cleartext nodes are excluded.
However, if a deployment has specific properties, one could configure this
per-interface:
a router could require DTLS over the Wi-Fi interface but allow non-DTLS on
the secure VPN
interface. That would allow cleartext speakers over VPN into the
DTLS-secured enclave,
but that should only be used by someone who wants that property. I've added
a subsection.


> You should probably provide some guidance about the kind of
> credentials do you plan to use (certs, raw pkeys)?
>

We actually don't currently have guidance to give, as it might depend on
the use-case.
For example, there will be a document specifying how HOMENET uses Babel
over DTLS,
and I suspect that document will provide very specific guidance on what
credentials to use
and how they are provisioned.


> It seems to me that the P2P nature of the protocol requires mutual
> authentication, could you confirm it?  This seems to be a critical thing
> to prevent a rogue node to spoof the lowest (highest, I have already
> forgot, sorry) L-L address in a clear-text multicast Hello and bypass
> authentication.
>

Absolutely, this requires mutual authentication, I'll add a specific note
to the draft.


> - s2.1
> "Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS connections use different
>  ephemeral ports from recently used connections to allow servers to
>  differentiate between the new and old DTLS connections."
>
> Maybe you could suggest using a sufficiently entropic connection id here
> as a more robust alternative.
>

Good point, I added text.


> - s2.5
> Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are, but I'd
> make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD?  It seems more polite
> :-)
>

I agree, I upgraded politeness to a SHOULD.


> - s.3
> Not sure which TLS stack Babel nodes will use (are you targeting
> extremely constrained devices with custom TLS implementations?), but all
> the stacks I know of let the application set the MTU and take care of
> splitting the messages in MTU sized chunks transparently.
>

The goal is for this to work on general-purpose stacks as well as embedded
ones.
Since Babel datagrams are comprised of a sequence of TLVs, it's best to
fragment
at the Babel layer because that way a single fragment is still parseable in
the
presence of packet loss. I added text to clarify this.

--000000000000580aee057a81cc5e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the feedback Thomas! Responses=
 inline.<div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On =
Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:30 PM Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge) &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:thomas.fossati@nokia.com">thomas.fossati@nokia.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">One high le=
vel thing which I can&#39;t extrapolate from the draft (which is<br>
probably due to my ignorance with Babel) is whether you envisage that<br>
*every* node does DTLS on the unicast channel, IOW that non-DTLS nodes<br>
are excluded from the mesh?=C2=A0 Or would it be acceptable to mesh HMAC an=
d<br>
DTLS neighbours?=C2=A0 What about clear-text speakers?=C2=A0 (It&#39;d seem=
 unwise to<br>
let them in an otherwise secured enclave.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>The main use-case would be that the entire mesh runs over DTLS and clea=
rtext nodes are excluded.</div><div>However, if a deployment has specific p=
roperties, one could configure this per-interface:</div><div>a router could=
 require DTLS over the Wi-Fi interface but allow non-DTLS on the secure VPN=
</div><div>interface. That would allow cleartext speakers over VPN into the=
 DTLS-secured enclave,</div><div>but that should only be used by someone wh=
o wants that property. I&#39;ve added a subsection.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
You should probably provide some guidance about the kind of<br>
credentials do you plan to use (certs, raw pkeys)?<br></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>We actually don&#39;t currently have guidance to give, as it mi=
ght depend on the use-case.</div><div>For example, there will be a document=
 specifying how HOMENET uses Babel over DTLS,</div><div>and I suspect that =
document will provide very specific guidance on what credentials to use</di=
v><div>and how they are provisioned.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
It seems to me that the P2P nature of the protocol requires mutual<br>
authentication, could you confirm it?=C2=A0 This seems to be a critical thi=
ng<br>
to prevent a rogue node to spoof the lowest (highest, I have already<br>
forgot, sorry) L-L address in a clear-text multicast Hello and bypass<br>
authentication.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Absolutely, this requir=
es mutual authentication, I&#39;ll add a specific note to the draft.</div><=
div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- s2.1<br>
&quot;Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS connections use different<br=
>
=C2=A0ephemeral ports from recently used connections to allow servers to<br=
>
=C2=A0differentiate between the new and old DTLS connections.&quot;<br>
<br>
Maybe you could suggest using a sufficiently entropic connection id here<br=
>
as a more robust alternative.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good poin=
t, I added text.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
- s2.5<br>
Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are, but I&#39;d<br=
>
make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD?=C2=A0 It seems more polite<=
br>
:-)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree, I upgraded politeness to a=
 SHOULD.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex">
- s.3<br>
Not sure which TLS stack Babel nodes will use (are you targeting<br>
extremely constrained devices with custom TLS implementations?), but all<br=
>
the stacks I know of let the application set the MTU and take care of<br>
splitting the messages in MTU sized chunks transparently.<br></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>The goal is for this to work on general-purpose stacks a=
s well as embedded ones.</div><div>Since Babel datagrams are comprised of a=
 sequence of TLVs, it&#39;s best to fragment</div><div>at the Babel layer b=
ecause that way a single fragment is still parseable in the</div><div>prese=
nce of packet loss. I added text to clarify this.</div><div><br></div><div>=
<br></div></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000580aee057a81cc5e--


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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 17:32:55 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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Thanks for your comment Hannes!

One of the motivations for Babel-HMAC (the custom format only offering
integrity protection) is to have a simple mechanism with smaller
dependencies for inclusion in small embedded devices that do not
necessarily have a DTLS stack.

We could define a mechanism that performs Babel-DTLS and then leverages a
keying material exporter to have keys for Babel-HMAC and use that for
multicast, but potentially in a later draft -- we're trying to minimize
complexity for this current pass.

David

On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:53 PM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
wrote:

> I took a quick look at the document and I don't know Babel.
>
> I see that you have two different proposals for securing Babel messages,
> namely
> * DTLS, and
> * a custom format offering integrity protection only.
>
> You correctly note in the document that DTLS offers more features. It is
> an authentication and key exchange protocol.
>
> One option to explore is to use DTLS to perform authentication and key
> exchange then use your custom format for integrity protection of packets
> with the keys exported from DTLS. Design-wise this approach is similiar to
> what we have done with DTLS-SRTP. This would also allow you to cover the
> multicast security case.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 08. November 2018 um 11:30 Uhr
> *Von:* "Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)" <thomas.fossati@nokia.com>
> *An:* "David Schinazi" <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* "draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org>, "
> tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> *Betreff:* Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
> Hi David,
>
> A few quick notes below.
>
> Cheers
>
> The 11/08/2018 09:14, David Schinazi wrote:
> > Hi everyone,
> >
> > Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel with
> > DTLS:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01
> >
> > It's 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick read and
> > let us know if we're using DTLS correctly?
> >
> > Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version to
> > use?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > David
>
> Premise: I don't know Babel -- apologies for any nonsense!
>
> One high level thing which I can't extrapolate from the draft (which is
> probably due to my ignorance with Babel) is whether you envisage that
> *every* node does DTLS on the unicast channel, IOW that non-DTLS nodes
> are excluded from the mesh? Or would it be acceptable to mesh HMAC and
> DTLS neighbours? What about clear-text speakers? (It'd seem unwise to
> let them in an otherwise secured enclave.)
>
> You should probably provide some guidance about the kind of
> credentials do you plan to use (certs, raw pkeys)?
>
> It seems to me that the P2P nature of the protocol requires mutual
> authentication, could you confirm it? This seems to be a critical thing
> to prevent a rogue node to spoof the lowest (highest, I have already
> forgot, sorry) L-L address in a clear-text multicast Hello and bypass
> authentication.
>
> - s2.1
> "Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS connections use different
> ephemeral ports from recently used connections to allow servers to
> differentiate between the new and old DTLS connections."
>
> Maybe you could suggest using a sufficiently entropic connection id here
> as a more robust alternative.
>
> - s2.5
> Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are, but I'd
> make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD? It seems more polite
> :-)
>
> - s.3
> Not sure which TLS stack Babel nodes will use (are you targeting
> extremely constrained devices with custom TLS implementations?), but all
> the stacks I know of let the application set the MTU and take care of
> splitting the messages in MTU sized chunks transparently.
>
> --
> Thomas
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000a8953d057a81cc4f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for your comment Hannes!<div><br></div><div>One of =
the motivations for Babel-HMAC (the custom format only offering integrity p=
rotection) is to have a simple mechanism with smaller dependencies for incl=
usion in small embedded devices that do not necessarily have a DTLS stack.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>We could define a mechanism that performs Babel-DT=
LS and then leverages a keying material exporter to have keys for Babel-HMA=
C and use that for multicast, but potentially in a later draft -- we&#39;re=
 trying to minimize complexity for this current pass.</div><div><br></div><=
div>David</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed=
, Nov 7, 2018 at 8:53 PM Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tsc=
hofenig@gmx.net">Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"font-family:Verdana;font-size:12.=
0px"><div>I took a quick look at the document and I don&#39;t know Babel.=
=C2=A0</div>

<div>=C2=A0</div>

<div>I see that you have two different proposals for securing Babel message=
s, namely=C2=A0</div>

<div>* DTLS, and=C2=A0</div>

<div>* a custom format offering integrity protection only.=C2=A0</div>

<div>=C2=A0</div>

<div>You correctly note in the document that DTLS offers more features. It =
is an authentication and key exchange protocol.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div>

<div>=C2=A0</div>

<div>One option to explore is to use DTLS to perform authentication and key=
 exchange then use your custom format for integrity protection of packets w=
ith the keys exported from DTLS. Design-wise this approach is similiar to w=
hat we have done with DTLS-SRTP. This would also allow you to cover the mul=
ticast security case.=C2=A0</div>

<div>=C2=A0</div>

<div>Ciao</div>

<div>Hannes</div>

<div>=C2=A0</div>

<div>
<div name=3D"quote" style=3D"margin:10px 5px 5px 10px;padding:10px 0 10px 1=
0px;border-left:2px solid #c3d9e5;word-wrap:break-word">
<div style=3D"margin:0 0 10px 0"><b>Gesendet:</b>=C2=A0Donnerstag, 08. Nove=
mber 2018 um 11:30 Uhr<br>
<b>Von:</b>=C2=A0&quot;Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)&quot; &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:thomas.fossati@nokia.com" target=3D"_blank">thomas.fossati@n=
okia.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>An:</b>=C2=A0&quot;David Schinazi&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi.=
ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b>=C2=A0&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org" tar=
get=3D"_blank">draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:draft-ietf-babel-dtls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">draft-ietf-babel-dtls@=
ietf.org</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">t=
ls@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Betreff:</b>=C2=A0Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?</div>

<div name=3D"quoted-content">Hi David,<br>
<br>
A few quick notes below.<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<br>
The 11/08/2018 09:14, David Schinazi wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi everyone,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel w=
ith<br>
&gt; DTLS:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It&#39;s 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick re=
ad and<br>
&gt; let us know if we&#39;re using DTLS correctly?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version =
to<br>
&gt; use?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; David<br>
<br>
Premise: I don&#39;t know Babel -- apologies for any nonsense!<br>
<br>
One high level thing which I can&#39;t extrapolate from the draft (which is=
<br>
probably due to my ignorance with Babel) is whether you envisage that<br>
*every* node does DTLS on the unicast channel, IOW that non-DTLS nodes<br>
are excluded from the mesh? Or would it be acceptable to mesh HMAC and<br>
DTLS neighbours? What about clear-text speakers? (It&#39;d seem unwise to<b=
r>
let them in an otherwise secured enclave.)<br>
<br>
You should probably provide some guidance about the kind of<br>
credentials do you plan to use (certs, raw pkeys)?<br>
<br>
It seems to me that the P2P nature of the protocol requires mutual<br>
authentication, could you confirm it? This seems to be a critical thing<br>
to prevent a rogue node to spoof the lowest (highest, I have already<br>
forgot, sorry) L-L address in a clear-text multicast Hello and bypass<br>
authentication.<br>
<br>
- s2.1<br>
&quot;Nodes SHOULD ensure that new client DTLS connections use different<br=
>
ephemeral ports from recently used connections to allow servers to<br>
differentiate between the new and old DTLS connections.&quot;<br>
<br>
Maybe you could suggest using a sufficiently entropic connection id here<br=
>
as a more robust alternative.<br>
<br>
- s2.5<br>
Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are, but I&#39;d<br=
>
make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD? It seems more polite<br>
:-)<br>
<br>
- s.3<br>
Not sure which TLS stack Babel nodes will use (are you targeting<br>
extremely constrained devices with custom TLS implementations?), but all<br=
>
the stacks I know of let the application set the MTU and take care of<br>
splitting the messages in MTU sized chunks transparently.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Thomas<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></div>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 17:32:58 -0800
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Hi Martin,

Thanks for looking into this.

Our threat model should be described in the introduction. From your
comments I'm guessing it isn't clear, so we should fix that. The basic
idea is that any on-link device can change the routing of the entire
network, and that's bad for hopefully obvious reasons. The goal of
Babel over DTLS is to prevent that. Can you suggest a better way
to convey that?

I've removed the mention of the certificate status request extension,
as I don't think it's relevant and don't remember why it was added.

PSK can either be used with:
- one key for the entire network, which does not allow revocation
- one key per node (N), but that requires all nodes to know all keys
    which allows impersonation
- pairwise (N^2) keys, which does not scale well
so PSK would be suited in the simple case where revocation is not
wanted, but in that use-case we recommend Babel-HMAC.

I'll let the Babel-HMAC authors start a separate thread.

David


On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 4:26 AM Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi David,
>
> I couldn't find any description of the threat model involved here, nor
> could I find any analysis of the security against that model.  Without
> that, I can't really say whether this is right or not.  For instance,
> there is specific mention of the certificate status request extension,
> but there is no mention of why.
>
> Given the configuration that I might infer from the hmac draft, I'm a
> little surprised that this doesn't use PSK.
>
> I'm somewhat dismayed by the firm recommendation to use the HMAC
> mechanism, which doesn't seem particularly robust.  Offhand, it seems
> like replays are possible if you allow the possibility of the node
> crashing and dumping state.  The same applies during a rollover of the
> 32-bit counter.  Of course, that might not be permitted by the threat
> model.
> On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 9:15 AM David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi everyone,
> >
> > Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel
> with DTLS:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01
> >
> > It's 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick read and
> let us know if we're using DTLS correctly?
> >
> > Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version to
> use?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > David
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000e39726057a81cca6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Martin,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for looking into this=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Our threat model should be described in the intr=
oduction. From your</div><div>comments I&#39;m guessing it isn&#39;t clear,=
 so we should fix that. The basic</div><div>idea is that any on-link device=
 can change the routing of the entire</div><div>network, and that&#39;s bad=
 for hopefully obvious reasons. The goal of</div><div>Babel over DTLS is to=
 prevent that. Can you suggest a better way</div><div>to convey that?</div>=
<div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve removed the mention of the certificate status =
request extension,</div><div>as I don&#39;t think it&#39;s relevant and don=
&#39;t remember why it was added.</div><div><br></div><div>PSK can either b=
e used with:</div><div>- one key for the entire network, which does not all=
ow revocation</div><div>- one key per node (N), but that requires all nodes=
 to know all keys</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 which allows impersonation</div><=
div>- pairwise (N^2) keys, which does not scale well<br></div><div>so PSK w=
ould be suited in the simple case where revocation is not</div><div>wanted,=
 but in that use-case we recommend Babel-HMAC.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#=
39;ll let the Babel-HMAC authors start a separate thread.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>David</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 4:26 AM Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com">martin.thomson@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi David,<br>
<br>
I couldn&#39;t find any description of the threat model involved here, nor<=
br>
could I find any analysis of the security against that model.=C2=A0 Without=
<br>
that, I can&#39;t really say whether this is right or not.=C2=A0 For instan=
ce,<br>
there is specific mention of the certificate status request extension,<br>
but there is no mention of why.<br>
<br>
Given the configuration that I might infer from the hmac draft, I&#39;m a<b=
r>
little surprised that this doesn&#39;t use PSK.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m somewhat dismayed by the firm recommendation to use the HMAC<br>
mechanism, which doesn&#39;t seem particularly robust.=C2=A0 Offhand, it se=
ems<br>
like replays are possible if you allow the possibility of the node<br>
crashing and dumping state.=C2=A0 The same applies during a rollover of the=
<br>
32-bit counter.=C2=A0 Of course, that might not be permitted by the threat<=
br>
model.<br>
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 9:15 AM David Schinazi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschina=
zi.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi everyone,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Over in the Babel working group we have a draft about securing Babel w=
ith DTLS:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-01" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ba=
bel-dtls-01</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It&#39;s 5 pages long, could any TLS experts please give it a quick re=
ad and let us know if we&#39;re using DTLS correctly?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Also, should the document contain guidance such as which DTLS version =
to use?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; David<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 14:45:50 +1100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 12:33 PM David Schinazi
<dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Our threat model should be described in the introduction. From your
> comments I'm guessing it isn't clear, so we should fix that. The basic
> idea is that any on-link device can change the routing of the entire
> network, and that's bad for hopefully obvious reasons. The goal of
> Babel over DTLS is to prevent that. Can you suggest a better way
> to convey that?

It might pay to describe who is involved, and what prior information
is assumed.  There might be a few different deployment assumptions,
which probably means pointing at other documents.

Your list of PSK options (below) assumes a range of options, each
assuming a different threat model.  I hadn't even considered that
option - the draft mentions asymmetric-key-based authentication.
Which you should probably pin down to either certificates or raw
public keys.  Not choosing is a different sort of choosing.

> PSK can either be used with:
> - one key for the entire network, which does not allow revocation

In this case, you would assume that there is no possibility of
compromise or defection of any entity in a "network".  That doesn't
seem like a reasonable threat model.

> - one key per node (N), but that requires all nodes to know all keys
>     which allows impersonation
> - pairwise (N^2) keys, which does not scale well

Yep, all of which speaks to some serious shortcomings of the
HMAC-based protocol.  If N^2 is feasible, it would be good to hear how
those keys are managed.  1 and N similarly don't seem feasible from a
deployment and operational perspective.


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/6S7NC4wtVXP011-3K6CrSseWjiQ>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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> Nor have I, and I rather think that introducing fixed-(EC)DH ciphers into=
 TLS was a mistake, and glad to see them gone in TLS 1.3.

I agree with the sentiment, but there is a concerted effort to bring fixed =
(EC)DH to TLS 1.3:
https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103500_103599/10352303/01.01.01_60/ts_=
10352303v010101p.pdf

It seems that a client that is not willing to participate has to actively l=
ook for and reject server certs with "VisibilityInformation" in them.
Except this won't always help, because "In some essential circumstances, th=
e visibility information field may be omitted."

Cheers,

Andrei


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Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 22:39:14 +0100
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From: Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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> Yep, all of which speaks to some serious shortcomings of the
> HMAC-based protocol.

The scope of Babel-HMAC is deliberately limited.  Babel-HMAC aims to
implement the strict minimum of features that make it useful.

Any deployment that needs features beyond what Babel-HMAC provides should
use Babel-DTLS instead.

> If N^2 is feasible, it would be good to hear how those keys are managed.

Not in Babel-HMAC, no.  We've tried to be very clear about that in Section 1.1
of draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 :

   The protocol defined in this document assumes that all interfaces on
   a given link are equally trusted and share a small set of symmetric
   keys (usually just one, two during key rotation).  The protocol is
   inapplicable in situations where asymmetric keying is required, where
   the trust relationship is partial, or where large numbers of trusted
   keys are provisioned on a single link at the same time.

   This protocol supports incremental deployment (where an insecure
   Babel network is made secure with no service interruption), and it
   supports graceful key rotation (where the set of keys is changed with
   no service interruption).

   This protocol does not require synchronised clocks, it does not
   require persistently monotonic clocks, and it does not require any
   form of persistent storage.

If you believe this deserves further clarification, we'll be grateful for
your guidance.

-- Juliusz


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/XnbYlF1w1ZQI9NuiFWbcp0hMLfo>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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>     - s2.5 Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are,
>     but I'd make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD? It seems more
>     polite :-)

> I agree, I upgraded politeness to a SHOULD.

Note however that a neighbour is usually discarded when we loose too many
Hellos from it.  At that point, we've lost contact with the neighbour,
it's too late to be polite.

-- Juliusz


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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:07:13 +0400
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Subject: [TLS] Proposed Errata for rfc5246
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--00000000000014ccda057a9a9633
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks,

Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL reported this issue with an implementation:
"
Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent in client
preference order. http://outlook.office365.com  <https://t.co/EOcbx3oZpI>
then chooses the least preferred. every time.
Additional fun fact: I believe it is still standards compliant. RFC5246
says only that it must be sent by the client in preference order. It does
not say the server must respect the order.
"
My suggestion would be something like:
Section 7.4.1.4.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1>.
current text:

Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving
this extension.
Suggestion:
Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving
this extension. TLS servers MUST respect the order in which the signature
algorithms are sent by the client.

--00000000000014ccda057a9a9633
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<div><br></div><div>Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL =
reported this issue with an implementation:</div><div><font face=3D"times n=
ew roman, serif">&quot;</font></div><div><font face=3D"arial, helvetica, sa=
ns-serif"><span style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27px;white-sp=
ace:pre-wrap">Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent =
in client preference order. </span><a href=3D"https://t.co/EOcbx3oZpI" rel=
=3D"nofollow noopener" dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-twit=
ter-timeline-link" title=3D"http://outlook.office365.com" style=3D"backgrou=
nd-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;backgr=
ound-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;color=
:rgb(29,161,242);text-decoration-line:none;letter-spacing:0.27px;white-spac=
e:pre-wrap" target=3D"_blank"><span class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-tco=
-ellipsis"></span><span class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-invisible" styl=
e=3D"line-height:0">http://</span><span class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail=
-js-display-url">outlook.office365.com</span><span class=3D"m_4244187228502=
055090gmail-invisible" style=3D"line-height:0"></span><span class=3D"m_4244=
187228502055090gmail-tco-ellipsis"><span class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmai=
l-invisible" style=3D"line-height:0">=C2=A0</span></span></a><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27px;white-space:pre-wrap"> then choo=
ses the least preferred. every time.</span></font><br></div><div><span styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);font-family:&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,Helvetica,A=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:14px;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:rgb(24=
5,248,250)">Additional fun fact: I believe it is still standards compliant.=
 RFC5246 says only that it must be sent by the client in preference order. =
It does not say the server must respect the order.</span><font face=3D"time=
s new roman, serif"><span style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27p=
x;white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></font></div><div>&quot;</div><div>My su=
ggestion would be something like:</div><div><span class=3D"gmail-h6" style=
=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inline;white-space:pre;font-family:monospace;fo=
nt-size:13.3333px;font-weight:bold;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><h6 style=3D"line-heig=
ht:0pt;display:inline;font-size:1em">Section <a class=3D"gmail-selflink" na=
me=3D"section-7.4.1.4.1" href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#sectio=
n-7.4.1.4.1" style=3D"color:black;text-decoration-line:none">7.4.1.4.1</a>.=
 current text:</h6></span></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(0,0,0);font-family:monospace;font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre"> Server=
s MUST NOT send this extension.  TLS servers MUST support
   receiving this extension.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-fam=
ily:monospace;font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre">
</span><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"></div><div>Suggestion:=
<br>Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receivin=
g this extension. TLS servers MUST respect the order in which the signature=
 algorithms are sent by the client.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></di=
v>

--00000000000014ccda057a9a9633--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Errata for rfc5246
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--Apple-Mail=_52F94E5D-E34A-4A7E-BBEE-1E072D765A7A
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	charset=utf-8

The intent is that the server pick the most preferred signature =
algorithm that is supported and meets local policy.  Given the local =
policy aspect of the server's choice, it can be any one offered by the =
client.  The client should not offer any that are not acceptable =
according o their local policy.

Russ


> On Nov 14, 2018, at 2:07 AM, Loganaden Velvindron =
<loganaden@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi folks,
>=20
> Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL reported this issue with an =
implementation:
> "
> Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent in client =
preference order. http://outlook.office365.com=C2=A0 =
<https://t.co/EOcbx3oZpI> then chooses the least preferred. every time.
> Additional fun fact: I believe it is still standards compliant. =
RFC5246 says only that it must be sent by the client in preference =
order. It does not say the server must respect the order.
> "
> My suggestion would be something like:
> Section 7.4.1.4.1 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1>. current text:
>=20
>  Servers MUST NOT send this extension.  TLS servers MUST support
>    receiving this extension.
>=20
> Suggestion:
> Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support =
receiving this extension. TLS servers MUST respect the order in which =
the signature algorithms are sent by the client.


--Apple-Mail=_52F94E5D-E34A-4A7E-BBEE-1E072D765A7A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">The =
intent is that the server pick the most preferred signature algorithm =
that is supported and meets local policy. &nbsp;Given the local policy =
aspect of the server's choice, it can be any one offered by the client. =
&nbsp;The client should not offer any that are not acceptable according =
o their local policy.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Nov =
14, 2018, at 2:07 AM, Loganaden Velvindron &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:loganaden@gmail.com" class=3D"">loganaden@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hi folks,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL reported this issue with an =
implementation:</div><div class=3D""><font face=3D"times new roman, =
serif" class=3D"">"</font></div><div class=3D""><font face=3D"arial, =
helvetica, sans-serif" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27px;white-space:pre-wrap" =
class=3D"">Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent =
in client preference order. </span><a href=3D"https://t.co/EOcbx3oZpI" =
rel=3D"nofollow noopener" dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-twitter-timeline-link" =
title=3D"http://outlook.office365.com" =
style=3D"background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-s=
ize:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background=
-clip:initial;color:rgb(29,161,242);text-decoration-line:none;letter-spaci=
ng:0.27px;white-space:pre-wrap" target=3D"_blank"><span =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-tco-ellipsis"></span><span =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-invisible" =
style=3D"line-height:0">http://</span><span =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-js-display-url">outlook.office365.com<=
/span><span class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-invisible" =
style=3D"line-height:0"></span><span =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-tco-ellipsis"><span =
class=3D"m_4244187228502055090gmail-invisible" =
style=3D"line-height:0">&nbsp;</span></span></a><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27px;white-space:pre-wrap" =
class=3D""> then chooses the least preferred. every =
time.</span></font><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);font-family:&quot;Helvetica =
Neue&quot;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:14px;white-space:pre-wrap;=
background-color:rgb(245,248,250)" class=3D"">Additional fun fact: I =
believe it is still standards compliant. RFC5246 says only that it must =
be sent by the client in preference order. It does not say the server =
must respect the order.</span><font face=3D"times new roman, serif" =
class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color:rgb(20,23,26);letter-spacing:0.27px;white-space:pre-wrap" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></font></div><div class=3D"">"</div><div =
class=3D"">My suggestion would be something like:</div><div =
class=3D""><span class=3D"gmail-h6" style=3D"line-height: 0pt; display: =
inline; white-space: pre; font-family: monospace; font-size: 13.3333px; =
font-weight: bold;"><h6 =
style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inline;font-size:1em" class=3D"">Section =
<a class=3D"gmail-selflink" name=3D"section-7.4.1.4.1" =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1" =
style=3D"">7.4.1.4.1</a>. current text:</h6></span></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: monospace; font-size: 13.3333px; white-space: =
pre;" class=3D""> Servers MUST NOT send this extension.  TLS servers =
MUST support
   receiving this extension.</span><span style=3D"font-family: =
monospace; font-size: 13.3333px; white-space: pre;" class=3D"">
</span><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"></div><div =
class=3D"">Suggestion:<br class=3D"">Servers MUST NOT send this =
extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving this extension. TLS =
servers MUST respect the order in which the signature algorithms are =
sent by the client.</div></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_52F94E5D-E34A-4A7E-BBEE-1E072D765A7A--


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Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:49:39 +0100
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From: Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/3U__YDIeeEPePPRtFA6y2-Miklc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Babel-HMAC [was: are we holding TLS wrong?]
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>> Unless I've missed something -- they are not, assuming you have
>> a sufficiently strong random number generator.  The challenge mechanism
>> rebuilds the shared state in a secure manner, and the index mechanism
>> ensures that an (index, seqno) pair is never reused.

> I had a really hard time understanding this, even with this help.
> Right now, I don't know what key is used for HMAC.  I think that the
> expectation is that each peer has a fixed HMAC key, but the contents
> of the packet always change, thereby ensuring that the resulting MAC
> is different for every packet.

That's the general idea, yes.  I'm not a cryptographer myself, and I don't
know how original this is.

> I would suggest that a formal analysis would be a good idea.

Yes, we're hoping to do that.  If you could point us to examples of papers
that contain a proof of correctness of a cryptographic protocol that you
believe is well done, that'd be helpful.

-- Juliusz


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 22:58:45 +1100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed Errata for rfc5246
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For the record, NSS servers always pick their choices first, except
for key shares in TLS 1.3 where P-256 and X25519 are considered equal
and the one with a share wins.  Some servers do similar things for
ChaCha20Poly1305 vs. AES-128-GCM, where maybe client ordering
indicates a preference where the server doesn't care.  For instance,
the client might not have AES-NI or equivalent and so prefer not to
use AES.  We never got around to implementing that one, but its the
other case I'm aware of.  Otherwise, servers can and do pick what they
like, which is usually the right way around in my opinion.
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 6:12 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>
> The intent is that the server pick the most preferred signature algorithm=
 that is supported and meets local policy.  Given the local policy aspect o=
f the server's choice, it can be any one offered by the client.  The client=
 should not offer any that are not acceptable according o their local polic=
y.
>
> Russ
>
>
> On Nov 14, 2018, at 2:07 AM, Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com> w=
rote:
>
> Hi folks,
>
> Bob Beck of OpenBSD/LibreSSL reported this issue with an implementation:
> "
> Fun fact: The TLS 1.2 signature algorithms extension is sent in client pr=
eference order. http://outlook.office365.com  then chooses the least prefer=
red. every time.
> Additional fun fact: I believe it is still standards compliant. RFC5246 s=
ays only that it must be sent by the client in preference order. It does no=
t say the server must respect the order.
> "
> My suggestion would be something like:
> Section 7.4.1.4.1. current text:
>
> Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving =
this extension.
> Suggestion:
> Servers MUST NOT send this extension. TLS servers MUST support receiving =
this extension. TLS servers MUST respect the order in which the signature a=
lgorithms are sent by the client.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are we holding TLS wrong?
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--000000000000ed3b7e057aa5a5ad
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi everyone,

Thanks again for your feedback, we've updated the document to reflect it:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-02
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-babel-dtls-02

David

On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 1:41 PM Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr> wrote:

> >     - s2.5 Not sure what the ceremonies around flushing a neighbor are,
> >     but I'd make explicit signalling EOD at least a SHOULD? It seems more
> >     polite :-)
>
> > I agree, I upgraded politeness to a SHOULD.
>
> Note however that a neighbour is usually discarded when we loose too many
> Hellos from it.  At that point, we've lost contact with the neighbour,
> it's too late to be polite.
>
> -- Juliusz
>

--000000000000ed3b7e057aa5a5ad
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi everyone,<div><br></d=
iv><div>Thanks again for your feedback, we&#39;ve updated the document to r=
eflect it:</div><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babe=
l-dtls-02">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-babel-dtls-02</a></div><d=
iv><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-babel-dtls-02"=
>https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-babel-dtls-02</a><br></div>=
<div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 1:41 PM Juliusz Chroboczek &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:jch@irif.fr">jch@irif.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex">&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0- s2.5 Not sure what the c=
eremonies around flushing a neighbor are,<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0but I&#39;d make explicit signalling EOD at least a=
 SHOULD? It seems more<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0polite :-)<br>
<br>
&gt; I agree, I upgraded politeness to a SHOULD.<br>
<br>
Note however that a neighbour is usually discarded when we loose too many<b=
r>
Hellos from it.=C2=A0 At that point, we&#39;ve lost contact with the neighb=
our,<br>
it&#39;s too late to be polite.<br>
<br>
-- Juliusz<br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000ed3b7e057aa5a5ad--


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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Certificate keyUsage enforcement question (new in RFC8446 Appendix E.8)
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On Mon, 2018-11-05 at 21:24 -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> TL;DR:  Should TLS client abort DHE-RSA handshakes with a peer
> certificate that *only* lists:
> 
>             X509v3 Key Usage: 
>                 Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
> 
> (which one might take to mean that only RSA key exchange is allowed,
> and DHE-RSA is not, for lack of the DigitalSignature bit?
> 
> [ In the unlikely case it matters, the record the certificate
>   in question is self-signed, and has a DANE TLSA "3 0 1" record. ]
> 
> -- Background:
> 
> I am somewhat sympathetic to forbidding RSA key exchange when
> "Key Encipherment" is not listed, in order to reduce the risk of
> Bleichenbacher-type attacks, but it is not obvious at first blush
> why one might the converse restriction...
> 
> The reason I ask is that the Haskell TLS library has recently added
> enforcement in both directions, and I am finding some SMTP servers
> with whose STARTTLS implementation my DANE scan engine no longer
> interoperates.
> 
> And yet, FWIW, OpenSSL 1.1.1 continues to connect just fine.  Is
> this an oversight in OpenSSL?  Overly strict enforcement in Haskell's
> Network.TLS?

gnutls has been enforcing that rule for quite some time. That had
generated quite some bug reports from application developers in the
past. The main argument was, but other implementations work.
Nevertheless the last few years the trend has changed and I think that
strictness is not only tolerated by developers/end-users but actually
promoted. That's only my impression though.

regards,
Nikos



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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Tuesday, 13 November 2018 00:13:58 CET Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> [ I agree that this thread is off topic for this WG, thus below
>   just a short OT aside on some oft-repeated critiques of DNSSEC. ]
>=20
> > On Nov 12, 2018, at 2:15 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > The cryptography employed by the X..509 PKI is substantially more modern
> > than what's in DNSSEC. Much of DNSSEC's security comes down to 1024-bit
> > or 1280-bit RSA ZSKs.
> It is true that while the KSKs tend to be 2048-bit RSA, ZSKs are typically
> 1024-bits or 1280-bits.
>=20
> 	http://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#keysize
>=20
> That said, all the TLDs are using 2048-bit KSKs, and we're seeing
> increasing adoption of ECDSA in DSSSEC:
>=20
> 	http://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#parameter
>=20
> and the .CZ and .BR TLDs switched to ECDSA this year, and more will likely
> follow.
>=20
> Furthermore, the weakest link in the chain for both WebPKI and DNSSEC is =
not
> the cryptography.  Rather it is operational weaknesses in the enrollment
> processes.
>=20
> For WebPKI, we basically have TOFU by the CA based on apparent
> unauthenticated control of a TCP endpoint as the basis of certificate
> issuance, occasionally strengthened via DNSSEC(!) validated CAA records
> and/or ACME challenges.

but that TOFU is global, not local to a client

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Lanlan Pan <abbypan@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2018 06:07:42 -0500
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Personally I think the low rate of dnssec deployment on SLD authoritative
server and recursive resolver is the problem.

And TLS's distribute certificate exchange maybe better than DNSSEC's
centralized trust anchor.

Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>=E4=BA=8E2018=E5=B9=B411=E6=9C=888=E6=97=A5=
=E5=91=A8=E5=9B=9B =E4=B8=8B=E5=8D=884:44=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A

> Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Mayb=
e
> we should ask Google.
>
> The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.
>
> This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be
> placed in a DNS TXT record. In another DNS TXT record, a list of supporte=
d
> protocols could be listed.
> A DNS SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a
> service, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a
> domain and after chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains
> was unimportant. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.
> Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072,
> and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.
> And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by using the time=
r
> entropy daemon for one second (and which would in theory provide enough
> entropy for perpetuity).
>
> This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. The state of cyber security is a horri=
ble
> disappointment.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
--=20
=E8=87=B4=E7=A4=BC  Best Regards

=E6=BD=98=E8=93=9D=E5=85=B0  Pan Lanlan

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Personally I think the low rate of dnssec deployment =
on SLD authoritative server and recursive resolver is the problem.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>And TLS&#39;s distribute certificate exchange maybe better=
 than DNSSEC&#39;s centralized trust anchor.<br></div><div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">Ryan Carboni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryacko=
@gmail.com">ryacko@gmail.com</a>&gt;=E4=BA=8E2018=E5=B9=B411=E6=9C=888=E6=
=97=A5=E5=91=A8=E5=9B=9B =E4=B8=8B=E5=8D=884:44=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. Ho=
w does one create a new protocol? Maybe we should ask Google.<div><br></div=
><div>The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.</div><div><br></div><div>=
This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be p=
laced in a DNS TXT record. In another DNS TXT record, a list of supported p=
rotocols could be listed.</div><div>A DNS SRV record would define the port =
that one can use to connect to a service, because the URL scheme died after=
 .onion was recognized as a domain and after chromium decided to that the p=
resentation of sub domains was unimportant. So no browser has to show which=
 port it is connected to.</div><div>Although, to be radical, all anyone nee=
ds is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072, and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.</div><div>And may=
be recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by using the timer entropy=
 daemon for one second (and which would in theory provide enough entropy fo=
r perpetuity).</div><div><br></div><div>This isn=E2=80=99t rocket science. =
The state of cyber security is a horrible disappointment.</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signa=
ture" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">=E8=87=B4=E7=A4=
=BC=C2=A0 Best Regards<br><br>=E6=BD=98=E8=93=9D=E5=85=B0=C2=A0 Pan Lanlan<=
br></div></div>

--00000000000022fc66057ada51d3--


From nobody Sat Nov 17 12:45:48 2018
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> On Nov 17, 2018, at 6:07 AM, Lanlan Pan <abbypan@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> And TLS's distribute certificate exchange maybe better than DNSSEC's =
centralized trust anchor.

In principle, yes, when one carefully selects just the appropriate
trust anchor(s) for a given task.  Some applications do use specific
trust-anchors (internal corporate CAs) at least some of the time.

[ FWIW, TLS is trust-model agnostic, it is the WebPKI that uses the
  usual panoply of CAs. ]

In practice, one generally uses the Mozilla or similar trust bundle,
and so it is still centralized, except that now the attacker has a
choice of multiple central authorities to compromise.

So most of the time the WebPKI is weaker, but you sometimes have
a choice when you can limit the set of peers with which you need
to communicate.

With DNSSEC validating resolvers can also configure trust-anchors
at any point in the tree, which also allows for internal corporate
trust-anchors, and if some TLD or similar followed the RFC5011 key
rollover process used at the root, one could also track the TLD's
keys independently of the delegation from ICANN, but AFAIK this is
not presently a common TLD practice.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From nobody Sun Nov 18 12:15:12 2018
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On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 02:30:53PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:

> >    [ FWIW, TLS is trust-model agnostic, it is the WebPKI that uses the
>       usual panoply of CAs. ]
>  
> No, it is not agnostic.  It does support other trust models -- raw keys,
> PGP web-of-trust -- but it's default and primary model from its inception
> is X509 and its (so ingrained you might consider it implicit) "trust the
> issuer" model.  Look at the definitions of certs and CA's and things like
> path validation in PKIX and its predecessors, the "trust anchors" which
> builds on the chain model -- chained through *issuers* -- in the protocol,
> and so on.

[ I don't know why you would choose to argue this point, let's not
  confuse TLS with the CA/B forum WebPKI in browsers.  My post was
  about TLS.

  My post was emphatically not an attempt to revive the DANE chain
  discussion here, and was not even about DANE, nobody is looking
  forward to reopening that discussion here.  However, since bashing
  DNSSEC is a popular sport, I may for the record, now and then
  post corrections to messages that mischaracterize DNSSEC. ]

The X.509 trust-anchors are NOT specified in TLS, and need not be
used.  Long before DANE, Postfix supported "fingerprint" authentication,
especially for email submission clients, which bypassed the WebPKI
and never looked at the certificate issuer.  Peter Gutmann may
apprise you of similar usage in industrial automation.

> The "usual panoply of CAs" is the WebPKI instantiation of a trust model,
> but do not confuse it with the trust model itself. I have deployed several
> instances of the X509/PKI trust model at work, and none of them use a
> conventional WebPKI set of anchors.

This was explicitly acknowledged and discussed in more detail in
the message you're responding to.  Yes, PKIX is not always the
WebPKI, but in practice it typically is.

> If DANE-TLS is to come back, the authors should use a new TLS certificate
> type that is perhaps an X509 structure, but whose trust semantics are
> defined by DANE. The recent IEEE vehicle cert did similar, and all it took
> was a couple of pieces of email.

There is simply no need for that.  The existing X.509 encapsultion
works just fine, and makes it possible to transparently interoperate
with both DANE and CA/B forum WebPKI or other PKIX peers.

For clients that can do DNSSEC lookups directly and reliably, DANE
works in TLS with no friction.  With DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3) you
get a different trust model, and DANE-TA(2) does use "trust the
issuer", but the ultimately trusted issuer is delivered via DNSSEC
TLSA records.

DANE does not have to "come back".  It is in use today, enabling
authenticated SMTP to over 337 thousand email domains and growing:

    http://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#graphs

DANE TLS for SMTP is supported by Postfix, Exim, Halon, PowerMTA,
Cisco ESA, ...  There are also consumer email providers with millions
of users that employ DANE in both directions: comcast.net, web.de,
gmx.de, freenet.de, ... and more planned.

-- 
	Viktor.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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From nobody Sun Nov 18 13:51:56 2018
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> On Nov 18, 2018, at 4:27 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
>>   [ I don't know why you would choose to argue this point, let's not
>>      confuse TLS with the CA/B forum WebPKI in browsers.  My post was
>>      about TLS.
> 
> I am not.  You say TLS is CA/B WebPKI.

No, I specifically say that TLS *is not* CA/B WebPKI.
The OP to whom I responded was comparing WebPKI to
DNSSEC, so my response was about WebPKI and its use
in TLS (which also supports other models).

Anyway, this is way off topic.  I've made my points,
and stand by them.  I think we're done.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Sun Nov 18 15:02:44 2018
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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 15:02:28 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 1:52 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wr=
ote:
>
>
>
> > On Nov 18, 2018, at 4:27 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> >
> >>   [ I don't know why you would choose to argue this point, let's not
> >>      confuse TLS with the CA/B forum WebPKI in browsers.  My post was
> >>      about TLS.
> >
> > I am not.  You say TLS is CA/B WebPKI.
>
> No, I specifically say that TLS *is not* CA/B WebPKI.
> The OP to whom I responded was comparing WebPKI to
> DNSSEC, so my response was about WebPKI and its use
> in TLS (which also supports other models).
>
> Anyway, this is way off topic.  I've made my points,
> and stand by them.  I think we're done.

Yes, this is off topic. Let=E2=80=99s please leave this thread here and foc=
us
on Ryan=E2=80=99s original post.

Thanks,
Chris (chair hat on)


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Subject: [TLS] WGLC has concluded for draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption
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--000000000000df3b6f057af93b9b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Several comments were received for draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption.  The
chairs will work with the authors to address the comments and revise the
draft to submit it to the IESG.

The working group has consensus to work on the document, however comments
against this consensus will be noted in the document shepherd's writeup.

Summary of comments to be evaluated for document changes:

- Update references
- 3.6 fix text referring to multiplexed server
- 3.8.1 ALPN encryption may be separate from esni
- 3.9 clarify purpose of section
- 4 addition work may need to be cited
- discuss CT and not differentiating certs
- may need to updated discussion of http fronting
- 2.2 reference SAN
- (section 2.3 and 3.6) esni causing privacy and security trade-offs in
other areas
- editorial comments raised

Thanks,

Chairs

--000000000000df3b6f057af93b9b
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail-gs" style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px 0p=
x 20px;width:1032px;font-family:Roboto,RobotoDraft,Helvetica,Arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:medium"><div class=3D"gmail-"><div id=3D"gmail-:1kv" class=3D"=
gmail-ii gmail-gt" style=3D"font-size:12.8px;direction:ltr;margin:8px 0px 0=
px;padding:0px"><div id=3D"gmail-:1ku" class=3D"gmail-a3s gmail-aXjCH" tabi=
ndex=3D"-1" style=3D"overflow:hidden;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-varia=
nt-east-asian:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:small;line-height:1.5;fo=
nt-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;outline:none"><div dir=3D"ltr">Several=
 comments were received for draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption.=C2=A0 The chairs=
 will work with the authors to=C2=A0address the comments and revise the dra=
ft to submit it to the IESG.=C2=A0=C2=A0<br><div><br></div><div>The working=
 group has consensus to work on the document, however comments against this=
 consensus will be noted in the document shepherd&#39;s writeup.=C2=A0</div=
><div><br></div><div>Summary of comments to be evaluated for document chang=
es:</div><div><br></div><div>- Update references</div><div>- 3.6 fix text r=
eferring to multiplexed server</div><div>- 3.8.1 ALPN encryption may be sep=
arate from esni</div><div>- 3.9 clarify purpose of section</div><div>- 4 ad=
dition work may need to be cited</div><div>- discuss CT and not differentia=
ting certs</div><div>- may need to updated discussion of http fronting</div=
><div>- 2.2 reference SAN=C2=A0<br></div><div>-=C2=A0(section 2.3 and 3.6)=
=C2=A0esni causing privacy and security trade-offs in other areas=C2=A0</di=
v><div>- editorial comments raised=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</=
div><div><br></div><div>Chairs</div></div><div class=3D"gmail-yj6qo"></div>=
<div class=3D"gmail-adL"></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail-hi" style=3D=
"border-bottom-left-radius:1px;border-bottom-right-radius:1px;padding:0px;w=
idth:auto;background:rgb(242,242,242);margin:0px"></div></div></div><br cla=
ss=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"></div>

--000000000000df3b6f057af93b9b--


From nobody Mon Nov 19 01:40:37 2018
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 20:40:22 +1100
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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls13
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As discussed, we'll want some more time for analysis and
implementation of this one.  I did a thorough pass and have opened a
few PRs and issues.  Mostly editorial, though some likely would
benefit from discussion.

https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=is%3Aopen+author%3Amartinthomson+
On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
> This is the working group last call for the "The Datagram Transport
> Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3" draft available at
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/.  Please
> review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on
> 30 November 2018.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants
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<html><head></head><body><div style="font-family: Verdana;font-size: 12.0px;"><div>
<div>Hi Ryan</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>reading through your email and the subsequent exchanges I am surprised that you show up right after years of standardization of TLS 1.3.</div>

<div>Suggesting ideas at the right time is somewhat important. &nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>Later in your emails you explain what you consider complex in TLS and some of the ideas you are suggesting are alternative design approaches. What standardization helps you do is to work out the details of these different proposals and then to compare the different approaches against each other.&nbsp;</div>

<div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>&gt;&nbsp;The state of cyber security is a horrible disappointment.</div>

<div>... and most (if not all)&nbsp;of that disappointment has nothing to do with TLS.&nbsp;</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>Ciao</div>

<div>Hannes</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div name="quote" style="margin:10px 5px 5px 10px; padding: 10px 0 10px 10px; border-left:2px solid #C3D9E5; word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">
<div style="margin:0 0 10px 0;"><b>Gesendet:</b>&nbsp;Donnerstag, 08. November 2018 um 09:44 Uhr<br/>
<b>Von:</b>&nbsp;&quot;Ryan Carboni&quot; &lt;ryacko@gmail.com&gt;<br/>
<b>An:</b>&nbsp;tls@ietf.org<br/>
<b>Betreff:</b>&nbsp;[TLS] Enforcing Protocol Invariants</div>

<div name="quoted-content">Hmm. TLS has gotten too complex. How does one create a new protocol? Maybe we should ask Google.
<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>The SSHFP DNS record exists. DNSSEC exists.</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>This might be a radical proposal, but maybe the certificate hash could be placed in a DNS TXT record. In another DNS TXT record, a list of supported protocols could be listed.</div>

<div>A DNS SRV record would define the port that one can use to connect to a service, because the URL scheme died after .onion was recognized as a domain and after chromium decided to that the presentation of sub domains was unimportant. So no browser has to show which port it is connected to.</div>

<div>Although, to be radical, all anyone needs is RSA-2048, ephemeral DH-3072, and SHAKE-128 as AEAD.</div>

<div>And maybe recommend that boot entropy could be obtained by using the timer entropy daemon for one second (and which would in theory provide enough entropy for perpetuity).</div>

<div>&nbsp;</div>

<div>This isn&rsquo;t rocket science. The state of cyber security is a horrible disappointment.</div>
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a></div>
</div>
</div>
</div></div></body></html>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls13
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Thanks for your review Martin!

Definitely not trying to rush this out the door, but it is time to move =
the goal posts a bit.

spt

> On Nov 19, 2018, at 04:40, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> As discussed, we'll want some more time for analysis and
> implementation of this one.  I did a thorough pass and have opened a
> few PRs and issues.  Mostly editorial, though some likely would
> benefit from discussion.
>=20
> =
https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues?utf8=3D%E2%9C%93&q=3Dis%3Aopen=
+author%3Amartinthomson+
> On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> This is the working group last call for the "The Datagram Transport
>> Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3" draft available at
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/.  Please
>> review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on
>> 30 November 2018.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Chris, Joe, and Sean
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 14:02:27 +1100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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Comments and PRs in GitHub:
https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues?utf8=3D%E2%9C%93&q=3Dis%3Aopen=
+author%3Amartinthomson+

One thing I didn't add as an issue, but is worth considering: This
makes zero mention of DTLS 1.3 and the vastly superior design that is
available there.  I think that it should make that reference.
On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 6:40 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
>
> This is the working group last call for the "Connection Identifiers for D=
TLS 1.2" draft available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls=
-dtls-connection-id/. Please review the document and send your comments to =
the list by 2359 UTC on 30 November 2018.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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On Wed, 2018-11-07 at 14:39 +0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> This is the working group last call for the "Connection Identifiers
> for DTLS 1.2" draft available at 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/.
> Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359
> UTC on 30 November 2018.
> 

Hi,

It is a very good document, I support its publication. Some editorial comments follow.

I think the paragraph of the section 3 that starts:
"This is effectively the simplest possible design that will work."

looks like unnecessary; why would previous designs be mentioned unless
there is a challenge for this protocol and in that case an appendix
may be more suitable. What about replacing with:
"The design is kept simple to ease implementation and deployment"


In security considerations the following two paragraphs seem to be part
of a single one, that is separated by a However? (i.e., replace Importantly with However),
or do I missread it?

   With multi-homing, an adversary is able to correlate the
   communication interaction over the two paths, which adds further
   privacy concerns.

   Importantly, the sequence number makes it possible for a passive
   attacker to correlate packets across CID changes.  Thus, even if a
   client/server pair do a rehandshake to change CID, that does not
   provide much privacy benefit.

regards,
Nikos



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Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:27:34 +0800
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Subject: [TLS] regd. signature algorithm 0x0804 (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) use in TLSv1.2 CertificateVerify
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Hi,

If a TLSv1.2 Certificate Request message contains 0x0804
(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) as one of the supported signature algorithms,
can a client sign the CertificateVerify message using that algorithm?
(client cert is RSA).  Is it allowed in TLSv1.2?

with regards,
Saravanan


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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:35:24 +0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] regd. signature algorithm 0x0804 (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) use in TLSv1.2 CertificateVerify
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Hi,

RFC8446:
=================================================
4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms

[...]
-  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
      mandatory in TLS 1.3) MUST be prepared to accept a signature using
      that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated.  In TLS 1.2,
      RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.

=================================================

The above paragraph gives me an impression that, in TLSv1.2, if
CertificateRequest message advertise 0x0804, then the client can sign
the CertificateVerify message with 0x0804 if client cert is RSA.

0x0804 = rsa_pss_rsae_sha256

Can some one please confirm whether my understanding is correct?

with regards,
Saravanan

On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 00:27, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> If a TLSv1.2 Certificate Request message contains 0x0804
> (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) as one of the supported signature algorithms,
> can a client sign the CertificateVerify message using that algorithm?
> (client cert is RSA).  Is it allowed in TLSv1.2?
>
> with regards,
> Saravanan


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 12:07:39 -0600
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Subject: Re: [TLS] regd. signature algorithm 0x0804 (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) use in TLSv1.2 CertificateVerify
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--000000000000031d55057b1c83ab
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Yes, this is correct.

On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:35 AM M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> RFC8446:
> =================================================
> 4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms
>
> [...]
> -  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
>       mandatory in TLS 1.3) MUST be prepared to accept a signature using
>       that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated.  In TLS 1.2,
>       RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.
>
> =================================================
>
> The above paragraph gives me an impression that, in TLSv1.2, if
> CertificateRequest message advertise 0x0804, then the client can sign
> the CertificateVerify message with 0x0804 if client cert is RSA.
>
> 0x0804 = rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
>
> Can some one please confirm whether my understanding is correct?
>
> with regards,
> Saravanan
>
> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 00:27, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > If a TLSv1.2 Certificate Request message contains 0x0804
> > (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) as one of the supported signature algorithms,
> > can a client sign the CertificateVerify message using that algorithm?
> > (client cert is RSA).  Is it allowed in TLSv1.2?
> >
> > with regards,
> > Saravanan
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000031d55057b1c83ab
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Yes, this is correct.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:35 AM M K Saravanan &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:mksarav@gmail.com">mksarav@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
RFC8446:<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br=
>
4.2.3.=C2=A0 Signature Algorithms<br>
<br>
[...]<br>
-=C2=A0 Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 mandatory in TLS 1.3) MUST be prepared to accept a sig=
nature using<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated.=C2=A0 In =
TLS 1.2,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.<br>
<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br=
>
<br>
The above paragraph gives me an impression that, in TLSv1.2, if<br>
CertificateRequest message advertise 0x0804, then the client can sign<br>
the CertificateVerify message with 0x0804 if client cert is RSA.<br>
<br>
0x0804 =3D rsa_pss_rsae_sha256<br>
<br>
Can some one please confirm whether my understanding is correct?<br>
<br>
with regards,<br>
Saravanan<br>
<br>
On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 00:27, M K Saravanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mksarav@g=
mail.com" target=3D"_blank">mksarav@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If a TLSv1.2 Certificate Request message contains 0x0804<br>
&gt; (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) as one of the supported signature algorithms,<br=
>
&gt; can a client sign the CertificateVerify message using that algorithm?<=
br>
&gt; (client cert is RSA).=C2=A0 Is it allowed in TLSv1.2?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; with regards,<br>
&gt; Saravanan<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 02:45:48 +0800
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To: davidben@chromium.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] regd. signature algorithm 0x0804 (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) use in TLSv1.2 CertificateVerify
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Thanks David.

with regards,
Saravanan.
On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 02:07, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this is correct.
>
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:35 AM M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> RFC8446:
>> =================================================
>> 4.2.3.  Signature Algorithms
>>
>> [...]
>> -  Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is
>>       mandatory in TLS 1.3) MUST be prepared to accept a signature using
>>       that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated.  In TLS 1.2,
>>       RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.
>>
>> =================================================
>>
>> The above paragraph gives me an impression that, in TLSv1.2, if
>> CertificateRequest message advertise 0x0804, then the client can sign
>> the CertificateVerify message with 0x0804 if client cert is RSA.
>>
>> 0x0804 = rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
>>
>> Can some one please confirm whether my understanding is correct?
>>
>> with regards,
>> Saravanan
>>
>> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 00:27, M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > Hi,
>> >
>> > If a TLSv1.2 Certificate Request message contains 0x0804
>> > (rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) as one of the supported signature algorithms,
>> > can a client sign the CertificateVerify message using that algorithm?
>> > (client cert is RSA).  Is it allowed in TLSv1.2?
>> >
>> > with regards,
>> > Saravanan
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <797cd94d-b5be-24fd-923c-53b614cbc2c5@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: ESNIKeys over complex

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Hiya,

I've started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]
(Don't be scared though, it'll likely be taken over by a
student in the new year:-)

=46rom doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too
complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones
I'd argue for would be:

- use a new RR, not TXT
- have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option
  (so no lists at all) since >1 value needs to be supported
  at the DNS level anyway
   - that'd mean exactly one ciphersuite
   - exactly one key share
   - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)
- get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
  are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
- get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must
  always use the max (260?) - that needs to be the same
  for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on
  'em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems
  fragile
- I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
  hard to handle
- (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
  friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
  defined in addition)

I'm fine that such changes don't get done for a while (so
I or my student get time to try make stuff work:-) and
it might in any case take a while to figure out how to
handle the multi-CDN use-case discussed in Bangkok which
would I guess also affect this structure some, but I wanted
to send this to the list while it's fresh for me.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 15:30:51 -0800
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 1:46 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> I've started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]
> (Don't be scared though, it'll likely be taken over by a
> student in the new year:-)
>

Thanks for your comments. Responses below.

>From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too
> complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones
> I'd argue for would be:
>
> - use a new RR, not TXT
>

This is likely to happen.

- have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option
>   (so no lists at all) since >1 value needs to be supported
>   at the DNS level anyway
>    - that'd mean exactly one ciphersuite
>    - exactly one key share
>

I don't agree with this. It is going to lead to a lot of redundancy because
many
servers will support >1 cipher suite with the same key share. Moreover, from
an implementation perspective, supporting >1 RR would be quite a bit more
work.

   - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)
>

Again, not a fan of this. It leads to redundancy.


- get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
>   are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
>

I'm mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are useful,
as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.


- get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must
>   always use the max (260?) -


I'm not in favor of this. The CH is big enough as it is, and this has a
pretty big impact on that, especially for QUIC. There are plenty of
scenarios where the upper  limit is known and << 160.


that needs to be the same
>   for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on
>   'em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems
>   fragile
>

It only has to be the same for all the ones in the anonymity set, and they
already need to coordinate on the key.




- I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
>   hard to handle
> - (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
>   friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
>   defined in addition)
>

We are likely to drop the base64 encoding.

-Ekr



> [1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000005e36cd057b210898
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Nov 20, 2018 at 1:46 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.far=
rell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
I&#39;ve started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]<br>
(Don&#39;t be scared though, it&#39;ll likely be taken over by a<br>
student in the new year:-)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks for y=
our comments. Responses below.</div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">
>From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too<br>
complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones<br>
I&#39;d argue for would be:<br>
<br>
- use a new RR, not TXT<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is likely =
to happen.<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option<br>
=C2=A0 (so no lists at all) since &gt;1 value needs to be supported<br>
=C2=A0 at the DNS level anyway<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- that&#39;d mean exactly one ciphersuite<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- exactly one key share<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I =
don&#39;t agree with this. It is going to lead to a lot of redundancy becau=
se many</div><div>servers will support &gt;1 cipher suite with the same key=
 share. Moreover, from</div><div>an implementation perspective, supporting =
&gt;1 RR would be quite a bit more</div><div>work.<br></div><div> <br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
=C2=A0 =C2=A0- no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)<br><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>Again, not a fan of this. It leads to redun=
dancy.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- get rid of not_before/not_after - I don&#39;t believe those<br>
=C2=A0 are useful given TTLs and they&#39;ll just lead to failures<br></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m mostly ambivalent on this, but on balan=
ce, I think these are useful,</div><div>as they are not tied to potentially=
 fragile DNS TTLs.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">
- get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must<br>
=C2=A0 always use the max (260?) -</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m =
not in favor of this. The CH is big enough as it is, and this has a pretty =
big impact on that, especially for QUIC. There are plenty of scenarios wher=
e the upper=C2=A0 limit is known and &lt;&lt; 160.<br></div><div><br></div>=
<div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> that needs to be the same<b=
r>
=C2=A0 for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on<br>
=C2=A0 &#39;em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems<br>
=C2=A0 fragile<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It only has to be the sa=
me for all the ones in the anonymity set, and they already need to coordina=
te on the key.</div><div> <br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- I&#39;m not convinced the checksum is useful, but it&#39;s not<br>
=C2=A0 hard to handle<br>
- (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator<br>
=C2=A0 friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format<br>
=C2=A0 defined in addition)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We are like=
ly to drop the base64 encoding.</div><div><br> </div><div>-Ekr<br></div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/mas=
ter/esnistuff</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:36:41 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <70290643-cf98-44de-ca6e-2cae4584d750@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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Hiya,

On 20/11/2018 23:30, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 1:46 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd=
=2Eie>
> wrote:
>=20
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> I've started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]
>> (Don't be scared though, it'll likely be taken over by a
>> student in the new year:-)
>>
>=20
> Thanks for your comments. Responses below.

Ditto.

>=20
>>From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too
>> complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones
>> I'd argue for would be:
>>
>> - use a new RR, not TXT
>>
>=20
> This is likely to happen.
>=20
> - have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option
>>   (so no lists at all) since >1 value needs to be supported
>>   at the DNS level anyway
>>    - that'd mean exactly one ciphersuite
>>    - exactly one key share
>>
>=20
> I don't agree with this. It is going to lead to a lot of redundancy bec=
ause
> many
> servers will support >1 cipher suite with the same key share. Moreover,=
 from
> an implementation perspective, supporting >1 RR would be quite a bit mo=
re
> work.

Aren't DNS answers RRsets? I may be wrong but I thought DNS
clients have to handle that anyway, and I'd expect use of
RRsets to be a part of figuring out a multi-CDN stpry.

That said, >1 ciphersuite wouldn't be so bad if that were
the only list per RData instance. Or maybe one could get
rid of it entirely via some conditional link the to set
of suites in the CH, not sure. (Or just go fully experimental
and say everyone doing esni for now has to use the same
suite all the time.)

>=20
>    - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)
>>
>=20
> Again, not a fan of this. It leads to redundancy.

That's reasonable. OTOH, it's equally reasonable to say that
we're dealing with an experimental draft and a future PS
version could use another RRytpe and add extensions if they
end up needed.

>=20
>=20
> - get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
>>   are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
>>
>=20
> I'm mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are useful=
,
> as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.

If there were a justification offered for 'em I'd be
ok with it, but TBH, I'm not seeing it. And my main
experience of the similar dates on RRSIGs are that they
just break things and don't help. Put another way, I
don't know what sensible code to write to decide between
not connecting or sending SNI in clear if one of these
dates is out of whack. (I be tempted to just ignore the
time constraints and try send the SNI encrypted instead.)
And having to deploy a cron job equivalent for the DNS
data is an order of magnitude harder than not.

>=20
> - get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must
>>   always use the max (260?) -
>=20
>=20
> I'm not in favor of this. The CH is big enough as it is, and this has a=

> pretty big impact on that, especially for QUIC. There are plenty of
> scenarios where the upper  limit is known and << 160.

True, big CH's are a bit naff, but my (perhaps wrong)
assumption was that nobody cared since the F5 bug. It
seems a bit wrong though to have every domain that's
behind the same front have to publish this. I'm also
not sure it'll work well if we ever end up with cases
where domains A and B both use fronts/CDNs x and y and
can't figure out a good value as x prefers 132 and y
prefers 260.

How about rounding up to the nearest power of 2 that's
bigger than 5? (Or some such.) Very long names might
lose some protection, but I'm not sure that's a big
deal and one can likely just register a shorter name
for applications using ESNI.

>=20
>=20
> that needs to be the same
>>   for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on
>>   'em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems
>>   fragile
>>
>=20
> It only has to be the same for all the ones in the anonymity set, and t=
hey
> already need to coordinate on the key.

Saying that every key share in DNS needs to be published
with the same padded_length would be ok actually. (As a
nasty hack, you could even derive the padded_length
from the value of the key_share and fronters could just
keep generating shares until they get one that works:-)

> - I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
>>   hard to handle
>> - (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
>>   friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
>>   defined in addition)
>>
>=20
> We are likely to drop the base64 encoding.

Ack.

And just to note again - I suspect a bunch of the above would
be better sorted out as ancillary changes once a multi-CDN
proposal is figured out.

Cheers,
S.

>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> [1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>=20

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:59:30 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 4:36 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 20/11/2018 23:30, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 1:46 PM Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Hiya,
> >>
> >> I've started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]
> >> (Don't be scared though, it'll likely be taken over by a
> >> student in the new year:-)
> >>
> >
> > Thanks for your comments. Responses below.
>
> Ditto.
>
> >
> >>From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too
> >> complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones
> >> I'd argue for would be:
> >>
> >> - use a new RR, not TXT
> >>
> >
> > This is likely to happen.
> >
> > - have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option
> >>   (so no lists at all) since >1 value needs to be supported
> >>   at the DNS level anyway
> >>    - that'd mean exactly one ciphersuite
> >>    - exactly one key share
> >>
> >
> > I don't agree with this. It is going to lead to a lot of redundancy
> because
> > many
> > servers will support >1 cipher suite with the same key share. Moreover,
> from
> > an implementation perspective, supporting >1 RR would be quite a bit more
> > work.
>
> Aren't DNS answers RRsets? I may be wrong but I thought DNS
> clients have to handle that anyway,


Not really, because any of them is co-valid. We currently permit >1 RR, but
actually
I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this. This would be
especially
true if we get rid of expiry, because then there would be no good reason to
have
>1 ESNIKeys record with a given version.


and I'd expect use of
> RRsets to be a part of figuring out a multi-CDN stpry.
>

That's not at all obvious.


> That said, >1 ciphersuite wouldn't be so bad if that were
> the only list per RData instance. Or maybe one could get
> rid of it entirely via some conditional link the to set
> of suites in the CH, not sure. (Or just go fully experimental
> and say everyone doing esni for now has to use the same
> suite all the time.)
>

I've implemented this and did not find it to be a major obstacle.
I do not think unnecessary duplication is a good tradeoff for
such a trivial implementation complexity reduction.


>    - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)
> >>
> >
> > Again, not a fan of this. It leads to redundancy.
>
> That's reasonable. OTOH, it's equally reasonable to say that
> we're dealing with an experimental draft and a future PS
> version could use another RRytpe and add extensions if they
> end up needed.
>

I don't see any advantage to choosing a suboptimal design, just
based on it being Experimental.

Incidentally, there seems to be some uncertainty about the status.
I'm not quite sure why this is marked Experimental (I think it may
have just been a thinko on my part), and the chairs didn't
ask at call for acceptance time, so I'd encourage them to sort that
out.




> >
> >
> > - get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
> >>   are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
> >>
> >
> > I'm mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are useful,
> > as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.
>
> If there were a justification offered for 'em I'd be
> ok with it, but TBH, I'm not seeing it. And my main
> experience of the similar dates on RRSIGs are that they
> just break things and don't help.


This has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs, so I'm
not sure that's that useful an analogy.



> Put another way, I
> don't know what sensible code to write to decide between
> not connecting or sending SNI in clear if one of these
> dates is out of whack. (I be tempted to just ignore the
> time constraints and try send the SNI encrypted instead.)
>

You should connect with SNI in the clear.


And having to deploy a cron job equivalent for the DNS
> data is an order of magnitude harder than not.
>

Nothing stops you having an infinite expiry.

>
> >
> > - get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must
> >>   always use the max (260?) -
> >
> >
> > I'm not in favor of this. The CH is big enough as it is, and this has a
> > pretty big impact on that, especially for QUIC. There are plenty of
> > scenarios where the upper  limit is known and << 160.
>
> True, big CH's are a bit naff, but my (perhaps wrong)
> assumption was that nobody cared since the F5 bug.


This has nothing to do with the F5 bug. It's about not exceeding one
packet in the QUIC CH.


It
> seems a bit wrong though to have every domain that's
> behind the same front have to publish this.


They also have to publish the key, so I don't really see a problem.


I'm also
> not sure it'll work well if we ever end up with cases
> where domains A and B both use fronts/CDNs x and y and
> can't figure out a good value as x prefers 132 and y
> prefers 260.
>

They will also use different keys for x and y, so they will
have different records and can have different pad lengghts.


How about rounding up to the nearest power of 2 that's
> bigger than 5? (Or some such.)


I don't know what this means.



> > that needs to be the same
> >>   for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on
> >>   'em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems
> >>   fragile
> >>
> >
> > It only has to be the same for all the ones in the anonymity set, and
> they
> > already need to coordinate on the key.
>
> Saying that every key share in DNS needs to be published
> with the same padded_length would be ok actually.


Sure, I can make that explicit.

(As a
> nasty hack, you could even derive the padded_length
> from the value of the key_share and fronters could just
> keep generating shares until they get one that works:-)
>

I thought you were complaining about complexity

-Ekr


> > - I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
> >>   hard to handle
> >> - (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
> >>   friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
> >>   defined in addition)
> >>
> >
> > We are likely to drop the base64 encoding.
>
> Ack.
>
> And just to note again - I suspect a bunch of the above would
> be better sorted out as ancillary changes once a multi-CDN
> proposal is figured out.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> >
> >> [1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> TLS mailing list
> >> TLS@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >>
> >
>

--000000000000640f8e057b22456a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Nov 20, 2018 at 4:36 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.far=
rell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
On 20/11/2018 23:30, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 1:46 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&=
gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Hiya,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I&#39;ve started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]<br=
>
&gt;&gt; (Don&#39;t be scared though, it&#39;ll likely be taken over by a<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; student in the new year:-)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks for your comments. Responses below.<br>
<br>
Ditto.<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too<br>
&gt;&gt; complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones<br>
&gt;&gt; I&#39;d argue for would be:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - use a new RR, not TXT<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is likely to happen.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; - have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0(so no lists at all) since &gt;1 value needs to be sup=
ported<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0at the DNS level anyway<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - that&#39;d mean exactly one ciphersuite<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - exactly one key share<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don&#39;t agree with this. It is going to lead to a lot of redundanc=
y because<br>
&gt; many<br>
&gt; servers will support &gt;1 cipher suite with the same key share. Moreo=
ver, from<br>
&gt; an implementation perspective, supporting &gt;1 RR would be quite a bi=
t more<br>
&gt; work.<br>
<br>
Aren&#39;t DNS answers RRsets? I may be wrong but I thought DNS<br>
clients have to handle that anyway,</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Not rea=
lly, because any of them is co-valid. We currently permit &gt;1 RR, but act=
ually</div><div>I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this. =
This would be especially</div><div>true if we get rid of expiry, because th=
en there would be no good reason to have</div><div>&gt;1 ESNIKeys record wi=
th a given version.<br></div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex"> and I&#39;d expect use of<br>
RRsets to be a part of figuring out a multi-CDN stpry.<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>That&#39;s not at all obvious.</div><div><br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
That said, &gt;1 ciphersuite wouldn&#39;t be so bad if that were<br>
the only list per RData instance. Or maybe one could get<br>
rid of it entirely via some conditional link the to set<br>
of suites in the CH, not sure. (Or just go fully experimental<br>
and say everyone doing esni for now has to use the same<br>
suite all the time.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve implement=
ed this and did not find it to be a major obstacle.</div><div>I do not thin=
k unnecessary duplication is a good tradeoff for</div><div>such a trivial i=
mplementation complexity reduction.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Again, not a fan of this. It leads to redundancy.<br>
<br>
That&#39;s reasonable. OTOH, it&#39;s equally reasonable to say that<br>
we&#39;re dealing with an experimental draft and a future PS<br>
version could use another RRytpe and add extensions if they<br>
end up needed.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t see any adva=
ntage to choosing a suboptimal design, just</div><div>based on it being Exp=
erimental.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Incidentally, there seems to be som=
e uncertainty about the status.</div><div>I&#39;m not quite sure why this i=
s marked Experimental (I think it may</div><div>have just been a thinko on =
my part), and the chairs didn&#39;t</div><div>ask at call for acceptance ti=
me, so I&#39;d encourage them to sort that</div><div>out.<br></div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; - get rid of not_before/not_after - I don&#39;t believe those<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0are useful given TTLs and they&#39;ll just lead to fai=
lures<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I&#39;m mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are u=
seful,<br>
&gt; as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.<br>
<br>
If there were a justification offered for &#39;em I&#39;d be<br>
ok with it, but TBH, I&#39;m not seeing it. And my main<br>
experience of the similar dates on RRSIGs are that they<br>
just break things and don&#39;t help.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>This =
has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs, so I&#39;m</div><div>n=
ot sure that&#39;s that useful an analogy.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0<=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> Put another way, I<br>
don&#39;t know what sensible code to write to decide between<br>
not connecting or sending SNI in clear if one of these<br>
dates is out of whack. (I be tempted to just ignore the<br>
time constraints and try send the SNI encrypted instead.)<br></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>You should connect with SNI in the clear.</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
And having to deploy a cron job equivalent for the DNS<br>
data is an order of magnitude harder than not.<br></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>Nothing stops you having an infinite expiry. <br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; - get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0always use the max (260?) -<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I&#39;m not in favor of this. The CH is big enough as it is, and this =
has a<br>
&gt; pretty big impact on that, especially for QUIC. There are plenty of<br=
>
&gt; scenarios where the upper=C2=A0 limit is known and &lt;&lt; 160.<br>
<br>
True, big CH&#39;s are a bit naff, but my (perhaps wrong)<br>
assumption was that nobody cared since the F5 bug.</blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>This has nothing to do with the F5 bug. It&#39;s about not exceedin=
g one</div><div>packet in the QUIC CH.<br></div><div><br></div><div> <br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> It<br>
seems a bit wrong though to have every domain that&#39;s<br>
behind the same front have to publish this. </blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>They also have to publish the key, so I don&#39;t really see a problem.</=
div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I&#39;m =
also<br>
not sure it&#39;ll work well if we ever end up with cases<br>
where domains A and B both use fronts/CDNs x and y and<br>
can&#39;t figure out a good value as x prefers 132 and y<br>
prefers 260.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>They will also use differe=
nt keys for x and y, so they will</div><div>have different records and can =
have different pad lengghts.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">
How about rounding up to the nearest power of 2 that&#39;s<br>
bigger than 5? (Or some such.) </blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t=
 know what this means.</div><div><br></div>=C2=A0<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex">
&gt; that needs to be the same<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on<br=
>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&#39;em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems=
<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0fragile<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It only has to be the same for all the ones in the anonymity set, and =
they<br>
&gt; already need to coordinate on the key.<br>
<br>
Saying that every key share in DNS needs to be published<br>
with the same padded_length would be ok actually. </blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>Sure, I can make that explicit.<br></div><div> <br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">(As a<br>
nasty hack, you could even derive the padded_length<br>
from the value of the key_share and fronters could just<br>
keep generating shares until they get one that works:-)<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>I thought you were complaining about complexity</div><div>=
<br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; - I&#39;m not convinced the checksum is useful, but it&#39;s not<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0hard to handle<br>
&gt;&gt; - (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text for=
mat<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0defined in addition)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; We are likely to drop the base64 encoding.<br>
<br>
Ack.<br>
<br>
And just to note again - I suspect a bunch of the above would<br>
be better sorted out as ancillary changes once a multi-CDN<br>
proposal is figured out.<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnist=
uff" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/=
tree/master/esnistuff</a><br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 01:27:19 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <8546c227-a5e1-e17b-edce-ca173c8cfa81@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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(Trimming bits down...)

On 21/11/2018 00:59, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 4:36 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd=
=2Eie>
>> Aren't DNS answers RRsets? I may be wrong but I thought DNS
>> clients have to handle that anyway,
>=20
>=20
> Not really, because any of them is co-valid.=20

Sure, in DNS terms.

> We currently permit >1 RR, but
> actually
> I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this.=20

Not sure we can and I suspect that'd raise DNS-folks' hackles,
but maybe I'm wrong.

>> That said, >1 ciphersuite wouldn't be so bad if that were
>> the only list per RData instance. Or maybe one could get
>> rid of it entirely via some conditional link the to set
>> of suites in the CH, not sure. (Or just go fully experimental
>> and say everyone doing esni for now has to use the same
>> suite all the time.)
>>
>=20
> I've implemented this and did not find it to be a major obstacle.
> I do not think unnecessary duplication is a good tradeoff for
> such a trivial implementation complexity reduction.

Sure a list of ciphersuites isn't bad. But the current
design has a set of keys and a set of ciphersuites and a
set of extensions and a set of Rdata values in the RRset.

Surely we can collapse at least most of those down to
one list without too much of a problem. And as to trivial,
I'd bet a beer on such complexity being a source of bugs
every time.

> I don't see any advantage to choosing a suboptimal design, just
> based on it being Experimental.

All designs are suboptimal for someone:-)

>>> - get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
>>>>   are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'm mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are usef=
ul,
>>> as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.
>>
>> If there were a justification offered for 'em I'd be
>> ok with it, but TBH, I'm not seeing it. And my main
>> experience of the similar dates on RRSIGs are that they
>> just break things and don't help.
>=20
>=20
> This has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs, so I'm
> not sure that's that useful an analogy.

Disagree. They're both specifying a time window for DNS data.
Same problems will arise is my bet.

My main ask though for these time values is that their presence
be explicitly justified. That's missing now, and I suspect won't
be convincing, but maybe I'll turn out to be wrong.

>> Put another way, I
>> don't know what sensible code to write to decide between
>> not connecting or sending SNI in clear if one of these
>> dates is out of whack. (I be tempted to just ignore the
>> time constraints and try send the SNI encrypted instead.)
>>
>=20
> You should connect with SNI in the clear.

As a generic browser, I guess so. As some specialised
privacy sensitive application, not sure. As a library
that could be used for either, I'm not clear there's a
good answer other than ignoring the artificial time
window and encrypting anyway.

> And having to deploy a cron job equivalent for the DNS
>> data is an order of magnitude harder than not.
>>
>=20
> Nothing stops you having an infinite expiry.

Nothing stops us deleting the useless dates:-)

> They will also use different keys for x and y, so they will
> have different records and can have different pad lengghts.

All going well, yes. All not going well, the pad lengths
may get out of whack, exposing names.

> How about rounding up to the nearest power of 2 that's
>> bigger than 5? (Or some such.)
>=20
> I don't know what this means.

Ah sorry. I meant just take the length of the server
name and pad to the shortest of 32, 64, 128 or 256
octets. (Or some other breakpoints.) I'm sure we could
do some measurement so that an acceptable fraction of
names fit in the shortest bucket. (Didn't DKG do work
on that for DNS padding?)

>> (As a
>> nasty hack, you could even derive the padded_length
>> from the value of the key_share and fronters could just
>> keep generating shares until they get one that works:-)
>=20
> I thought you were complaining about complexity

That's not complex, it's just waay hacky:-) It'd actually
be simpler for the client to just take some (e.g. low order)
bits of the key share as the padded_length. More work for
the people generating the key share yes, (they need to keep
iterating 'till they find a key share that works for their
preferred padding_length) but that's easy, offline, done by
fewer folks and removes a way of screwing up the ops.

All-in-all, while it's too hacky it's not complex at all.

Cheers,
S.

>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
>>> - I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
>>>>   hard to handle
>>>> - (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
>>>>   friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
>>>>   defined in addition)
>>>>
>>>
>>> We are likely to drop the base64 encoding.
>>
>> Ack.
>>
>> And just to note again - I suspect a bunch of the above would
>> be better sorted out as ancillary changes once a multi-CDN
>> proposal is figured out.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> [1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>
>>
>=20

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 18:34:42 -0800
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 6:04 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> >    Sure a list of ciphersuites isn't bad. But the current
>     design has a set of keys and a set of ciphersuites and a
>     set of extensions and a set of Rdata values in the RRset.
>
> Since this is defined for TLS 1.3 with all known-good ciphers, can't that
> field be eliminated?
>

No, I don't think so. The server might choose to not support one of the TLS
1.3 ciphers, for instance. And even if that weren't true, how would we add
new ciphers?

-Ekr


> >    I'd bet a beer on such complexity being a source of bugs
>     every time.
>
> All sorts of aphorisms come to mind. :)
>
>     > This has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs, so I'm
>     > not sure that's that useful an analogy.
>
>     Disagree. They're both specifying a time window for DNS data.
>     Same problems will arise is my bet.
>
> I am inclined to agree.
>
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Nov 20, 2018 at 6:04 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com=
">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&=
gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Sure a list of ciphersuites isn&#39;t bad. But the current=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 design has a set of keys and a set of ciphersuites and a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 set of extensions and a set of Rdata values in the RRset.<br>
<br>
Since this is defined for TLS 1.3 with all known-good ciphers, can&#39;t th=
at field be eliminated?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, I don&#39;t=
 think so. The server might choose to not support one of the TLS 1.3 cipher=
s, for instance. And even if that weren&#39;t true, how would we add new ci=
phers?<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I&#39;d bet a beer on such complexity being a source of b=
ugs<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 every time.<br>
<br>
All sorts of aphorisms come to mind. :) <br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &gt; This has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs=
, so I&#39;m<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &gt; not sure that&#39;s that useful an analogy.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Disagree. They&#39;re both specifying a time window for DNS d=
ata.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Same problems will arise is my bet.<br>
<br>
I am inclined to agree.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000d86ed1057b239971--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 20:06:01 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNVW3am4XQd2SB-TgwDdfXu932rdXTyTVR=H6Et3ne4mA@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 7:40 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - No, I don't think so. The server might choose to not support one of
>    the TLS 1.3 ciphers, for instance. And even if that weren't true, how =
would
>    we add new ciphers?
>
>
>
> Standard TLS negotiation. I don=E2=80=99t see that we need to specify cip=
hers at
> the DNS layer. A client with new ciphers will add it in the hello message
> and the server will pick one it supports.  It seems complex and fragile
> (keeping the server cipher config, not just the fronted hosts, in sync wi=
th
> DNS).
>

I'm sorry, I'm not quite following. In this draft, ESNI ciphers are
orthogonal to the ciphers used to encrypt the TLS records.This is perhaps
easier to see in a split configuration, where (for instance) the
client-facing server might support only AES-128-GCM and the back-end server
might support only ChaCha/Poly1305. As you say, the negotiation works well
for the TLS records, but that doesn't influence the ESNI encryption cipher
suite selection (because that happens before the Hello exchange). So, if we
don't provide a list of the ESNI ciphers in the ESNIKeys record, then we
are effectively creating a fixed list.

Am I missing something here?

-Ekr


>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Nov 20, 2018 at 7:40 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com=
">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"m_-2151992464851175308WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_-2151992464851175308MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0=
in">No, I don&#39;t think so. The server might choose to not support one of=
 the TLS 1.3 ciphers, for instance. And even if that weren&#39;t true, how =
would we add new ciphers?<u></u><u></u></li></ul>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Standard TLS negotiation. I don=E2=80=99t see that w=
e need to specify ciphers at the DNS layer. A client with new ciphers will =
add it in the hello message and the server will pick one it supports.=C2=A0=
 It seems complex and fragile (keeping the server
 cipher config, not just the fronted hosts, in sync with DNS).</p></div></d=
iv></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m sorry, I&#39;m not quite =
following. In this draft, ESNI ciphers are orthogonal to the ciphers used t=
o encrypt the TLS records.This is perhaps easier to see in a split configur=
ation, where (for instance) the client-facing server might support only AES=
-128-GCM and the back-end server might support only ChaCha/Poly1305. As you=
 say, the negotiation works well for the TLS records, but that doesn&#39;t =
influence the ESNI encryption cipher suite selection (because that happens =
before the Hello exchange). So, if we don&#39;t provide a list of the ESNI =
ciphers in the ESNIKeys record, then we are effectively creating a fixed li=
st.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Am I missing something here?<br></div><div=
><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><di=
v link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"m_-2151992464=
851175308WordSection1"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Wed, 21 Nov 2018, Stephen Farrell wrote:

>> We currently permit >1 RR, but
>> actually
>> I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this.
>
> Not sure we can and I suspect that'd raise DNS-folks' hackles,
> but maybe I'm wrong.

I think the SOA record is the only exception allowed (and there
is an exception to that when doing AXFR I believe)

Usually these things are defined as "pick the first DNS RRTYPE
that satisfies you".

>>>> - get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
>>>>>   are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm mostly ambivalent on this, but on balance, I think these are useful,
>>>> as they are not tied to potentially fragile DNS TTLs.
>>>
>>> If there were a justification offered for 'em I'd be
>>> ok with it, but TBH, I'm not seeing it. And my main
>>> experience of the similar dates on RRSIGs are that they
>>> just break things and don't help.
>>
>>
>> This has a totally different expiry behavior from RRSIGs, so I'm
>> not sure that's that useful an analogy.
>
> Disagree. They're both specifying a time window for DNS data.
> Same problems will arise is my bet.

You mean the problem of not being able to replay old data? :)

> My main ask though for these time values is that their presence
> be explicitly justified. That's missing now, and I suspect won't
> be convincing, but maybe I'll turn out to be wrong.

Note that TTLs are about the caching of data and nothing else. If
the content of your record requires some specific time of death,
you cannot rely on TTL. Note that a TTL on a received RRTYPE can
have any value under the published TTL on the authoritative server
if it was flowing through caching recursive servers. So you cannot
use a TTL for some other kind of expiry value for another protocol.
Also, DNS software sometimes enforces maximum and minimum TTL values,
so again, do not use DNS TTL for other protocol timing parameters.

Although, if I am correct, the epectation is that all of this data
will be used without mandating DNSSEC validation, so all these
security parameters could be modified by any DNS party in transit
to try and break the protocol or privacy of the user. The "not DNSSEC
camel" is growing fast.

Paul
Paul


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From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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* Paul Wouters:

> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
>>> We currently permit >1 RR, but
>>> actually
>>> I suspect that it would be better to try to restrict this.
>>
>> Not sure we can and I suspect that'd raise DNS-folks' hackles,
>> but maybe I'm wrong.
>
> I think the SOA record is the only exception allowed (and there
> is an exception to that when doing AXFR I believe)
>
> Usually these things are defined as "pick the first DNS RRTYPE
> that satisfies you".

Not sure what you mean by that (RRTYPE?).

The DNAME algorithm (RFC 6672) only works if there is a single DNAME
record for an owner name.  RFC 1034 is also pretty clear that only CNAME
record is permitted per owner name.

To be honest, I don't expect much opposition from DNS people, as long as
there is no expectation that the DNS layer is expected to reject
multiple records.  If the higher-level protocol treats non-singleton
RRsets as a hard error, I expect that would be fine.

DNS treats RRsets as an atomic unit, so there is no risk here that a
zone file change ends up producing a multi-record RRset due to caching.

Thanks,
Florian


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--000000000000385d06057b2d0ee9
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 11:28 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> Although, if I am correct, the epectation is that all of this data
> will be used without mandating DNSSEC validation, so all these
> security parameters could be modified by any DNS party in transit
> to try and break the protocol or privacy of the user.
>

Yes, because being able to modify the A/AAAA records is generally
sufficient to
determine the SNI. See:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-7.1

-Ekr

--000000000000385d06057b2d0ee9
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 11:28 PM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Although, if I am correct, the epectation is that all of this data<br>
will be used without mandating DNSSEC validation, so all these<br>
security parameters could be modified by any DNS party in transit<br>
to try and break the protocol or privacy of the user. <br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Yes, because being able to modify the A/AAAA records is gen=
erally sufficient to</div><div>determine the SNI. See: <a href=3D"https://t=
ools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-7.1">https://tools.ietf.o=
rg/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-7.1</a><br></div><div><br></div><div=
>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000385d06057b2d0ee9--


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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 08:50:21 +1100
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Subject: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2
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In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about
what the semantics of an empty value is here.  Some implementations
seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes
that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms
extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)

The text on CertificateRequest is less clear about what to do.  That's
understandable because it doesn't have to deal with the value being
absent because it's not optional.  All we have to go on is this from
Section 7.4.8:

   The hash and signature algorithms used in the signature MUST be
   one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms field
   of the CertificateRequest message.

We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field
as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.
We'll send a fatal alert if we receive one.

This is consistent with our handling of the signature_algorithms
extension, where we treat an empty list as a failure.


From nobody Wed Nov 21 13:56:55 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2
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> On Nov 21, 2018, at 4:50 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about
> what the semantics of an empty value is here.  Some implementations
> seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes
> that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms
> extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)
>=20
> [...]
>=20
> We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field
> as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.
> We'll send a fatal alert if we receive one.

Sounds reasonable, provided the application did or would have actually
provided a client certificate to use.  If the application would have
continued with an empty certificate list, and no CertificateVerify,
then hanging up is arguably counter-productive.  Of course the server
should still not send a certificate request that could never be =
satisfied,
so perhaps snatching victory from the jaws of defeat is not worth the
trouble even when the client has no certificate to send?

--=20
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Empty CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2
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--0000000000009e7fbc057b33e416
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On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:50 PM Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about
> what the semantics of an empty value is here.  Some implementations
> seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes
> that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms
> extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)
>
> The text on CertificateRequest is less clear about what to do.  That's
> understandable because it doesn't have to deal with the value being
> absent because it's not optional.  All we have to go on is this from
> Section 7.4.8:
>
>    The hash and signature algorithms used in the signature MUST be
>    one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms field
>    of the CertificateRequest message.
>
> We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field
> as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.
> We'll send a fatal alert if we receive one.
>

Yes, I believe this is the right approach.

-Ekr


> This is consistent with our handling of the signature_algorithms
> extension, where we treat an empty list as a failure.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000009e7fbc057b33e416
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed=
, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:50 PM Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martin.thoms=
on@gmail.com">martin.thomson@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex">In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question c=
ame up about<br>
what the semantics of an empty value is here.=C2=A0 Some implementations<br=
>
seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes<br>
that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms<br>
extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)<br>
<br>
The text on CertificateRequest is less clear about what to do.=C2=A0 That&#=
39;s<br>
understandable because it doesn&#39;t have to deal with the value being<br>
absent because it&#39;s not optional.=C2=A0 All we have to go on is this fr=
om<br>
Section 7.4.8:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The hash and signature algorithms used in the signature MUST b=
e<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms fie=
ld<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the CertificateRequest message.<br>
<br>
We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field<br>
as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.<br>
We&#39;ll send a fatal alert if we receive one.<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Yes, I believe this is the right approach.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
This is consistent with our handling of the signature_algorithms<br>
extension, where we treat an empty list as a failure.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000009e7fbc057b33e416--


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On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 3:50 PM Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up about
> what the semantics of an empty value is here.  Some implementations
> seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes
> that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms
> extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)
>

In the ClientHello, I believe an empty signature_algorithms extension is
invalid. The structure is defined as:

      SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
        supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;

BoringSSL enforces this. If your ClientHello has an empty
signature_algorithms extension, we will reject it. If it is missing, we do
interpret it as {*, SHA1}, as TLS 1.2 (mistakenly) prescribes.


> The text on CertificateRequest is less clear about what to do.  That's
> understandable because it doesn't have to deal with the value being
> absent because it's not optional.  All we have to go on is this from
> Section 7.4.8:
>
>    The hash and signature algorithms used in the signature MUST be
>    one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms field
>    of the CertificateRequest message.
>
> We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field
> as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.
> We'll send a fatal alert if we receive one.
>


> This is consistent with our handling of the signature_algorithms
> extension, where we treat an empty list as a failure.
>

Sadly, the structure itself has a syntax error, so it's unclear whether
empty is allowed or not. :-)

      struct {
          ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
          SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
            supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
          DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
      } CertificateRequest;

We do tolerate empty and give it the same {*, SHA1} interpretation as
ClientHello, since they go through the same logic, but I agree with you
that the specification does not actually say it applies to both. Rejecting
the empty list sounds like a good idea, assuming it's compatible with
current implementations. The 7.4.8 citation looks right, and rejecting it
makes sense on general principle. IMO, the default {*, SHA1} bit in TLS 1.2
was a mistake. It's caused unnecessary confusion, resulting in buggy TLS
1.2 servers that only sign SHA-1.

Maybe we should errata this by fixing that <2^16-1> to <2..2^16-1>?

David

--000000000000193cac057b33ff77
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Nov 21=
, 2018 at 3:50 PM Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martin.thomson@gmail=
.com">martin.thomson@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex">In attempting to fix a bug related to this, a question came up a=
bout<br>
what the semantics of an empty value is here.=C2=A0 Some implementations<br=
>
seem to infer that empty means {*,SHA1}, which effectively assumes<br>
that an empty value is equivalent to an absent signature_algorithms<br>
extension (Section 7.4.1.4.1)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In the Cl=
ientHello, I believe an empty signature_algorithms extension is invalid. Th=
e structure is defined as:</div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 SignatureAndHashAlgorithm</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 support=
ed_signature_algorithms&lt;2..2^16-2&gt;;</div></div><div><br></div><div>Bo=
ringSSL enforces this. If your ClientHello has an empty signature_algorithm=
s extension, we will reject it. If it is missing, we do interpret it as {*,=
 SHA1}, as TLS 1.2 (mistakenly) prescribes.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex">
The text on CertificateRequest is less clear about what to do.=C2=A0 That&#=
39;s<br>
understandable because it doesn&#39;t have to deal with the value being<br>
absent because it&#39;s not optional.=C2=A0 All we have to go on is this fr=
om<br>
Section 7.4.8:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The hash and signature algorithms used in the signature MUST b=
e<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms fie=
ld<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the CertificateRequest message.<br>
<br>
We think that treating an empty supported_signature_algorithms field<br>
as an error is the best response and plan to implement that change.<br>
We&#39;ll send a fatal alert if we receive one.<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
This is consistent with our handling of the signature_algorithms<br>
extension, where we treat an empty list as a failure.<br></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>Sadly, the structure itself has a syntax error, so it&#39;s =
unclear whether empty is allowed or not. :-)<br><br><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 struct {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ClientCertificate=
Type certificate_types&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 SignatureAndHashAlgorithm</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 supported_signature_algorithms&lt;2^16-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DistinguishedName certificate_authorities&l=
t;0..2^16-1&gt;;</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } CertificateRequest;</div>=
</div><div><br></div><div>We do tolerate empty and give it the same {*, SHA=
1} interpretation as ClientHello, since they go through the same logic, but=
 I agree with you that the specification does not actually say it applies t=
o both. Rejecting the empty list sounds like a good idea, assuming it&#39;s=
 compatible with current implementations. The 7.4.8 citation looks right, a=
nd rejecting it makes sense on general principle. IMO, the default {*, SHA1=
} bit in TLS 1.2 was a mistake. It&#39;s caused unnecessary confusion, resu=
lting in buggy TLS 1.2 servers that only sign SHA-1.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Maybe we should errata this by fixing that &lt;2^16-1&gt; to &lt;2..2^16=
-1&gt;?</div><div><br></div><div>David</div></div></div>

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On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 9:08 AM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> Maybe we should errata this by fixing that <2^16-1> to <2..2^16-1>?

https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid2864 was filed a while ago.
Apparently also erratum 1585 found an error.

We really need a view of these documents that includes errata.


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Issues and Requirements for SNI Encryption in TLS
        Authors         : Christian Huitema
                          Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-04.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2018-11-22

Abstract:
   This draft describes the general problem of encryption of the Server
   Name Identification (SNI) parameter.  The proposed solutions hide a
   Hidden Service behind a Fronting Service, only disclosing the SNI of
   the Fronting Service to external observers.  The draft lists known
   attacks against SNI encryption, discusses the current "co-tenancy
   fronting" solution, and presents requirements for future TLS layer
   solutions.

   In practice, it may well be that no solution can meet every
   requirement, and that practical solutions will have to make some
   compromises.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-04
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:

   Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
   against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against
   DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case
   where SNI.

Where SNI what?

I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the
only existing way to choose privacy.

The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to
face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that
snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
is confusing as it stands now.

Nick.


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To: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <96041c0d-7fad-71a3-87dd-c12a1947c00e@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni
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On 25/11/2018 17:18, Nick Lamb wrote:
> In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:
>=20
>    Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defens=
e
>    against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses agains=
t
>    DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common cas=
e
>    where SNI.
>=20
> Where SNI what?

I'm guessing what's missing is an argument that DoT or DoH can
(if better than opportunistic) counter some local attacks that'd be
similarly mitigated by DNSSEC.

> I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
> to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the=

> only existing way to choose privacy.

Perhaps (exceptionally) less so in this case. The client here
depends on confidentiality of the DNS query for both the A/AAAA
and ESNIKeys RR's, so an authenticated DoT or DoH connection
to a chosen recursive could be a pretty good defence here. And
DNSSEC alone (hard fail or not) isn't sufficient.

> The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to=

> face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that=

> snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
> anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
> is confusing as it stands now.

FWIW, I'd have no issue with more strongly encouraging DNSSEC,
but I think ESNI turns out to be a situation where the presence
or absence of DNSSEC perhaps makes less difference that in other
TLS cases. For example, I think there's a stronger argument for
DNSSEC being used to secure CAA RRs or those used by any ACME
challenges, than there is for reasons related to ESNI.

Cheers,
S.


>=20
> Nick.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 14:43:01 -0800
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On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 1:36 PM Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> wrote:

> In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:
>
>    Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
>    against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against
>    DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case
>    where SNI.
>
> Where SNI what?
>

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/commit/1ed8d7d02c3b0884ac20c93f891d2745ab0f9d49

-Ekr



>
> I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
> to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the
> only existing way to choose privacy.
>
> The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to
> face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that
> snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
> anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
> is confusing as it stands now.
>
> Nick.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 1:36 PM Nick Lamb &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
njl@tlrmx.org">njl@tlrmx.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex">In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a =
defense<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses =
against<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a comm=
on case<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0where SNI.<br>
<br>
Where SNI what?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/commit/1ed8d7d02c3b0884ac20c93f891d2745ab0=
f9d49">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/commit/1ed8d7d02c3b0884=
ac20c93f891d2745ab0f9d49</a></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></=
div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I&#39;d be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you<=
br>
to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the<br>
only existing way to choose privacy.<br>
<br>
The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don&#39;t want to=
<br>
face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that<br>
snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley&#39;s phrase) is a good idea<br>
anyway. But regardless of whether I&#39;m correct about that, the sentence<=
br>
is confusing as it stands now.<br>
<br>
Nick.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 14:43:46 -0800
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: njl@tlrmx.org, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni
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On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 2:08 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 25/11/2018 17:18, Nick Lamb wrote:
> > In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:
> >
> >    Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
> >    against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against
> >    DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case
> >    where SNI.
> >
> > Where SNI what?
>
> I'm guessing what's missing is an argument that DoT or DoH can
> (if better than opportunistic) counter some local attacks that'd be
> similarly mitigated by DNSSEC.
>

Actually, these local attacks are better mitigated by DoH/DoT, because
what you want is to conceal the name you are looking up.

-Ekr



> I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
> > to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the
> > only existing way to choose privacy.
>
> Perhaps (exceptionally) less so in this case. The client here
> depends on confidentiality of the DNS query for both the A/AAAA
> and ESNIKeys RR's, so an authenticated DoT or DoH connection
> to a chosen recursive could be a pretty good defence here. And
> DNSSEC alone (hard fail or not) isn't sufficient.
>
> > The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to
> > face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that
> > snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
> > anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
> > is confusing as it stands now.
>
> FWIW, I'd have no issue with more strongly encouraging DNSSEC,
> but I think ESNI turns out to be a situation where the presence
> or absence of DNSSEC perhaps makes less difference that in other
> TLS cases. For example, I think there's a stronger argument for
> DNSSEC being used to secure CAA RRs or those used by any ACME
> challenges, than there is for reasons related to ESNI.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
>
> >
> > Nick.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon=
, Nov 26, 2018 at 2:08 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.far=
rell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 25/11/2018 17:18, Nick Lamb wrote:<br>
&gt; In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) =
is a defense<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defe=
nses against<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a=
 common case<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 where SNI.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Where SNI what?<br>
<br>
I&#39;m guessing what&#39;s missing is an argument that DoT or DoH can<br>
(if better than opportunistic) counter some local attacks that&#39;d be<br>
similarly mitigated by DNSSEC.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Actually=
, these local attacks are better mitigated by DoH/DoT, because</div><div>wh=
at you want is to conceal the name you are looking up.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
&gt; I&#39;d be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force=
 you<br>
&gt; to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is th=
e<br>
&gt; only existing way to choose privacy.<br>
<br>
Perhaps (exceptionally) less so in this case. The client here<br>
depends on confidentiality of the DNS query for both the A/AAAA<br>
and ESNIKeys RR&#39;s, so an authenticated DoT or DoH connection<br>
to a chosen recursive could be a pretty good defence here. And<br>
DNSSEC alone (hard fail or not) isn&#39;t sufficient.<br>
<br>
&gt; The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don&#39;t wa=
nt to<br>
&gt; face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt tha=
t<br>
&gt; snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley&#39;s phrase) is a good idea<=
br>
&gt; anyway. But regardless of whether I&#39;m correct about that, the sent=
ence<br>
&gt; is confusing as it stands now.<br>
<br>
FWIW, I&#39;d have no issue with more strongly encouraging DNSSEC,<br>
but I think ESNI turns out to be a situation where the presence<br>
or absence of DNSSEC perhaps makes less difference that in other<br>
TLS cases. For example, I think there&#39;s a stronger argument for<br>
DNSSEC being used to secure CAA RRs or those used by any ACME<br>
challenges, than there is for reasons related to ESNI.<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Nick.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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