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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 12:10:36 +0300
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Subject: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Dear All,

JFYI. Via Feisti Duck nerwsletter.

https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management

The eTLS key exchange shall use exactly the same messages and procedures to
establish a set of session keys as a
TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, except for two differences
[2].
1) the server shall use a static public/private key pair at Step 2 in
clause 4.3.1; and
2) the server's certificate at Step 5 shall contain visibility information
as defined in clause 4.3.3 to indicate to the
client that eTLS is in use.
NOTE: Neither the static public key nor the visibility information affects
the operation of a TLS 1.3 compliant
client, so an eTLS server is therefore fully interoperable with TLS 1.3
compliant clients.

-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--000000000000a4add5057bf24acb
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dear All,<div><br></div>=
<div>JFYI. Via Feisti=C2=A0Duck nerwsletter.</div><div><br></div><div><a hr=
ef=3D"https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-release=
s-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management">https://www=
.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-standards-for-e=
nterprise-security-and-data-centre-management</a></div><div><br></div><div>=
<div>The eTLS key exchange shall use exactly the same messages and procedur=
es to establish a set of session keys as a</div><div>TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diff=
ie-Hellman key exchange, except for two differences [2].</div><div>1) the s=
erver shall use a static public/private key pair at Step 2 in clause 4.3.1;=
 and</div><div>2) the server&#39;s certificate at Step 5 shall contain visi=
bility information as defined in clause 4.3.3 to indicate to the</div><div>=
client that eTLS is in use.</div><div>NOTE: Neither the static public key n=
or the visibility information affects the operation of a TLS 1.3 compliant<=
/div><div>client, so an eTLS server is therefore fully interoperable with T=
LS 1.3 compliant clients.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature">SY, Dmitry Belyavsky</div></div></div></div></di=
v>

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 07:59:45 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily
resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.

I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons they
should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traffic
is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decrypted
traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This does not seem to address a problem which was brought =
up when the similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, na=
mely any system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private key=
s, ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrari=
ly resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients=
.<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not a fan of systems like th=
is, but I believe for security reasons they should be designed in such a wa=
y that only the confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a &quot;visibil=
ity&quot; system isn&#39;t able to leverage the decrypted traffic to resume=
 decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.</div><div><br></div>--=
 <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_sig=
nature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div>

--000000000000dacb98057bf80141--


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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 19:11:54 +0300
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 6:59 PM Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:

> This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
> similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
> system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
> ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily
> resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.
>
> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons
> they should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of
> traffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the
> decrypted traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate
> clients.
>

I do not understand why the ETSI solution does not provide ability to
impersonate clients/servers.

-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sat=
, Dec 1, 2018 at 6:59 PM Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.c=
om">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">This does not seem to address a problem which was brough=
t up when the similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, =
namely any system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private k=
eys, ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitra=
rily resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clien=
ts.<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not a fan of systems like =
this, but I believe for security reasons they should be designed in such a =
way that only the confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a &quot;visib=
ility&quot; system isn&#39;t able to leverage the decrypted traffic to resu=
me decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.</div></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>I do not understand why the ETSI solution does not =
provide ability to impersonate clients/servers.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><=
/div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gm=
ail_signature">SY, Dmitry Belyavsky</div></div>

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 09:24:18 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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--00000000000039afd2057bf93012
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 8:12 AM Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> wrote:

> I do not understand why the ETSI solution does not provide ability to
> impersonate clients/servers.
>

My understanding of this solution is a "visibility" system would have
access to a not-so-ephemeral ECDHE private key. This gives it access (via
passive observation) to all session keys ultimately derived from ECDHE key
agreement, including the resumption master secret.

See RFC 8446, section 7.1: Key Schedule

(EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c hs traffic",
             |                     ClientHello...ServerHello)
             |                     = client_handshake_traffic_secret
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s hs traffic",
             |                     ClientHello...ServerHello)
             |                     = server_handshake_traffic_secret
             v
       Derive-Secret(., "derived", "")
             |
             v
   0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic",
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     = client_application_traffic_secret_0
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic",
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     = server_application_traffic_secret_0
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master",
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     = exporter_master_secret
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "res master",
                                   ClientHello...client Finished)
                                   = resumption_master_secret


-- 
Tony Arcieri

--00000000000039afd2057bf93012
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 8:12 AM Dmitry Belyavsky &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:be=
ldmit@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">beldmit@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div>I do not understand why the ETSI solution does no=
t provide ability to impersonate clients/servers.=C2=A0</div></div></div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>My understanding of this solution is a &quot=
;visibility&quot; system would have access to a not-so-ephemeral ECDHE priv=
ate key. This gives it access (via passive observation) to all session keys=
 ultimately derived from ECDHE key agreement, including the resumption mast=
er secret.</div><div><br></div><div>See RFC 8446, section 7.1: Key Schedule=
</div><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"box-sizing:border-box;overflow:auto=
;font-family:&quot;PT Mono&quot;,Monaco,monospace;font-size:14px;padding:10=
px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:10.5px;line-height:1.214;color:rgb(0,0,0);w=
ord-break:break-all;background-color:rgb(255,253,245);border:1px solid rgb(=
204,204,204);border-radius:4px">(EC)DHE -&gt; HKDF-Extract =3D Handshake Se=
cret
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;c hs traffic&quot;,
             |                     ClientHello...ServerHello)
             |                     =3D client_handshake_traffic_secret
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;s hs traffic&quot;,
             |                     ClientHello...ServerHello)
             |                     =3D server_handshake_traffic_secret
             v
       Derive-Secret(., &quot;derived&quot;, &quot;&quot;)
             |
             v
   0 -&gt; HKDF-Extract =3D Master Secret
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;c ap traffic&quot;,
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     =3D client_application_traffic_secret_0
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;s ap traffic&quot;,
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     =3D server_application_traffic_secret_0
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;exp master&quot;,
             |                     ClientHello...server Finished)
             |                     =3D exporter_master_secret
             |
             +-----&gt; Derive-Secret(., &quot;res master&quot;,
                                   ClientHello...client Finished)
                                   =3D resumption_master_secret</pre></div>=
</div><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail-m_8030754709920=
330927gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div></div>

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On 12/1/2018 9:24 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 8:12 AM Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com
> <mailto:beldmit@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     I do not understand why the ETSI solution does not provide ability
>     to impersonate clients/servers. 
>
>
> My understanding of this solution is a "visibility" system would have
> access to a not-so-ephemeral ECDHE private key. This gives it access
> (via passive observation) to all session keys ultimately derived from
> ECDHE key agreement, including the resumption master secret.


Which is indeed a huge problem. Security conscious implementations of
TLS should detect the use of such "enhancements", and either abort the
session or automatically treat it as insecure.

-- Christian Huitema


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/1/2018 9:24 AM, Tony Arcieri
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAHOTMV+ppxTmNaBdTOEkXzX_LWWcE=RMu4sxN3CsHTEga_8M2Q@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div dir="ltr">
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div dir="ltr">On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 8:12 AM Dmitry
              Belyavsky &lt;<a href="mailto:beldmit@gmail.com"
                target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">beldmit@gmail.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div dir="ltr">
                <div class="gmail_quote">
                  <div>I do not understand why the ETSI solution does
                    not provide ability to impersonate clients/servers. </div>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>My understanding of this solution is a "visibility"
              system would have access to a not-so-ephemeral ECDHE
              private key. This gives it access (via passive
              observation) to all session keys ultimately derived from
              ECDHE key agreement, including the resumption master
              secret.</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Which is indeed a huge problem. Security conscious
      implementations of TLS should detect the use of such
      "enhancements", and either abort the session or automatically
      treat it as insecure.</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
  </body>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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On 01/12/2018 09:10, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote:
> Dear All,
>=20
> JFYI. Via Feisti Duck nerwsletter.
>=20
> https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-=
standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management

Yes, it is a shame that ETSI's role in transport security
appears to be to stick their noses in the trough of cast-off
proposals that didn't garner IETF consensus due to insecurity.

I hope that that properly (i.e., negatively), influences
people's opinions of ETSI, and of any government or industry
body so easily open to capture. Put another way, the IETF's
imperfect but terrifically open process considered this for
more than a year, (once there were people who raised the
topic, no matter how ineptly) and concluded there was no
consensus to even start such work, whereas ETSI appear to
have picked up those droppings and started and finished their
"standardisation" "process" (ironic quoting intended:-) in
roughly the same amount of time an open process requires to
conclude that such proposals are rubbish.

>=20
> The eTLS key exchange shall use exactly the same messages and procedure=
s to

I also hope the IETF aren't shy about enforcing copyright
on the name TLS. (Not that I understand copyright;-)

Cheers,
S.

> establish a set of session keys as a
> TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, except for two differenc=
es
> [2].
> 1) the server shall use a static public/private key pair at Step 2 in
> clause 4.3.1; and
> 2) the server's certificate at Step 5 shall contain visibility informat=
ion
> as defined in clause 4.3.3 to indicate to the
> client that eTLS is in use.
> NOTE: Neither the static public key nor the visibility information affe=
cts
> the operation of a TLS 1.3 compliant
> client, so an eTLS server is therefore fully interoperable with TLS 1.3=

> compliant clients.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 17:42:50 -0800
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/98g49Dz57jyIq7rMykTPChUWnFM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On 12/1/2018 11:14 AM, Tony Rutkowski wrote:
>
> The eTLS use case is an enterprise network or data center that is
> owned or dedicated and under the control of a company (e.g., a
> financial institution) or government agency that is subject to
> compliance obligations that require auditing and traffic monitoring
> capabilities for their systems and users.  This relatively bounded use
> case should be kept in mind here.  The associated tutorial is
> helpful. 
> https://www.etsi.org/news-events/events/1338-2018-10-webinar-middlebox-security-protocol-explained
>

Which reinforces the idea that these "enhancements" have no legitimate
reason to be found "in the wild", and hence should be treated as errors
when detected.

-- Christian Huitema


From nobody Sun Dec  2 08:39:03 2018
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
CC: "trutkowski@netmagic.com" <trutkowski@netmagic.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Exactly. I for one am against such "enhancements" and agree that treating th=
em as errors is the right way.

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On Dec 1, 2018, at 20:44, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> On 12/1/2018 11:14 AM, Tony Rutkowski wrote:
>>=20
>> The eTLS use case is an enterprise network or data center that is
>> owned or dedicated and under the control of a company (e.g., a
>> financial institution) or government agency that is subject to
>> compliance obligations that require auditing and traffic monitoring
>> capabilities for their systems and users.  This relatively bounded use
>> case should be kept in mind here.  The associated tutorial is
>> helpful.=20
>> https://www.etsi.org/news-events/events/1338-2018-10-webinar-middlebox-se=
curity-protocol-explained
>>=20
>=20
> Which reinforces the idea that these "enhancements" have no legitimate
> reason to be found "in the wild", and hence should be treated as errors
> when detected.
>=20
> -- Christian Huitema
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, "beldmit@gmail.com" <beldmit@gmail.com>
CC: Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Question about client impersonation... was Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management]
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<html><head></head><body lang=3D"en-US" style=3D"background-color: rgb(255,=
 255, 255); line-height: initial;">                                        =
                                              <div style=3D"width: 100%; fo=
nt-size: initial; font-family: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif, sans-serif=
; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); text-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, =
255, 255);">Is the security property &nbsp;mentioned below a defined goal o=
f, and proved=E2=80=8E for, TLS 1.3?</div><div style=3D"width: 100%; font-s=
ize: initial; font-family: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif, sans-serif; co=
lor: rgb(31, 73, 125); text-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255,=
 255);"><br></div><div style=3D"width: 100%; font-size: initial; font-famil=
y: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); t=
ext-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Just curious, be=
cause it seems a little counter-intuitive: =E2=80=8Eimpersonation of an ano=
nymous (unauthenticated) client, under the harsh conditions of all content =
in the clear. It is certainly plausible by regarding the client as having a=
 a MAC key and a pseudonym from the handshake: I think many key exchange pr=
oofs have a notion of sessions, etc., and PKE definitions also have notions=
 of non-malleability, so I would not be surprised if a proof of this proper=
ty is known for TLS 1.3.&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size: initial; text-align=
: initial; line-height: initial;">=E2=80=8E If there is a proof, then could=
 it be said that eTLS defeats the proof, etc.</span></div><div style=3D"wid=
th: 100%; font-size: initial; font-family: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif=
, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); text-align: initial; background-colo=
r: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br></div>                                         =
                                                                           =
                 <div style=3D"width: 100%; font-size: initial; font-family=
: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); te=
xt-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br></div>       =
                                                                           =
                                                                           =
                                      <div style=3D"font-size: initial; fon=
t-family: Calibri, 'Slate Pro', sans-serif, sans-serif; color: rgb(31, 73, =
125); text-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></div>   =
                                                                           =
                                                                           =
                         <table width=3D"100%" style=3D"background-color:wh=
ite;border-spacing:0px;"> <tbody><tr><td colspan=3D"2" style=3D"font-size: =
initial; text-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">      =
                     <div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-to=
p-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0in 0in; f=
ont-family: Tahoma, 'BB Alpha Sans', 'Slate Pro'; font-size: 10pt;">  <div>=
<b>From: </b>Tony Arcieri</div><div><b>Sent: </b>Saturday, December 1, 2018=
 11:00 AM</div><div><b>To: </b>beldmit@gmail.com</div><div><b>Cc: </b>Crypt=
o; &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;</div><div><b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] ETSI releases s=
tandards for enterprise security and data centre management</div></div></td=
></tr></tbody></table><div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-t=
op-color: rgb(186, 188, 209); border-top-width: 1pt; font-size: initial; te=
xt-align: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></div><br><div id=
=3D"_originalContent" style=3D"">

<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">


<div dir=3D"ltr">This does not seem to address a problem which was brought =
up when the similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, na=
mely any system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private key=
s, ostensibly for the purposes of
 passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily resume decrypted sessions and =
therefore impersonate any observed clients..<br clear=3D"all">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons=
 they should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of tra=
ffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decr=
ypted traffic to resume decrypted
 sessions and thereby impersonate clients.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br>
</div>
</div>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Sat, Dec 01, 2018 at 07:59:45AM -0800, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
> similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
> system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
> ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily
> resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.
> 
> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons they
> should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traffic
> is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decrypted
> traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.

Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session keys
(or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.

If I had to I would build a corporate TLS 1.3 session key escrow system
as follows:

 - use a keyed PRF/PRNG to generate the ephemeral DH keys, with two
   inputs, a secret key shared with the escrow third party, and a number
   generated randomly:

   edh_key = DH_key_gen(seed = PRF+(escrowed_key, r = getrandom()));

 - log to the escrow third party {connection ID, random} for each
   connection (the connection ID can be a handshake transcript hash).

   (it's even safe to log the random number r in the clear, as it alone
   is insufficient for recovering session keys)

This would preserve all the properties of TLS 1.3 and would work for any
other version of TLS with EDH too, and also for any other protocols that
use ephemeral key agreement (SSHv2, IKE, ...).

It's more work to integrate this than to use RSA key transport with
escrowed RSA key orchestration, but it's one-time work (do it for about
six or so open source implementations and you've got 90+% coverage).

I'm sure upstreams would accept this sort of contribution as it is
better for everyone outside corporate environments if we can just stop
the pressure to go back to RSA key transport.  It's also better for
corporate environments, as insiders are the largest threat there, so
forward security is still a plus even in corporate environments.

Nico
-- 


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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] ESNI TXT RData, add leading distinguisher?
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On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 10:19:54AM -0700, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02

I see that the TXT record does not carry any sort of distinguishing
identifier in front of the payload:

    $ dig +short txt _esni.www.cloudflare.com
    "/wHdTAKgACQAHQAgnkJCWxSqQ75Vaxti1Q/S2XEbZa49aRA5/wtNLK2yA38AAhMBAQQAAAAAXAGIsAAAAABcCXGwAAA="

Given widely deployed wildcard (mostly SPF) TXT records implementations
need to be prepared to ignore responses that are not well-formed
base64 encodings of the expected data structure.  Perhaps a short
leading identifier such as "ESNI;" or similar would make it easier
to quickly reject non-ESNI RData.

For example, Rapid7's "mta-sts" survey dataset contains over a
million TXT records with owner name "_mta-sts.<domain-suffix>", but
only O(100) are actual "v=STSv1" MTA-STS TXT records, the rest are
largely SPF.  So one can't rely on the "_esni" prefix to be an
effective indication of intent to provide an actual ESNI response.

-- 
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI TXT RData, add leading distinguisher?
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--0000000000008ac779057c2551f9
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Currently, the record has a checksum at the front which would allow
rejection of malformed records.

However, I think it is likely we will stop using TXT.

-Ekr


On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 12:24 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 10:19:54AM -0700, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02
>
> I see that the TXT record does not carry any sort of distinguishing
> identifier in front of the payload:
>
>     $ dig +short txt _esni.www.cloudflare.com
>
> "/wHdTAKgACQAHQAgnkJCWxSqQ75Vaxti1Q/S2XEbZa49aRA5/wtNLK2yA38AAhMBAQQAAAAAXAGIsAAAAABcCXGwAAA="
>
> Given widely deployed wildcard (mostly SPF) TXT records implementations
> need to be prepared to ignore responses that are not well-formed
> base64 encodings of the expected data structure.  Perhaps a short
> leading identifier such as "ESNI;" or similar would make it easier
> to quickly reject non-ESNI RData.
>
> For example, Rapid7's "mta-sts" survey dataset contains over a
> million TXT records with owner name "_mta-sts.<domain-suffix>", but
> only O(100) are actual "v=STSv1" MTA-STS TXT records, the rest are
> largely SPF.  So one can't rely on the "_esni" prefix to be an
> effective indication of intent to provide an actual ESNI response.
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000008ac779057c2551f9
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Currently, the record has a checksum at the front whi=
ch would allow rejection of malformed records.</div><div><br></div><div>How=
ever, I think it is likely we will stop using TXT.<br></div><div><br></div>=
<div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 12:24 PM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 10:19:54AM -0700, <a=
 href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">internet-drafts=
@ietf.org</a> wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-0=
2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/ht=
ml/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02</a><br>
<br>
I see that the TXT record does not carry any sort of distinguishing<br>
identifier in front of the payload:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 $ dig +short txt _<a href=3D"http://esni.www.cloudflare.com" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">esni.www.cloudflare.com</a><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;/wHdTAKgACQAHQAgnkJCWxSqQ75Vaxti1Q/S2XEbZa49aRA5/wtNLK2=
yA38AAhMBAQQAAAAAXAGIsAAAAABcCXGwAAA=3D&quot;<br>
<br>
Given widely deployed wildcard (mostly SPF) TXT records implementations<br>
need to be prepared to ignore responses that are not well-formed<br>
base64 encodings of the expected data structure.=C2=A0 Perhaps a short<br>
leading identifier such as &quot;ESNI;&quot; or similar would make it easie=
r<br>
to quickly reject non-ESNI RData.<br>
<br>
For example, Rapid7&#39;s &quot;mta-sts&quot; survey dataset contains over =
a<br>
million TXT records with owner name &quot;_mta-sts.&lt;domain-suffix&gt;&qu=
ot;, but<br>
only O(100) are actual &quot;v=3DSTSv1&quot; MTA-STS TXT records, the rest =
are<br>
largely SPF.=C2=A0 So one can&#39;t rely on the &quot;_esni&quot; prefix to=
 be an<br>
effective indication of intent to provide an actual ESNI response.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Viktor.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000008ac779057c2551f9--


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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 17:42:29 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator
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The WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" is now complete. No
outstanding or otherwise blocking issues were raised. We will work
with the author to prepare a write-up for Ben and the IESG.

Thanks,
Chris, Joe, and Sean

On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 11:34 PM Christopher Wood
<christopherwood07@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> This is the working group last call for the "Exported Authenticators
> in TLS" draft available at
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/.
> Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359
> UTC on 30 November 2018.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean


From nobody Tue Dec  4 07:34:33 2018
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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:34:08 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Is it necessarily true that any key escrow system must allow resumptions?

Just to play devil's advocate, consider defining a new cipher suite that
appended a MAC to each message before applying one of the other cipher
suites.
If the MAC is keyed with a key not derived from the master secret, but from
some other value shared between the client and server, but not the
middlebox, then the middlebox would be able to read all* the traffic, but
would not be able to successfully resume the session.

*The middlebox would not be able to verify the tag, so technically it can't
check /everything/, but it would be able to read the data on the channel
without being able to modify it.

Regards,

Jonathan



On Sun, 2 Dec 2018 at 23:36 Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 01, 2018 at 07:59:45AM -0800, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> > This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
> > similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
> > system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
> > ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can
> arbitrarily
> > resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.
> >
> > I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons
> they
> > should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traffic
> > is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the
> decrypted
> > traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.
>
> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session keys
> (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.
>
> If I had to I would build a corporate TLS 1.3 session key escrow system
> as follows:
>
>  - use a keyed PRF/PRNG to generate the ephemeral DH keys, with two
>    inputs, a secret key shared with the escrow third party, and a number
>    generated randomly:
>
>    edh_key = DH_key_gen(seed = PRF+(escrowed_key, r = getrandom()));
>
>  - log to the escrow third party {connection ID, random} for each
>    connection (the connection ID can be a handshake transcript hash).
>
>    (it's even safe to log the random number r in the clear, as it alone
>    is insufficient for recovering session keys)
>
> This would preserve all the properties of TLS 1.3 and would work for any
> other version of TLS with EDH too, and also for any other protocols that
> use ephemeral key agreement (SSHv2, IKE, ...).
>
> It's more work to integrate this than to use RSA key transport with
> escrowed RSA key orchestration, but it's one-time work (do it for about
> six or so open source implementations and you've got 90+% coverage).
>
> I'm sure upstreams would accept this sort of contribution as it is
> better for everyone outside corporate environments if we can just stop
> the pressure to go back to RSA key transport.  It's also better for
> corporate environments, as insiders are the largest threat there, so
> forward security is still a plus even in corporate environments.
>
> Nico
> --
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000cdceb1057c33ff35
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Is it necessarily true that any key escrow system must all=
ow resumptions?<div><br></div><div>Just to play devil&#39;s advocate, consi=
der defining a new cipher suite that appended a MAC to each message before =
applying one of the other cipher suites.=C2=A0</div><div>If the MAC is keye=
d with a key not derived from the master secret, but from some other value =
shared between the client and server, but not the middlebox, then the middl=
ebox would be able to read all* the traffic, but would not be able to succe=
ssfully resume the session.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>*The middlebox w=
ould not be able to verify the tag, so technically it can&#39;t check /ever=
ything/, but it would be able to read the data on the channel without being=
 able to modify it.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Jonathan</div><div><br><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, 2 Dec 2018 at 23:36 Nico Williams &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:nico@cryptonector.com">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Sat, Dec 01, 2018 at 07:59:45AM -0800, Tony=
 Arcieri wrote:<br>
&gt; This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the<=
br>
&gt; similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely an=
y<br>
&gt; system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,<b=
r>
&gt; ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitra=
rily<br>
&gt; resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clien=
ts.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I&#39;m not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security rea=
sons they<br>
&gt; should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traf=
fic<br>
&gt; is impacted, and a &quot;visibility&quot; system isn&#39;t able to lev=
erage the decrypted<br>
&gt; traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.<=
br>
<br>
Any key escrow system will have this property.=C2=A0 Given the session keys=
<br>
(or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.<br>
<br>
If I had to I would build a corporate TLS 1.3 session key escrow system<br>
as follows:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0- use a keyed PRF/PRNG to generate the ephemeral DH keys, with two<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0inputs, a secret key shared with the escrow third party, and a=
 number<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0generated randomly:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0edh_key =3D DH_key_gen(seed =3D PRF+(escrowed_key, r =3D getra=
ndom()));<br>
<br>
=C2=A0- log to the escrow third party {connection ID, random} for each<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0connection (the connection ID can be a handshake transcript ha=
sh).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(it&#39;s even safe to log the random number r in the clear, a=
s it alone<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is insufficient for recovering session keys)<br>
<br>
This would preserve all the properties of TLS 1.3 and would work for any<br=
>
other version of TLS with EDH too, and also for any other protocols that<br=
>
use ephemeral key agreement (SSHv2, IKE, ...).<br>
<br>
It&#39;s more work to integrate this than to use RSA key transport with<br>
escrowed RSA key orchestration, but it&#39;s one-time work (do it for about=
<br>
six or so open source implementations and you&#39;ve got 90+% coverage).<br=
>
<br>
I&#39;m sure upstreams would accept this sort of contribution as it is<br>
better for everyone outside corporate environments if we can just stop<br>
the pressure to go back to RSA key transport.=C2=A0 It&#39;s also better fo=
r<br>
corporate environments, as insiders are the largest threat there, so<br>
forward security is still a plus even in corporate environments.<br>
<br>
Nico<br>
-- <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>

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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 04:34:08PM +0100, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> Is it necessarily true that any key escrow system must allow resumptions?
> 
> Just to play devil's advocate, consider defining a new cipher suite that
> appended a MAC to each message before applying one of the other cipher
> suites.
> If the MAC is keyed with a key not derived from the master secret, but from
> some other value shared between the client and server, but not the
> middlebox, then the middlebox would be able to read all* the traffic, but
> would not be able to successfully resume the session.

This MAC key would also have to be involved in the session resumption
PSK, but yes.  You don't even need this extra MAC past the handshake,
you just need an extra key not known to the escrow agent for use in the
session resumption PSK.  (The extra MAC on every record would impose too
much overhead.)

> *The middlebox would not be able to verify the tag, so technically it can't
> check /everything/, but it would be able to read the data on the channel
> without being able to modify it.

Oh sure, if you're willing to do such violence to TLS, then yes, it can
be done.

However, a constraint here is that an escrow design can't really require
client-side modifications without the IETF approving of it and the
client implementations accepting the change.

The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients is to
use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most obvious such
design is to have the server talk to the escrow agent.

Nico
-- 


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 08:18:44 -0800
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

>  > I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons
> they
> > should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traffic
> > is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the
> decrypted
> > traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.
>
> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session keys
> (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.


Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic secrets
(instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this problem? These keys
would permit the one capability "visibility" appliance vendors allege to
care about: traffic decryption, without permitting others like session
resumption.

 The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients is to
> use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most obvious such
> design is to have the server talk to the escrow agent.


It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets could
be escrowed with no changes to TLS.

--
Tony Arcieri

--000000000000497abc057c349fb5
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 2,=
 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com"=
>nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x">=C2=A0&gt; I&#39;m not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for sec=
urity reasons they<br>
&gt; should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traf=
fic<br>
&gt; is impacted, and a &quot;visibility&quot; system isn&#39;t able to lev=
erage the decrypted<br>
&gt; traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.<=
br>
<br>
Any key escrow system will have this property.=C2=A0 Given the session keys=
<br>
(or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.</blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>Wouldn&#39;t escrowing only the client/server applicatio=
n traffic secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this probl=
em? These keys would permit the one capability &quot;visibility&quot; appli=
ance vendors allege to care about: traffic decryption, without permitting o=
thers like session resumption.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0The most obvious escrow design requiring no=
 changes to the clients is to<br>use a static eDH key on the server-side.=
=C2=A0 The next most obvious such<br>design is to have the server talk to t=
he escrow agent.</blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>It seems like with a=
n out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets could be escrowed with no c=
hanges to TLS.</div><div></div><div><br></div>--<br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></d=
iv></div>

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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 17:39:30 +0100
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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Isn't there a lower bar at the IETF for defining new cipher suites, as long
as you're not seeking a "recommended" setting?

I think escrowing lower down keys / not MACing the messages beyond the
handshake means that you lose authenticity and integrity of the message
data, which is unattractive.
How burdensome would the extra few bytes actually be, given that the
alternative is substantially weaker security?

Regards,

Jonathan


On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 at 16:19 Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
> wrote:
>
>>  > I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons
>> they
>> > should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of
>> traffic
>> > is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the
>> decrypted
>> > traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.
>>
>> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session keys
>> (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.
>
>
> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic secrets
> (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this problem? These keys
> would permit the one capability "visibility" appliance vendors allege to
> care about: traffic decryption, without permitting others like session
> resumption.
>
>  The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients is to
>> use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most obvious such
>> design is to have the server talk to the escrow agent.
>
>
> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets could
> be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>
> --
> Tony Arcieri
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--00000000000096fb5c057c34e9d4
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Isn&#39;t there a lower bar at the IETF for defining new c=
ipher suites, as long as you&#39;re not seeking a &quot;recommended&quot; s=
etting?=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>I think escrowing lower down keys / not MA=
Cing the messages beyond the handshake means that you lose authenticity and=
 integrity of the message data, which is unattractive.</div><div><span styl=
e=3D"line-height:1.5">How burdensome would the extra few bytes actually be,=
 given that the alternative is substantially weaker security?</span></div><=
div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"li=
ne-height:1.5">Regards,</span></div><div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5"><b=
r></span></div><div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5">Jonathan =C2=A0</span><=
br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 at 16:19 Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bascule@g=
mail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun=
, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonec=
tor.com" target=3D"_blank">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0&gt; I&#39;m not a fan of systems like t=
his, but I believe for security reasons they<br>
&gt; should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of traf=
fic<br>
&gt; is impacted, and a &quot;visibility&quot; system isn&#39;t able to lev=
erage the decrypted<br>
&gt; traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate clients.<=
br>
<br>
Any key escrow system will have this property.=C2=A0 Given the session keys=
<br>
(or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.</blockquote><=
div><br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>=
Wouldn&#39;t escrowing only the client/server application traffic secrets (=
instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this problem? These keys woul=
d permit the one capability &quot;visibility&quot; appliance vendors allege=
 to care about: traffic decryption, without permitting others like session =
resumption.</div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0The mo=
st obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients is to<br>use a=
 static eDH key on the server-side.=C2=A0 The next most obvious such<br>des=
ign is to have the server talk to the escrow agent.</blockquote></div></div=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"></div><div><br></div><div>It s=
eems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets could be es=
crowed with no changes to TLS.</div><div></div><div><br></div>--<br><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"m_4243452944962675528gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"=
gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000096fb5c057c34e9d4--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 05:39:30PM +0100, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> Isn't there a lower bar at the IETF for defining new cipher suites, as long
> as you're not seeking a "recommended" setting?

Yes, but then you have to get interoperability using them, which means
patching clients and servers.  You can't 100% escrow this way.

Nico
-- 


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Subject: [TLS] Thoughts on draft-rescorla-tls13-semistatic-dh-00
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Dear all,

I read the draft and have a few comments. First off it seems like
OPTLS used an HKDF extracted key to feed into the content keys,
instead of reusing the shared secret. I'm pretty sure that will end up
not mattering, but I'm by no means an expert in how much some change
like that will affect the analysis.

Secondly there is the question of performance. A fixed based
exponentiation can almost always be done faster then a variable base
exponentiation because it offers precomputation. As specified a server
does one fixed based exponentiation and two variable based
exponentiations, while with signatures a server does two fixed based
exponentiations and one variable base exponentiation. The performance
gains possible from OPTLS come from reuse of the ephemeral, resulting
in just two variable base exponentiations for most clients, unless
there is a very fast choice of group that doesn't support signatures
out there. The given example of x25519 vs. P256 could be solved with
issuing an Ed25519 delegated credential for instance. Clients will see
a performance gain if the total number of signature verifications goes
down as two variable base exponentiations are cheaper then a
verification plus variable base exponentiation, but that depends on
not using delegated credentials.

Perhaps more interesting is the question of postquantum schemes that
don't support signatures.  But there a classical signature usually
outperforms a postquantum key exchange, and so it is not very
interesting to do two postquantum key exchanges instead of one and a
classical signature.

As for client authentication I think the server ephemeral+client
static producing a key they use to MAC works out: it's no worse for
mixing the client secret in then the signature based client
authentication is in TLS.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain

On Sat 2018-12-01 10:02:44 -0800, Christian Huitema wrote:
> Which is indeed a huge problem. Security conscious implementations of
> TLS should detect the use of such "enhancements", and either abort the
> session or automatically treat it as insecure.

This certainly looks like a case of forum-shopping to do an end-run
around the underlying goals of TLS as a 2-party protocol that
prioritizes confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity between the two
peers.

Even worse, the supposed "VisibilityInformation" mechanism is stuffed
into subjectAltName in the server's certificate, which means that it
can't even depend on the "critical bit" that would have been available
to a standard X.509v3 certificate extension.  This appears to encourage
deployment to unaware clients.

I've just submitted draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-00, which suggests
that responsible TLS clients that observe a server certificate with a
subjectAltName otherName with the VisibilityInformation type-id (OID
0.4.0.3523.3.1 {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) msp(3523)
etls(3) visibility(1)}) MUST reject the certificate.  I'm open to
feedback on it.

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh/

One mitigating factor of the ETSI standard, i suppose, is that the
CABForum's Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of a certificate with
any subjectAltName other than dNSName or iPAddress, so otherName looks
like it must not be issued by standard public CAs.

top of p. 44 of https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf

Has anyone set up tools to monitor the CT logs for such a sAN to see
whether that element of the BR is being honored?

    --dkg

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Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,  "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real =
problem and need.  We can either address the use case and need here in =
the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I would =
personally prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in the =
IETF.

Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but that does =
not mean the use case is not valid and needed.=20

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that =
can not be unscrambled is an egg."

> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com =
<mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>> wrote:
>  > I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security =
reasons they
> > should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of =
traffic
> > is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the =
decrypted
> > traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate =
clients.
>=20
> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session keys
> (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.
>=20
> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic secrets =
(instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this problem? These keys =
would permit the one capability "visibility" appliance vendors allege to =
care about: traffic decryption, without permitting others like session =
resumption.
>=20
>  The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients is =
to
> use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most obvious such
> design is to have the server talk to the escrow agent.
>=20
> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets =
could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>=20
> --
> Tony Arcieri
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


--Apple-Mail=_31A5328B-10CE-45FC-9B80-87BA73E47A78
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Now =
this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real problem =
and need. &nbsp;We can either address the use case and need here in the =
IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I would personally =
prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in the IETF.<div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Finally, remember, you =
may not like the use case or need, but that does not mean the use case =
is not valid and needed.&nbsp;<br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; border-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;">Thanks,</span></div><div =
class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: =
none;">Bret</span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D""><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" =
face=3D"Calibre, Verdana" class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 11px;">PGP =
Fingerprint:&nbsp;</span></font><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-align: =
-webkit-auto; font-size: 11px;"><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" face=3D"Calibre, =
Verdana" class=3D"">63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 =
0050</font></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"color: rgb(124, 124, 124); font-size: 8pt; =
font-family: Calibre, Verdana; text-align: -webkit-auto;">"Without =
cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not =
be unscrambled is an =
egg."</span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></span></d=
iv></div>
</div>
<div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com" class=3D"">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" =
class=3D"">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&nbsp;&gt; I'm not a =
fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons they<br =
class=3D"">
&gt; should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of =
traffic<br class=3D"">
&gt; is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the =
decrypted<br class=3D"">
&gt; traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate =
clients.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Any key escrow system will have this property.&nbsp; Given the session =
keys<br class=3D"">
(or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted =
sessions.</blockquote><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic =
secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this problem? =
These keys would permit the one capability "visibility" appliance =
vendors allege to care about: traffic decryption, without permitting =
others like session resumption.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&nbsp;The most obvious escrow design =
requiring no changes to the clients is to<br class=3D"">use a static eDH =
key on the server-side.&nbsp; The next most obvious such<br =
class=3D"">design is to have the server talk to the escrow =
agent.</blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic =
secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.</div><div =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div>--<br =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" =
data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br class=3D""></div></div>=

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_31A5328B-10CE-45FC-9B80-87BA73E47A78--


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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <51754d91-c00c-0cad-ecd6-8db74544d26a@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data
 centre management
References: <CADqLbzKd-AgDRv2suZ-0Nz4jNUqKg0RNT8sgQd-n793t+gEN3g@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAHOTMVKZT1ScvHeP3=Kv2zodVimHkaAtG-2DTq6ojnF+q-OMSQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20181202233553.GD15561@localhost>
 <CAHOTMV+vPkM-=Qsto-8-ipFuGsNKkH_U=BEY_mB=7CM7tto3Mw@mail.gmail.com>
 <38D10A65-B4EE-4E81-8EA4-D69514F7F47B@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <38D10A65-B4EE-4E81-8EA4-D69514F7F47B@gmail.com>

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On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan wrote:
> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real
> problem and need.  We can either address the use case and need here
> in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I would
> personally prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in
> the IETF.

#include <previous-discussions>

I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new
facts to justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping
is not new - rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was explicitly
proposed as a putative reason to adopt draft-green and that
did not result in consensus to work on this topic despite
the significant effort put in by proponents. I'm also happy
to say that I see no evidence that the WG would reach a
different conclusion as to lack of consensus.

FWIW, I view this discussion as being analogous to scratching
an itchy scab - despite our knowing it is unproductive to do
so, some IETF participants apparently can't resist poking at
the wound:-(

S.

>=20
> Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but that
> does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.
>=20
> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8
> ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,
> the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>=20
>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com
>> <mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>> wrote:
>>> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security
>>> reasons they should be designed in such a way that only the
>>> confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system
>>> isn't able to leverage the decrypted traffic to resume decrypted
>>> sessions and thereby impersonate clients.
>>=20
>> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session
>> keys (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.
>>=20
>> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic
>> secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this
>> problem? These keys would permit the one capability "visibility"
>> appliance vendors allege to care about: traffic decryption, without
>> permitting others like session resumption.
>>=20
>> The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients
>> is to use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most
>> obvious such design is to have the server talk to the escrow
>> agent.
>>=20
>> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets
>> could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>>=20
>> -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ TLS
>> mailing list TLS@ietf.org=20
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From nobody Wed Dec  5 01:31:02 2018
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Content-Type: text/plain

On Wed 2018-12-05 17:08:44 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real
> problem and need.  We can either address the use case and need here in
> the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I would
> personally prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in the
> IETF.

Or, the IETF can say with relative clarity that this kind of information
leakage is inappropriate for and incomaptible with the information
security goals of TLS.

> Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but that
> does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.

Sure, but just because someone says it is, doesn't mean that the use
case is valid or needed within the scope of TLS either.

Throughout the (several years now) discussion of this sort of proposal,
we've repeatedly heard about "legal obligations" which somehow evaporate
when pressed for details.  And we've heard about "operational
considerations" which typically amount to cost-shifting concerns (they
can come across as: "we've invested a bunch of money in this particular
network architecture/application design, please change the infosec
guarantees provided by TLS for everyone on the global network so that we
don't have to do an expensive re-tooling or staff up on new skills while
i'm responsible for this budget line item").

The WG is chartered to make TLS a fast, secure, confidential transport
layer.  Let's keep the charter goals in mind.

        --dkg

--=-=-=
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> The WG is chartered to make TLS a fast, secure, confidential transport
> layer.  Let's keep the charter goals in mind.
> 
>        --dkg

+ 1


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I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a 360 =
degree deployment perspective. The real power of the IETF is in looking =
at all the needs and requirements and designing solutions for them.

We should flesh this out. It seems like several people on this list so =
far have proposed options that might work. If we spent half as much time =
looking for a solution as we have trying to prevent a solution, we would =
probably be done by now.=20

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that =
can not be unscrambled is an egg."

> On Dec 5, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan wrote:
>> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real
>> problem and need.  We can either address the use case and need here
>> in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I would
>> personally prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in
>> the IETF.
>=20
> #include <previous-discussions>
>=20
> I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new
> facts to justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping
> is not new - rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was explicitly
> proposed as a putative reason to adopt draft-green and that
> did not result in consensus to work on this topic despite
> the significant effort put in by proponents. I'm also happy
> to say that I see no evidence that the WG would reach a
> different conclusion as to lack of consensus.
>=20
> FWIW, I view this discussion as being analogous to scratching
> an itchy scab - despite our knowing it is unproductive to do
> so, some IETF participants apparently can't resist poking at
> the wound:-(
>=20
> S.
>=20
>>=20
>> Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but that
>> does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.
>>=20
>> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8
>> ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,
>> the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>=20
>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com
>>> <mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>> wrote:
>>>> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security
>>>> reasons they should be designed in such a way that only the
>>>> confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system
>>>> isn't able to leverage the decrypted traffic to resume decrypted
>>>> sessions and thereby impersonate clients.
>>>=20
>>> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the session
>>> keys (or a way to recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.
>>>=20
>>> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic
>>> secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this
>>> problem? These keys would permit the one capability "visibility"
>>> appliance vendors allege to care about: traffic decryption, without
>>> permitting others like session resumption.
>>>=20
>>> The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the clients
>>> is to use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The next most
>>> obvious such design is to have the server talk to the escrow
>>> agent.
>>>=20
>>> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets
>>> could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>>>=20
>>> -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ TLS
>>> mailing list TLS@ietf.org=20
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
> <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I =
think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a 360 =
degree deployment perspective. The real power of the IETF is in looking =
at all the needs and requirements and designing solutions for them.<div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">We =
should flesh this out. It seems like several people on this list so far =
have proposed options that might work. If we spent half as much time =
looking for a solution as we have trying to prevent a solution, we would =
probably be done by now.&nbsp;<div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; border-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;">Thanks,</span></div><div =
class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: =
none;">Bret</span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D""><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" =
face=3D"Calibre, Verdana" class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 11px;">PGP =
Fingerprint:&nbsp;</span></font><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-align: =
-webkit-auto; font-size: 11px;"><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" face=3D"Calibre, =
Verdana" class=3D"">63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 =
0050</font></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"color: rgb(124, 124, 124); font-size: 8pt; =
font-family: Calibre, Verdana; text-align: -webkit-auto;">"Without =
cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not =
be unscrambled is an =
egg."</span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></span></d=
iv></div>
</div>
<div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Dec 5, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" =
class=3D"">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Now this WG is finally =
starting to talk about a solution to a real<br class=3D"">problem and =
need. &nbsp;We can either address the use case and need here<br =
class=3D"">in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. =
I would<br class=3D"">personally prefer we take this work item back and =
solve it here in<br class=3D"">the IETF.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">#include &lt;previous-discussions&gt;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new<br =
class=3D"">facts to justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping<br =
class=3D"">is not new - rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was =
explicitly<br class=3D"">proposed as a putative reason to adopt =
draft-green and that<br class=3D"">did not result in consensus to work =
on this topic despite<br class=3D"">the significant effort put in by =
proponents. I'm also happy<br class=3D"">to say that I see no evidence =
that the WG would reach a<br class=3D"">different conclusion as to lack =
of consensus.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">FWIW, I view this discussion =
as being analogous to scratching<br class=3D"">an itchy scab - despite =
our knowing it is unproductive to do<br class=3D"">so, some IETF =
participants apparently can't resist poking at<br class=3D"">the =
wound:-(<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">S.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><br class=3D"">Finally, =
remember, you may not like the use case or need, but that<br =
class=3D"">does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A =
6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8<br class=3D"">ACAE 7415 0050 "Without =
cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,<br class=3D"">the only thing =
that can not be unscrambled is an egg."<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 =
AM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">wrote:<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" =
class=3D"">nico@cryptonector.com</a><br class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" =
class=3D"">mailto:nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">I'm not a fan of systems =
like this, but I believe for security<br class=3D"">reasons they should =
be designed in such a way that only the<br class=3D"">confidentiality of =
traffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system<br class=3D"">isn't able =
to leverage the decrypted traffic to resume decrypted<br =
class=3D"">sessions and thereby impersonate clients.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Any key escrow system will have =
this property. &nbsp;Given the session<br class=3D"">keys (or a way to =
recover them) you can resume decrypted sessions.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application =
traffic<br class=3D"">secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) =
avoid this<br class=3D"">problem? These keys would permit the one =
capability "visibility"<br class=3D"">appliance vendors allege to care =
about: traffic decryption, without<br class=3D"">permitting others like =
session resumption.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The most obvious escrow =
design requiring no changes to the clients<br class=3D"">is to use a =
static eDH key on the server-side. &nbsp;The next most<br =
class=3D"">obvious such design is to have the server talk to the =
escrow<br class=3D"">agent.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">It seems like =
with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets<br class=3D"">could =
be escrowed with no changes to TLS.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Tony =
Arcieri _______________________________________________ TLS<br =
class=3D"">mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a> <br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________ TLS mailing =
list <br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D""></blockquote><span =
id=3D"cid:D45CCD0F-3C0D-44AE-AF04-C89A04CA31B0">&lt;0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc=
&gt;</span></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <9344c0e1-f484-2b4b-8594-1d29731f6b7a@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data
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On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
> I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
> 360 degree deployment perspective.=20

I think we should avoid marketing speak.

> The real power of the IETF is in
> looking at all the needs and requirements and designing solutions for
> them.

The IETF is sometimes at it's best when it says "no." This
is one of those cases.

> We should flesh this out. It seems like several people on this list
> so far have proposed options that might work. If we spent half as
> much time looking for a solution as we have trying to prevent a
> solution, we would probably be done by now.

All of the above was done, at length, and we got a result.
The TLS WG had no consensus to work on this topic.

S.


>=20
> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8
> ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,
> the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>=20
>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a
>>> real problem and need.  We can either address the use case and
>>> need here in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else
>>> where. I would personally prefer we take this work item back and
>>> solve it here in the IETF.
>>=20
>> #include <previous-discussions>
>>=20
>> I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new facts to
>> justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping is not new -
>> rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was explicitly proposed as a
>> putative reason to adopt draft-green and that did not result in
>> consensus to work on this topic despite the significant effort put
>> in by proponents. I'm also happy to say that I see no evidence that
>> the WG would reach a different conclusion as to lack of consensus.
>>=20
>> FWIW, I view this discussion as being analogous to scratching an
>> itchy scab - despite our knowing it is unproductive to do so, some
>> IETF participants apparently can't resist poking at the wound:-(
>>=20
>> S.
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but
>>> that does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0
>>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw,
>>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>>=20
>>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>=20
>>>> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams
>>>> <nico@cryptonector.com <mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>> wrote:
>>>>> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for
>>>>> security reasons they should be designed in such a way that
>>>>> only the confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a
>>>>> "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decrypted
>>>>> traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate
>>>>> clients.
>>>>=20
>>>> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the
>>>> session keys (or a way to recover them) you can resume
>>>> decrypted sessions.
>>>>=20
>>>> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic=20
>>>> secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this=20
>>>> problem? These keys would permit the one capability
>>>> "visibility" appliance vendors allege to care about: traffic
>>>> decryption, without permitting others like session resumption.
>>>>=20
>>>> The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the
>>>> clients is to use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The
>>>> next most obvious such design is to have the server talk to the
>>>> escrow agent.
>>>>=20
>>>> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic
>>>> secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>>>>=20
>>>> -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org=20
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list
>>>  TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>=20
>> <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>
>=20
>=20

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From: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>
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References: <CADqLbzKd-AgDRv2suZ-0Nz4jNUqKg0RNT8sgQd-n793t+gEN3g@mail.gmail.com> <CAHOTMVKZT1ScvHeP3=Kv2zodVimHkaAtG-2DTq6ojnF+q-OMSQ@mail.gmail.com> <20181202233553.GD15561@localhost> <CAHOTMV+vPkM-=Qsto-8-ipFuGsNKkH_U=BEY_mB=7CM7tto3Mw@mail.gmail.com> <38D10A65-B4EE-4E81-8EA4-D69514F7F47B@gmail.com> <51754d91-c00c-0cad-ecd6-8db74544d26a@cs.tcd.ie> <A7423BAF-398B-4BBE-81AC-364CE748D6B1@gmail.com> <9344c0e1-f484-2b4b-8594-1d29731f6b7a@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Comments inline=20

Sent from my Commodore 128D

PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050

> On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wr=
ote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
>> I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
>> 360 degree deployment perspective.=20
>=20
> I think we should avoid marketing speak.

This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these solutions need t=
o be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from consumer, to small b=
usiness, to enterprise, to service provider, to content provider, to telco, e=
tc. =20


>=20
>> The real power of the IETF is in
>> looking at all the needs and requirements and designing solutions for
>> them.
>=20
> The IETF is sometimes at it's best when it says "no." This
> is one of those cases.


I disagree.



>> We should flesh this out. It seems like several people on this list
>> so far have proposed options that might work. If we spent half as
>> much time looking for a solution as we have trying to prevent a
>> solution, we would probably be done by now.
>=20
> All of the above was done, at length, and we got a result.
> The TLS WG had no consensus to work on this topic.

Or it could be said the TLS WG had no consensus to not work on it.  When the=
re is a tie who wins? It seems like working on a solution that works for the=
 larger community is the right solution.  The use case and need is a valid r=
equirement.

Bret=20



> S.
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8
>> ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,
>> the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>=20
>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Stephen Farrell
>>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>>> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a
>>>> real problem and need.  We can either address the use case and
>>>> need here in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else
>>>> where. I would personally prefer we take this work item back and
>>>> solve it here in the IETF.
>>>=20
>>> #include <previous-discussions>
>>>=20
>>> I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new facts to
>>> justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping is not new -
>>> rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was explicitly proposed as a
>>> putative reason to adopt draft-green and that did not result in
>>> consensus to work on this topic despite the significant effort put
>>> in by proponents. I'm also happy to say that I see no evidence that
>>> the WG would reach a different conclusion as to lack of consensus.
>>>=20
>>> FWIW, I view this discussion as being analogous to scratching an
>>> itchy scab - despite our knowing it is unproductive to do so, some
>>> IETF participants apparently can't resist poking at the wound:-(
>>>=20
>>> S.
>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but
>>>> that does not mean the use case is not valid and needed.
>>>>=20
>>>> Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0
>>>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw,
>>>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>>>=20
>>>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>=20
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams
>>>>> <nico@cryptonector.com <mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>> wrote:
>>>>>> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for
>>>>>> security reasons they should be designed in such a way that
>>>>>> only the confidentiality of traffic is impacted, and a
>>>>>> "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decrypted
>>>>>> traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate
>>>>>> clients.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Any key escrow system will have this property.  Given the
>>>>> session keys (or a way to recover them) you can resume
>>>>> decrypted sessions.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic=20
>>>>> secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this=20
>>>>> problem? These keys would permit the one capability
>>>>> "visibility" appliance vendors allege to care about: traffic
>>>>> decryption, without permitting others like session resumption.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> The most obvious escrow design requiring no changes to the
>>>>> clients is to use a static eDH key on the server-side.  The
>>>>> next most obvious such design is to have the server talk to the
>>>>> escrow agent.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic
>>>>> secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________
>>>>> TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org=20
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>=20
>>> <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>
>>=20
>>=20
> <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto">Comments inline&nbsp;<br><br><div id=3D"App=
leMailSignature" dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255,=
 255, 0);">Sent from my Commodore 128D</span><div><span style=3D"background-=
color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"backgro=
und-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><font class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-l=
igatures: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variant-numeric: norma=
l; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; line-he=
ight: normal;">PGP Fingerprint:&nbsp;</font><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-a=
lign: -webkit-auto;"><font class=3D"">63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74=
F8 ACAE 7415 0050</font></span></span></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>On De=
c 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span></span><br><span></span><br><span>On 0=
5/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:</span><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><spa=
n>I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a</span><=
br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>360 degree deployment perspe=
ctive. </span><br></blockquote><span></span><br><span>I think we should avoi=
d marketing speak.</span><br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is n=
ot marketing speak. This is understanding how these solutions need to be dep=
loyed end to end in all of their scenarios from consumer, to small business,=
 to enterprise, to service provider, to content provider, to telco, etc. &nb=
sp;</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span=
></span><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>The real power of the IETF is in=
</span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>looking at all the n=
eeds and requirements and designing solutions for</span><br></blockquote><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><span>them.</span><br></blockquote><span></span><br><=
span>The IETF is sometimes at it's best when it says "no." This</span><br><s=
pan>is one of those cases.</span><br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
<br></div><div>I disagree.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>We should f=
lesh this out. It seems like several people on this list</span><br></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>so far have proposed options that might w=
ork. If we spent half as</span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><s=
pan>much time looking for a solution as we have trying to prevent a</span><b=
r></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>solution, we would probably b=
e done by now.</span><br></blockquote><span></span><br><span>All of the abov=
e was done, at length, and we got a result.</span><br><span>The TLS WG had n=
o consensus to work on this topic.</span><br></div></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>Or it could be said the TLS WG had no consensus to not work on it. &=
nbsp;When there is a tie who wins? It seems like working on a solution that w=
orks for the larger community is the right solution. &nbsp;The use case and n=
eed is a valid requirement.</div><div><br></div><div>Bret&nbsp;</div><div><b=
r></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span>=
S.</span><br><span></span><br><span></span><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><sp=
an></span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>Thanks, Bret PGP =
Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8</span><br></blockquote=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv v=
ivc ce xhrnrw, however,</span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><sp=
an>the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."</span><br></blockq=
uote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>On Dec 5, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Steph=
en Farrell</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><span>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie=
">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:</span><br></blockquote></blockquo=
te><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></bl=
ockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><s=
pan></span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>On 05/12/2018 08:08, Bret Jordan w=
rote:</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>Now this WG is finally sta=
rting to talk about a solution to a</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></bl=
ockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><span>real problem and need. &nbsp;We can either address the use c=
ase and</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>need here i=
n the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else</span><br></blockquote>=
</blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite=
"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>where. I would personally prefer we take t=
his work item back and</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blo=
ckquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><s=
pan>solve it here in the IETF.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></b=
lockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
span>#include &lt;previous-discussions&gt;</span><br></blockquote></blockquo=
te><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></bl=
ockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><s=
pan>I would hope the WG not revisit this topic and see no new facts to</span=
><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><span>justify distracting the WG again. Forum shopping is not new -</=
span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><span>rubber-stamping by ETSI or ANSI was explicitly proposed as a=
</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><span>putative reason to adopt draft-green and that did not res=
ult in</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite"><span>consensus to work on this topic despite the signifi=
cant effort put</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite=
"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>in by proponents. I'm also happy to say th=
at I see no evidence that</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>the WG would reach a different c=
onclusion as to lack of consensus.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><bloc=
kquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote=
></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>FWIW=
, I view this discussion as being analogous to scratching an</span><br></blo=
ckquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><sp=
an>itchy scab - despite our knowing it is unproductive to do so, some</span>=
<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><span>IETF participants apparently can't resist poking at the wound:-(=
</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>S.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></bloc=
kquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blo=
ckquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquot=
e><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"ci=
te"><span>Finally, remember, you may not like the use case or need, but</spa=
n><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><bloc=
kquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>that does not mean the u=
se case is not valid and needed.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></block=
quote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>Thank=
s, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0</span><br></blo=
ckquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without crypt=
ography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw,</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquot=
e><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"ci=
te"><span>however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."</s=
pan><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquo=
te></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"c=
ite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>On Dec 5, 201=
8, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com">bascule=
@gmail.com</a>&gt; </span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></block=
quote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>wrote:</span><br></blockquote></block=
quote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br>=
</blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite=
"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"ci=
te"><span>On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 3:36 PM Nico Williams</span><br></blockquot=
e></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>&=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com">nico@cryptonector.com</a> &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com">mailto:nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt;&=
gt; wrote:</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>I'm not a fan of sy=
stems like this, but I believe for</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blo=
ckquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><span>security reasons they should be designed in such a way tha=
t</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cit=
e"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>only the confid=
entiality of traffic is impacted, and a</span><br></blockquote></blockquote>=
</blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><span>"visibility" system isn't able to leverage the decryp=
ted</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquo=
te><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"c=
ite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>traffic to re=
sume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate</span><br></blockquote></blo=
ckquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>clients.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote>=
</blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></s=
pan><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><span>Any key escrow system will have this property. &nbsp;Given=
 the</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite"><span>session keys (or a way to recover them) you can res=
ume</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite"><span>decrypted sessions.</span><br></blockquote></blockqu=
ote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br><=
/blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cit=
e"><span>Wouldn't escrowing only the client/server application traffic </spa=
n><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><span>secrets (instead of keys higher in the schedule) avoid this </s=
pan><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><span>problem? These keys would permit the one capability</span>=
<br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><span>"visibility" appliance vendors allege to care about: traffic</s=
pan><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><span>decryption, without permitting others like session resumpt=
ion.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquo=
te type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><=
/blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>The most obvious escrow design r=
equiring no changes to the</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote>=
</blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>clients is to use a static eD=
H key on the server-side. &nbsp;The</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></bl=
ockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><b=
lockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>next most obvious su=
ch design is to have the server talk to the</span><br></blockquote></blockqu=
ote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>escrow agent=
.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blo=
ckquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>It seems like with an out-of-band e=
scrow agent, the traffic</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></=
blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>secrets could be escrowed with n=
o changes to TLS.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote><=
/blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>-- Tony Arcieri _=
______________________________________________</span><br></blockquote></bloc=
kquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>TLS mailing=
 list <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> </span><br></blockquo=
te></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>=
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/tls</a></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote></b=
lockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>=
</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">=
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></block=
quote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>_____________________________________=
__________ TLS mailing list</span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cit=
e"><span> <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls</a></span><br></blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br><=
/blockquote></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><span>&lt;0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc&gt;</span><br></blockquote></b=
lockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote></div></blockquote><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">&lt;0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc&gt;</div></blockq=
uote></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-636A0F2E-94AE-490E-A3A1-8E0E0D4E7B5A--


From nobody Wed Dec  5 04:37:18 2018
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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Wed 2018-12-05 20:15:08 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:
>>> On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>> I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
>>> 360 degree deployment perspective.=20
>>=20
>> I think we should avoid marketing speak.
>
> This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these solutions
> need to be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from
> consumer, to small business, to enterprise, to service provider, to
> content provider, to telco, etc.

Perhaps one of the reasons that this might across as marketing speak to
some people is that your list of "all their scenarios" appears to be
only business use cases (where the individual people involved are at
most consumers of business products).  You haven't mentioned
journalists, disk jockeys, activists, flat earthers, dissidents,
students, medical professionals, juggalos, community organizers, gun
nuts, cryptozoologists, whistleblowers, LGBTQ folx, refugees, free
software developers, elected officials, religious minorities, senior
citizens, or any of the other non-business use cases that may depend on
TLS for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or any of the other
information security guarantees that are put at risk by proposals like
this.

One of the concerns the last time we danced this dance was that the
proposal claimed to be interested in one use case only: "the enterprise
data center", and yet offered no meaningful way to effectively limit its
(ab)use outside the data center.  This objection was raised clearly, and
the proponents of the protocol change failed to address it.  And now it
appears that instead of addressing the concern, they forum-shopped until
they found a place to publish the same approach without even
acknowledging the concern that this could have an impact beyond the data
center.

A full 360 degree view might acknowledge that doing harm to the core
priniciples of a security protocol that everyone relies on for the sake
of one particular use case out of many might not be an appropriate step
to take.  (and that one use case might have other solutions, albeit
perhaps more expensive or inconveient ones for people who have already
made certain investments)

I'm pretty sure we don't want TLS to be all things to all people, right?
What are the core goals or guarantees of TLS that you would like to see
preserved?

        --dkg

--=-=-=
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--=-=-=--


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 07:51:26 -0800
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To: jordan.ietf@gmail.com
Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 12:09 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real problem
> and need.  We can either address the use case and need here in the IETF, or
> we can let the solutions be done else where. I would personally prefer we
> take this work item back and solve it here in the IETF.
> [...]
>
> On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
> It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traffic secrets could
> be escrowed with no changes to TLS.
>
> Note that the solution I was proposing here requires no changes to TLS. I
am sure that there are many in the IETF who would be happy with people
exploring solutions which don't require changes to TLS.

Here are some others:

   - Endpoint agents (OSS - commercial options are also available):
   - https://osquery.io/
      - https://www.bro.org/ (now Zeek)
      - https://wazuh.com/
      - Encrypted traffic analytics:
   https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-version-1-3-change-is-here-and-encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got-your-back

--
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed=
, Dec 5, 2018 at 12:09 AM Bret Jordan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jordan.ietf@gma=
il.com">jordan.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;">Now =
this WG is finally starting to talk about a solution to a real problem and =
need.=C2=A0 We can either address the use case and need here in the IETF, o=
r we can let the solutions be done else where. I would personally prefer we=
 take this work item back and solve it here in the IETF.<div><div>
</div>
<div>[...]<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, To=
ny Arcieri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">bascu=
le@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>[...]<br class=3D"gmail-m_-653380948187941=
7619Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr">It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the t=
raffic secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.</div></div></div><=
/div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div><div>Note that the s=
olution I was proposing here requires no changes to TLS. I am sure that the=
re are many in the IETF who would be happy with people exploring solutions =
which don&#39;t require changes to TLS.<div><br></div><div>Here are some ot=
hers:</div><div><ul><li>Endpoint agents (OSS - commercial options are also =
available):<br></li><ul><li><a href=3D"https://osquery.io/">https://osquery=
.io/</a><br></li><li><a href=3D"https://www.bro.org/">https://www.bro.org/<=
/a> (now Zeek)<br></li><li><a href=3D"https://wazuh.com/">https://wazuh.com=
/</a><br></li></ul><li>Encrypted traffic analytics:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https:/=
/blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-version-1-3-change-is-here-and-encrypted-traf=
fic-analytics-has-got-your-back">https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-versi=
on-1-3-change-is-here-and-encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got-your-back</a>=
</li></ul></div></div>--<br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Tony=
 Arcieri<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2018 11:44:04 -0500
From: R duToit <r@nerd.ninja>
To: "Tony Arcieri" <bascule@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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I like the gist of what Tony is saying. =C2=A0Key escrow (it should be call=
ed "secret escrow", but I digress) itself is not really the problem in a da=
tacenter - those guys struggle to solve the key distribution problem. =C2=
=A0If it was one-server-to-one-tool then we would not be having this discus=
sion. =C2=A0eTLS looks like an attempt to simplify the key distribution imp=
lementation, but at the expense of the security attributes of the TLS sessi=
on. Why don't we provide a "sandbox" mechanism that would allow business-so=
lution folks to solve the key distribution problem without directly affecti=
ng the TLS session? =C2=A0What I have in mind is a TLS extension that would=
 unlock a new TLS record ContentType called "foo" (for lack of a name). =C2=
=A0All "foo" records will be completely ignored by the TLS stack, including=
 not affecting the TLS record sequence number or crypto state. =C2=A0That m=
echanism can then be used to send in-band messages that could be picked up =
by inline and passive tools along the way. =C2=A0Mechanisms that use "foo" =
records could potentially be designed outside the IETF, and the TLS-WG woul=
d have no responsibility for insecure implementations of multi-party secret=
 sharing mechanisms (although it would be good to point those engineers in =
the right direction). --Roelof ---- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 10:51:26 -0500=C2=
=A0Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote ---- On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 12:09=
 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: Now this WG is finally start=
ing to talk about a solution to a real problem and need.=C2=A0 We can eithe=
r address the use case and need here in the IETF, or we can let the solutio=
ns be done else where. I would personally prefer we take this work item bac=
k and solve it here in the IETF. [...] On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arc=
ieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote: [...] It seems like with an out-of-band esc=
row agent, the traffic secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS. No=
te that the solution I was proposing here requires no changes to TLS. I am =
sure that there are many in the IETF who would be happy with people explori=
ng solutions which don't require changes to TLS. Here are some others: Endp=
oint agents (OSS - commercial options are also available): https://osquery.=
.io/ https://www.bro.org/ (now Zeek) https://wazuh.com/ Encrypted traffic a=
nalytics:=C2=A0https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-version-1-3-change-is-h=
ere-and-encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got-your-back -- Tony Arcieri _____=
__________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html><head>=
<meta content=3D"text/html;charset=3DUTF-8" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"></h=
ead><body ><div style=3D'font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif;color:#00000;'><div>I like the gist of what Tony is saying. &nb=
sp;Key escrow (it should be called "secret escrow", but I digress) itself i=
s not really the problem in a datacenter - those guys struggle to solve the=
 key <b>distribution</b> problem. &nbsp;If it was one-server-to-one-tool th=
en we would not be having this discussion. &nbsp;eTLS looks like an attempt=
 to simplify the key distribution implementation, but at the expense of the=
 security attributes of the TLS session.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Why d=
on't we provide a "sandbox" mechanism that would allow business-solution fo=
lks to solve the key distribution problem without directly affecting the TL=
S session? &nbsp;What I have in mind is a TLS extension that would unlock a=
 new TLS record ContentType called "foo" (for lack of a name). &nbsp;All "f=
oo" records will be completely ignored by the TLS stack, including not affe=
cting the TLS record sequence number or crypto state. &nbsp;That mechanism =
can then be used to send in-band messages that could be picked up by inline=
 and passive tools along the way. &nbsp;Mechanisms that use "foo" records c=
ould potentially be designed outside the IETF, and the TLS-WG would have no=
 responsibility for insecure implementations of multi-party secret sharing =
mechanisms (although it would be good to point those engineers in the right=
 direction).<br></div><div><br></div><div>--Roelof<br></div><div><br></div>=
<div class=3D"zmail_extra"><div id=3D"Zm-_Id_-Sgn1"><div><br></div><div>---=
- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 10:51:26 -0500&nbsp;<b>Tony Arcieri &lt;bascule@gmail=
.com&gt;</b> wrote ----<br></div></div><div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"=
border-left: 1px solid #cccccc; padding-left: 6px; margin:0 0 0 5px"><div><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div class=3D"x_138023314gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"l=
tr">On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 12:09 AM Bret Jordan &lt;<a target=3D"_blank" hr=
ef=3D"mailto:jordan.ietf@gmail.com">jordan.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px sol=
id rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex" class=3D"x_138023314gmail_quote">=
<div style=3D""><div>Now this WG is finally starting to talk about a soluti=
on to a real problem and need.&nbsp; We can either address the use case and=
 need here in the IETF, or we can let the solutions be done else where. I w=
ould personally prefer we take this work item back and solve it here in the=
 IETF.<br></div><div><div><br></div><div><div>[...]<br></div><blockquote><d=
iv>On Dec 5, 2018, at 1:18 AM, Tony Arcieri &lt;<a target=3D"_blank" href=
=3D"mailto:bascule@gmail.com">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><di=
v>[...]<br></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"x_138023314gmail_quote=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">It seems like with an out-of-band escrow agent, the traf=
fic secrets could be escrowed with no changes to TLS.<br></div></div></div>=
</div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div><div><div>Note that=
 the solution I was proposing here requires no changes to TLS. I am sure th=
at there are many in the IETF who would be happy with people exploring solu=
tions which don't require changes to TLS.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Here=
 are some others:<br></div><div><ul><li>Endpoint agents (OSS - commercial o=
ptions are also available):<br></li><ul><li><a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"ht=
tps://osquery.io/">https://osquery..io/</a><br></li><li><a target=3D"_blank=
" href=3D"https://www.bro.org/">https://www.bro.org/</a> (now Zeek)<br></li=
><li><a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"https://wazuh.com/">https://wazuh.com/</a=
><br></li></ul><li>Encrypted traffic analytics:&nbsp;<a target=3D"_blank" h=
ref=3D"https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-version-1-3-change-is-here-and-=
encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got-your-back">https://blogs.cisco.com/secu=
rity/tls-version-1-3-change-is-here-and-encrypted-traffic-analytics-has-got=
-your-back</a><br></li></ul></div></div><div>--<br></div><div class=3D"x_13=
8023314gmail_signature" dir=3D"ltr">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div></div></div=
></div></div></div></div></div><div>_______________________________________=
________<br></div><div>TLS mailing list <br></div><div><a target=3D"_blank"=
 href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> <br></div><div><a target=3D"=
_blank" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf=
.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a> <br></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br><=
/div></div><br></body></html>
------=_Part_924041_489574463.1544028244398--



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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 08:44:46 -0800
Message-ID: <CAO8oSX=ttaHiEeqxPuN6Ehk0af3OVVsj8xQvwSP2B4iUK4m6VA@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: jordan.ietf@gmail.com, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>,  "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/q3GnG_qgabrM8rA5g86sfRCCwA4>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 8:28 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
> Or it could be said the TLS WG had no consensus to not work on it.  When =
there is a tie who wins? It seems like working on a solution that works for=
 the larger community is the right solution.  The use case and need is a va=
lid requirement.
>
> That=E2=80=99s not the way it works.  When deciding whether or not to ado=
pt something as a WG item, unless there is consensus to DO it, then the con=
sensus is DO NOT do it.  There is no tie.  A decision was made, and by not =
adopting this work, the WG decided to NOT DO IT.

Rich's assessment is correct. This may very well be a legitimate use
case and goal, though we previously concluded via lack of consensus
that it does not align with the goals of WG. Therefore, this
discussion should happen elsewhere, and not in this particular WG. I
recommend contacting the ADs for advice as to where this discussion
should go next.

Best,
Chris (for the chairs)


From nobody Wed Dec  5 09:04:54 2018
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 08:04:34 -0900
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On 12/5/18 7:27 AM, Salz, Rich wrote:
> That’s not the way it works.  When deciding whether or not to adopt
> something as a WG item, unless there is consensus to DO it, then the
> consensus is DO NOT do it.  There is no tie.  A decision was made, and
> by not adopting this work, the WG decided to NOT DO IT.

I'm going to split hairs here, since there are a few participants
in the discussion who aren't experienced in the ways of the IETF:
If there's no consensus then there's no consensus.  However, the
outcome, in this case, is very much the same.

Melinda


-- 
Software longa, hardware brevis

PGP key fingerprint  4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
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From nobody Wed Dec  5 10:14:37 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:59:07 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <9a9be8fb-9667-0c6a-9fac-cc167f94599f@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh

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Hiya,

Thanks for writing this, I would support it
being progressed if we conclude that it's
feasible and not easily defeated.

My main concern is that a server playing a
draft-green-like game could just choose DH
values more cleverly and avoid detection.
E.g. if the DH values are derived via some
function so that public shares never recur,
or only rarely. (And while such derived DH
values would in a sense represent the server
borking its own crypto, that's basically what
draft-green suggested anyway, so one might
expect a DH borking adversary in such cases
to not care so much about the client's
security.)

I guess that testing would also be an issue
so it'd be great if someone was to try do
that to check if this might break things.
(Which'd be useful in any case if it found
some servers accidentally re-using.)

Other than that, some more minor comments:

It'd be good to describe in detail a way in
which one might efficiently retain the client
state required, e.g. via a bloom filter maybe?
(Assuming an occasional false positive isn't
too alarming;-)

It might also be good to outline how a survey
or CT-like mechanism (say logging some value
as a witness for the DH public) could be used
to detect this kind of badness even if common
TLS clients didn't deploy.

I think in 3.2 you need to be a bit more
precise about which DH values you mean, e.g.
if doing ESNI then clients will see the same
DH value from ESNIKeys a number of times. (So
I suspect you couldn't implement this at a
very low level in the crypto engine.)

"MUST avoid accidental" is an interesting
phrase:-)

Section 4 could probably do with some text
about how not to do this, e.g. keeping a list
of {servername,[DH values]} would be bad if
a client's disk were compromised.

Cheers,
S.

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From: R duToit <r@nerd.ninja>
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See=C2=A0https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3D2987480 Quote: =C2=A0"As we w=
ill discuss later, we empirically find that at least 7.2% of HTTPS domains =
in the Alexa Top Million reuse DHE values and 15.5% reuse ECDHE values." --=
-- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 13:59:07 -0500=C2=A0Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie> wrote ---- Hiya, Thanks for writing this, I would support it be=
ing progressed if we conclude that it's feasible and not easily defeated. M=
y main concern is that a server playing a draft-green-like game could just =
choose DH values more cleverly and avoid detection. E.g. if the DH values a=
re derived via some function so that public shares never recur, or only rar=
ely. (And while such derived DH values would in a sense represent the serve=
r borking its own crypto, that's basically what draft-green suggested anywa=
y, so one might expect a DH borking adversary in such cases to not care so =
much about the client's security.) I guess that testing would also be an is=
sue so it'd be great if someone was to try do that to check if this might b=
reak things. (Which'd be useful in any case if it found some servers accide=
ntally re-using.) Other than that, some more minor comments: It'd be good t=
o describe in detail a way in which one might efficiently retain the client=
 state required, e.g. via a bloom filter maybe? (Assuming an occasional fal=
se positive isn't too alarming;-) It might also be good to outline how a su=
rvey or CT-like mechanism (say logging some value as a witness for the DH p=
ublic) could be used to detect this kind of badness even if common TLS clie=
nts didn't deploy. I think in 3.2 you need to be a bit more precise about w=
hich DH values you mean, e.g. if doing ESNI then clients will see the same =
DH value from ESNIKeys a number of times. (So I suspect you couldn't implem=
ent this at a very low level in the crypto engine.) "MUST avoid accidental"=
 is an interesting phrase:-) Section 4 could probably do with some text abo=
ut how not to do this, e.g. keeping a list of {servername,[DH values]} woul=
d be bad if a client's disk were compromised. Cheers, S. __________________=
_____________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
------=_Part_999975_1451935658.1544037597970
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html><head>=
<meta content=3D"text/html;charset=3DUTF-8" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"></h=
ead><body ><div style=3D'font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif;color:#00000;'><div>See&nbsp;<a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"https=
://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3D2987480">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
=3D2987480</a><br></div><div>Quote: &nbsp;"<span class=3D"font" style=3D"fo=
nt-family:NimbusRomNo9L"><span class=3D"size" style=3D"font-size:10pt">As w=
e will discuss later, we empirically find that at least 7.2% of HTTPS domai=
ns in the Alexa Top Million reuse DHE values and 15.5% reuse ECDHE values."=
</span></span><br></div><div><br></div><div class=3D"zmail_extra"><div id=
=3D"Zm-_Id_-Sgn1"><div><br></div><div>---- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 13:59:07 -05=
00&nbsp;<b>Stephen Farrell &lt;stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie&gt;</b> wrote ----=
<br></div></div><div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"border-left: 1px solid =
#cccccc; padding-left: 6px; margin:0 0 0 5px"><div><div><br></div><div>Hiya=
, <br></div><div> <br></div><div>Thanks for writing this, I would support i=
t <br></div><div>being progressed if we conclude that it's <br></div><div>f=
easible and not easily defeated. <br></div><div> <br></div><div>My main con=
cern is that a server playing a <br></div><div>draft-green-like game could =
just choose DH <br></div><div>values more cleverly and avoid detection. <br=
></div><div>E.g. if the DH values are derived via some <br></div><div>funct=
ion so that public shares never recur, <br></div><div>or only rarely. (And =
while such derived DH <br></div><div>values would in a sense represent the =
server <br></div><div>borking its own crypto, that's basically what <br></d=
iv><div>draft-green suggested anyway, so one might <br></div><div>expect a =
DH borking adversary in such cases <br></div><div>to not care so much about=
 the client's <br></div><div>security.) <br></div><div> <br></div><div>I gu=
ess that testing would also be an issue <br></div><div>so it'd be great if =
someone was to try do <br></div><div>that to check if this might break thin=
gs. <br></div><div>(Which'd be useful in any case if it found <br></div><di=
v>some servers accidentally re-using.) <br></div><div> <br></div><div>Other=
 than that, some more minor comments: <br></div><div> <br></div><div>It'd b=
e good to describe in detail a way in <br></div><div>which one might effici=
ently retain the client <br></div><div>state required, e.g. via a bloom fil=
ter maybe? <br></div><div>(Assuming an occasional false positive isn't <br>=
</div><div>too alarming;-) <br></div><div> <br></div><div>It might also be =
good to outline how a survey <br></div><div>or CT-like mechanism (say loggi=
ng some value <br></div><div>as a witness for the DH public) could be used =
<br></div><div>to detect this kind of badness even if common <br></div><div=
>TLS clients didn't deploy. <br></div><div> <br></div><div>I think in 3.2 y=
ou need to be a bit more <br></div><div>precise about which DH values you m=
ean, e.g. <br></div><div>if doing ESNI then clients will see the same <br><=
/div><div>DH value from ESNIKeys a number of times. (So <br></div><div>I su=
spect you couldn't implement this at a <br></div><div>very low level in the=
 crypto engine.) <br></div><div> <br></div><div>"MUST avoid accidental" is =
an interesting <br></div><div>phrase:-) <br></div><div> <br></div><div>Sect=
ion 4 could probably do with some text <br></div><div>about how not to do t=
his, e.g. keeping a list <br></div><div>of {servername,[DH values]} would b=
e bad if <br></div><div>a client's disk were compromised. <br></div><div> <=
br></div><div>Cheers, <br></div><div>S. <br></div><div>____________________=
___________________________ <br></div><div>TLS mailing list <br></div><div>=
<a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> <br></di=
v><div><a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/t=
ls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a> <br></div></div></blockqu=
ote></div><div><br></div></div><br></body></html>
------=_Part_999975_1451935658.1544037597970--



From nobody Wed Dec  5 11:34:51 2018
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> On Dec 5, 2018, at 2:19 PM, R duToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:
>=20
> Quote:  "As we will discuss later, we empirically find that at least =
7.2% of HTTPS domains in the Alexa Top Million reuse DHE values and =
15.5% reuse ECDHE values."

That survey is now dated.  Library defaults matter, and it used to be
the case in OpenSSL that it was all to easy to re-use (EC)DHE keys.

This is no longer the case, and if that survey were repeated today,
servers not running unpatched EOL code would not re-use (EC)DHE keys.
I rather expect the amount of re-use is much lower now, and will be
essentially zero in the next couple of years (as most of the remaining
outdated software is replaced).

Some Internet metrics can change in just a few years.

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Wed Dec  5 11:35:21 2018
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On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 06:59:07PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> My main concern is that a server playing a
> draft-green-like game could just choose DH
> values more cleverly and avoid detection.

We can forbid static server DH keys, and should attempt to preclude them
by encouraging clients to do _some_ work to detect them.

We can preclude Dual_EC style escrow systems by not providing a way to
publish enough material on the wire for an eavesdropper with access to
the Dual_EC secrets to recover the keys.  Dual_EC style escrow systems
are not protocol-neutral.

We can forbid extension/ciphersuite registration for key escrow schemes.
We'd have to direct experts designated for Expert Review to look for
the possibility that an extension or ciphersuite could be used for
in-band key escrow.

But we can't preclude protocol-neutral (out-of-band) key escrow schemes.
These are not detectable (implementation fingerprinting can always be
defeated).

> E.g. if the DH values are derived via some
> function so that public shares never recur,
> or only rarely. (And while such derived DH
> values would in a sense represent the server
> borking its own crypto, that's basically what
> draft-green suggested anyway, so one might
> expect a DH borking adversary in such cases
> to not care so much about the client's
> security.)

Such a scheme requires some sort of counter to appear on the wire,
similar to Dual_EC.  With no nonces, this can't be done.  But with small
enough counters it will be difficult to preclude their appearance (or
the appearance of a truncated counter, which would require some brute
force on the part of the escrow agents, again like Dual_EC) as there
will always be freedom to express some small number of arbitrary bits
in-band.

> I guess that testing would also be an issue
> so it'd be great if someone was to try do
> that to check if this might break things.
> (Which'd be useful in any case if it found
> some servers accidentally re-using.)
> 
> Other than that, some more minor comments:
> 
> It'd be good to describe in detail a way in
> which one might efficiently retain the client
> state required, e.g. via a bloom filter maybe?
> (Assuming an occasional false positive isn't
> too alarming;-)

OK, but clients would have to share...:

> It might also be good to outline how a survey
> or CT-like mechanism (say logging some value
> as a witness for the DH public) could be used
> to detect this kind of badness even if common
> TLS clients didn't deploy.

Providing a way for clients to report what they see would have serious
privacy concerns that, IMO, outweigh the static server DH key concerns.

And none of this would help detect/preclude out-of-band escrow systems.
Client-side detection of static/reused server DH keys will simply push
server operators who must escrow to use undetectable out-of-band escrow,
thus wasting all work on client-side detection.

Nico
-- 


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From: R duToit <r@nerd.ninja>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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1. Perhaps the kind folks at Qualsys ssllabs.com have some recent stats for=
 us, given that they track DH reuse under "Protocol Details" when you run t=
heir=C2=A0https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html=C2=A0tool. 2. The Do=
S (prevention) engineers should also weigh in on this. =C2=A0Would servers =
not start reusing TLS 1.3 keyshare values when under DoS attack? --Roelof -=
--- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 14:34:44 -0500=C2=A0Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukh=
ovni.org> wrote ---- > On Dec 5, 2018, at 2:19 PM, R duToit <r@nerd.ninja> =
wrote: > > Quote: "As we will discuss later, we empirically find that at le=
ast 7.2% of HTTPS domains in the Alexa Top Million reuse DHE values and 15.=
5% reuse ECDHE values." That survey is now dated. Library defaults matter, =
and it used to be the case in OpenSSL that it was all to easy to re-use (EC=
)DHE keys. This is no longer the case, and if that survey were repeated tod=
ay, servers not running unpatched EOL code would not re-use (EC)DHE keys. I=
 rather expect the amount of re-use is much lower now, and will be essentia=
lly zero in the next couple of years (as most of the remaining outdated sof=
tware is replaced). Some Internet metrics can change in just a few years. -=
- =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Viktor. _________________________________________=
______ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
tls
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html><head>=
<meta content=3D"text/html;charset=3DUTF-8" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"></h=
ead><body ><div style=3D'font-size:10pt;font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif;color:#00000;'><div>1. Perhaps the kind folks at Qualsys ssllab=
s.com have some recent stats for us, given that they track DH reuse under "=
Protocol Details" when you run their&nbsp;<a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"http=
s://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html">https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/a=
nalyze.html</a>&nbsp;tool.</div><div><br></div><div>2. The DoS (prevention)=
 engineers should also weigh in on this. &nbsp;Would servers not start reus=
ing TLS 1.3 keyshare values when under DoS attack?<br></div><div><br></div>=
<div>--Roelof<br></div><div><br></div><div class=3D"zmail_extra"><div id=3D=
"Zm-_Id_-Sgn1"><div><br></div><div>---- On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 14:34:44 -0500&=
nbsp;<b>Viktor Dukhovni &lt;ietf-dane@dukhovni.org&gt;</b> wrote ----<br></=
div></div><div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"border-left: 1px solid #ccccc=
c; padding-left: 6px; margin:0 0 0 5px"><div><div>&gt; On Dec 5, 2018, at 2=
:19 PM, R duToit &lt;<a target=3D"_blank" href=3D"mailto:r@nerd.ninja">r@ne=
rd.ninja</a>&gt; wrote: <br></div><div>&gt; <br></div><div>&gt; Quote:  "As=
 we will discuss later, we empirically find that at least 7.2% of HTTPS dom=
ains in the Alexa Top Million reuse DHE values and 15.5% reuse ECDHE values=
." <br></div><div> <br></div><div>That survey is now dated.  Library defaul=
ts matter, and it used to be <br></div><div>the case in OpenSSL that it was=
 all to easy to re-use (EC)DHE keys. <br></div><div> <br></div><div>This is=
 no longer the case, and if that survey were repeated today, <br></div><div=
>servers not running unpatched EOL code would not re-use (EC)DHE keys. <br>=
</div><div>I rather expect the amount of re-use is much lower now, and will=
 be <br></div><div>essentially zero in the next couple of years (as most of=
 the remaining <br></div><div>outdated software is replaced). <br></div><di=
v> <br></div><div>Some Internet metrics can change in just a few years. <br=
></div><div> <br></div><div>-- <br></div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Vikto=
r. <br></div><div> <br></div><div>_________________________________________=
______ <br></div><div>TLS mailing list <br></div><div><a target=3D"_blank" =
href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a> <br></div><div><a target=3D"_=
blank" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a> <br></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></=
div></div><br></body></html>
------=_Part_1012344_34858589.1544039223855--



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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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--_000_8bc14ca57ff64ebaaef7d6e23f7e54feboschsicom_--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls13
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The WGLC for =E2=80=9CDTLS 1.3" is now complete. We thank Martin
Thomson for his review.  There are some issues that need to
be addressed.  We are going to let the authors sift through
them over the next couple of week and we will bring back
any to the WG that requires discussion.

spt

> On Nov 7, 2018, at 02:39, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> This is the working group last call for the "The Datagram Transport
> Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3" draft available at
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/.  Please
> review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on
> 30 November 2018.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean


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--000000000000055ee7057c5ab33b
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On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 12:19 AM Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) <
Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com> wrote:

> Hi List,
>
>
>
> I put some comments and question on the github page,
>
>
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/15
>

This is IANA considerations. I will fix.



> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/25
>

This is just a bit incomplete in terms of explaining how the MAC works for
other ciphers. I'll fix. I've explained in the issue why the CID needs to
be in the MAC.


and still wait for feedback and comments. FMPOV, the last changes
>
>
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/13
>
>
>
> seems to be not complete worked out.
>
>
Are there other concerns

-Ekr

Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fen / Best regards
>
>
> *Achim Kraus *
> (INST/ECS4)
> Bosch Software Innovations GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 71332
> Waiblingen | GERMANY | www.bosch-si.com
>
> Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B
> Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=
=C3=BChrung: Dr.
> Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of * Salz, Rich
> *Sent:* Mittwoch, 5. Dezember 2018 19:15
> *To:* Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
>
>
>
> Still stuck in that five-day-behind timezone, but I read this doc and hav=
e
> no problems.  Advance it.
>
>
>
> *From: *Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
> *Date: *Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 2:40 AM
> *To: *"tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *[TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
>
>
>
> This is the working group last call for the "Connection Identifiers for
> DTLS 1.2" draft available at
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.ietf.=
org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Ddtls-2Dconnection-2Did_&d=3DDwMFaQ&c=3D96ZbZZc=
aMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3DiqBSgMFiImiHzfVRyybXVZ-sDu8u=
_4S7Arwhr9LoYCk&s=3D2lKHSWzhVyvp_ezQjZN3wJWpxINMJ4H-xR_9VPxzIjA&e=3D>.
> Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC
> on 30 November 2018.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000055ee7057c5ab33b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Dec 6, 2018 at 12:19 AM Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Ach=
im.Kraus@bosch-si.com">Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"m_-9028411240249719107WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif">Hi List,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif">I put some comments and question on the github page,<=
u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issu=
es/15" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/15</a=
></span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is IANA consi=
derations. I will fix.<br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US"><div=
 class=3D"m_-9028411240249719107WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issu=
es/25" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/25</a=
></span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is just a bit=
 incomplete in terms of explaining how the MAC works for other ciphers. I&#=
39;ll fix. I&#39;ve explained in the issue why the CID needs to be in the M=
AC.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><=
div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"m_-90284112=
40249719107WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif">and still wait for feedback and comments. FMPOV, the =
last changes
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull=
/13" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/13</a><u>=
</u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif">seems to be not complete worked out.<u></u><u></u></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif"></span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>Are there other concerns</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div link=3D"blue" vli=
nk=3D"purple" lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"m_-9028411240249719107WordSectio=
n1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif;color:black" lang=3D"DE">Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=
=9Fen / Best regards
<br>
<br>
<b>Achim Kraus<br>
</b><br>
(INST/ECS4) <br>
Bosch=C2=A0Software Innovations=C2=A0GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 7=
1332 Waiblingen | <span style=3D"text-transform:uppercase">
GERMANY</span></span><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Time=
s New Roman&quot;,serif" lang=3D"DE"> |
</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:black"><a href=3D"http://www.bosch-si.com" target=3D"_blank"><sp=
an lang=3D"DE">www.bosch-si.com</span></a></span><span style=3D"font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:black" lang=3D"DE">
<br>
</span><span style=3D"font-size:8.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-se=
rif;color:black" lang=3D"DE"><br>
Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B<br>
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=
=BChrung: Dr. Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic<br>
<br>
</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:black" lang=3D"DE"><br>
<br>
</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-s=
erif" lang=3D"DE"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@i=
etf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b=
>
Salz, Rich<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Mittwoch, 5. Dezember 2018 19:15<br>
<b>To:</b> Joseph Salowey &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:joe@salowey.net" target=3D"=
_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt;; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Still stuck in that five-day-behind timezone, but I =
read this doc and have no problems.=C2=A0 Advance it.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">Joseph Salowey &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:joe@salowey.net" target=3D"_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&=
gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 2:40 AM<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf=
.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ie=
tf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This is the working group last call for the &quot;Co=
nnection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2&quot; draft available at=C2=A0<a href=3D"=
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.ietf.org=
_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Ddtls-2Dconnection-2Did_&amp;d=3DDwMFaQ&amp;c=3D96=
ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&amp;m=3DiqBSgMFiImiHzfV=
RyybXVZ-sDu8u_4S7Arwhr9LoYCk&amp;s=3D2lKHSWzhVyvp_ezQjZN3wJWpxINMJ4H-xR_9VP=
xzIjA&amp;e=3D" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ie=
tf-tls-dtls-connection-id/</a>.
 Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC =
on 30 November 2018.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, Joe, and Sean<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000055ee7057c5ab33b--


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From: "Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4)" <Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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From nobody Thu Dec  6 12:33:24 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Hi Andrei--

On Thu 2018-12-06 02:10:06 +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> I like the intent of draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01, but this part will cost servers some perf:
>
>    "Given the concerns in Section 2 and the necessary client mitigations
>    in the subsections above, servers need to avoid giving the appearance
>    of using non-ephemeral DH.  Servers MUST NOT reuse ephemeral DH
>    shares."
>
> In our tests, we see significant drop in handshakes/sec on a busy TLS
> server with ephemeral DH share reuse time < 1 sec.

interesting, i'd love to see more details on those tests if you can
share them.  What kind of load are we talking about?  Which server
implementation?

The cost here is in the fixed-base operation, iiuc, which is the
cheapest part of the handshake -- DH share reuse allows you to skip this
one step per handshake (or rather, to amortize the one step across
multiple handshakes).

You mention a cutoff of 1 second.  If the amortization is spread across,
say, all handshakes within 2 seconds, is the performance impact still
significant?

If the draft's server guidance were to be amended to suggest avoiding DH
reuse for more than 2 seconds, and the guidance for clients to track
added a buffer of 2 seconds before rejection, would that satisfy your
concerns about performance under load?

> Also, won't the "enterprise TLS" server just create a bunch of static
> DH shares and send different ones at different times, thereby avoiding
> detection by most clients?

I don't think that the intent of the ETSI spec is to encourage
non-visible use.  They've specifically stated visibility to clients as a
primary goal, and acknoweldged that "Annex A" servers would be in
violation of their own goals.

So it's conceivable that truly malicious servers would do this, of
course, but they might also just publish the master secret on twitter
too, and the client wouldn't know how to detect that inband either.  But
for the misbehavior that we *can* detect in-band, a responsible client
should be aware of it and avoid it, right?

       --dkg

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From nobody Thu Dec  6 13:06:08 2018
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On Thu 2018-12-06 02:10:06 +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> In our tests, we see significant drop in handshakes/sec on a busy TLS
> server with ephemeral DH share reuse time < 1 sec.

hm, thinking about this optimization approach, i would really like to
know what implementations are doing this.  It occurs to me that client
implementations as well as server implementations could be doing this
"for efficiency reasons".

If both sides do it, and two connections are established within the
window before the "ephemeral" keys are disposed of, then you could end
up in a scenario where you actually have a "Handshake Secret" and
"Master Secret" that are reused across a connection, and this would be
entirely observable by a passive monitor.

That leaves the only defense against direct key reuse for encryption on
the wire the entropy in:

 * ClientHello and ServerHello (for
   {client,server}_handshake_traffic_secret)

 * ClientHello and server Finished (for
   {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 and
   exporter_master_secret)

 * ClientHello and client Finished (for
   resumption_master_secret)

Seems like risky business... we're leaning heavily on HKDF-Expand-Label
to keep a passive observer from being able to identify how the actual
traffic keys across sessions are related to one another.  Or am i
missing something?  I'd love for someone to correct me here.

Maybe i'll add a section to the draft explicitly forbidding clients from
ever taking this "optimization" step as well.

      --dkg

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VsUTHGBCmzncUM2l5G-v_jz8_14>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 15:29:13 -0800
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 12:33 PM Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:

> So it's conceivable that truly malicious servers would do this, of
> course, but they might also just publish the master secret on twitter
> too, and the client wouldn't know how to detect that inband either.  But
> for the misbehavior that we *can* detect in-band, a responsible client
> should be aware of it and avoid it, right?
>

If nothing else, implementations which reuse ephemeral keys for long
periods of time are buggy and contain a vulnerability which violates the
security assumptions of the protocol.

I think it's reasonable for clients to detect and reject this behavior, as
it's an indicator TLS has been deployed in an insecure way and therefore
the connection should be aborted. I think this could detect a wide range of
"real world" TLS implementation failures which have come up in the past,
including bugs in random number generation and bugs in the code in TLS
stacks responsible for rotating ephemeral keys.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--000000000000777d41057c62de2c
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Dec 6,=
 2018 at 12:33 PM Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorsem=
an.net">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex">So it&#39;s conceivable that truly malicious s=
ervers would do this, of<br>
course, but they might also just publish the master secret on twitter<br>
too, and the client wouldn&#39;t know how to detect that inband either.=C2=
=A0 But<br>
for the misbehavior that we *can* detect in-band, a responsible client<br>
should be aware of it and avoid it, right?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>If nothing else, implementations which reuse ephemeral keys for long pe=
riods of time are buggy and contain a vulnerability which violates the secu=
rity assumptions of the protocol.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I think it=
&#39;s reasonable for clients to detect and reject this behavior, as it&#39=
;s an indicator TLS has been deployed in an insecure way and therefore the =
connection should be aborted. I think this could detect a wide range of &qu=
ot;real world&quot; TLS implementation failures which have come up in the p=
ast, including bugs in random number generation and bugs in the code in TLS=
 stacks responsible for rotating ephemeral keys.</div></div><div></div><div=
><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<b=
r></div></div>

--000000000000777d41057c62de2c--


From nobody Thu Dec  6 15:30:26 2018
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To: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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> On Dec 6, 2018, at 4:08 PM, Andrei Popov =
<Andrei.Popov=3D40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Widespread deployment of draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01 and failing =
connections to "enterprise TLS" servers would probably qualify as =
"essential circumstances", at least to some operators.

I don't think the TLS WG or IETF can win this skirmish.  If some
operators are set on session recording, they'll find a way, and
the more obstacles they have to overcome the more likely they are
to compromise security along the way.

So while clients should not do anything special to support this,
and the protocol should not change to adapt to the use-case, it
might in fact be more productive to help the operators who need
this arrive at an approach that minimizes risk.  Explicitly
trying to defeat what they're sure to do anyway does look like
a wise approach to me.

The operators could, for example, derive the (EC)DH private key
from an HMAC of the client and server random with a secret
key shared with the wiretap device.  The client would never
know, and the (EC)DH key would not look any different to an
outside observer.

The best we can probably do is publicize the risks, so that
auditors are well aware of them and can highlight poor designs,
and hope that some operators will decide they can do without
such intercepts, or will use an approach that preserves as
much security as possible.

--=20
	Viktor.


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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain

On Thu 2018-12-06 21:08:00 +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> In a specific quick test that I did, there was no significant perf
> impact with key reuse time > 1 sec. And I could probably get it down
> to sub-seconds on my HW. But HW specs differ between TLS servers; our
> current "ephemeral" key lifetime is a generous 30 sec., mainly because
> we saw no reason to push for a lower key lifetime.

Is this on both client side and server side?  That is, does SChannel as
a client also use an "ephemeral" key lifetime of a generous 30 seconds?

> "Truly malicious" is perhaps an overstatement for this easy workaround explicitly permitted by the "Enterprise TLS" spec:
> "In some essential circumstances, the visibility information field may be omitted."

The ETSI "Middlebox Security Protocol" explicitly aims to drop Annex A.
They've said that they *want* visibility and that is an explicit goal.

Surely the purpose of visibility is to ensure that both parties involved
are running the significantly weaker eTLS, and not TLS.  Opting for
visibility while expecting clients to not do anything with the knowledge
gained doesn't make much sense to me.

       --dkg

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/8Tm5gjskW62XelMWJNq2plQnITk>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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> I don't think the TLS WG or IETF can win this skirmish. =20
That's what I'm thinking as well, although I agree with the goals of draft-=
dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01.

Cheers,

Andrei


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On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 12:04:02AM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> > I don't think the TLS WG or IETF can win this skirmish.  
>
> That's what I'm thinking as well, although I agree with the goals of
> draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01.

Yes.  What we can, and IMO should do, is say that if you must do key
escrow or session recording, to it out-of-band.

Nico
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On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 3:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> > On Dec 6, 2018, at 4:08 PM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov=
> 40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > Widespread deployment of draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01 and failing
> connections to "enterprise TLS" servers would probably qualify as
> "essential circumstances", at least to some operators.
>
> I don't think the TLS WG or IETF can win this skirmish.
>

I think there are very strong technical/security reasons to reject using a
static D-H key in place of an ephemeral D-H key, namely compromise of this
key permits "impersonation" of any previously (passively) observed TLS
sessions by allowing a passive observer holding one of these keys to
recover the resumption master secret.

In as much as people are attempting to build standards around this
approach, based on the conversation earlier in this thread it seems they
were unaware of this security property. I hope this causes the creators of
"eTLS" to reconsider the security implications of their proposal.

I think a protocol which aims to fulfill the specific goals of "eTLS"
should focus on providing a way for a passive observer to recover the
*traffic* secrets, which would provide the ability to passively decrypt
traffic (something I think is a bad idea, but I digress), but *NOT* resume
observed sessions.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

--000000000000b8d52e057c63baf7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Dec 6,=
 2018 at 3:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.o=
rg">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Dec 6, 2018, at 4:08 PM, Andrei Popov &lt=
;Andrei.Popov=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank">40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Widespread deployment of draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh-01 and failing=
 connections to &quot;enterprise TLS&quot; servers would probably qualify a=
s &quot;essential circumstances&quot;, at least to some operators.<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t think the TLS WG or IETF can win this skirmish.<br>
</blockquote></div><div><br></div>I think there are very strong technical/s=
ecurity reasons to reject using a static D-H key in place of an ephemeral D=
-H key, namely compromise of this key permits &quot;impersonation&quot; of =
any previously (passively) observed TLS sessions by allowing a passive obse=
rver holding one of these keys to recover the resumption master secret.<div=
><br><div>In as much as people are attempting to build standards around thi=
s approach, based on the conversation earlier in this thread it seems they =
were unaware of this security property. I hope this causes the creators of =
&quot;eTLS&quot; to reconsider the security implications of their proposal.=
</div><div><br></div><div>I think a protocol which aims to fulfill the spec=
ific goals of &quot;eTLS&quot; should focus on providing a way for a passiv=
e observer to recover the *traffic* secrets, which would provide the abilit=
y to passively decrypt traffic (something I think is a bad idea, but I digr=
ess), but *NOT* resume observed sessions.</div><div><div><br></div>-- <br><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div></div=
></div>

--000000000000b8d52e057c63baf7--


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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
From: "Arnaud.Taddei.IETF" <Arnaud.Taddei.IETF@protonmail.com>
Cc: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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I am really surprised how the answers you don't like are systematically put=
 on denial. Can you explain me what leads you to think that some people her=
e are not concerned by the list of people you list? this is an assumption a=
nd the wrong assumption.

Perhaps on the contrary we are concerned BOTH by what these people endure b=
ut too by what other consistencies are basically removed rights to defend t=
hemselves.

As to the marketing aspect frankly this is an invention here and again I do=
n't see what allows you to paint the answers you don't like because you don=
't like.

So I could on the contrary hightight the dogmatism that reins here, with a =
smell of intimidation, and to some degree the sectarianism back to the lati=
n roots of the word

Regarding Human Rights, we DO care about Human Rights too and fact is that =
I had the chance to make more progress in 2 hours than I did in 2 years at =
IET and I had the chance to contribute to a magic moment with a Chinese Org=
anization to comply a technical solution to Human Rights requirements. You =
know why? Because we took the time to TALK properly to each other, understa=
nd each other, learn from each other with no intimidation and no wrong assu=
mptions that 'because we LOOK to be on the wrong side' we are foolish peopl=
e, and respect to the fact that not everyone speaks and writes a proper Eng=
lish and sometimes words are dangerous when we don't know exactly the seman=
tics in the right context

The assumption that you are the only one who cares is tiresome.

This group was offered a chance to control the development of a 360 degree =
solution for all parties and it was rejected. Fine. The ETSI took it and is=
 taking its responsibly.

I don't know what leads you to think that a model where security resides on=
ly on the 2 ends of the communication IS the answer to all the problems.

The recent continuous scandals that are affecting a number of platforms and=
 destroying trust, privacy and security is leading me to think about why sh=
ould I trust this model. By analogy when I see how my body defends itself a=
gainst bad stuff, it is using a battery of models, not one model.

In any negotiation you can look for what is the right battle, and those who=
 understand that point will know that the right battle (and the one which i=
s harder for the opposition) is on providing guarantees. This would have be=
en a better battle to pick and would have given a chance to work more colla=
boratively and not by confrontation.

Now I don't understand what leads this group to try now to block the ETSI, =
can someone tell me and in particular the chairs if we have a consensus her=
e?

Finally I am calling on the chairs of this group. It was very interesting t=
o observe the many comments at the last IETF103 about the vile and toxic at=
mosphere that prevails here. I have all my time to work in these conditions=
 but perhaps the chair could try to think about a more positive atmosphere =
of work.

A bon entendeur salut



Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original Me=
ssage =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90
On Wednesday 5 December 2018 21:36, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.=
net> wrote:

> On Wed 2018-12-05 20:15:08 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie=
 wrote:
> > >
> > > > On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
> > > > I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
> > > > 360 degree deployment perspective.
> > >
> > > I think we should avoid marketing speak.
> >
> > This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these solutions
> > need to be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from
> > consumer, to small business, to enterprise, to service provider, to
> > content provider, to telco, etc.
>
> Perhaps one of the reasons that this might across as marketing speak to
> some people is that your list of "all their scenarios" appears to be
> only business use cases (where the individual people involved are at
> most consumers of business products). You haven't mentioned
> journalists, disk jockeys, activists, flat earthers, dissidents,
> students, medical professionals, juggalos, community organizers, gun
> nuts, cryptozoologists, whistleblowers, LGBTQ folx, refugees, free
> software developers, elected officials, religious minorities, senior
> citizens, or any of the other non-business use cases that may depend on
> TLS for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or any of the other
> information security guarantees that are put at risk by proposals like
> this.
>
> One of the concerns the last time we danced this dance was that the
> proposal claimed to be interested in one use case only: "the enterprise
> data center", and yet offered no meaningful way to effectively limit its
> (ab)use outside the data center. This objection was raised clearly, and
> the proponents of the protocol change failed to address it. And now it
> appears that instead of addressing the concern, they forum-shopped until
> they found a place to publish the same approach without even
> acknowledging the concern that this could have an impact beyond the data
> center.
>
> A full 360 degree view might acknowledge that doing harm to the core
> priniciples of a security protocol that everyone relies on for the sake
> of one particular use case out of many might not be an appropriate step
> to take. (and that one use case might have other solutions, albeit
> perhaps more expensive or inconveient ones for people who have already
> made certain investments)
>
> I'm pretty sure we don't want TLS to be all things to all people, right?
> What are the core goals or guarantees of TLS that you would like to see
> preserved?
>
> --dkg


From nobody Thu Dec  6 20:34:03 2018
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On Wed 2018-12-05 18:59:07 +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> it's feasible and not easily defeated.

TLS endpoints can share their data (key material, cleartext, etc) with
whoever they choose -- that's just how the universe is implemented.
They can even do it out of band, on a channel that the peer has no
knowledge of.

The question for TLS implementers is what to do about risks or leakage
that they *can* become aware of.

> It'd be good to describe in detail a way in which one might
> efficiently retain the client state required, e.g. via a bloom filter
> maybe?  (Assuming an occasional false positive isn't too alarming;-)

Yes, that would be great.  the way i was going to write it that guidance
was pretty dumb (i was thinking of just a hashtable combined with a
fixed-size ring buffer to be constant-space and roughly constant-time,
and hadn't even considered bloom filters), so i welcome suggested text.

Given that the size of the set of elements to include is effectively
infinite, standard Bloom filters seem likely to be trouble (way too fast
to converge onto false-positives).

Perhaps "stable bloom filters" would represent a better tradeoff:

  http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~drafiei/papers/DupDet06Sigmod.pdf

But hm, even a 0.1% false positive rate sounds pretty alarming too.  1
in a thousand connections failing?  yikes!  I think we'd want to err on
the false-negative side for this particular use case.

> It might also be good to outline how a survey or CT-like mechanism
> (say logging some value as a witness for the DH public) could be used
> to detect this kind of badness even if common TLS clients didn't
> deploy.

oof, CT itself is *really* heavyweight, and given our overall failure to
get any sort of monitoring that would detect abuse by the CT logs
themselves working (gossip hasn't had the necessary traction), i'm not
sure i have the stamina to go down that route for ephemeral DH values.

If someone wants to try to think that through (how do you ensure it's
not spammed?) i'd be happy to see it as a separate draft, but i don't
think it belongs in this one, which is intended as guidance for TLS
endpoint implementations.

> I think in 3.2 you need to be a bit more precise about which DH values
> you mean, e.g.  if doing ESNI then clients will see the same DH value
> from ESNIKeys a number of times. (So I suspect you couldn't implement
> this at a very low level in the crypto engine.)

Yes, that's absolutely right.  Proposals for text welcome!

> "MUST avoid accidental" is an interesting phrase:-)

good catch, i'll drop "accidental" :)

> Section 4 could probably do with some text about how not to do this,
> e.g. keeping a list of {servername,[DH values]} would be bad if a
> client's disk were compromised.

right, this would align with the bloom filter (or whatever)
implementation guidance you mention above.  I've been thinking about
this, and i'm not sure that we even need servername as part of the key.
is there any reason that a client should ephemeral DH reuse *across*
hosts?  If anything, ephemeral DH reuse across hosts *proves* that a DH
secret has been shared (wittingly or unwittingly), which is one of the
things we're trying to avoid, right?  Simpler implementations are
probably better, and it's certainly easier to not deal with the
servername.

        --dkg


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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 03:37:25AM +0300, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Wed 2018-12-05 18:59:07 +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> > it's feasible and not easily defeated.
> 
> TLS endpoints can share their data (key material, cleartext, etc) with
> whoever they choose -- that's just how the universe is implemented.
> They can even do it out of band, on a channel that the peer has no
> knowledge of.
> 
> The question for TLS implementers is what to do about risks or leakage
> that they *can* become aware of.

Sure.

> > It'd be good to describe in detail a way in which one might
> > efficiently retain the client state required, e.g. via a bloom filter
> > maybe?  (Assuming an occasional false positive isn't too alarming;-)
> 
> Yes, that would be great.  the way i was going to write it that guidance
> was pretty dumb (i was thinking of just a hashtable combined with a
> fixed-size ring buffer to be constant-space and roughly constant-time,
> and hadn't even considered bloom filters), so i welcome suggested text.

False negatives are OK here.  False positives... depends on whether the
application / library can reconnect and retry.  (I doubt we'd add a TLS
extension by which the client can ask to retry with a fresher server eDH
key...)

When false positives are not OK a Bloom filter check prior to doing a
slower check that has no false positives is a good optimization.  But
let's assume the client can reconnect and retry, no?  If not then just
write all the eDH keys seen to a circular log and on Bloom filter
positive just do a linear search on the log.

Another possibility is to not fail on false positive but to mark a
server as "needs watching like a hawk" and use a more appropriate data
structure (w/o false positives) to watch it for a while.  When you catch
a server cheating with that data structure, then fail hard.

> Given that the size of the set of elements to include is effectively
> infinite, standard Bloom filters seem likely to be trouble (way too fast
> to converge onto false-positives).
> 
> Perhaps "stable bloom filters" would represent a better tradeoff:
> 
>   http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~drafiei/papers/DupDet06Sigmod.pdf

Nifty.

Another option is Scalable Bloom Filters.  Basically, when a filter gets
full-ish, you close it to additions and add a new filter, thenceforth
checking all the closed filters and the one open filter.  Delete filters
older than some number of days, and you limit storage use.

Looks like both Scalable and Stable BFs would fit the bill in terms of
limiting storage use and false positive rate.

> But hm, even a 0.1% false positive rate sounds pretty alarming too.  1
> in a thousand connections failing?  yikes!  I think we'd want to err on
> the false-negative side for this particular use case.

Depends on whether the client can retry, or whether you can do something
other than fail (see above).

> > It might also be good to outline how a survey or CT-like mechanism
> > (say logging some value as a witness for the DH public) could be used
> > to detect this kind of badness even if common TLS clients didn't
> > deploy.
> 
> oof, CT itself is *really* heavyweight, and given our overall failure to
> get any sort of monitoring that would detect abuse by the CT logs
> themselves working (gossip hasn't had the necessary traction), i'm not
> sure i have the stamina to go down that route for ephemeral DH values.

+1

> > Section 4 could probably do with some text about how not to do this,
> > e.g. keeping a list of {servername,[DH values]} would be bad if a
> > client's disk were compromised.
> 
> right, this would align with the bloom filter (or whatever)
> implementation guidance you mention above.  I've been thinking about
> this, and i'm not sure that we even need servername as part of the key.
> is there any reason that a client should ephemeral DH reuse *across*
> hosts?  If anything, ephemeral DH reuse across hosts *proves* that a DH
> secret has been shared (wittingly or unwittingly), which is one of the
> things we're trying to avoid, right?  Simpler implementations are
> probably better, and it's certainly easier to not deal with the
> servername.

You're right, the server name isn't needed.  In principle eDH keys
should be large enough and all randomly generated.  The chances of reuse
anywhere, ever, should be very small.

This would help detect RNGs with shared seeds.  Remember the bad RNG in
OpenSSL in Debian, about a decade ago?  Yeah, let's not have that happen
again.

Nico
-- 


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>the way i was going to write it that guidance was pretty dumb (i was think=
ing=0A=
>of just a hashtable combined with a fixed-size ring buffer to be constant-=
=0A=
>space and roughly constant-time, and hadn't even considered bloom filters)=
,=0A=
>so i welcome suggested text.=0A=
=0A=
Aren't you going to get into an adversarial machine learning problem where=
=0A=
your recogniser has to be smarter than the other side's DH-reuse code?  In=
=0A=
other words if the server just reuses the same DHE public value again and=
=0A=
again you can detect it, but if they generate slightly different values fro=
m a=0A=
fixed seed or start point you're not going to be able to detect it unless y=
ou=0A=
know what they're doing.=0A=
=0A=
Not to mention a NOBUS DHE public value if they really want to be crafty.  =
In=0A=
other words if someone wants to middlebox TLS, they're going to do it no=0A=
matter how much people may dislike it.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 06:31:21AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Aren't you going to get into an adversarial machine learning problem where
> your recogniser has to be smarter than the other side's DH-reuse code?  In
> other words if the server just reuses the same DHE public value again and
> again you can detect it, but if they generate slightly different values from a
> fixed seed or start point you're not going to be able to detect it unless you
> know what they're doing.

If it's different then that's costing the server the resources to
generate it, which is precisely what its operator didn't want when they
enabled eDH key reuse.

Indeed, the client cannot detect the use of a fixed seed and counter
shared with an escrow agent.

> Not to mention a NOBUS DHE public value if they really want to be crafty.  In
> other words if someone wants to middlebox TLS, they're going to do it no
> matter how much people may dislike it.

No argument there.  There's nothing wrong with server-side key escrow if
that's what the server operator wants.

Nico
-- 


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
CC: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>If it's different then that's costing the server the resources to generate=
=0A=
>it, which is precisely what its operator didn't want when they enabled eDH=
=0A=
>key reuse.=0A=
=0A=
It depends on what those resources are, at one end you've got proper DHE wi=
th=0A=
a full modexp required, at the other end if you can fake it with something =
as=0A=
lightweight as a mod-add or similar it's essentially free while defeating D=
HE-=0A=
reuse detection.=0A=
=0A=
I appreciate that people feel strongly about this, and I support the idea o=
f=0A=
non-ephemeral DHE detection in principal [0] (along with many, many other=
=0A=
measures to strengthen TLS), but this draft reads a lot like the IETF blowi=
ng=0A=
raspberries at ETSI.  =0A=
=0A=
Some years ago a draft was rejected by, of all places, PKIX, for being=0A=
"workgroup posturing", and that's what this seems to be.  The IETF could ma=
ke=0A=
its point by releasing a statement saying they don't support what ETSI is=
=0A=
doing, but getting into an arms race you know you can't win seems like, wel=
l,=0A=
workgroup posturing.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=
=0A=
[0] "In principal" because there's a fair bit of SCADA gear that does this=
=0A=
    because it doesn't have the CPU power to generate new DHE values, as I =
=0A=
    found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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Please stand by.

The chairs (Joe, Chris, and myself) have been discussing whether this =
draft is in scope.  We are meeting later today to wrap up the discussion =
and get message out to the WG.

spt

> On Dec 6, 2018, at 21:19, Arnaud.Taddei.IETF =
<Arnaud.Taddei.IETF=3D40protonmail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> I am really surprised how the answers you don't like are =
systematically put on denial. Can you explain me what leads you to think =
that some people here are not concerned by the list of people you list? =
this is an assumption and the wrong assumption.
>=20
> Perhaps on the contrary we are concerned BOTH by what these people =
endure but too by what other consistencies are basically removed rights =
to defend themselves.
>=20
> As to the marketing aspect frankly this is an invention here and again =
I don't see what allows you to paint the answers you don't like because =
you don't like.
>=20
> So I could on the contrary hightight the dogmatism that reins here, =
with a smell of intimidation, and to some degree the sectarianism back =
to the latin roots of the word
>=20
> Regarding Human Rights, we DO care about Human Rights too and fact is =
that I had the chance to make more progress in 2 hours than I did in 2 =
years at IET and I had the chance to contribute to a magic moment with a =
Chinese Organization to comply a technical solution to Human Rights =
requirements. You know why? Because we took the time to TALK properly to =
each other, understand each other, learn from each other with no =
intimidation and no wrong assumptions that 'because we LOOK to be on the =
wrong side' we are foolish people, and respect to the fact that not =
everyone speaks and writes a proper English and sometimes words are =
dangerous when we don't know exactly the semantics in the right context
>=20
> The assumption that you are the only one who cares is tiresome.
>=20
> This group was offered a chance to control the development of a 360 =
degree solution for all parties and it was rejected. Fine. The ETSI took =
it and is taking its responsibly.
>=20
> I don't know what leads you to think that a model where security =
resides only on the 2 ends of the communication IS the answer to all the =
problems.
>=20
> The recent continuous scandals that are affecting a number of =
platforms and destroying trust, privacy and security is leading me to =
think about why should I trust this model. By analogy when I see how my =
body defends itself against bad stuff, it is using a battery of models, =
not one model.
>=20
> In any negotiation you can look for what is the right battle, and =
those who understand that point will know that the right battle (and the =
one which is harder for the opposition) is on providing guarantees. This =
would have been a better battle to pick and would have given a chance to =
work more collaboratively and not by confrontation.
>=20
> Now I don't understand what leads this group to try now to block the =
ETSI, can someone tell me and in particular the chairs if we have a =
consensus here?
>=20
> Finally I am calling on the chairs of this group. It was very =
interesting to observe the many comments at the last IETF103 about the =
vile and toxic atmosphere that prevails here. I have all my time to work =
in these conditions but perhaps the chair could try to think about a =
more positive atmosphere of work.
>=20
> A bon entendeur salut
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>=20
> =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 =
Original Message =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=
=80=90
> On Wednesday 5 December 2018 21:36, Daniel Kahn Gillmor =
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>=20
>> On Wed 2018-12-05 20:15:08 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>=20
>>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell =
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>>>> I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
>>>>> 360 degree deployment perspective.
>>>>=20
>>>> I think we should avoid marketing speak.
>>>=20
>>> This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these =
solutions
>>> need to be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from
>>> consumer, to small business, to enterprise, to service provider, to
>>> content provider, to telco, etc.
>>=20
>> Perhaps one of the reasons that this might across as marketing speak =
to
>> some people is that your list of "all their scenarios" appears to be
>> only business use cases (where the individual people involved are at
>> most consumers of business products). You haven't mentioned
>> journalists, disk jockeys, activists, flat earthers, dissidents,
>> students, medical professionals, juggalos, community organizers, gun
>> nuts, cryptozoologists, whistleblowers, LGBTQ folx, refugees, free
>> software developers, elected officials, religious minorities, senior
>> citizens, or any of the other non-business use cases that may depend =
on
>> TLS for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or any of the other
>> information security guarantees that are put at risk by proposals =
like
>> this.
>>=20
>> One of the concerns the last time we danced this dance was that the
>> proposal claimed to be interested in one use case only: "the =
enterprise
>> data center", and yet offered no meaningful way to effectively limit =
its
>> (ab)use outside the data center. This objection was raised clearly, =
and
>> the proponents of the protocol change failed to address it. And now =
it
>> appears that instead of addressing the concern, they forum-shopped =
until
>> they found a place to publish the same approach without even
>> acknowledging the concern that this could have an impact beyond the =
data
>> center.
>>=20
>> A full 360 degree view might acknowledge that doing harm to the core
>> priniciples of a security protocol that everyone relies on for the =
sake
>> of one particular use case out of many might not be an appropriate =
step
>> to take. (and that one use case might have other solutions, albeit
>> perhaps more expensive or inconveient ones for people who have =
already
>> made certain investments)
>>=20
>> I'm pretty sure we don't want TLS to be all things to all people, =
right?
>> What are the core goals or guarantees of TLS that you would like to =
see
>> preserved?
>>=20
>> --dkg
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Fri Dec  7 08:48:23 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 07:14:17AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> It depends on what those resources are, at one end you've got proper DHE with
> a full modexp required, at the other end if you can fake it with something as
> lightweight as a mod-add or similar it's essentially free while defeating DHE-
> reuse detection.

Fair.

> I appreciate that people feel strongly about this, and I support the idea of
> non-ephemeral DHE detection in principal [0] (along with many, many other
> measures to strengthen TLS), but this draft reads a lot like the IETF blowing
> raspberries at ETSI.  

That's my take as well.  However, the possibility of detecting stuck
RNGs like the Debian OpenSSL debacle of ten years ago is interesting.
Still, it's more complexity for clients.

Nico
-- 


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 09:42:16 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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--0000000000002674f0057c7225d7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

The Security ADs sent the following liaison statement to ETSI on this topic:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1616/

On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 1:11 AM Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> JFYI. Via Feisti Duck nerwsletter.
>
>
> https://www..etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management
> <https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-etsi-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management>
>
> The eTLS key exchange shall use exactly the same messages and procedures
> to establish a set of session keys as a
> TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, except for two differences
> [2].
> 1) the server shall use a static public/private key pair at Step 2 in
> clause 4.3.1; and
> 2) the server's certificate at Step 5 shall contain visibility information
> as defined in clause 4.3.3 to indicate to the
> client that eTLS is in use.
> NOTE: Neither the static public key nor the visibility information affects
> the operation of a TLS 1.3 compliant
> client, so an eTLS server is therefore fully interoperable with TLS 1.3
> compliant clients.
>
> --
> SY, Dmitry Belyavsky
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000002674f0057c7225d7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The Security ADs sent the following =
liaison statement to ETSI on this topic:</div><div><a href=3D"https://datat=
racker.ietf.org/liaison/1616/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1616/</=
a><br></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On =
Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 1:11 AM Dmitry Belyavsky &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:beldmit@=
gmail.com">beldmit@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dear All,<div><=
br></div><div>JFYI. Via Feisti=C2=A0Duck nerwsletter.</div><div><br></div><=
div><a href=3D"https://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-ets=
i-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www..etsi.org/news-events/news/1358-2018-11-press-e=
tsi-releases-standards-for-enterprise-security-and-data-centre-management</=
a></div><div><br></div><div><div>The eTLS key exchange shall use exactly th=
e same messages and procedures to establish a set of session keys as a</div=
><div>TLS 1.3 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, except for two differe=
nces [2].</div><div>1) the server shall use a static public/private key pai=
r at Step 2 in clause 4.3.1; and</div><div>2) the server&#39;s certificate =
at Step 5 shall contain visibility information as defined in clause 4.3.3 t=
o indicate to the</div><div>client that eTLS is in use.</div><div>NOTE: Nei=
ther the static public key nor the visibility information affects the opera=
tion of a TLS 1.3 compliant</div><div>client, so an eTLS server is therefor=
e fully interoperable with TLS 1.3 compliant clients.=C2=A0</div><div><br><=
/div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"m_8296993928782873174gmail_signature"=
>SY, Dmitry Belyavsky</div></div></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000002674f0057c7225d7--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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There is no WG consensus to adopt this draft as no WG adoption call has =
been made.  draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh is an individual draft that =
is currently being discussed on this list; in much the same way =
draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13 and draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility =
were individual drafts that were discussed on this list; there was no WG =
consensus to adopt draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility and there was never a =
call to adopt draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13. =20

The chairs have been debating whether draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh is =
in scope or whether the discussion should be moved elsewhere.  Parts of =
this draft we believe are in scope, e.g., providing guidance on handling =
key share re-use and pitfalls for not following this guidance.  (Note =
that how to handle key share re-use is not the same thing as explicitly =
prohibiting re-use of keys.)  Other parts of the draft contain material =
for which we did not reach consensus to address, such as Section 3.3 on =
prohibiting key-share reuse.  We are not the protocol police and have =
recently gotten out of that business, e.g., by removing barriers for =
cipher suite code points. We do not want to get back in that business.

In order to ensure a focused discussion and avoid rehashing the previous =
debate regarding draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility, parts of this draft =
should be rescoped or removed.  Authors are free to take this material =
to an AD and seek sponsorship, or to the ISE/IAB for further guidance.

Cheers,
Joe, Chris, and Sean

> On Dec 6, 2018, at 21:19, Arnaud.Taddei.IETF =
<Arnaud.Taddei.IETF=3D40protonmail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> I am really surprised how the answers you don't like are =
systematically put on denial. Can you explain me what leads you to think =
that some people here are not concerned by the list of people you list? =
this is an assumption and the wrong assumption.
>=20
> Perhaps on the contrary we are concerned BOTH by what these people =
endure but too by what other consistencies are basically removed rights =
to defend themselves.
>=20
> As to the marketing aspect frankly this is an invention here and again =
I don't see what allows you to paint the answers you don't like because =
you don't like.
>=20
> So I could on the contrary hightight the dogmatism that reins here, =
with a smell of intimidation, and to some degree the sectarianism back =
to the latin roots of the word
>=20
> Regarding Human Rights, we DO care about Human Rights too and fact is =
that I had the chance to make more progress in 2 hours than I did in 2 =
years at IET and I had the chance to contribute to a magic moment with a =
Chinese Organization to comply a technical solution to Human Rights =
requirements. You know why? Because we took the time to TALK properly to =
each other, understand each other, learn from each other with no =
intimidation and no wrong assumptions that 'because we LOOK to be on the =
wrong side' we are foolish people, and respect to the fact that not =
everyone speaks and writes a proper English and sometimes words are =
dangerous when we don't know exactly the semantics in the right context
>=20
> The assumption that you are the only one who cares is tiresome.
>=20
> This group was offered a chance to control the development of a 360 =
degree solution for all parties and it was rejected. Fine. The ETSI took =
it and is taking its responsibly.
>=20
> I don't know what leads you to think that a model where security =
resides only on the 2 ends of the communication IS the answer to all the =
problems.
>=20
> The recent continuous scandals that are affecting a number of =
platforms and destroying trust, privacy and security is leading me to =
think about why should I trust this model. By analogy when I see how my =
body defends itself against bad stuff, it is using a battery of models, =
not one model.
>=20
> In any negotiation you can look for what is the right battle, and =
those who understand that point will know that the right battle (and the =
one which is harder for the opposition) is on providing guarantees. This =
would have been a better battle to pick and would have given a chance to =
work more collaboratively and not by confrontation.
>=20
> Now I don't understand what leads this group to try now to block the =
ETSI, can someone tell me and in particular the chairs if we have a =
consensus here?
>=20
> Finally I am calling on the chairs of this group. It was very =
interesting to observe the many comments at the last IETF103 about the =
vile and toxic atmosphere that prevails here. I have all my time to work =
in these conditions but perhaps the chair could try to think about a =
more positive atmosphere of work.
>=20
> A bon entendeur salut
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>=20
> =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 =
Original Message =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=
=80=90
> On Wednesday 5 December 2018 21:36, Daniel Kahn Gillmor =
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>=20
>> On Wed 2018-12-05 20:15:08 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>=20
>>>> On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell =
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
>>>>> I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs from a
>>>>> 360 degree deployment perspective.
>>>>=20
>>>> I think we should avoid marketing speak.
>>>=20
>>> This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these =
solutions
>>> need to be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from
>>> consumer, to small business, to enterprise, to service provider, to
>>> content provider, to telco, etc.
>>=20
>> Perhaps one of the reasons that this might across as marketing speak =
to
>> some people is that your list of "all their scenarios" appears to be
>> only business use cases (where the individual people involved are at
>> most consumers of business products). You haven't mentioned
>> journalists, disk jockeys, activists, flat earthers, dissidents,
>> students, medical professionals, juggalos, community organizers, gun
>> nuts, cryptozoologists, whistleblowers, LGBTQ folx, refugees, free
>> software developers, elected officials, religious minorities, senior
>> citizens, or any of the other non-business use cases that may depend =
on
>> TLS for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or any of the other
>> information security guarantees that are put at risk by proposals =
like
>> this.
>>=20
>> One of the concerns the last time we danced this dance was that the
>> proposal claimed to be interested in one use case only: "the =
enterprise
>> data center", and yet offered no meaningful way to effectively limit =
its
>> (ab)use outside the data center. This objection was raised clearly, =
and
>> the proponents of the protocol change failed to address it. And now =
it
>> appears that instead of addressing the concern, they forum-shopped =
until
>> they found a place to publish the same approach without even
>> acknowledging the concern that this could have an impact beyond the =
data
>> center.
>>=20
>> A full 360 degree view might acknowledge that doing harm to the core
>> priniciples of a security protocol that everyone relies on for the =
sake
>> of one particular use case out of many might not be an appropriate =
step
>> to take. (and that one use case might have other solutions, albeit
>> perhaps more expensive or inconveient ones for people who have =
already
>> made certain investments)
>>=20
>> I'm pretty sure we don't want TLS to be all things to all people, =
right?
>> What are the core goals or guarantees of TLS that you would like to =
see
>> preserved?
>>=20
>> --dkg
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Fri Dec  7 19:24:32 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Fri 2018-12-07 07:14:17 +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> I appreciate that people feel strongly about this, and I support the idea=
 of
> non-ephemeral DHE detection in principal [0] (along with many, many other
> measures to strengthen TLS), but this draft reads a lot like the IETF blo=
wing
> raspberries at ETSI.=20=20

hm, it's true that i'm not happy with ETSI's decision-making process
here, but my goal with the draft is to provide a measure of defense for
TLS clients on the public Internet who might accidentally/unknowingly
come into contact with some errant eTLS server implementation that has
escaped the enterprise data center, and not realize it.  If you want to
suggest ways to reduce the raspberry-blowing-ness of it, i'm all ears.

My initial (unpublished) copy of the draft didn't contain the "Problems
with static DH" section at all, it was just a quick set of guidance on
how to mitigate the risks introduced by this potential ecosystem change.

I added the "Problems" section because i wanted to document the very
real concerns; it's not a raspberry-blowing doc for the sake of
rasberries.

> but getting into an arms race you know you can't win seems like, well,
> workgroup posturing.

Another way that someone who wants to leak secrets could leak them would
be to use a bad FFDHE group and small subgroup during key exchange
(indeed, this can happen by accident in some cases), or by enabling and
encouraging the use of export ciphersuites.  But we discourage people
from doing bad FFDHE at a protocol level in TLS 1.2 (where arbitrary
groups are allowed) by encouraging peers to reject handshakes that are
not in the right-sized subgroup.  If you can detect that the peer is
misbehaving, shouldn't you act on it?  Otherwise, what's the point of
detection?

> [0] "In principal" because there's a fair bit of SCADA gear that does this
>     because it doesn't have the CPU power to generate new DHE values, as =
I=20
>     found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.

Is this SCADA gear running TLS 1.3?  is it clients and servers both, or
just one or the other?  When was this scan done?  i'd love to see more
documentation about this practice.

        --dkg

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
CC: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>> [0] "In principal" because there's a fair bit of SCADA gear that does th=
is=0A=
>>     because it doesn't have the CPU power to generate new DHE values, as=
 I =0A=
>>     found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.=0A=
>=0A=
>Is this SCADA gear running TLS 1.3?  is it clients and servers both, or ju=
st=0A=
>one or the other?  When was this scan done?  i'd love to see more=0A=
>documentation about this practice.=0A=
=0A=
No, it'd be mostly 1.0, moving slowly to 1.2 at some stage (I spend a fair=
=0A=
chunk of yesterday debugging a handshake failure that turned out to be the=
=0A=
fact that the current, most-recent release of the code in a fairly signific=
ant=0A=
code base can't understand anything newer than TLS 1.0).  It wasn't a rigor=
ous=0A=
scan, it just got enabled for a new release and then there were enough=0A=
complaints about it breaking things that it got removed again.=0A=
=0A=
I don't really know if it's possible to do any kind of useful survey of the=
=0A=
SCADA environment because most of it is invisible to the public internet, y=
ou=0A=
just try various things on a small basis and if no-one complains, push it o=
ut=0A=
to more and more users and hope you don't get complaints.  Sometimes things=
=0A=
break, for example within the last month we had a customer who thought "USA=
"=0A=
was a valid ISO 3166 country code:=0A=
=0A=
231  12:       SET {=0A=
233  10:         SEQUENCE {=0A=
235   3:           OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)=0A=
240   3:           PrintableString 'USA'=0A=
       :           }=0A=
       :         }=0A=
=0A=
Since no-one seems to check whether the C=3D component in a DN is a valid=
=0A=
country or even looks like a valid C=3D component, it hadn't been noticed=
=0A=
before.  No idea what would have ended up in there if they were in Saint=0A=
Vincent and the Grenadines or the Federated States of Micronesia.=0A=
=0A=
Anyway, I don't have any real data, just that it was common enough that we =
had=0A=
to remove the check again.  When I talk about SCADA stuff and it sounds rat=
her=0A=
anecdotal that's because it usually is, you enable a new feature and if you=
=0A=
don't get complaints, leave it enabled, but that's as far as it goes in ter=
ms=0A=
of coverage.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
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On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 11:14 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> [0] "In principal" because there's a fair bit of SCADA gear that does this
>     because it doesn't have the CPU power to generate new DHE values, as I
>     found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.
>

I think these concerns can largely be addressed by ECDHE with e.g. X25519:

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/343.pdf

This implementation does variable-base X25519 scalar multiplication in
13,900,397 cycles, or ~0.869s on a 16MHz AVR CPU commonly found on
Arduinos. I imagine fixed-base scalar multiplication can be further
optimized.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 11:14 PM Peter Gutmann &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt; w=
rote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">[0] &quot;=
In principal&quot; because there&#39;s a fair bit of SCADA gear that does t=
his<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 because it doesn&#39;t have the CPU power to generate new DHE=
 values, as I <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 found out when I turned on non-DHE checking some years ago.<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think these concerns can largely be ad=
dressed by ECDHE with e.g. X25519:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http=
s://eprint.iacr.org/2015/343.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/343.pdf</a><=
/div><div><br></div><div>This implementation does variable-base X25519 scal=
ar multiplication in 13,900,397 cycles, or ~0.869s on a 16MHz AVR CPU commo=
nly found on Arduinos. I imagine fixed-base scalar multiplication can be fu=
rther optimized.</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D=
"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div></div></div></div>

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Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 18:38:30 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 09:45:51PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> I'm fine that such changes don't get done for a while (so
> I or my student get time to try make stuff work:-) and
> it might in any case take a while to figure out how to
> handle the multi-CDN use-case discussed in Bangkok which
> would I guess also affect this structure some, but I wanted
> to send this to the list while it's fresh for me.

For even nastier combination, combine zone apex (so no CNAMEs)
and multi-CDN. Due to atomicity constraints (the unit of atomicity is
the RRset), plain includes will not work, even if the site is only
using one CDN at a time.

A nasty hack would be to include valid prefixes (with usual more-
specific rules for matching) in include directives. The client could
then match the includes with addresses they belong to.

In the proposed include syntax, there is an issue that the base64
encoding prevents recursive server from returning the referenced
ESNI records in one query. The include would have to be specified as
DNS wire-format name field for DNS recursors to be able to perform such
performance optimization.

For CNAME multi-CDNs, it should be enough to ensure that the ESNI
and address records share owner name and class, as this should
suffice to ensure that address and ESNI always come from the same CDN.

The problems with using CDNs with zone apex are well-known, and there
are attempts at solving those. Any such solution if practical would
also solve the "address CDN" issue for ESNI.


The "recovery" issue seems to be Capital-H Hard. In TLS 1.3, a
really nasty hack would be to restart the handshake after server
finished without resetting encryption (since encryption is not reset,
the client_hello and server_hello would be encrypted, with keys
known by the client and fronting server). However, I do not think that
would work in DTLS 1.3 (as it assumes that keys can not change during
an epoch, and there is space for only one handshake epoch). And even
that hack is likely too much. And of course fallbacks would be horrible
idea here.

Then it seems to me that other ways to do recovery are even worse,
as they would dink even more with the internals of TLS 1.3, which is
not something to do lightly (the "extreme care" remark from RFC8446
definitely appiles here). This seems to apply even if somebody invents
a snappy shortcut using some more exotic cryptographic primitive.

In summary, I do not think "recovery" will work. But this is not the
first DNS record one can take down a site for a long time. But perhaps
the first where one can do that on mass scale...


While thinking about the previous, I ran into some issues with the
split mode. Firstly, if the fronting server does not encrypt the
client_hello when transmitting it to backend server, passive attack
can match incoming connections with backend servers. This reduces
anonymity set to a single backend server (a lot smaller set).

And secondly, even if server encrypts the client_hello, but does not
use a tunnel to backend, if server does not have client hello replay
filtering (and such filtering is hard on typical fronting servers),
replay attacks and some very simple traffic analysis can discover the
backend server (again reducing the anonymity set by a lot).

This means that the fronting server should have an encrypted tunnel
with the backend server (and there is likely double encryption).


Then there is a future compatiblity issue: If one has a PQ IND-CPA
KEM with sufficiently small size (over a dozen of those in NISTPQC),
one can extend base TLS 1.3 to post-quantum in straightforward manner
(client generates a public key, sticks it to key_share, the server
encapsulates a random session key to that public key, sticks the
ciphertext into its key_share and the client decrypts the session key
with the private key. PFS is possible if key generation is cheap enough
for client to do that per-connection). However, such extension is not
compatible with present ESNI design. 

The problem is that key_share in client_hello carries a public key, and
not a ciphertext. And besides, one can not encrypt messages with
IND-CPA KEM (one needs at least IND-CCA KEM). But even if the key
exchange algorithm was IND-CCA, it still would not help because of the
first problem. There are some ways to both perform key agreement and
encrypt using the same PQ key, but all of them are way too slow and
have way too little analysis.

Of course, there does not seem to be straightforware way to fix this:
Decoupling the keys would require some way to ensure one can not copy-
paste ESNI between client hellos (nasty hack that could work would be
to hash client random and client key_share and include that into key
derivation for the ESNI).

Except the above might run into trouble in PSK mode. And reading the
editor's draft: What prevents from using pure-PSK "resumption" with
ESNI (that would be pretty stupid)? As the binding between ESNI and
connection does not apply in straightforward way in that case.



-Ilari


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From: =?UTF-8?Q?T=C3=B6ma_Gavrichenkov?= <ximaera@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 19:49:14 +0300
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:47 PM R duToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:
> 2. The DoS (prevention) engineers should also weigh in on this.  Would se=
rvers not start reusing TLS 1.3 keyshare values when under DoS attack?

DDoS (mitigation) engineer here,

I'll reiterate the idea I've raised before in quic-wg. The operation
of a server (or a client, because a client could be attacked too)
under a DDoS attack should be as close to a normal way of operation as
possible. Every single case where it's different should be seen as
opening a motivation for an attacker to hunt exactly for that
difference. E.g. if you add RTTs under an attack, then an attacker can
play with jitter, or make your server appear slower for clients than
their server (assuming the attack is ordered by your market
competition).

(This is by the way the reason why fast open wasn't a nice idea from
the DDoS mitigation perspective)

So no. TLS keyshare reuse is visible from the attacker's point of
view, so must not be done under a DDoS attack.

| T=C3=B6ma Gavrichenkov
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From nobody Sat Dec  8 10:45:15 2018
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Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 11:42:56 -0700
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNIKeys over complex
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On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 06:38:30PM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> While thinking about the previous, I ran into some issues with the
> split mode. Firstly, if the fronting server does not encrypt the
> client_hello when transmitting it to backend server, passive attack
> can match incoming connections with backend servers. This reduces
> anonymity set to a single backend server (a lot smaller set).
> 
> And secondly, even if server encrypts the client_hello, but does not
> use a tunnel to backend, if server does not have client hello replay
> filtering (and such filtering is hard on typical fronting servers),
> replay attacks and some very simple traffic analysis can discover the
> backend server (again reducing the anonymity set by a lot).
> 
> This means that the fronting server should have an encrypted tunnel
> with the backend server (and there is likely double encryption).

I see--you're thinking of an observer who can see "both sides" of a
connection: the link between the Client and the Client-Facing Server,
and the link between the Client-Facing Server and the Backend Server.
I agree: such an observer could, through timing analysis, deanonymize
client connections (i.e., tell which Backend Server the Client is
accessing, as if it were accessing directly and not through the
Client-Facing Server). I suppose to really defend against a global
observer, you would need some kind of mixnet.

It looks like a little bug in the draft. I've checked just now and I
don't see that it says exactly *where* the observer is. I had assumed
that the observer only sees the Client–Server link (in Shared Mode) or
the link between Client and Client-Facing Server (in Split Mode).

I don't understand your point about replay and encrypting the Client
Hello. An observer doesn't need to see the contents of the Client Hello
to identify a Backend Server--the destination IP address is enough. I
don't see what specific attack you have in mind using replay, but it
seems to me that even an encrypted tunnel is insufficient. Unless the
encrypted tunnel additionally obfuscates packet sizes and timing, an
observer can correlate e.g. burst sizes and match incoming flows to
outgoing flows, in the manner of website fingerprinting.


From nobody Sat Dec  8 11:03:56 2018
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Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 21:03:45 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 11:42:56AM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 06:38:30PM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> > While thinking about the previous, I ran into some issues with the
> > split mode. Firstly, if the fronting server does not encrypt the
> > client_hello when transmitting it to backend server, passive attack
> > can match incoming connections with backend servers. This reduces
> > anonymity set to a single backend server (a lot smaller set).
> > 
> > And secondly, even if server encrypts the client_hello, but does not
> > use a tunnel to backend, if server does not have client hello replay
> > filtering (and such filtering is hard on typical fronting servers),
> > replay attacks and some very simple traffic analysis can discover the
> > backend server (again reducing the anonymity set by a lot).
> > 
> > This means that the fronting server should have an encrypted tunnel
> > with the backend server (and there is likely double encryption).
> 
> I see--you're thinking of an observer who can see "both sides" of a
> connection: the link between the Client and the Client-Facing Server,
> and the link between the Client-Facing Server and the Backend Server.
> I agree: such an observer could, through timing analysis, deanonymize
> client connections (i.e., tell which Backend Server the Client is
> accessing, as if it were accessing directly and not through the
> Client-Facing Server). I suppose to really defend against a global
> observer, you would need some kind of mixnet.

If the client hello is not encrypted to backend server, one does not
need timing analysis if one is on both sides: Things like key share
and client random allow much more robust correlation.

> It looks like a little bug in the draft. I've checked just now and I
> don't see that it says exactly *where* the observer is. I had assumed
> that the observer only sees the Client–Server link (in Shared Mode) or
> the link between Client and Client-Facing Server (in Split Mode).

I think there have actually been real world attacks where link from
client to CDN is encrypted, but link from CDN to backend is not,
and attacker attacked the CDN to backend link.

And those were active attacks, the attacks I am talking about are
passive-only (not as exciting, but more dangerous).

> I don't understand your point about replay and encrypting the Client
> Hello. An observer doesn't need to see the contents of the Client Hello
> to identify a Backend Server--the destination IP address is enough. I
> don't see what specific attack you have in mind using replay, but it
> seems to me that even an encrypted tunnel is insufficient. Unless the
> encrypted tunnel additionally obfuscates packet sizes and timing, an
> observer can correlate e.g. burst sizes and match incoming flows to
> outgoing flows, in the manner of website fingerprinting.

>From the destination IP address, one can only tell that _some_ client
is accessing the backend. One presumably wants to know _which_ client
is doing so (e.g. correlating the IP address of the client). Because
otherwise the client might actually be someone from juristiction that
is not friendly to you.

And yes, even with encrypted tunnel, traffic analysis can get
great amounts of data. It is just that if client hellos are replayable
and there is no tunnel, it is much easier for the attacker to
correlate connections on both sides (since attacker can then observe
new connections versus just some data exchange).



-Ilari


From nobody Sun Dec  9 09:35:35 2018
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Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:35:20 +0100
From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 07:07:30AM +0300, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> One mitigating factor of the ETSI standard, i suppose, is that the
> CABForum's Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of a certificate with
> any subjectAltName other than dNSName or iPAddress, so otherName looks
> like it must not be issued by standard public CAs.
> 
> top of p. 44 of https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf
> 
> Has anyone set up tools to monitor the CT logs for such a sAN to see
> whether that element of the BR is being honored?

All the linters will give an error about that, see for instance:
https://crt.sh/?id=1009623020&opt=x509lint,cablint,zlint


Kurt


From nobody Sun Dec  9 17:12:25 2018
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Subject: [TLS] OCSP Stapling confusion
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I was trying to sort out concrete, specific advice for OCSP stapling
that provides security benefits for the server (and not just performance
and privacy benefits).  Either i'm easily confused, or it's a mess.  I
hope it's the former, please unconfuse me!

Given the IAB's statement from nearly two years ago about the value in
OCSP stapling [0], it's a little distressing to me how difficult it
seems to be to get it right in today's landscape.

  [0]   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/j0JIIGhD-xvbaWx=
tGm2-pFK0JQ8

In the bullet points below, i'll refer to the status requester as the
"client", and the party returning the status as the "server".  I'm aware
that the roles could be reversed if the server is requesting client
certs, but i'm going to punt on that wrinkle for now, since the
straightforward/common case is confusing enough.

 * the status_request TLS extension doesn't provide a mechanism for
   stapling OCSP for intermediate certs.

 * the status_request_v2 extension does provide a mechanism for stapling
   intermediate OCSP, but it is deprecated by TLS 1.3 and TLS servers
   responding with a TLS 1.3 handshake MUST NOT send
   status_request_v2 in the ServerHello.

 * the location of the stapled response has changed between TLS 1.2 and
   TLS 1.3 -- in 1.2 and below, the OCSP response data is carried in a
   CertificateStatus message.  In 1.3, it's in an Extension object
   associated with a Certificate, which allows certificate stapling for
   intermediate certs.  this is a good thing!  but a TLS client capable
   of both 1.2 and 1.3 that wants to be rigorous about stapling in both
   protocol versions has a much more complicated set of logic to worry
   about.

 * the certificate_status extension has its own internal extension
   point:

        enum { ocsp(1), (255) } CertificateStatusType;

   This goes against the "have one joint, and keep it well-oiled" design
   pattern we've learned over the years, because now you have the
   extension itself (certificate_status) and its own config selector.

   This results in another 8-bit registry to maintain: [1]
=20=20=20
   [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extens=
iontype-values.xhtml#certificate-status

   I think we should have omitted this additional joint, and just
   defined the certificate_status extension to be ocsp_status, without
   this field.  If someone wants to introduce a new status type, they
   can introduce a distinct TLS extension later.

 * I see no requirement that the CertificateStatusType in the
   CertificateStatus record actually matches the CertificateStatusType
   in the status_request extension sent by the client.

 * In TLS 1.2 and earlier, there is no obligation for a server which
   replies with the certificate_status extension to actually publish a
   CertificateStatus message.

 * Furthermore, if a status_request arrives at a TLS 1.2 or earlier
   server with a CertificateStatusType other than ocsp(1), or with
   non-empty ResponderID or Extensions members, it's conceivable that
   the server couldn't accurately create a corresponding OCSP response
   (either because it does not know about, or cannot contact any of the
   requested OCSP responders, or is for whatever reason unable to apply
   the requested OCSP extension(s).

 * the TLS Feature Request x.509v3 extension only indicates which
   extensions are supported in a generic, per-extension way.  So while a
   CA might be able to assert "this server will always reply with a
   status_request extension for this certificate", it doesn't appear to
   guarantee that (in 1.2) the server will actually send a
   CertificateStatus message at all, even if a status_request extension
   is sent, let alone whether the contents of that CertificateStatus
   message will be related to the client's status_request.  And in 1.3
   it doesn't guarantee that status_type will be ocsp(1) for the
   status_request extension that is sent.

 * Without the TLS Feature Request x.509v3 extension in the server's
   cert, there's no way to ensure that a compromised server can't just
   block the client from ever learning any OCSP details (e.g. by
   controlling the client's network).


So i think this is a big swirling mishmash of not-quite-compatible and
not-quite-complete specs, especially as we think about TLS clients and
servers that want to be interoperable with both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.

In trying to figure out reasonable, useful guidance, and to make the TLS
Feature Request X.509v3 extension somehow useful, i'm tempted to try to
write up a clarifying/simplifying specification that actually cleans up
some of the semantics of status_request by cleaning up and enforcing the
currently-expected semantics.

In particular, i would want to propose something like:

 * regardless of TLS version, clients SHOULD NOT send status_request_v2,
   and servers SHOULD NOT return it even if the client supplies it.  If
   you want stapling for your intermediate certs, you need to have
   negotiated TLS 1.3.  (i think this is in line with the deprecation
   announced in 8446)

 * ask IANA to lock down the CertificateStatusType registry, or maybe
   remove it altogether.  status_type would then become just a legacy
   fixed value of 0x01 ("ocsp")

 * clients SHOULD always send ResponderID of length 0 and rely on the
   server to select an OCSP responder based on the AIA X.509v3
   extension's "OCSP" and "CA Issuers" fields in the server's
   certificate's X.509v3 extensions.

 * i'm not sure what to do about the Extensions field in status_request.
   For simplicty's sake, i'd like to say it should always be empty.  how
   much would we lose if we lost the ability to force in
   id-pkix-ocsp-nonce.

 * I'd like to redefine the semantics of what the TLS Feature Extension
   means for X.509 if it includes the status_request integer (5).  In
   TLS 1.2 and earlier, it means that if the client sends a
   status_request extension, a server MUST always send a
   CertificateStatus message after its Certificate message, and that
   CertificateStatus message MUST have status_type set to ocsp(1).  for
   TLS v1.3, it means that each CertificateEntry that contains this cert
   should also have a status_request extension, and that the extension's
   contents should match the expectations for v1.2 CertificateStatus
   messages described above (e.g., status_type=3Docsp(1), no ResponderID).


additional conclusions for CAs
=2D-----------------------------

 * CAs must not issue certificates with a TLS Feature extension that
   indicates status_request_v2 for any server that intends to use the
   certificate with TLS 1.3, since TLS 1.3 servers are prohibited from
   responding with status_request_v2 extensions anywhere.


what do folks think of the above simplifications and subtle shifts in
semantics of already-defined code?  Is it worth trying to collect all
this into a single document with clear guidance to implementers, and a
promise that we will not extend status_request to non-ocsp mechanisms,
so that the X.509 TLS Feature Extension can be meaningfully applied for
this purpose?

Or does such a document already exist?  should we be encouraging
stapling as much as possible for security, in addition to performance
and privacy enhancements?

   --dkg

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OCSP Stapling confusion
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From nobody Mon Dec 10 06:03:25 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP Stapling confusion
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--=-=-=
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On Mon 2018-12-10 02:24:29 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
>>     * the status_request TLS extension doesn't provide a mechanism for
>        stapling OCSP for intermediate certs.
>=20=20=20
> Nobody does this.  There's a handful of reasons, but the end result is: n=
obody does this.

I'd be interested in hearing the reasons enumerated.  It seems to me
like being able to promptly revoke an intermediate certificate is a
useful bit of mechanism.  is it just because we hope the major browsers
are clever and responsive enough that they'll push out a CRLset (or
equivalent) when they hear of an intermediate that is found to be
violating the BRs?

>>    So i think this is a big swirling mishmash of not-quite-compatible and
>     not-quite-complete specs, especially as we think about TLS clients and
>     servers that want to be interoperable with both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
>=20=20=20
> Yes, there are many things that could be cleared out with a BCP doc.
> I would be interested in helping with that.

I agree that a BCP would be pretty helpful in clarifiying the state of
play, since it's currently scattered across a few docs over several
years.

But I think i'm proposing something that is not quite just a "BCP",
since it might involve changing the semantics and extensibility of
status_request (limiting it to OCSP responses (from the authorities
found in the AIA?))  so that "TLS Feature" can actually provide
meaningful guarantees of OCSP stapling for X.509v3 certificates.

Because right now, with all the extra (currently unused) flexibility in
status_request, it's hard to see how a client or server can meaningfully
rely on "TLS Feature" as a "must-staple" extension.

           --dkg

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From nobody Mon Dec 10 10:40:25 2018
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Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:40:17 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 07:16:31AM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Mon 2018-12-10 02:24:29 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> >>     * the status_request TLS extension doesn't provide a mechanism for
> >        stapling OCSP for intermediate certs.
> >   
> > Nobody does this.  There's a handful of reasons, but the end result is: nobody does this.
> 
> I'd be interested in hearing the reasons enumerated.  It seems to me
> like being able to promptly revoke an intermediate certificate is a
> useful bit of mechanism.  is it just because we hope the major browsers
> are clever and responsive enough that they'll push out a CRLset (or
> equivalent) when they hear of an intermediate that is found to be
> violating the BRs?

One is that in baseline requirements, the maximum intermediate OCSP
lifetime is 12 months(!) (compare this with the maximum end-entity
OCSP lifetime, which is 7 days), which makes them pretty useless for
quickly notifying of intermediate compromises when stapled.

And yes, some CAs actually use those 12 month OCSP responses.

As noted, all the browsers handle intermediate compromise via their
own blacklisting measures (oneCRL/CRLset/Disallowed.stl/etc...)

> >>    So i think this is a big swirling mishmash of not-quite-compatible and
> >     not-quite-complete specs, especially as we think about TLS clients and
> >     servers that want to be interoperable with both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
> >   
> > Yes, there are many things that could be cleared out with a BCP doc.
> > I would be interested in helping with that.
> 
> I agree that a BCP would be pretty helpful in clarifiying the state of
> play, since it's currently scattered across a few docs over several
> years.
> 
> But I think i'm proposing something that is not quite just a "BCP",
> since it might involve changing the semantics and extensibility of
> status_request (limiting it to OCSP responses (from the authorities
> found in the AIA?))  so that "TLS Feature" can actually provide
> meaningful guarantees of OCSP stapling for X.509v3 certificates.
> 
> Because right now, with all the extra (currently unused) flexibility in
> status_request, it's hard to see how a client or server can meaningfully
> rely on "TLS Feature" as a "must-staple" extension.

The TLS feature extension looks to be woefully underspecified. Even
in the one usecase it was meant to, which was this.

The interpretation I took when writing some releated code was that 5
in any (including CA) TLS feature extension means OCSP stapling EE
certificate is mandatory (or the EE certficate is shortlived). Just
answering the extension 5 is not enough.


-Ilari


From nobody Mon Dec 10 16:50:50 2018
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 11:50:34 +1100
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP Stapling confusion
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On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:03 AM Daniel Kahn Gillmor
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> I'd be interested in hearing the reasons enumerated.  It seems to me
> like being able to promptly revoke an intermediate certificate is a
> useful bit of mechanism.  is it just because we hope the major browsers
> are clever and responsive enough that they'll push out a CRLset (or
> equivalent) when they hear of an intermediate that is found to be
> violating the BRs?

Yeah, from the browser side of things, we tend to rush out updates
when an intermediate is revoked.

I don't think that there is any reason we would prevent stapling in
TLS 1.3, other than the extensions being hard to plumb through.  NSS
throws them away and doesn't have an API surface for exposing the
information.  It's fairly tricky getting all this stuff where it is
needed.


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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 21:43:05 -0500
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP Stapling confusion
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On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 9:03 AM Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:

> On Mon 2018-12-10 02:24:29 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> >>     * the status_request TLS extension doesn't provide a mechanism for
> >        stapling OCSP for intermediate certs.
> >
> > Nobody does this.  There's a handful of reasons, but the end result is:
> nobody does this.
>
> I'd be interested in hearing the reasons enumerated.  It seems to me
> like being able to promptly revoke an intermediate certificate is a
> useful bit of mechanism.  is it just because we hope the major browsers
> are clever and responsive enough that they'll push out a CRLset (or
> equivalent) when they hear of an intermediate that is found to be
> violating the BRs?
>

A few more reasons - speaking broadly to the "revoke intermediates" problem:

* The traditional revocation model (of CRLs and OCSP) is not as robust as
browser-based methods.
  - OCSP & CRLs both do the (Issuer+Serial number) dance, while alternative
revocation methods can use use the (Subject+SPKI), or even just the (SPKI),
as a blacklisting mechanism.
  - In the case of stapling responses for Intermediates, it's not
sufficient to 'simply' staple the response for the given intermediate - it
would have to consider all possible intermediates that chain to trust
anchors (both public and locally-configured).

* It's inefficient for the stated goal, under an adversarial model. This
applies to both leafs and intermediates.
  - While TLS 1.3 has the potential to make this better [1], the
intermediate response is generally going to be highly common between
multiple connections. There's no way (AFAIK), under V2 or 1.3, to indicate
that you already have a suitable response regarding a particular
intermediate. Past proposals [2] ran into a whole host of sharp edges of
complexity here; if memory serves, that complexity is very similar, in
terms of security/privacy/performance tradeoffs, as some of the cache
digest proposals [3] - bloom filters abound :)
  - If a client doesn't support it (and, indeed, only Microsoft provides
the relevant APIs in a safe way [4]), it's wasted bytes. Unlike
status_request_v2, AFAIK, there's no way for a 1.3 client to signal it's
uninterested in those intermediates; whether because it doesn't support
them or because it has alternative means.

* It's slow, under an adversarial model.
  - For leaves, we're talking 7 days of reusable "GOOD" response from an
adversary - the maximally permitted time under current root programs, less
than the 10 days the CABF BRs allow. For intermediates, as Ilari mentioned,
this becomes a substantially greater timescale. And this is without
touching on some of the ambiguity CAs rely on - the difference between
marking in their (internal only) database that a certificate is revoked
versus making that information publicly available (aka distributed to their
CDN). I'm told lag times may go up to an additional 7 days there.
  - For intermediates, this is "12 months". Some efforts to profile this
down [5] resulted in non-trivial pushback, given that many
non-actively-issuing certificates (offline roots/intermediates) require
ceremonies for the use of the key material - such as delegated responders
(which then opens up a whole new can of worms regarding compromises of
responder certificates - given id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck in the responders)

And this ignores some of the other "technical but not fundamental" problem,
such as few servers actually perform any form of path building or
validation on the certificates they will serve, and largely leave that to
the server administrator to configure. The lack of robust OCSP stapling
infrastructure for leaves - for which Microsoft IIS or Caddy may be the
only COTS server software robust enough to handle it - is dwarfed by the
complexity of also considering path building, possible paths, and finding
the 'ideal' intermediate and response to serve to avoid the known
challenges, let alone the challenges for some of the issues above.

To your specific question about the semantics for TLS 1.3, I don't think
that proposed semantic shift is good or desirable. I think it will both
increase inefficiency and fail to achieve the desired security properties,
as a consequence of the reasons above. Happy to expand on that, if it does
not seem like the conclusion logically follows the enumeration of problems.
That said, I also acknowledge that there aren't plans, at this time, to
support for "TLS Feature" extension, due to the policy and availability
implications, which are not technical and a consequence of the Web PKI
specifically.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression
[2]
https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/tree/master/tls-cached-info
Hannes could speak to better threads capturing these discussions, no doubt
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-cache-digest
[4]
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-certsetcertificatecontextproperty
with CERT_OCSP_RESPONSE_PROP_ID allows per-certificate handle setting; NSS
uses https://dxr.mozilla.org/nss/source/nss/lib/certhigh/ocsp.c#5073 ,
which is per CERTCertificate handle, except those can get shared between
connections, resulting in clobbering of the OCSP cache by 'adversarial'
peers. Of course, Firefox ignores this with
https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h?q=%2Bfunction%3A"mozilla%3A%3Apsm%3A%3ANSSCertDBTrustDomain%3A%3AGetOCSPStaplingStatus%28%29+const"&redirect_type=single#162
. For Apple,
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1400880-sectrustsetocspresponse?language=objc
exists but doesn't provide any (documented) way of binding the
response<->certificate pairs.
[5] https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/2/files

--0000000000002c9e59057cb60be1
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 9:03 AM Daniel Kahn =
Gillmor &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net">dkg@fifthhorseman.net<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">O=
n Mon 2018-12-10 02:24:29 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* the status_request TLS extension doesn&#39;t =
provide a mechanism for<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 stapling OCSP for intermediate certs.<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>
&gt; Nobody does this.=C2=A0 There&#39;s a handful of reasons, but the end =
result is: nobody does this.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d be interested in hearing the reasons enumerated.=C2=A0 It seems to =
me<br>
like being able to promptly revoke an intermediate certificate is a<br>
useful bit of mechanism.=C2=A0 is it just because we hope the major browser=
s<br>
are clever and responsive enough that they&#39;ll push out a CRLset (or<br>
equivalent) when they hear of an intermediate that is found to be<br>
violating the BRs?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A few more reasons -=
 speaking broadly to the &quot;revoke intermediates&quot; problem:</div><di=
v><br></div><div>* The traditional revocation model (of CRLs and OCSP) is n=
ot as robust as browser-based methods.</div><div>=C2=A0 - OCSP &amp; CRLs b=
oth do the (Issuer+Serial number) dance, while alternative revocation metho=
ds can use use the (Subject+SPKI), or even just the (SPKI), as a blacklisti=
ng mechanism.</div><div>=C2=A0 - In the case of stapling responses for Inte=
rmediates, it&#39;s not sufficient to &#39;simply&#39; staple the response =
for the given intermediate - it would have to consider all possible interme=
diates that chain to trust anchors (both public and locally-configured).</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>* It&#39;s inefficient for the stated goal, under an=
 adversarial model. This applies to both leafs and intermediates.<br></div>=
<div>=C2=A0 - While TLS 1.3 has the potential to make this better [1], the =
intermediate response is generally going to be highly common between multip=
le connections. There&#39;s no way (AFAIK), under V2 or 1.3, to indicate th=
at you already have a suitable response regarding a particular intermediate=
. Past proposals [2] ran into a whole host of sharp edges of complexity her=
e; if memory serves, that complexity is very similar, in terms of security/=
privacy/performance tradeoffs, as some of the cache digest proposals [3] - =
bloom filters abound :)</div><div>=C2=A0 - If a client doesn&#39;t support =
it (and, indeed, only Microsoft provides the relevant APIs in a safe way [4=
]), it&#39;s wasted bytes. Unlike status_request_v2, AFAIK, there&#39;s no =
way for a 1.3 client to signal it&#39;s uninterested in those intermediates=
; whether because it doesn&#39;t support them or because it has alternative=
 means.<br></div><div><br></div><div>* It&#39;s slow, under an adversarial =
model.</div><div><div>=C2=A0 - For leaves, we&#39;re talking 7 days of reus=
able &quot;GOOD&quot; response from an adversary - the maximally permitted =
time under current root programs, less than the 10 days the CABF BRs allow.=
 For intermediates, as Ilari mentioned, this becomes a substantially greate=
r timescale. And this is without touching on some of the ambiguity CAs rely=
 on - the difference between marking in their (internal only) database that=
 a certificate is revoked versus making that information publicly available=
 (aka distributed to their CDN). I&#39;m told lag times may go up to an add=
itional 7 days there.</div><div>=C2=A0 - For intermediates, this is &quot;1=
2 months&quot;. Some efforts to profile this down [5] resulted in non-trivi=
al pushback, given that many non-actively-issuing certificates (offline roo=
ts/intermediates) require ceremonies for the use of the key material - such=
 as delegated responders (which then opens up a whole new can of worms rega=
rding compromises of responder certificates - given id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck in=
 the responders)</div><div><br></div><div>And this ignores some of the othe=
r &quot;technical but not fundamental&quot; problem, such as few servers ac=
tually perform any form of path building or validation on the certificates =
they will serve, and largely leave that to the server administrator to conf=
igure. The lack of robust OCSP stapling infrastructure for leaves - for whi=
ch Microsoft IIS or Caddy may be the only COTS server software robust enoug=
h to handle it - is dwarfed by the complexity of also considering path buil=
ding, possible paths, and finding the &#39;ideal&#39; intermediate and resp=
onse to serve to avoid the known challenges, let alone the challenges for s=
ome of the issues above.</div><div><br></div><div>To your specific question=
 about the semantics for TLS 1.3, I don&#39;t think that proposed semantic =
shift is good or desirable. I think it will both increase inefficiency and =
fail to achieve the desired security properties, as a consequence of the re=
asons above. Happy to expand on that, if it does not seem like the conclusi=
on logically follows the enumeration of problems. That said, I also acknowl=
edge that there aren&#39;t plans, at this time, to support for &quot;TLS Fe=
ature&quot; extension, due to the policy and availability implications, whi=
ch are not technical and a consequence of the Web PKI specifically.</div><b=
r class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"></div><div>[1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"=
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression">https:/=
/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression</a></div><div>[=
2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/tree/=
master/tls-cached-info">https://github.com/hannestschofenig/tschofenig-ids/=
tree/master/tls-cached-info</a> Hannes could speak to better threads captur=
ing these discussions, no doubt</div><div>[3]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-cache-digest">https://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-ietf-httpbis-cache-digest</a></div><div>[4]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://=
docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-certsetce=
rtificatecontextproperty">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/=
api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-certsetcertificatecontextproperty</a> with=C2=A0CE=
RT_OCSP_RESPONSE_PROP_ID allows per-certificate handle setting; NSS uses=C2=
=A0<a href=3D"https://dxr.mozilla.org/nss/source/nss/lib/certhigh/ocsp.c#50=
73">https://dxr.mozilla.org/nss/source/nss/lib/certhigh/ocsp.c#5073</a> , w=
hich is per CERTCertificate handle, except those can get shared between con=
nections, resulting in clobbering of the OCSP cache by &#39;adversarial&#39=
; peers. Of course, Firefox ignores this with=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://dxr.m=
ozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomai=
n.h?q=3D%2Bfunction%3A">https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/secu=
rity/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h?q=3D%2Bfunction%3A</a>&quot;mozill=
a%3A%3Apsm%3A%3ANSSCertDBTrustDomain%3A%3AGetOCSPStaplingStatus%28%29+const=
&quot;&amp;redirect_type=3Dsingle#162 . For Apple,=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://=
developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1400880-sectrustsetocspresponse?=
language=3Dobjc">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1400880=
-sectrustsetocspresponse?language=3Dobjc</a> exists but doesn&#39;t provide=
 any (documented) way of binding the response&lt;-&gt;certificate pairs.=C2=
=A0</div><div>[5]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/p=
ull/2/files">https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/2/files</a></div>=
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv>

--0000000000002c9e59057cb60be1--


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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 21:18:52 -0800
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/WPGRxS6ygHUVB7a0CV061PEDO0s>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
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The WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id has completed.   There were
some minor issued raised that require a new revision of the draft before
progressing to the ISEG.

Thanks,

Chris, Joe, and Sean

On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 6:08 AM Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) <
Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com> wrote:

> Hello Eric,
>
> > Are there other concerns
>
> No, there are no other concerns, these two issues addresses my findings.
>
> Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fen / Best regards
>
> Achim Kraus
>
> (INST/ECS4)
> Bosch Software Innovations GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 71332
> Waiblingen | GERMANY | http://www.bosch-si.com
>
> Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B
> Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=
=C3=BChrung: Dr.
> Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic
>
>
> From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
> Sent: Donnerstag, 6. Dezember 2018 14:44
> To: Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) <Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com>
> Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 12:19 AM Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) <mailto:
> Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com> wrote:
> Hi List,
>
> I put some comments and question on the github page,
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/15
>
> This is IANA considerations. I will fix.
>
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/25
>
> This is just a bit incomplete in terms of explaining how the MAC works fo=
r
> other ciphers. I'll fix. I've explained in the issue why the CID needs to
> be in the MAC.
>
>
> and still wait for feedback and comments. FMPOV, the last changes
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/13
>
> seems to be not complete worked out.
>
> Are there other concerns
>
> -Ekr
>
> Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fen / Best regards
>
> Achim Kraus
>
> (INST/ECS4)
> Bosch Software Innovations GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 71332
> Waiblingen | GERMANY | http://www.bosch-si.com
>
> Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B
> Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=
=C3=BChrung: Dr.
> Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic
>
>
> From: TLS <mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Mittwoch, 5. Dezember 2018 19:15
> To: Joseph Salowey <mailto:joe@salowey.net>; <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
> <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
>
> Still stuck in that five-day-behind timezone, but I read this doc and hav=
e
> no problems.  Advance it.
>
> From: Joseph Salowey <mailto:joe@salowey.net>
> Date: Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 2:40 AM
> To: "mailto:tls@ietf.org" <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id
>
> This is the working group last call for the "Connection Identifiers for
> DTLS 1.2" draft available at
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.ietf.o=
rg_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Ddtls-2Dconnection-2Did_&d=3DDwMFaQ&c=3D96ZbZZca=
MF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3DiqBSgMFiImiHzfVRyybXVZ-sDu8u_=
4S7Arwhr9LoYCk&s=3D2lKHSWzhVyvp_ezQjZN3wJWpxINMJ4H-xR_9VPxzIjA&e=3D.
> Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC
> on 30 November 2018.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, Joe, and Sean
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> mailto:TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>The WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-<span class=3D"gmail-il">=
dtls</span>-<span class=3D"gmail-il">connection</span>-id has completed.=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0There were some minor issued raised that require a new revision o=
f the draft before progressing to the ISEG.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks=
,</div><div><br></div><div>Chris, Joe, and Sean</div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 6:08 AM Kraus Achi=
m (INST/ECS4) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com">Achim.Kraus@b=
osch-si.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">Hello Eric,<br>
<br>
&gt; Are there other concerns<br>
<br>
No, there are no other concerns, these two issues addresses my findings.<br=
>
<br>
Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fen / Best regards <br>
<br>
Achim Kraus<br>
<br>
(INST/ECS4) <br>
Bosch=C2=A0Software Innovations=C2=A0GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 7=
1332 Waiblingen | GERMANY | <a href=3D"http://www.bosch-si.com" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://www.bosch-si.com</a> <br>
<br>
Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B<br>
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=
=BChrung: Dr. Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">e=
kr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; <br>
Sent: Donnerstag, 6. Dezember 2018 14:44<br>
To: Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&=
gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&=
gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id<br>
<br>
<br>
On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 12:19 AM Kraus Achim (INST/ECS4) &lt;mailto:<a href=
=3D"mailto:Achim.Kraus@bosch-si.com" target=3D"_blank">Achim.Kraus@bosch-si=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
Hi List,<br>
=C2=A0<br>
I put some comments and question on the github page,<br>
=C2=A0<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/15" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/15</a><b=
r>
<br>
This is IANA considerations. I will fix.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/25" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/25</a><b=
r>
<br>
This is just a bit incomplete in terms of explaining how the MAC works for =
other ciphers. I&#39;ll fix. I&#39;ve explained in the issue why the CID ne=
eds to be in the MAC.<br>
<br>
<br>
and still wait for feedback and comments. FMPOV, the last changes <br>
=C2=A0<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/13" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/13</a><br>
=C2=A0<br>
seems to be not complete worked out.<br>
<br>
Are there other concerns<br>
<br>
-Ekr<br>
<br>
Mit freundlichen Gr=C3=BC=C3=9Fen / Best regards <br>
<br>
Achim Kraus<br>
<br>
(INST/ECS4) <br>
Bosch=C2=A0Software Innovations=C2=A0GmbH | Stuttgarter Stra=C3=9Fe 130 | 7=
1332 Waiblingen | GERMANY | <a href=3D"http://www.bosch-si.com" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://www.bosch-si.com</a> <br>
<br>
Sitz: Berlin, Registergericht: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg; HRB 148411 B<br>
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Dr.-Ing. Thorsten L=C3=BCcke; Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=
=BChrung: Dr. Stefan Ferber, Michael Hahn, Dr. Aleksandar Mitrovic<br>
<br>
<br>
From: TLS &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; On Behalf Of Salz, Rich<br>
Sent: Mittwoch, 5. Dezember 2018 19:15<br>
To: Joseph Salowey &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:joe@salowey.net" target=3D"=
_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt;; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ie=
tf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id<br>
=C2=A0<br>
Still stuck in that five-day-behind timezone, but I read this doc and have =
no problems.=C2=A0 Advance it.<br>
=C2=A0<br>
From: Joseph Salowey &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:joe@salowey.net" target=
=3D"_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt;<br>
Date: Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 2:40 AM<br>
To: &quot;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf=
.org</a>&quot; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Subject: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id<br>
=C2=A0<br>
This is the working group last call for the &quot;Connection Identifiers fo=
r DTLS 1.2&quot; draft available at=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://urldefense.proo=
fpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls=
-2Ddtls-2Dconnection-2Did_&amp;d=3DDwMFaQ&amp;c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&am=
p;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&amp;m=3DiqBSgMFiImiHzfVRyybXVZ-sDu8u_4S7Arwhr9=
LoYCk&amp;s=3D2lKHSWzhVyvp_ezQjZN3wJWpxINMJ4H-xR_9VPxzIjA&amp;e=3D" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3D=
https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Ddtls-2Dconnection-2=
Did_&amp;d=3DDwMFaQ&amp;c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86F=
tsKI-w&amp;m=3DiqBSgMFiImiHzfVRyybXVZ-sDu8u_4S7Arwhr9LoYCk&amp;s=3D2lKHSWzh=
Vyvp_ezQjZN3wJWpxINMJ4H-xR_9VPxzIjA&amp;e=3D</a>. Please review the documen=
t and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on 30 November 2018.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, Joe, and Sean<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><b=
r>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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On Sun 2018-12-09 18:35:20 +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 07:07:30AM +0300, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> One mitigating factor of the ETSI standard, i suppose, is that the
>> CABForum's Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of a certificate with
>> any subjectAltName other than dNSName or iPAddress, so otherName looks
>> like it must not be issued by standard public CAs.
>> 
>> top of p. 44 of https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf
>> 
>> Has anyone set up tools to monitor the CT logs for such a sAN to see
>> whether that element of the BR is being honored?
>
> All the linters will give an error about that, see for instance:
> https://crt.sh/?id=1009623020&opt=x509lint,cablint,zlint

right, so what is to be done about that, when some of these CAs are
clearly violating the BRs?  Transparency is only as useful as the
actions we can take once violations are uncovered.  Unactionable
transparency just sounds like despair to me.  So what's the action?

          --dkg


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 08:39:14 -0500
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On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 6:58 AM Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:

> On Sun 2018-12-09 18:35:20 +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 07:07:30AM +0300, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> >> One mitigating factor of the ETSI standard, i suppose, is that the
> >> CABForum's Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of a certificate with
> >> any subjectAltName other than dNSName or iPAddress, so otherName looks
> >> like it must not be issued by standard public CAs.
> >>
> >> top of p. 44 of
> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf
> >>
> >> Has anyone set up tools to monitor the CT logs for such a sAN to see
> >> whether that element of the BR is being honored?
> >
> > All the linters will give an error about that, see for instance:
> > https://crt.sh/?id=3D1009623020&opt=3Dx509lint,cablint,zlint
>
> right, so what is to be done about that, when some of these CAs are
> clearly violating the BRs?  Transparency is only as useful as the
> actions we can take once violations are uncovered.  Unactionable
> transparency just sounds like despair to me.  So what's the action?


The same as it is for any misissuance:
1) Report to the CA=E2=80=99s problem reporting mechanism. The  Baseline
Requirements require they provide one in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS (BRs
Section 4.9.3). The CA is obligated to revoke such certificates and,
according to various root policies, report and/or disclose to the root
programs they participate in or publicly.

If you are unsatisfied with the answer you get from the CA, or want to
ensure greater transparency, you can/should also
2) Report to any root programs that trust those CAs.

The example from Kurt is from a CA that is ONLY trusted by Microsoft, and
which other programs have, sometimes explicitly, declined to trust. If CAs
are violating the contractual or public requirements of Microsoft=E2=80=99s=
 root
program, such as the one demonstrated (although notably, it is NOT
displaying the use of this ETSI MITM extension), then that is an
enforcement action for Microsoft, or something for their customers to
respond to if Microsoft is shipping insecure CAs to them.

Your best-best-case is that publicly trusted CAs never issue such
certificates. Your worst-best-case is that the CA has to revoke within 24
hours/5 days of issuance, and that the root program takes the violation
into consideration when evaluating whether to trust that CA. Your
worst-worst case is that the CA ignores the revocation requirements, as
they did the issuance requirements, and that root programs that trust those
CAs fail to take action to ensure consistency among the CAs they trust and
with the requirements.

--000000000000c17075057cbf35f5
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<div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue,=
 Dec 11, 2018 at 6:58 AM Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fift=
hhorseman.net">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">On Sun 2018-12-09 18:35:20 +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:<br>
&gt; On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 07:07:30AM +0300, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; One mitigating factor of the ETSI standard, i suppose, is that the=
<br>
&gt;&gt; CABForum&#39;s Baseline Requirements forbid issuance of a certific=
ate with<br>
&gt;&gt; any subjectAltName other than dNSName or iPAddress, so otherName l=
ooks<br>
&gt;&gt; like it must not be issued by standard public CAs.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; top of p. 44 of <a href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads=
/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.6.1.pdf</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Has anyone set up tools to monitor the CT logs for such a sAN to s=
ee<br>
&gt;&gt; whether that element of the BR is being honored?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; All the linters will give an error about that, see for instance:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://crt.sh/?id=3D1009623020&amp;opt=3Dx509lint,cablint,=
zlint" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://crt.sh/?id=3D1009623020=
&amp;opt=3Dx509lint,cablint,zlint</a><br>
<br>
right, so what is to be done about that, when some of these CAs are<br>
clearly violating the BRs?=C2=A0 Transparency is only as useful as the<br>
actions we can take once violations are uncovered.=C2=A0 Unactionable<br>
transparency just sounds like despair to me.=C2=A0 So what&#39;s the action=
?</blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">The same as it =
is for any misissuance:</div><div dir=3D"auto">1) Report to the CA=E2=80=99=
s problem reporting mechanism. The =C2=A0Baseline Requirements require they=
 provide one in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS (BRs Section 4.9.3). The CA is o=
bligated to revoke such certificates and, according to various root policie=
s, report and/or disclose to the root programs they participate in or publi=
cly.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">If you are unsatisf=
ied with the answer you get from the CA, or want to ensure greater transpar=
ency, you can/should also</div><div dir=3D"auto">2) Report to any root prog=
rams that trust those CAs.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"aut=
o">The example from Kurt is from a CA that is ONLY trusted by Microsoft, an=
d which other programs have, sometimes explicitly, declined to trust. If CA=
s are violating the contractual or public requirements of Microsoft=E2=80=
=99s root program, such as the one demonstrated (although notably, it is NO=
T displaying the use of this ETSI MITM extension), then that is an enforcem=
ent action for Microsoft, or something for their customers to respond to if=
 Microsoft is shipping insecure CAs to them.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto">Your best-best-case is that publicly trusted CAs never=
 issue such certificates. Your worst-best-case is that the CA has to revoke=
 within 24 hours/5 days of issuance, and that the root program takes the vi=
olation into consideration when evaluating whether to trust that CA. Your w=
orst-worst case is that the CA ignores the revocation requirements, as they=
 did the issuance requirements, and that root programs that trust those CAs=
 fail to take action to ensure consistency among the CAs they trust and wit=
h the requirements.</div></div></div>

--000000000000c17075057cbf35f5--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
CC: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
Thread-Index: AQHUjMy2+Ip4vOdFW02pqhJ3jndT6qVxloSAgAE690z//yyCgIAA4O8ngAFNW4CABqPVKw==
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 08:30:44 +0000
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References: <9a9be8fb-9667-0c6a-9fac-cc167f94599f@cs.tcd.ie> <874lbqcgu2.fsf@fifthhorseman.net> <1544164274460.61998@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <20181207064745.GU15561@localhost> <1544166850611.133@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <CAHOTMVL1adjAcP536fC5Yb2cqi1FJzKkMuRXw5MiOv4M7NZ8EQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh
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Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>I think these concerns can largely be addressed by ECDHE with e.g. X25519:=
=0A=
=0A=
Sure, and they could be addressed even better with LoRaWAN security, which =
is=0A=
even more efficient, however given that the current common denominator for =
the=0A=
user base appears to be TLS 1.0, the fact that better things exist doesn't=
=0A=
help much until all of the existing hardware is replaced.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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--0000000000002697a9057cdaa0a0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks,

We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806

It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not yet released. In
the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients and disable TLS
1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downgrade signal in
ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade signal, so the
workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective for other
clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.

To salvage this for now, we've introduced a second value, generated
randomly:
    0xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x47, 0x10, 0xff

When Google servers detect JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 to work around this
issue, they will use that value in ServerHello.random instead of the
standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versions of
Chrome will treat the new value as an alias of the standard one. Other
clients may wish to do the same, but please properly test your TLS 1.3
implementation first.

As JDK 11 is quite recent, we hope this will be relatively short-lived and
that we can remove this workaround and non-standard signal in the future.
Users of JDK 11 should upgrade to 11.0.2 once released to avoid
interoperability issues. In the meantime, they should disable TLS 1.3 by
passing -Djdk.tls.client.protocols=TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 to the java binary.

Finally, as an update to the non-compliant middleboxes we noted previously
<https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg27066.html>, PAN-OS
8.1.4, PAN-OS 8.0.14, and PAN-OS 7.1.21 appear to now be released. Users of
Cisco and Palo Alto Networks firewall devices should upgrade their
products. We plan to reintroduce enforcement of the downgrade signal
sometime in the next year.

David

--0000000000002697a9057cdaa0a0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>We have one more u=
pdate for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the course of deployin=
g TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11 unfortunately implemented=
 TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to send the SNI extension. Th=
is means that the first connection from a JDK 11 client will work, but subs=
equent ones fail.</div><div><a href=3D"https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse=
/JDK-8211806">https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806</a></div><di=
v><br></div><div>It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not =
yet released. In the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients a=
nd disable TLS 1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downg=
rade signal in ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade sig=
nal, so the workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective=
 for other clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>To salvage this for now, we&#39;ve introduced a second value, =
generated randomly:</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 0xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0=
x47, 0x10, 0xff</div><div><br></div><div>When Google servers detect JDK 11 =
and disable TLS 1.3 to work around this issue, they will use that value in =
ServerHello.random instead of the standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x=
52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versions of Chrome will treat the new value as an al=
ias of the standard one. Other clients may wish to do the same, but please =
properly test your TLS 1.3 implementation first.</div><div><br></div><div>A=
s JDK 11 is quite recent, we hope this will be relatively short-lived and t=
hat we can remove this workaround and non-standard signal in the future. Us=
ers of JDK 11 should upgrade to 11.0.2 once released to avoid interoperabil=
ity issues. In the meantime, they should disable TLS 1.3 by passing -Djdk.t=
ls.client.protocols=3DTLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 to the java binary.</div><div><=
br></div><div>Finally, as an update to the non-compliant middleboxes we not=
ed <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg27066.ht=
ml">previously</a>, PAN-OS 8.1.4, PAN-OS 8.0.14, and PAN-OS 7.1.21 appear t=
o now be released. Users of Cisco and Palo Alto Networks firewall devices s=
hould upgrade their products. We plan to reintroduce enforcement of the dow=
ngrade signal sometime in the next year.</div><div><br></div><div>David</di=
v></div>

--0000000000002697a9057cdaa0a0--


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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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I appreciate this answer, thank you


Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original Me=
ssage =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90
On Friday 7 December 2018 23:48, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> There is no WG consensus to adopt this draft as no WG adoption call has b=
een made. draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh is an individual draft that is cur=
rently being discussed on this list; in much the same way draft-green-tls-s=
tatic-dh-in-tls13 and draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility were individual draft=
s that were discussed on this list; there was no WG consensus to adopt draf=
t-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility and there was never a call to adopt draft-green=
-tls-static-dh-in-tls13.
>
> The chairs have been debating whether draft-dkg-tls-reject-static-dh is i=
n scope or whether the discussion should be moved elsewhere. Parts of this =
draft we believe are in scope, e.g., providing guidance on handling key sha=
re re-use and pitfalls for not following this guidance. (Note that how to h=
andle key share re-use is not the same thing as explicitly prohibiting re-u=
se of keys.) Other parts of the draft contain material for which we did not=
 reach consensus to address, such as Section 3.3 on prohibiting key-share r=
euse. We are not the protocol police and have recently gotten out of that b=
usiness, e.g., by removing barriers for cipher suite code points. We do not=
 want to get back in that business.
>
> In order to ensure a focused discussion and avoid rehashing the previous =
debate regarding draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility, parts of this draft shoul=
d be rescoped or removed. Authors are free to take this material to an AD a=
nd seek sponsorship, or to the ISE/IAB for further guidance.
>
> Cheers,
> Joe, Chris, and Sean
>
> > On Dec 6, 2018, at 21:19, Arnaud.Taddei.IETF Arnaud.Taddei.IETF=3D40pro=
tonmail.com@dmarc.ietf.org wrote:
> > I am really surprised how the answers you don't like are systematically=
 put on denial. Can you explain me what leads you to think that some people=
 here are not concerned by the list of people you list? this is an assumpti=
on and the wrong assumption.
> > Perhaps on the contrary we are concerned BOTH by what these people endu=
re but too by what other consistencies are basically removed rights to defe=
nd themselves.
> > As to the marketing aspect frankly this is an invention here and again =
I don't see what allows you to paint the answers you don't like because you=
 don't like.
> > So I could on the contrary hightight the dogmatism that reins here, wit=
h a smell of intimidation, and to some degree the sectarianism back to the =
latin roots of the word
> > Regarding Human Rights, we DO care about Human Rights too and fact is t=
hat I had the chance to make more progress in 2 hours than I did in 2 years=
 at IET and I had the chance to contribute to a magic moment with a Chinese=
 Organization to comply a technical solution to Human Rights requirements. =
You know why? Because we took the time to TALK properly to each other, unde=
rstand each other, learn from each other with no intimidation and no wrong =
assumptions that 'because we LOOK to be on the wrong side' we are foolish p=
eople, and respect to the fact that not everyone speaks and writes a proper=
 English and sometimes words are dangerous when we don't know exactly the s=
emantics in the right context
> > The assumption that you are the only one who cares is tiresome.
> > This group was offered a chance to control the development of a 360 deg=
ree solution for all parties and it was rejected. Fine. The ETSI took it an=
d is taking its responsibly.
> > I don't know what leads you to think that a model where security reside=
s only on the 2 ends of the communication IS the answer to all the problems=
.
> > The recent continuous scandals that are affecting a number of platforms=
 and destroying trust, privacy and security is leading me to think about wh=
y should I trust this model. By analogy when I see how my body defends itse=
lf against bad stuff, it is using a battery of models, not one model.
> > In any negotiation you can look for what is the right battle, and those=
 who understand that point will know that the right battle (and the one whi=
ch is harder for the opposition) is on providing guarantees. This would hav=
e been a better battle to pick and would have given a chance to work more c=
ollaboratively and not by confrontation.
> > Now I don't understand what leads this group to try now to block the ET=
SI, can someone tell me and in particular the chairs if we have a consensus=
 here?
> > Finally I am calling on the chairs of this group. It was very interesti=
ng to observe the many comments at the last IETF103 about the vile and toxi=
c atmosphere that prevails here. I have all my time to work in these condit=
ions but perhaps the chair could try to think about a more positive atmosph=
ere of work.
> > A bon entendeur salut
> > Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
> > =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Origina=
l Message =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=
=90
> > On Wednesday 5 December 2018 21:36, Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg@fifthhorsem=
an.net wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed 2018-12-05 20:15:08 +0900, Bret Jordan wrote:
> > >
> > > > > On Dec 5, 2018, at 7:33 PM, Stephen Farrell stephen.farrell@cs.tc=
d.ie wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > On 05/12/2018 10:22, Bret Jordan wrote:
> > > > > > I think we should be more open minded and look at the needs fro=
m a
> > > > > > 360 degree deployment perspective.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think we should avoid marketing speak.
> > > >
> > > > This is not marketing speak. This is understanding how these soluti=
ons
> > > > need to be deployed end to end in all of their scenarios from
> > > > consumer, to small business, to enterprise, to service provider, to
> > > > content provider, to telco, etc.
> > >
> > > Perhaps one of the reasons that this might across as marketing speak =
to
> > > some people is that your list of "all their scenarios" appears to be
> > > only business use cases (where the individual people involved are at
> > > most consumers of business products). You haven't mentioned
> > > journalists, disk jockeys, activists, flat earthers, dissidents,
> > > students, medical professionals, juggalos, community organizers, gun
> > > nuts, cryptozoologists, whistleblowers, LGBTQ folx, refugees, free
> > > software developers, elected officials, religious minorities, senior
> > > citizens, or any of the other non-business use cases that may depend =
on
> > > TLS for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or any of the other
> > > information security guarantees that are put at risk by proposals lik=
e
> > > this.
> > > One of the concerns the last time we danced this dance was that the
> > > proposal claimed to be interested in one use case only: "the enterpri=
se
> > > data center", and yet offered no meaningful way to effectively limit =
its
> > > (ab)use outside the data center. This objection was raised clearly, a=
nd
> > > the proponents of the protocol change failed to address it. And now i=
t
> > > appears that instead of addressing the concern, they forum-shopped un=
til
> > > they found a place to publish the same approach without even
> > > acknowledging the concern that this could have an impact beyond the d=
ata
> > > center.
> > > A full 360 degree view might acknowledge that doing harm to the core
> > > priniciples of a security protocol that everyone relies on for the sa=
ke
> > > of one particular use case out of many might not be an appropriate st=
ep
> > > to take. (and that one use case might have other solutions, albeit
> > > perhaps more expensive or inconveient ones for people who have alread=
y
> > > made certain investments)
> > > I'm pretty sure we don't want TLS to be all things to all people, rig=
ht?
> > > What are the core goals or guarantees of TLS that you would like to s=
ee
> > > preserved?
> > > --dkg
> >
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: ESNI padding the Certificate message

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Hiya,

Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says
a server: "SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at
the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the
largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI
key."

I think that ought also mention the CertificateVerify as that
could also tell you something about the ESNI being used if the
key lengths in the various certificates differ.

More specific to openssl though, there isn't really a terribly
easy way to do such fine-grained padding (that I've found so
far), so to cover the above, and as there are likely many
other ways that the ESNI could be exposed, it might be good to
add that clients and servers could reasonably decide to pad all
handshake messages or even all records. (That last being what
is currently easiest with openssl, and hence what I've done
for now with my proof-of-concept code:-)

Cheers,
S.

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--------------D8D6FCA8E4E72F1381ED7AB7--

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Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--nPz0xXtDULevT4X7BS4GqdJELfZfnNGRI--


From nobody Thu Dec 13 05:36:20 2018
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From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Openpgp: preference=signencrypt
Autocrypt: addr=matt@openssl.org; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQENBFGALsIBCADBkh6zfxbewW2KJjaMaishSrpxuiVaUyvWgpe6Moae7JNCW8ayhJbwAtsQ 69SGA4gUkyrR6PBvDMVYEiYqZwXB/3IErStESjcu+gkbmsa0XcwHpkE3iN7I8aU66yMt710n GEmcrR5E4u4NuNoHtnOBKEh+RCLGp5mo6hwbUYUzG3eUI/zi2hLApPpaATXnD3ZkhgtHV3ln 3Z16nUWQAdIVToxYhvVno2EQsqe8Q3ifl2Uf0YpaN19BDBrxM3WPOAKbJk0Ab1bjgEadavrF BCOl9CrbThewRGmkOdxJWaVkERXMShlzUzjJvKOUEUGOxJCmnfQimPQoCdQyVFLgHfRFABEB AAG0H01hdHQgQ2Fzd2VsbCA8bWF0dEBvcGVuc3NsLm9yZz6JATgEEwECACIFAlPevrwCGwMG CwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJENnE0m0OYESRoD0H/1lEJXfr66rdvskyOi0z U0ARvUXHjbmmYkZ7ETkdXh7Va/Tjn81T3pwmr3F4IcLGNLDz4Eg67xbq/T8rrsEPOx5nV/mR nUT97UmsQuLnR2wLGbRBu24FKM7oX3KQvgIdJWdxHHJsjpGCViE1mIFARAzlN+6p3tPbnQzA NjRy7i/PYU/niGdqVcMhcnZCX5F7YH6w6t0ZmYH3m1QeREnWqfxu7eyHsIvebMgKTI/bMG8Z 7KlLZha9HwrFXQAPIST6sfc1blKJ9INUDM9iK6DR/ulkw7e0hmHLqjWqYs5PzyXeoNnsPXJt 69wiADYqj4KNDIdNp1RoF9qfb1nE+DM6rga5AQ0EUYAuwgEIAM9nUJAEpsVBYwK92PP9Mlo1 /etXp6JgBI68sOCJxTwzBrbTzIlevVQXqW9zdODD6ObKcgGNuG+G6Nwn54P6McRpd2dxor9Y A+yaI0yT6CVnhxsXjwc/vuQ4tBAL6tfuMAXRVIeEVk22cKk4HJB68ImXCCRdyRi9HIE5iTrZ HsHC4sjAsirhlc0o8hU3gqkKh2Ehwa6+U8lzNx06hoFEZxIVRteoz1jzCHImF7EXztEcDIam O8uckVKAuKbJgFGkU3bkvNgWlc8Pgx4tRUNJGC1LE4nYqaSEwee1SpA/VewiDObj97PozCTF zRCUBCnSvaAlTnpA90TnODH7ar+L5aEAEQEAAYkBHwQYAQIACQUCUYAuwgIbDAAKCRDZxNJt DmBEkQs2B/96XB9hyFpX/bhu41YNr7nSA65dDi9d+PkMqvLppickG3VR4xXWywzEJTw6W2DN MyFO6mOtdXWgNdgDF7HKZYvHBr6pyttLAMP7BfWBvU7YY59uKmUSc5vl0NzsaSbx5PDSQEkS ICLI+/hIwuEXOb6Z7gOrX7F1uy83TmHFOOjD2mLl5isUzFhaLVk0fZSY+mCgg3/inbwb8g31 91Ybk2LfXmndaEsdEzMLrT0g6wIgmybz6UdVuVPfSPGly0VWVAG1sNPOCpAuJpNV6+VxrdVi Ax3vQPbx3XzqDFS1ISlnd0qS/7RXwMuFDpVH/BDvzQcoikWnpRY/loPGkSg4TB7a
Message-ID: <ed463806-067d-bd83-f186-2ef6f5bd3518@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 13:36:12 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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On 13/12/2018 13:10, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> Hiya,
> 
> Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says
> a server: "SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at
> the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the
> largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI
> key."
> 
> I think that ought also mention the CertificateVerify as that
> could also tell you something about the ESNI being used if the
> key lengths in the various certificates differ.
> 
> More specific to openssl though, there isn't really a terribly
> easy way to do such fine-grained padding (that I've found so
> far),

You can set a padding callback using SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback() (or
SSL_set_record_padding_callback()). The callback can determine whether it is
padding a handshake message by examining its "type" parameter, and which message
it is by calling SSL_get_state(). From there you should be able to get the
callback to add padding only to the Certificate and/or CertificateVerify
messages as required.

Matt



> so to cover the above, and as there are likely many
> other ways that the ESNI could be exposed, it might be good to
> add that clients and servers could reasonably decide to pad all
> handshake messages or even all records. (That last being what
> is currently easiest with openssl, and hence what I've done
> for now with my proof-of-concept code:-)
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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 <ed463806-067d-bd83-f186-2ef6f5bd3518@openssl.org>
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On 13/12/2018 13:36, Matt Caswell wrote:
> You can set a padding callback using SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callbac=
k() (or
> SSL_set_record_padding_callback()). The callback can determine whether =
it is
> padding a handshake message by examining its "type" parameter, and whic=
h message
> it is by calling SSL_get_state(). From there you should be able to get =
the
> callback to add padding only to the Certificate and/or CertificateVerif=
y
> messages as required.

Thanks! I'll try that,
S.

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 07:09:32 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 5:10 AM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says
> a server: "SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at
> the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the
> largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI
> key."
>
> I think that ought also mention the CertificateVerify as that
> could also tell you something about the ESNI being used if the
> key lengths in the various certificates differ.
>

Sure. Send a PR.

-Ekr


More specific to openssl though, there isn't really a terribly
> easy way to do such fine-grained padding (that I've found so
> far), so to cover the above, and as there are likely many
> other ways that the ESNI could be exposed, it might be good to
> add that clients and servers could reasonably decide to pad all
> handshake messages or even all records. (That last being what
> is currently easiest with openssl, and hence what I've done
> for now with my proof-of-concept code:-)
>
> Cheers,
> S.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Dec 13, 2018 at 5:10 AM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.far=
rell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says<br>
a server: &quot;SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at<br>
the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the<br>
largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI<br>
key.&quot;<br>
<br>
I think that ought also mention the CertificateVerify as that<br>
could also tell you something about the ESNI being used if the<br>
key lengths in the various certificates differ.<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Sure. Send a PR.</div><div> <br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></di=
v><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
More specific to openssl though, there isn&#39;t really a terribly<br>
easy way to do such fine-grained padding (that I&#39;ve found so<br>
far), so to cover the above, and as there are likely many<br>
other ways that the ESNI could be exposed, it might be good to<br>
add that clients and servers could reasonably decide to pad all<br>
handshake messages or even all records. (That last being what<br>
is currently easiest with openssl, and hence what I&#39;ve done<br>
for now with my proof-of-concept code:-)<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
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</blockquote></div></div>

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> On Dec 13, 2018, at 8:10 AM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
> Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says
> a server: "SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at
> the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the
> largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI
> key."

"Largest possible" is not always a knowable target.  One often does
not know anything about the sizes of the other potential certificate
chains in advance of serving such a chain.  Far more sensible would
be to add random padding whose size is commensurate with the size of
the certificate message.

I would generate a random nibble, and count the first $k$
non-zero bits.  Then $1 + k$ times add independently
random([0, N/2]) bytes of padding to an $N$ byte message,
giving an additional $~N$ bytes on average, but occasionally
up to $2.5N$ additional bytes.

--=20
	Viktor.


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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 7:28 AM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> > On Dec 13, 2018, at 8:10 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> wrote:
> >
> > Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says
> > a server: "SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at
> > the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the
> > largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI
> > key."
>
> "Largest possible" is not always a knowable target.  One often does
> not know anything about the sizes of the other potential certificate
> chains in advance of serving such a chain.


You already need some of this information in order to specify the largest
possible SNI (so you can pad to it), so I don't think this is prohibitive.


Far more sensible would
> be to add random padding whose size is commensurate with the size of
> the certificate message.
>

> I would generate a random nibble, and count the first $k$
> non-zero bits.  Then $1 + k$ times add independently
> random([0, N/2]) bytes of padding to an $N$ byte message,
> giving an additional $~N$ bytes on average, but occasionally
> up to $2.5N$ additional bytes.
>

Random padding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,
if I get to observe a large number of requests from the same client
to the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert
chain.

-Ekr




> --
>         Viktor.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Dec 13, 2018 at 7:28 AM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@d=
ukhovni.org">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Dec 13, 2018, at 8:10 AM, Stephe=
n Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank=
">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Was just adding code for this and I noticed that the draft says<br>
&gt; a server: &quot;SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at<br>
&gt; the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the<br>
&gt; largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI<br>
&gt; key.&quot;<br>
<br>
&quot;Largest possible&quot; is not always a knowable target.=C2=A0 One oft=
en does<br>
not know anything about the sizes of the other potential certificate<br>
chains in advance of serving such a chain.=C2=A0 </blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>You already need some of this information in order to specify the la=
rgest</div><div>possible SNI (so you can pad to it), so I don&#39;t think t=
his is prohibitive.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Far more sensible would<br>
be to add random padding whose size is commensurate with the size of<br>
the certificate message.<br></blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex"><br>
I would generate a random nibble, and count the first $k$<br>
non-zero bits.=C2=A0 Then $1 + k$ times add independently<br>
random([0, N/2]) bytes of padding to an $N$ byte message,<br>
giving an additional $~N$ bytes on average, but occasionally<br>
up to $2.5N$ additional bytes.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Random p=
adding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,</div><div>if I g=
et to observe a large number of requests from the same client</div><div>to =
the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert</div><div>c=
hain.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
-- <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Viktor.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 07:51:17AM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> Random padding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,
> if I get to observe a large number of requests from the same client
> to the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert
> chain.

Yes, I was aware of this.  But one might also note that may services
are not behind a CDN, and that data traffic patterns after the
handshake can also fingerprint the target service.

Session resumption helps to reduce the number of full handshakes
that leak some information about the certificate size.

Users who really want (better) protection against traffic analysis
should use Tor.  TLS traffic analysis protection from ESNI et. al.
is IMHO best-effort protection for casual use.

If a user visits just one site (and no others) at a particular CDN,
absent traffic flow obfuscation ala Tor, the user's TLS traffic
will eventually stand out from the noise.

-- 
	Viktor.


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On Wednesday, 12 December 2018 23:21:43 CET David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>=20
> We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
> course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
> unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
> send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
> client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
>=20
> It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not yet released. In
> the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients and disable TLS
> 1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downgrade signal in
> ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade signal, so the
> workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective for other
> clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.
>=20
> To salvage this for now, we've introduced a second value, generated
> randomly:
>     0xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x47, 0x10, 0xff
>=20
> When Google servers detect JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 to work around this
> issue, they will use that value in ServerHello.random instead of the
> standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versions =
of
> Chrome will treat the new value as an alias of the standard one. Other
> clients may wish to do the same, but please properly test your TLS 1.3
> implementation first.

there is now a server test script in tlsfuzzer for standard downgrade=20
sentinel:
https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-downgrade-pr=
otection.py

example of usage: https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/pull/479/files

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 08:53:33 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 8:03 AM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 07:51:17AM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> > Random padding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,
> > if I get to observe a large number of requests from the same client
> > to the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert
> > chain.
>
> Yes, I was aware of this.  But one might also note that may services
> are not behind a CDN, and that data traffic patterns after the
> handshake can also fingerprint the target service.
>

Yes. But the idea here is to gradually remove fingerprinting surface, and so
the mitigations we recommend should work.

-Ekr


Session resumption helps to reduce the number of full handshakes
> that leak some information about the certificate size.
>
> Users who really want (better) protection against traffic analysis
> should use Tor.  TLS traffic analysis protection from ESNI et. al.
> is IMHO best-effort protection for casual use.
>
> If a user visits just one site (and no others) at a particular CDN,
> absent traffic flow obfuscation ala Tor, the user's TLS traffic
> will eventually stand out from the noise.
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu=
, Dec 13, 2018 at 8:03 AM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@d=
ukhovni.org">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 07:51:17AM -0800=
, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Random padding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,<br>
&gt; if I get to observe a large number of requests from the same client<br=
>
&gt; to the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert<br>
&gt; chain.<br>
<br>
Yes, I was aware of this.=C2=A0 But one might also note that may services<b=
r>
are not behind a CDN, and that data traffic patterns after the<br>
handshake can also fingerprint the target service.<br></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>Yes. But the idea here is to gradually remove fingerprinting su=
rface, and so</div><div>the mitigations we recommend should work.</div><div=
><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Session resumption helps to reduce the number of full handshakes<br>
that leak some information about the certificate size.<br>
<br>
Users who really want (better) protection against traffic analysis<br>
should use Tor.=C2=A0 TLS traffic analysis protection from ESNI et. al.<br>
is IMHO best-effort protection for casual use.<br>
<br>
If a user visits just one site (and no others) at a particular CDN,<br>
absent traffic flow obfuscation ala Tor, the user&#39;s TLS traffic<br>
will eventually stand out from the noise.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Viktor.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 11:04:12 -0600
Message-ID: <CAF8qwaACQncPCSJBdVrCiBAy904AuS=GScdrYUDYkxe8WuA4DA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 10:54 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Wednesday, 12 December 2018 23:21:43 CET David Benjamin wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over
> the
> > course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
> > unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
> > send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK
> 11
> > client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
> > https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
> >
> > It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not yet released.
> In
> > the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients and disable TLS
> > 1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downgrade signal
> in
> > ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade signal, so the
> > workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective for other
> > clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.
> >
> > To salvage this for now, we've introduced a second value, generated
> > randomly:
> >     0xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x47, 0x10, 0xff
> >
> > When Google servers detect JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 to work around this
> > issue, they will use that value in ServerHello.random instead of the
> > standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versions
> of
> > Chrome will treat the new value as an alias of the standard one. Other
> > clients may wish to do the same, but please properly test your TLS 1.3
> > implementation first.
>
> there is now a server test script in tlsfuzzer for standard downgrade
> sentinel:
>
> https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-downgrade-protection.py
>
> example of usage: https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/pull/479/files


That's not the problematic direction here. If someone ships a TLS 1.3
*client* which enforces the downgrade sentinel, it is important that the
TLS 1.3 implementation not contain show-stopping bugs. The reason JDK 11's
problem impacts the downgrade sentinel is because JDK 11 lacks a working
client TLS 1.3 implementation, but it insists it has one by way of
enforcing the signal on the client.

David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Dec 13=
, 2018 at 10:54 AM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">On Wednesday, 12 December 2018 23:21:43 CET David Benjamin wr=
ote:<br>
&gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over=
 the<br>
&gt; course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11<br=
>
&gt; unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails=
 to<br>
&gt; send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JD=
K 11<br>
&gt; client will work, but subsequent ones fail.<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-821180=
6</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not yet released=
. In<br>
&gt; the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients and disable T=
LS<br>
&gt; 1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downgrade signa=
l in<br>
&gt; ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade signal, so th=
e<br>
&gt; workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective for ot=
her<br>
&gt; clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; To salvage this for now, we&#39;ve introduced a second value, generate=
d<br>
&gt; randomly:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A00xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x47, 0x10, 0xff<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; When Google servers detect JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 to work around t=
his<br>
&gt; issue, they will use that value in ServerHello.random instead of the<b=
r>
&gt; standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versio=
ns of<br>
&gt; Chrome will treat the new value as an alias of the standard one. Other=
<br>
&gt; clients may wish to do the same, but please properly test your TLS 1.3=
<br>
&gt; implementation first.<br>
<br>
there is now a server test script in tlsfuzzer for standard downgrade <br>
sentinel:<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-d=
owngrade-protection.py" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github=
.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-downgrade-protection.py</a=
><br>
<br>
example of usage: <a href=3D"https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/pull/479=
/files" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tomato42/tl=
sfuzzer/pull/479/files</a></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>That&#3=
9;s not the problematic direction here. If someone ships a TLS 1.3 *client*=
 which enforces the downgrade sentinel, it is important that the TLS 1.3 im=
plementation not contain show-stopping bugs. The reason JDK 11&#39;s proble=
m impacts the downgrade sentinel is because JDK 11 lacks a working client T=
LS 1.3 implementation, but it insists it has one by way of enforcing the si=
gnal on the client.</div></div></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>Da=
vid</div></div></div></div></div></div>

--00000000000086ffa3057cea4e8c--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 18:20:53 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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On Thursday, 13 December 2018 18:04:12 CET David Benjamin wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 10:54 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 12 December 2018 23:21:43 CET David Benjamin wrote:
> > > Hi folks,
> > >=20
> > > We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over
> > > the
> > > course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
> > > unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails
> > > to
> > > send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a J=
DK
> > > 11
> > > client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
> > > https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
> > >=20
> > > It appears this will be fixed in JDK 11.0.2, which is not yet release=
d.
> > > In
> > > the meantime, we have sadly had to detect JDK 11 clients and disable =
TLS
> > > 1.3 for them. This, in turn, raises a problem with the downgrade sign=
al
> > > in
> > > ServerHello.random. JDK 11 does implement that downgrade signal, so t=
he
> > > workaround cannot send it. However, the signal is not effective for
> > > other
> > > clients unless all TLS 1.2 ServerHellos are marked.
> > >=20
> > > To salvage this for now, we've introduced a second value, generated
> > >=20
> > > randomly:
> > >     0xed, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x47, 0x10, 0xff
> > >=20
> > > When Google servers detect JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 to work around
> > > this
> > > issue, they will use that value in ServerHello.random instead of the
> > > standard 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01. Future versi=
ons
> > > of
> > > Chrome will treat the new value as an alias of the standard one. Other
> > > clients may wish to do the same, but please properly test your TLS 1.3
> > > implementation first.
> >=20
> > there is now a server test script in tlsfuzzer for standard downgrade
> > sentinel:
> >=20
> > https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-downgrad=
e-p
> > rotection.py
> >=20
> > example of usage: https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/pull/479/files
>=20
> That's not the problematic direction here. If someone ships a TLS 1.3
> *client* which enforces the downgrade sentinel, it is important that the
> TLS 1.3 implementation not contain show-stopping bugs. The reason JDK 11's
> problem impacts the downgrade sentinel is because JDK 11 lacks a working
> client TLS 1.3 implementation, but it insists it has one by way of
> enforcing the signal on the client.

I know, but if people start fiddling with downgrade signal, they should ver=
ify=20
that it works correctly in general case =E2=80=94 I was replying to the las=
t sentence=20
only.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Thu Dec 13 09:38:57 2018
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Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 10:36:39 -0700
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 11:02:54AM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 07:51:17AM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> > Random padding does poorly with repeated trials. So, for instance,
> > if I get to observe a large number of requests from the same client
> > to the same server, you can gradually infer the length of the cert
> > chain.
> 
> Yes, I was aware of this.  But one might also note that may services
> are not behind a CDN, and that data traffic patterns after the
> handshake can also fingerprint the target service.
> 
> Session resumption helps to reduce the number of full handshakes
> that leak some information about the certificate size.
> 
> Users who really want (better) protection against traffic analysis
> should use Tor.  TLS traffic analysis protection from ESNI et. al.
> is IMHO best-effort protection for casual use.
>
> If a user visits just one site (and no others) at a particular CDN,
> absent traffic flow obfuscation ala Tor, the user's TLS traffic
> will eventually stand out from the noise.

Tor does not really offer protection against traffic analysis, apart
from hiding the source and destination IP addresses. In fact a lot of
website fingerprinting research uses Tor as a carrier, *because* it
preserves features of the underlying flow. See for example Table 1 at
https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue4/popets-2018-0039.pdf#page=3
Tor pads most of its cells to 514 bytes (https://spec.torproject.org/tor-spec §0.2 §3),
and fairly recently (Tor 0.3.1.7, 2017-09-18) it sends padding cells
during quiet periods in order to collapse long-term netflow records
(https://spec.torproject.org/padding-spec §2), but neither of these are
designed to defend against website fingerprinting attacks; on the
contrary, they introduce fingerprints that make it easier to detect the
use of Tor inside a tunnel.

Don't miss an important use case. Tor and ESNI are not mutually
exclusive. A user may want to use ESNI in order to *reach* Tor (or any
other service offering additional security properties). ESNI is not just
for HTTPS web pages; it's for any TLS service (or service that can be
tunnelled in TLS). But any such service is useless if an intermediary
can block the server hosting it. This is where ESNI can be of help.

I wouldn't put repeated trials to infer a randomized value, and analysis
of encrypted application-layer traffic characteristics, in the same
class of difficulty, and reason that if the latter is possible, there's
no reason to defend against the former. I think part of the reason that
Tor does not (yet) do traffic flow obfuscation is that it hasn't been
necessary. The networks that block Tor don't do it on that basis. That's
not to say it's not something to think about, just that empirically it
hasn't proven as pressing as other considerations. Things like Cisco ETA
(https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/22/ciscos_encrypted_traffic_fingerprinting_turned_into_product/,
https://github.com/cisco/joy#relation-to-cisco-eta, https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01639)
show the commercial world at least reaching for such capabilities, but
my understanding is that it's still far short of an operational
"identify this HTTPS site" feature.


From nobody Thu Dec 13 11:04:24 2018
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <e749a309-76ea-2e6c-40e0-eebdeb5c93b1@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 19:04:08 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hShQySOgCu3npiPDCY-Y_5d0cxs>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <e749a309-76ea-2e6c-40e0-eebdeb5c93b1@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI padding the Certificate message
References: <876187a2-df66-2eb0-5a55-b6e67cf668f6@cs.tcd.ie>
 <CABcZeBNQE2iU-67Bf1FemXP1c6mnJZi6mXBx24_Mv6wZksTEPw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBNQE2iU-67Bf1FemXP1c6mnJZi6mXBx24_Mv6wZksTEPw@mail.gmail.com>

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Hiya,

On 13/12/2018 15:09, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Sure. Send a PR.

Just did that adding in CerticateVerify. [1]

That PR does also take out the "longest cert length" aspect
of the current text - I reckon Viktor's right that one might
not know that, and it could be error prone as new certs get
issued in some scenarios. I'd not yell much if you wanted to
keep that aspect but I'd equally argue we might be better off
with some more general "traffic analysis considerations"
text we can work on later (e.g. after the DNS stuff changes).

Cheers,
S


[1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/122

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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:21:43PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
> course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
> unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
> send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
> client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806

I'm told that OpenSSL accidentally takes the SNI from the initial
connection on resumption if there's no SNI in the resumption.  This
seems like a very good workaround for the buggy JDK 11 TLS 1.3 client,
as it has no fingerprinting nor downgrade considerations.

If the server rejects resumption I guess the client would still fail,
but this is much better than failing at 100% of all resumptions and
better than adding fingerprinting and downgrades.

Nico
-- 


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From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 11:25:12 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 10:50 AM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
wrote:

> If the server rejects resumption I guess the client would still fail,
> but this is much better than failing at 100% of all resumptions and
> better than adding fingerprinting and downgrades.
>

In order for TLS 1.3 deployment to be viable the failure rate needs to be
negligible. It's not feasible to construct things such that moving traffic
across session caching domains causes a wave of handshake failures.
Additionally, if we were to wait for these versions of Java to die out in
the ecosystem, we risk other buggy clients getting established in the mean
time. We are painfully aware that limiting our server-side deployment
allowed this bug to become established and, while we did it to ease
middlebox issues, it may have been a mistake.


Cheers

AGL

-- 
Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org

--0000000000008628e1057d006491
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 10:50 AM Nico Wil=
liams &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com">nico@cryptonector.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">If the server rejects resumption I guess the client=
 would still fail,<br>
but this is much better than failing at 100% of all resumptions and<br>
better than adding fingerprinting and downgrades.<br></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>In order for TLS 1.3 deployment to be viable the failure rate ne=
eds to be negligible. It&#39;s not feasible to construct things such that m=
oving traffic across session caching domains causes a wave of handshake fai=
lures. Additionally, if we were to wait for these versions of Java to die o=
ut in the ecosystem, we risk other buggy clients getting established in the=
 mean time. We are painfully aware that limiting our server-side deployment=
 allowed this bug to become established and, while we did it to ease middle=
box issues, it may have been a mistake.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div>Cheers</div><div><br></div><div>AGL</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature">Adam Langley <a href=3D"mailto:ag=
l@imperialviolet.org" target=3D"_blank">agl@imperialviolet.org</a> <a href=
=3D"https://www.imperialviolet.org" target=3D"_blank">https://www.imperialv=
iolet.org</a></div></div>

--0000000000008628e1057d006491--


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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:21:43PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
>> We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
>> course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
>> unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
>> send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
>> client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
>> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
> 
> I'm told that OpenSSL accidentally takes the SNI from the initial
> connection on resumption if there's no SNI in the resumption.  This
> seems like a very good workaround for the buggy JDK 11 TLS 1.3 client,
> as it has no fingerprinting nor downgrade considerations.

Just that this workaround is a no-go for any layered approach
to SNI, where server-side processing of SNI is outside of the TLS stack.

-Martin


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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 10:11:38PM +0100, Martin Rex wrote:
> Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:21:43PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> >> We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
> >> course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
> >> unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
> >> send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
> >> client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
> >> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
> > 
> > I'm told that OpenSSL accidentally takes the SNI from the initial
> > connection on resumption if there's no SNI in the resumption.  This
> > seems like a very good workaround for the buggy JDK 11 TLS 1.3 client,
> > as it has no fingerprinting nor downgrade considerations.
> 
> Just that this workaround is a no-go for any layered approach
> to SNI, where server-side processing of SNI is outside of the TLS stack.

I mean, that's already a problem for TLS 1.{0,1,2}, so I don't believe
that getting the SNI from the resumption ticket would be a problem on
this account.

Nico
-- 


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Subject: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.

This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here
on their behalf.

Also, while we're at it, I'd like to note that SNI is not the only thing
requiring privacy protection from the client.  There's also the PSK
identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...  Not as important as SNI,
perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we'll be
engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.

Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discovery) and
DNSSEC not necessary.

The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake traffic
secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent hanshake
messages.  This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure active attack
-- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.  This variant adds one
round-trip to full handshakes.

We can then optionally piggy-back the server's Certificate and
CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the
client's initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and now we have
authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means there is no
active attack on the ESNI.  This still only adds just the one round-trip
to full handshakes.  And look ma', now w/ no DNSSEC requirement to avoid
active attacks.

And if the client already knows about the co-tenancy of the fronting
and desired servers, then no DNS lookups are needed to discover it.
E.g., dissidents might learn this by word of mouth.

The second variant can, sadly, add an extra round-trip when the server
finds the client's initial key_share unacceptable.

As to resumption, the real SNI should be the one from the original full
handshake, and the SNI in the resumption should be the fronting
service's name.  Resumption retains the same latency as in RFC 8446.

Below are the flows for the three cases, all of these being full
handshakes.  Naturally, these should be read after first reading figure
2 from RFC 8446.


        ClientHello
        + key_share             -------->
                                                  HelloRetryRequest
                                <--------               + key_share      
        ClientHello
        {EncryptedExtensions}
        + key_share             -------->
                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
                                              {CertificateRequest*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                                         {Finished}
                                <--------       [Application Data*]
        {Certificate*}
        {CertificateVerify*}
        {Finished}              -------->
        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]

             Figure 1: Alternative ESNI w/o active protection



        ClientHello
        + key_share             -------->
                                                        ServerHello
                                                        + key_share
                                             {EncryptedExtensions*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
        ClientHello
        + key_share
        {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
                                              {CertificateRequest*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                                         {Finished}
                                <--------       [Application Data*]
        {Certificate*}
        {CertificateVerify*}
        {Finished}              -------->
        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]

              Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection




        ClientHello
        + key_share             -------->
                                                  HelloRetryRequest
                                <--------               + key_share
        ClientHello
        + key_share             -------->
                                                        ServerHello
                                                        + key_share
                                             {EncryptedExtensions*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
        ClientHello
        + key_share
        {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
                                              {CertificateRequest*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                                         {Finished}
                                <--------       [Application Data*]
        {Certificate*}
        {CertificateVerify*}
        {Finished}              -------->
        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]

             Figure 3: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection,
                          with worst-case latency


Thoughts?  Is this horrible somehow?  Has this been discussed and
discarded for some reason?

Nico
-- 


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 20:01:35 -0800
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 6:54 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.
>
> This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here
> on their behalf.
>
> Also, while we're at it, I'd like to note that SNI is not the only thing
> requiring privacy protection from the client.  There's also the PSK
> identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...  Not as important as SNI,
> perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we'll be
> engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.
>
> Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discovery) and
> DNSSEC not necessary.
>
> The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake traffic
> secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent hanshake
> messages.  This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure active attack
> -- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.  This variant adds one
> round-trip to full handshakes.
>

We looked at this class of design during the initial work on TLS 1.3 because
(a) it has trivial active attacks, as you note and (b) we don't want people
to
have to accept an extra round trip in order to get ESNI, because that's a
major disincentive to doing it.

WRT to the active attack point, DNSSEC isn't necessary with the current ESNI
design. What's necessary is that the client be able to get the ESNIKeys
record
(and the A/AAAA records) securely wrt to the attacker trying to get the SNI.
However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local
network,
there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH.
In addition, if the attacker controls DNS (or generally can observe DNS
traffic)
then getting the SNI encryption key securely isn't sufficient because the
attacker
can just learn the domain name from the DNS lookup (or return a unique
IP for each query and then use that to look up the SNI from the IP).





> We can then optionally piggy-back the server's Certificate and
> CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the
> client's initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and now we have
> authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means there is no
> active attack on the ESNI.  This still only adds just the one round-trip
> to full handshakes.  And look ma', now w/ no DNSSEC requirement to avoid
> active attacks.
>

This seems like a more invasive version of what David Benjamin et al.
proposed the
other day, just without the ESNI key at all. I don't think this is an
acceptable
general solution for latency reasons (as opposed to fallback), and of course
you still need some way to securely obtain the domain name you put in
the SNI, and if this isn't done with DNS, then you end up with a situation
where very few people use ESNI and so you stick out.

-Ekr

--000000000000c9a764057d079c4d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 6:54 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">OpenSSL extracts and=
 uses SNI from session resumption tickets.<br>
<br>
This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I&#39;ll relay here=
<br>
on their behalf.<br>
<br>
Also, while we&#39;re at it, I&#39;d like to note that SNI is not the only =
thing<br>
requiring privacy protection from the client.=C2=A0 There&#39;s also the PS=
K<br>
identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...=C2=A0 Not as important as SNI,<=
br>
perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we&#39;ll be<=
br>
engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.<br>
<br>
Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discovery) and<br>
DNSSEC not necessary.<br>
<br>
The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake traffic<br=
>
secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent hanshake<br>
messages.=C2=A0 This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure active attack=
<br>
-- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.=C2=A0 This variant adds on=
e<br>
round-trip to full handshakes.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We looke=
d at this class of design during the initial work on TLS 1.3 because</div><=
div>(a) it has trivial active attacks, as you note and (b) we don&#39;t wan=
t people to</div><div>have to accept an extra round trip in order to get ES=
NI, because that&#39;s a</div><div>major disincentive to doing it.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>WRT to the active attack point, DNSSEC isn&#39;t necessary=
 with the current ESNI</div><div>design. What&#39;s necessary is that the c=
lient be able to get the ESNIKeys record</div><div>(and the A/AAAA records)=
 securely wrt to the attacker trying to get the SNI.</div><div>However, in =
a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local network,</div><div=
>there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH.</=
div><div>In addition, if the attacker controls DNS (or generally can observ=
e DNS traffic)</div><div>then getting the SNI encryption key securely isn&#=
39;t sufficient because the attacker</div><div>can just learn the domain na=
me from the DNS lookup (or return a unique</div><div>IP for each query and =
then use that to look up the SNI from the IP).</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
We can then optionally piggy-back the server&#39;s Certificate and<br>
CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the<br>
client&#39;s initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and now we hav=
e<br>
authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means there is no<br=
>
active attack on the ESNI.=C2=A0 This still only adds just the one round-tr=
ip<br>
to full handshakes.=C2=A0 And look ma&#39;, now w/ no DNSSEC requirement to=
 avoid<br>
active attacks.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This seems like a more =
invasive version of what David Benjamin et al. proposed the</div><div>other=
 day, just without the ESNI key at all. I don&#39;t think this is an accept=
able</div><div>general solution for latency reasons (as opposed to fallback=
), and of course</div><div>you still need some way to securely obtain the d=
omain name you put in</div><div>the SNI, and if this isn&#39;t done with DN=
S, then you end up with a situation</div><div>where very few people use ESN=
I and so you stick out.<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote">-Ekr</div><br></div>

--000000000000c9a764057d079c4d--


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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 08:01:35PM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 6:54 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> > OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.
> > This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here
> > on their behalf.
> >
> > Also, while we're at it, I'd like to note that SNI is not the only thing
> > requiring privacy protection from the client.  There's also the PSK
> > identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...  Not as important as SNI,
> > perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we'll be
> > engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.
> >
> > Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discovery) and
> > DNSSEC not necessary.
> >
> > The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake traffic
> > secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent hanshake
> > messages.  This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure active attack
> > -- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.  This variant adds one
> > round-trip to full handshakes.
> >
> 
> We looked at this class of design during the initial work on TLS 1.3
> because (a) it has trivial active attacks, as you note and (b) we
> don't want people to have to accept an extra round trip in order to
> get ESNI, because that's a major disincentive to doing it.

One of the two has no active attack, and the extra round trip is already
possible due to the existing HelloRetryRequest flow.  The variant that
is resistant to active attack has a worst case additional round-trip,
but again, only on initial handshake.

BTW, the flows I presented have no multi-CDN keyshare private key
distribution issues because there are no keyshares to publish in the
DNS.

> WRT to the active attack point, DNSSEC isn't necessary with the
> current ESNI design. What's necessary is that the client be able to
> get the ESNIKeys record (and the A/AAAA records) securely wrt to the
> attacker trying to get the SNI.  However, in a large number of cases
> (e.g., an attacker on your local network, there are non-DNSSEC ways of
> obtaining this property, such as using DoH.  In addition, if the

DoH?

> attacker controls DNS (or generally can observe DNS traffic) then
> getting the SNI encryption key securely isn't sufficient because the
> attacker can just learn the domain name from the DNS lookup (or return
> a unique IP for each query and then use that to look up the SNI from
> the IP).

Sure.  DPRIV is still needed, no doubt.

> > We can then optionally piggy-back the server's Certificate and
> > CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the
> > client's initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and now we have
> > authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means there is no
> > active attack on the ESNI.  This still only adds just the one round-trip
> > to full handshakes.  And look ma', now w/ no DNSSEC requirement to avoid
> > active attacks.
> >
> 
> This seems like a more invasive version of what David Benjamin et al.
> proposed the other day, just without the ESNI key at all. I don't
> think this is an acceptable general solution for latency reasons (as
> opposed to fallback), and of course you still need some way to

Again, it's comparable to the existing HelloRequestRetry flow case.

> securely obtain the domain name you put in the SNI, and if this isn't
> done with DNS, then you end up with a situation where very few people
> use ESNI and so you stick out.

Granted.  But not having to coordinate privte keys for the keyshares to
be published in the DNS seems like a very big win.

Nico
-- 

Nico
-- 


From nobody Sat Dec 15 05:09:06 2018
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, tls@ietf.org
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 13:08:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <d297696e-5199-779a-697c-a5c3249555f2@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
References: <20181215025346.GJ15561@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <20181215025346.GJ15561@localhost>

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Hi Nico,

On 15/12/2018 02:53, Nico Williams wrote:
> OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.
>=20
> This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here=

> on their behalf.

I agree this is worth exploring, though am not sure if it'd be
better in the end. (I chatted with Viktor about this and said
I'd try see if I could make it work once I've gotten further
along coding up the current draft.)

I don't see any point in considering the variant with the easy
active attack though; as ekr said, I think that was considered
before and I'd say that'll just confuse matters and is better
omitted, so I'm only really considering your figure 2 below.

>=20
=2E..snip...
>=20

>=20
>         ClientHello
>         + key_share             -------->
>                                                         ServerHello
>                                                         + key_share
>                                              {EncryptedExtensions*}
>                                                       {Certificate}
>                                                 {CertificateVerify}
>                                 <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
>         ClientHello
>         + key_share
>         {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
>                                               {EncryptedExtensions}
>                                               {CertificateRequest*}
>                                                       {Certificate}
>                                                 {CertificateVerify}
>                                                          {Finished}
>                                 <--------       [Application Data*]
>         {Certificate*}
>         {CertificateVerify*}
>         {Finished}              -------->
>         [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]
>=20
>               Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection
>=20

Some questions:

- How are you proposing the client knows of the existence of the
  hidden service? (Aside from local configuration, which is always
  possible.)
- How does the server know to include the HRR in it's answers? (IOW,
  what ESNI signal is present in the client's 1st flight?
- Ought that be some more general signal? e,g. "client wants to send
  some EncryptedExtensions, let's do an extra RTT." (I'd like that
  I think, but the counter argument might be that that's overreach
  and we'd be better to just stick with an ESNI model that we're
  confident can get some deployment.)
- Given HRR was a kludge for backwards compatibility could changing
  where that occurs in the protocol trigger more middlebox messes?
- This seems like supporting the split mode behaviour [1] could be a
  lot more complex, as this scheme is more embedded in the h/s. Is
  that fair? (Note: I'm not sure the split mode is really easy in
  any circumstances though, so that mightn't be a killer argument.)
- In tls1.3 the HRR has an accompanying key_share, if pursuing this
  further I'd say you'd want to consider whether or not that is
  better to include. (That is, your server's first flight above has
  a SH and then HRR but only one key_share - it might be better to
  have a key_share in each, and that might even enable a more
  tractable split mode model if the cover server could handoff the
  rest of the h/s after that maybe.)

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-5.4

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 05:22:37 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:48 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 08:01:35PM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 6:54 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
> wrote:
> > > OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.
> > > This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here
> > > on their behalf.
> > >
> > > Also, while we're at it, I'd like to note that SNI is not the only
> thing
> > > requiring privacy protection from the client.  There's also the PSK
> > > identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...  Not as important as SNI,
> > > perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we'll be
> > > engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.
> > >
> > > Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discovery) and
> > > DNSSEC not necessary.
> > >
> > > The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake
> traffic
> > > secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent hanshake
> > > messages.  This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure active attack
> > > -- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.  This variant adds one
> > > round-trip to full handshakes.
> > >
> >
> > We looked at this class of design during the initial work on TLS 1.3
> > because (a) it has trivial active attacks, as you note and (b) we
> > don't want people to have to accept an extra round trip in order to
> > get ESNI, because that's a major disincentive to doing it.
>
> One of the two has no active attack


It only doesn't have an active attack because you have assumed away
some method of distributing the name to put in the SNI in the clear.


and the extra round trip is already
> possible due to the existing HelloRetryRequest flow.


Yes, but we expect that HRR is going to be quite rare. If it's not,
other things have generally gone wrong.


BTW, the flows I presented have no multi-CDN keyshare private key
> distribution issues because there are no keyshares to publish in the
> DNS.
>

No, but they have similar problems in terms of coordinating the SNI
you put in the clear. Consider the case where domain X desires to
use ESNI and is hosted on CDN 1, which also hosts domains A, B, and
C, and CDN 2, which also hosts domains U, V, and W. What domain
does it put in the cleartext version of the SNI?






> > WRT to the active attack point, DNSSEC isn't necessary with the
> > current ESNI design. What's necessary is that the client be able to
> > get the ESNIKeys record (and the A/AAAA records) securely wrt to the
> > attacker trying to get the SNI.  However, in a large number of cases
> > (e.g., an attacker on your local network, there are non-DNSSEC ways of
> > obtaining this property, such as using DoH.  In addition, if the
>
> DoH?
>

DNS over HTTPS.


> > We can then optionally piggy-back the server's Certificate and
> > > CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the
> > > client's initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and now we
> have
> > > authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means there is
> no
> > > active attack on the ESNI.  This still only adds just the one
> round-trip
> > > to full handshakes.  And look ma', now w/ no DNSSEC requirement to
> avoid
> > > active attacks.
> > >
> >
> > This seems like a more invasive version of what David Benjamin et al.
> > proposed the other day, just without the ESNI key at all. I don't
> > think this is an acceptable general solution for latency reasons (as
> > opposed to fallback), and of course you still need some way to
>
> Again, it's comparable to the existing HelloRequestRetry flow case.
>

A case which we try to avoid.



> > securely obtain the domain name you put in the SNI, and if this isn't
> > done with DNS, then you end up with a situation where very few people
> > use ESNI and so you stick out.
>
> Granted.  But not having to coordinate privte keys for the keyshares to
> be published in the DNS seems like a very big win.
>

As noted above, I don't think you're meaningfully avoiding this,

-Ekr


> Nico
> --
>
> Nico
> --
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:48 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, Dec 14, 2018=
 at 08:01:35PM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 6:54 PM Nico Williams &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ni=
co@cryptonector.com" target=3D"_blank">nico@cryptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br>
&gt; &gt; OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.<br=
>
&gt; &gt; This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I&#39;ll =
relay here<br>
&gt; &gt; on their behalf.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Also, while we&#39;re at it, I&#39;d like to note that SNI is not=
 the only thing<br>
&gt; &gt; requiring privacy protection from the client.=C2=A0 There&#39;s a=
lso the PSK<br>
&gt; &gt; identity payload for non-resumption PSKs...=C2=A0 Not as importan=
t as SNI,<br>
&gt; &gt; perhaps, nonetheless I think we should maximize privacy, else we&=
#39;ll be<br>
&gt; &gt; engaging in repeated encrypted-{fill-in-the-blank} exercises.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Our proposal makes DNS optional (for co-tenancy fronting discover=
y) and<br>
&gt; &gt; DNSSEC not necessary.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The basic idea is to use a HelloRetryRequest to make a handshake =
traffic<br>
&gt; &gt; secret available to the client for it to use in its subsequent ha=
nshake<br>
&gt; &gt; messages.=C2=A0 This form is susceptible to an SNI disclosure act=
ive attack<br>
&gt; &gt; -- same as the current ESNI proposal w/o DNSSEC.=C2=A0 This varia=
nt adds one<br>
&gt; &gt; round-trip to full handshakes.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; We looked at this class of design during the initial work on TLS 1.3<b=
r>
&gt; because (a) it has trivial active attacks, as you note and (b) we<br>
&gt; don&#39;t want people to have to accept an extra round trip in order t=
o<br>
&gt; get ESNI, because that&#39;s a major disincentive to doing it.<br>
<br>
One of the two has no active attack</blockquote><div><br></div><div>It only=
 doesn&#39;t have an active attack because you have assumed away</div><div>=
some method of distributing the name to put in the SNI in the clear.<br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"> and the extra round trip is already<br>
possible due to the existing HelloRetryRequest flow.=C2=A0</blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Yes, but we expect that HRR is going to be quite rare. If i=
t&#39;s not,</div><div>other things have generally gone wrong.</div><div><b=
r></div><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
BTW, the flows I presented have no multi-CDN keyshare private key<br>
distribution issues because there are no keyshares to publish in the<br>
DNS.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, but they have similar problems=
 in terms of coordinating the SNI</div><div>you put in the clear. Consider =
the case where domain X desires to</div><div>use ESNI and is hosted on CDN =
1, which also hosts domains A, B, and</div><div>C, and CDN 2, which also ho=
sts domains U, V, and W. What domain</div><div>does it put in the cleartext=
 version of the SNI?</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
>
<br>
&gt; WRT to the active attack point, DNSSEC isn&#39;t necessary with the<br=
>
&gt; current ESNI design. What&#39;s necessary is that the client be able t=
o<br>
&gt; get the ESNIKeys record (and the A/AAAA records) securely wrt to the<b=
r>
&gt; attacker trying to get the SNI.=C2=A0 However, in a large number of ca=
ses<br>
&gt; (e.g., an attacker on your local network, there are non-DNSSEC ways of=
<br>
&gt; obtaining this property, such as using DoH.=C2=A0 In addition, if the<=
br>
<br>
DoH?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>DNS over HTTPS.</div><div> <br></d=
iv><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; &gt; We can then optionally piggy-back the server&#39;s Certificate an=
d<br>
&gt; &gt; CertificateVerify along with the HelloRetryRequest (provided the<=
br>
&gt; &gt; client&#39;s initial key_share is acceptable to the server), and =
now we have<br>
&gt; &gt; authenticated the server under its fronted name, which means ther=
e is no<br>
&gt; &gt; active attack on the ESNI.=C2=A0 This still only adds just the on=
e round-trip<br>
&gt; &gt; to full handshakes.=C2=A0 And look ma&#39;, now w/ no DNSSEC requ=
irement to avoid<br>
&gt; &gt; active attacks.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This seems like a more invasive version of what David Benjamin et al.<=
br>
&gt; proposed the other day, just without the ESNI key at all. I don&#39;t<=
br>
&gt; think this is an acceptable general solution for latency reasons (as<b=
r>
&gt; opposed to fallback), and of course you still need some way to<br>
<br>
Again, it&#39;s comparable to the existing HelloRequestRetry flow case.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>A case which we try to avoid.</div><div> <=
br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
>
&gt; securely obtain the domain name you put in the SNI, and if this isn&#3=
9;t<br>
&gt; done with DNS, then you end up with a situation where very few people<=
br>
&gt; use ESNI and so you stick out.<br>
<br>
Granted.=C2=A0 But not having to coordinate privte keys for the keyshares t=
o<br>
be published in the DNS seems like a very big win.<br></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>As noted above, I don&#39;t think you&#39;re meaningfully avoid=
ing this,<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Nico<br>
-- <br>
<br>
Nico<br>
-- <br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--00000000000033a75c057d0f733b--


From nobody Sat Dec 15 12:00:20 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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> On Dec 15, 2018, at 8:08 AM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
> I don't see any point in considering the variant with the easy
> active attack though;

For the record the easy MiTM attack requires on-path TCP termination,
only discloses the SNI name, and the full handshake then fails.  It
looks to me like the same happens with the current draft when the
fronting key_share is not DNSSEC-validated.  And the attack on DNS
can be done cheaply at scale as we saw with the MyEtherWallet BGP
re-route back in April.

The present draft puts keys in DNS that for many site operators
will be difficult to rotate frequently, so there is a considerable
loss of forward-secrecy.  Absent DNSSEC, and even with DoH/DoT,
MiTM attacks are not precluded by the current draft.  The attacker
just has to compromise the traffic between the DoH/DoT recursive
resolver and the authoritative server.

Yes, if the same provider operates both of:

   * The user's selected DoH/DoT upstream DNS resolver
   * The authoritative DNS for the ultimate target domain

do we really want this much centralization?

> as ekr said, I think that was considered
> before and I'd say that'll just confuse matters and is better
> omitted, so I'm only really considering your figure 2 below.

It seems to me that in this space we can't realistically have
perfection, there are only trade-offs.  If we want the protected
domains to not stand out by being a tiny fraction of the traffic
to the fronted server, then low adoption barriers are essential
to getting any security here, MiTM or not.

Obviating the need to put server keys in DNS, and synchronize the
key shares across the server farm, ... IMHO does more to ensure
SNI privacy than an MiTM-resistant but more difficult to deploy
model.

>>        ClientHello
>>        + key_share             -------->
>>                                                        ServerHello
>>                                                        + key_share
>>                                             {EncryptedExtensions*}
>>                                                      {Certificate}
>>                                                {CertificateVerify}
>>                                <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
>>        ClientHello
>>        + key_share
>>        {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
>>                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
>>                                              {CertificateRequest*}
>>                                                      {Certificate}
>>                                                {CertificateVerify}
>>                                                         {Finished}
>>                                <--------       [Application Data*]
>>        {Certificate*}
>>        {CertificateVerify*}
>>        {Finished}              -------->
>>        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]
>>=20
>>              Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection
>>=20
>=20
> Some questions:
>=20
> - How are you proposing the client knows of the existence of the
>  hidden service? (Aside from local configuration, which is always
>  possible.)

For opportunistic discovery, yes also DNS, but the DNS record would
just hold a stable indication of support for the protocol.

  * It could be just a boolean, with the SNI name sent to the CDN
    being a well-known placeholder (but only in the case that we
    forgo authenticating the CDN and accept MiTM SNI disclosure).

  * It could be a list of fronting server names (similar to SRV) with
    the appropriate SNI name sent to each server, prior to switching
    to an encrypted SNI.  This supports multi-CDN deployments, but
    the load-balancing across CDNs is then handled client-side.

> - How does the server know to include the HRR in it's answers? (IOW,
>  what ESNI signal is present in the client's 1st flight?

It could be a specially designated sentinel key_share algorithm, or
it could be an extension that solicits HRR.  If this proposal merits
further discussion, then we can get into the details, for now it is
perhaps best to consider the broad outline, and see whether that has
any merit.

> - Ought that be some more general signal? e,g. "client wants to send
>  some EncryptedExtensions, let's do an extra RTT." (I'd like that
>  I think, but the counter argument might be that that's overreach
>  and we'd be better to just stick with an ESNI model that we're
>  confident can get some deployment.)

Either is possible.

> - Given HRR was a kludge for backwards compatibility could changing
>  where that occurs in the protocol trigger more middlebox messes?

It could.  This would need to be explored.

> - This seems like supporting the split mode behaviour [1] could be a
>  lot more complex, as this scheme is more embedded in the h/s. Is
>  that fair? (Note: I'm not sure the split mode is really easy in
>  any circumstances though, so that mightn't be a killer argument.)

Yes, it is not immediately obvious how/whether split mode works.
I've not given it much thought.  Presently just wanted to see
whether using ephemeral keying for ESNI is a viable alternative.

--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 20:40:12 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <4d16124a-11ae-592c-638b-4462ce39fd43@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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 <970F5B55-A45D-4DFF-9D9D-C9E310D8E331@dukhovni.org>
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Hiya,

On 15/12/2018 20:00, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> On Dec 15, 2018, at 8:08 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.i=
e> wrote:
>>e
>> I don't see any point in considering the variant with the easy
>> active attack though;
>=20
> For the record the easy MiTM attack requires on-path TCP termination,
> only discloses the SNI name, and the full handshake then fails.  It
> looks to me like the same happens with the current draft when the
> fronting key_share is not DNSSEC-validated. =20

Yes. The significant difference though, for me, is that I can
see how to mitigate the attack in the case of the current draft
(deploy DNSSEC and/or DoH/DoT covering the bits of network about
which you're worried). Whereas the HRR scheme without the step
of authenticating the cover site inherently cannot have such a
mitigation as far as I can see.

Personally, I think that's a winning argument against the HRR
scheme with no cover-server authentication prior to exposing the
ESNI.

> And the attack on DNS
> can be done cheaply at scale as we saw with the MyEtherWallet BGP
> re-route back in April.
>=20
> The present draft puts keys in DNS that for many site operators
> will be difficult to rotate frequently, so there is a considerable
> loss of forward-secrecy.  Absent DNSSEC, and even with DoH/DoT,
> MiTM attacks are not precluded by the current draft.  The attacker
> just has to compromise the traffic between the DoH/DoT recursive
> resolver and the authoritative server.
>=20
> Yes, if the same provider operates both of:
>=20
>    * The user's selected DoH/DoT upstream DNS resolver
>    * The authoritative DNS for the ultimate target domain
>=20
> do we really want this much centralization?

I agree that the current content specified for putting in the
DNS and the potential centralisation that may cause are both
undesirable.

I'm not convinced the HRR scheme is a better replacement. (But
I do think it is worth considering, as I said before.)

If browsers found one of the schemes attractive and the other
not, that'd I think be a winning argument - unfortunately, but
realistically, that'd win all arguments about trade-offs in
terms of potential for privacy improvement.

>=20
>> as ekr said, I think that was considered
>> before and I'd say that'll just confuse matters and is better
>> omitted, so I'm only really considering your figure 2 below.
>=20
> It seems to me that in this space we can't realistically have
> perfection, there are only trade-offs.  If we want the protected
> domains to not stand out by being a tiny fraction of the traffic
> to the fronted server, then low adoption barriers are essential
> to getting any security here, MiTM or not.
>=20
> Obviating the need to put server keys in DNS, and synchronize the
> key shares across the server farm, ... IMHO does more to ensure
> SNI privacy than an MiTM-resistant but more difficult to deploy
> model.
>=20
>>>        ClientHello
>>>        + key_share             -------->
>>>                                                        ServerHello
>>>                                                        + key_share
>>>                                             {EncryptedExtensions*}
>>>                                                      {Certificate}
>>>                                                {CertificateVerify}
>>>                                <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
>>>        ClientHello
>>>        + key_share
>>>        {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
>>>                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
>>>                                              {CertificateRequest*}
>>>                                                      {Certificate}
>>>                                                {CertificateVerify}
>>>                                                         {Finished}
>>>                                <--------       [Application Data*]
>>>        {Certificate*}
>>>        {CertificateVerify*}
>>>        {Finished}              -------->
>>>        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]
>>>
>>>              Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection
>>>
>>
>> Some questions:
>>
>> - How are you proposing the client knows of the existence of the
>>  hidden service? (Aside from local configuration, which is always
>>  possible.)
>=20
> For opportunistic discovery, yes also DNS, but the DNS record would
> just hold a stable indication of support for the protocol.

Isn't the easiest attack on ESNI then to just block visibility
of that boolean at which point a client will use SNI and not ESNI
and it's game-over? That seems to imply the HRR scheme isn't
any less dependent on DNS really, as I think ekr implied. (The
HRR scheme could be much nicer in terms of operating DNS, but not
more secure.)

Cheers,
S.

PS: Thanks for the other answers below, I think they're clear
enough.

>=20
>   * It could be just a boolean, with the SNI name sent to the CDN
>     being a well-known placeholder (but only in the case that we
>     forgo authenticating the CDN and accept MiTM SNI disclosure).
>=20
>   * It could be a list of fronting server names (similar to SRV) with
>     the appropriate SNI name sent to each server, prior to switching
>     to an encrypted SNI.  This supports multi-CDN deployments, but
>     the load-balancing across CDNs is then handled client-side.
>=20
>> - How does the server know to include the HRR in it's answers? (IOW,
>>  what ESNI signal is present in the client's 1st flight?
>=20
> It could be a specially designated sentinel key_share algorithm, or
> it could be an extension that solicits HRR.  If this proposal merits
> further discussion, then we can get into the details, for now it is
> perhaps best to consider the broad outline, and see whether that has
> any merit.
>=20
>> - Ought that be some more general signal? e,g. "client wants to send
>>  some EncryptedExtensions, let's do an extra RTT." (I'd like that
>>  I think, but the counter argument might be that that's overreach
>>  and we'd be better to just stick with an ESNI model that we're
>>  confident can get some deployment.)
>=20
> Either is possible.
>=20
>> - Given HRR was a kludge for backwards compatibility could changing
>>  where that occurs in the protocol trigger more middlebox messes?
>=20
> It could.  This would need to be explored.
>=20
>> - This seems like supporting the split mode behaviour [1] could be a
>>  lot more complex, as this scheme is more embedded in the h/s. Is
>>  that fair? (Note: I'm not sure the split mode is really easy in
>>  any circumstances though, so that mightn't be a killer argument.)
>=20
> Yes, it is not immediately obvious how/whether split mode works.
> I've not given it much thought.  Presently just wanted to see
> whether using ephemeral keying for ESNI is a viable alternative.
>=20

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From nobody Sat Dec 15 13:06:15 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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[ After this comment, stepping back for a while, I want to hear what =
others
  think about the general shape of the alternative... ]

> On Dec 15, 2018, at 3:40 PM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
>> For opportunistic discovery, yes also DNS, but the DNS record would
>> just hold a stable indication of support for the protocol.
>=20
> Isn't the easiest attack on ESNI then to just block visibility
> of that boolean at which point a client will use SNI and not ESNI
> and it's game-over? That seems to imply the HRR scheme isn't
> any less dependent on DNS really, as I think ekr implied. (The
> HRR scheme could be much nicer in terms of operating DNS, but not
> more secure.)

The HRR scheme has better support for out-of-band local policy, that
resists the above attack, since the data that would be obtained via
DNS is comparatively stable, and could just be a local setting in
the user agent.

If one is willing to forgo authenticating the fronting server
(trade-off), the use of ESNI could simply be on by default,
discovered in-band by observing whether the server's HRR carries
an appropriate extension.

  * Send sentinel client key_share that triggers HRR
  * Omit all sensitive extensions.
  * Send sentinel SNI
  * Check server HRR for extension that indicates support
    for encrypted extensions in client HELLO after HRR
  * If present, encrypt all the client extensions including SNI.
  * If absent, then proceed as before.

In this mode, there are no new DNS lookups, but we end up doing
an extra round-trip for all servers, even those that are not behind
CDNs and don't support the extension.

That is of course great news for not standing out of the crowd,
all traffic looks the same whether behind a fronting CDN or not,
*but* this forgoes the opportunity to learn (via a secure out
of band channel) the fronting server's name and authenticate it,
so the MiTM SNI disclosure attack is back.

We can trade-off broad deployment against active attack resistance,
but it seems difficult to have both.  I'd be inclined to favour
broad deployment, and rely on Tor and the like (in combination
with ESNI) to make SNI disclosure through active attack less
useful to the attacker.

--=20
--=20
	Viktor.


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 13:27:04 -0800
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Cc: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 12:41 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

> If browsers found one of the schemes attractive and the other
> not, that'd I think be a winning argument - unfortunately, but
> realistically, that'd win all arguments about trade-offs in
> terms of potential for privacy improvement.
>

I can't speak for anyone else, but as I said, we discussed this topic during
the initial design phase of TLS 1.3 and the conclusion was that taking
an extra round trip to get ESNI was prohibitive and that people wouldn't
be willing to turn it on by default (and we ultimately hope that ever TLS
connection will have ESNI). do not believe Firefox would be willing
to do so. Perhaps otehr browsers feel differently.

-Ekr

--000000000000b0548f057d1637d6
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 12:41 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; w=
rote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
If browsers found one of the schemes attractive and the other<br>
not, that&#39;d I think be a winning argument - unfortunately, but<br>
realistically, that&#39;d win all arguments about trade-offs in<br>
terms of potential for privacy improvement.<br></blockquote><div><br></div>=
<div>I can&#39;t speak for anyone else, but as I said, we discussed this to=
pic during</div><div>the initial design phase of TLS 1.3 and the conclusion=
 was that taking</div><div>an extra round trip to get ESNI was prohibitive =
and that people wouldn&#39;t</div><div>be willing to turn it on by default =
(and we ultimately hope that ever TLS</div><div>connection will have ESNI).=
 do not believe Firefox would be willing</div><div>to do so. Perhaps otehr =
browsers feel differently.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br>=
</div><br></div></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 13:30:18 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 12:01 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

>
>
> > On Dec 15, 2018, at 8:08 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> wrote:
> >
> > I don't see any point in considering the variant with the easy
> > active attack though;
>
> For the record the easy MiTM attack requires on-path TCP termination,
> only discloses the SNI name, and the full handshake then fails.  It
> looks to me like the same happens with the current draft when the
> fronting key_share is not DNSSEC-validated.


As I said in my response to Nico, it depends on the threat model. If your
concern is the local network (which is quite common), then DoH addresses
the issue.

-Ekr

--0000000000004bc703057d1643a3
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 12:01 PM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Dec 15, 2018, at 8:08 AM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ste=
phen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don&#39;t see any point in considering the variant with the easy<br>
&gt; active attack though;<br>
<br>
For the record the easy MiTM attack requires on-path TCP termination,<br>
only discloses the SNI name, and the full handshake then fails.=C2=A0 It<br=
>
looks to me like the same happens with the current draft when the<br>
fronting key_share is not DNSSEC-validated.</blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>As I said in my response to Nico, it depends on the threat model. If your<=
/div><div>concern is the local network (which is quite common), then DoH ad=
dresses</div><div>the issue.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></=
div></div></div>

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Date: Sun, 16 Dec 2018 14:45:00 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local network,
> there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH.

Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.

DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you
received is not modified.

Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The
move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided
and just moving the goal post. It is very concerning now that we see
browser vendors to start moving DNS from the endpoint to trusted
servers elsewhere on the internet under the control of very few, mostly
US based, for profit entities.

Paul


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Dec 2018 12:29:07 -0800
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/d6rQUgEPEPfIZpcbmtxB9L8heDY>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> > However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local
> network,
> > there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH.
>
> Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.
>

Yes, I'm quite aware of this fact.


DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you
> received is not modified.
>

As with all things security, it depends on your threat model. If the
attacker you
are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it does
provide protection.


Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The
> move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided
> and just moving the goal post.
>

I don't think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation. At
present,
the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protected [0], and yet we
have to rely on it. If there's a "blindly trusting" in this discussion,
it's that. DNS
over HTTPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it's not
a panacea.

However in *this* case, it actually covers a pretty large fraction of the
threat
model, because (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the
attacker
controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in
any case even before you send SNI. Even if all the attacker can do is
*modify*
records rather than observe queries, this is often enough. For censorship
applications,
they just serve a blackholed IP address, and for surveillance applications,
an
attacker with significant network capabilities can serve a dedicated IP for
each
server name and then forward the traffic.

Note that DNSSEC does not help very much in this case. If the attacker is
the server, they don't need to modify records, and if they are not the
server,
then DNSSEC protection relies upon the client hard-failing on DNSSEC
failures,
which generic clients do not do because it would cause unacceptable failure
rates.

-Ekr

[0] https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf provides an overview
of the extremely depressing state of play; only 1% of .com is properly
signed
and about 30% of domains which have DNSSEC don't publish all the records
needed to verify the domain.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wou=
ters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, 14 Dec 201=
8, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local n=
etwork,<br>
&gt; there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using Do=
H.<br>
<br>
Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I&#39;m quite aware of this fact.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you<br>
received is not modified.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As with all t=
hings security, it depends on your threat model. If the attacker you</div><=
div>are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it d=
oes</div><div>provide protection.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The<br>
move towards &quot;blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS&quot; servers is mis=
guided<br>
and just moving the goal post.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#3=
9;t think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation. At pre=
sent,</div><div>the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protecte=
d [0], and yet we</div><div>have to rely on it. If there&#39;s a &quot;blin=
dly trusting&quot; in this discussion, it&#39;s that. DNS</div><div>over HT=
TPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it&#39;s not</di=
v><div>a panacea.<br></div><div><br></div><div>However in *this* case, it a=
ctually covers a pretty large fraction of the threat</div><div>model, becau=
se (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the attacker</div><d=
iv>controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in=
</div><div>any case even before you send SNI. Even if all the attacker can =
do is *modify*</div><div>records rather than observe queries, this is often=
 enough. For censorship applications,</div><div>they just serve a blackhole=
d IP address, and for surveillance applications, an</div><div>attacker with=
 significant network capabilities can serve a dedicated IP for each</div><d=
iv>server name and then forward the traffic.</div><div><br></div><div>Note =
that DNSSEC does not help very much in this case. If the attacker is</div><=
div>the server, they don&#39;t need to modify records, and if they are not =
the server,</div><div>then DNSSEC protection relies upon the client hard-fa=
iling on DNSSEC failures,</div><div>which generic clients do not do because=
 it would cause unacceptable failure rates.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-E=
kr</div><div><br></div><div>[0] <a href=3D"https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/pape=
rs/dnssec_imc17.pdf">https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf</a=
> provides an overview</div><div>of the extremely depressing state of play;=
 only 1% of .com is properly signed</div><div>and about 30% of domains whic=
h have DNSSEC don&#39;t publish all the records</div><div>needed to verify =
the domain.</div><div><br></div><br></div></div></div>

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Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 17:17:37 -0600
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To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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Hi folks,

We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd like
the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and eliminate
a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125

The first tries to make ESNI more robust. It introduces the notion of a
"public name" which gives the client an authenticated signal to retry with
new keys or without ESNI at all. This mitigates DNS/server mismatches (a
concern on each key rotation), and partial rollouts or rollbacks (a concern
when first enabling it, plus some scenarios with TLS-terminating
middleboxes).

The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they do
not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick
out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.

Details are in the PRs.

(The two PRs were originally written up together. I split them in two based
on some feedback, but since they touch the same text, the GREASE PR
includes the robustness PR. If the WG wishes to go with one but not the
other, the text and details can be adjusted accordingly.)

Thoughts?

David

[*] Steven and I wrote the text itself, with input from Adam, Ben, and
Brad, all CC'd.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>We[*] wrote up som=
e proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we&#39;d like the group&#39=
;s thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and eliminate a bunch =
of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124</a></div><div><a href=3D"https://=
github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125">https://github.com/tlswg/dra=
ft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125</a></div><div><br></div><div>The first tries to m=
ake ESNI more robust. It introduces the notion of a &quot;public name&quot;=
 which gives the client an authenticated signal to retry with new keys or w=
ithout ESNI at all. This mitigates DNS/server mismatches (a concern on each=
 key rotation), and partial rollouts or rollbacks (a concern when first ena=
bling it, plus some scenarios with TLS-terminating middleboxes).</div><div>=
<br></div><div>The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions=
 when they do not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the &qu=
ot;Do not stick out&quot; goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives u=
s this for free.</div><div><br></div><div>Details are in the PRs.</div><div=
><br></div><div>(The two PRs were originally written up together. I split t=
hem in two based on some feedback, but since they touch the same text, the =
GREASE PR includes the robustness PR. If the WG wishes to go with one but n=
ot the other, the text and details can be adjusted accordingly.)</div><div>=
<br></div><div>Thoughts?</div><div><br></div><div>David</div><div><br></div=
><div>[*] Steven and I wrote the text itself, with input from Adam, Ben, an=
d Brad, all CC&#39;d.</div><div><br></div></div>

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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 01:08:50PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> On 15/12/2018 02:53, Nico Williams wrote:
> > OpenSSL extracts and uses SNI from session resumption tickets.
> > 
> > This gave Viktor Dukhovni and Matt Caswell an idea that I'll relay here
> > on their behalf.
> 
> I agree this is worth exploring, though am not sure if it'd be
> better in the end. (I chatted with Viktor about this and said
> I'd try see if I could make it work once I've gotten further
> along coding up the current draft.)

Perhaps this alternative ESNI protocol can complement the current ESNI
proposal.

The idea would be to allow sites that cannot orchestrate ESNI keyshares
across multiple CDNs to opt for this alternative by publishing in DNS
only the fronting domainname(s).  Only then would one pay the extra
round trip price to get ESNI, and only if the client wants it (but the
client should want it).

A client that finds a domain's fronting domain but not ESNI keys would
engage in the active attack resistant variant I posted with the fronting
domainname as the public SNI, and the server would know to respond with
the HRR.

The key is that we need to be able to deploy an ESNI protocol widely and
easily, but if ESNI keyshare orchestration is a big brake on deployment,
then it might take a long time to get traction.

(Note that I never said that DoH/DPRIV would not be needed.  The
alternative would allow simple manual, local configuration, whereas
publishing ESNI keyshares does not.)

> I don't see any point in considering the variant with the easy
> active attack though; as ekr said, I think that was considered

Agreed.  I included it mostly to show how we got to the one that is
resistant to active attacks.  I thought it'd be useful to do that, but
instead it seems to have given everyone something bad to latch onto :(

> before and I'd say that'll just confuse matters and is better
> omitted, so I'm only really considering your figure 2 below.

I agree.

> >         ClientHello
> >         + key_share             -------->
> >                                                         ServerHello
> >                                                         + key_share
> >                                              {EncryptedExtensions*}
> >                                                       {Certificate}
> >                                                 {CertificateVerify}
> >                                 <--------       {HelloRetryRequest}
> >         ClientHello
> >         + key_share
> >         {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
> >                                               {EncryptedExtensions}
> >                                               {CertificateRequest*}
> >                                                       {Certificate}
> >                                                 {CertificateVerify}
> >                                                          {Finished}
> >                                 <--------       [Application Data*]
> >         {Certificate*}
> >         {CertificateVerify*}
> >         {Finished}              -------->
> >         [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]
> > 
> >               Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection
> > 
> 
> Some questions:
> 
> - How are you proposing the client knows of the existence of the
>   hidden service? (Aside from local configuration, which is always
>   possible.)

DNS (DPRIV, DoH).

Local config isn't really possible if it means the user has to type in
keyshares.

> - How does the server know to include the HRR in it's answers? (IOW,
>   what ESNI signal is present in the client's 1st flight?

The client uses the fronting domainname as the public SNI payload.  The
server, knowing via local configuration that it has no ESNI keyshares in
DNS, responds with the HRR as above.

> - Ought that be some more general signal? e,g. "client wants to send
>   some EncryptedExtensions, let's do an extra RTT." (I'd like that
>   I think, but the counter argument might be that that's overreach
>   and we'd be better to just stick with an ESNI model that we're
>   confident can get some deployment.)

Yes and no.  In order to get ESNI widely adopted it will probably help
to have a way to trigger this denies the censors an unambiguous "pst,
hey, let's do this thing so the censors don't know your name" signal.

But for that I would think that yes, we'd want a general signal about
this.

> - Given HRR was a kludge for backwards compatibility could changing
>   where that occurs in the protocol trigger more middlebox messes?

Dunno.

> - This seems like supporting the split mode behaviour [1] could be a
>   lot more complex, as this scheme is more embedded in the h/s. Is
>   that fair? (Note: I'm not sure the split mode is really easy in
>   any circumstances though, so that mightn't be a killer argument.)

See above, and below.

Maybe we do both, the current ESNI proposal and this as an alternative
for when ESNI keyshare orchestration is difficult, and in that case you
don't get to do split mode.

> - In tls1.3 the HRR has an accompanying key_share, if pursuing this
>   further I'd say you'd want to consider whether or not that is
>   better to include. (That is, your server's first flight above has
>   a SH and then HRR but only one key_share - it might be better to
>   have a key_share in each, and that might even enable a more
>   tractable split mode model if the cover server could handoff the
>   rest of the h/s after that maybe.)

Ohhh, nice!  That's brilliant!  One of the keyshares (the HRR's) could
be the one shared with the middlebox for split mode.  The client would
derive two sets of handshake traffic keys then.  (If split mode is not
used then the HRR can have the same keyshare as the SH, then only one
set of handshake traffic keys need be derived.  In encrypted extensions
we'd need to identify which key was used -- maybe, the recipient can
always try decrypting with both keys.)

Nico
-- 


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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Hiya,

On 17/12/2018 23:17, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
>=20
> We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd =
like
> the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and elimi=
nate
> a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
>=20
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124

I like chunks of that. I'm unsure about others 'till I grok
'em better.

I like the bits that add detail of required behaviour, e.g.
handling resumption, which has been puzzling me:-)

The idea of a "public name" is possibly good, but I'll need
to ponder it more. (Being slow, as I am:-)

Would it be fair to say that that concept isolates ESNI from
a likely DNS ops failure mode at the expense of adding another
way in which ESNI could be defeated via abuses of the Web PKI?
If so, is there any way to make using a "public name" require
that the entity who can authenticate as the "public name" also
has the private part of the public value published in DNS?
(Apologies if your scheme does that already and I missed it, or
if that's exactly the sync breakage you're trying to mitigate;-)

At first sight though, it does look like there's an interesting
overlap between this and what Nico/Viktor were proposing about
using HRRs. (In the sense that maybe you're all heading towards
a not-bad idea, modulo what I think is ekr's winning argument
that always requiring an extra RTT would be disqualifying.)

[On a different point, changes like these (or other breaking
changes) may be easier if we do that "pick an implementation
draft" thing that's been done in other more complex cases. I'm
not sure if ESNI justifies that, but given my coding resources,
(and abilities:-) it'd help me if people wanted to do something
like that. E.g. to decide we noodle about with a -03 and try
code up to a -04 or similar (or -05 or whatever version is
appropriate). For example, there's another kind of change that
I think we want before doing interop on a later version: I'd
argue the value published in DNS needs to be DNS/zonefile friendly
and not primarily TLS-presentation-layer friendly - we're not
there now and getting there (or deciding that's not needed) may
require discussion of published drafts and not just issues/PRs.]

> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125

Greasing like this seems like a fine plan. I'm not sure if
greasing is still quite the appropriate term, as this is doing
more than that, but I like it lots - without something like
this ESNI will stick out a lot. I do wonder if people will
be willing to emit so many useless bytes though?

A possible alternative way to get a similar "don't stand out"
effect might be to re-do the CH changes for ESNI so that they're
encoded to look like a real key-share (maybe with some other
bits of the CH serving dual purposes) - I think that might be
just about doable, but a) likely ends up as a total hack, b) is
pretty limited (e.g. for looooong names),  and c) requires
servers to guess if a CH does or doesn't contain ESNI stuff.
Could be fun if it worked though, but has anyone looked at
that alternative way to not stand out?

Cheers,
S.

>=20
> The first tries to make ESNI more robust. It introduces the notion of a=

> "public name" which gives the client an authenticated signal to retry w=
ith
> new keys or without ESNI at all. This mitigates DNS/server mismatches (=
a
> concern on each key rotation), and partial rollouts or rollbacks (a con=
cern
> when first enabling it, plus some scenarios with TLS-terminating
> middleboxes).
>=20
> The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they =
do
> not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick=

> out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.
>=20
> Details are in the PRs.
>=20
> (The two PRs were originally written up together. I split them in two b=
ased
> on some feedback, but since they touch the same text, the GREASE PR
> includes the robustness PR. If the WG wishes to go with one but not the=

> other, the text and details can be adjusted accordingly.)
>=20
> Thoughts?
>=20
> David
>=20
> [*] Steven and I wrote the text itself, with input from Adam, Ben, and
> Brad, all CC'd.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <3e297d53-9125-98f8-e4db-ef82640e91de@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 01:58:53 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/cj72-uNv-CZxwMzXcWNa67EaKyI>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <3e297d53-9125-98f8-e4db-ef82640e91de@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On 17/12/2018 23:33, Nico Williams wrote:
>=20
> Maybe we do both, the current ESNI proposal and this as an alternative
> for when ESNI keyshare orchestration is difficult, and in that case you=

> don't get to do split mode.

Interesting that the above overlaps a bit with the PR davidben
just posted. That seems promising.

That said, I'd bet we're all generally unkeen on "do both" but
maybe the above-mentioned PR avoids that by casting the HRR-mode
as way to better handle a likely operational failure mode.

S.

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From nobody Mon Dec 17 18:47:29 2018
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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> On Dec 17, 2018, at 8:58 PM, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
> That said, I'd bet we're all generally unkeen on "do both" but
> maybe the above-mentioned PR avoids that by casting the HRR-mode
> as way to better handle a likely operational failure mode.

I guess the reason I started thinking along the lines of the alternative
proposal is because it would doing it *at all* might be too complex for
many sites, and privacy protection that is mostly not deployed is then
not very effective.

Thus, instead of trying to work around glitches caused by key management
glitches, my thinking was to avoid them entirely, by using ephemeral =
keys.

I don't dispute the obstacles:

  * Additional round-trip for full handshakes.
  * Possible middle-box concerns that I can't speak to.

The potential upside is:

  * Supports stable local policy (no keys, means client used by users
    with critical need can have a static fronting server config).
   =20
  * Better forward secrecy.

  * Much simpler operationally, so could have much broader deployment.

I'll take a look at David Benjamin's PR, to see whether it resolves
any of the motivating reasons for the alternative...

--=20
	Viktor.


From nobody Mon Dec 17 19:01:32 2018
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 01:58:53AM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> On 17/12/2018 23:33, Nico Williams wrote:
> > Maybe we do both, the current ESNI proposal and this as an alternative
> > for when ESNI keyshare orchestration is difficult, and in that case you
> > don't get to do split mode.
> 
> Interesting that the above overlaps a bit with the PR davidben
> just posted. That seems promising.
> 
> That said, I'd bet we're all generally unkeen on "do both" but
> maybe the above-mentioned PR avoids that by casting the HRR-mode
> as way to better handle a likely operational failure mode.

I have no dog in this hunt, but ISTM that anything we can do to simplify
deployment will help a great deal.  The ESNI keyshare orchestration
strikes me as a big impediment to deployment, but I understand too that
adding a round trip to every initial handshake is a bit much.  A
combination of options, or some new thing -- it's all the same to me, as
long as it gets us ESNI.

Oh, and not just ESNI.  I also want the PSK identity payloads for
non-resumption handshakes encrypted.

Nico
-- 


From nobody Mon Dec 17 20:45:14 2018
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Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 21:42:51 -0700
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd like the
> group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and eliminate a bunch
> of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> 
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124

Under this design, the ESNIKeys structure in DNS gains a public_name
field, which is the name against which the client is supposed to verify
handshake, in the event that the server cannot descript the ESNI and
returns a esni_retry_request response. The esni_retry_request structure
contains alternative ESNIKeys for the client to use in its next
connection attempt.

I started to think: what if the alternative ESNIKeys were a standard TLS
extension on their own? The server could tell the client, on each
connection, what ESNIKeys to use for its next connection. The client
would not have to consult the DNS for ESNIKeys for any connection but
the first, as long as the connections were frequent enough that the
ESNIKeys didn't expire.

But then I reflected: this would enable precise tracking of clients. The
server could give different keys to every client--effectively a
cookie--and thereby link past and future connections.

I think similar tracking concerns apply to the public_name design. A TLS
server could publish one global ESNIKeys in DNS. This one, because it is
used by all clients, would not help tracking (within the anonymity set
of ESNI-using clients). But the server could, whenever it receives an
encrypted_server_name extension encrypted with the global ESNIKeys,
pretend that it is unable to decrypt and reply with esni_retry_request
and a unique "cookie" ESNIKeys, which that client, and no other, would
use for future connections.

A unique ESNIKeys per client may not be feasible, if the server has to
do trial decryption using the private component of all the ESNIKeys
cookies it has handed out. There may be a more clever way to do it than
trial description. But anyway a server could define some budget, say,
256 trial decryptions per connection, and instead of a unique ESNIKeys
per client, choose one randomly from a pool of 256. Clients would then
be partitioned into 256 buckets for the lifetime of the ESNIKeys--which
other tracking technique could of course refine further.

I suppose something like this is possible even in the current draft as
written, if the TLS server and DNS server collude. The DNS server could
give different ESNIKeys to different clients, enabling not only the
linking of a DNS request and TLS connection, but the linking of several
TLS connections together.


From nobody Mon Dec 17 21:25:48 2018
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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 14:25:30 +0900
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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Hi David and others involved in the work,

Thank you for the PR.

2018=E5=B9=B412=E6=9C=8818=E6=97=A5(=E7=81=AB) 8:18 David Benjamin <davidbe=
n@chromium.org>:
>
> Hi folks,
>
> We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd li=
ke the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and elimin=
ate a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
>
> The first tries to make ESNI more robust. It introduces the notion of a "=
public name" which gives the client an authenticated signal to retry with n=
ew keys or without ESNI at all. This mitigates DNS/server mismatches (a con=
cern on each key rotation), and partial rollouts or rollbacks (a concern wh=
en first enabling it, plus some scenarios with TLS-terminating middleboxes)=
.

I think that this is a logical solution, under the premise that we
need to the fix issue.

It provides an authenticated signal, thereby protecting the
server-name from even the active attackers. That makes the SNI
exchange as secure as DoH or DoT. DNS lookup and SNI are the two
moments that we need to protect the server name, and having secure
exchange for the both is IMO the correct path.

Also, I actually like the fact that there is a non-negligible amount
of overhead in the fallback path, because that would encourage people
to deploy ESNI correctly.

>
> The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they do=
 not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick ou=
t" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.

I agree that having ESNI extension everywhere is an improvement. We
should do this regardless of if we take PR 124.

>
> Details are in the PRs.
>
> (The two PRs were originally written up together. I split them in two bas=
ed on some feedback, but since they touch the same text, the GREASE PR incl=
udes the robustness PR. If the WG wishes to go with one but not the other, =
the text and details can be adjusted accordingly.)
>
> Thoughts?
>
> David
>
> [*] Steven and I wrote the text itself, with input from Adam, Ben, and Br=
ad, all CC'd.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
Kazuho Oku


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 00:45:22 -0600
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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Thanks for the comment! The PR did try to touch on this, but perhaps I did
a poor job of wording it:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124/files#diff-4d2dc9df336bea8e17f5eb4ed7cb1107R511

The intent is you use the retry keys just for that one retry. Subsequent
connection attempts revert to the DNS-provided ones. Then the server could
correlate the initial connection and the immediately-following retry, but
that initial "connection" was discarded. It's like saying the server can
correlate the client's ClientHello and Finished. An earlier iteration even
placed the retry on the same connection, which makes the analog clearer.
(Doing it in the same connection is rather a mess, so we bounce to a new
one.)

Another possibility might be to require clients treat these like session
identifiers w.r.t. scoping and lifetime, reducing to something existing,
but that is more complex, so the simple solution seemed a better starting
point.

Does that address the concern, or have I missed something?

David

On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:45 PM David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> > We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd
> like the
> > group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and eliminate
> a bunch
> > of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> >
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
>
> Under this design, the ESNIKeys structure in DNS gains a public_name
> field, which is the name against which the client is supposed to verify
> handshake, in the event that the server cannot descript the ESNI and
> returns a esni_retry_request response. The esni_retry_request structure
> contains alternative ESNIKeys for the client to use in its next
> connection attempt.
>
> I started to think: what if the alternative ESNIKeys were a standard TLS
> extension on their own? The server could tell the client, on each
> connection, what ESNIKeys to use for its next connection. The client
> would not have to consult the DNS for ESNIKeys for any connection but
> the first, as long as the connections were frequent enough that the
> ESNIKeys didn't expire.
>
> But then I reflected: this would enable precise tracking of clients. The
> server could give different keys to every client--effectively a
> cookie--and thereby link past and future connections.
>
> I think similar tracking concerns apply to the public_name design. A TLS
> server could publish one global ESNIKeys in DNS. This one, because it is
> used by all clients, would not help tracking (within the anonymity set
> of ESNI-using clients). But the server could, whenever it receives an
> encrypted_server_name extension encrypted with the global ESNIKeys,
> pretend that it is unable to decrypt and reply with esni_retry_request
> and a unique "cookie" ESNIKeys, which that client, and no other, would
> use for future connections.
>
> A unique ESNIKeys per client may not be feasible, if the server has to
> do trial decryption using the private component of all the ESNIKeys
> cookies it has handed out. There may be a more clever way to do it than
> trial description. But anyway a server could define some budget, say,
> 256 trial decryptions per connection, and instead of a unique ESNIKeys
> per client, choose one randomly from a pool of 256. Clients would then
> be partitioned into 256 buckets for the lifetime of the ESNIKeys--which
> other tracking technique could of course refine further.
>
> I suppose something like this is possible even in the current draft as
> written, if the TLS server and DNS server collude. The DNS server could
> give different ESNIKeys to different clients, enabling not only the
> linking of a DNS request and TLS connection, but the linking of several
> TLS connections together.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000891467057d463ebc
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the comment! The PR did try to touch on this, b=
ut perhaps I did a poor job of wording it:<div><a href=3D"https://github.co=
m/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124/files#diff-4d2dc9df336bea8e17f5eb4ed7c=
b1107R511">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124/files#diff=
-4d2dc9df336bea8e17f5eb4ed7cb1107R511</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>The =
intent is you use the retry keys just for that one retry. Subsequent connec=
tion attempts revert to the DNS-provided ones. Then the server could correl=
ate the initial connection and the immediately-following retry, but that in=
itial &quot;connection&quot; was discarded. It&#39;s like saying the server=
 can correlate the client&#39;s ClientHello and Finished. An earlier iterat=
ion even placed the retry on the same connection, which makes the analog cl=
earer. (Doing it in the same connection is rather a mess, so we bounce to a=
 new one.)</div><div><br></div><div>Another possibility might be to require=
 clients treat these like session identifiers w.r.t. scoping and lifetime, =
reducing to something existing, but that is more complex, so the simple sol=
ution seemed a better starting point.</div><div><br></div><div>Does that ad=
dress the concern, or have I missed something?</div><div><br></div><div>Dav=
id</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Dec 17=
, 2018 at 10:45 PM David Fifield &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david@bamsoftware.co=
m">david@bamsoftware.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex">On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we&#=
39;d like the<br>
&gt; group&#39;s thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and elim=
inate a bunch<br>
&gt; of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-e=
sni/pull/124</a><br>
<br>
Under this design, the ESNIKeys structure in DNS gains a public_name<br>
field, which is the name against which the client is supposed to verify<br>
handshake, in the event that the server cannot descript the ESNI and<br>
returns a esni_retry_request response. The esni_retry_request structure<br>
contains alternative ESNIKeys for the client to use in its next<br>
connection attempt.<br>
<br>
I started to think: what if the alternative ESNIKeys were a standard TLS<br=
>
extension on their own? The server could tell the client, on each<br>
connection, what ESNIKeys to use for its next connection. The client<br>
would not have to consult the DNS for ESNIKeys for any connection but<br>
the first, as long as the connections were frequent enough that the<br>
ESNIKeys didn&#39;t expire.<br>
<br>
But then I reflected: this would enable precise tracking of clients. The<br=
>
server could give different keys to every client--effectively a<br>
cookie--and thereby link past and future connections.<br>
<br>
I think similar tracking concerns apply to the public_name design. A TLS<br=
>
server could publish one global ESNIKeys in DNS. This one, because it is<br=
>
used by all clients, would not help tracking (within the anonymity set<br>
of ESNI-using clients). But the server could, whenever it receives an<br>
encrypted_server_name extension encrypted with the global ESNIKeys,<br>
pretend that it is unable to decrypt and reply with esni_retry_request<br>
and a unique &quot;cookie&quot; ESNIKeys, which that client, and no other, =
would<br>
use for future connections.<br>
<br>
A unique ESNIKeys per client may not be feasible, if the server has to<br>
do trial decryption using the private component of all the ESNIKeys<br>
cookies it has handed out. There may be a more clever way to do it than<br>
trial description. But anyway a server could define some budget, say,<br>
256 trial decryptions per connection, and instead of a unique ESNIKeys<br>
per client, choose one randomly from a pool of 256. Clients would then<br>
be partitioned into 256 buckets for the lifetime of the ESNIKeys--which<br>
other tracking technique could of course refine further.<br>
<br>
I suppose something like this is possible even in the current draft as<br>
written, if the TLS server and DNS server collude. The DNS server could<br>
give different ESNIKeys to different clients, enabling not only the<br>
linking of a DNS request and TLS connection, but the linking of several<br>
TLS connections together.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--000000000000891467057d463ebc--


From nobody Mon Dec 17 23:16:26 2018
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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 00:14:08 -0700
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:45:22AM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> Thanks for the comment! The PR did try to touch on this, but perhaps I did a
> poor job of wording it:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124/files#diff-4d2dc9df336bea8e17f5eb4ed7cb1107R511
> 
> The intent is you use the retry keys just for that one retry. Subsequent
> connection attempts revert to the DNS-provided ones. Then the server could
> correlate the initial connection and the immediately-following retry, but that
> initial "connection" was discarded. It's like saying the server can correlate
> the client's ClientHello and Finished. An earlier iteration even placed the
> retry on the same connection, which makes the analog clearer. (Doing it in the
> same connection is rather a mess, so we bounce to a new one.)
> 
> Another possibility might be to require clients treat these like session
> identifiers w.r.t. scoping and lifetime, reducing to something existing, but
> that is more complex, so the simple solution seemed a better starting point.
> 
> Does that address the concern, or have I missed something?

Oh thanks -- I completely missed that.


From nobody Mon Dec 17 23:27:32 2018
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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 02:27:27 -0500
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:45:22AM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:

> An earlier iteration even placed the retry on the same connection, which
> makes the analog clearer.  (Doing it in the same connection is rather a
> mess, so we bounce to a new one.)

Any concern about the possibility that the reason the key did not
work was that the particular server had unexpected keys, but
reconnecting might land on a different server, with yet another set
of keys?  (Which is to say that I am concerned, but perhaps you're
not?).

Also connection re-establishment has considerable cost, additional
TCP roundtrips on top of the extra TLS roundtrips.

Is the HRR idea being explored in the parallel thread not viable?
[ That'd be fine by me, one less thing to worry about, but it did
seem worth exploring at first blush...  The suggestion of using it
as a fallback when there are either no keys in DNS, or they don't
work also seems like it could be viable. ]


-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Dec 18 01:00:54 2018
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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 11:00:31 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi folks,
> 
> We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd like
> the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and eliminate
> a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> 
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
> 
> The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they do
> not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick
> out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.

It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but
the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall
back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as
the server is required to reject the resumption)?


Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as
normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across whole
group of domains and servers.


-Ilari


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Subject: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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To: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20f38e3b-c23b-fb8c-b54b-78b47aa8d2f3@tributh.net>
Subject: OCSP stapling problem

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Hi,

first I may introduce my problem.

We take a small mail server, in this case exim and enabling TLS with an
OCSP-Must-Staple certificate. We add the status_request
like described in  RFC 6066 and everything works fine for all clients
connecting to that server and send mail.
Now we turn to sending out a mail. In this moment this server become a
client connecting to another server, which can request our certificate.
We serve (this) Must-Staple certificate, but the status_request from RFC
6066 is not included and the server should see this certificate as
"invalid".

some more details under:
https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D2350


In RFC 6066:
Constrained clients may wish to use a certificate-status protocol
   such as OCSP [RFC2560] to check the validity of server certificates,


there is no information about the other direction, where a server may
request from a client ....


RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.1
A server MAY request that a client present an OCSP response with its
   certificate by sending an empty "status_request" extension in its
   CertificateRequest message.

So RFC8446 changes RFC6066 in the way that also a server can request OCSP=
=2E
Is that only intended to match for TLS 1.3 ?
Or does this change is meant also for TLS 1.2, where implementations
actually lacking this case?

Should in this case RFC 6066 changed to make the "server request from
client" case being also described?

In the moment such a mail system must have two certificates for the
server and the client mode to offer a valid cert until TLS libraries
have offered both methods.

I assume the same problem for example also for XMPP where the server is
changing to client mode too.
There may be much more protocols, which I have not in mind now.

Am I getting this right?

Kind regards

Torsten Tributh


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To: "T.Tributh" <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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Subject: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem (which has
been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion is that we
define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "stapled" A/AAAA
records.

Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that only
contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to publish
an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.  (A
Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such records
automatically.)  This kind of address stapling would only be required of
CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.

Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the
current TXT record).  If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP
addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.

Advantages:
 - No possibility of mixing up which ESNIKeys goes with which server IP.
 - No changes needed to recursives (which would treat the entire record as
opaque).
 - Doesn't add roundtrips at any stage.
 - Fully compatible with existing CNAME delegations.
 - Only adds complexity to the most sophisticated party (CDNs who want to
enable multi-CDN).
 - Not limited to one protocol (e.g. HTTPS).

Disadvantages:
 - IP address data is duplicated (10-100 extra bytes in the ESNI record),
and single-stack (e.g. v4-only) clients would still get both sets of IP
addresses.
 - Clients must wait for the ESNI query to complete before sending a TCP
SYN.  (Any resulting delay should be very small.  Does not apply to TFO or
QUIC.)
 - Support requires implementation work in authoritatives, especially for
load-balancing or geotargeting.
 - If IP stapling is rarely used (or rarely _not_ used), some clients might
fail to implement the rare case properly.

--Ben Schwartz, Jigsaw

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to propose a solution to the ESNI=C2=A0+ Mult=
i-CDN problem (which has been discussed a lot on this list already).=C2=A0 =
My suggestion is that we define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally in=
cluding &quot;stapled&quot; A/AAAA records.<div><br></div><div>Server opera=
tors would have the option to publish an ESNI record that only contains an =
ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to publish an ESNI rec=
ord that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.=C2=A0 (A Sufficiently Ad=
vanced authoritative DNS server would generate such records automatically.)=
=C2=A0 This kind of address stapling would only be required of CDN operator=
s who want to support multi-CDN deployments.</div><div><br></div><div>Clien=
ts would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the current T=
XT record).=C2=A0 If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP addresses, t=
he client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Advantages:</div><div>=C2=A0- No possibility of mixing up which ESNIKe=
ys goes with which server IP.</div><div>=C2=A0- No changes needed to recurs=
ives (which would treat the entire record as opaque).</div><div>=C2=A0- Doe=
sn&#39;t add roundtrips at any stage.</div><div>=C2=A0- Fully compatible wi=
th existing CNAME delegations.</div><div>=C2=A0- Only adds complexity to th=
e most sophisticated party (CDNs who want to enable multi-CDN).</div><div>=
=C2=A0- Not limited to one protocol (e.g. HTTPS).</div><div><br></div><div>=
Disadvantages:</div><div>=C2=A0- IP address data is duplicated (10-100 extr=
a bytes in the ESNI record), and single-stack (e.g. v4-only) clients would =
still get both sets of IP addresses.</div><div>=C2=A0- Clients must wait fo=
r the ESNI query to complete before sending a TCP SYN.=C2=A0 (Any resulting=
 delay should be very small.=C2=A0 Does not apply to TFO or QUIC.)</div><di=
v>=C2=A0- Support requires implementation work in authoritatives, especiall=
y for load-balancing or geotargeting.</div><div>=C2=A0- If IP stapling is r=
arely used (or rarely _not_ used), some clients might fail to implement the=
 rare case properly.</div><div><br></div><div>--Ben Schwartz, Jigsaw</div><=
/div>

--000000000000c08f50057d4f3f3f--

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 08:53:47PM -0600, Nico Williams wrote:
>              Figure 1: Alternative ESNI w/o active protection

Figure 1 was expositional.  Please forget it.

>               Figure 2: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection


>              Figure 3: Alternative ESNI w/ active protection,
>                           with worst-case latency

There's a different way to do the third case _without_ an extra round
trip in the worst case.  Now there are no cases with worse latency than
the worst latency in RFC 8446.

This is the case where the client's initial key_share is not acceptable
to the server.

The key observation is that we can send the server's Certificate and
CertificateVerify in the clear when they are for the fronting name,
which means we can authenticate the server in the first flight, which
means that we can have handshake traffic keys in the second flight:


        ClientHello
        + key_share             -------->
                                                        ServerHello
                                                        + key_share
                                                        Certificate
                                                  CertificateVerify
                                <--------         HelloRetryRequest
        ClientHello
        + key_share
        {EncryptedExtensions}   -------->
                                              {EncryptedExtensions}
                                              {CertificateRequest*}
                                                      {Certificate}
                                                {CertificateVerify}
                                                         {Finished}
                                <--------       [Application Data*]
        {Certificate*}
        {CertificateVerify*}
        {Finished}              -------->
        [Application Data]      <------->        [Application Data]

             Figure 4: Like figure #2 but with initial client
               key_share that is unacceptable to the server


Note that the server's Certificate and CertificateVerify goes
unencrypted.  Why?  Well, it is the Certificate for the *fronting*
name, the one that went unencrypted in the ClientHello, so it doesn't
really need protection.

As Stephen Farrell points out, we get to have *two* server key_shares,
one from the SH and one from the HRR, which gives us the opportunity to
have one of them be something of a static key share shared with a
traffic director.  So we get to have *two* sets of handshake traffic
keys, one that gives a traffic director visibility, and one that does
not.

Do we ever need confidentiality protection relative to the traffic
director?  If so we'll need notation for indicating which handshake
traffic key set to use for what encrypted extensions.

Nico
-- 


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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 13:53:56 -0500
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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--000000000000946a02057d506daf
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Just a clarifying question inline
On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> > However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local
>> network,
>> > there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH.
>>
>> Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.
>>
>
> Yes, I'm quite aware of this fact.
>
>
> DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you
>> received is not modified.
>>
>
> As with all things security, it depends on your threat model. If the
> attacker you
> are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it does
> provide protection.
>
>
> Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The
>> move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided
>> and just moving the goal post.
>>
>
> I don't think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation.
> At present,
> the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protected [0], and yet
> we
> have to rely on it. If there's a "blindly trusting" in this discussion,
> it's that. DNS
> over HTTPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it's not
> a panacea.
>
> However in *this* case, it actually covers a pretty large fraction of the
> threat
> model, because (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the
> attacker
> controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in
> any case even before you send SNI.
>

This is written as a pretty broad statement.  Did you intend to say that
the attackers for this threat vector are close to the user or many
attackers? Asking as this could sway opinions and the current solution is
well suited to CDNs, not necessarily others.

Even if all the attacker can do is *modify*
> records rather than observe queries, this is often enough. For censorship
> applications,
> they just serve a blackholed IP address, and for surveillance
> applications, an
> attacker with significant network capabilities can serve a dedicated IP
> for each
> server name and then forward the traffic.
>
> Note that DNSSEC does not help very much in this case. If the attacker is
> the server, they don't need to modify records, and if they are not the
> server,
> then DNSSEC protection relies upon the client hard-failing on DNSSEC
> failures,
> which generic clients do not do because it would cause unacceptable
> failure rates.
>
> -Ekr
>
> [0] https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf provides an
> overview
>

This is probably a bit better as a reference as it appears to be kept
current:
https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/

and includes links to others providing statistics for reference as well.
The validation statistics look a bit better in the following study:
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=XA&x=1&g=1&r=1&w=7&g=0
where worldwide, they say 16% DNSSEC validates.

-Kathleen


> of the extremely depressing state of play; only 1% of .com is properly
> signed
> and about 30% of domains which have DNSSEC don't publish all the records
> needed to verify the domain.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen

--000000000000946a02057d506daf
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Just a =
clarifying question inline<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">O=
n Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></=
div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at=
 11:45 AM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_bla=
nk">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex">On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local n=
etwork,<br>
&gt; there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using Do=
H.<br>
<br>
Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I&#39;m quite aware of this fact.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you<br>
received is not modified.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As with all t=
hings security, it depends on your threat model. If the attacker you</div><=
div>are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it d=
oes</div><div>provide protection.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The<br>
move towards &quot;blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS&quot; servers is mis=
guided<br>
and just moving the goal post.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#3=
9;t think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation. At pre=
sent,</div><div>the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protecte=
d [0], and yet we</div><div>have to rely on it. If there&#39;s a &quot;blin=
dly trusting&quot; in this discussion, it&#39;s that. DNS</div><div>over HT=
TPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it&#39;s not</di=
v><div>a panacea.<br></div><div><br></div><div>However in *this* case, it a=
ctually covers a pretty large fraction of the threat</div><div>model, becau=
se (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the attacker</div><d=
iv>controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in=
</div><div>any case even before you send SNI.</div></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>This is written as a pretty broad statement.=C2=
=A0 Did you intend to say that the attackers for this threat vector are clo=
se to the user or many attackers? Asking as this could sway opinions and th=
e current solution is well suited to CDNs, not necessarily others.</div><di=
v><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div> Even if all the attac=
ker can do is *modify*</div><div>records rather than observe queries, this =
is often enough. For censorship applications,</div><div>they just serve a b=
lackholed IP address, and for surveillance applications, an</div><div>attac=
ker with significant network capabilities can serve a dedicated IP for each=
</div><div>server name and then forward the traffic.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Note that DNSSEC does not help very much in this case. If the attacker i=
s</div><div>the server, they don&#39;t need to modify records, and if they =
are not the server,</div><div>then DNSSEC protection relies upon the client=
 hard-failing on DNSSEC failures,</div><div>which generic clients do not do=
 because it would cause unacceptable failure rates.<br></div><div><br></div=
><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div>[0] <a href=3D"https://www.cs.umd.edu/~=
dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/=
papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf</a> provides an overview</div></div></div></div></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>This is probably a bit better as a reference =
as it appears to be kept current:</div><div><a href=3D"https://www.internet=
society.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/">https://www.internetsociety.org/d=
eploy360/dnssec/statistics/</a></div><div><br></div><div>and includes links=
 to others providing statistics for reference as well.=C2=A0 The validation=
 statistics look a bit better in the following study:</div><div><a href=3D"=
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&amp;x=3D1&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1=
&amp;w=3D7&amp;g=3D0">https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&amp;x=
=3D1&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1&amp;w=3D7&amp;g=3D0</a></div><div>where worldwide,=
 they say 16% DNSSEC validates.</div><div><br></div><div>-Kathleen</div><di=
v>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>of the extremely dep=
ressing state of play; only 1% of .com is properly signed</div><div>and abo=
ut 30% of domains which have DNSSEC don&#39;t publish all the records</div>=
<div>needed to verify the domain.</div><div><br></div><br></div></div></div=
>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div>Best regards,</div><di=
v>Kathleen</div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000946a02057d506daf--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 19:56:03 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 15:09:52 -0500
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:56 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>    - I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem
>    (which has been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion =
is
>    that we define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "sta=
pled"
>    A/AAAA records.
>
>
>
> As in a multiple response?  That might be interesting, but it allows an
> adversary to just strip those responses, right?
>

I don't think I mean "multiple response" in the DNS sense.  What I mean by
"stapling" is "the ESNI RRTYPE has a defined format that can convey both
the ESNIKeys structure and some IP addresses".  This is all RFC
3597-compliant, and is a unified opaque blob to DNSSEC.


> > This kind of address stapling would only be required of CDN operators
> who want to support multi-CDN deployments.
>
>
>
> Or anyone who maintains DNS records for a site that wants multi-CDN.  Man=
y
> of our customers, for example, maintain their own DNS.  It=E2=80=99d say =
its common
> because they want switch quickly (very short TTL).  Yes, this usually is
> okay because the initial redirection is done via CNAME, but it is worth
> calling out that explicitly.
>

OK, to be precise, the stapling would be required of multi-CDN customers
_if_ they do not use CNAME, and instead maintain the various CDNs' A/AAAA
records in their own zone.  As I think you are noting, this is unusual;
most multi-CDN customers use CNAME, which (in this design) means that they
do not have to think about ESNI at all.


>
>
>                 /r$
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:56 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com=
">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_-1762758637669469505WordSection1">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_-1762758637669469505MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-=
left:0in">I&#39;d like to propose a solution to the ESNI=C2=A0+ Multi-CDN p=
roblem (which has been discussed a lot on this list already).=C2=A0 My sugg=
estion is that we define the ESNI DNS record format as
 optionally including &quot;stapled&quot; A/AAAA records. <u></u><u></u></l=
i></ul>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As in a multiple response?=C2=A0 That might be inter=
esting, but it allows an adversary to just strip those responses, right?</p=
></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think I mea=
n &quot;multiple response&quot; in the DNS sense.=C2=A0 What I mean by &quo=
t;stapling&quot; is &quot;the ESNI RRTYPE has a defined format that can con=
vey both the ESNIKeys structure and some IP addresses&quot;.=C2=A0 This is =
all RFC 3597-compliant, and is a unified opaque blob to DNSSEC.</div><div>=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div la=
ng=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_-1762758637669469505WordSection1"><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; This kind of address stapling would only be req=
uired of CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.<u></u><u>=
</u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Or anyone who maintains DNS records for a site that =
wants multi-CDN.=C2=A0 Many of our customers, for example, maintain their o=
wn DNS.=C2=A0 It=E2=80=99d say its common because they want switch quickly =
(very short TTL).=C2=A0 Yes, this usually is okay because
 the initial redirection is done via CNAME, but it is worth calling out tha=
t explicitly.</p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>OK, to =
be precise, the stapling would be required of multi-CDN customers _if_ they=
 do not use CNAME, and instead maintain the various CDNs&#39; A/AAAA record=
s in their own zone.=C2=A0 As I think you are noting, this is unusual; most=
 multi-CDN customers use CNAME, which (in this design) means that they do n=
ot have to think about ESNI at all.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_=
-1762758637669469505WordSection1"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 /r$<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 14:27:10 -0600
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd
> like
> > the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and
> eliminate
> > a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> >
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
> >
> > The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they do
> > not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick
> > out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.
>
> It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but
> the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall
> back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as
> the server is required to reject the resumption)?
>

It's possible I didn't word this correctly. If the client did not get ESNI
keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI session,
which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an ESNI
session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That's to cut out
the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we want to
tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don't support ESNI at all
while others don't at all, this scenario is a concern:

1. Server A does ESNI. Server B does not.
2. Client gets ESNIKeys from DNS and talks to server A. ESNI works out and
all. It gets a session for origin-name.
3. Client connects again and this time load balances to server B. Or maybe
server B is server A at a later time. Perhaps the ESNI implementation had a
show-stopping bug and folks had to revert for now. It will send
SNI=public-name, ESNI=origin-name, PSKs=ticket-for-origin-name.

Since server B has no clue what's going on, it'll ignore the ESNI
extension, and then process SNI + PSKs. This runs into the mess of
cross-name resumption stuff. In particular, RFC 8446 says:

   Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for the server
   certificate presented in the original session and SHOULD only resume
   if the SNI value matches the one used in the original session.  The
   latter is a performance optimization: normally, there is no reason to
   expect that different servers covered by a single certificate would
   be able to accept each other's tickets; hence, attempting resumption
   in that case would waste a single-use ticket.  If such an indication
   is provided (externally or by any other means), clients MAY resume
   with a different SNI value.

It is not possible for the client to honor that first sentence because it
is effectively offering two names at once, so it does not know which name
the server will use to handle the ticket. This is kind of a headache. The
ESNI bit in the session disambiguates by preventing the server from
resuming under the SNI name. The semantics are: this session is associated
with the ESNI name, not the SNI name. If you don't know what that means, or
if you can't decrypt the ESNI name, please ignore it.

Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers MUST
NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.


> Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as
> normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across whole
> group of domains and servers.
>

This is true. I don't see a clear way around that one, short of taking the
record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key
trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch
tolerance, it's no longer necessary for servers to be quite so paranoid
about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still seems
poor.)

I think this is still worth doing, especially as it's basically free if you
want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating ESNI-clueless
servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers
more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either observe
multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.

David

--00000000000080ec0d057d51b930
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:=
00 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com">ilari=
liusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we&#=
39;d like<br>
&gt; the group&#39;s thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and =
eliminate<br>
&gt; a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-e=
sni/pull/124</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-e=
sni/pull/125</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they=
 do<br>
&gt; not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the &quot;Do not=
 stick<br>
&gt; out&quot; goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for =
free.<br>
<br>
It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but<br>
the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall<br>
back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as<br>
the server is required to reject the resumption)?<br></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>It&#39;s possible I didn&#39;t word this correctly. If the clien=
t did not get ESNI keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a=
 non-ESNI session, which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want t=
o avoid is an ESNI session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept=
. That&#39;s to cut out the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In p=
articular, if we want to tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don&#=
39;t support ESNI at all while others don&#39;t at all, this scenario is a =
concern:</div><div><br></div><div>1. Server A does ESNI. Server B does not.=
<br></div><div>2. Client gets ESNIKeys from DNS and talks to server A. ESNI=
 works out and all. It gets a session for origin-name.</div><div>3. Client =
connects again and this time load balances to server B. Or maybe server B i=
s server A at a later time. Perhaps the ESNI implementation had a show-stop=
ping bug and folks had to revert for now. It will send SNI=3Dpublic-name, E=
SNI=3Dorigin-name, PSKs=3Dticket-for-origin-name.</div><div><br></div><div>=
Since server B has no clue what&#39;s going on, it&#39;ll ignore the ESNI e=
xtension, and then process SNI=C2=A0+ PSKs. This runs into the mess of cros=
s-name resumption stuff. In particular, RFC 8446 says:</div><div><br></div>=
<div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is val=
id for the server</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate presented in the origi=
nal session and SHOULD only resume</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0if the SNI value =
matches the one used in the original session.=C2=A0 The</div><div>=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0latter is a performance optimization: normally, there is no reason to=
</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0expect that different servers covered by a single c=
ertificate would</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0be able to accept each other&#39;s =
tickets; hence, attempting resumption</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0in that case w=
ould waste a single-use ticket.=C2=A0 If such an indication</div><div>=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0is provided (externally or by any other means), clients MAY resum=
e</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0with a different SNI value.</div></div><div><br></=
div><div>It is not possible for the client to honor that first sentence bec=
ause it is effectively offering two names at once, so it does not know whic=
h name the server will use to handle the ticket. This is kind of a headache=
. The ESNI bit in the session disambiguates by preventing the server from r=
esuming under the SNI name. The semantics are: this session is associated w=
ith the ESNI name, not the SNI name. If you don&#39;t know what that means,=
 or if you can&#39;t decrypt the ESNI name, please ignore it.</div><div><br=
></div><div>Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say =
servers MUST NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.</div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as<br>
normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across whole<br>
group of domains and servers.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is t=
rue. I don&#39;t see a clear way around that one, short of taking the recor=
d_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key trial-decry=
pt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch tolerance, it&#3=
9;s no longer necessary for servers to be quite so paranoid about keeping a=
ll their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still seems poor.)</div><di=
v><br></div><div>I think this is still worth doing, especially as it&#39;s =
basically free if you want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and to=
lerating ESNI-clueless servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires t=
hat servers more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.)=C2=A0You also need t=
o either observe multiple connections or know something about the server to=
 do this.</div><div><br></div><div>David=C2=A0</div></div></div>

--00000000000080ec0d057d51b930--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 15:01:07 -0600
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 1:27 AM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:45:22AM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
>
> > An earlier iteration even placed the retry on the same connection, which
> > makes the analog clearer.  (Doing it in the same connection is rather a
> > mess, so we bounce to a new one.)
>
> Any concern about the possibility that the reason the key did not
> work was that the particular server had unexpected keys, but
> reconnecting might land on a different server, with yet another set
> of keys?  (Which is to say that I am concerned, but perhaps you're
> not?).
>

That's a good point. This probably means the client needs to allow for a
handful of iterations before giving up, which is a bit of a nuisance.


> Also connection re-establishment has considerable cost, additional
> TCP roundtrips on top of the extra TLS roundtrips.
>

Agreed. The other cost is that it cannot be implemented entirely within the
TLS stack, since most TLS stacks do not establish connections. (Though ESNI
already needs caller involvement anyway to get the ESNI keys out of DNS,
and the perf overhead can be fine if you believe it's rare.)

Is the HRR idea being explored in the parallel thread not viable?
> [ That'd be fine by me, one less thing to worry about, but it did
> seem worth exploring at first blush...  The suggestion of using it
> as a fallback when there are either no keys in DNS, or they don't
> work also seems like it could be viable. ]
>

I actually still need to fully digest in that thread. I hadn't even
realized when I sent this how much the two had in common, or I would have
acknowledged it in the mail. Sorry about that. I imagine my email probably
looked odd to you. I'm glad to see we had similar ideas!

There might be some version that works? We never came up with a formulation
we really liked, and the single-connection version made a lot of things
simpler. Some of the nuisances with doing it together:

- Sticking two full handshakes on the same connection introduces several
new key changes, which will frustrate QUIC and DTLS.

- Joining two handshakes at the ServerHello or so frustrates existing
analysis, split mode, and any servers with SNI-dependent cipher parameters.
(Everyone seems to keep asking their hosting providers for silly little
checkboxes to configure TLS parameters.)

David

--000000000000f4f808057d5232a0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18=
, 2018 at 1:27 AM Viktor Dukhovni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.=
org">ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:45:22AM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; An earlier iteration even placed the retry on the same connection, whi=
ch<br>
&gt; makes the analog clearer.=C2=A0 (Doing it in the same connection is ra=
ther a<br>
&gt; mess, so we bounce to a new one.)<br>
<br>
Any concern about the possibility that the reason the key did not<br>
work was that the particular server had unexpected keys, but<br>
reconnecting might land on a different server, with yet another set<br>
of keys?=C2=A0 (Which is to say that I am concerned, but perhaps you&#39;re=
<br>
not?).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That&#39;s a good point. This pr=
obably means the client needs to allow for a handful of iterations before g=
iving up, which is a bit of a nuisance.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">
Also connection re-establishment has considerable cost, additional<br>
TCP roundtrips on top of the extra TLS roundtrips.<br></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>Agreed. The other cost is that it cannot be implemented entirel=
y within the TLS stack, since most TLS stacks do not establish connections.=
 (Though ESNI already needs caller involvement anyway to get the ESNI keys =
out of DNS, and the perf overhead can be fine if you believe it&#39;s rare.=
)</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Is the HRR idea being explored in the parallel thread not viable?<br>
[ That&#39;d be fine by me, one less thing to worry about, but it did<br>
seem worth exploring at first blush...=C2=A0 The suggestion of using it<br>
as a fallback when there are either no keys in DNS, or they don&#39;t<br>
work also seems like it could be viable. ]<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>I actually still need to fully digest in that thread. I hadn&#39;t even=
 realized when I sent this how much the two had in common, or I would have =
acknowledged it in the mail. Sorry about that. I imagine my email probably =
looked odd to you. I&#39;m glad to see we had similar ideas!</div><div><br>=
</div><div>There might be some version that works? We never came up with a =
formulation we really liked, and the single-connection version made a lot o=
f things simpler. Some of the nuisances with doing it together:</div><div><=
br></div><div>- Sticking two full handshakes on the same connection introdu=
ces several new key changes, which will frustrate QUIC and DTLS.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>- Joining two handshakes at the ServerHello or so frustrates=
 existing analysis, split mode, and any servers with SNI-dependent cipher p=
arameters. (Everyone seems to keep asking their hosting providers for silly=
 little checkboxes to configure TLS parameters.)</div><div><br></div><div>D=
avid</div></div></div>

--000000000000f4f808057d5232a0--


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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 23:06:07 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 02:27:10PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > Hi folks,
> > >
> > > We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that we'd
> > like
> > > the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and
> > eliminate
> > > a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> > >
> > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
> > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
> > >
> > > The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when they do
> > > not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not stick
> > > out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for free.
> >
> > It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but
> > the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall
> > back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as
> > the server is required to reject the resumption)?
> >
> 
> It's possible I didn't word this correctly. If the client did not get ESNI
> keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI session,
> which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an ESNI
> session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That's to cut out
> the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we want to
> tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don't support ESNI at all
> while others don't at all, this scenario is a concern:

"The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that
were established without ESNI.". This holds even if client sent a
dummy ESNI value.

> Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers MUST
> NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.

This case the server should at least know if it has ESNI keys or not.
 
> > Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as
> > normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across whole
> > group of domains and servers.
> >
> 
> This is true. I don't see a clear way around that one, short of taking the
> record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key
> trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch
> tolerance, it's no longer necessary for servers to be quite so paranoid
> about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still seems
> poor.)

Especially with asymmetric cryptography, as even the fastest ops are
about 100kcyc at least (outside some very rare pieces of laptop
hardware).

> I think this is still worth doing, especially as it's basically free if you
> want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating ESNI-clueless
> servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers
> more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either observe
> multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.

And then there might be fun with timing attacks. This is whole
asymmetric operation, so timing signal should be rather large.



-Ilari


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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 23:14:35 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem (which has
> been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion is that we
> define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "stapled" A/AAAA
> records.
> 
> Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that only
> contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to publish
> an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.  (A
> Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such records
> automatically.)  This kind of address stapling would only be required of
> CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.
> 
> Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the
> current TXT record).  If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP
> addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.

I do not think this will work:

- The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys
- If you hand them this control, you can hand over address control at
  the same time.
- Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.

I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is one
of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but never
seem to get done).


Conversely, if one had HTTP service discovery, almost everything about
the CDN problems with ESNI would be solved instantly (what is not
solved by the same-owner rule).


-Ilari


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References: <CAHbrMsCDR4oQzJhkcF05+wSKEoDEnACLH8D-os34xoNE9hyWHQ@mail.gmail.com> <20181218211435.GB592@LK-Perkele-VII>
In-Reply-To: <20181218211435.GB592@LK-Perkele-VII>
From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 16:26:45 -0500
Message-ID: <CAHbrMsAVNua0TDinVZr7zaO5R_MYSOVwzKDvb1GzeXXvgRJQ9g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:14 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> > I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem (which has
> > been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion is that we
> > define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "stapled"
> A/AAAA
> > records.
> >
> > Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that
> only
> > contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to
> publish
> > an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.  (A
> > Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such
> records
> > automatically.)  This kind of address stapling would only be required of
> > CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.
> >
> > Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the
> > current TXT record).  If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP
> > addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.
>
> I do not think this will work:
>
> - The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys
> - If you hand them this control, you can hand over address control at
>   the same time.
> - Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.
>
> I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is one
> of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but never
> seem to get done).
>

Sorry, I don't understand.  What are you saying will not work?

This proposal is not HTTP-related, nor is it any kind of service
discovery.  A CDN necessarily controls both the addresses and ESNIKeys;
this proposal just stores that info in one RR instead of two.


> Conversely, if one had HTTP service discovery, almost everything about
> the CDN problems with ESNI would be solved instantly (what is not
> solved by the same-owner rule).
>
>
> -Ilari
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18=
, 2018 at 4:14 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welh=
o.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, =
Ben Schwartz wrote:<br>
&gt; I&#39;d like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem (wh=
ich has<br>
&gt; been discussed a lot on this list already).=C2=A0 My suggestion is tha=
t we<br>
&gt; define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including &quot;staple=
d&quot; A/AAAA<br>
&gt; records.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that =
only<br>
&gt; contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to pu=
blish<br>
&gt; an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.=C2=A0 (A=
<br>
&gt; Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such rec=
ords<br>
&gt; automatically.)=C2=A0 This kind of address stapling would only be requ=
ired of<br>
&gt; CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the=
<br>
&gt; current TXT record).=C2=A0 If an ESNI record exists, and it contains I=
P<br>
&gt; addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.<br>
<br>
I do not think this will work:<br>
<br>
- The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys<br>
- If you hand them this control, you can hand over address control at<br>
=C2=A0 the same time.<br>
- Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.<br>
<br>
I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is one<br>
of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but never<br>
seem to get done).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sorry, I don&#39;t u=
nderstand.=C2=A0 What are you saying will not work?</div><div><br></div><di=
v>This proposal is not HTTP-related, nor is it any kind of service discover=
y.=C2=A0 A CDN necessarily controls both the addresses and ESNIKeys; this p=
roposal just stores that info in one RR instead of two.</div><div>=C2=A0</d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Conversely, if one had HTTP service discovery, almost everything about<br>
the CDN problems with ESNI would be solved instantly (what is not<br>
solved by the same-owner rule).<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 15:32:58 -0600
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:06 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 02:27:10PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > > Hi folks,
> > > >
> > > > We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that
> we'd
> > > like
> > > > the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and
> > > eliminate
> > > > a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
> > > >
> > > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
> > > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
> > > >
> > > > The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when
> they do
> > > > not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not
> stick
> > > > out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for
> free.
> > >
> > > It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but
> > > the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall
> > > back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as
> > > the server is required to reject the resumption)?
> > >
> >
> > It's possible I didn't word this correctly. If the client did not get
> ESNI
> > keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI
> session,
> > which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an
> ESNI
> > session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That's to cut
> out
> > the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we want
> to
> > tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don't support ESNI at all
> > while others don't at all, this scenario is a concern:
>
> "The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that
> were established without ESNI.". This holds even if client sent a
> dummy ESNI value.
>
> > Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers
> MUST
> > NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.
>
> This case the server should at least know if it has ESNI keys or not.
>
> > > Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as
> > > normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across whole
> > > group of domains and servers.
> > >
> >
> > This is true. I don't see a clear way around that one, short of taking
> the
> > record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key
> > trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch
> > tolerance, it's no longer necessary for servers to be quite so paranoid
> > about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still
> seems
> > poor.)
>
> Especially with asymmetric cryptography, as even the fastest ops are
> about 100kcyc at least (outside some very rare pieces of laptop
> hardware).
>
> > I think this is still worth doing, especially as it's basically free if
> you
> > want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating
> ESNI-clueless
> > servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers
> > more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either
> observe
> > multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.
>
> And then there might be fun with timing attacks. This is whole
> asymmetric operation, so timing signal should be rather large.
>

Sorry, that was really confusing. By "this" I meant GREASE, not trial
decryption schemes. :-)

--000000000000ebd5e8057d52a4f3
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:06 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusva=
ara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 02:27:10PM -0600, David Benjami=
n wrote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni=
 that we&#39;d<br>
&gt; &gt; like<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the group&#39;s thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more r=
obust and<br>
&gt; &gt; eliminate<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/124" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/pull/124</a><br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/125" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/pull/125</a><br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions=
 when they do<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the &q=
uot;Do not stick<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; out&quot; goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us=
 this for free.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but<br>
&gt; &gt; the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fal=
l<br>
&gt; &gt; back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; the server is required to reject the resumption)?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It&#39;s possible I didn&#39;t word this correctly. If the client did =
not get ESNI<br>
&gt; keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI sess=
ion,<br>
&gt; which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an =
ESNI<br>
&gt; session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That&#39;s t=
o cut out<br>
&gt; the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we wa=
nt to<br>
&gt; tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don&#39;t support ESNI at=
 all<br>
&gt; while others don&#39;t at all, this scenario is a concern:<br>
<br>
&quot;The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that<br=
>
were established without ESNI.&quot;. This holds even if client sent a<br>
dummy ESNI value.<br>
<br>
&gt; Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers=
 MUST<br>
&gt; NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.<br>
<br>
This case the server should at least know if it has ESNI keys or not.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as<=
br>
&gt; &gt; normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across=
 whole<br>
&gt; &gt; group of domains and servers.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is true. I don&#39;t see a clear way around that one, short of ta=
king the<br>
&gt; record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key<b=
r>
&gt; trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch<=
br>
&gt; tolerance, it&#39;s no longer necessary for servers to be quite so par=
anoid<br>
&gt; about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still s=
eems<br>
&gt; poor.)<br>
<br>
Especially with asymmetric cryptography, as even the fastest ops are<br>
about 100kcyc at least (outside some very rare pieces of laptop<br>
hardware).<br>
<br>
&gt; I think this is still worth doing, especially as it&#39;s basically fr=
ee if you<br>
&gt; want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating ESNI-clu=
eless<br>
&gt; servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers<br>
&gt; more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either obs=
erve<br>
&gt; multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.<br=
>
<br>
And then there might be fun with timing attacks. This is whole<br>
asymmetric operation, so timing signal should be rather large.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Sorry, that was really confusing. By &quot;this&quo=
t; I meant GREASE, not trial decryption schemes. :-)=C2=A0</div></div></div=
>

--000000000000ebd5e8057d52a4f3--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 15:39:15 -0600
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs
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(Hit send too early)

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:32 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:06 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 02:27:10PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
>> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara <
>> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
>> > > > Hi folks,
>> > > >
>> > > > We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni that
>> we'd
>> > > like
>> > > > the group's thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more robust and
>> > > eliminate
>> > > > a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:
>> > > >
>> > > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/124
>> > > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/125
>> > > >
>> > > > The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions when
>> they do
>> > > > not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the "Do not
>> stick
>> > > > out" goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us this for
>> free.
>> > >
>> > > It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but
>> > > the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fall
>> > > back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as
>> > > the server is required to reject the resumption)?
>> > >
>> >
>> > It's possible I didn't word this correctly. If the client did not get
>> ESNI
>> > keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI
>> session,
>> > which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an
>> ESNI
>> > session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That's to cut
>> out
>> > the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we
>> want to
>> > tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don't support ESNI at all
>> > while others don't at all, this scenario is a concern:
>>
>> "The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that
>> were established without ESNI.". This holds even if client sent a
>> dummy ESNI value.
>>
>
Oops, yes, that was a typo. It should have said:

The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that were
established with ESNI.

I'll fix that. Thanks for catching that!


> > Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers
>> MUST
>> > NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.
>>
>> This case the server should at least know if it has ESNI keys or not.
>>
>> > > Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as
>> > > normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across
>> whole
>> > > group of domains and servers.
>> > >
>> >
>> > This is true. I don't see a clear way around that one, short of taking
>> the
>> > record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key
>> > trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch
>> > tolerance, it's no longer necessary for servers to be quite so paranoid
>> > about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still
>> seems
>> > poor.)
>>
>> Especially with asymmetric cryptography, as even the fastest ops are
>> about 100kcyc at least (outside some very rare pieces of laptop
>> hardware).
>>
>> > I think this is still worth doing, especially as it's basically free if
>> you
>> > want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating
>> ESNI-clueless
>> > servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers
>> > more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either
>> observe
>> > multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.
>>
>> And then there might be fun with timing attacks. This is whole
>> asymmetric operation, so timing signal should be rather large.
>>
>
> Sorry, that was really confusing. By "this" I meant GREASE, not trial
> decryption schemes. :-)
>

--000000000000441b56057d52bb06
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">(Hit send too early)<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:32 PM David Benjamin &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:davidben@chromium.org">davidben@chromium.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:06 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@we=
lho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Dec =
18, 2018 at 02:27:10PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:00 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 05:17:37PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; We[*] wrote up some proposed changes for draft-ietf-tls-esni=
 that we&#39;d<br>
&gt; &gt; like<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the group&#39;s thoughts on. The goal is to make ESNI more r=
obust and<br>
&gt; &gt; eliminate<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; a bunch of deployment risks. The PRs are linked below:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/124" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/pull/124</a><br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/125" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/pull/125</a><br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; The second recommends clients to send GREASE ESNI extensions=
 when they do<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; not have cached ESNIKeys available. This better meets the &q=
uot;Do not stick<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; out&quot; goal. The server behavior in the first PR gives us=
 this for free.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; It seems to me that if server thinks it has ESNI enabled, but<br>
&gt; &gt; the client does not get ESNI keys for it, then all handshakes fal=
l<br>
&gt; &gt; back to full handshake and session resumption will not work (as<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; the server is required to reject the resumption)?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It&#39;s possible I didn&#39;t word this correctly. If the client did =
not get ESNI<br>
&gt; keys for the server, the client is presumably offering a non-ESNI sess=
ion,<br>
&gt; which has no resumption restrictions. The case we want to avoid is an =
ESNI<br>
&gt; session being resumed at anything other than esni_accept. That&#39;s t=
o cut out<br>
&gt; the resumption case in {{verify-public-name}}. In particular, if we wa=
nt to<br>
&gt; tolerate partial rollouts where some servers don&#39;t support ESNI at=
 all<br>
&gt; while others don&#39;t at all, this scenario is a concern:<br>
<br>
&quot;The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that<br=
>
were established without ESNI.&quot;. This holds even if client sent a<br>
dummy ESNI value.<br></blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div><div>Oops, yes, that was a typo. It should have said:</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>The server MUST NOT resume any sessions offered by the client that =
were established with ESNI.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ll fix that. Tha=
nks for catching that!</div></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex">
&gt; Without this case (and GREASE---see remark), we could just say servers=
 MUST<br>
&gt; NOT resume if they send esni_retry_request.<br>
<br>
This case the server should at least know if it has ESNI keys or not.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; Also, randomly generating the ESNI key handle does stick out, as<=
br>
&gt; &gt; normally the ESNI key is releatively static (DNS caching!) across=
 whole<br>
&gt; &gt; group of domains and servers.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is true. I don&#39;t see a clear way around that one, short of ta=
king the<br>
&gt; record_digest parameter out and requiring the server do a public-key<b=
r>
&gt; trial-decrypt for each unexpired ESNI key. (Perhaps with key mismatch<=
br>
&gt; tolerance, it&#39;s no longer necessary for servers to be quite so par=
anoid<br>
&gt; about keeping all their old keys around, but the trial-decrypt still s=
eems<br>
&gt; poor.)<br>
<br>
Especially with asymmetric cryptography, as even the fastest ops are<br>
about 100kcyc at least (outside some very rare pieces of laptop<br>
hardware).<br>
<br>
&gt; I think this is still worth doing, especially as it&#39;s basically fr=
ee if you<br>
&gt; want to support rollbacks. (Making GREASE work and tolerating ESNI-clu=
eless<br>
&gt; servers are very strongly related. GREASE requires that servers<br>
&gt; more-or-less ignore ESNI on key mismatch.) You also need to either obs=
erve<br>
&gt; multiple connections or know something about the server to do this.<br=
>
<br>
And then there might be fun with timing attacks. This is whole<br>
asymmetric operation, so timing signal should be rather large.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div>Sorry, that was really confusing. By &quot;this&quot; I meant GREASE, =
not trial decryption schemes. :-)=C2=A0</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000441b56057d52bb06--


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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 23:40:05 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI robustness and GREASE PRs - client tracking concerns?
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 03:01:07PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 1:27 AM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
> wrote:
> 
> > Also connection re-establishment has considerable cost, additional
> > TCP roundtrips on top of the extra TLS roundtrips.
> >
> 
> Agreed. The other cost is that it cannot be implemented entirely within the
> TLS stack, since most TLS stacks do not establish connections. (Though ESNI
> already needs caller involvement anyway to get the ESNI keys out of DNS,
> and the perf overhead can be fine if you believe it's rare.)

Looks like the missed ESNI penalty with this proposal is 2RTT (1 RTT
from new TCP setup, 1 RTT from unusable handshake; Yes I know that
both TCP setup and handshake are three-way, but seems like some flights
can be merged). 

> Is the HRR idea being explored in the parallel thread not viable?
> > [ That'd be fine by me, one less thing to worry about, but it did
> > seem worth exploring at first blush...  The suggestion of using it
> > as a fallback when there are either no keys in DNS, or they don't
> > work also seems like it could be viable. ]
> >
> 
> I actually still need to fully digest in that thread. I hadn't even
> realized when I sent this how much the two had in common, or I would have
> acknowledged it in the mail. Sorry about that. I imagine my email probably
> looked odd to you. I'm glad to see we had similar ideas!
> 
> There might be some version that works? We never came up with a formulation
> we really liked, and the single-connection version made a lot of things
> simpler. Some of the nuisances with doing it together:
> 
> - Sticking two full handshakes on the same connection introduces several
> new key changes, which will frustrate QUIC and DTLS.
> 
> - Joining two handshakes at the ServerHello or so frustrates existing
> analysis, split mode, and any servers with SNI-dependent cipher parameters.
> (Everyone seems to keep asking their hosting providers for silly little
> checkboxes to configure TLS parameters.)

I had idea of joining at server Finished (with key state left as-is),
which would be only 1RTT penalty (unuseable handshake), but this has
the same issues with QUIC and DTLS. And trying to make it compatible
with dummy ESNI does some rather annoying things to the TLS state
machine.


-Ilari


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 13:48:12 -0800
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--000000000000d99ad4057d52dc3b
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:54 AM Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Just a clarifying question inline
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>
>>> > However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local
>>> network,
>>> > there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using
>>> DoH.
>>>
>>> Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I'm quite aware of this fact.
>>
>>
>> DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you
>>> received is not modified.
>>>
>>
>> As with all things security, it depends on your threat model. If the
>> attacker you
>> are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it does
>> provide protection.
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The
>>> move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided
>>> and just moving the goal post.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation.
>> At present,
>> the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protected [0], and yet
>> we
>> have to rely on it. If there's a "blindly trusting" in this discussion,
>> it's that. DNS
>> over HTTPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it's not
>> a panacea.
>>
>> However in *this* case, it actually covers a pretty large fraction of the
>> threat
>> model, because (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the
>> attacker
>> controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in
>> any case even before you send SNI.
>>
>
> This is written as a pretty broad statement.  Did you intend to say that
> the attackers for this threat vector are close to the user or many
> attackers?
>

I'm not sure I understand the question you are asking. A lot of the threats


Asking as this could sway opinions and the current solution is well suited
> to CDNs, not necessarily others.
>

Yes, the current solution is generally designed to fit into CDN-like
scenarios. However, ESNI is generally not that useful unless you have a lot
of origins on the same domain (otherwise the IP address itself reveals your
destination), and there are a limited number of scenarios of this type
(CDNs, hosting providers, application servers, etc.)



>> [0] https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf provides an
>> overview
>>
>
> This is probably a bit better as a reference as it appears to be kept
> current:
> https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/
>

Thanks.


and includes links to others providing statistics for reference as well.
> The validation statistics look a bit better in the following study:
> https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=XA&x=1&g=1&r=1&w=7&g=0
> where worldwide, they say 16% DNSSEC validates.
>

I believe this is measuring something different, which is the fraction of
the Internet which is covered by validating resolvers. However, that
doesn't reflect end-to-end validation, but (typically) recursive resolver
validation, which is a rather different matter. To my knowledge, no generic
browser client does DNSSEC validation, for the reason that when people have
looked at it it created unaceptable failure rates.

-Ekr

--000000000000d99ad4057d52dc3b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:54 AM Kathleen Moriarty &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gma=
il.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">J=
ust a clarifying question inline<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"=
ltr">On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ek=
r@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
>On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@n=
ohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorl=
a wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local n=
etwork,<br>
&gt; there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using Do=
H.<br>
<br>
Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I&#39;m quite aware of this fact.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you<br>
received is not modified.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As with all t=
hings security, it depends on your threat model. If the attacker you</div><=
div>are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it d=
oes</div><div>provide protection.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The<br>
move towards &quot;blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS&quot; servers is mis=
guided<br>
and just moving the goal post.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#3=
9;t think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation. At pre=
sent,</div><div>the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protecte=
d [0], and yet we</div><div>have to rely on it. If there&#39;s a &quot;blin=
dly trusting&quot; in this discussion, it&#39;s that. DNS</div><div>over HT=
TPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it&#39;s not</di=
v><div>a panacea.<br></div><div><br></div><div>However in *this* case, it a=
ctually covers a pretty large fraction of the threat</div><div>model, becau=
se (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the attacker</div><d=
iv>controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in=
</div><div>any case even before you send SNI.</div></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>This is written as a pretty broad statement.=C2=
=A0 Did you intend to say that the attackers for this threat vector are clo=
se to the user or many attackers? </div></div></div></div></div></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not sure I understand the question you =
are asking. A lot of the threats <br></div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>=
Asking as this could sway opinions and the current solution is well suited =
to CDNs, not necessarily others.</div></div></div></div></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>Yes, the current solution is generally designed t=
o fit into CDN-like scenarios. However, ESNI is generally not that useful u=
nless you have a lot of origins on the same domain (otherwise the IP addres=
s itself reveals your destination), and there are a limited number of scena=
rios of this type (CDNs, hosting providers, application servers, etc.)<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br><div=
>[0] <a href=3D"https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf</a> provide=
s an overview</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This =
is probably a bit better as a reference as it appears to be kept current:</=
div><div><a href=3D"https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statis=
tics/" target=3D"_blank">https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/s=
tatistics/</a></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></d=
iv><div>Thanks.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>and includes links to ot=
hers providing statistics for reference as well.=C2=A0 The validation stati=
stics look a bit better in the following study:</div><div><a href=3D"https:=
//stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&amp;x=3D1&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1&amp;w=
=3D7&amp;g=3D0" target=3D"_blank">https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=
=3DXA&amp;x=3D1&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1&amp;w=3D7&amp;g=3D0</a></div><div>where=
 worldwide, they say 16% DNSSEC validates.</div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe this is measuring something d=
ifferent, which is the fraction of the Internet which is covered by validat=
ing resolvers. However, that doesn&#39;t reflect end-to-end validation, but=
 (typically) recursive resolver validation, which is a rather different mat=
ter. To my knowledge, no generic browser client does DNSSEC validation, for=
 the reason that when people have looked at it it created unaceptable failu=
re rates.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail-m_-6424319431034792963gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div><br></div></div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000d99ad4057d52dc3b--


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Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 23:49:28 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 04:26:45PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:14 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> > > I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem (which has
> > > been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion is that we
> > > define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "stapled"
> > A/AAAA
> > > records.
> > >
> > > Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that
> > only
> > > contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to
> > publish
> > > an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.  (A
> > > Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such
> > records
> > > automatically.)  This kind of address stapling would only be required of
> > > CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.
> > >
> > > Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with the
> > > current TXT record).  If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP
> > > addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.
> >
> > I do not think this will work:
> >
> > - The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys
> > - If you hand them this control, you can hand over address control at
> >   the same time.
> > - Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.
> >
> > I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is one
> > of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but never
> > seem to get done).
> >
> 
> Sorry, I don't understand.  What are you saying will not work?
> 
> This proposal is not HTTP-related, nor is it any kind of service
> discovery.  A CDN necessarily controls both the addresses and ESNIKeys;
> this proposal just stores that info in one RR instead of two.
 
What I meant is that one must be able to redirect the ESNI lookup
somehow to the CDN itself. Otherwise updating the ESNI keys is too
hard due to excessive coordination required. And if you can somehow
redirect the ESNI lookup, you could redirect the address lookup using
the same mechanism.

And what that results is a service discovery mechanism. And turns
out that HTTP is pretty much the only widely used protocol that does
not have service discovery mechansim (e.g., SMTP uses MX, XMPP uses
SRV, etc..).



-Ilari



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From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 16:59:35 -0500
Message-ID: <CAHbrMsDop8nB068xJYhUo=M7W3SMegLbBJcmeDpW5YtswBA_tw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:55 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 04:26:45PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:14 PM Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> > > > I'd like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN problem
> (which has
> > > > been discussed a lot on this list already).  My suggestion is that we
> > > > define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including "stapled"
> > > A/AAAA
> > > > records.
> > > >
> > > > Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI record that
> > > only
> > > > contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record), or to
> > > publish
> > > > an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses.  (A
> > > > Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generate such
> > > records
> > > > automatically.)  This kind of address stapling would only be
> required of
> > > > CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.
> > > >
> > > > Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (as with
> the
> > > > current TXT record).  If an ESNI record exists, and it contains IP
> > > > addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA query.
> > >
> > > I do not think this will work:
> > >
> > > - The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys
> > > - If you hand them this control, you can hand over address control at
> > >   the same time.
> > > - Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.
> > >
> > > I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is one
> > > of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but never
> > > seem to get done).
> > >
> >
> > Sorry, I don't understand.  What are you saying will not work?
> >
> > This proposal is not HTTP-related, nor is it any kind of service
> > discovery.  A CDN necessarily controls both the addresses and ESNIKeys;
> > this proposal just stores that info in one RR instead of two.
>
> What I meant is that one must be able to redirect the ESNI lookup
> somehow to the CDN itself. Otherwise updating the ESNI keys is too
> hard due to excessive coordination required. And if you can somehow
> redirect the ESNI lookup, you could redirect the address lookup using
> the same mechanism.
>

Yes.  This proposal assumes that these lookups are in fact the same, i.e.
they are both for the same name (www.example.com), and this entire name is
redirected (i.e. delegated) to the CDN via CNAME (which is not
type-specific).  This is the typical deployment pattern for CDN customers.


> And what that results is a service discovery mechanism.


No, it's just CNAME.


> And turns
> out that HTTP is pretty much the only widely used protocol that does
> not have service discovery mechansim (e.g., SMTP uses MX, XMPP uses
> SRV, etc..).
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>
>
>

--0000000000001ece5b057d53047d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:55 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusva=
ara@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 04:26:45PM -=
0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:14 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt=
;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 12:29:56PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; I&#39;d like to propose a solution to the ESNI + Multi-CDN p=
roblem (which has<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; been discussed a lot on this list already).=C2=A0 My suggest=
ion is that we<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; define the ESNI DNS record format as optionally including &q=
uot;stapled&quot;<br>
&gt; &gt; A/AAAA<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; records.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Server operators would have the option to publish an ESNI re=
cord that<br>
&gt; &gt; only<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; contains an ESNIKeys structure (like the current TXT record)=
, or to<br>
&gt; &gt; publish<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; an ESNI record that also includes IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses=
.=C2=A0 (A<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Sufficiently Advanced authoritative DNS server would generat=
e such<br>
&gt; &gt; records<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; automatically.)=C2=A0 This kind of address stapling would on=
ly be required of<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; CDN operators who want to support multi-CDN deployments.<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Clients would issue A, AAAA, and ESNI queries in parallel (a=
s with the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; current TXT record).=C2=A0 If an ESNI record exists, and it =
contains IP<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; addresses, the client discards the results of the A or AAAA =
query.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I do not think this will work:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; - The CDNs need control of ESNIkeys<br>
&gt; &gt; - If you hand them this control, you can hand over address contro=
l at<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the same time.<br>
&gt; &gt; - Now you are in HTTP service discovery territory.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I am not saying that HTTP service discovery is undesirable (it is=
 one<br>
&gt; &gt; of those perennial topics that are not seemingly bad ideas but ne=
ver<br>
&gt; &gt; seem to get done).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Sorry, I don&#39;t understand.=C2=A0 What are you saying will not work=
?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This proposal is not HTTP-related, nor is it any kind of service<br>
&gt; discovery.=C2=A0 A CDN necessarily controls both the addresses and ESN=
IKeys;<br>
&gt; this proposal just stores that info in one RR instead of two.<br>
<br>
What I meant is that one must be able to redirect the ESNI lookup<br>
somehow to the CDN itself. Otherwise updating the ESNI keys is too<br>
hard due to excessive coordination required. And if you can somehow<br>
redirect the ESNI lookup, you could redirect the address lookup using<br>
the same mechanism.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes.=C2=A0 This pro=
posal assumes that these lookups are in fact the same, i.e. they are both f=
or the same name (<a href=3D"http://www.example.com">www.example.com</a>), =
and this entire name is redirected (i.e. delegated) to the CDN via CNAME (w=
hich is not type-specific).=C2=A0 This is the typical deployment pattern fo=
r CDN customers.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
And what that results is a service discovery mechanism.</blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>No, it&#39;s just CNAME.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> And turns<br>
out that HTTP is pretty much the only widely used protocol that does<br>
not have service discovery mechansim (e.g., SMTP uses MX, XMPP uses<br>
SRV, etc..).<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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To: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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> On Dec 18, 2018, at 4:48 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> To my knowledge, no generic browser client does DNSSEC validation, for =
the reason that when people have looked at it it created unaceptable =
failure rates.

Agreed.  That's a pretty safe bet.  The last-mile problem is still with =
us for
now, though of course DoH/DoT change that too.  The failure rates are =
almost
never on the backbone, but rather between the user and a crippled local =
resolver.
To the extent that ESNI presumes DoH/DoT, DNSSEC might become more =
viable, but
we're certainly not there yet.

And even though public recursive resolvers often do validation, most =
domains
are as yet unsigned, the signed domains are still heavily concentrated =
at
a few registries and hosting providers in Northern Europe, and =
separately Brazil.

Adoption elsewhere is still light, adoption barriers at registries and =
registrars
are are a major obstacle, that is slowly starting to change as some =
start to
implement CDS (RFC8078) support.

--=20
	Viktor.


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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
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Am 18.12.18 um 15:57 schrieb Salz, Rich:
> Does the server claim to support must-staple?
>  

The "exim" server claims to support stapling (for incoming connections)

The Must-Staple belongs to the certificate which was requested
including "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24=DER:30:03:02:01:05"
in the CSR.

Most people will only request "ONE" Certificate for their server.
OCSP Must-Staple certificates are getting more popular.
When such a cert is used for incoming and outgoing connections, than
stapling must be supported when the cert is requested from a client too

This situation happens if the server asks for the certificate of the
sender, which is common.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "T.Tributh" <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
Thread-Index: AQHUluFTjOFLsO6XyUC+wFqi0VfWkaWEpx8AgABd6ICAAE95gA==
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 01:18:29 +0000
Message-ID: <043B351E-28A3-4981-8555-9D950FA2FF98@akamai.com>
References: <20181215162408.55DD3130DCD@ietfa.amsl.com> <597308EA-C2A0-4BC8-9BFF-AAC4E036F470@akamai.com> <20181218163448.2B642131170@ietfa.amsl.com>
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From nobody Wed Dec 19 03:28:03 2018
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Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 13:27:48 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:46:29PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> Here is how it usually works.  Not everyone necessarily does it this
> way, but in our experience almost all of them do.
> 
> 1. Sites use a CNAME, usually using a host-specific name.
> 
> 2. Sometimes the CDN owns the DNS entry. 

There is also:

3. The site owns the zone apex DNS entry. And since it is zone apex, no
CNAME can be used (yes, everything falls apart in practice if you do).
So zone owner inserts a bunch of A/AAAA records pointing at the CDN (or
worse, CDNs).

Fixing the above is a perennial topic. Proposals include CNAME-like
mechanisms scoped to just addresses, and HTTP service discovery
mechanisms (as most popular things other than HTTP already do service
discovery).

> Having the ESNI RRtype include optional a/quadA records is something
> we have talked about internally. If so, it should be part of the RRtype
> definition, of course. We came to the same idea. Of course, we will
> then have to fight the intent to make this "generic server record"
> data such as draft-nygren-service-bindings. :)

The only use for addresses in ESNI records I can come up with is
scoping keys to practicular addresses. But one could do that by
including address masks in ESNI records so clients can match ESNI
keys to addresses without breaking database normalization.

And if one is dealing with the third case above, the solutions are
basically service discovery. And then one presumably would want it to
be service-specific (as there are other rarer services that also lack
discovery besides HTTP).

> DNS is a strange and wondrous beast, like a bear riding a bicycle. 
> We should make sure that DNS folks are heavily involved in this draft.

Here are some tips:

- If you have name references, encode those in DNS wire format and
  preferably put them first, so that recursives can follow them and
  include records they think are helpful.
- Do not assume the above happens (but do assume it may happen). Client
  has to act as a backstop.
- DNS is 8-bit clean just fine with new types.
- Records do not need explicit terminators.
- There can be many records for each type on the same owner.
- The unit of atomicity is set of records with the same (owner,
  class, type) combo. 
- The 64kB limit is not just for individual record but whole set of
  records with (owner, class, type). And to be safe, limit it to 63.5kB
  minus 12 bytes per record.

The following are Bad Idea:

- Using type or class ANY (a.k.a. *). 
  - Type ANY does the wrong thing.
  - Class ANY does completely nonsensical thing.
- Defining a new class.
- Using class other than IN (Internet).
- If you use labels, using lots of different labels at outermost level.
- Putting anything into new type that DNS can not treat as a blob.
- Assuming authoritatives do anything smart.
- Assuming authoritatives follow any references.
- Assuming different types are in any way atomic w.r.t. each other.
- Copying TXT record wire format.


-Ilari


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From: Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, T.Tributh <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com>, "T.Tributh" <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, T.Tributh <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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References: <20181215025346.GJ15561@localhost> <CABcZeBM_7LF-UDH8NR3Kad-8zSJBWwuNsDEJVAagHf1cV4Ow6g@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1812161439170.14874@bofh.nohats.ca> <CABcZeBNyF6kP7iHZjDq0w+OtOOj5d67J8sCkLYwA5xaFTW8Q8Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAHbuEH7R36YyFN=7ctMUHMndgt93TKM9srM4YkdBqL05dLyscQ@mail.gmail.com> <CABcZeBPWL-BaaWvrkjmyaqUNccctEsYegN3i-JPT+brVCRHZRQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/DaKMQxJvzfDtAQZKcjR9CltQ68M>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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Hey EKR,

Sent from my mobile device

> On Dec 18, 2018, at 4:48 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:54 AM Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.iet=
f@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Just a clarifying question inline
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> > However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local n=
etwork,
>>>> > there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using D=
oH.
>>>>=20
>>>> Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.
>>>=20
>>> Yes, I'm quite aware of this fact.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you
>>>> received is not modified.
>>>=20
>>> As with all things security, it depends on your threat model. If the att=
acker you
>>> are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it do=
es
>>> provide protection.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The
>>>> move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided=

>>>> and just moving the goal post.
>>>=20
>>> I don't think this is a very accurate characterization of the situation.=
 At present,
>>> the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protected [0], and ye=
t we
>>> have to rely on it. If there's a "blindly trusting" in this discussion, i=
t's that. DNS
>>> over HTTPS is designed to improve the situation, though of course it's n=
ot
>>> a panacea.
>>>=20
>>> However in *this* case, it actually covers a pretty large fraction of th=
e threat
>>> model, because (1) many attackers are close to the user and (2) if the a=
ttacker
>>> controls your DNS server, then they learn which site you are going to in=

>>> any case even before you send SNI.
>>=20
>> This is written as a pretty broad statement.  Did you intend to say that t=
he attackers for this threat vector are close to the user or many attackers?=

>=20
> I'm not sure I understand the question you are asking. A lot of the threat=
s=20

It=E2=80=99s a broad statement.  If I were to give that acting in a CISO rol=
e, it would sound like FUD and I either wouldn=E2=80=99t get very far or wou=
ldn=E2=80=99t get anywhere towards goals the next time around.  Crisping it u=
p to the exact threat, point of risk, quantifying, and prioritizing would he=
lp.

I=E2=80=99m hearing from concerned people in the threat detection/response s=
ide on this (eSNI) who are not willing to speak up.  This point is also wher=
e they sit on a network , typically one they manage and users consent to mon=
itoring in their employment agreement.  They are watching for attackers, inc=
luding nation-state threat actors. =20

When =E2=80=98many=E2=80=99 attackers are listed, it sounds ominous.  Howeve=
r, if it were quantified and the exact threat were listed, then judgement ca=
lls could be made.  Maybe the threats you are referring to are far worse tha=
n nation state supply chain attacks or are ones that TLS as a WG prioritizes=
.  It would be good to either leave out generic statements or to list someth=
ing more specific (or a list or point back to the draft that covers this top=
ic).

It=E2=80=99s likely that incident responders will just need to adapt, but ke=
eping a prioritized list of threats and point of defense could be helpful to=
 many.

Best,
Kathleen=20
>=20
>=20
>> Asking as this could sway opinions and the current solution is well suite=
d to CDNs, not necessarily others.
>=20
> Yes, the current solution is generally designed to fit into CDN-like scena=
rios. However, ESNI is generally not that useful unless you have a lot of or=
igins on the same domain (otherwise the IP address itself reveals your desti=
nation), and there are a limited number of scenarios of this type (CDNs, hos=
ting providers, application servers, etc.)
>=20
>=20
>>>=20
>>> [0] https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf provides an over=
view
>>=20
>> This is probably a bit better as a reference as it appears to be kept cur=
rent:
>> https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/
>=20
> Thanks.
>=20
>=20
>> and includes links to others providing statistics for reference as well. =
 The validation statistics look a bit better in the following study:
>> https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&x=3D1&g=3D1&r=3D1&w=3D7&g=3D=
0
>> where worldwide, they say 16% DNSSEC validates.
>=20
> I believe this is measuring something different, which is the fraction of t=
he Internet which is covered by validating resolvers. However, that doesn't r=
eflect end-to-end validation, but (typically) recursive resolver validation,=
 which is a rather different matter. To my knowledge, no generic browser cli=
ent does DNSSEC validation, for the reason that when people have looked at i=
t it created unaceptable failure rates.
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto">Hey EKR,<br><br><div id=3D"AppleMailSignatu=
re">Sent from my mobile device</div><div><br>On Dec 18, 2018, at 4:48 PM, Er=
ic Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Dec 18, 2=
018 at 10:54 AM Kathleen Moriarty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ie=
tf@gmail.com">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Just a clarifying question inline<br><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:30 PM Eri=
c Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.co=
m</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 11:45 AM Paul Wouters=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@nohats.ca</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri,=
 14 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; However, in a large number of cases (e.g., an attacker on your local ne=
twork,<br>
&gt; there are non-DNSSEC ways of obtaining this property, such as using DoH=
.<br>
<br>
Data origin authenticity is not the same as transport security.<br></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I'm quite aware of this fact.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
DoH offers no guarantee that the non-dnssec protected information you<br>
received is not modified.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As with all th=
ings security, it depends on your threat model. If the attacker you</div><di=
v>are concerned with is between you and the DNS server, then in fact it does=
</div><div>provide protection.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Unfortunately, I keep needing to say this on various IETF lists. The<br>
move towards "blindly trusting DNS over HTTPS/TLS" servers is misguided<br>
and just moving the goal post.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don't t=
hink this is a very accurate characterization of the situation. At present,<=
/div><div>the vast majority of DNS information is not DNSSEC protected [0], a=
nd yet we</div><div>have to rely on it. If there's a "blindly trusting" in t=
his discussion, it's that. DNS</div><div>over HTTPS is designed to improve t=
he situation, though of course it's not</div><div>a panacea.<br></div><div><=
br></div><div>However in *this* case, it actually covers a pretty large frac=
tion of the threat</div><div>model, because (1) many attackers are close to t=
he user and (2) if the attacker</div><div>controls your DNS server, then the=
y learn which site you are going to in</div><div>any case even before you se=
nd SNI.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is writ=
ten as a pretty broad statement.&nbsp; Did you intend to say that the attack=
ers for this threat vector are close to the user or many attackers? </div></=
div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'm not sure I u=
nderstand the question you are asking. A lot of the threats <br></div></div>=
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>It=E2=80=99s a broad statement. &nbs=
p;If I were to give that acting in a CISO role, it would sound like FUD and I=
 either wouldn=E2=80=99t get very far or wouldn=E2=80=99t get anywhere towar=
ds goals the next time around. &nbsp;Crisping it up to the exact threat, poi=
nt of risk, quantifying, and prioritizing would help.<div><br></div><div>I=E2=
=80=99m hearing from concerned people in the threat detection/response side o=
n this (eSNI) who are not willing to speak up. &nbsp;This point is also wher=
e they sit on a network , typically one they manage and users consent to mon=
itoring in their employment agreement. &nbsp;They are watching for attackers=
, including nation-state threat actors. &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>When=
 =E2=80=98many=E2=80=99 attackers are listed, it sounds ominous. &nbsp;Howev=
er, if it were quantified and the exact threat were listed, then judgement c=
alls could be made. &nbsp;Maybe the threats you are referring to are far wor=
se than nation state supply chain attacks or are ones that TLS as a WG prior=
itizes. &nbsp;It would be good to either leave out generic statements or to l=
ist something more specific (or a list or point back to the draft that cover=
s this topic).</div><div><br></div><div>It=E2=80=99s likely that incident re=
sponders will just need to adapt, but keeping a prioritized list of threats a=
nd point of defense could be helpful to many.</div><div><br></div><div>Best,=
</div><div>Kathleen&nbsp;<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb=
(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Asking as this could s=
way opinions and the current solution is well suited to CDNs, not necessaril=
y others.</div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>Yes, the current solution is generally designed to fit into CDN-like scena=
rios. However, ESNI is generally not that useful unless you have a lot of or=
igins on the same domain (otherwise the IP address itself reveals your desti=
nation), and there are a limited number of scenarios of this type (CDNs, hos=
ting providers, application servers, etc.)<br></div><div><br></div><div><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br><div>[0] <a href=3D"https://www.cs.umd.e=
du/~dml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://www.cs.umd.edu/~d=
ml/papers/dnssec_imc17.pdf</a> provides an overview</div></div></div></div><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is probably a bit better as a reference=
 as it appears to be kept current:</div><div><a href=3D"https://www.internet=
society.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/" target=3D"_blank">https://www.inte=
rnetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/</a></div></div></div></div></di=
v></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks.</div><div><br></div><div><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div>and includes links to others providing statistics for reference as well=
.&nbsp; The validation statistics look a bit better in the following study:<=
/div><div><a href=3D"https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&amp;x=3D1=
&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1&amp;w=3D7&amp;g=3D0" target=3D"_blank">https://stats.la=
bs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA?c=3DXA&amp;x=3D1&amp;g=3D1&amp;r=3D1&amp;w=3D7&amp;g=3D=
0</a></div><div>where worldwide, they say 16% DNSSEC validates.</div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe this is me=
asuring something different, which is the fraction of the Internet which is c=
overed by validating resolvers. However, that doesn't reflect end-to-end val=
idation, but (typically) recursive resolver validation, which is a rather di=
fferent matter. To my knowledge, no generic browser client does DNSSEC valid=
ation, for the reason that when people have looked at it it created unacepta=
ble failure rates.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail-m_-6424319431034792963gmail_signature"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><div><br></div></div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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Am 19.12.18 um 14:20 schrieb Rob Stradling:
> On 19/12/2018 13:13, Salz, Rich wrote:
>>>     OpenSSL already has some support for Must-Staple:
>>>     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/495
>>    
>> Oops, yeah, you're aright.  But it's not really documented and not hooked up to any popular server, is it?  OpenSSL can parse it, but that's about it.
> 
> I suspect that's true.
> 
> What would hooking it up to a webserver look like, I wonder?  Would the 
> webserver automatically enable OCSP stapling if the server cert 
> indicates Must Staple?  Or would the webserver throw an error and refuse 
> to start until the administrator has manually enabled OCSP stapling?
> 

Let me answer also some previously questions:

The problem exists on an exim server.
Exim is compiled with openssl 1.1.1a
Their is an 384bit-Ecdsa Certtificate from letsencrypt with Must-Staple
enabled in place.
The config adds a staple file with the status_response from
letsencrypt-OCSP server.

This part works very well without any issues.

To check the functionality, their was openssl commandline,
https://hardenize.com & Thunderbird as mailclient.
Thunderbird (recent version) refuses to establish a TLS connection, when
the stapling file is not added as an extension to the certificate.


OCSP-Must-Staple certificates work also very well on apache & nginx.
Nginx starts without any issue when stapling is not enabled, but Firefox
& Chrome will fail to connect with TLS errors.
Other browsers may behave similar.

Shall I open a ticket for openssl?
GnuTLS seems also not be able to staple the status_response when in
client mode.

Have I missed to clarify something?

Torsten


From nobody Wed Dec 19 09:19:31 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "T.Tributh" <tls=40tributh.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 17:19:05 +0000
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References: <20181215162408.55DD3130DCD@ietfa.amsl.com> <597308EA-C2A0-4BC8-9BFF-AAC4E036F470@akamai.com> <20181218163448.2B642131170@ietfa.amsl.com> <043B351E-28A3-4981-8555-9D950FA2FF98@akamai.com> <8ee97d12-606c-f7a7-09a1-eecdd84807d1@sectigo.com> <B05F4EC2-9B1C-4587-B29F-4C8644476C16@akamai.com> <9314a20a-fe11-825a-454f-20f3104d4b3c@sectigo.com> <20181219144731.8F555124BE5@ietfa.amsl.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 13:40:43 -0500
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 03:47:25PM +0100, T.Tributh wrote:

> Shall I open a ticket for openssl?

Before you do that, it would be good to have clarity about the
specific behaviour you're seeing and how it differs from what you
want, and whether you want to see changes in the client or in the
server.

To that end, please post a "tshark" decode of a TLS 1.2 handshake
(thus avoiding encrypted handshake records that make much of the
TLS 1.3 handshake opaque, and your tshark may not yet support TLS
1.3).  With reference to that handshake explain what you'd like
to see happen differently on either the client or server end.

Capture a PCAP file of the traffic with

    # pcap=$(mktemp -t ocsp)
    # port=25 # or 587, 465, ...
    # tcpdump -s0 -w "${pcap}" tcp port "${port}"

extract traffic for a specific connection of interest
(you may need to look through the pcap interactively
looking for the connection you wanted).

    # conn=$(mktemp -t session)
    # client_port=... # provide the desired value
    # tcpdump -s0 -r "${pcap}" -w "${conn}" tcp port "${client_port}"

and post the decoded handshake from:

    # tshark -r "${conn}" -d "tcp.port==${port},ssl" -V |
	sed -ne '/^Secure Sockets Layer/,/^$/p'

Make sure to not rewrap the text.

-- 
	Viktor.


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Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 13:47:35 -0500
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ESNI and Multi-CDN
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:28 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:46:29PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> > Here is how it usually works.  Not everyone necessarily does it this
> > way, but in our experience almost all of them do.
> >
> > 1. Sites use a CNAME, usually using a host-specific name.
> >
> > 2. Sometimes the CDN owns the DNS entry.
>
> There is also:
>
> 3. The site owns the zone apex DNS entry. And since it is zone apex, no
> CNAME can be used (yes, everything falls apart in practice if you do).
> So zone owner inserts a bunch of A/AAAA records pointing at the CDN (or
> worse, CDNs).
>
> Fixing the above is a perennial topic. Proposals include CNAME-like
> mechanisms scoped to just addresses, and HTTP service discovery
> mechanisms (as most popular things other than HTTP already do service
> discovery).
>

Agreed.  This proposal is not meant to address the CNAME-at-apex problem,
and does not make that situation better or worse.


> > Having the ESNI RRtype include optional a/quadA records is something
> > we have talked about internally. If so, it should be part of the RRtype
> > definition, of course. We came to the same idea. Of course, we will
> > then have to fight the intent to make this "generic server record"
> > data such as draft-nygren-service-bindings. :)
>
> The only use for addresses in ESNI records I can come up with is
> scoping keys to practicular addresses.


Yes, that is the multi-CDN ESNI problem that we are trying to solve.  Each
CDN has its own ESNIKeys and its own IP addresses.


> But one could do that by
> including address masks in ESNI records so clients can match ESNI
> keys to addresses without breaking database normalization.
>

No, this doesn't work.  If the client has a AAAA RRSET and an ESNI RRSET,
and the ESNI RRSET contains a mask that is not compatible with the AAAA
RRSET, then the client can tell that it has the wrong IP addresses, but it
has no way to acquire the right IP addresses.


> And if one is dealing with the third case above, the solutions are
> basically service discovery. And then one presumably would want it to
> be service-specific (as there are other rarer services that also lack
> discovery besides HTTP).
>
> > DNS is a strange and wondrous beast, like a bear riding a bicycle.
> > We should make sure that DNS folks are heavily involved in this draft.
>
> Here are some tips:
>
> - If you have name references, encode those in DNS wire format and
>   preferably put them first, so that recursives can follow them and
>   include records they think are helpful.
> - Do not assume the above happens (but do assume it may happen). Client
>   has to act as a backstop.
> - DNS is 8-bit clean just fine with new types.
> - Records do not need explicit terminators.
> - There can be many records for each type on the same owner.
> - The unit of atomicity is set of records with the same (owner,
>   class, type) combo.
> - The 64kB limit is not just for individual record but whole set of
>   records with (owner, class, type). And to be safe, limit it to 63.5kB
>   minus 12 bytes per record.
>
> The following are Bad Idea:
>
> - Using type or class ANY (a.k.a. *).
>   - Type ANY does the wrong thing.
>   - Class ANY does completely nonsensical thing.
> - Defining a new class.
> - Using class other than IN (Internet).
> - If you use labels, using lots of different labels at outermost level.
> - Putting anything into new type that DNS can not treat as a blob.
> - Assuming authoritatives do anything smart.
> - Assuming authoritatives follow any references.
> - Assuming different types are in any way atomic w.r.t. each other.
> - Copying TXT record wire format.
>
>
> -Ilari
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Dec 19=
, 2018 at 6:28 AM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welh=
o.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:46:29PM +0000, =
Salz, Rich wrote:<br>
&gt; Here is how it usually works.=C2=A0 Not everyone necessarily does it t=
his<br>
&gt; way, but in our experience almost all of them do.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 1. Sites use a CNAME, usually using a host-specific name.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 2. Sometimes the CDN owns the DNS entry. <br>
<br>
There is also:<br>
<br>
3. The site owns the zone apex DNS entry. And since it is zone apex, no<br>
CNAME can be used (yes, everything falls apart in practice if you do).<br>
So zone owner inserts a bunch of A/AAAA records pointing at the CDN (or<br>
worse, CDNs).<br>
<br>
Fixing the above is a perennial topic. Proposals include CNAME-like<br>
mechanisms scoped to just addresses, and HTTP service discovery<br>
mechanisms (as most popular things other than HTTP already do service<br>
discovery).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed.=C2=A0 This proposal=
 is not meant to address the CNAME-at-apex problem, and does not make that =
situation better or worse.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; Having the ESNI RRtype include optional a/quadA records is something<b=
r>
&gt; we have talked about internally. If so, it should be part of the RRtyp=
e<br>
&gt; definition, of course. We came to the same idea. Of course, we will<br=
>
&gt; then have to fight the intent to make this &quot;generic server record=
&quot;<br>
&gt; data such as draft-nygren-service-bindings. :)<br>
<br>
The only use for addresses in ESNI records I can come up with is<br>
scoping keys to practicular addresses.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes,=
 that is the multi-CDN ESNI problem that we are trying to solve.=C2=A0 Each=
 CDN has its own ESNIKeys and its own IP addresses.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> But one could do that by<=
br>
including address masks in ESNI records so clients can match ESNI<br>
keys to addresses without breaking database normalization.<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>No, this doesn&#39;t work.=C2=A0 If the client has a AA=
AA RRSET and an ESNI RRSET, and the ESNI RRSET contains a mask that is not =
compatible with the AAAA RRSET, then the client can tell that it has the wr=
ong IP addresses, but it has no way to acquire the right IP addresses.</div=
><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
And if one is dealing with the third case above, the solutions are<br>
basically service discovery. And then one presumably would want it to<br>
be service-specific (as there are other rarer services that also lack<br>
discovery besides HTTP).<br>
<br>
&gt; DNS is a strange and wondrous beast, like a bear riding a bicycle. <br=
>
&gt; We should make sure that DNS folks are heavily involved in this draft.=
<br>
<br>
Here are some tips:<br>
<br>
- If you have name references, encode those in DNS wire format and<br>
=C2=A0 preferably put them first, so that recursives can follow them and<br=
>
=C2=A0 include records they think are helpful.<br>
- Do not assume the above happens (but do assume it may happen). Client<br>
=C2=A0 has to act as a backstop.<br>
- DNS is 8-bit clean just fine with new types.<br>
- Records do not need explicit terminators.<br>
- There can be many records for each type on the same owner.<br>
- The unit of atomicity is set of records with the same (owner,<br>
=C2=A0 class, type) combo. <br>
- The 64kB limit is not just for individual record but whole set of<br>
=C2=A0 records with (owner, class, type). And to be safe, limit it to 63.5k=
B<br>
=C2=A0 minus 12 bytes per record.<br>
<br>
The following are Bad Idea:<br>
<br>
- Using type or class ANY (a.k.a. *). <br>
=C2=A0 - Type ANY does the wrong thing.<br>
=C2=A0 - Class ANY does completely nonsensical thing.<br>
- Defining a new class.<br>
- Using class other than IN (Internet).<br>
- If you use labels, using lots of different labels at outermost level.<br>
- Putting anything into new type that DNS can not treat as a blob.<br>
- Assuming authoritatives do anything smart.<br>
- Assuming authoritatives follow any references.<br>
- Assuming different types are in any way atomic w.r.t. each other.<br>
- Copying TXT record wire format.<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From nobody Wed Dec 19 11:15:23 2018
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OCSP stapling problem
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 01:40:43PM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> To that end, please post a "tshark" decode of a TLS 1.2 handshake
> (thus avoiding encrypted handshake records that make much of the
> TLS 1.3 handshake opaque, and your tshark may not yet support TLS
> 1.3).  With reference to that handshake explain what you'd like
> to see happen differently on either the client or server end.

That said, there is no mechanism for servers to request OCSP stapling
from clients in TLS 1.2 and below.  The TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest
message is a fixed structure with no room for extensions, such as
needed to request OCSP stapling from clients:

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.4

so if you're looking for an implementation of (and API to trigger)
the "status_request" extension for the TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest
message, that'd of course be specific to TLS 1.3, and would likely
be a new feature.

Support for OCSP stapling in OpenSSL is IIRC presently rather
anaemic.  An interface is provided for applications to examine and
validate OCSP messages, but nothing exists to ask the library to
do that internally.  The interfaces are subtle, and some applications
go through the motions, but get the details wrong.  IIRC curl (i.e.
libcurl) is one of the few places where the code looked right after
a cursory review.

So before the existing OCSP stapling support is extended in the
client-to-server direction, I'd rather see more robust support for
handling the OCSP status extension inside the library, so that
client applications can just ask for one of:

    * Mandatory OCSP stapling
    * Conditional OCSP stapling (based on must-staple in the certificate)
    * Ignore OCSP stapling (regardless of must-staple in the certificate)

and have all the details handled in the library.  Once that's done,
one might ask for the reverse direction in TLS 1.3.

-- 
	Viktor.

P.S. personal soapbox:

FWIW, OCSP is IMHO too fragile for too little benefit, and I've
steered well clear of it in Postfix.  OCSP has and will likely for
some time continue to have insecure fallback modes (the attacker
won't ask for a must-staple certificate, and most CAs will not
refuse to issue certificates without must-staple).  So what you get
is more opportunities to fail, and little meaningful security gain.

What I'd rather see is automation of certificate rotation, and
increasingly (decreasingly?) short certificate lifetimes as
with Let's Encrypt.  I think that in practice that's more beneficial
than OCSP.


From nobody Wed Dec 19 11:23:53 2018
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 01:47:35PM -0500, Ben Schwartz wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:28 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> 
> 
> > But one could do that by
> > including address masks in ESNI records so clients can match ESNI
> > keys to addresses without breaking database normalization.
> >
> 
> No, this doesn't work.  If the client has a AAAA RRSET and an ESNI RRSET,
> and the ESNI RRSET contains a mask that is not compatible with the AAAA
> RRSET, then the client can tell that it has the wrong IP addresses, but it
> has no way to acquire the right IP addresses.

At least the client can tell the result is not going to work and
disable ESNI. Whereas with addresses there is no indication anything
is wrong, leading to potentially unrecoverable failure.


-Ilari


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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References: <CAHbrMsCDR4oQzJhkcF05+wSKEoDEnACLH8D-os34xoNE9hyWHQ@mail.gmail.com> <20181218211435.GB592@LK-Perkele-VII> <CAHbrMsAVNua0TDinVZr7zaO5R_MYSOVwzKDvb1GzeXXvgRJQ9g@mail.gmail.com> <20181218214928.GD592@LK-Perkele-VII> <8ED2A93D-3FC8-43C6-A15D-008F0890DEF4@akamai.com> <20181219112748.GA6681@LK-Perkele-VII> <CAHbrMsD1u3pnOfwTvMUnTzvrOtnrups7O1Owf1wYd3W+OtWwdA@mail.gmail.com> <20181219192343.GA16574@LK-Perkele-VII>
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From nobody Wed Dec 19 15:40:57 2018
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On 12/19/18 at 11:15 AM, ietf-dane@dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni) wrote:

> What I'd rather see is automation of certificate rotation, and
> increasingly (decreasingly?) short certificate lifetimes as
> with Let's Encrypt.

I think what you wanted to say was "increasingly shorter certificate lifeti=
mes" :-)

Happy New Year - Bill

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--000000000000747e33057d8ade10
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I am shepherding the conflict review for this document. I propose to say:

The IESG has concluded that this work is related to IETF work done in
LAMPS, TLS, and IPSECME, but this relationship does not prevent publishing.

-Ekr

--000000000000747e33057d8ade10
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I am shepherding the conflict review for =
this document. I propose to say:</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"ltr">The IESG has concluded that this work is related to IETF work done=
 in LAMPS, TLS, and IPSECME, but this relationship does not prevent publish=
ing.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>

--000000000000747e33057d8ade10--


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Subject: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated
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Hello, everyone

We have just updated the internet draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public K=
ey in Transport Layer Security (TLS)".=20

In this draft, we propose to use the Identity as raw public key, which furt=
her simplifies authentication and identity management of large scale IoT de=
vices.=20

The updating are mainly in the IANA consideration part.=20

We have some IANA related issues that need expert from this group to help:
1) TLS protocol require OID to identify an signature algorithm used in auth=
entication and key exchange.=20
     However, the identity-based signature algorithm (ECCSI) specified by I=
ETF in RFC 6507 does not have an OID yet.=20
     We have written to IANA for consideration but do not get it yet.=20
2) TLS cipher suites and a  few TLS registries need to be updated also, by =
adding in the relative names for ECCSI:=20
     * TLS  cipher suites
     * TLS TLS KeyExchangeAlgorithm Registry
     * TLS ClientCertificateType Registry
     * TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry

Although the draft is still personal draft , some telecom customer want to =
use TLS+ECCSI in their network for IoT=20
device authentication. Therefore, is it possible for IANA to assign value f=
or above TLS registries and OID for ECCSI since ECCSI is specified by IETF?

Please give us some suggestion on the OID and TLS registries updating issue=
s.

Below is the link to our recently uploaded draft.=20
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc=
-03.txt


Best regards.

Haiguang


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Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 16:51:06 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated
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On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 09:00:08AM +0000, Wang Haiguang wrote:
> Hello, everyone
> 
> We have just updated the internet draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)". 
> 
> In this draft, we propose to use the Identity as raw public key, which further simplifies authentication and identity management of large scale IoT devices. 
> 
> The updating are mainly in the IANA consideration part. 
> 
> We have some IANA related issues that need expert from this group to help:
> 1) TLS protocol require OID to identify an signature algorithm used in authentication and key exchange. 
>      However, the identity-based signature algorithm (ECCSI) specified by IETF in RFC 6507 does not have an OID yet. 
>      We have written to IANA for consideration but do not get it yet. 

Also, Huawei seems to have an OID arc...

> 2) TLS cipher suites and a  few TLS registries need to be updated also, by adding in the relative names for ECCSI: 
>      * TLS  cipher suites

This registry seems to be specification required.

>      * TLS TLS KeyExchangeAlgorithm Registry

>From what I can tell, there is no such registry. The key exchange
algorithms seem to be specified in the RFCs themselves.

>      * TLS ClientCertificateType Registry

Specification required range exists.

>      * TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry

Note that SignatureAlgorithm registry has all entries reserved, it
does not have unassigned codepoints. Instead, request SignatureScheme
assignment, and specify if it is valid for TLS 1.2 or not. From
the above registry requests, I would guess it is meant to be valid in
TLS 1.2.

> Although the draft is still personal draft , some telecom customer
> want to use TLS+ECCSI in their network for IoT  device authentication.
> Therefore, is it possible for IANA to assign value for above TLS
> registries and OID for ECCSI since ECCSI is specified by IETF?
> 
> Please give us some suggestion on the OID and TLS registries updating issues.
>
> Below is the link to our recently uploaded draft. 
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-03.txt
>

Some other comments:

- Why is this seemi~ngly only specified for TLS 1.2? I am not seeing any
  obstacles to porting this to TLS 1.3 in fairly straightforward
  manner. The only problematic aspects I see are:
  - Using SignatureAlgorithm, but I do not think that would work in
    TLS 1.2 either (use SignatureScheme instead).
  - The weird preference signaling for client signature via
    ciphersuite.
  For TLS 1.3, new ciphersuites, key exchange algorithms and client
  certificate types would be unnecressary (the last two do not even
  exist in TLS 1.3, with first the standard algorithms should work).
- Section 2 references RFC 2119 and not RFC 8174 (I have seen complaints
  about this).
- Section 2 seems to be missing "NOT RECOMMENDED" (or if the list is
  supposed to be minimal, "RECOMMENDED" does not seem to be used
  anywhere (this is actually an errata on RFC 2119).
- Section 3 has "SubjectECCSIPublicKeyInfo" in figure 1 title. I
  suppose that should be "subjectPublicKeyInfo"?
- Section 3 has mechanism to fetch the parameters from URL. Those
  parameters should be strongly checksummed (e.g., SHA-256). Also, the
  risks of fetching information from URL as part of handshake (probing,
  pointing at some large file, etc...) should be considered.
- Section 4 references RFC 4492. Use RFC 8422 instead.
- Section 4 defines AES-CBC cihpersuites. No new ciphersuites using
  AES-CBC are to be defined. Use AES-GCM and/or Chacha20-Poly1305
  instead. The usual hash algorithms are SHA-384 for AES-256-GCM and
  SHA-256 for AES-128-GCM and Chacha20-Poly1305.
- Section 5 has "ANSI.1 structure for CertificateRequest" I presume
  that should be "TLS 1.2 structure for CertificateRequest". 
- Section 5: Since eccsi_sign in ClientCertificateType is actual
  codepoint, but no value is known, it presumably should be
  "eccsi_sign(TBD1)".
- Section 5: I do not think SignatureAlgorithm can be obtained.
  One should use SignatureScheme instead. And if it is indeed
  fixed to SHA-256, it should be specified as "eccsi_sha256(TBD2)"
  or something like that. And then specify TLS 1.2 to use whatever
  HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithm that SignatureScheme gets read
  as).
- Section 6 has example url of "pkgx.org/1.html". I presume that
  should be something like "http://pkgx.example/1.pkg" or thereabouts.
- Section 6.2: Negotiatating client preference for signature types
  using ciphersuites looks very odd. If server used X.509, but 
  supported both ECDSA and ECSSI for client, it would pick ECDSA
  ciphersuite and include both ECDSA and ECSSI in CertificateRequest,
  and then the client would pick. Alternatively the server could
  include only ECSSI in CertificateRequest if it demanded ECSSI from
  the client (the ciphersuite could still be ECDSA one).
- Section 8 has obsolete registration policy information. None of
  the registeries are "standards action" anymore, all the existing
  ones are "specification required". One should also duplicate all
  requested codepoints in this section.


-Ilari


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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: "ilariliusvaara@welho.com" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated
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Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2018 08:09:52 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated
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From nobody Thu Dec 27 06:58:34 2018
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated
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Haiguang:

Like Ilari, I am a bit confused about the specification for TLS 1.2 but =
not TLS 1.3.  It seems that the pros and cons of an identity-based =
approach are the same in bot environments.

When I quickly went through the document, I did not understand client =
authentication.  I guess I can figure it out for server-to-server mutual =
authentication, where both servers are identified by domain names.  What =
is the form of the identity in other cases?

Russ


> On Dec 26, 2018, at 4:00 AM, Wang Haiguang =
<wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hello, everyone
>=20
> We have just updated the internet draft for "Using Identity as Raw =
Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)".=20
>=20
> In this draft, we propose to use the Identity as raw public key, which =
further simplifies authentication and identity management of large scale =
IoT devices.=20
>=20
> The updating are mainly in the IANA consideration part.=20
>=20
> We have some IANA related issues that need expert from this group to =
help:
> 1) TLS protocol require OID to identify an signature algorithm used in =
authentication and key exchange.=20
>     However, the identity-based signature algorithm (ECCSI) specified =
by IETF in RFC 6507 does not have an OID yet.=20
>     We have written to IANA for consideration but do not get it yet.=20=

> 2) TLS cipher suites and a  few TLS registries need to be updated =
also, by adding in the relative names for ECCSI:=20
>     * TLS  cipher suites
>     * TLS TLS KeyExchangeAlgorithm Registry
>     * TLS ClientCertificateType Registry
>     * TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry
>=20
> Although the draft is still personal draft , some telecom customer =
want to use TLS+ECCSI in their network for IoT=20
> device authentication. Therefore, is it possible for IANA to assign =
value for above TLS registries and OID for ECCSI since ECCSI is =
specified by IETF?
>=20
> Please give us some suggestion on the OID and TLS registries updating =
issues.
>=20
> Below is the link to our recently uploaded draft.=20
> =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ib=
c-03.txt
>=20
>=20
> Best regards.
>=20
> Haiguang
>=20


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Subject: [TLS] ct_compliant cached info field
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--000000000000cbcaaa057e04b2f7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks

Please take a look at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-30#section-6.5
which defines a new "ct_compliant" cached info extension. This sort of
overloads the cached info mechanism (one might say "abuses"), so needs
review by the TLS WG.

-Ekr

--000000000000cbcaaa057e04b2f7
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks</div><div><br></div><div>Pl=
ease take a look at <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans=
-rfc6962-bis-30#section-6.5">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-r=
fc6962-bis-30#section-6.5</a></div><div>which defines a new &quot;ct_compli=
ant&quot; cached info extension. This sort of overloads the cached info mec=
hanism (one might say &quot;abuses&quot;), so needs review by the TLS WG.<b=
r></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><=
/div>

--000000000000cbcaaa057e04b2f7--


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From: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2018 17:06:17 +1100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ct_compliant cached info field
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On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, at 04:58, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Please take a look at
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-30#section-6.5

At a minimum, this would seem to update cached_info.

There's not a lot of meat on this text.  It seems to be saying that if you are providing transparency_info, then you can provide a certificate other than any of the certificates that the client believes to be CT compliant.  Also, you don't provide "x509_sct_v2" or "precert_sct_v2" in transparency_info.

How is the client then able to determine that this new certificate is CT compliant?  Using  "inclusion_proof_v2" and "signed_tree_head_v2" (or one or other)?  If so, the text doesn't point in that direction.

There's a lot of "why" missing in this document.  Why would a client choose to indicate "ct_compliant"?  Why is cached_info being extended in this way?

I might guess that the reason here is that the draft aims to avoid including information that might change over time, which would render caches invalid.  Isn't that motivation to recommend an SCT over an STH?

Separately, why does this establish a new registry for signature schemes?  It is obviously trying to keep TLS compatibility, based on the codepoints, but forking the registry is a great way to create problems.


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2018 06:36:54 -0800
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+ trans

On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 10:06 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

>
> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, at 04:58, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Please take a look at
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-30#section-6.5
>
> At a minimum, this would seem to update cached_info.
>
> There's not a lot of meat on this text.  It seems to be saying that if you
> are providing transparency_info, then you can provide a certificate other
> than any of the certificates that the client believes to be CT compliant.
> Also, you don't provide "x509_sct_v2" or "precert_sct_v2" in
> transparency_info.
>
> How is the client then able to determine that this new certificate is CT
> compliant?  Using  "inclusion_proof_v2" and "signed_tree_head_v2" (or one
> or other)?  If so, the text doesn't point in that direction.
>
> There's a lot of "why" missing in this document.  Why would a client
> choose to indicate "ct_compliant"?  Why is cached_info being extended in
> this way?
>
> I might guess that the reason here is that the draft aims to avoid
> including information that might change over time, which would render
> caches invalid.  Isn't that motivation to recommend an SCT over an STH?
>
> Separately, why does this establish a new registry for signature schemes?
> It is obviously trying to keep TLS compatibility, based on the codepoints,
> but forking the registry is a great way to create problems.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">+ trans<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 10:06 PM Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:mt@lowentropy.net">mt@lowentropy.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, at 04:58, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; Please take a look at<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-30=
#section-6.5" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-30#section-6.5</a><br>
<br>
At a minimum, this would seem to update cached_info.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s not a lot of meat on this text.=C2=A0 It seems to be saying tha=
t if you are providing transparency_info, then you can provide a certificat=
e other than any of the certificates that the client believes to be CT comp=
liant.=C2=A0 Also, you don&#39;t provide &quot;x509_sct_v2&quot; or &quot;p=
recert_sct_v2&quot; in transparency_info.<br>
<br>
How is the client then able to determine that this new certificate is CT co=
mpliant?=C2=A0 Using=C2=A0 &quot;inclusion_proof_v2&quot; and &quot;signed_=
tree_head_v2&quot; (or one or other)?=C2=A0 If so, the text doesn&#39;t poi=
nt in that direction.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s a lot of &quot;why&quot; missing in this document.=C2=A0 Why wo=
uld a client choose to indicate &quot;ct_compliant&quot;?=C2=A0 Why is cach=
ed_info being extended in this way?<br>
<br>
I might guess that the reason here is that the draft aims to avoid includin=
g information that might change over time, which would render caches invali=
d.=C2=A0 Isn&#39;t that motivation to recommend an SCT over an STH?<br>
<br>
Separately, why does this establish a new registry for signature schemes?=
=C2=A0 It is obviously trying to keep TLS compatibility, based on the codep=
oints, but forking the registry is a great way to create problems.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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