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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 08:57:23 -0800
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To: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/q8QqXCN7T834O57GlcgZiNpotj0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 11:34 PM Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Chris,
>
> Thank you for writing down the PRs describing possible designs that we
> might adopt. I think it helps a lot in understanding the details and
> making accurate comparisons.
>
> My comments inline.
>
> 2019=E5=B9=B42=E6=9C=8827=E6=97=A5(=E6=B0=B4) 8:19 Christopher Wood <chri=
stopherwood07@gmail.com>:
> >
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > Below are two PRs that seek to address the multi-CDN issue discussed
> > on this list and in meetings:
> >
> >    1. https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/136
> >    2. https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/137
> >
> > #136 implements the combined or stapled record approach discussed
> > several times, most recently in [1]. It includes these via an ESNIKeys
> > extension.
>
> Reading the PR, I think that there is a mild privacy concern. The
> issue with the unified record proposal is that it incentivizes the
> operators to create more ESNI records possibly using different keys,
> which is against the design principle of ESNI: provide anonymity set
> by using the least number of keys.
>
> Retaining address resolution unbundled with ESNI incentivizes the
> operator to use less number of keys; for example they might just use
> one key at a time. That would be a nice property to have, especially
> in terms of transparency. It would help third parties verify that an
> operator is actually providing an anonymity set (rather than just
> pretending to use ESNI).

I don't quite agree with this. Operators can already use different
keys across records if they so choose. That said, given the concern,
we could add advisory text suggesting that operators use as few ESNI
keys as possible to cover addresses.

> Also, I would like to point out that it is only when one key is used
> by each of the provider at a given time that it would be possible to
> use ESNI from a network that blocks DoH or DoT; a user can write the
> IP addresses of services he/she wants to access in the hosts file, and
> supply the ESNI key to the client he/she uses. Such a hack becomes
> difficult under the unified approach, where operators could synthesize
> different keys based on various conditions.

Good point!

>
> At the least, if we are to adopt #136, I think we should change the
> definition of record digest included in the ClientHello extension so
> that it does not cover the "address_set" extension of the ESNI record.
> Otherwise, we would be exposing to the wire the fingerprint of the set
> of IP addresses contained in the DNS response the client received
> through a secure channel, whereas in the split record approach you
> only leak the ESNI key being used and the IP address the client has
> chosen.

I'm not sure this is an issue. Clients that use HappyEyeballs will
already reveal the set of addresses by attempting to connect to them.

> As much as I like the idea of bundling IP addresses and ESNI key, I am
> concerned if the requirement to bundle different types of records is a
> requirement specific to ESNI. If not, I think we should (in the long
> term) try to create a generic solution, while in the short time we
> could rely on a more limited mechanism as proposed in #137.

In my view, since these are both extensions, they can both proceed in
parallel. If some operators can support #136, and can do so without
creating many ESNI keys, then I think it's worth including. Operators
for which this is not a concern do not need to support the extension,
right?

> > #137 builds on this design with a mechanism that lets
> > clients detect and recover from A/AAAA and ESNI mismatch (if desired).
> > It is certainly more complex in several respects. A third variant,
> > which is not (yet) in PR form, is a simplification of #137 wherein
> > ESNIKeys addresses are only used as filters, instead of filters *or*
> > complete addresses.
>
> I think using IP address blocks to limit the validity of the ESNI key
> is a fine approach. I do not oppose to having a name-based filter if
> it's impossible for certain operators to apply the IP address-based
> filtering approach.

Indeed -- that's the only reason the name exists.

Best,
Chris


From nobody Fri Mar  1 13:16:10 2019
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Subject: [TLS] tls - Requested sessions have been scheduled for IETF 104
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Dear Christopher Wood,

The session(s) that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by
the original request. 


    tls Session 1 (1:00 requested)
    Monday, 25 March 2019, Morning Session II 1120-1220
    Room Name: Congress Hall 2 size: 350
    ---------------------------------------------
    tls Session 2 (2:00 requested)
    Tuesday, 26 March 2019, Afternoon Session II 1610-1810
    Room Name: Congress Hall 2 size: 350
    ---------------------------------------------


iCalendar: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/104/sessions/tls.ics

Request Information:


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: Transport Layer Security
Area Name: Security Area
Session Requester: Christopher Wood

Number of Sessions: 2
Length of Session(s):  2 Hours, 1 Hour
Number of Attendees: 120
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 First Priority: teep taps suit secdispatch saag stir rtcweb quic perc mls httpbis dnsop tokbind dispatch curdle cfrg acme uta git
 Second Priority: dprive ace
 Third Priority: tcpinc lamps sidrops


People who must be present:
  Eric Rescorla
  Rich Salz
  Sean Turner
  Joseph A. Salowey
  Yoav Nir
  Benjamin Kaduk
  Christopher A. Wood
  Nick Sullivan

Resources Requested:

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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Hiya,

On 01/03/2019 23:19, Mike Bishop wrote:
> Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think
> we all have varying knowledge gaps.
Doubtless. I confess lots of ignorance as to how CDNs operate.

>=20
> *   There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA
> records and CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update
> complexities on the part of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI
> query for your domain to their ESNI record, but you can certainly
> directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys in your domain if you prefer.  No=
thing
> should preclude that.`

I agree that we need something that works for both. As there
are meta-issues with some privacy mechanisms encouraging more
centralisation, I think it's important that we be explicit in
considering such, as we've been doing here. (To simplify and
paraphrase it a bit: part of my position is that "nothing
should preclude" is too weak - ESNI needs to work for both - to
the extent possible.)

> *   The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when
> the ESNI record and the A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains
> and you get the records from different hosts.  Of course, if we move
> to an ESNI RRType with the same hostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s
> hopefully a single CNAME chain that gets cached at the resolver and
> used when looking up both queries.  If they remain separate
> hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to diverge.=20

I agree with all you say except the first one of the two words "the
issue" - there is more than one issue at play I'd say:-)

> *
> It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wit=
h returning a
> subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, some CDNs
> return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the
> load-balancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to
> different targets based on the desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s n=
ot a
> behavior that maps well to DNSsec as I understand it.  You mention
> DNSsec signing your domain as part of why you have issues with the
> proposal, but I think this is an open issue beyond ESNI or these
> PRs.

It seems I didn't explain myself so well. For my setup the fact
that I support DNSSEC (and hence periodic re-signing) makes it
easier for me to support periodically acquiring and (re-)publishing
ESNIKeys from multiple sources. So having an existing DNSSEC setup
helps here.

Other than that, I'm not sure DNSSEC and ESNI have so much to do
with one another, given that DNSSEC really doesn't provide any
cryptographic linkage when things like MX or CNAME are used in the
DNS.

> Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how
> all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely
> bumps here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions=
 to
> answer, or maybe changes to the structure of the record are
> warranted.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in
> these records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you
> that we have to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s=
 agree
> on content first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to
> see whether the content can be more pleasantly arranged.

I'm not quite sure what you mean but I can think of two things:-

1. I have argued about how the content and structure of ESNIKeys
can affect deployment models and manageability, and do think that
now is the time to consider both. I maintain that position. And
my main points in this thread have all been about how the structure
of ESNIKeys could affect deployment models.

2. I think I explicitly said I'm fine with the encoding (TXT vs new
RRTYPE) being handled later. The same goes for a lot of other aspects
of the structure of ESNIKeys (but not all). There were a bunch of
mails though, so it's likely easy to miss that;-)

Cheers,
S.


>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message----- From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf
> Of Stephen Farrell Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2019 2:50 AM To: Eric
> Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org> Subject:
> Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Hiya,
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On 28/02/2019 02:40, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
>> On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 5:56 PM Stephen Farrell
>=20
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie<mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>>
>=20
>> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>> Hiya,
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>> On 28/02/2019 01:41, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
>>>> I think you're misunderstanding the scenario here: we have two
>>>> CDNs
>=20
>>>> A and B, and some switching service in front, so that when you
>=20
>>>> lookup
>=20
>>> example.com,
>=20
>>>> you get a CNAME to A or B, and then you get the ESNIKeySet
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>> (ESNIKeySet is a type you've just invented I guess?)
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>> No. I forgot it was named ESNIKeys
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Phew:-)
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>>> for A or B as
>=20
>>>> the case may be. So you're not going to get both ESNIKeys
>>>> values.
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>> Yes, that's not the model I had in mind. I don't recall that
>>> having
>=20
>>> been written down but maybe I missed it. (Where should I look?)
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>> I believe this was discussed in Bangkok during the discussion of
>=20
>> problems with the current structure.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> FWIW, I didn't take from that discussion that we only want that model
> to be supported, but it may have passed me by if that was stated.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>> The model I had in mind was where the hidden site has it's own
>>> DNS
>=20
>>> operator but >1 CDN/front-site with each of those having a
>>> private
>=20
>>> ESNI value. (And if there's some front-end DNS cleverness, it'd
>>> kick
>=20
>>> in when the CNAME from #137 is being chased down.)
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>> I don't see how this is conflicts with what I said above, as that
>=20
>> server still needs to ensure consistency.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I don't think mine conflicts with the model you describe, but I do
> think it has different consequences for how we ought structure the
> ESNIKeys stuff.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> To be more specific, say in my model I have example.com and want to
> see ESNI used for www.example.com<http://www.example.com> and I
> publish the zone for example.com including ESNIKeys.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Now I want browsers to be able to use either cdn1.example or
> cdn2.example to front for www.example.com<http://www.example.com>
> where those are independent CDNs.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> So I need to update my DNS zone periodically whenever one or other
> CDN changes their ESNI public key share.
>=20
> In my tiny little case doing this for a few domains, I already have a
> small infrastructure that allows me to do that kind of thing because
> of the need for regular DNSSEC re-signing. (Mine currently works at a
> weekly or daily cadence, but doing it hourly would be fine.)
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I'd like to do that via a simple update to my zone files without
> having to unpack and re-pack the data structures I get from cdn1 or
> cdn2. Now sure, I could write a new tool to munge together what I get
> from the CDNs but that's more work (that could go wrong) and doesn't
> match my current work flows. And I suspect others may operate
> similarly.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> That's what leads me to think that we'd be better off to have
> multi-valued answers when a browser looks up the RRset at
> _esni.www.example.com with each separate value matching one ESNI
> public share (or one CDN, though I'd argue for one share per zone
> file stanza).
>=20
>=20
>=20
> I don't think that conflicts with your model where
> _esni.www.example.com is one or another CNAME at a given moment but
> it does differ from it.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> There is however some dependency on #137 to get what I want I guess
> using the host_pointer to get the privacy benefit of using a CDN. I
> guess I might need to publish yet another ESNI public share that
> matches the private available at the A/AAAA of
> www.example.com<http://www.example.com> as well as those from the CDN
> even though that may get me less privacy benefit compared to browsers
> who go to cdn1 or cdn2. (It's possible that I'm reading
>=20
> #137 wrong though, but I read it as supporting the kind of setup I
> describe here.)
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> In any case, the model I am describing has a consistency problem
>> which
>=20
>> needs to be addressed.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>> PS: I nonetheless maintain my points about the current ESNIKeys
>=20
>>> structure - it's over generic and over complex and these PRs can
>>> only
>=20
>>> make that worse:-)
>=20
>>>=20
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>> Yes, I am aware this is your opinion, but I don't agree.
>=20
> Fair enough:-) Personally I think that if we support the kind of
> model above, such simplifications may well naturally fall out of that
> work but we'll see I guess.
>=20
> For example, I think that'd allow re-structuring the ESNIKeys thing
> so the host_pointer in #137 no longer needs to be an extension and
> hence we don't need the concept of mandatory/critical extensions at
> all.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Cheers,
>=20
> S.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>=20
>> -Ekr
>=20
>>=20

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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Cg==


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From: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 18:26:52 -0800
Message-ID: <CAO8oSX=2N=_wvf3L=o6ou=zJaSHE4zpgQDK38QO99+ausYmEpQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,  "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
>
> Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we al=
l have varying knowledge gaps.
>
> There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA records and=
 CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update complexities on the part of =
the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain to their ESNI =
record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys in your=
 domain if you prefer.  Nothing should preclude that.
> The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and the=
 A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records from d=
ifferent hosts.  Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the same host=
name (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain that gets c=
ached at the resolver and used when looking up both queries.  If they remai=
n separate hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to diverge=
.
> It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well with =
returning a subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, some =
CDNs return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the load-b=
alancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different targets ba=
sed on the desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s not a behavior that maps =
well to DNSsec as I understand it.  You mention DNSsec signing your domain =
as part of why you have issues with the proposal, but I think this is an op=
en issue beyond ESNI or these PRs.
>
> Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how all=
 that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bumps her=
e we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answer, o=
r maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.
>
> However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in thes=
e records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you that we have=
 to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s agree on conten=
t first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see whether the c=
ontent can be more pleasantly arranged.

Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content
of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we
essentially have the following:

- #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,
at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,
A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.
- #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI
since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records
dictate routing.

With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI
for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS
query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their
A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only
get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with
correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones
that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.

Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:
Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records
control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said
operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.

Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137
right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use
them, and see what works best in practice.

Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and
possible tradeoffs.

Best,
Chris


From nobody Fri Mar  1 18:39:22 2019
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In-Reply-To: <CAO8oSX=2N=_wvf3L=o6ou=zJaSHE4zpgQDK38QO99+ausYmEpQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 18:39:04 -0800
Message-ID: <CAFDDyk_57De_xkXQmhfL_GdojMG0j-=RBhoTFReiCHyArobYWQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.co=
m>
wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
> >
> > Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we
> all have varying knowledge gaps.
> >
> > There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA records
> and CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update complexities on the par=
t
> of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain to their
> ESNI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys =
in your
> domain if you prefer.  Nothing should preclude that.
> > The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and t=
he A/AAAA
> record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records from differe=
nt
> hosts.  Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the same hostname (s=
ee
> #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain that gets cached at=
 the
> resolver and used when looking up both queries.  If they remain separate
> hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to diverge.
> > It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wit=
h returning a
> subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, some CDNs retur=
n
> DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the load-balancing s=
ervers
> will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different targets based on the
> desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s not a behavior that maps well to D=
NSsec as I
> understand it.  You mention DNSsec signing your domain as part of why you
> have issues with the proposal, but I think this is an open issue beyond
> ESNI or these PRs.
> >
> > Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how
> all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bump=
s
> here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answ=
er, or
> maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.
> >
> > However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in
> these records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you that w=
e
> have to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s agree on =
content
> first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see whether the
> content can be more pleasantly arranged.
>
> Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content
> of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we
> essentially have the following:
>
> - #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,
> at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,
> A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.
> - #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI
> since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records
> dictate routing.
>
> With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI
> for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS
> query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their
> A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only
> get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with
> correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones
> that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.
>
> Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:
> Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records
> control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said
> operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.


Thanks for the summary, Chris.

Speaking for Cloudflare, we prefer the method described in #136 and would
be willing to implement ESNI records this way.

I have sympathy for organizations with a preference for #137 for
debuggability reasons, but I would rather avoid situations in which the
client needs to do an additional DNS query if avoidable.

I would support the option to include either extension based on operator
preference.


> Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137
> right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use
> them, and see what works best in practice.
>
> Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and
> possible tradeoffs.
>
> Best,
> Chris
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--000000000000f1b2f00583136dba
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:christopherwood07@gmail.com">christopherwood07@gmail.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at =
3:19 PM Mike Bishop &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mbishop@evequefou.be" target=3D"_=
blank">mbishop@evequefou.be</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we=
 all have varying knowledge gaps.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:=C2=A0 Direct A/AAAA rec=
ords and CNAMEs.=C2=A0 The easiest way to handle key update complexities on=
 the part of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain t=
o their ESNI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s=
 keys in your domain if you prefer.=C2=A0 Nothing should preclude that.<br>
&gt; The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and =
the A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records fro=
m different hosts.=C2=A0 Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the s=
ame hostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain tha=
t gets cached at the resolver and used when looking up both queries.=C2=A0 =
If they remain separate hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for th=
em to diverge.<br>
&gt; It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wi=
th returning a subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.=C2=A0 Howeve=
r, some CDNs return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; th=
e load-balancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different ta=
rgets based on the desired traffic share.=C2=A0 That=E2=80=99s not a behavi=
or that maps well to DNSsec as I understand it.=C2=A0 You mention DNSsec si=
gning your domain as part of why you have issues with the proposal, but I t=
hink this is an open issue beyond ESNI or these PRs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how =
all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bumps =
here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answer=
, or maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in t=
hese records and how clients make use of it.=C2=A0 I disagree with you that=
 we have to resolve both questions at the same time.=C2=A0 Let=E2=80=99s ag=
ree on content first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see =
whether the content can be more pleasantly arranged.<br>
<br>
Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content<br>
of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we<br>
essentially have the following:<br>
<br>
- #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,<br>
at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,<br>
A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.<br>
- #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI<br>
since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records<br>
dictate routing.<br>
<br>
With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI<br>
for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS<br>
query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their<br>
A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only<br>
get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with<br>
correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones<br>
that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.<br>
<br>
Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:<br>
Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records<br>
control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said<br>
operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.</blockquote><div><br></d=
iv>Thanks for the summary, Chris.<br><br>Speaking for Cloudflare,=C2=A0we p=
refer the method=C2=A0described in #136 and would be willing to implement E=
SNI records this way.<div><br></div><div>I have sympathy for organizations =
with a preference for #137 for debuggability reasons, but I would rather av=
oid situations in which the client needs to do an additional DNS query if a=
voidable.</div><div><br></div><div>I would support the option to include ei=
ther extension based on operator preference.</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137<br>
right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use<br>
them, and see what works best in practice.<br>
<br>
Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and<br>
possible tradeoffs.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br></a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 19:19:06 -0800
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On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:39 PM Nick Sullivan <nick=3D
40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood <
> christopherwood07@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
>> >
>> > Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we
>> all have varying knowledge gaps.
>> >
>> > There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA records
>> and CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update complexities on the pa=
rt
>> of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain to their
>> ESNI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys=
 in your
>> domain if you prefer.  Nothing should preclude that.
>> > The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and =
the
>> A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records from
>> different hosts.  Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the same
>> hostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain that=
 gets
>> cached at the resolver and used when looking up both queries.  If they
>> remain separate hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to
>> diverge.
>> > It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wi=
th returning a
>> subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, some CDNs retu=
rn
>> DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the load-balancing =
servers
>> will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different targets based on the
>> desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s not a behavior that maps well to =
DNSsec as I
>> understand it.  You mention DNSsec signing your domain as part of why yo=
u
>> have issues with the proposal, but I think this is an open issue beyond
>> ESNI or these PRs.
>> >
>> > Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how
>> all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bum=
ps
>> here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to ans=
wer, or
>> maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.
>> >
>> > However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in
>> these records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you that =
we
>> have to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s agree on=
 content
>> first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see whether the
>> content can be more pleasantly arranged.
>>
>> Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content
>> of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we
>> essentially have the following:
>>
>> - #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,
>> at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,
>> A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.
>> - #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI
>> since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records
>> dictate routing.
>>
>> With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI
>> for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS
>> query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their
>> A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only
>> get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with
>> correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones
>> that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.
>>
>> Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:
>> Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records
>> control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said
>> operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.
>
>
> Thanks for the summary, Chris.
>
> Speaking for Cloudflare, we prefer the method described in #136 and would
> be willing to implement ESNI records this way.
>
> I have sympathy for organizations with a preference for #137 for
> debuggability reasons, but I would rather avoid situations in which the
> client needs to do an additional DNS query if avoidable.
>
> I would support the option to include either extension based on operator
> preference.
>

This more or less aligns with my views.

>From my perspective, we know that #136 is safe, although it may be
inconvenient for some operators, and it's not clear to me that #137 can be
made to work without frequently incurring another serialized DNS query. If
we had some evidence to the contrary, I would be somewhat more favorable to
#137, though I would probably still prefer #136 for reasons of simplicity,
especially as we can always add #137 later if it proves viable.

-Ekr


>
>> Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137
>> right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use
>> them, and see what works best in practice.
>>
>> Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and
>> possible tradeoffs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Chris
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000c3e6b3058313fe06
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:39 PM Nick Sulli=
van &lt;nick=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank">40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 1, =
2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:christopherwood07@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">christopherwood07@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 a=
t 3:19 PM Mike Bishop &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mbishop@evequefou.be" target=3D=
"_blank">mbishop@evequefou.be</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we=
 all have varying knowledge gaps.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:=C2=A0 Direct A/AAAA rec=
ords and CNAMEs.=C2=A0 The easiest way to handle key update complexities on=
 the part of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain t=
o their ESNI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s=
 keys in your domain if you prefer.=C2=A0 Nothing should preclude that.<br>
&gt; The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and =
the A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records fro=
m different hosts.=C2=A0 Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the s=
ame hostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain tha=
t gets cached at the resolver and used when looking up both queries.=C2=A0 =
If they remain separate hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for th=
em to diverge.<br>
&gt; It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wi=
th returning a subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.=C2=A0 Howeve=
r, some CDNs return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; th=
e load-balancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different ta=
rgets based on the desired traffic share.=C2=A0 That=E2=80=99s not a behavi=
or that maps well to DNSsec as I understand it.=C2=A0 You mention DNSsec si=
gning your domain as part of why you have issues with the proposal, but I t=
hink this is an open issue beyond ESNI or these PRs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how =
all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bumps =
here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answer=
, or maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in t=
hese records and how clients make use of it.=C2=A0 I disagree with you that=
 we have to resolve both questions at the same time.=C2=A0 Let=E2=80=99s ag=
ree on content first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see =
whether the content can be more pleasantly arranged.<br>
<br>
Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content<br>
of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we<br>
essentially have the following:<br>
<br>
- #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,<br>
at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,<br>
A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.<br>
- #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI<br>
since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records<br>
dictate routing.<br>
<br>
With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI<br>
for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS<br>
query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their<br>
A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only<br>
get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with<br>
correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones<br>
that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.<br>
<br>
Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:<br>
Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records<br>
control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said<br>
operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.</blockquote><div><br></d=
iv>Thanks for the summary, Chris.<br><br>Speaking for Cloudflare,=C2=A0we p=
refer the method=C2=A0described in #136 and would be willing to implement E=
SNI records this way.<div><br></div><div>I have sympathy for organizations =
with a preference for #137 for debuggability reasons, but I would rather av=
oid situations in which the client needs to do an additional DNS query if a=
voidable.</div><div><br></div><div>I would support the option to include ei=
ther extension based on operator preference.</div></div></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>This more or less aligns with my views.</div><div=
><br></div><div>From my perspective, we know that #136 is safe, although it=
 may be inconvenient for some operators, and it&#39;s not clear to me that =
#137 can be made to work without frequently incurring another serialized DN=
S query. If we had some evidence to the contrary, I would be somewhat more =
favorable to #137, though I would probably still prefer #136 for reasons of=
 simplicity, especially as we can always add #137 later if it proves viable=
.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137<br>
right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use<br>
them, and see what works best in practice.<br>
<br>
Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and<br>
possible tradeoffs.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br></a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000c3e6b3058313fe06--


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From: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 12:56:37 -0800
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To: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:03 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:

> Totally agree that we want to avoid the extra DNS round-trip as often as
> possible.  However, I see the options in the opposite light =E2=80=93 if =
all you
> need is #136, then you can put exact addresses into #137 and get the same
> behavior.
>

Sure, but if the error rate is too high, then people will just not do ESNI
with the non-exact address version, so you've absorbed complexity for
nothing.

i'd also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges are
really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive.


The question is whether the additional capabilities of #137 are safe and
> needed.  Depending how much later #137 is added, we may wind up needing t=
o
> support both, which would be=E2=80=A6 suboptimal.
>

I actually don't think that's so bad. The complexity of the union of 136
and 137 isn't actually much  more than the complexity of 137, especially if
the client just omits step 1 of the 137 algorithm (for exact addresses).

I think what will swing the needle on safety =E2=80=93 how often there=E2=
=80=99s divergence
> =E2=80=93 lies in how the record is positioned.  Two problems with the cu=
rrent
> approach that I see:
>
>    - Correct me if I=E2=80=99m wrong, but I don=E2=80=99t believe the ali=
as is allowed to
>    have subdomains.  If www.example.com is a CNAME, then _
>    esni.www.example.com cannot exist, can it?
>    - Even presuming that it did, or that it weren=E2=80=99t a subdomain, =
it would
>    follow its own CNAME chain which might not lead to the correct provide=
r.
>
>
My understanding is that there was consensus to remove _esni, just that we
didn't get around to it because of this issue.


>
> If, however, the ESNIKeys RRType is resolved by following the CNAME from
> the host, it depends on how often two queries for two different RRTypes o=
n
> the same hostname follow different CNAME chains.  We have a ready-made wa=
y
> to test that =E2=80=93 A and AAAA.  I have an idea where we can get some =
data on
> that.
>

Great. I would be interested in seeing that.

-Ekr


>
> *From:* TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of * Eric Rescorla
> *Sent:* Friday, March 1, 2019 7:19 PM
> *To:* Nick Sullivan <nick=3D40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> *Cc:* <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:39 PM Nick Sullivan <nick=3D
> 40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood <
> christopherwood07@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
> >
> > Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we
> all have varying knowledge gaps.
> >
> > There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA records
> and CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update complexities on the par=
t
> of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain to their
> ESNI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys =
in your
> domain if you prefer.  Nothing should preclude that.
> > The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and t=
he A/AAAA
> record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records from differe=
nt
> hosts.  Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the same hostname (s=
ee
> #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain that gets cached at=
 the
> resolver and used when looking up both queries.  If they remain separate
> hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to diverge.
> > It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wit=
h returning a
> subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, some CDNs retur=
n
> DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the load-balancing s=
ervers
> will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different targets based on the
> desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s not a behavior that maps well to D=
NSsec as I
> understand it.  You mention DNSsec signing your domain as part of why you
> have issues with the proposal, but I think this is an open issue beyond
> ESNI or these PRs.
> >
> > Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how
> all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bump=
s
> here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answ=
er, or
> maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.
> >
> > However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in
> these records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you that w=
e
> have to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s agree on =
content
> first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see whether the
> content can be more pleasantly arranged.
>
> Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content
> of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we
> essentially have the following:
>
> - #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,
> at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,
> A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.
> - #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI
> since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records
> dictate routing.
>
> With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI
> for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS
> query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their
> A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only
> get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with
> correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones
> that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.
>
> Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:
> Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records
> control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said
> operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.
>
>
>
> Thanks for the summary, Chris.
>
> Speaking for Cloudflare, we prefer the method described in #136 and would
> be willing to implement ESNI records this way.
>
>
>
> I have sympathy for organizations with a preference for #137 for
> debuggability reasons, but I would rather avoid situations in which the
> client needs to do an additional DNS query if avoidable.
>
>
>
> I would support the option to include either extension based on operator
> preference.
>
>
>
> This more or less aligns with my views.
>
>
>
> From my perspective, we know that #136 is safe, although it may be
> inconvenient for some operators, and it's not clear to me that #137 can b=
e
> made to work without frequently incurring another serialized DNS query. I=
f
> we had some evidence to the contrary, I would be somewhat more favorable =
to
> #137, though I would probably still prefer #136 for reasons of simplicity=
,
> especially as we can always add #137 later if it proves viable..
>
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137
> right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use
> them, and see what works best in practice.
>
> Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and
> possible tradeoffs.
>
> Best,
> Chris
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

--000000000000957c89058322c478
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:03 PM Mike =
Bishop &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mbishop@evequefou.be">mbishop@evequefou.be</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_7124260424930216602WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Totally agree that we want to avoid the extra DNS ro=
und-trip as often as possible.=C2=A0 However, I see the options in the oppo=
site light =E2=80=93 if all you need is #136, then you can put exact addres=
ses into #137 and get the same behavior.=C2=A0</p></div></div></blockquote>=
<div><br></div>Sure, but if the error rate is too high, then people will ju=
st not do ESNI with the non-exact address version, so you&#39;ve absorbed c=
omplexity for nothing.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">i&#39;d also like to hear from CDNs about whether their ad=
dress ranges are really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobi=
tive.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_7124260424930216602Wo=
rdSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"> The question
 is whether the additional capabilities of #137 are safe and needed.=C2=A0 =
Depending how much later #137 is added, we may wind up needing to support b=
oth, which would be=E2=80=A6 suboptimal.</p></div></div></blockquote><div><=
br></div><div>I actually don&#39;t think that&#39;s so bad. The complexity =
of the union of 136 and 137 isn&#39;t actually much=C2=A0 more than the com=
plexity of 137, especially if the client just omits step 1 of the 137 algor=
ithm (for exact addresses).<br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_71242=
60424930216602WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think what will swing =
the needle on safety =E2=80=93 how often there=E2=80=99s divergence =E2=80=
=93 lies in how the record is positioned.=C2=A0 Two problems with the curre=
nt approach that I see:<u></u><u></u></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_7124260424930216602MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0in">Correct me if I=E2=80=99m wrong, but I don=E2=80=99t believe the a=
lias is allowed to have subdomains.=C2=A0 If
<a href=3D"http://www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a> is=
 a CNAME, then _<a href=3D"http://esni.www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">e=
sni.www.example.com</a> cannot exist, can it?<u></u><u></u></li><li class=
=3D"gmail-m_7124260424930216602MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in">=
Even presuming that it did, or that it weren=E2=80=99t a subdomain, it woul=
d follow its own CNAME chain which might not lead to the correct provider.<=
/li></ul></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>My understanding is t=
hat there was consensus to remove _esni, just that we didn&#39;t get around=
 to it because of this issue.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_71242604=
24930216602WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If, however, the ESNIKeys RRType is resolved by foll=
owing the CNAME from the host, it depends on how often two queries for two =
different RRTypes on the same hostname follow different CNAME chains.=C2=A0=
 We have a ready-made way to test that
 =E2=80=93 A and AAAA.=C2=A0 I have an idea where we can get some data on t=
hat.<u></u><u></u></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Great. I=
 would be interested in seeing that.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><di=
v><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"=
EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_7124260424930216602WordSection1"><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@i=
etf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b=
>
Eric Rescorla<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 1, 2019 7:19 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Nick Sullivan &lt;nick=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40cloudflare.com@dmar=
c.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:39 PM Nick Sullivan &lt;nic=
k=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40=
cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rg=
b(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium=
 medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:christopherwood07@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">christophe=
rwood07@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rg=
b(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium=
 medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:mbishop@evequefou.be" target=3D"_blank">mbishop@evequefou.be</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we=
 all have varying knowledge gaps.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:=C2=A0 Direct A/AAAA rec=
ords and CNAMEs.=C2=A0 The easiest way to handle key update complexities on=
 the part of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain t=
o their ESNI record, but you can certainly directly
 host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys in your domain if you prefer.=C2=A0 Nothing s=
hould preclude that.<br>
&gt; The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and =
the A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records fro=
m different hosts.=C2=A0 Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the s=
ame hostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single
 CNAME chain that gets cached at the resolver and used when looking up both=
 queries.=C2=A0 If they remain separate hostnames, it seems like it gets mu=
ch easier for them to diverge.<br>
&gt; It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wi=
th returning a subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.=C2=A0 Howeve=
r, some CDNs return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; th=
e load-balancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different
 targets based on the desired traffic share.=C2=A0 That=E2=80=99s not a beh=
avior that maps well to DNSsec as I understand it.=C2=A0 You mention DNSsec=
 signing your domain as part of why you have issues with the proposal, but =
I think this is an open issue beyond ESNI or these
 PRs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how =
all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bumps =
here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answer=
, or maybe changes to the structure of the
 record are warranted.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in t=
hese records and how clients make use of it.=C2=A0 I disagree with you that=
 we have to resolve both questions at the same time.=C2=A0 Let=E2=80=99s ag=
ree on content first, and spent some time separately
 with DNS folks to see whether the content can be more pleasantly arranged.=
<br>
<br>
Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content<br>
of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we<br>
essentially have the following:<br>
<br>
- #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,<br>
at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,<br>
A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.<br>
- #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI<br>
since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records<br>
dictate routing.<br>
<br>
With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI<br>
for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS<br>
query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their<br>
A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only<br>
get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with<br>
correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones<br>
that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.<br>
<br>
Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:<br>
Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records<br>
control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said<br>
operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.<u></u><u></u></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks for the summary, Chris.<br>
<br>
Speaking for Cloudflare,=C2=A0we prefer the method=C2=A0described in #136 a=
nd would be willing to implement ESNI records this way.<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I have sympathy for organizations with a preference =
for #137 for debuggability reasons, but I would rather avoid situations in =
which the client needs to do an additional DNS query if avoidable.<u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I would support the option to include either extensi=
on based on operator preference.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This more or less aligns with my views.<u></u><u></u=
></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">From my perspective, we know that #136 is safe, alth=
ough it may be inconvenient for some operators, and it&#39;s not clear to m=
e that #137 can be made to work without frequently incurring another serial=
ized DNS query. If we had some evidence
 to the contrary, I would be somewhat more favorable to #137, though I woul=
d probably still prefer #136 for reasons of simplicity, especially as we ca=
n always add #137 later if it proves viable..<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-Ekr<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rg=
b(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium=
 medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rg=
b(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium=
 medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137<br>
right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use<br>
them, and see what works best in practice.<br>
<br>
Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and<br>
possible tradeoffs.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br>
</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><u></u><u></u></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000957c89058322c478--


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/qiS1d0bdMPwilnYjU3MaNqLoaPA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re:  Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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From nobody Mon Mar  4 06:56:35 2019
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From: Erik Sy <sy@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
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To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 15:56:24 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] Internet-Draft on TLS resumption across Server Name Indications
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X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2019 14:56:33 -0000

Hi folks,

we investigated the potential benefit of resuming TLS sessions across
different SNI values [1].
We found, that enabling TLS resumption across different SNI values
allows converting 58.7% of the required full TLS handshakes to resumed
connection establishments when retrieving an average Alexa Top 1K website.
These conversions to performance-optimized resumption handshakes yield
to a reduction of 44% of the CPU time (energy resources) consumed for
the TLS connection establishments.
Furthermore, our results suggest, that resuming TLS sessions across
different SNI values accelerates the connection establishment with an
average website by up to 30.6%.

I think it's time to reassess the recommendation of TLS 1.3 to avoid
resumption handshakes when connecting to a different SNI value.

To realize this performance improvement, I suggest a dedicated TLS
extension. Here, you can find an Internet-Draft describing such a simple
TLS extension [2]. I will be at the IETF 104 in Prague to present and
discuss this topic.

I ask you for feedback on this topic and welcome your contributions to
this Internet-Draft [3].

Thanks in advance for your feedback.

Best,
Erik Sy

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.02531.pdf

[2] https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-sy-tls-resumption-group-00.txt

[3] https://github.com/kirsey/draft-sy-tls-resumption-group


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03
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This is a working group last call
for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03.  The last working group last call
resulted in some issues.  The authors worked with the reviewers to publish
a new draft to address these issue. Please focus your review on the changes
since the previous last call.  You can find a link to a diff with the
previous draft on the tools page [1].  Please response to the list with any
comments by 2359 UTC on 12 March 2019.

Thanks,

Chris, Joe and Sean

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">This is a working group last call for=C2=
=A0draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03.=C2=A0 The last working group last =
call resulted in some issues.=C2=A0 The authors worked with the reviewers t=
o publish a new draft to address these issue. Please focus your review on t=
he changes since the previous last call.=C2=A0 You can find a link to a dif=
f with the previous draft on the tools page [1].=C2=A0 Please response to t=
he list with any comments by 2359 UTC on 12 March 2019.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><br></div><div>Chris, Joe a=
nd Sean</div><div><br></div><div>[1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org=
/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03" target=3D"_blank">https://tools=
.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03</a></div><div class=3D"=
gmail-yj6qo"></div><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"></div>

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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/3Xra34Y4c3WVPcR7LrCi8QHWBVA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re:  Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 22:52:58 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Jack Visoky <jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com>,
 John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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Jack,

(With the proviso that this isn't and I agree ought not
be a WG item, so the chairs should feel free to tell me to
stop...)

On 04/03/2019 21:49, Jack Visoky wrote:
> OK I will add an update to the draft which further emphasizes that
> these cipher suites are strictly to be used when confidentiality is
> not a concern.
I don't understand how that can be usefully specified for
a TLS implementer. AFAICS there's no credible way a library
with these ciphersuites can refuse to make them available
when there is a need for confidentiality but allow them to
be used when there is apparently no need for confidentiality.
That's just one part of what makes these schemes dangerous.

I honestly don't think that's really fixable tbh. The best
I can think of is to again try convince people who claim
they don't need confidentiality in TLS that they're really
actually better off with it - I don't believe there's any
person or enterprise today who never needs TLS confidentiality
ever, so these schemes also impose a real risk even on those
who promote them. (As well as the rest of us.)

I'm not however expecting to convince you or others who are
promoting this to drop it. (But do feel free:-) I guess all
I can hope is that you've considered the overall costs to
the ecosystem (incl. yourselves) in promoting this stuff.
If you were to document that analysis and those costs then
I think that'd maybe be better than not doing so. But to
add text saying to not use these when confidentiality is
needed seems to me fairly pointless.

S.

PS: for those who really cannot use TLS confidentiality,
e.g. for broadcast applications, my answer is that TLS is
the wrong tool, not that they have gotten their requirements
wrong. (But please don't damage a tool that's good for lots
of other things by bending it out of shape;-)



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Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2019 21:23:10 -0500
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/yG4msH0W6dlR-92FjwaACyvkT6Y>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03
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LGTM.

I would strike ", if these privacy properties are important in a given deployment" from the acknowledgments section (which is an odd place for the accompanying statement. 

I would add an explicit note about the lack of CID update making this unsuitable for mobility scenarios.  That's a common use case for this sort of mechanism, but this design lacks any defense against linkability.

On Tue, Mar 5, 2019, at 03:43, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> This is a working group last call for 
> draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03. The last working group last call 
> resulted in some issues. The authors worked with the reviewers to 
> publish a new draft to address these issue. Please focus your review on 
> the changes since the previous last call. You can find a link to a diff 
> with the previous draft on the tools page [1]. Please response to the 
> list with any comments by 2359 UTC on 12 March 2019. 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Chris, Joe and Sean
> 
> [1] https://tools..ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 12:17:22 +0900
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2019=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=882=E6=97=A5(=E5=9C=9F) 1:57 Christopher Wood <christo=
pherwood07@gmail.com>:
>
> On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 11:34 PM Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Chris,
> >
> > Thank you for writing down the PRs describing possible designs that we
> > might adopt. I think it helps a lot in understanding the details and
> > making accurate comparisons.
> >
> > My comments inline.
> >
> > 2019=E5=B9=B42=E6=9C=8827=E6=97=A5(=E6=B0=B4) 8:19 Christopher Wood <ch=
ristopherwood07@gmail.com>:
> > >
> > > Hi folks,
> > >
> > > Below are two PRs that seek to address the multi-CDN issue discussed
> > > on this list and in meetings:
> > >
> > >    1. https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/136
> > >    2. https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/137
> > >
> > > #136 implements the combined or stapled record approach discussed
> > > several times, most recently in [1]. It includes these via an ESNIKey=
s
> > > extension.
> >
> > Reading the PR, I think that there is a mild privacy concern. The
> > issue with the unified record proposal is that it incentivizes the
> > operators to create more ESNI records possibly using different keys,
> > which is against the design principle of ESNI: provide anonymity set
> > by using the least number of keys.
> >
> > Retaining address resolution unbundled with ESNI incentivizes the
> > operator to use less number of keys; for example they might just use
> > one key at a time. That would be a nice property to have, especially
> > in terms of transparency. It would help third parties verify that an
> > operator is actually providing an anonymity set (rather than just
> > pretending to use ESNI).
>
> I don't quite agree with this. Operators can already use different
> keys across records if they so choose. That said, given the concern,
> we could add advisory text suggesting that operators use as few ESNI
> keys as possible to cover addresses.

Having a guidance sounds sufficient to me.

>
> > Also, I would like to point out that it is only when one key is used
> > by each of the provider at a given time that it would be possible to
> > use ESNI from a network that blocks DoH or DoT; a user can write the
> > IP addresses of services he/she wants to access in the hosts file, and
> > supply the ESNI key to the client he/she uses. Such a hack becomes
> > difficult under the unified approach, where operators could synthesize
> > different keys based on various conditions.
>
> Good point!
>
> >
> > At the least, if we are to adopt #136, I think we should change the
> > definition of record digest included in the ClientHello extension so
> > that it does not cover the "address_set" extension of the ESNI record.
> > Otherwise, we would be exposing to the wire the fingerprint of the set
> > of IP addresses contained in the DNS response the client received
> > through a secure channel, whereas in the split record approach you
> > only leak the ESNI key being used and the IP address the client has
> > chosen.
>
> I'm not sure this is an issue. Clients that use HappyEyeballs will
> already reveal the set of addresses by attempting to connect to them.

Using happy eyeballs does not always mean that the clients are
exposing all the addresses in the address_set. IIUC, a client does not
eyeball between multiple addresses belonging to the same address
family.

> > As much as I like the idea of bundling IP addresses and ESNI key, I am
> > concerned if the requirement to bundle different types of records is a
> > requirement specific to ESNI. If not, I think we should (in the long
> > term) try to create a generic solution, while in the short time we
> > could rely on a more limited mechanism as proposed in #137.
>
> In my view, since these are both extensions, they can both proceed in
> parallel. If some operators can support #136, and can do so without
> creating many ESNI keys, then I think it's worth including. Operators
> for which this is not a concern do not need to support the extension,
> right?

I think the idea of using extensions is a nice approach to move
forward. I won't oppose to having an "option" to change the way the
address is being resolved, as long as it does not hinder the
standardization of the draft without the feature.
>
> > > #137 builds on this design with a mechanism that lets
> > > clients detect and recover from A/AAAA and ESNI mismatch (if desired)=
.
> > > It is certainly more complex in several respects. A third variant,
> > > which is not (yet) in PR form, is a simplification of #137 wherein
> > > ESNIKeys addresses are only used as filters, instead of filters *or*
> > > complete addresses.
> >
> > I think using IP address blocks to limit the validity of the ESNI key
> > is a fine approach. I do not oppose to having a name-based filter if
> > it's impossible for certain operators to apply the IP address-based
> > filtering approach.
>
> Indeed -- that's the only reason the name exists.
>
> Best,
> Chris



--
Kazuho Oku


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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 12:24:07 +0900
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be>,  Nick Sullivan <nick=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/pHbArVP67YNCVPeN5gvu8OfZvg0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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2019=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=883=E6=97=A5(=E6=97=A5) 5:57 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.c=
om>:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:03 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
>>
>> Totally agree that we want to avoid the extra DNS round-trip as often as=
 possible.  However, I see the options in the opposite light =E2=80=93 if a=
ll you need is #136, then you can put exact addresses into #137 and get the=
 same behavior.
>
>
> Sure, but if the error rate is too high, then people will just not do ESN=
I with the non-exact address version, so you've absorbed complexity for not=
hing.
>
> i'd also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges are re=
ally small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive.
>
>
>> The question is whether the additional capabilities of #137 are safe and=
 needed.  Depending how much later #137 is added, we may wind up needing to=
 support both, which would be=E2=80=A6 suboptimal.
>
>
> I actually don't think that's so bad. The complexity of the union of 136 =
and 137 isn't actually much  more than the complexity of 137, especially if=
 the client just omits step 1 of the 137 algorithm (for exact addresses).
>
>> I think what will swing the needle on safety =E2=80=93 how often there=
=E2=80=99s divergence =E2=80=93 lies in how the record is positioned.  Two =
problems with the current approach that I see:
>>
>> Correct me if I=E2=80=99m wrong, but I don=E2=80=99t believe the alias i=
s allowed to have subdomains.  If www.example.com is a CNAME, then _esni.ww=
w.example.com cannot exist, can it?
>> Even presuming that it did, or that it weren=E2=80=99t a subdomain, it w=
ould follow its own CNAME chain which might not lead to the correct provide=
r.
>
>
> My understanding is that there was consensus to remove _esni, just that w=
e didn't get around to it because of this issue.
>
>>
>>
>> If, however, the ESNIKeys RRType is resolved by following the CNAME from=
 the host, it depends on how often two queries for two different RRTypes on=
 the same hostname follow different CNAME chains.  We have a ready-made way=
 to test that =E2=80=93 A and AAAA.  I have an idea where we can get some d=
ata on that.
>
>
> Great. I would be interested in seeing that.

FWIW, I am also looking forward to seeing the data, because if the
chances of responses getting out-of-sync is very low (e.g. 0.1%), I
think there's chance we might agree without having neither of #136 or
#137.

We could just use the ESNI key synchronization mechanism that was
introduced in #124 by using IP address-based certificates. That'd have
2 RT penalty (or 1 RT when TCP fast open is used), but that might be
tolerable if the probability is low.

>
> -Ekr
>
>>
>>
>> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla
>> Sent: Friday, March 1, 2019 7:19 PM
>> To: Nick Sullivan <nick=3D40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
>> Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:39 PM Nick Sullivan <nick=3D40cloudflare.com@dm=
arc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:27 PM Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail=
.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:19 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> wrote:
>> >
>> > Stephen, there are a couple complicating factors here where I think we=
 all have varying knowledge gaps.
>> >
>> > There are two major ways of pointing to a CDN:  Direct A/AAAA records =
and CNAMEs.  The easiest way to handle key update complexities on the part =
of the CDN(s) is simply to CNAME the ESNI query for your domain to their ES=
NI record, but you can certainly directly host your CDN=E2=80=99s keys in y=
our domain if you prefer.  Nothing should preclude that.
>> > The issue we=E2=80=99re trying to address is when the ESNI record and =
the A/AAAA record follow different CNAME chains and you get the records fro=
m different hosts.  Of course, if we move to an ESNI RRType with the same h=
ostname (see #105), there=E2=80=99s hopefully a single CNAME chain that get=
s cached at the resolver and used when looking up both queries.  If they re=
main separate hostnames, it seems like it gets much easier for them to dive=
rge.
>> > It=E2=80=99s my understanding that DNSsec doesn=E2=80=99t play well wi=
th returning a subset of all extant RRs for a given name+type.  However, so=
me CDNs return DNS results tailored to the user=E2=80=99s location; the loa=
d-balancing servers will (in some cases) return CNAMEs to different targets=
 based on the desired traffic share.  That=E2=80=99s not a behavior that ma=
ps well to DNSsec as I understand it.  You mention DNSsec signing your doma=
in as part of why you have issues with the proposal, but I think this is an=
 open issue beyond ESNI or these PRs.
>> >
>> > Maybe someone better-steeped in DNS/DNSsec can help us figure out how =
all that should work, and I agree with you that there are definitely bumps =
here we need to iron out =E2=80=93 maybe those are just questions to answer=
, or maybe changes to the structure of the record are warranted.
>> >
>> > However, these PRs are primarily about what information should be in t=
hese records and how clients make use of it.  I disagree with you that we h=
ave to resolve both questions at the same time.  Let=E2=80=99s agree on con=
tent first, and spent some time separately with DNS folks to see whether th=
e content can be more pleasantly arranged.
>>
>> Thanks all for the discussion so far! Focusing strictly on the content
>> of the records and not the formatting, as Mike suggests, we
>> essentially have the following:
>>
>> - #137 gives clients a way to detect A/AAAA+ESNI mismatch and recover,
>> at the cost of another sequential DNS query for ESNI. In this change,
>> A/AAAA records still control where traffic goes.
>> - #136 never requires clients to send a second DNS query for ESNI
>> since clients ignore the A/AAAA results. In this change, ESNI records
>> dictate routing.
>>
>> With #137, clients willing to send a second DNS query will get ESNI
>> for all supporting providers. Clients unwilling to send a second DNS
>> query will only get ESNI for those providers which ensure that their
>> A/AAAA and ESNI records very rarely mismatch. With #136, clients only
>> get ESNI for those providers capable of building ESNI records with
>> correct addresses. In theory, these providers should be the same ones
>> that could ensure A/AAAA and ESNI record matching.
>>
>> Given this, the discussion seems to hinge on the following question:
>> Are operators comfortable with the risks of letting ESNI records
>> control routing. If so, #136 is probably a better design for said
>> operators. If not, then #137 is probably required.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for the summary, Chris.
>>
>> Speaking for Cloudflare, we prefer the method described in #136 and woul=
d be willing to implement ESNI records this way.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have sympathy for organizations with a preference for #137 for debugga=
bility reasons, but I would rather avoid situations in which the client nee=
ds to do an additional DNS query if avoidable.
>>
>>
>>
>> I would support the option to include either extension based on operator=
 preference.
>>
>>
>>
>> This more or less aligns with my views.
>>
>>
>>
>> From my perspective, we know that #136 is safe, although it may be incon=
venient for some operators, and it's not clear to me that #137 can be made =
to work without frequently incurring another serialized DNS query. If we ha=
d some evidence to the contrary, I would be somewhat more favorable to #137=
, though I would probably still prefer #136 for reasons of simplicity, espe=
cially as we can always add #137 later if it proves viable..
>>
>>
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Note that this does not mean we must choose between #136 and #137
>> right now. We can do both (after possibly simplifying #137!), use
>> them, and see what works best in practice.
>>
>> Anyway, I hope this summary accurately captures the differences and
>> possible tradeoffs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Chris
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
Kazuho Oku


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From: Thomas Fossati <tho.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 06:53:22 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03
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On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 4:43 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
> This is a working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-0=
3.  The last working group last call resulted in some issues.  The authors =
worked with the reviewers to publish a new draft to address these issue. Pl=
ease focus your review on the changes since the previous last call.  You ca=
n find a link to a diff with the previous draft on the tools page [1].  Ple=
ase response to the list with any comments by 2359 UTC on 12 March 2019.
> Thanks,
>
> Chris, Joe and Sean
>
> [1] https://tools..ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03

-05 describes CID processing with AEAD ciphersuites only, which seems
to imply that CID modifies ciphersuite's selection -- and it's
incompatible with EtM.

I looks like the interaction between CID, non-AEAD modes and EtM
should be clarified.

Cheers,


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/qSA4ZorXlLrfrwJ9KDlT7XoAcbU>
Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: Re: Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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Hi Stephen,
> This version attempts to make the few changes discussed
> at the meeting on Monday. I wrote a script that gave me
> a list of 76(!) RFCs this might need to update, and may
> of course have mucked that up, so if anyone has a chance
> to check if (some of) those make sense, that'd be great.

I believe updating RFC 4642 (TLS with NNTP) is useless because this RFC 
has already been updated by RFC 8143.

In RFC 8143:

A.6.  Related to Other Obsolete Wording

    The first two sentences of the seventh paragraph in Section 2.2.2 of
    [RFC4642] are removed.  There is no special requirement for NNTP with
    regard to TLS Client Hello messages.  Section 7.4.1.2 and Appendix E
    of [RFC5246] apply.

That is to say, the following sentences in RFC 4642 are no longer relevant:

    Servers MUST be able to understand backwards-compatible TLS Client
    Hello messages (provided that client_version is TLS 1.0 or later),
    and clients MAY use backwards-compatible Client Hello messages.
    Neither clients nor servers are required to actually support Client
    Hello messages for anything other than TLS 1.0.



That's why I suggest draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate does not 
update RFC 4642.  It is no longer useful.
Are you OK with this analysis?

-- 
Julien Ã‰LIE

Â«Â Le rire est une chose sÃ©rieuse avec laquelle il ne faut pas
   plaisanter.Â Â» (Raymond Devos)


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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Hi Julien,

Thanks for taking the time to check this!

On 07/03/2019 20:42, Julien =C3=89LIE wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>> This version attempts to make the few changes discussed
>> at the meeting on Monday. I wrote a script that gave me
>> a list of 76(!) RFCs this might need to update, and may
>> of course have mucked that up, so if anyone has a chance
>> to check if (some of) those make sense, that'd be great.
>=20
> I believe updating RFC 4642 (TLS with NNTP) is useless because this RFC=

> has already been updated by RFC 8143.
>=20
> In RFC 8143:
>=20
> A.6.=C2=A0 Related to Other Obsolete Wording
>=20
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 The first two sentences of the seventh paragraph in Sectio=
n 2.2.2 of
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 [RFC4642] are removed.=C2=A0 There is no special requireme=
nt for NNTP with
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 regard to TLS Client Hello messages.=C2=A0 Section 7.4.1.2=
 and Appendix E
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 of [RFC5246] apply.
>=20
> That is to say, the following sentences in RFC 4642 are no longer relev=
ant:
>=20
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 Servers MUST be able to understand backwards-compatible TL=
S Client
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 Hello messages (provided that client_version is TLS 1.0 or=
 later),
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 and clients MAY use backwards-compatible Client Hello mess=
ages.
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 Neither clients nor servers are required to actually suppo=
rt Client
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 Hello messages for anything other than TLS 1.0.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> That's why I suggest draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate does not
> update RFC 4642.=C2=A0 It is no longer useful.
> Are you OK with this analysis?

Sorta:-) I think these are overlapping but not quite
identical updates. E.g. IIUC 8143 doesn't say to not
use TLSv1.1. I added the sentence below to the editor's
copy [1], but happy to do something else if I'm wrong,
which is entirely possible;-)

  "In the case of [RFC4642], that has already been
   updated by [RFC8143] which makes an overlapping,
   but not quite the same, update as this document."

Cheers,
S.

[1]
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls=
-oldversions-deprecate.txt

>=20

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From nobody Fri Mar  8 11:31:30 2019
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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Hi Stephen,
>> That's why I suggest draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate does not
>> update RFC 4642.Â  It is no longer useful.
>> Are you OK with this analysis?
> 
> Sorta:-) I think these are overlapping but not quite
> identical updates. E.g. IIUC 8143 doesn't say to not
> use TLSv1.1. I added the sentence below to the editor's
> copy [1], but happy to do something else if I'm wrong,
> which is entirely possible;-)

RFC 8143 (updating RFC 4642) states in Section 3:

    The best current practices documented in [BCP195] apply here.
    Therefore, NNTP implementations and deployments compliant with this
    document are REQUIRED to comply with [BCP195] as well.

And RFC 7525 (belonging to BCP 195) states in Section 3.1.1:

    o  Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1
[...]
    o  Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MUST prefer to
       negotiate TLS version 1.2 over earlier versions of TLS.

That's why I thought RFC 8143 was already requiring not to use TLS 1.1.



Incidentally, in the Abstract of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate, 
it is said that this document updates RFC 7525, but RFC 7525 does not 
appear in the Updates list.  Shouldn't it be added?

-- 
Julien Ã‰LIE

Â«Â Le rire est une chose sÃ©rieuse avec laquelle il ne faut pas
   plaisanter.Â Â» (Raymond Devos)


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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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Hiya,

On 08/03/2019 19:31, Julien =C3=89LIE wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>>> That's why I suggest draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate does not
>>> update RFC 4642.=C2=A0 It is no longer useful.
>>> Are you OK with this analysis?
>>
>> Sorta:-) I think these are overlapping but not quite
>> identical updates. E.g. IIUC 8143 doesn't say to not
>> use TLSv1.1. I added the sentence below to the editor's
>> copy [1], but happy to do something else if I'm wrong,
>> which is entirely possible;-)
>=20
> RFC 8143 (updating RFC 4642) states in Section 3:
>=20
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 The best current practices documented in [BCP195] apply he=
re.
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 Therefore, NNTP implementations and deployments compliant =
with this
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 document are REQUIRED to comply with [BCP195] as well.
>=20
> And RFC 7525 (belonging to BCP 195) states in Section 3.1.1:
>=20
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 o=C2=A0 Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS version 1=
=2E1
> [...]
> =C2=A0=C2=A0 o=C2=A0 Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and=
 MUST prefer to
> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 negotiate TLS version 1.2 over earlier v=
ersions of TLS.
>=20
> That's why I thought RFC 8143 was already requiring not to use TLS 1.1.=


SHOULD NOT !=3D MUST NOT though:-) And in any case, an additional
unnecessary update would be no harm in this case, so I figure it's
best to leave it as-is. (Unless I'm missing some reason why that
UPDATE would do damage, in which case, we should chat more.)

> Incidentally, in the Abstract of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate,
> it is said that this document updates RFC 7525, but RFC 7525 does not
> appear in the Updates list.=C2=A0 Shouldn't it be added?

Yeah, I was wondering about that too;-)

A BCP can consist of >1 RFC (e.g. see BCP10 [1]). So this one can
become part of BCP195 without UPDATEing RFC7525 I think. However,
now that I actually look at BCP 10, it has two RFCs: 7437 and 8318.
And in that case 8318 does update 7437.

So, yes, I've added 7525 to the list of UPDATEd stuff in my copy [2]
and made a change of intended status to BCP. (I bet a beer we'll
change that again >1 time:-)

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp10
[2]
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls=
-oldversions-deprecate.txt

>=20

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Hi Stephen,
>> And RFC 7525 (belonging to BCP 195) states in Section 3.1.1:
>>
>>  Â Â  oÂ  Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1
>> [...]
>>  Â Â  oÂ  Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MUST prefer to
>>  Â Â Â Â Â  negotiate TLS version 1.2 over earlier versions of TLS.
>>
>> That's why I thought RFC 8143 was already requiring not to use TLS 1.1.
> 
> SHOULD NOT != MUST NOT though:-) And in any case, an additional
> unnecessary update would be no harm in this case, so I figure it's
> best to leave it as-is.

Sure.


> (Unless I'm missing some reason why that
> UPDATE would do damage, in which case, we should chat more.)

No damage at all.
You can leave it as-is.


> So, yes, I've added 7525 to the list of UPDATEd stuff in my copy
> and made a change of intended status to BCP. (I bet a beer we'll
> change that again >1 time:-)

:)

-- 
Julien Ã‰LIE

Â«Â Si l'art n'a pas de patrie, les artistes en ont une.Â Â» (Camille
   Saint-SaÃ«ns)


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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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Hi John,

On 08/03/2019 22:44, John Mattsson wrote:
> Hi,
>=20
> Thanks for driving this. Great work. I would like to see deprecation
> of done more often in IETF and elsewhere.
>=20
> 3GPP has deprecated TLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.0 some years ago (but could at
> that time not deprecate TLS 1.1 due to interop with older releases).
> I would estimate that 3GPP will deprecate TLS 1.1 this year, at least
> that is what I am going to suggest. I think that 3GPP will deprecate
> non-AEAD and non-PFS cipher suites at the same time as TLS 1.1.

Good to know. Might be no harm to put in some reference to that if you
have one?

> Moving deprecation of SHA-1 to a different document makes sense to
> me. I would want such a document be deprecate a much as section 9.2
> of RFC 7540 with the exception of TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 for IoT.
> I.e, I think such a document should forbid non-AEAD and < 2048 DHE as
> well as changing the MTI cipher suite in TLS 1.2.

I'd support progressing such a draft if someone wrote one. Or maybe
that'd be good text to include in a revision of BCP195 when we've a
bit more experience with TLSv1.3.

For now, I think leaving in section 3 is ok though - killing sha-1
multiple times still leaves it as dead as killing it once:-)

> - I think the document should mention DTLS 1.0 much earlier, probably
> even in the title.

Fair point. Didn't add to title but added stuff in the abstract.

But that does raise an issue for the WG. I never checked what
else refers to 4347 that's needs to be updated. (Sigh, I should
have done that before I guess;-)

So I re-ran my script to find non-obsoleted RFCs with normative
references to 4347 and that turns up these new ones:

- RFC 8261, which says:

   The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347] and SHOULD
   support the most recently published version of DTLS, which was DTLS
   1.2 [RFC6347] when this RFC was published.  In the absence of a
   revision to this document, the latter requirement applies to all
   future versions of DTLS when they are published as RFCs.  This
   document will only be revised if a revision to DTLS or SCTP makes a
   revision to the encapsulation necessary.

I guess we could UPDATE that via this draft but we should probably add
some text if doing that, and we defo need to check if WebRTC really
needs DTLSv1.0 or if it's ok to deprecate that. (Anyone know?) I've
added a note to the draft wondering what to do about that but did't
add 8261 to the list of RFCs UPDATEd by this.

- RFC 6460 is suite-B which is already historic, so it probably doesn't
matter. I added this to the mega-list of stuff updated by this one as
that seems harmless.

- RFC 6353 is SNMP/TLS so seems like a straightforward case. I added
this to the list updated here.

- RFC 6084, which is "GIST" whatever that is.  I added this to the
list updated here.

- RFC 6083 is DTLS/SCTP. I added this to the list updated here.

- RFC 6012 is DTLS for syslog. I added this to the list updated here.

- RFC 5456 is some asterisk-related protocol. I added this to the list
updated here.

- RFC 5415 is CAPWAP. I added this to the list updated here.

> - Nit: The document uses "TLS1.0" "TLSv1.0" while most other drafts
> use "TLS 1.0"

I did a pass trying to make those consistently be TLSv1.x.

The changes above are reflected in the editor's copy, [1] now but
since those new UPDATE references are a substantive change, I'll push
out a -02 later today or tomorrow.

Cheers,
S.

[1]
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls=
-oldversions-deprecate.txt

>=20
> Cheers, John
>=20
> =EF=BB=BF-----Original Message----- From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on=

> behalf of Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thursday,
> 8 November 2018 at 06:36 To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject:
> Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
>=20
>=20
> Hiya,
>=20
> This version attempts to make the few changes discussed at the
> meeting on Monday. I wrote a script that gave me a list of 76(!) RFCs
> this might need to update, and may of course have mucked that up, so
> if anyone has a chance to check if (some of) those make sense, that'd
> be great.
>=20
> Ta, S.
>=20
> On 08/11/2018 05:28, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>>=20
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories. This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer
>> Security WG of the IETF.
>>=20
>> Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Authors         :
>> Kathleen Moriarty Stephen Farrell Filename        :
>> draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt Pages           : 21=20
>> Date            : 2018-11-07
>>=20
>> Abstract: This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport
>> Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and
>> moves these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack
>> support for current and recommended cipher suites, and various
>> government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now
>> mandate avoiding these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the
>> recommended version for IETF protocols since 2008, providing
>> sufficient time to transition away from older versions.  Products
>> having to support older versions increase the attack surface
>> unnecessarily and increase opportunities for misconfigurations.
>> Supporting these older versions also requires additional effort for
>> library and product maintenance.
>>=20
>> This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0
>> or TLS1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525
>> and hence is part of BCP195.
>>=20
>>=20
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:=20
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/=

>>
>>
>>=20
There are also htmlized versions available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01
>>
>>=20
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecat=
e-01
>>=20
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:=20
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-oldversions-depreca=
te-01
>>
>>
>>
>>=20
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>> tools.ietf.org.
>>=20
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:=20
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>=20

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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From nobody Sat Mar  9 12:50:17 2019
Return-Path: <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2019 20:50:05 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Vj7saIYLda32wGA3KF1volqp6Kc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <82c1eb35-55d9-bf82-b5d0-301a92bf8f32@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
References: <154165491176.26419.11906807559515385277@ietfa.amsl.com>
 <62386296-c674-44ef-65b0-e3ced823eb92@cs.tcd.ie>
 <09181304-3B39-464D-B98A-E7C109701507@ericsson.com>
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Hiya,

On 09/03/2019 20:04, John Mattsson wrote:
> Yes, you can find the 3GPP TLS profile in Clause 6.2 of 3GPP TS 33.210
> https://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33210.htm

Thanks for that, will add a mention.

And in a nice bit of irony, the www.3gpp.org server uses TLS1.0 :-)

S.


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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
                          Stephen Farrell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2019-03-09

Abstract:
   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
   these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
   for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
   industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
   these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
   IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
   away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
   increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
   for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
   additional effort for library and product maintenance.

   This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0
   [RFC6347] (but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version
   1.1).

   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLSv1.0 or
   TLSv1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525 and
   hence is part of BCP195.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Sat Mar  9 18:07:47 2019
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From: "Christopher Wood" <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
To: "Kazuho Oku" <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@rtfm.com>, "Nick Sullivan" <nick=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, tls@ietf.org
Date: Sat, 09 Mar 2019 18:07:40 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Two Multi-CDN proposals
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On 4 Mar 2019, at 19:24, Kazuho Oku wrote:

> 2019å¹´3æœˆ3æ—¥(æ—¥) 5:57 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:03 PM Mike Bishop <mbishop@evequefou.be> 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Totally agree that we want to avoid the extra DNS round-trip as 
>>> often as possible.  However, I see the options in the opposite light 
>>> â€“ if all you need is #136, then you can put exact addresses into 
>>> #137 and get the same behavior.
>>
>>
>> Sure, but if the error rate is too high, then people will just not do 
>> ESNI with the non-exact address version, so you've absorbed 
>> complexity for nothing.
>>
>> i'd also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges 
>> are really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive.
>>
>>
>>> The question is whether the additional capabilities of #137 are safe 
>>> and needed.  Depending how much later #137 is added, we may wind up 
>>> needing to support both, which would beâ€¦ suboptimal.
>>
>>
>> I actually don't think that's so bad. The complexity of the union of 
>> 136 and 137 isn't actually much  more than the complexity of 137, 
>> especially if the client just omits step 1 of the 137 algorithm (for 
>> exact addresses).
>>
>>> I think what will swing the needle on safety â€“ how often thereâ€™s 
>>> divergence â€“ lies in how the record is positioned.  Two problems 
>>> with the current approach that I see:
>>>
>>> Correct me if Iâ€™m wrong, but I donâ€™t believe the alias is 
>>> allowed to have subdomains.  If www.example.com is a CNAME, then 
>>> _esni.www.example.com cannot exist, can it?
>>> Even presuming that it did, or that it werenâ€™t a subdomain, it 
>>> would follow its own CNAME chain which might not lead to the correct 
>>> provider.
>>
>>
>> My understanding is that there was consensus to remove _esni, just 
>> that we didn't get around to it because of this issue.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If, however, the ESNIKeys RRType is resolved by following the CNAME 
>>> from the host, it depends on how often two queries for two different 
>>> RRTypes on the same hostname follow different CNAME chains.  We have 
>>> a ready-made way to test that â€“ A and AAAA.  I have an idea where 
>>> we can get some data on that.
>>
>>
>> Great. I would be interested in seeing that.
>
> FWIW, I am also looking forward to seeing the data, because if the
> chances of responses getting out-of-sync is very low (e.g. 0.1%), I
> think there's chance we might agree without having neither of #136 or
> #137.
>
> We could just use the ESNI key synchronization mechanism that was
> introduced in #124 by using IP address-based certificates. That'd have
> 2 RT penalty (or 1 RT when TCP fast open is used), but that might be
> tolerable if the probability is low.

Absent this data and objections to #136, Iâ€™ve merged the PR as a 
viable mitigation to the multi-CDN problem. We can continue iterating on 
#137 and work on collecting this critical data as needed in parallel.

Best,
Chris


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Thomas Fossati
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2019-03-11

Abstract:
   This document specifies the Connection ID (CID) construct for the
   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol version 1.2.

   A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header that gives
   the recipient additional information for selecting the appropriate
   security association.  In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security
   association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with the help
   of the 5-tuple.  If the source IP address and/or source port changes
   during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will
   be unable to locate the correct security context.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id/

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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-esni-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Kazuho Oku
                          Nick Sullivan
                          Christopher A. Wood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-esni-03.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2019-03-11

Abstract:
   This document defines a simple mechanism for encrypting the Server
   Name Indication for TLS 1.3.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
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--000000000000b2277c0583d9915c
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All,

We have submitted a draft that describes several ways that OPAQUE (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01) can be
implemented in TLS 1.3, both as an in-handshake authentication method and
as a post-handshake authentication method via Exported Authenticators.

Nick

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 3:58 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>,
Owen Friel <ofriel@cisco.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Nick Sullivan and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-sullivan-tls-opaque
Revision:       00
Title:          Usage of OPAQUE with TLS 1.3
Document date:  2019-03-11
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          16
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque


Abstract:
   This document describes two mechanisms for enabling the use of the
   OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange in TLS 1.3.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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The IETF Secretariat

--000000000000b2277c0583d9915c
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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>We have submitted a draft that des=
cribes several ways that OPAQUE (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/dra=
ft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg=
-opaque-01</a>) can be implemented in TLS 1.3, both as an in-handshake auth=
entication method and as a post-handshake authentication method via Exporte=
d Authenticators.</div><div><br></div><div>Nick<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message -=
--------<br>From: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-=
drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>Date: Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 3:58 PM<br>Subject: N=
ew Version Notification for draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt<br>To: Hugo Kr=
awczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il=
</a>&gt;, Richard Barnes &lt;rlb@ipv.sx&gt;, Owen Friel &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:ofriel@cisco.com">ofriel@cisco.com</a>&gt;, Nick Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:nick@cloudflare.com">nick@cloudflare.com</a>&gt;<br></div><br><br><=
br>A new version of I-D, draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt<br>has been succe=
ssfully submitted by Nick Sullivan and posted to the<br>IETF repository.<br=
>
<br>Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-sullivan-tls-opaque=
<br>Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A000<br>Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Usage of OPAQUE with TLS 1.3<br>Document date:=C2=A0 2019-03-=
11<br>Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Individual Submission<br>Pag=
es:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 16<br>URL:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sulliv=
an-tls-opaque-00.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf=
.org/internet-drafts/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00.txt</a><br>Status:=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draf=
t-sullivan-tls-opaque/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatr=
acker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque/</a><br>Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sullivan-tls-opa=
que-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/dr=
aft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00</a><br>Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a hr=
ef=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sullivan-tls-opaque" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/dra=
ft-sullivan-tls-opaque</a><br>
<br>
<br>Abstract:<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document describes two mechanisms for en=
abling the use of the<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0OPAQUE password-authenticated key exc=
hange in TLS 1.3.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submi=
ssion<br>until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"ht=
tp://tools.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a=
>.<br>
<br>The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
</div></div></div>

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: CWTs in TLS
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Subject: [TLS] CWTs in TLS
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Hi all,

I submitted a short document about the use of CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) in TLS=
. The document is quite simple in the sense that it registers a new "certif=
icate type" into an already existing registry.

Here is the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00

At the moment, this is a bit of an experiment. We hope to get some code siz=
e improvements over the use of X.509 certificates.

Ciao
Hannes & Mathias

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hi all,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">I submitted a short document ab=
out the use of CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) in TLS. The document is quite simple =
in the sense that it registers a new &#8220;certificate type&#8221; into an=
 already existing registry.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Here is the draft: <a href=3D"h=
ttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00">
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00</a> <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">At the moment, this is a bit of=
 an experiment. We hope to get some code size improvements over the use of =
X.509 certificates.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Ciao<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hannes &amp; Mathias<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
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 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04
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Hi all,

Yesterday I submitted version -04 of the DTLS 1.2 CID draft. On the working=
 group Github issue tracker we spent a long time discussing how the MAC cal=
culation should be changed to include the cid/cid_length information. In ve=
rsion -03 we only provided a description how to use the CID functionality w=
ith AEAD ciphersuites. In version -04 we also included a description for no=
n-AEAD ciphersuites as well. Since the description became a bit convoluted =
we improved the language and the representation of the record layer protect=
ion and of the record layer format. We hope that implementers will find the=
 -04 version easier to read.

Here is the draft:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04

Here is the diff:
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04.=
txt

We have been doing interop testing this year while editing the spec. If you=
 want to test your code please drop me an email or take a look at https://g=
ithub.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/18

Ciao
Hannes

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hi all, <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Yesterday I submitted version -=
04 of the DTLS 1.2 CID draft. On the working group Github issue tracker we =
spent a long time discussing how the MAC calculation should be changed to i=
nclude the cid/cid_length information.
 In version -03 we only provided a description how to use the CID functiona=
lity with AEAD ciphersuites. In version -04 we also included a description =
for non-AEAD ciphersuites as well. Since the description became a bit convo=
luted we improved the language and
 the representation of the record layer protection and of the record layer =
format. We hope that implementers will find the -04 version easier to read.=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Here is the draft: <o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.o=
rg/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04">https://tools.ietf.org/html/d=
raft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Here is the diff: <o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.o=
rg/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04.txt">https://tools.i=
etf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04.txt</a><o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">We have been doing interop test=
ing this year while editing the spec. If you want to test your code please =
drop me an email or take a look at https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/is=
sues/18<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Ciao<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hannes<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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From: "Christopher Wood" <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
To: "TLS WG" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:14:01 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Draft agenda for IETF104
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A draft agenda for IETF 104 is here:

   https://github.com/tlswg/wg-materials/blob/master/ietf104/agenda.md

Please let us know if there are any issues.

Best,
Chris, Joe, and Sean


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Coming out of the EDHOC discussions, I was thinking about doing this as
well.  I will definitely read it before Prague.

 

Jim

 

 

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2019 1:59 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] CWTs in TLS

 

Hi all,

 

I submitted a short document about the use of CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) in TLS.
The document is quite simple in the sense that it registers a new
"certificate type" into an already existing registry. 

 

Here is the draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00 

 

At the moment, this is a bit of an experiment. We hope to get some code size
improvements over the use of X.509 certificates. 

 

Ciao

Hannes & Mathias

 

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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US =
link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Coming out of the EDHOC discussions, I was thinking =
about doing this as well.&nbsp; I will definitely read it before =
Prague.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> TLS =
&lt;tls-bounces@ietf.org&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Hannes =
Tschofenig<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 12, 2019 1:59 AM<br><b>To:</b> =
tls@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [TLS] CWTs in =
TLS<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi =
all,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I submitted a short document about the use of CBOR Web =
Tokens (CWTs) in TLS. The document is quite simple in the sense that it =
registers a new &#8220;certificate type&#8221; into an already existing =
registry. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Here is the draft: <a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00">https://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt-00</a> <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>At the =
moment, this is a bit of an experiment. We hope to get some code size =
improvements over the use of X.509 certificates. <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Ciao<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hannes &amp; =
Mathias<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of =
this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be =
privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the =
sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, =
use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. =
Thank you. <o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0081_01D4D8C8.9E3CA3A0--


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Subject: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6066 (5658)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6066,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5658

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Owen Friel <ofriel@cisco.com>

Section: 3

Original Text
-------------


Corrected Text
--------------
When a client uses DNS SRV to discover and connect to a server, the 
client SHOULD include the "source domain" in the "host_name" and SHOULD
NOT include the "derived domain", where "source domain" and "derived
domain" are defined in RFC6125. 

Notes
-----
The original text is all fine, but it is missing some additional clarifying text on use of SNI when a client users DNS SRV to discover the service it is connecting to.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC6066 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-12)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions
Publication Date    : January 2011
Author(s)           : D. Eastlake 3rd
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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All,

The agenda has been posted:
=
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/104/materials/agenda-104-tls-01.html

Note that we have two sessions:

   ---------------------------------------------
   tls Session 1
   Monday, 25 March 2019, Morning Session II 1120-1220
   Room Name: Congress Hall 2
   ---------------------------------------------
   tls Session 2 (2:00 requested)
   Tuesday, 26 March 2019, Afternoon Session II 1610-1810
   Room Name: Congress Hall 2
   ---------------------------------------------

Links for remote participation (meetech, jabber, audio) can be found on =
this page:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/agenda/

spt=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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(no hat on)

Could we make a couple of tweaks to the to the IANA considerations =
section that:

1. The draft should probably indicate the values for the other columns.  =
They=E2=80=99ve been assigned this way so this is more of a =
documentation thing:

  These DTLS-OK column value is =E2=80=9CY=E2=80=9D and
  the Recommended column value is =E2=80=9CN=E2=80=9D.

2. Ask IANA to add something like the following as note:

  These ciphers provide only data integrity protection and no
  confidentiality protections, i.e., in other words these algorithms
  provide no privacy.  Consult the Applicability Statement in the
  reference column.

While you could argue #2 is maybe a bit over the top because the draft =
is already referenced and people really ought to read the draft/RFC =
before implementing, I think we have some experience with that not being =
the case.  Also, I suspect that based on the concerns raised by Rich =
(and others) this note couldn=E2=80=99t really hurt.  Some will say that =
the IANA registries are not the right place for this kind of note, but I =
do tend to think that the more places we sprinkle security clue the =
better.


Nits:

s1: r/message../message.

s2: should be:

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.


spt

> On Feb 26, 2019, at 15:54, Jack Visoky <jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> TLS Colleagues,=20
> If you recall we discussed a draft for authentication only =
ciphersuites over email back in August of 2018.  We've since made some =
updates to that draft.  We also have gotten IANA assignments to the =
authentication only ciphersuites for TLS 1.3 and have updated the draft =
to reflect the new assignments.
> To that extent, as the IoT community is looking to adopt these =
ciphersuites, we would like to solicit review of the draft:
>    =20
>     =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-ts13-macciphersuites-02
>    =20
> and request that it be published as informational draft given that the =
IoT forums are looking to adopt its use and the draft can serve as the =
guide for use and interoperability.
> =20
> Thanks and Best Regards,
> =20
> --Jack (and Nancy)
> =20
> =20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Jack Visoky <jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 16:50:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Authentication Only Ciphersuites RFC
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From: Jack Visoky <jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Thanks to the authors for this survey.  I think that it is good to have this sort of work is extremely valuable in informing decisions.

I would like to see one approach come out of discussion here.  I don't want the protocol to be a tapestry of options.  As someone who has to maintain software, that is a disaster.

To be clear, I have a fairly strong preference for the design choices in draft-kiefer-tls-ecdhe-sidh.  I don't see any reason to negotiate differently.  The drawback is that you might duplicate shares for groups that you offer both in combination and separately (as noted in the draft), but the gains in terms of simplicity are significant.  And the size increment resulting from duplicating classic shares is dwarfed by the PQ shares, so it's not that much of a loss.

I have some reservations about the way that results are integrated into the key schedule.  I pushed Franziskus toward concatenation, and it's good to see analysis supporting this choice.  We did however discuss a few options that I don't see in the draft.  The one I am most interested in has the (EC)DHE replaced by HKDF-Extract(classic, PQ) rather than classic || PQ.

Adding new steps in the ladder as suggested by 3.4.3 would require disruptive changes to stacks.  I'd be opposed to that.  3.4.4 suggests using the 0 step that exists, which would conflict with other proposed uses of that entry point.  I don't think that it is a good choice.

Cheers,
Martin


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This is quite an interesting idea, and it's good to see a draft starting the discussion.

I have some interest in this general problem space, but am concerned that this proposal is operating at the wrong layer of the stack.  It's a fairly obvious design, given that TLS provides the NewSessionTicket message, but that isn't the only relevant consideration.

In doing connection coalescing in HTTP/2, we discovered that there are many cases where servers have certificates for a wider span of names than they are truly able to serve.  You can connect to foo.example.com, which has a wildcard certificate for *.example.com, but while it might happily serve bar.example.com or other names, it is completely incapable of serving other names (e.g., baz.example.com might be operated by a completely different provider).

We sort of knew that already, which is why we added the 421 status code in RFC 7540, but RFC 8336 (ORIGIN frame) was needed to provide a better fix. The insight there is that for names other than the one for which the connection was made, the server needs an explicit opt in to having those names/origins used on the same connection.  [1]

The same will apply to resumption and so similar mechanisms are likely necessary for this to be useful for HTTP.  Re-building those at the TLS layer will be costly.

Any design needs to be really crisp about the scope of applicability here.  Is it possible to connect to port 443 and then use the same ticket when connecting to port 465?  I doubt that.  It might make sense to constrain this by protocol (or ALPN) at least to avoid problems, but it probably needs to include port numbers as well.  This is why the ORIGIN frame uses origins, which conveniently encapsulates the key ideas.  Origin uses scheme and not ALPN, which is important in that context, but for this example, the narrower concept of ALPN is likely to be necessary.

Finally for HTTP (and likely other protocols) the cross-site tracking characteristics of this design are interesting.  This is a form of cookie that origin X can set and origin Y can read outside of the usual paths.  I don't know if we could reasonably implement this in a web browser.

Cheers,
Martin


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I see a substantially similar draft in draft-pauly-quic-address-extension.  I'd like to understand how these might be complementary, or whether the idea is to pursue only one.  The QUIC extension seems superior, if you have QUIC.  There are a lot more plausible reasons to want this information in QUIC though.

Nits:

The format of the extension is not ideal.  Wouldn't you want to know which family it came from?

The term of art is reflexive address (or reflected address).


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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 05:37:55 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Subject: [TLS] draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt comments
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I've no real opinion on whether this draft is worth doing, because that depends on making an assessment about CWT and I keep bouncing off the C part.  I guess that the point of the draft is to start that part of the discussion, which is a fine thing.

There are a few more mundane, mechanical issues I noted when reading the draft.

This appears to be aimed at both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.  That should be made clearer.  Supporting TLS 1.2 complicates the design.

The mapping from CWT to TLS signature scheme (or signature algorithms in 1.2) needs to be clearer.  Also, the interactions with the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension need some treatment.  For some of what I think is being proposed, that requires the definition of new methods of producing CertificateVerify messages.

The symmetric key stuff needs considerably more meat on it.  How does the sender know what encryption schemes are used?  Why use an encrypted key and not just a key identifier (or PSK for that matter)?

Section 4 is interesting.  It's good to see a treatment of this issue here.  However, this is missing the piece where the server checks to see if it is willing to offer the identity it has been given via server_name.

The use of a URI as an identity is new.  It narrows the conception of server identity in a way that could be useful.  However, it needs far more thorough a treatment than this text gives.  Take a look at RFC 6125 if you want to get an appreciation for what thorough means in this context.

Cheers,
Martin


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The QUIC and TLS drafts were written together, and are quite similar as you note. The intention is to use the TLS extension over TLS/TCP connections, and the QUIC extension for QUIC/UDP.

I agree that QUIC as a protocol benefits more from the extension than TLS does, but applications on top of both can benefit by detecting NATs, for making decisions about long-lived connections and privacy mitigations. 

Thanks,
Tommy

> On Mar 20, 2019, at 2:26 AM, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> 
> I see a substantially similar draft in draft-pauly-quic-address-extension.  I'd like to understand how these might be complementary, or whether the idea is to pursue only one.  The QUIC extension seems superior, if you have QUIC.  There are a lot more plausible reasons to want this information in QUIC though.
> 
> Nits:
> 
> The format of the extension is not ideal.  Wouldn't you want to know which family it came from?

I think the intention was to use the length to infer the family. 
> 
> The term of art is reflexive address (or reflected address).

Thanks, good to know!
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Erik Sy <sy@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:53:01 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/GugqIWZSPfyJoV3dKMSy8hh2dv8>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-sy-tls-resumption-group comments
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Dear Martin,

thanks for reading the draft and commenting on it.

You point out, that there exist similarities between the draft and
connection coalescing in HTTP/2 and a solution in HTTP can somehow solve
the described performance problem.

As I understand it, connection coalescing in HTTP/2 is improving
performance by reducing the number of required connections. However,
this draft proposes a mechanism to optimize the process of resumed
connection establishment. Thus, in case that a connection cannot be
avoided via connection coalescing, this draft may contribute to an
efficient connection establishment. I think both approaches should be
pursued independently and that the TLS layer is the right place to
improve the TLS connection establishment.

Furthermore, you mention that we need something similar to RFC 8336
(Origin HTTP/2 frame) to explicitly opt-in for session resumptions
across SNI values and that this might lead to significant complexity.

I agree, that an explicit opt-in is required. As described in the draft,
the server indicates support for session resumptions across SNI values
with a single bit. If this bit signals support for this feature, then
the subject alternative name (SAN) extension of the certificate is used
to define the resumption group, which members mutually accept their TLS
resumption tickets to establish resumed connections. I hope this
description mitigates your concerns.

Moreover, you point out issues with the scope of applicability. The
proposed behavior would use the same ALPN parameter as associated with
the PSK in use when resuming a connection across SNI values. If this
used ALPN parameter is not accepted by the server when establishing a
resumed connection, we apply the fallback as defined in TLS 1.3 for
standard session resumptions. Does this solve your issue?

Finally, you address cross-site tracking enabled by this design. I
discussed this point in a subsection of
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.02531.pdf.
Generally spoken, I think it is not feasible to defend against
cross-site tracking if two sites collaborate with each other. For
example, a simple redirect from site A to site B can be used to link the
logs on a user across both sites. Thus, this proposal does not increase
the privacy risks of web browsing. However, browser vendors should
implement proper countermeasures against long-term tracking via session
resumption mechanisms (see https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.07304.pdf).

Best,
Erik


On 3/20/19 10:21, Martin Thomson wrote:
> This is quite an interesting idea, and it's good to see a draft starting the discussion.
>
> I have some interest in this general problem space, but am concerned that this proposal is operating at the wrong layer of the stack.  It's a fairly obvious design, given that TLS provides the NewSessionTicket message, but that isn't the only relevant consideration.
>
> In doing connection coalescing in HTTP/2, we discovered that there are many cases where servers have certificates for a wider span of names than they are truly able to serve.  You can connect to foo.example.com, which has a wildcard certificate for *.example.com, but while it might happily serve bar.example.com or other names, it is completely incapable of serving other names (e.g., baz.example.com might be operated by a completely different provider).
>
> We sort of knew that already, which is why we added the 421 status code in RFC 7540, but RFC 8336 (ORIGIN frame) was needed to provide a better fix. The insight there is that for names other than the one for which the connection was made, the server needs an explicit opt in to having those names/origins used on the same connection.  [1]
>
> The same will apply to resumption and so similar mechanisms are likely necessary for this to be useful for HTTP.  Re-building those at the TLS layer will be costly.
>
> Any design needs to be really crisp about the scope of applicability here.  Is it possible to connect to port 443 and then use the same ticket when connecting to port 465?  I doubt that.  It might make sense to constrain this by protocol (or ALPN) at least to avoid problems, but it probably needs to include port numbers as well.  This is why the ORIGIN frame uses origins, which conveniently encapsulates the key ideas.  Origin uses scheme and not ALPN, which is important in that context, but for this example, the narrower concept of ALPN is likely to be necessary.
>
> Finally for HTTP (and likely other protocols) the cross-site tracking characteristics of this design are interesting.  This is a form of cookie that origin X can set and origin Y can read outside of the usual paths.  I don't know if we could reasonably implement this in a web browser.
>
> Cheers,
> Martin
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Douglas Stebila <dstebila@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 11:41:31 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-stebila-tls-hybrid-design comments
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Thanks for the feedback, Martin!

> We did however discuss a few options that I don't see in the draft.  The =
one I am most interested in has the (EC)DHE replaced by HKDF-Extract(classi=
c, PQ) rather than classic || PQ.

Good suggestion, I've added it to the document for the next version;
https://github.com/dstebila/draft-stebila-tls-hybrid-design.

Douglas



On Mar 20, 2019, at 04:41, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> Thanks to the authors for this survey.  I think that it is good to have t=
his sort of work is extremely valuable in informing decisions.
>
> I would like to see one approach come out of discussion here.  I don't wa=
nt the protocol to be a tapestry of options.  As someone who has to maintai=
n software, that is a disaster.
>
> To be clear, I have a fairly strong preference for the design choices in =
draft-kiefer-tls-ecdhe-sidh.  I don't see any reason to negotiate different=
ly.  The drawback is that you might duplicate shares for groups that you of=
fer both in combination and separately (as noted in the draft), but the gai=
ns in terms of simplicity are significant.  And the size increment resultin=
g from duplicating classic shares is dwarfed by the PQ shares, so it's not =
that much of a loss.
>
> I have some reservations about the way that results are integrated into t=
he key schedule.  I pushed Franziskus toward concatenation, and it's good t=
o see analysis supporting this choice.  We did however discuss a few option=
s that I don't see in the draft.  The one I am most interested in has the (=
EC)DHE replaced by HKDF-Extract(classic, PQ) rather than classic || PQ.
>
> Adding new steps in the ladder as suggested by 3.4.3 would require disrup=
tive changes to stacks.  I'd be opposed to that.  3.4.4 suggests using the =
0 step that exists, which would conflict with other proposed uses of that e=
ntry point.  I don't think that it is a good choice.
>
> Cheers,
> Martin


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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 17:45:15 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 04:41:10AM -0400, Martin Thomson wrote:
> Thanks to the authors for this survey.  I think that it is good to
> have this sort of work is extremely valuable in informing decisions.
> 
> To be clear, I have a fairly strong preference for the design
> choices in draft-kiefer-tls-ecdhe-sidh.  I don't see any reason to
> negotiate differently.  The drawback is that you might duplicate
> shares for groups that you offer both in combination and separately
> (as noted in the draft), but the gains in terms of simplicity are
> significant.  And the size increment resulting from duplicating
> classic shares is dwarfed by the PQ shares, so it's not that much of
> a loss.

Yes, duplicating shares is the easiest, and in fact that is the
way I took when I cooked an implementation as experiment.

It basically takes the simplest way for everything:

- Use one algorithm that is internally composite.
- Concatenate shares
- Concatenate secrets.

The duplication enlarges key data by about 5% (as PQ key size is
~18.5x classic key size).

> I have some reservations about the way that results are integrated
> into the key schedule.  I pushed Franziskus toward concatenation, and
> it's good to see analysis supporting this choice.  We did however
> discuss a few options that I don't see in the draft.  The one I am
> most interested in has the (EC)DHE replaced by
> HKDF-Extract(classic, PQ) rather than classic || PQ.

Beware that construct is not CR-preserving.

> Adding new steps in the ladder as suggested by 3.4.3 would require
> disruptive changes to stacks.  I'd be opposed to that.  3.4.4
> suggests using the 0 step that exists, which would conflict with
> other proposed uses of that entry point.  I don't think that it is
> a good choice.

Furthermore, that 0 step is in wrong place (after handshake keying)
for this kind of use.


-Ilari


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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 17:54:02 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>
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On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 06:59:55AM -0700, Tommy Pauly wrote:
> The QUIC and TLS drafts were written together, and are quite similar
> as you note. The intention is to use the TLS extension over TLS/TCP
> connections, and the QUIC extension for QUIC/UDP.

Quickly reading the draft:

struct {
       opaque address<32..255>;
} NetworkAddress;


Address is at least 32 octets? Even IPv6 addresses are only 16 octets
(and IPv4 is 4 octets).


-Ilari


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> On Mar 20, 2019, at 8:54 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 06:59:55AM -0700, Tommy Pauly wrote:
>> The QUIC and TLS drafts were written together, and are quite similar
>> as you note. The intention is to use the TLS extension over TLS/TCP
>> connections, and the QUIC extension for QUIC/UDP.
> 
> Quickly reading the draft:
> 
> struct {
>       opaque address<32..255>;
> } NetworkAddress;
> 
> 
> Address is at least 32 octets? Even IPv6 addresses are only 16 octets
> (and IPv4 is 4 octets).

This is a silly bug. Oops!

Best,
Chris


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Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 17:10:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
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I had a quick scan of that.

I wondered what'd the server send if MPTCP was being used?

(But I forget how TLS/MPTCP works, so maybe it's a dumb
question;-)

S.

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From nobody Wed Mar 20 11:57:45 2019
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Tommy Pauly' <tpauly=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
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I have not looked at this draft yet, but what about DTLS/UDP?

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tommy Pauly
> Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 3:00 PM
> To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
> 
> The QUIC and TLS drafts were written together, and are quite similar as
you
> note. The intention is to use the TLS extension over TLS/TCP connections,
> and the QUIC extension for QUIC/UDP.
> 
> I agree that QUIC as a protocol benefits more from the extension than TLS
> does, but applications on top of both can benefit by detecting NATs, for
> making decisions about long-lived connections and privacy mitigations.
> 
> Thanks,
> Tommy
> 
> > On Mar 20, 2019, at 2:26 AM, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
> wrote:
> >
> > I see a substantially similar draft in
draft-pauly-quic-address-extension.  I'd
> like to understand how these might be complementary, or whether the idea
> is to pursue only one.  The QUIC extension seems superior, if you have
QUIC.
> There are a lot more plausible reasons to want this information in QUIC
> though.
> >
> > Nits:
> >
> > The format of the extension is not ideal.  Wouldn't you want to know
which
> family it came from?
> 
> I think the intention was to use the length to infer the family.
> >
> > The term of art is reflexive address (or reflected address).
> 
> Thanks, good to know!
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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--_002_0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E321135SINEML521MBXchi_
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Hello, everyone.

Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.=20

The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS. Id=
enitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server authentica=
tion.=20

The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.=
=20

The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS. =
=20
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.

This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.=20

It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.

Best regards.

Haiguang=20



--_002_0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E321135SINEML521MBXchi_
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From: Dan Wing <danwing@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
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Good point.  Furthering that point:

- what about DTLS/SRTP when that is used with ICE (RFC8445 and its =
precursor RFC5245) and QUIC (c.f., https://w3c.github.io/webrtc-quic/).  =
Need guidance in the document to use ICE and/or quic-address-extension, =
as well as what it means if they differ (heaven forbid they differ, but =
...). =20
- Some motivational text and advice-to-implementor text explaining how =
ICE-over-QUIC-over-UDP is unsuitable compared to =
draft-pauly-quic-address-extension (lack of specification, desire to use =
same technique for both TLS-over-TCP and QUIC-over-UDP (perhaps), ICE =
too heavy (and can't be profiled?), or whatever the reasons are.  Such =
guidance will help developers who might happen to notice several IETF =
protocols that could be made to achieve the same ends. =20
- Also need guidance that the information is time-limited, source =
network specific (different answers on Ethernet vs WiFi vs LTE) and =
destination specific (different answer is possible depending on the =
server queried, due to a NAT or Carrier Grade NAT using multiple =
outbound interfaces ("pooling") and whatever the NAT's algorithm to =
choose whichever outbound interface (based on client VLAN, performance =
of each outbound interface, etc., who knows).  NAT pooling can be a =
significantly complicated issue =
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4787#page-7.
- Does anyone see a need for a well-known underscore name to retrieve =
this information from a web server?  As written both drafts work with =
TLS and with QUIC, which means they don't require an HTTP server on the =
far side so works with SMTP, IMAP, etc.  However, I could see it being =
difficult for an application to learn its public IP address (needs to =
get its TLS or QUIC implementation to support these I-Ds).  Supporting =
this over HTTP has the advantage that both the OS and an application can =
programmatically learn its public IP address. =20
- As already mentioned, MPTCP complicates the answer from the server, as =
will multipath QUIC (which publicly appears to be stalled, but we should =
reasonably expect it might come to life again).  Guidance text needs to =
be added, or perhaps we can safely punt the problem with 'for further =
study' and recommend against using it with MPTCP?
- Finally, the datastructure doe not convey protocol; I worked on a =
TCP-to-SCTP gateway a few years ago and one might envision a TCP-to-QUIC =
gateway or QUIC-to-QUIC8 gateway in 2030.  Should we anticipate that and =
include protocol number to fully qualify the port number that exists =
already in the datastructure?  I honestly don't know the answer to that, =
but throwing it out for consideration.

-d


> On Mar 21, 2019, at 12:26 AM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> I have not looked at this draft yet, but what about DTLS/UDP?
>=20
> Jim
>=20
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tommy Pauly
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 3:00 PM
>> To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
>> Cc: tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
>>=20
>> The QUIC and TLS drafts were written together, and are quite similar =
as
> you
>> note. The intention is to use the TLS extension over TLS/TCP =
connections,
>> and the QUIC extension for QUIC/UDP.
>>=20
>> I agree that QUIC as a protocol benefits more from the extension than =
TLS
>> does, but applications on top of both can benefit by detecting NATs, =
for
>> making decisions about long-lived connections and privacy =
mitigations.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Tommy
>>=20
>>> On Mar 20, 2019, at 2:26 AM, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I see a substantially similar draft in
> draft-pauly-quic-address-extension.  I'd
>> like to understand how these might be complementary, or whether the =
idea
>> is to pursue only one.  The QUIC extension seems superior, if you =
have
> QUIC.
>> There are a lot more plausible reasons to want this information in =
QUIC
>> though.
>>>=20
>>> Nits:
>>>=20
>>> The format of the extension is not ideal.  Wouldn't you want to know
> which
>> family it came from?
>>=20
>> I think the intention was to use the length to infer the family.
>>>=20
>>> The term of art is reflexive address (or reflected address).
>>=20
>> Thanks, good to know!
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:46:07 -0700
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To: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.

First the motivation for this technique appears rather
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.

First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.

In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a
certificate
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-level
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically
either
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?

In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).

For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.


TECHNICAL COMMENTS
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
PKI.

You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
Something else?

-Ekr


[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
text in future.


On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <
wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:

> Hello, everyone.
>
> Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on
> draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10.
>
> The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS.
> Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server
> authentication.
>
> The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.
>
> The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support
> three other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and
> ISO-Chinese-IBS.
> Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.
>
> This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will
> submit it once it is reopen.
>
> It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and
> help us to improve the draft.
>
> Best regards.
>
> Haiguang
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draf=
t [0]. Comments follow.<br><br>First the motivation for this technique appe=
ars rather<br>weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to imple=
ment and<br>this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to cons=
ider.<br><br>First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to=
 work<br>outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn&#39;t seem to acc=
ount for<br>any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someon=
e&#39;s<br>keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this =
inside<br>the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the=
<br>identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>but you don&#39;=
t specify these, and they add complexity.<br><br>In a similar vein, another=
 thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>hierarchy rather tha=
n a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-level<br>hierarchy then =
life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically either<br>foregoes =
this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?<br><br>In addition, the =
innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7<br>is a way in w=
hich IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br>way we don&#=
39;t know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).<br><br>For these reasons, I=
 don&#39;t think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>the process allo=
ws you to have a code point without adoption.<br><br><br>TECHNICAL COMMENTS=
<br>I don&#39;t understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the =
wire.<br>Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in w=
hich<br>case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot=
<br>be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br=
>course this doesn&#39;t mesh well with multiple generations of PKG paramet=
ers<br>(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mi=
ni<br>PKI.<br><br>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. I=
s it a domain name?<br>Something else?<br><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br=
></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>[0] Note that it&#39;s much harder to review do=
cuments in PDF. Please send<br>text in future.<br><br></div></div><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Mar 21,=
 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldl=
ab@huawei.com" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hello, e=
veryone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10. <br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to=C2=A0 use identity as raw public key=C2=A0 ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication. <br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.=
=C2=A0 <br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen. <br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address and 'public address'
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I see this draft describes the format of a network address as
   
   NetworkAddress.address carries the raw network-order byte-wise
   representation of the client IP address.
   ...
   Clients which receive a non-empty NetworkAddress extension may use
   it to record their public IP address.

This is an end-to-end operation, and so I see a few problems with it:

- There's no guarantee that the IP address seen by the server is a
  'public' address.  It's perfectly possible that the path looks like
  
  client - NAT - NAT - internet - NAT - NAT - server

  or it may not even be that simple.  There may not be any involvement
  of what we would call the 'internet' at all.  I think the intent of
  the draft is that the server should only implement this extension if
  it can see the client's address as visible on the Internet and if
  so, the draft should say this, along with MUST NOT prohibitions for
  returning local, link-local, site-local, private use, or similar
  addresses.

- There's no guarantee that the public IP address of the client is the
  same address family (IPv4/IPv6/whatever) as the private address,
  leading to ambiguity.  In fact there is no guarantee the client even
  implements that address family.  My suggestion is that
  NetworkAddress should be enhanced to include a value from the IANA
  'Address Family Numbers' table.

  Alternatively you might look at the SNMP TransportDomain and
  its related TransportAddress object from RFC 3419.


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Hi!

I try to find authoritative explanation for some aspects in RFC 5246 (TLS 1=
.2). I hope this is right place to ask.

Background: Company A has client/browser and company B has web server. Serv=
er has certificate and it also requires certificate from client. Client do =
not advertise signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 in its client hello. Server =
supports signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 by default, but it does not send =
it to client with certificate request message because it  is not advertised=
 in client hello! (Communication fails.)


  *   Company B says that this is correct implementation for RFC 5246 - onl=
y common signature algorithms for both parties must be included in signatur=
e_algorithms extension in certificate request message!
  *   Company A says that in correct implementation of RFC 5246 all signatu=
re_algorithms supported by server must be included in certificate request m=
essage (and client hello has nothing to do with certificate request message=
)!

Can you please share your opinion/understanding with me?
Or lead me to right direction?

Thanks!

Urmas


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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hi!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">I try to find authoritative exp=
lanation for some aspects in RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2). I hope this is right place=
 to ask.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Background: Company A has clien=
t/browser and company B has web server. Server has certificate and it also =
requires certificate from client. Client do not advertise signature_algorit=
hm ECDSA/SHA512 in its client hello.
 Server supports signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 by default, but it does n=
ot send it to client with certificate request message because it&nbsp; is n=
ot advertised in client hello! (Communication fails.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0cm" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Company B says that this is correct implementati=
on for RFC 5246 &#8211; only common signature algorithms for both parties m=
ust be included in signature_algorithms extension
 in certificate request message!<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=3D"MsoList=
Paragraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><span lang=3D"=
EN-US">Company A says that in correct implementation of RFC 5246 all signat=
ure_algorithms supported by server must be included in certificate request =
message (and client
 hello has nothing to do with certificate request message)!<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Can you please share your opini=
on/understanding with me?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Or lead me to right direction?<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Thanks!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Urmas<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_VI1PR0101MB2336F08960C01C00F628D1E58C420VI1PR0101MB2336_--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 01:14:10 -0700
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To: Urmas Vanem <urmas.vanem@octox.eu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis
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On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 9:22 PM Urmas Vanem <urmas.vanem@octox.eu> wrote:

> Hi!
>
>
>
> I try to find authoritative explanation for some aspects in RFC 5246 (TLS
> 1.2). I hope this is right place to ask.
>
>
>
> Background: Company A has client/browser and company B has web server.
> Server has certificate and it also requires certificate from client. Clie=
nt
> do not advertise signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 in its client hello.
> Server supports signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 by default, but it does
> not send it to client with certificate request message because it  is not
> advertised in client hello! (Communication fails.)
>
>
>
>    - Company B says that this is correct implementation for RFC 5246 =E2=
=80=93
>    only common signature algorithms for both parties must be included in
>    signature_algorithms extension in certificate request message!
>    - Company A says that in correct implementation of RFC 5246 all
>    signature_algorithms supported by server must be included in certifica=
te
>    request message (and client hello has nothing to do with certificate
>    request message)!
>
> The signature algorithms in certificate request are unrelated from those
in the client hello, so the server should send its entire list.

-Ekr


>    -
>
>
>
> Can you please share your opinion/understanding with me?
>
> Or lead me to right direction?
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
> Urmas
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000c955270584aa7394
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 9:22 PM Urmas=
 Vanem &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:urmas.vanem@octox.eu">urmas.vanem@octox.eu</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"ET">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_4606194444054147873WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hi!<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">I try to find authoritative exp=
lanation for some aspects in RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2). I hope this is right place=
 to ask.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Background: Company A has clien=
t/browser and company B has web server. Server has certificate and it also =
requires certificate from client. Client do not advertise signature_algorit=
hm ECDSA/SHA512 in its client hello.
 Server supports signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 by default, but it does n=
ot send it to client with certificate request message because it=C2=A0 is n=
ot advertised in client hello! (Communication fails.)<u></u><u></u></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0cm" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_4606194444054147873MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0cm"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Company B says that this is correct implement=
ation for RFC 5246 =E2=80=93 only common signature algorithms for both part=
ies must be included in signature_algorithms extension
 in certificate request message!<u></u><u></u></span></li><li class=3D"gmai=
l-m_4606194444054147873MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0cm"><span la=
ng=3D"EN-US">Company A says that in correct implementation of RFC 5246 all =
signature_algorithms supported by server must be included in certificate re=
quest message (and client
 hello has nothing to do with certificate request message)!</span></li></ul=
></div></div></blockquote><div>The signature algorithms in certificate requ=
est are unrelated from those in the client hello, so the server should send=
 its entire list.<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"ET"><div clas=
s=3D"gmail-m_4606194444054147873WordSection1"><ul style=3D"margin-top:0cm" =
type=3D"disc"><li class=3D"gmail-m_4606194444054147873MsoListParagraph" sty=
le=3D"margin-left:0cm"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Can you please share your opini=
on/understanding with me?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Or lead me to right direction?<=
u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Thanks!<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Urmas<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000c955270584aa7394--


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On Thursday, 21 March 2019 12:16:08 CET Urmas Vanem wrote:
> Hi!
>=20
> I try to find authoritative explanation for some aspects in RFC 5246 (TLS
> 1..2). I hope this is right place to ask.
>=20
> Background: Company A has client/browser and company B has web server.
> Server has certificate and it also requires certificate from client. Clie=
nt
> do not advertise signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 in its client hello.
> Server supports signature_algorithm ECDSA/SHA512 by default, but it does
> not send it to client with certificate request message because it  is not
> advertised in client hello! (Communication fails.)
>=20
>=20
>   *   Company B says that this is correct implementation for RFC 5246 - o=
nly
> common signature algorithms for both parties must be included in
> signature_algorithms extension in certificate request message!

no, that's not correct interpretation of RFC 5246, signature_algorithms=20
advertised in ClientHello and in CertificateRequest are independent.

In the description of Signature Algorithms extension, section 7.4.1.4.1, th=
e=20
algorithms are what the _client_ is willing to _verify_:

   Each SignatureAndHashAlgorithm value lists a single hash/signature
   pair that the client is willing to verify.

=46ormally, client does not verify its own signatures.
No part of Section 7.4.4. states that the=20
CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms must be a subset of the=20
values advertised in signature_algorithms extension from ClientHello.
Again in Section 7.4.8. it is stated that the signature algorithm used must=
=20
have been present in CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithms. The=
re=20
is no mention of signature_algorithms from ClientHello.

> *   Company
> A says that in correct implementation of RFC 5246 all signature_algorithms
> supported by server must be included in certificate request message (and
> client hello has nothing to do with certificate request message)!


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi, Eric
Thanks very much for your comments.
Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we will i=
mprove
it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
Sent: Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.

First the motivation for this technique appears rather
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
[HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view with
the authors of RFC 7250.
Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the performa=
nce
of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwi=
th cost, etc.
As claimed in [2], TLS with  IBC  could significantly improve the performan=
ce.
Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times =
over standard TLS,
meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
[1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet=
 of Things.
Master thesis,https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Sha=
fagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf",
[2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services

First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
[HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but we h=
ave
considered it in the design. In practice, an
expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.
In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration time =
may be included
in the identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation i=
ssue in our draft.  If experts in this
group think we should address this issue, we can provide more information a=
nd details in the next draft.
Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for usin=
g IBC over telecom
network. We do have a separate section in the draft to address the identity=
 format, which includes expiring
time, location, service type (Appendix A).
We also want to point out that IBC is not a toy scenario. 3GPP has adopted =
the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509
for mission critical communications, and UK government has already started =
to use it.


In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
[HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system. In =
the future,
if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.


In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
[HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for authenticat=
ion, the
home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their SIM =
card.
Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus, whether =
key escrow
being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.
 I think in the security consideration section, we can remind the TLS-IBC u=
sers of this key
escrow issue, and they should make a judgment before including TLS-IBC in t=
heir system.


For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critical
communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our d=
raft.


TECHNICAL COMMENTS
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
PKI.
[HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to tr=
ust
each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.

You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
Something else?
[HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of the i=
dentity
is application-specific.
-Ekr


[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
text in future.


On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@hua=
wei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hello, everyone.

Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.

The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS. Id=
enitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server authentica=
tion.

The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.

The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.

This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.

It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.

Best regards.

Haiguang


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--_000_0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E323661SINEML521MBXchi_
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<html dir=3D"ltr">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style id=3D"owaParaStyle">P {
	MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN-TOP: 0px
}
</style>
</head>
<body fPStyle=3D"1" ocsi=3D"0">
<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"COLO=
R: black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"></span><span style=3D"COLOR: black=
"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">Thanks very much for your comments=
.
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"></span><span style=3D"COLOR: black=
"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">Please see my reply inline. Our dr=
aft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">it continuously based on the comme=
nts from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 16px; FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; COLOR: #000000=
">&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 16px; FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; COLOR: #000000=
">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRpF494439" style=3D"DIRECTION: ltr"><font color=3D"#000000" s=
ize=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#000080=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">[HG] The&nbsp=
;statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public key&quot;
 is from</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#000080=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">RFC 7250 (1<s=
up>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></fon=
t></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#000080=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">key has been =
supported in TLS 1.3. &nbsp;We share a similar point of view
 with </span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">the authors of RFC =
7250.
</font></span></p>
<span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif=
; COLOR: #1f497d">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">Moreover,&nbsp;the =
advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#000080=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">As analysed i=
n [1]
</span><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,san=
s-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">using of certificates has serious&nbsp;impact on t=
he performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">of resource contrai=
ned devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwith
 cost, etc.</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">As claimed in [2], =
TLS with&nbsp;&nbsp;IBC&nbsp; could significantly improve the performance.
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">Quote fr=
om [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times ove=
r standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">meaning =
websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">[1] H. S=
hafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of Thin=
gs.&nbsp;
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">Master t=
hesis,https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC=
_in_the_IoT.pdf&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#000080">[2] CESG=
. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>&nbsp;</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt">First, I believe the d=
esign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for<br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">[HG] Regardin=
g the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft,
 but we have </span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">considered it=
 in the design. In practice,&nbsp;an</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></s=
pan></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#666699">expiring time&nbsp;=
can be included in the&nbsp;identity for the IBC system.</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">In fact, in R=
FC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration
 time may be included </span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></f=
ont></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">in the identi=
ty. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation
 issue in our draft.&nbsp;&nbsp;If experts in this</span><span style=3D"COL=
OR: black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#666699">group think we shou=
ld address this issue, we can provide more information
 and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">Besides, in I=
TU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></fon=
t></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">network. We d=
o have a separate section in the draft to address the&nbsp;identity
 format, which includes expiring </span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">time, locatio=
n, service type
</span></font></font><font color=3D"#666699"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLO=
R: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot=
;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">(Appendix A).
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#666699"></font><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font color=3D"#666699=
"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt;=
 FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">We also want =
to point out that IBC is not a toy scenario. 3GPP has
 adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509</span><span style=3D"COLOR: bl=
ack"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#666699">for mission critica=
l communications, and UK government has already started
 to use it. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><br>
<br>
In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">[HG] At the moment, our target is to =
support a single-level IBC system. In the future,
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">if there are needs from industry, we =
can add in the support of HIBC.</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span><=
/font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">[HG] For telecom operator networks, s=
ymmetric keys are used for authentication, the</span><span style=3D"COLOR: =
black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">home operators always know the root k=
ey of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">Therefore, the key escrow is not issu=
e in telecom networks.&nbsp; Thus, whether key escrow
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">being a severe issue depends on the a=
pplication scenario.
</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">&nbsp;I think in the security conside=
ration section, we can remind the TLS-IBC users of this
 key</span><span style=3D"COLOR: black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">escrow issue, and they should make a =
judgment before including TLS-IBC in their system.
</font></span></p>
<span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif=
; COLOR: #1f497d"></span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><br>
<br>
For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
#1f497d"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">Thank you for your comme=
nts. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
#1f497d"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">this moment. In fact, IB=
C sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:&nbsp;</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"COLOR: =
#1f497d"></span><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&=
quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><font style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00"=
>3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509&nbsp;for
 mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">communications, and UK government has=
 already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"COLOR: #1f497d">&nbsp;
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00"><span style=3D"COLOR: #1f497d">Considering this, we wou=
ld like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>=
<br>
</font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.<br=
>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters<b=
r>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#1f497d" face=3D"Calibri">[HG] We agree with y=
our comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#1f497d" face=3D"Calibri">use hash values.&nbs=
p; For multiple PKGs, it is&nbsp; reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><font style=3D"BACKGRO=
UND-COLOR: #ffff00" color=3D"#1f497d" face=3D"Calibri">each other, just lik=
e &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.&nbsp;</font><span style=3D"COLO=
R: black"></span></p>
<span style=3D"COLOR: black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><br>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d">[<fo=
nt style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">HG] ServerID is simply the identity =
of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><span style=3D"FONT-SI=
ZE: 11pt; FONT-FAMILY: &quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; COLOR: #1f497d"><fon=
t style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">is application-specific.&nbsp;&nbsp;<=
/font></span><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; BORDER-LEFT: =
rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to&nbsp; use identity as raw public key&nbsp; ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.&=
nbsp;
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 10:13:03 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <
wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:

> Hi, Eric
>
> Thanks very much for your comments.
>
> Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we will
> improve
>
> it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
> *To:* Wang Haiguang
> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>
> I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.
>
> First the motivation for this technique appears rather
> weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
> this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
>
> [HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
>
> RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
>
> key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view with
>
> the authors of RFC 7250.
>

Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a
differently-construted PKI.



Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
>
> As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the
> performance
>
> of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage ,
> bandwith cost, etc.
>

Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.



Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times
> over standard TLS,
>
> meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
>
What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's not
really apples to apples.

[1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet
> of Things.
>
> Master thesis,
> https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in_=
the_IoT.pdf
> ",
>
> [2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services
>
>
>
> First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
> outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
> any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
> keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
> the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
> identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
> but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
>
> [HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but we
> have
>
> considered it in the design. In practice, an
>
> expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.
>

In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration time
> may be included
>
> in the identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed the revo=
cation
> issue in our draft.  If experts in this
>
> group think we should address this issue, we can provide more information
> and details in the next draft.
>
> Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for
> using IBC over telecom
>

This draft needs to provide a complete description.




> In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a
> certificate
> hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a
> single-level
> hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically
> either
> foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
>
> [HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system. I=
n
> the future,
>
> if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
>
But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want a
one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
See, for instance:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/


>
> In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section=
 7
> is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
> way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
>
> [HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for
> authentication, the
>
> home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their SI=
M
> card.
>
> Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus, whethe=
r
> key escrow
>
> being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.
>

I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's merely
a demonstration that the current situation is bad.


For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
> the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
>
> Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
>
> this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
>
> 3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critical
>
> communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
>
> Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our
> draft.
>

You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.


>
> TECHNICAL COMMENTS
> I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
> Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
> case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
> be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
> course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
> (see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
> PKI.
>
> [HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
>
> use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to
> trust
>
> each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.
>

I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust
anchors don't
need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor will
sign another
trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming something
like that
here? If so, how would it work?

>
> You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
> Something else?
>
> [HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of the
> identity
>
> is application-specific.
>
That is not going to promote interoperability.

-Ekr



> -Ekr
>
>
> [0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
> text in future.
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <
> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>> Hello, everyone.
>>
>> Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on
>> draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10.
>>
>> The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS.
>> Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server
>> authentication.
>>
>> The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th
>> version.
>>
>> The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support
>> three other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and
>> ISO-Chinese-IBS.
>> Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.
>>
>> This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We
>> will submit it once it is reopen.
>>
>> It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and
>> help us to improve the draft.
>>
>> Best regards.
>>
>> Haiguang
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019=
 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@hua=
wei.com">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">




<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your commen=
ts.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Our =
draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the com=
ments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">=
=C2=A0</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_2548543183531189906divRpF494439" style=3D"direction:ltr"=
><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resco=
rla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br=
>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] T=
he=C2=A0statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public key&quot;
 is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC 72=
50 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">key ha=
s been supported in TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 We share a similar point of view
 with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">the authors =
of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differe=
ntly-construted PKI.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:=
ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-=
size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;co=
lor:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Moreover,=C2=
=A0the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As ana=
lysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious=C2=A0impact on=
 the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">of resource =
contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwith
 cost, etc.</font></span></p></span></div></div></div></div></div></div></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any b=
etter.</div><div> <br></div><div><br></div><br><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"directi=
on:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"fo=
nt-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"=
margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:black"><font style=3D"background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Quote from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE spe=
d up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p></span></div>=
</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div>What algorithms is this com=
paring? If it&#39;s (say) BB versus RSA, that&#39;s not really apples to ap=
ples.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-=
size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:r=
gb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:=
11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.=C2=A0
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://people.inf.ethz.c=
h/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</fon=
t></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>=C2=A0</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn&#39;t seem to account for<=
br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone&#39;s<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don&#39;t specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] R=
egarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft,
 but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">consid=
ered it in the design. In practice,=C2=A0an</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">expiring tim=
e=C2=A0can be included in the=C2=A0identity for the IBC system.</font></spa=
n></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:l=
tr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-s=
ize:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">In fac=
t, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration
 time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></fo=
nt></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">in the=
 identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed the revocation
 issue in our draft.=C2=A0=C2=A0If experts in this</span><span style=3D"col=
or:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">group think =
we should address this issue, we can provide more information
 and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Beside=
s, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p></div></div></div></div=
></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This draft needs to provide a=
 complete description.</div><br><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;fon=
t-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16=
px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">
In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our target=
 is to support a single-level IBC system. In the future,
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indust=
ry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></blockquote><div>But again, this is an additional source =
of complexity. If you only want a one-level CA system, you can have somethi=
ng much simpler than PKIX. <br></div><div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"htt=
ps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/">https://datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;fo=
nt-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:1=
6px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font sty=
le=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span><=
/font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don&#39;t know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator netw=
orks, symmetric keys are used for authentication, the</span><span style=3D"=
color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know the=
 root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is n=
ot issue in telecom networks.=C2=A0 Thus, whether key escrow
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends o=
n the application scenario.
</span></font></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>I don&#39;t think this is a demonstration that this is not seve=
re. It&#39;s merely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div=
><div><br></div><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>=
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0=
,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin-bottom:12pt">
For these reasons, I don&#39;t think this WG should adopt this work, though=
<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:=C2=A0</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibr=
i&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rg=
b(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509=C2=A0for
 mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK governm=
ent has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">=C2=A0
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</span><br></font></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>You&#39;re of course free to request this, but you ha=
ve not persuaded me.</div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:=
rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times N=
ew Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"background-color=
:rgb(255,255,0)">
</font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don&#39;t understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire=
.<br>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn&#39;t mesh well with multiple generations of PKG paramete=
rs<br>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">use hash values=
.=C2=A0 For multiple PKGs, it is=C2=A0 reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.=C2=A0</font></p></div></di=
v></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t unde=
rstand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust anchors don&#39;=
t</div><div>need to trust each other. It&#39;s true that in some cases a tr=
ust anchor will sign another</div><div>trust anchor, but that&#39;s a deleg=
ation of trust. Are you assuming something like that</div><div>here? If so,=
 how would it work?</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
<div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-s=
ize:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rg=
b(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p></span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a =
domain name?<br>
Something else?<br>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[<f=
ont style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the id=
entity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</font></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><d=
iv>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div><div><br></div><div>=
-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pad=
ding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rg=
b(0,0,0);font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New=
 Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it&#39;s much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<=
br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to=C2=A0 use identity as raw public key=C2=A0 ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.=
=C2=A0
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div></div>

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References: <0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E321135@SINEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com> <CABcZeBMfY38Ps4fVk+Y6xuJB9=WjCJVNgyL+aOKp6TVy=s8ZKw@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,
 Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <157717aa-8515-2485-1ae2-4b18b38b48ad@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
References: <0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E321135@SINEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com>
 <CABcZeBMfY38Ps4fVk+Y6xuJB9=WjCJVNgyL+aOKp6TVy=s8ZKw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBMfY38Ps4fVk+Y6xuJB9=WjCJVNgyL+aOKp6TVy=s8ZKw@mail.gmail.com>

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Hiya,

On 21/03/2019 13:46, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Secti=
on 7
> is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in =
a
> way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).

I agree with Ekr here. I'd go further and argue that applications
really need to be aware that somewhere there's a key generator who
knows all private keys and that it'd be too dangerous for that
kind of difference to be hidden inside a TLS library.

> For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though=

> the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.

+1

Cheers,
S.


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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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On 3/22/19 7:28 AM, Wang Haiguang wrote:
> [HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but
> we have
> 
> considered it in the design. In practice, an
> 
> expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.
> 
> In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration
> time may be included
> 
> in the identity. That’s the reason we have not discussed the revocation
> issue in our draft.  If experts in this
> 
> group think we should address this issue, we can provide more
> information and details in the next draft.
> 

I generally agree with EKR's comments but I do think this is a
particular problem that needs to be addressed.  The security of a
mechanism like this depends on the ability to revoke compromised keys.
Your draft does not, in fact, include a key lifetime in the identifier
(and note that the timestamp is a MAY in RFC 6507).  If you decide to
include one it will probably need to be notably short in order to
provide any robustness against key compromises, which means that
rekeying and provisioning are going to be a practical problem that
may not be in scope for the draft but which will need to be addressed
in implementation and deployment.

I'm unenthusiastic about this draft but to the extent that there's a
hope to progress it, revocation really must be dealt with.

Melinda


-- 
Software longa, hardware brevis

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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Hi, Eric

Thanks very much for the clarification.

Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit more =
on the actual definition on the raw public key?

Regards.

Haiguang

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric
Thanks very much for your comments.
Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we will i=
mprove
it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.

First the motivation for this technique appears rather
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
[HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view with
the authors of RFC 7250.

Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-constru=
ted PKI.



Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the performa=
nce
of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwi=
th cost, etc.

Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.



Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times =
over standard TLS,
meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's not =
really apples to apples.

[1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet=
 of Things.
Master thesis,https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Sha=
fagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf",
[2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services

First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
[HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but we h=
ave
considered it in the design. In practice, an
expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.

In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration time =
may be included
in the identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation i=
ssue in our draft.  If experts in this
group think we should address this issue, we can provide more information a=
nd details in the next draft.
Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for usin=
g IBC over telecom

This draft needs to provide a complete description.



In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
[HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system. In =
the future,
if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want a o=
ne-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
See, for instance: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cw=
t/



In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
[HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for authenticat=
ion, the
home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their SIM =
card.
Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus, whether =
key escrow
being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.

I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's merely =
a demonstration that the current situation is bad.


For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critical
communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our d=
raft.

You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.



TECHNICAL COMMENTS
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
PKI.
[HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to tr=
ust
each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.

I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust anch=
ors don't
need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor will =
sign another
trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming something =
like that
here? If so, how would it work?

You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
Something else?
[HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of the i=
dentity
is application-specific.
That is not going to promote interoperability.

-Ekr



-Ekr


[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
text in future.


On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@hua=
wei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hello, everyone.

Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.

The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS. Id=
enitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server authentica=
tion.

The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.

The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.

This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.

It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.

Best regards.

Haiguang


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<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;">Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the clarification.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit =
more on the actual definition on the raw public key?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regards.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Times New Roman; color: #000000; font-size: 16px=
">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRpF565697" style=3D"direction: ltr;"><font face=3D"Tahoma" si=
ze=3D"2" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"=
color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your comm=
ents.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Ou=
r draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the c=
omments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_2548543183531189906divRpF494439" style=3D"direction:ltr"=
><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resco=
rla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener nore=
ferrer">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopene=
r noreferrer">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 The&nbsp;statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public
 key&quot; is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC =
7250 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">key =
has been supported in TLS 1.3.&nbsp; We share a similar point
 of view with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">the author=
s of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-co=
nstruted PKI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Moreover,&=
nbsp;the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">As a=
nalysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-=
serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious&nbsp;impact =
on the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">of resourc=
e contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage
 , bandwith cost, etc.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; =
color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Quot=
e from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times=
 over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's=
 not really apples to apples.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.&nbsp;
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferre=
r">https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>&nbsp;</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for<br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in
 the draft, but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></=
font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">cons=
idered it in the design. In practice,&nbsp;an</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">expiring t=
ime&nbsp;can be included in the&nbsp;identity for the IBC system.</font></s=
pan></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">In f=
act, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that
 expiration time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span>=
</font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">in t=
he identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed
 the revocation issue in our draft.&nbsp;&nbsp;If experts in this</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">group thin=
k we should address this issue, we can provide more
 information and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Besi=
des, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This draft needs to provide a complete description.</div>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">In a similar vein, anot=
her thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our targ=
et is to support a single-level IBC system. In the
 future, </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indu=
stry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only wan=
t a one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
<br>
</div>
<div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-t=
schofenig-tls-cwt/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator ne=
tworks, symmetric keys are used for authentication,
 the</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know t=
he root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is=
 not issue in telecom networks.&nbsp; Thus, whether key
 escrow </span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends=
 on the application scenario.
</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's me=
rely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">For these reasons, I do=
n't think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:&nbsp;</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calib=
ri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:=
rgb(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508
 and RFC 6509&nbsp;for mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK gover=
nment has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">&nbsp;
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.&nbsp;&n=
bsp;</span><br>
</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.<=
/div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"></font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.<br=
>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters<b=
r>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">use hash values=
.&nbsp; For multiple PKGs, it is&nbsp; reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.&nbsp;</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust=
 anchors don't</div>
<div>need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor =
will sign another</div>
<div>trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming somet=
hing like that</div>
<div>here? If so, how would it work?</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[=
<font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the =
identity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.&nbs=
p;&nbsp;</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex; border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204); margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to&nbsp; use identity as raw public key&nbsp; ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.&=
nbsp;
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 04:30:50 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang Haiguang <
wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:

> Hi, Eric
>
> Thanks very much for the clarification.
>
> Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit mor=
e
> on the actual definition on the raw public key?
>

I don't understand this question.

-Ekr


> Regards.
>
> Haiguang
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM
> *To:* Wang Haiguang
> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <
> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi, Eric
>>
>> Thanks very much for your comments.
>>
>> Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we wil=
l
>> improve
>>
>> it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
>> *To:* Wang Haiguang
>> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>>
>> I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.
>>
>> First the motivation for this technique appears rather
>> weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
>> this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
>>
>> [HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
>>
>> RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
>>
>> key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view wit=
h
>>
>> the authors of RFC 7250.
>>
>
> Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a
> differently-construted PKI.
>
>
>
> Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
>>
>> As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the
>> performance
>>
>> of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage ,
>> bandwith cost, etc.
>>
>
> Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.
>
>
>
> Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 time=
s
>> over standard TLS,
>>
>> meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
>>
> What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's no=
t
> really apples to apples.
>
> [1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the
>> Internet of Things.
>>
>> Master thesis,
>> https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf
>> ",
>>
>> [2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services
>>
>>
>>
>> First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
>> outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
>> any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
>> keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
>> the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
>> identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
>> but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
>>
>> [HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but w=
e
>> have
>>
>> considered it in the design. In practice, an
>>
>> expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.
>>
>
> In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration tim=
e
>> may be included
>>
>> in the identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed the rev=
ocation
>> issue in our draft.  If experts in this
>>
>> group think we should address this issue, we can provide more informatio=
n
>> and details in the next draft.
>>
>> Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for
>> using IBC over telecom
>>
>
> This draft needs to provide a complete description.
>
>
>
>
>> In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a
>> certificate
>> hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a
>> single-level
>> hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically
>> either
>> foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
>>
>> [HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system.
>> In the future,
>>
>> if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
>>
> But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want a
> one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
> See, for instance:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/
>
>
>>
>> In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Sectio=
n
>> 7
>> is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
>> way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
>>
>> [HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for
>> authentication, the
>>
>> home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their
>> SIM card.
>>
>> Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus,
>> whether key escrow
>>
>> being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.
>>
>
> I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's merel=
y
> a demonstration that the current situation is bad.
>
>
> For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
>> the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
>>
>> Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
>>
>> this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
>>
>> 3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critica=
l
>>
>> communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
>>
>> Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider ou=
r
>> draft.
>>
>
> You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.
>
>
>>
>> TECHNICAL COMMENTS
>> I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
>> Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
>> case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
>> be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
>> course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameter=
s
>> (see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
>> PKI.
>>
>> [HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
>>
>> use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to
>> trust
>>
>> each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.
>>
>
> I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust
> anchors don't
> need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor wil=
l
> sign another
> trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming somethin=
g
> like that
> here? If so, how would it work?
>
>>
>> You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
>> Something else?
>>
>> [HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of
>> the identity
>>
>> is application-specific.
>>
> That is not going to promote interoperability.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> [0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
>> text in future.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <
>> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello, everyone.
>>>
>>> Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on
>>> draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10.
>>>
>>> The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS=
.
>>> Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server
>>> authentication.
>>>
>>> The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th
>>> version.
>>>
>>> The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to suppor=
t
>>> three other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and
>>> ISO-Chinese-IBS.
>>> Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.
>>>
>>> This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We
>>> will submit it once it is reopen.
>>>
>>> It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments an=
d
>>> help us to improve the draft.
>>>
>>> Best regards.
>>>
>>> Haiguang
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>

--0000000000000299300584c150db
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com">wang.hai=
guang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">




<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the clarification.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit =
more on the actual definition on the raw public key?</div></div></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t understand this question.</div><div=
><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regards.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:16px">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2178899699287292030divRpF565697" style=3D"direction:ltr=
"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resc=
orla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<b=
r>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your commen=
ts.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Our =
draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the com=
ments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">=
=C2=A0</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2178899699287292030gmail-m_2548543183531189906divRpF494=
439" style=3D"direction:ltr"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000=
000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"noo=
pener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] T=
he=C2=A0statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public
 key&quot; is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC 72=
50 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">key ha=
s been supported in TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 We share a similar point
 of view with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">the authors =
of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-co=
nstruted PKI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Moreover,=C2=
=A0the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As ana=
lysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious=C2=A0impact on=
 the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">of resource =
contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage
 , bandwith cost, etc.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;co=
lor:rgb(31,73,125)"></span>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Quot=
e from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times=
 over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>What algorithms is this comparing? If it&#39;s (say) BB versus RSA, th=
at&#39;s not really apples to apples.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.=C2=A0
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>=C2=A0</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn&#39;t seem to account for<=
br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone&#39;s<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don&#39;t specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] R=
egarding the revocation, we did not mention it in
 the draft, but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></=
font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">consid=
ered it in the design. In practice,=C2=A0an</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">expiring tim=
e=C2=A0can be included in the=C2=A0identity for the IBC system.</font></spa=
n></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">In fac=
t, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that
 expiration time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span>=
</font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">in the=
 identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed
 the revocation issue in our draft.=C2=A0=C2=A0If experts in this</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">group think =
we should address this issue, we can provide more
 information and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Beside=
s, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This draft needs to provide a complete description.</div>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">In a similar vein, anot=
her thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our target=
 is to support a single-level IBC system. In the
 future, </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indust=
ry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only wan=
t a one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
<br>
</div>
<div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-t=
schofenig-tls-cwt/" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don&#39;t know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator netw=
orks, symmetric keys are used for authentication,
 the</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know the=
 root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is n=
ot issue in telecom networks.=C2=A0 Thus, whether key
 escrow </span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends o=
n the application scenario.
</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don&#39;t think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It&=
#39;s merely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">For these reasons, I do=
n&#39;t think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:=C2=A0</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibr=
i&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rg=
b(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508
 and RFC 6509=C2=A0for mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK governm=
ent has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">=C2=A0
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</span><br>
</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You&#39;re of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded =
me.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"></font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don&#39;t understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire=
.<br>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn&#39;t mesh well with multiple generations of PKG paramete=
rs<br>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">use hash values=
.=C2=A0 For multiple PKGs, it is=C2=A0 reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.=C2=A0</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don&#39;t understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system t=
rust anchors don&#39;t</div>
<div>need to trust each other. It&#39;s true that in some cases a trust anc=
hor will sign another</div>
<div>trust anchor, but that&#39;s a delegation of trust. Are you assuming s=
omething like that</div>
<div>here? If so, how would it work?</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[<f=
ont style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the id=
entity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it&#39;s much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<=
br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to=C2=A0 use identity as raw public key=C2=A0 ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.=
=C2=A0
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi, Eric

It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.

In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But to m=
y understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the iden=
tity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have trans=
mit the PKG public parameters that makes it not a raw public key, I think i=
n single PKG scenario, both client and server does not need to exchange par=
ameters. That makes the identity take exactly the same role as raw public k=
ey.

I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical point mak=
es you think that IBC is not raw public key.

Thanks very much.

Haiguang

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric

Thanks very much for the clarification.

Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit more =
on the actual definition on the raw public key?

I don't understand this question.

-Ekr


Regards.

Haiguang

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric
Thanks very much for your comments.
Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we will i=
mprove
it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.

First the motivation for this technique appears rather
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
[HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view with
the authors of RFC 7250.

Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-constru=
ted PKI.



Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the performa=
nce
of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwi=
th cost, etc.

Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.



Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times =
over standard TLS,
meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's not =
really apples to apples.

[1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet=
 of Things.
Master thesis,https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Sha=
fagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf",
[2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services

First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
[HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but we h=
ave
considered it in the design. In practice, an
expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.

In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration time =
may be included
in the identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation i=
ssue in our draft.  If experts in this
group think we should address this issue, we can provide more information a=
nd details in the next draft.
Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for usin=
g IBC over telecom

This draft needs to provide a complete description.



In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
[HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system. In =
the future,
if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want a o=
ne-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
See, for instance: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cw=
t/



In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
[HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for authenticat=
ion, the
home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their SIM =
card.
Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus, whether =
key escrow
being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.

I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's merely =
a demonstration that the current situation is bad.


For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critical
communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our d=
raft.

You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.



TECHNICAL COMMENTS
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
PKI.
[HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to tr=
ust
each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.

I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust anch=
ors don't
need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor will =
sign another
trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming something =
like that
here? If so, how would it work?

You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
Something else?
[HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of the i=
dentity
is application-specific.
That is not going to promote interoperability.

-Ekr



-Ekr


[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
text in future.


On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@hua=
wei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hello, everyone.

Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.

The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS. Id=
enitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server authentica=
tion.

The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.

The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.

This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.

It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.

Best regards.

Haiguang


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<body fpstyle=3D"1" ocsi=3D"0">
<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;">
<div>Hi, Eric</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.&nbsp;</=
div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But=
 to my understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the=
 identity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have =
transmit the PKG public parameters
 that makes it not a raw public key, I think in single PKG scenario, both c=
lient and server does not need to exchange parameters. That makes the ident=
ity take exactly the same role as raw public key.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical poin=
t makes you think that IBC is not raw public key.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<br>
<div style=3D"font-family: Times New Roman; color: #000000; font-size: 16px=
">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRpF492139" style=3D"direction: ltr;"><font face=3D"Tahoma" si=
ze=3D"2" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the clarification.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit =
more on the actual definition on the raw public key?</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't understand this question.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regards.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-size:16px=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2178899699287292030divRpF565697" style=3D"direction:ltr=
"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resc=
orla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener nor=
eferrer">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopene=
r noreferrer">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"=
color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your comm=
ents.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Ou=
r draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the c=
omments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2178899699287292030gmail-m_2548543183531189906divRpF494=
439" style=3D"direction:ltr">
<font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescor=
la [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 The&nbsp;statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public
 key&quot; is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC =
7250 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">key =
has been supported in TLS 1.3.&nbsp; We share a similar point
 of view with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">the author=
s of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-co=
nstruted PKI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Moreover,&=
nbsp;the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">As a=
nalysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-=
serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious&nbsp;impact =
on the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">of resourc=
e contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage
 , bandwith cost, etc.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; =
color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Quot=
e from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times=
 over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's=
 not really apples to apples.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.&nbsp;
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>&nbsp;</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for<br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in
 the draft, but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></=
font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">cons=
idered it in the design. In practice,&nbsp;an</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">expiring t=
ime&nbsp;can be included in the&nbsp;identity for the IBC system.</font></s=
pan></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">In f=
act, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that
 expiration time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span>=
</font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">in t=
he identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed
 the revocation issue in our draft.&nbsp;&nbsp;If experts in this</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">group thin=
k we should address this issue, we can provide more
 information and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Besi=
des, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This draft needs to provide a complete description.</div>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">In a similar vein, anot=
her thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our targ=
et is to support a single-level IBC system. In the
 future, </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indu=
stry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only wan=
t a one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
<br>
</div>
<div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-t=
schofenig-tls-cwt/" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator ne=
tworks, symmetric keys are used for authentication,
 the</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know t=
he root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is=
 not issue in telecom networks.&nbsp; Thus, whether key
 escrow </span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends=
 on the application scenario.
</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's me=
rely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">For these reasons, I do=
n't think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:&nbsp;</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calib=
ri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:=
rgb(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508
 and RFC 6509&nbsp;for mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK gover=
nment has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">&nbsp;
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.&nbsp;&n=
bsp;</span><br>
</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.<=
/div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"></font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.<br=
>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters<b=
r>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">use hash values=
.&nbsp; For multiple PKGs, it is&nbsp; reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.&nbsp;</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust=
 anchors don't</div>
<div>need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor =
will sign another</div>
<div>trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming somet=
hing like that</div>
<div>here? If so, how would it work?</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[=
<font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the =
identity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.&nbs=
p;&nbsp;</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex; border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204); margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to&nbsp; use identity as raw public key&nbsp; ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.&=
nbsp;
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 10:02:05 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 8:57 AM Wang Haiguang <
wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:

> Hi, Eric
>
> It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.
>
> In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But to
> my understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the
> identity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have
> transmit the PKG public parameters that makes it not a raw public key, I
> think in single PKG scenario, both client and server does not need to
> exchange parameters. That makes the identity take exactly the same role a=
s
> raw public key.
>
> I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical point
> makes you think that IBC is not raw public key.
>

It's not a raw public key. It's an identity which, together with
parameters, is then used as input to some function which produces a public
key. This is especially obvious when you include stuff like validity
windows.

Fundamentally, IBC is an alternate type of PKI much more than it's like a
raw public key.

-Ekr


> Thanks very much.
>
> Haiguang
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM
> *To:* Wang Haiguang
> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang Haiguang <
> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi, Eric
>>
>> Thanks very much for the clarification.
>>
>> Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit
>> more on the actual definition on the raw public key?
>>
>
> I don't understand this question.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>> Regards.
>>
>> Haiguang
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
>> *Sent:* Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM
>> *To:* Wang Haiguang
>> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <
>> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi, Eric
>>>
>>> Thanks very much for your comments.
>>>
>>> Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we
>>> will improve
>>>
>>> it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
>>> *To:* Wang Haiguang
>>> *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
>>> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
>>>
>>> I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.
>>>
>>> First the motivation for this technique appears rather
>>> weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
>>> this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
>>>
>>> [HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is fro=
m
>>>
>>> RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw
>>> public
>>>
>>> key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view
>>> with
>>>
>>> the authors of RFC 7250.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a
>> differently-construted PKI.
>>
>>
>>
>> Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
>>>
>>> As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the
>>> performance
>>>
>>> of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage ,
>>> bandwith cost, etc.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.
>>
>>
>>
>> Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7
>>> times over standard TLS,
>>>
>>> meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
>>>
>> What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's
>> not really apples to apples.
>>
>> [1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the
>>> Internet of Things.
>>>
>>> Master thesis,
>>> https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_i=
n_the_IoT.pdf
>>> ",
>>>
>>> [2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
>>> outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
>>> any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
>>> keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
>>> the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
>>> identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
>>> but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
>>>
>>> [HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but
>>> we have
>>>
>>> considered it in the design. In practice, an
>>>
>>> expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.
>>>
>>
>> In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration
>>> time may be included
>>>
>>> in the identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed the re=
vocation
>>> issue in our draft.  If experts in this
>>>
>>> group think we should address this issue, we can provide more
>>> information and details in the next draft.
>>>
>>> Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for
>>> using IBC over telecom
>>>
>>
>> This draft needs to provide a complete description.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a
>>> certificate
>>> hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a
>>> single-level
>>> hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically
>>> either
>>> foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
>>>
>>> [HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system.
>>> In the future,
>>>
>>> if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
>>>
>> But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want =
a
>> one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
>> See, for instance:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/
>>
>>
>>>
>>> In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in
>>> Section 7
>>> is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in =
a
>>> way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
>>>
>>> [HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for
>>> authentication, the
>>>
>>> home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their
>>> SIM card.
>>>
>>> Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus,
>>> whether key escrow
>>>
>>> being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's
>> merely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.
>>
>>
>> For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
>>> the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
>>>
>>> Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
>>>
>>> this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry=
:
>>>
>>> 3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission
>>> critical
>>>
>>> communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
>>>
>>> Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider
>>> our draft.
>>>
>>
>> You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> TECHNICAL COMMENTS
>>> I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire=
.
>>> Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
>>> case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
>>> be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
>>> course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG paramete=
rs
>>> (see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
>>> PKI.
>>>
>>> [HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
>>>
>>> use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs t=
o
>>> trust
>>>
>>> each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.
>>>
>>
>> I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust
>> anchors don't
>> need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor
>> will sign another
>> trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming
>> something like that
>> here? If so, how would it work?
>>
>>>
>>> You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
>>> Something else?
>>>
>>> [HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of
>>> the identity
>>>
>>> is application-specific.
>>>
>> That is not going to promote interoperability.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>> [0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
>>> text in future.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <
>>> wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello, everyone.
>>>>
>>>> Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on
>>>> draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10.
>>>>
>>>> The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over
>>>> TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/serve=
r
>>>> authentication.
>>>>
>>>> The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th
>>>> version.
>>>>
>>>> The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to
>>>> support three other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and
>>>> ISO-Chinese-IBS.
>>>> Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.
>>>>
>>>> This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We
>>>> will submit it once it is reopen.
>>>>
>>>> It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments
>>>> and help us to improve the draft.
>>>>
>>>> Best regards.
>>>>
>>>> Haiguang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>>

--0000000000009401940584c5f0b4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 8:57 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com">wang.hai=
guang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">




<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div>Hi, Eric</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.=C2=A0</=
div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But=
 to my understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the=
 identity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have =
transmit the PKG public parameters
 that makes it not a raw public key, I think in single PKG scenario, both c=
lient and server does not need to exchange parameters. That makes the ident=
ity take exactly the same role as raw public key.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical poin=
t makes you think that IBC is not raw public key.=C2=A0</div></div></div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s not a raw public key. It&#39;s an i=
dentity which, together with parameters, is then used as input to some func=
tion which produces a public key. This is especially obvious when you inclu=
de stuff like validity windows.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Fundamentally,=
 IBC is an alternate type of PKI much more than it&#39;s like a raw public =
key.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-fam=
ily:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:10pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<br>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:16px">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405divRpF492139" style=3D"direction:ltr=
"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resc=
orla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<b=
r>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the clarification.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit =
more on the actual definition on the raw public key?</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don&#39;t understand this question.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regards.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:16px">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405gmail-m_-2178899699287292030divRpF56=
5697" style=3D"direction:ltr"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#00=
0000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"no=
opener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your commen=
ts.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Our =
draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Cali=
bri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the com=
ments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">=
=C2=A0</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405gmail-m_-2178899699287292030gmail-m_=
2548543183531189906divRpF494439" style=3D"direction:ltr">
<font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescor=
la [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] T=
he=C2=A0statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public
 key&quot; is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC 72=
50 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">key ha=
s been supported in TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 We share a similar point
 of view with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">the authors =
of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-co=
nstruted PKI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Moreover,=C2=
=A0the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As ana=
lysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious=C2=A0impact on=
 the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">of resource =
contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage
 , bandwith cost, etc.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;co=
lor:rgb(31,73,125)"></span>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Quot=
e from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times=
 over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>What algorithms is this comparing? If it&#39;s (say) BB versus RSA, th=
at&#39;s not really apples to apples.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.=C2=A0
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#000080">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>=C2=A0</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn&#39;t seem to account for<=
br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone&#39;s<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don&#39;t specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] R=
egarding the revocation, we did not mention it in
 the draft, but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></=
font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">consid=
ered it in the design. In practice,=C2=A0an</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">expiring tim=
e=C2=A0can be included in the=C2=A0identity for the IBC system.</font></spa=
n></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">In fac=
t, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that
 expiration time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span>=
</font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">in the=
 identity. That=E2=80=99s the reason we have not discussed
 the revocation issue in our draft.=C2=A0=C2=A0If experts in this</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)" color=3D"#666699">group think =
we should address this issue, we can provide more
 information and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Beside=
s, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This draft needs to provide a complete description.</div>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">In a similar vein, anot=
her thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our target=
 is to support a single-level IBC system. In the
 future, </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indust=
ry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only wan=
t a one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
<br>
</div>
<div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-t=
schofenig-tls-cwt/" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don&#39;t know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator netw=
orks, symmetric keys are used for authentication,
 the</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know the=
 root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is n=
ot issue in telecom networks.=C2=A0 Thus, whether key
 escrow </span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends o=
n the application scenario.
</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don&#39;t think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It&=
#39;s merely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">For these reasons, I do=
n&#39;t think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:=C2=A0</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibr=
i&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rg=
b(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508
 and RFC 6509=C2=A0for mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK governm=
ent has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125=
)">=C2=A0
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</span><br>
</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You&#39;re of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded =
me.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"></font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don&#39;t understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire=
.<br>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn&#39;t mesh well with multiple generations of PKG paramete=
rs<br>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">use hash values=
.=C2=A0 For multiple PKGs, it is=C2=A0 reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)" face=3D"Calibri" color=3D"#1f497d">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.=C2=A0</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don&#39;t understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system t=
rust anchors don&#39;t</div>
<div>need to trust each other. It&#39;s true that in some cases a trust anc=
hor will sign another</div>
<div>trust anchor, but that&#39;s a delegation of trust. Are you assuming s=
omething like that</div>
<div>here? If so, how would it work?</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[<f=
ont style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the id=
entity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"><fo=
nt style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:1=
0pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px;font-family:Times New Roman;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it&#39;s much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<=
br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to=C2=A0 use identity as raw public key=C2=A0 ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.=
=C2=A0
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: [TLS] Slides for Prague
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If you're on the agenda for one of our meetings in Prague, please send
the chairs a PDF version of your slides ASAP.

Thanks,
Chris, Joe, and Sean


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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2019 11:47:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi, Eric

Thanks very much for the comments.

For the first point, to some extent, we partly agree with you but let me cl=
arify as follows:

For some IBS algorithms such as RFC 6507 (ECCSI), there are two different i=
nterpretations on the public keys. The first is that ID is a public key, an=
d PVT as part of the signatures. This is exactly that RFC 6507 has specifie=
d. The second is what you stated in the previous email, the public key is d=
erived from both ID and PVT.

For Bilinear pairing based IBS algorithms, ID is absolutely public key.

For second point, IBS algorithms cab be seen as something in between pure r=
aw public and PKI. So it is normal that we both have different interpretati=
on on this point.

So it is acceptable that IBS algorithms can be treated as raw public. It si=
mplifies the management of raw public key and identity binding as long as P=
KG parameters are provisioned to both peer and server.

Regards.

Haiguang


________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]
Sent: Sunday, 24 March, 2019 1:02:05 AM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 8:57 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric

It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.

In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But to m=
y understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the iden=
tity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have trans=
mit the PKG public parameters that makes it not a raw public key, I think i=
n single PKG scenario, both client and server does not need to exchange par=
ameters. That makes the identity take exactly the same role as raw public k=
ey.

I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical point mak=
es you think that IBC is not raw public key.

It's not a raw public key. It's an identity which, together with parameters=
, is then used as input to some function which produces a public key. This =
is especially obvious when you include stuff like validity windows.

Fundamentally, IBC is an alternate type of PKI much more than it's like a r=
aw public key.

-Ekr


Thanks very much.

Haiguang

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric

Thanks very much for the clarification.

Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit more =
on the actual definition on the raw public key?

I don't understand this question.

-Ekr


Regards.

Haiguang

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10



On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huaw=
ei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi, Eric
Thanks very much for your comments.
Please see my reply inline. Our draft is still under development, we will i=
mprove
it continuously based on the comments from experts in this area.

________________________________
From: Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>]
Sent: Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM
To: Wang Haiguang
Cc: tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments follow.

First the motivation for this technique appears rather
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.
[HG] The statement "PKI is more complicated than raw public key" is from
RFC 7250 (1st paragraph in the introduction section), and the raw public
key has been supported in TLS 1.3.  We share a similar point of view with
the authors of RFC 7250.

Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-constru=
ted PKI.



Moreover, the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.
As analysed in [1] using of certificates has serious impact on the performa=
nce
of resource contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage , bandwi=
th cost, etc.

Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.



Quote from [2] "MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times =
over standard TLS,
meaning websites loaded over 200ms faster".
What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's not =
really apples to apples.

[1] H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet=
 of Things.
Master thesis,https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Sha=
fagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf",
[2] CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services

First, I believe the design you have selected is too simple to work
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.
[HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but we h=
ave
considered it in the design. In practice, an
expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.

In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration time =
may be included
in the identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation i=
ssue in our draft.  If experts in this
group think we should address this issue, we can provide more information a=
nd details in the next draft.
Besides, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot) for usin=
g IBC over telecom

This draft needs to provide a complete description.



In a similar vein, another thing that adds complexity is having a certifica=
te
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?
[HG] At the moment, our target is to support a single-level IBC system. In =
the future,
if there are needs from industry, we can add in the support of HIBC.
But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only want a o=
ne-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
See, for instance: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cw=
t/



In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).
[HG] For telecom operator networks, symmetric keys are used for authenticat=
ion, the
home operators always know the root key of a user device have in their SIM =
card.
Therefore, the key escrow is not issue in telecom networks.  Thus, whether =
key escrow
being a severe issue depends on the application scenario.

I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's merely =
a demonstration that the current situation is bad.


For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.
Thank you for your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
this moment. In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:
3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508 and RFC 6509 for mission critical
communications, and UK government has already started to use it.
Considering this, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our d=
raft.

You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.



TECHNICAL COMMENTS
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini
PKI.
[HG] We agree with your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
use hash values.  For multiple PKGs, it is  reasonable to assume PKGs to tr=
ust
each other, just like "root" CAs to trust each other.

I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust anch=
ors don't
need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor will =
sign another
trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming something =
like that
here? If so, how would it work?

You need to specify the format of "ServerID". Is it a domain name?
Something else?
[HG] ServerID is simply the identity of the server, and the format of the i=
dentity
is application-specific.
That is not going to promote interoperability.

-Ekr



-Ekr


[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send
text in future.


On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@hua=
wei.com<mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>> wrote:
Hello, everyone.

Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.

The target of the draft is to  use identity as raw public key  over TLS. Id=
enitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server authentica=
tion.

The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version.

The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.

This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.

It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.

Best regards.

Haiguang


_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html dir=3D"ltr">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style type=3D"text/css" id=3D"owaParaStyle"></style>
</head>
<body fpstyle=3D"1" ocsi=3D"0">
<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;">Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the comments.&nbsp;<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For the first point, to some extent, we partly agree with you <span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 10pt;">
but let me clarify as follows:</span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For some IBS algorithms such as&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">=
RFC 6507 (ECCSI), there are two different interpretations on the public key=
s. The first is that ID is a public key, and PVT as part of the signatures.=
 This is exactly that RFC 6507 has specified.
 The second is what you stated in the previous email, the public key is der=
ived from both ID and PVT.&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">For Bilinear pairing based IBS algori=
thms, ID is absolutely public key.&nbsp;</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">For second point, IBS algorithms cab =
be seen as something in between pure raw public and PKI. So it is normal th=
at we both have different interpretation on this point.&nbsp;</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">So it is acceptable that IBS algorith=
ms can be treated as raw public. It simplifies the management of raw public=
 key and identity binding as long as PKG parameters are provisioned to both=
 peer and server.&nbsp;</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">Regards.</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;">Haiguang</span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div style=3D"font-family: Times New Roman; color: #000000; font-size: 16px=
">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRpF272370" style=3D"direction: ltr;"><font face=3D"Tahoma" si=
ze=3D"2" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescorla [ekr@rtfm.com]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, 24 March, 2019 1:02:05 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> tls@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 8:57 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div>Hi, Eric</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It is just for clarification on the concept of raw public key.&nbsp;</=
div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In your previous email, you said that IBC is not a raw public key. But=
 to my understanding, with supporting from the IBS signature algorithm, the=
 identity can be used as raw public key. If you think that because we have =
transmit the PKG public parameters
 that makes it not a raw public key, I think in single PKG scenario, both c=
lient and server does not need to exchange parameters. That makes the ident=
ity take exactly the same role as raw public key.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would like to know that, in your understanding, which technical poin=
t makes you think that IBC is not raw public key.&nbsp;</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's not a raw public key. It's an identity which, together with param=
eters, is then used as input to some function which produces a public key. =
This is especially obvious when you include stuff like validity windows.<br=
>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Fundamentally, IBC is an alternate type of PKI much more than it's lik=
e a raw public key.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<br>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-size:16px=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405divRpF492139" style=3D"direction:ltr=
"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Resc=
orla [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener nor=
eferrer">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 7:30:50 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopene=
r noreferrer">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 3:08 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
Hi, Eric
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks very much for the clarification.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the raw public key, could you please elaborate a little bit =
more on the actual definition on the raw public key?</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't understand this question.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Regards.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Haiguang</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-size:16px=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405gmail-m_-2178899699287292030divRpF56=
5697" style=3D"direction:ltr">
<font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescor=
la [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, 23 March, 2019 1:13:03 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 8:28 AM Wang =
Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"n=
oopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Hi, Eric</span><span style=3D"=
color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Thanks very much for your comm=
ents.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Please see my reply inline. Ou=
r draft is still under development, we will improve
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Cal=
ibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">it continuously based on the c=
omments from experts in this area.
</span></p>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<hr>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-2048539641931681405gmail-m_-2178899699287292030gmail-m_=
2548543183531189906divRpF494439" style=3D"direction:ltr">
<font size=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Eric Rescor=
la [<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, 21 March, 2019 9:46:07 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Wang Haiguang<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">
tls@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">I have taken an initial look at this draft [0]. Comments f=
ollow.<br>
<br>
First the motivation for this technique appears rather<br>
weak. Primarily, you argue that a PKI is complicated to implement and<br>
this is simpler. However, there are a number of factors to consider.<br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 The&nbsp;statement &quot;PKI is more complicated than raw public
 key&quot; is from</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">RFC =
7250 (1<sup>st</sup> paragraph in the introduction section),
 and the raw public </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">key =
has been supported in TLS 1.3.&nbsp; We share a similar point
 of view with </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">the author=
s of RFC 7250.
</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but IBC is not raw public key. It is effectively a differently-co=
nstruted PKI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Moreover,&=
nbsp;the advantage of using IBC is beyond succint key management.</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#000080"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">As a=
nalysed in [1]
</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-=
serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">using of certificates has serious&nbsp;impact =
on the performance
</span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">of resourc=
e contrained devices (see section 7) including RAM usage
 , bandwith cost, etc.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, but its not clear that IBC will be any better.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; =
color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Quot=
e from [2] &quot;MIKEY-SAKKE sped up the setup of HTTPS sessions by 7 times=
 over standard TLS,
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">mean=
ing websites loaded over 200ms faster&quot;.</font></span></p>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>What algorithms is this comparing? If it's (say) BB versus RSA, that's=
 not really apples to apples.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&q=
uot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[1] =
H. Shafagh. Leveraging Public-key-based Authentication for the Internet of =
Things.&nbsp;
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Mast=
er thesis,<a href=3D"https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hoss=
ein_Shafagh_PKC_in_the_IoT.pdf" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://people.inf.ethz.ch/mshafagh/master_thesis_Hossein_Shafagh_PKC_in=
_the_IoT.pdf</a>&quot;,</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#000080" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[2] =
CESG. Using MIKEY-SAKKE Building secure multimedia services</font></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><font color=3D"#008000"></font></span>&nbsp;</p>
</span>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">First, I believe the de=
sign you have selected is too simple to work<br>
outside of toy scenarios. Specifically, it doesn't seem to account for<br>
any form of revocation. How do you handle the case where someone's<br>
keys are compromised? There are a number of ways to handle this inside<br>
the context of an IBC system (time-based PKG parameters, have the<br>
identities have a timestamp built into them, etc.),<br>
but you don't specify these, and they add complexity.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG]=
 Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in
 the draft, but we have </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></=
font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">cons=
idered it in the design. In practice,&nbsp;an</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">expiring t=
ime&nbsp;can be included in the&nbsp;identity for the IBC system.</font></s=
pan></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">In f=
act, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that
 expiration time may be included </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span>=
</font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">in t=
he identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed
 the revocation issue in our draft.&nbsp;&nbsp;If experts in this</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"></span></font></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font color=3D"#666699" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">group thin=
k we should address this issue, we can provide more
 information and details in the next draft. </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font color=3D"#666699"=
><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Besi=
des, in ITU-T SG-17, we have specified a framework (x.ibc-iot)
 for using IBC over telecom</span></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This draft needs to provide a complete description.</div>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">In a similar vein, anot=
her thing that adds complexity is having a certificate<br>
hierarchy rather than a single CA. If you are willing to have a single-leve=
l<br>
hierarchy then life is much simpler. With an IBC system, one typically eith=
er<br>
foregoes this or uses HIBC. Are these systems HIBC capable?</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] At the moment, our targ=
et is to support a single-level IBC system. In the
 future, </span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">if there are needs from indu=
stry, we can add in the support of HIBC.</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But again, this is an additional source of complexity. If you only wan=
t a one-level CA system, you can have something much simpler than PKIX.
<br>
</div>
<div>See, for instance: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-t=
schofenig-tls-cwt/" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-tls-cwt/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
<br>
In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section 7=
<br>
is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a<br=
>
way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[HG] For telecom operator ne=
tworks, symmetric keys are used for authentication,
 the</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">home operators always know t=
he root key of a user device have in their SIM card.
</span><span style=3D"color:black"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">Therefore, the key escrow is=
 not issue in telecom networks.&nbsp; Thus, whether key
 escrow </span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">being a severe issue depends=
 on the application scenario.
</span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't think this is a demonstration that this is not severe. It's me=
rely a demonstration that the current situation is bad.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">For these reasons, I do=
n't think this WG should adopt this work, though<br>
the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Thank you for=
 your comments. It is better we do not make a decision at
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">this moment. =
In fact, IBC sees an increasing acceptance in the industry:&nbsp;</font></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(31,73,125)"></span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calib=
ri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><font style=3D"background-color:=
rgb(255,255,0)">3GPP has adopted the RFC 6507, RFC 6508
 and RFC 6509&nbsp;for mission critical </font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt; font-family:&quot;C=
alibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">communications, and UK gover=
nment has already started to use it.</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,1=
25)">&nbsp;
</span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(31,73,125)">Considering t=
his, we would like to suggest that the group do consider our draft.&nbsp;&n=
bsp;</span><br>
</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You're of course free to request this, but you have not persuaded me.<=
/div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,0)"></font><br>
<br>
TECHNICAL COMMENTS<br>
I don't understand why you are sending the PKG parameters over the wire.<br=
>
Either the parameters are already known to the relying party, in which<br>
case they are unnecessary or they are not in which case they cannot<br>
be trusted. It seems like a hash of them would be sufficient. And of<br>
course this doesn't mesh well with multiple generations of PKG parameters<b=
r>
(see above) unless you have signed parameters, but now you have a mini<br>
PKI.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">[HG] We agree w=
ith your comments, and for the single PKG case, we can
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">use hash values=
.&nbsp; For multiple PKGs, it is&nbsp; reasonable to assume PKGs to trust
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><font face=3D"Calibri" =
color=3D"#1f497d" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">each other, jus=
t like &quot;root&quot; CAs to trust each other.&nbsp;</font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I don't understand what this means. First, in a PKI-based system trust=
 anchors don't</div>
<div>need to trust each other. It's true that in some cases a trust anchor =
will sign another</div>
<div>trust anchor, but that's a delegation of trust. Are you assuming somet=
hing like that</div>
<div>here? If so, how would it work?</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"></span></p>
<span style=3D"color:black">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</span>You need to specify the format of &quot;ServerID&quot;. Is it a doma=
in name?<br>
Something else?<br>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)">[=
<font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">HG] ServerID is simply the =
identity of the server, and the format of the identity
</font></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt; font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif; color:rgb(31,73,125)"><=
font style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">is application-specific.&nbs=
p;&nbsp;</font></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>That is not going to promote interoperability.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style=3D"direction:ltr; font-family:Tahoma; color:rgb(0,0,0); font-siz=
e:10pt">
<div style=3D"font-size:16px; font-family:Times New Roman; color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt"><br>
</p>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
[0] Note that it's much harder to review documents in PDF. Please send<br>
text in future.<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 12:33 AM Wang=
 Haiguang &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"padding-left:1ex; border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204); margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex">
Hello, everyone.<br>
<br>
Attached is an updated version to our personal draft on draft-wang-tls-raw-=
public-key-with-ibc-10.
<br>
<br>
The target of the draft is to&nbsp; use identity as raw public key&nbsp; ov=
er TLS. Idenitty-based signature (IBS) algorithms are used for peer/server =
authentication.
<br>
<br>
The draft has been updated from time to time and this is the 10th version. =
<br>
<br>
The main change in this version is we have extended the draft to support th=
ree other IBS algorithms, i.e. the ISO-IBS1, ISO-IBS2 and ISO-Chinese-IBS.&=
nbsp;
<br>
Data structures for these three algorithms are has been defined.<br>
<br>
This version has not been submitted to the IETF data trackers yet. We will =
submit it once it is reopen.
<br>
<br>
It is appreciate if expert in this mailing list can provide comments and he=
lp us to improve the draft.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<br>
Haiguang <br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E33259FSINEML521MBXchi_--


From nobody Sun Mar 24 05:05:47 2019
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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
Thread-Index: AdTftNFrvlhWFP56RKG/V+cna1b4df//6R+AgAHf/ICAAz20Fg==
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2019 12:05:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi, Stephen=0A=
=0A=
Thanks much for your comments. =0A=
=0A=
As IBS using a centralized PKG to generate keys for the peer, some users do=
 concern about this feature. =0A=
However, for some usage scenarios such as telecom operators, key escrow is =
not a issue since =0A=
with the current telecom networks, all the mobile devices embedded with a r=
oot key in their USIM card,=0A=
which is known to the home operators. So knowing the private keys of device=
s are not a issue, depends =0A=
on the usage of the keys. =0A=
=0A=
If users worry about this feature, can we make it an optional feature and o=
nly when companies want to use=0A=
it, then they can enable this feature or patch the library. =0A=
=0A=
Best regards.=0A=
=0A=
Haiguang       =0A=
________________________________________=0A=
From: Stephen Farrell [stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie]=0A=
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 2:24:03 AM=0A=
To: Eric Rescorla; Wang Haiguang=0A=
Cc: tls@ietf.org=0A=
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10=0A=
=0A=
Hiya,=0A=
=0A=
On 21/03/2019 13:46, Eric Rescorla wrote:=0A=
> In addition, the innherent escrow capability that you describe in Section=
 7=0A=
> is a way in which IBC systems are materially worse than PKI systems in a=
=0A=
> way we don't know how to ameliorate (as opposed to CT).=0A=
=0A=
I agree with Ekr here. I'd go further and argue that applications=0A=
really need to be aware that somewhere there's a key generator who=0A=
knows all private keys and that it'd be too dangerous for that=0A=
kind of difference to be hidden inside a TLS library.=0A=
=0A=
> For these reasons, I don't think this WG should adopt this work, though=
=0A=
> the process allows you to have a code point without adoption.=0A=
=0A=
+1=0A=
=0A=
Cheers,=0A=
S.=0A=
=0A=


From nobody Sun Mar 24 05:16:52 2019
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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi, Melinda=0A=
=0A=
We do plan to include an expire date in the identity design. The valid peri=
od is a decision that should be decide either by the user or the PKG manage=
r. =0A=
=0A=
When we use the existing raw public as specified in the TLS 1.3, somebody h=
as to decide the lifetime of a raw public key also.   =0A=
=0A=
Wtih IBC, re-keying is needed when a private key is expired. Similarly, whe=
n a raw public (as in TLS 1.3) expires, the binding list has to be updated =
by re-keying the raw public key at server side.  =0A=
=0A=
Haiguang =0A=
________________________________________=0A=
From: TLS [tls-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Melinda Shore [melinda.shore@=
nomountain.net]=0A=
Sent: Saturday, 23 March, 2019 5:12:20 PM=0A=
To: tls@ietf.org=0A=
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10=0A=
=0A=
On 3/22/19 7:28 AM, Wang Haiguang wrote:=0A=
> [HG] Regarding the revocation, we did not mention it in the draft, but=0A=
> we have=0A=
>=0A=
> considered it in the design. In practice, an=0A=
>=0A=
> expiring time can be included in the identity for the IBC system.=0A=
>=0A=
> In fact, in RFC 6507 page 7-8, authors have mentioned that expiration=0A=
> time may be included=0A=
>=0A=
> in the identity. That=92s the reason we have not discussed the revocation=
=0A=
> issue in our draft.  If experts in this=0A=
>=0A=
> group think we should address this issue, we can provide more=0A=
> information and details in the next draft.=0A=
>=0A=
=0A=
I generally agree with EKR's comments but I do think this is a=0A=
particular problem that needs to be addressed.  The security of a=0A=
mechanism like this depends on the ability to revoke compromised keys.=0A=
Your draft does not, in fact, include a key lifetime in the identifier=0A=
(and note that the timestamp is a MAY in RFC 6507).  If you decide to=0A=
include one it will probably need to be notably short in order to=0A=
provide any robustness against key compromises, which means that=0A=
rekeying and provisioning are going to be a practical problem that=0A=
may not be in scope for the draft but which will need to be addressed=0A=
in implementation and deployment.=0A=
=0A=
I'm unenthusiastic about this draft but to the extent that there's a=0A=
hope to progress it, revocation really must be dealt with.=0A=
=0A=
Melinda=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
--=0A=
Software longa, hardware brevis=0A=
=0A=
PGP key fingerprint  4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2=0A=
                     34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F=0A=
=0A=
_______________________________________________=0A=
TLS mailing list=0A=
TLS@ietf.org=0A=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=0A=


From nobody Sun Mar 24 06:24:48 2019
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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To: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E321135@SINEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com> <CABcZeBMfY38Ps4fVk+Y6xuJB9=WjCJVNgyL+aOKp6TVy=s8ZKw@mail.gmail.com> <0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E323661@SINEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com> <e766492c-07b0-b45f-d6ae-e636422fcd4b@nomountain.net> <0AE05CBFB1A6A0468C8581DAE58A31309E3325C5@SINEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com>
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@nomountain.net>
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Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2019 14:46:44 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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On 3/24/19 4:16 AM, Wang Haiguang wrote:
> We do plan to include an expire date in the identity design. The
> valid period is a decision that should be decide either by the user
> or the PKG manager.

The problem here is that you do not want to get into the
position of allowing a known compromised key to be treated
as valid for, say, a period of several years.  Even if you
replace the private key in the handset, a "compromise"
typically involves the existence of an uncontrolled instance
of the private key.  Consequently you need to either narrowly
constrain the key lifetime or provide a revocation mechanism.

Melinda


-- 
Software longa, hardware brevis

PGP key fingerprint  4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2
                     34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F


From nobody Sun Mar 24 08:34:05 2019
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From: Wang Haiguang <wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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To handle the compromised key, a revocation list maintained at server side =
can help. This is similar to the PKI certificate. =0A=
=0A=
The binding list used by existing raw public in TLS 1.3 actually is a white=
 list. If I have a few million devices, then the white list contains a few =
million records.   =0A=
=0A=
On the other hand, the number of compromised keys usually should be only a =
small number.  So the revocation list is much shorter compare to the bindin=
g list maintain for raw public.=0A=
=0A=
This is value point of using IBS as signature algorithm. =0A=
=0A=
TLS with IBS is not proposed for use with the existing browser/server kind =
of communication. The intention is to use IBS for IoT networks.  =0A=
=0A=
________________________________________=0A=
From: Melinda Shore [melinda.shore@nomountain.net]=0A=
Sent: Sunday, 24 March, 2019 9:46:44 PM=0A=
To: Wang Haiguang; tls@ietf.org=0A=
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10=0A=
=0A=
On 3/24/19 4:16 AM, Wang Haiguang wrote:=0A=
> We do plan to include an expire date in the identity design. The=0A=
> valid period is a decision that should be decide either by the user=0A=
> or the PKG manager.=0A=
=0A=
The problem here is that you do not want to get into the=0A=
position of allowing a known compromised key to be treated=0A=
as valid for, say, a period of several years.  Even if you=0A=
replace the private key in the handset, a "compromise"=0A=
typically involves the existence of an uncontrolled instance=0A=
of the private key.  Consequently you need to either narrowly=0A=
constrain the key lifetime or provide a revocation mechanism.=0A=
=0A=
Melinda=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
--=0A=
Software longa, hardware brevis=0A=
=0A=
PGP key fingerprint  4F68 2D93 2A17 96F8 20F2=0A=
                     34C0 DFB8 9172 9A76 DB8F=0A=


From nobody Mon Mar 25 01:41:37 2019
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31.txt
	Pages           : 51
	Date            : 2019-03-25

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability.
   Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the
   DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-31


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From nobody Mon Mar 25 02:23:44 2019
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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:23:32 +0100
From: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
To: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Slides for Prague
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On Sun, Mar 24, 2019 at 05:09:24AM +0100, Christopher Wood wrote:
> If you're on the agenda for one of our meetings in Prague, please send
> the chairs a PDF version of your slides ASAP.

Attached slides for certificate compression update (sorry for the delay).

Cheers

--jRHKVT23PllUwdXP
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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:24:17 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Q6bW4IxXcxMsZ53wNxEbwkGMs0E>
Subject: [TLS] Concerns with draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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Hi Tommy, thanks for the presentation.

I do not think the draft succeeds at addressing its goals. The mechanism is
a fine way for the client to receive its public address (assuming the
server is honest) but I can't see anything useful the client can do with
that information.

1) Keepalives
    The client cannot adjust its keep alive timeouts based on this
information because the network could contain stateful firewalls that
require keepalives similar to NATs but are not detectable this way because
they do not change addresses.

2) Unique Identifiers
    The presence of a NAT does not provide client privacy guarantees. It is
trivial for network operators to deploy NATs that still allows 1-to-1
mapping of public address+port to private address+port. The most common
example is NPT66. Therefore you cannot use this information to decide
whether to reuse DoT connections.

3) ASN
    If the goal is for the client to find its ASN, you might as well build
a mechanism for the server to send the ASN to the client instead of its
address. Otherwise you will need to save the entire database of
address-to-ASN mappings on all clients which isn't feasible on smartphones.

Thanks,
David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Tommy, thanks for the presentation.<di=
v><br></div><div>I do not think the draft succeeds at addressing its goals.=
 The mechanism is a fine way for the client to receive its public address (=
assuming the server is honest) but I can&#39;t see anything useful the clie=
nt can do with that information.</div><div><br></div><div>1) Keepalives</di=
v><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The client cannot adjust its keep alive timeouts based=
 on this information because the network could contain stateful firewalls t=
hat require keepalives similar to NATs but are not detectable this way beca=
use they do not change addresses.</div><div><br></div><div>2) Unique Identi=
fiers</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The presence of a NAT does not provide client=
 privacy guarantees. It is trivial for network operators to deploy NATs tha=
t still allows 1-to-1 mapping of public address+port to private address+por=
t. The most common example is NPT66. Therefore you cannot use this informat=
ion to decide whether to reuse DoT connections.</div><div><br></div><div>3)=
 ASN</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 If the goal is for the client to find its ASN,=
 you might as well build a mechanism for the server to send the ASN to the =
client instead of its address. Otherwise you will need to save the entire d=
atabase of address-to-ASN mappings on all clients which isn&#39;t feasible =
on smartphones.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>David</div></div=
></div>

--0000000000009e51180584e97218--


From nobody Mon Mar 25 04:30:45 2019
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of time:

given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP address=
=20
information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform the full=
=20
handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. make it a=
=20
post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.

I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the handshake=
=20
only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify or=20
=46inished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM attack=
s.
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Concerns with draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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	charset=utf-8

Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft even =
says so)

In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not =
traverse NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant =
that traverses NAT.  If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might =
use the NAT Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the =
server is really good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you =
should.

With the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better analysis =
for what happens if the server lies.  What happens if the client uses =
the answer to do geolocation?  We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay =
kid in Uganda=E2=80=9D scenario.

But I think the more interesting question is why do it at this layer?  =
Why not use some web service such as the API version of =
https://www.whatismyip.com <https://www.whatismyip.com/> ?  The answer =
is a property of the device, not to the socket.  We might as well have =
the device figure this out.

Yoav

> On 25 Mar 2019, at 12:24, David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi Tommy, thanks for the presentation.
>=20
> I do not think the draft succeeds at addressing its goals. The =
mechanism is a fine way for the client to receive its public address =
(assuming the server is honest) but I can't see anything useful the =
client can do with that information.
>=20
> 1) Keepalives
>     The client cannot adjust its keep alive timeouts based on this =
information because the network could contain stateful firewalls that =
require keepalives similar to NATs but are not detectable this way =
because they do not change addresses.
>=20
> 2) Unique Identifiers
>     The presence of a NAT does not provide client privacy guarantees. =
It is trivial for network operators to deploy NATs that still allows =
1-to-1 mapping of public address+port to private address+port. The most =
common example is NPT66. Therefore you cannot use this information to =
decide whether to reuse DoT connections.
>=20
> 3) ASN
>     If the goal is for the client to find its ASN, you might as well =
build a mechanism for the server to send the ASN to the client instead =
of its address. Otherwise you will need to save the entire database of =
address-to-ASN mappings on all clients which isn't feasible on =
smartphones.
>=20
> Thanks,
> David
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Yeah,=
 so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft even says =
so)<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In IKE the =
reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not traverse NAT. We =
need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant that traverses =
NAT. &nbsp;If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use the NAT =
Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the server is =
really good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you =
should.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">With =
the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better analysis for =
what happens if the server lies. &nbsp;What happens if the client uses =
the answer to do geolocation? &nbsp;We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9C=
gay kid in Uganda=E2=80=9D scenario.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">But I think the more interesting =
question is why do it at this layer? &nbsp;Why not use some web service =
such as the API version of&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com</a>&nbsp;? &nbsp;The answer is a =
property of the device, not to the socket. &nbsp;We might as well have =
the device figure this out.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D"">Yoav<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 25 Mar 2019, at 12:24, David =
Schinazi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hi Tommy, thanks for the =
presentation.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I do =
not think the draft succeeds at addressing its goals. The mechanism is a =
fine way for the client to receive its public address (assuming the =
server is honest) but I can't see anything useful the client can do with =
that information.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">1) Keepalives</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp; The client =
cannot adjust its keep alive timeouts based on this information because =
the network could contain stateful firewalls that require keepalives =
similar to NATs but are not detectable this way because they do not =
change addresses.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">2) Unique Identifiers</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp; The =
presence of a NAT does not provide client privacy guarantees. It is =
trivial for network operators to deploy NATs that still allows 1-to-1 =
mapping of public address+port to private address+port. The most common =
example is NPT66. Therefore you cannot use this information to decide =
whether to reuse DoT connections.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">3) ASN</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; =
&nbsp; If the goal is for the client to find its ASN, you might as well =
build a mechanism for the server to send the ASN to the client instead =
of its address. Otherwise you will need to save the entire database of =
address-to-ASN mappings on all clients which isn't feasible on =
smartphones.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks,</div><div class=3D"">David</div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_50892020-E362-4F4A-AAB1-E089F71FDD00--


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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:07:05 +0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Hi Ekr,


    As Haiguang explained in the email, the proposal now mainly targets the
IoT scenario and we believe there is a strong case that we should take a
new approach to the security of this scenario.



  As for IoT devices, mainly there are three possible choices. 1) use the
symmetric-key solution. Concurrently in the telecom networks, symmetric
keys are used for device authentication and session key establishment.
Maybe TLS could be further applied but with only server authentication and
a client device, whose symmetric key is known by the server, is
authenticated with the symmetric key in the application layer. 2) force
every device to obtain a certificate and use TLS with both client and
server authentication. 3)every device has a pair of public/private key and
use TLS for both client and server authentication. However, the raw public
key should be validated with separate mechanisms.



  As suggested in Erk's previous email, " the current situation is bad."
The first method is vulnerable to certain attacks and makes the whole
authentication process complicated if TLS+symmetric key (separated client
authentication) is used. In particular, roaming device authentication has
to involve the homework to participate in the authentication process.
However, the method is light on the client side and makes it the favorite
choice.


   The second method has the strongest security. On the other hand, it is
heavy, particularly for resource-constrained devices. This may be the main
reason that the first method is still a favorite choice for client
authentication.


   For the third method, the public key validation process should be
carried out. There are a couple of choices like DNS or PKIX or preinstalled
keys. For the server side's public key validation, DNS may be OK, but for
billions of IoT devices, this is not feasible. For PKIX, it is arguable
that if such system is "viable" in many cases with online certificate query
for tens of millions or even billions of devices. "viable" I mean both
technically and financially. Cost-effectiveness plays an important role
when a technical decision is made.  A PKI system with billions of
certificates may be technically possible like the one run by EMVCo.
However, for low-value target IoT devices, many service providers favor
low-cost solutions. A database containing the pairs of id and public keys
is a possible choice. On the other hand, the integrity of such maps has to
be guaranteed. If only a server needs to access such information, this may
not be critical. However, more scenarios should be considered too, like
cross-domain verifications and device2device authentications.



  Identity-based cryptography, particularly, identity-based signature in
the proposal offers another option. The entity's public key is calculated
from an identity string and a set of system parameters. It has several
advantages. First, it could use less bandwidth and computation power. For
example, the ECCSI algorithm could work exactly with an infostructure like
a PKIX with revocation capability. It still offers clear advantages. It
takes one point scalar to compute the public key and one point to represent
the public key reconstruction data. While in PKIX issuing certificates with
ECDSA, a certificate validation process requires two point scalar for ECDSA
verification, and the certificate contains an entity's identity info, a
public key and CA's signature (64 bytes at least). So,  ECCSI could be 50%
faster in term of public key validation and 50% shorter than a certificate
(if an identity encoding scheme with expiry info is about 32-bytes long,
for example, Zigbee smart energy standard uses 26-byte id encoding).
Second, IBC does not need a mechanism to map id with a key set, this
certainly simplifies the system. At least a highly protected database to
store a user's secret key is not necessary.



  As for the key escrow problem frequently raised in the emails, indeed,
there is a PKG in the system which could generate each device's private
key. However, when IBS is used in TLS1.3, passively attack to recover the
session key is not possible. Actively man-in-the-middle attack by replacing
exchanged DH tokens and signatures would certainly leave traces even
transiently. Similarly, a PKG could impersonate an entity to conduct a TLS
session, just as the KMS in the symmetric key solution, but forensic traces
could be also collected in this situation. It would be hugely risky for a
PKG, which would usually be a trusted party, to launch such attacks. If
such an attack is caught in red-handed, no one would trust the PKG's
service anymore.



   Overall, TLS+IBS offers advantages over symmetric-key based solution
with better security properties and flexibility. TLS+IBS could be better in
term of computation efficiency and communication bandwidth than
TLS+Certificate or TLS+raw public key. As for security, the only issue is
the key escrow capability of PKG. The passive attack is not possible with
TLS 1.3+IBS, and launching the active man-in-the-middle attack or
impersonation attack could severely corrode the PKG's reputation if such an
attack was detected. We believe for many application scenarios like the IoT
that the proposal is currently targeting, TLS+IBS makes a step forward
towards a better or more secure alternative.


Michael Cheng

--0000000000007758600584ebb99e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;te=
xt-align:justify;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Hi Ekr,</=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justif=
y;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><br></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;font-size:10.5pt=
;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:10.5pt">=C2=A0 </span><span style=3D"font-size:10.5p=
t">As Haiguang explained in the email, the proposal now mainly targets the =
IoT scenario and we believe there is a strong case that we should take a ne=
w approach to the security of this scenario.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0 As for IoT devices, mainly there are three possible choices. 1) use the=
 symmetric-key solution. Concurrently in the telecom networks, symmetric ke=
ys are used for device authentication and session key establishment. Maybe =
TLS could be further applied but with only server authentication and a clie=
nt device, whose symmetric key is known by the server, is authenticated wit=
h the symmetric key in the application layer. 2) force every device to obta=
in a certificate and use TLS with both client and server authentication. 3)=
every device has a pair of public/private key and use TLS for both client a=
nd server authentication. However, the raw public key should be validated w=
ith separate mechanisms.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0 As suggested in Erk&#39;s previous email, &quot; the current situation =
is bad.&quot; The first method is vulnerable to certain attacks and makes t=
he whole authentication process complicated if TLS+symmetric key (separated=
 client authentication) is used. In particular, roaming device authenticati=
on has to involve the homework to participate in the authentication process=
. However, the method is light on the client side and makes it the favorite=
 choice.=C2=A0</span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0=
001pt;text-align:justify;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><=
span lang=3D"EN-US"><br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0=
cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=A0 =C2=A0The second method has the strong=
est security. On the other hand, it is heavy, particularly for resource-con=
strained devices. This may be the main reason that the first method is stil=
l a favorite choice for client authentication.=C2=A0</span></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;font-size:10=
.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><br></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;fo=
nt-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0For the third method, the public key validation process should be car=
ried out. There are a couple of choices like DNS or PKIX or preinstalled ke=
ys. For the server side&#39;s public key validation, DNS may be OK, but for=
 billions of IoT devices, this is not feasible. For PKIX, it is arguable th=
at if such system is &quot;viable&quot; in many cases with online certifica=
te query for tens of millions or even billions of devices. &quot;viable&quo=
t; I mean both technically and financially. Cost-effectiveness plays an imp=
ortant role when a technical decision is made.=C2=A0 A PKI system with bill=
ions of certificates may be technically possible like the one run by EMVCo.=
 However, for low-value target IoT devices, many service providers favor lo=
w-cost solutions. A database containing the pairs of id and public keys is =
a possible choice. On the other hand, the integrity of such maps has to be =
guaranteed. If only a server needs to access such information, this may not=
 be critical. However, more scenarios should be considered too, like cross-=
domain verifications and device2device authentications.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0 Identity-based cryptography, particularly, identity-based signature in =
the proposal offers another option. The entity&#39;s public key is calculat=
ed from an identity string and a set of system parameters. It has several a=
dvantages. First, it could use less bandwidth and computation power. For ex=
ample, the ECCSI algorithm could work exactly with an infostructure like a =
PKIX with revocation capability. It still offers clear advantages. It takes=
 one point scalar to compute the public key and one point to represent the =
public key reconstruction data. While in PKIX issuing certificates with ECD=
SA, a certificate validation process requires two point scalar for ECDSA ve=
rification, and the certificate contains an entity&#39;s identity info, a p=
ublic key and CA&#39;s signature (64 bytes at least). So,=C2=A0 ECCSI could=
 be 50% faster in term of public key validation and 50% shorter than a cert=
ificate (if an identity encoding scheme with expiry info is about 32-bytes =
long, for example, Zigbee smart energy standard uses 26-byte id encoding). =
Second, IBC does not need a mechanism to map id with a key set, this certai=
nly simplifies the system. At least a highly protected database to store a =
user&#39;s secret key is not necessary.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0 As for the key escrow problem frequently raised in the emails, indeed, =
there is a PKG in the system which could generate each device&#39;s private=
 key. However, when IBS is used in TLS1.3, passively attack to recover the =
session key is not possible. Actively man-in-the-middle attack by replacing=
 exchanged DH tokens and signatures would certainly leave traces even trans=
iently. Similarly, a PKG could impersonate an entity to conduct a TLS sessi=
on, just as the KMS in the symmetric key solution, but forensic traces coul=
d be also collected in this situation. It would be hugely risky for a PKG, =
which would usually be a trusted party, to launch such attacks. If such an =
attack is caught in red-handed, no one would trust the PKG&#39;s service an=
ymore. </span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10.5pt">=C2=A0 =C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:10=
.5pt">Overall, TLS+IBS offers advantages over symmetric-key based solution =
with better security properties and flexibility. TLS+IBS could be better in=
 term of computation efficiency and communication bandwidth than TLS+Certif=
icate or TLS+raw public key. As for security, the only issue is the key esc=
row capability of PKG. The passive attack is not possible with TLS 1.3+IBS,=
 and launching the active man-in-the-middle attack or impersonation attack =
could severely corrode the PKG&#39;s reputation if such an attack was detec=
ted. We believe for many application scenarios like the IoT that the propos=
al is currently targeting, TLS+IBS makes a step forward towards a better or=
 more secure alternative.</span>=C2=A0=C2=A0<br></span></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;font-size:10.5pt=
;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><br></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;font-s=
ize:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Michael Che=
ng</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:0cm 0cm 0.0001pt;text-align:justify;=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang=3D"EN-US">=C2=
=A0</span></p></div>

--0000000000007758600584ebb99e--


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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:09:21 +0100
Message-ID: <CAPDSy+4SYssgJyx6ZOKDF961y4A=_6gh-LjkCFjeOJ-PoqSywQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/P2E0IKY752Bhm26WlwRg1vVGC9A>
Subject: Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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Hi Hubert,

Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to
the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides
integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stream is
being transported over the network.

Thanks,
David

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of time:
>
> given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP addres=
s
> information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform the ful=
l
> handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. make it
> a
> post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.
>
> I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the
> handshake
> only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify or
> Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM attack=
s.
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech
> Republic_______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Hubert,<div><br></div><div>Can you ela=
borate on how &quot;TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP=
 address information&quot;? In my understanding, TLS only provides integrit=
y and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stream is being t=
ransported over the network.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Dav=
id</div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I wanted to rise one comment=
 on the IETF session, but we ran out of time:<br>
<br>
given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP address =
<br>
information, shouldn&#39;t the protocol require the client to perform the f=
ull <br>
handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. make it a=
 <br>
post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.<br>
<br>
I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the handshake=
 <br>
only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify or <br=
>
Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM attacks.=
<br>
-- <br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00=C2=A0 Brno, Czech Republic=
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:36:24 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: michael cheng <mzhcheng@gmail.com>
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On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 10:07:05PM +0800, michael cheng wrote:
> 
> 
>   As for the key escrow problem frequently raised in the emails, indeed,
> there is a PKG in the system which could generate each device's private
> key. However, when IBS is used in TLS1.3, passively attack to recover the
> session key is not possible. Actively man-in-the-middle attack by replacing
> exchanged DH tokens and signatures would certainly leave traces even
> transiently. Similarly, a PKG could impersonate an entity to conduct a TLS
> session, just as the KMS in the symmetric key solution, but forensic traces
> could be also collected in this situation. It would be hugely risky for a
> PKG, which would usually be a trusted party, to launch such attacks. If
> such an attack is caught in red-handed, no one would trust the PKG's
> service anymore.

The risk here is not just limited to the PKG violating the trust placed
in it -- there is also new attack surface on the PKG itself, and the
risk that the PKG could become operationally compromised and an attacker
obtain secrets in that manner.

-Ben


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On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> Hi Hubert,
>=20
> Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to
> the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides
> integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stream =
is
> being transported over the network.

my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrity protect=
ed=20
on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an attacker =
can=20
trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of its own an=
d=20
then he'll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtensions mess=
age

the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is processed

> Thanks,
> David
>=20
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of tim=
e:
> >=20
> > given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP addr=
ess
> > information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform the f=
ull
> > handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. make =
it
> > a
> > post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.
> >=20
> > I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the
> > handshake
> > only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify or
> > Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM
> > attacks.
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech
> > Republic_______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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In-Reply-To: <6818263.BvhrVINyQd@pintsize.usersys.redhat.com>
From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 17:02:34 +0100
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting the
server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has been
authenticated.

David

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > Hi Hubert,
> >
> > Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity
> to
> > the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides
> > integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte strea=
m
> is
> > being transported over the network.
>
> my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrity
> protected
> on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an attacke=
r
> can
> trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of its own
> and
> then he'll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtensions
> message
>
> the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is processed
>
> > Thanks,
> > David
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote=
:
> > > I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of
> time:
> > >
> > > given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP
> address
> > > information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform the
> full
> > > handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. mak=
e
> it
> > > a
> > > post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.
> > >
> > > I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the
> > > handshake
> > > only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify =
or
> > > Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM
> > > attacks.
> > > --
> > > Regards,
> > > Hubert Kario
> > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech
> > > Republic_______________________________________________
> > > TLS mailing list
> > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

--000000000000db0a690584ed553f
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires =
trusting the server and the reply comes before the identity of the server h=
as been authenticated.<div><br></div><div>David</div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 25, 2019=
 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com">hkario@re=
dhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex">On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi Hubert,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Can you elaborate on how &quot;TLS is a providing integrity and authen=
ticity to<br>
&gt; the IP address information&quot;? In my understanding, TLS only provid=
es<br>
&gt; integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte stre=
am is<br>
&gt; being transported over the network.<br>
<br>
my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrity protect=
ed <br>
on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an attacker =
can <br>
trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of its own an=
d <br>
then he&#39;ll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtensions =
message<br>
<br>
the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is processed<b=
r>
<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; David<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hk=
ario@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out =
of time:<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the I=
P address<br>
&gt; &gt; information, shouldn&#39;t the protocol require the client to per=
form the full<br>
&gt; &gt; handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e.=
 make it<br>
&gt; &gt; a<br>
&gt; &gt; post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension=
.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the=
<br>
&gt; &gt; handshake<br>
&gt; &gt; only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVer=
ify or<br>
&gt; &gt; Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to Mit=
M<br>
&gt; &gt; attacks.<br>
&gt; &gt; --<br>
&gt; &gt; Regards,<br>
&gt; &gt; Hubert Kario<br>
&gt; &gt; Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
&gt; &gt; Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
&gt; &gt; Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00=C2=A0 Brno, Czec=
h<br>
&gt; &gt; Republic_______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a=
><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Regards,<br>
Hubert Kario<br>
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team<br>
Web: <a href=3D"http://www.cz.redhat.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_bla=
nk">www.cz.redhat.com</a><br>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00=C2=A0 Brno, Czech Republic=
</blockquote></div>

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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On Monday, 25 March 2019 17:02:34 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting the
> server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has been
> authenticated.

exactly

> David
>=20
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > > Hi Hubert,
> > >=20
> > > Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authentici=
ty
> >=20
> > to
> >=20
> > > the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provides
> > > integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte str=
eam
> >=20
> > is
> >=20
> > > being transported over the network.
> >=20
> > my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrity
> > protected
> > on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an attac=
ker
> > can
> > trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of its own
> > and
> > then he'll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtensions
> > message
> >=20
> > the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is process=
ed
> >=20
> > > Thanks,
> > > David
> > >=20
> > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wro=
te:
> > > > I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out of
> >=20
> > time:
> > > > given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the IP
> >=20
> > address
> >=20
> > > > information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perform t=
he
> >=20
> > full
> >=20
> > > > handshake and only then request information from the server? I.e. m=
ake
> >=20
> > it
> >=20
> > > > a
> > > > post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extension.
> > > >=20
> > > > I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do the
> > > > handshake
> > > > only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing CertificateVerify
> > > > or
> > > > Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to MitM
> > > > attacks.
> > > > --
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Hubert Kario
> > > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech
> > > > Republic_______________________________________________
> > > > TLS mailing list
> > > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >=20
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Hubert Kario
> > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Cc: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>,  draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 19:23:50 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Concerns with draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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On Monday, 25 March 2019 14:58:29 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft even says
> so)
>=20
> In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not traver=
se
> NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant that
> traverses NAT.  If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use the
> NAT Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the server is=
 really
> good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you should.
>=20
> With the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better analysis for
> what happens if the server lies.  What happens if the client uses the
> answer to do geolocation?  We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay kid =
in Uganda=E2=80=9D
> scenario.
>=20
> But I think the more interesting question is why do it at this layer?  Why
> not use some web service such as the API version of
> https://www.whatismyip.com <https://www.whatismyip.com/> ?  The answer is=
 a
> property of the device, not to the socket.  We might as well have the
> device figure this out.

how is it property of device? at best, it's a property of a LAN. And a LAN =
may=20
have multiple Internet uplinks, every other connection may end up with a=20
different IP (albeit from a small pool), so a public IP of any particular=20
connection does not reliably indicate public IP of subsequent connections.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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> On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:23, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Monday, 25 March 2019 14:58:29 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft even =
says
>> so)
>>=20
>> In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not =
traverse
>> NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant that
>> traverses NAT.  If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use =
the
>> NAT Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the =
server is really
>> good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you should.
>>=20
>> With the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better =
analysis for
>> what happens if the server lies.  What happens if the client uses the
>> answer to do geolocation?  We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay =
kid in Uganda=E2=80=9D
>> scenario.
>>=20
>> But I think the more interesting question is why do it at this layer? =
 Why
>> not use some web service such as the API version of
>> https://www.whatismyip.com <https://www.whatismyip.com/> =
<https://www.whatismyip.com/ <https://www.whatismyip.com/>> ?  The =
answer is a
>> property of the device, not to the socket.  We might as well have the
>> device figure this out.
>=20
> how is it property of device? at best, it's a property of a LAN. And a =
LAN may=20
> have multiple Internet uplinks, every other connection may end up with =
a=20
> different IP (albeit from a small pool), so a public IP of any =
particular=20
> connection does not reliably indicate public IP of subsequent =
connections.

It=E2=80=99s perhaps a property of the device at the current connection =
configuration. Pretty much any consumer device will have a preferred =
network where the default route is. Any phone with a metered and a =
non-metered connection will prefer the non-metered connection, and PCs =
will use the link where the default route is.  It is a reasonable =
approximation to assume that the web service connection to whatismyip =
will follow the same path as your other TLS connection.=20

Servers may have more complicated routing tables, where the =
=E2=80=9Cregular=E2=80=9D TLS connection might be using a dedicated link =
while the connection to whatismyip is going to the =E2=80=9CInternet=E2=80=
=9D.  I don=E2=80=99t think this is the scenario that this draft is =
working on.

An interesting twist even for consumer devices may be where one of the =
two connections chooses IPv4 while the other chooses IPv6.  In that =
case, they might end up on different links if, for example, the metered =
connection offers IPv6 while the non-metered connection does not, or =
vice versa.

Yoav


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:23, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">On Monday, 25 March 2019 =
14:58:29 CET Yoav Nir wrote:</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">Yeah, so this looks very much like =
the IKE mechanism (the draft even says<br class=3D"">so)<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec =
does not traverse<br class=3D"">NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to =
choose an IPsec variant that<br class=3D"">traverses NAT. &nbsp;If the =
server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use the<br class=3D"">NAT =
Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the server is =
really<br class=3D"">good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when =
you should.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">With the proposed TLS =
extension, I would like to see a better analysis for<br class=3D"">what =
happens if the server lies. &nbsp;What happens if the client uses the<br =
class=3D"">answer to do geolocation? &nbsp;We can easily take this to a =
=E2=80=9Cgay kid in Uganda=E2=80=9D<br class=3D"">scenario.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">But I think the more interesting question is =
why do it at this layer? &nbsp;Why<br class=3D"">not use some web =
service such as the API version of<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com/" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com</a><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>&lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com/" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com/</a>&gt; ? &nbsp;The answer is =
a<br class=3D"">property of the device, not to the socket. &nbsp;We =
might as well have the<br class=3D"">device figure this out.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">how is it property of device? at best, it's a property of a =
LAN. And a LAN may<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">have multiple Internet uplinks, =
every other connection may end up with a<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">different IP (albeit from a =
small pool), so a public IP of any particular<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">connection does not reliably =
indicate public IP of subsequent connections.</span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" =
class=3D""></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div></div>It=E2=80=99s=
 perhaps a property of the device at the current connection =
configuration. Pretty much any consumer device will have a preferred =
network where the default route is. Any phone with a metered and a =
non-metered connection will prefer the non-metered connection, and PCs =
will use the link where the default route is. &nbsp;It is a reasonable =
approximation to assume that the web service connection to whatismyip =
will follow the same path as your other TLS connection.&nbsp;<div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Servers may have more =
complicated routing tables, where the =E2=80=9Cregular=E2=80=9D TLS =
connection might be using a dedicated link while the connection to =
whatismyip is going to the =E2=80=9CInternet=E2=80=9D. &nbsp;I don=E2=80=99=
t think this is the scenario that this draft is working on.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">An interesting twist =
even for consumer devices may be where one of the two connections =
chooses IPv4 while the other chooses IPv6. &nbsp;In that case, they =
might end up on different links if, for example, the metered connection =
offers IPv6 while the non-metered connection does not, or vice =
versa.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Yoav</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_9034EC0B-A429-48A1-8BBE-2FB23D671FEC--


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Concerns with draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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On Monday, 25 March 2019 19:31:24 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:23, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > On Monday, 25 March 2019 14:58:29 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> >> Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft even s=
ays
> >> so)
> >>=20
> >> In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not
> >> traverse
> >> NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant that
> >> traverses NAT.  If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use t=
he
> >> NAT Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the server=
 is really
> >> good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you should.
> >>=20
> >> With the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better analysis
> >> for
> >> what happens if the server lies.  What happens if the client uses the
> >> answer to do geolocation?  We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay k=
id in
> >> Uganda=E2=80=9D
> >> scenario.
> >>=20
> >> But I think the more interesting question is why do it at this layer?=
=20
> >> Why
> >> not use some web service such as the API version of
> >> https://www.whatismyip.com <https://www.whatismyip.com/>
> >> <https://www.whatismyip.com/ <https://www.whatismyip.com/>> ?  The
> >> answer is a property of the device, not to the socket.  We might as we=
ll
> >> have the device figure this out.
> >=20
> > how is it property of device? at best, it's a property of a LAN. And a =
LAN
> > may have multiple Internet uplinks, every other connection may end up
> > with a different IP (albeit from a small pool), so a public IP of any
> > particular connection does not reliably indicate public IP of subsequent
> > connections.
> It=E2=80=99s perhaps a property of the device at the current connection
> configuration. Pretty much any consumer device will have a preferred
> network where the default route is. Any phone with a metered and a
> non-metered connection will prefer the non-metered connection, and PCs wi=
ll
> use the link where the default route is.  It is a reasonable approximation
> to assume that the web service connection to whatismyip will follow the
> same path as your other TLS connection.
>=20
> Servers may have more complicated routing tables, where the =E2=80=9Cregu=
lar=E2=80=9D TLS
> connection might be using a dedicated link while the connection to
> whatismyip is going to the =E2=80=9CInternet=E2=80=9D.  I don=E2=80=99t t=
hink this is the scenario
> that this draft is working on.
>=20
> An interesting twist even for consumer devices may be where one of the two
> connections chooses IPv4 while the other chooses IPv6.  In that case, they
> might end up on different links if, for example, the metered connection
> offers IPv6 while the non-metered connection does not, or vice versa.

I already gave you an example of situation where that's not the case.

You can have a router with two Internet links that routes the connections t=
o a=20
different ISP either based on a round-robin fashion or as a fallback when a=
=20
connection dies.

Neither of which would be visible to the device connected to a WiFi behind=
=20
such a router. The client in the context of this I-D.

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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> On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:38, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Monday, 25 March 2019 19:31:24 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:23, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Monday, 25 March 2019 14:58:29 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>>>> Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the draft =
even says
>>>> so)
>>>>=20
>>>> In IKE the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not
>>>> traverse
>>>> NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as to choose an IPsec variant =
that
>>>> traverses NAT.  If the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might =
use the
>>>> NAT Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the =
server is really
>>>> good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when you should.
>>>>=20
>>>> With the proposed TLS extension, I would like to see a better =
analysis
>>>> for
>>>> what happens if the server lies.  What happens if the client uses =
the
>>>> answer to do geolocation?  We can easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay =
kid in
>>>> Uganda=E2=80=9D
>>>> scenario.
>>>>=20
>>>> But I think the more interesting question is why do it at this =
layer?=20
>>>> Why
>>>> not use some web service such as the API version of
>>>> https://www.whatismyip.com <https://www.whatismyip.com/>
>>>> <https://www.whatismyip.com/ <https://www.whatismyip.com/> =
<https://www.whatismyip.com/ <https://www.whatismyip.com/>>> ?  The
>>>> answer is a property of the device, not to the socket.  We might as =
well
>>>> have the device figure this out.
>>>=20
>>> how is it property of device? at best, it's a property of a LAN. And =
a LAN
>>> may have multiple Internet uplinks, every other connection may end =
up
>>> with a different IP (albeit from a small pool), so a public IP of =
any
>>> particular connection does not reliably indicate public IP of =
subsequent
>>> connections.
>> It=E2=80=99s perhaps a property of the device at the current =
connection
>> configuration. Pretty much any consumer device will have a preferred
>> network where the default route is. Any phone with a metered and a
>> non-metered connection will prefer the non-metered connection, and =
PCs will
>> use the link where the default route is.  It is a reasonable =
approximation
>> to assume that the web service connection to whatismyip will follow =
the
>> same path as your other TLS connection.
>>=20
>> Servers may have more complicated routing tables, where the =
=E2=80=9Cregular=E2=80=9D TLS
>> connection might be using a dedicated link while the connection to
>> whatismyip is going to the =E2=80=9CInternet=E2=80=9D.  I don=E2=80=99t=
 think this is the scenario
>> that this draft is working on.
>>=20
>> An interesting twist even for consumer devices may be where one of =
the two
>> connections chooses IPv4 while the other chooses IPv6.  In that case, =
they
>> might end up on different links if, for example, the metered =
connection
>> offers IPv6 while the non-metered connection does not, or vice versa.
>=20
> I already gave you an example of situation where that's not the case.
>=20
> You can have a router with two Internet links that routes the =
connections to a=20
> different ISP either based on a round-robin fashion or as a fallback =
when a=20
> connection dies.
>=20
> Neither of which would be visible to the device connected to a WiFi =
behind=20
> such a router. The client in the context of this I-D.

True.  As far as NAT detection, the answer would be the same =E2=80=94 =
such a client is behind NAT regardless of which Internet link the router =
chooses, so keepalives are necessary anyway.  For the other use cases, =
I=E2=80=99m not so sure.  If a client has two =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D IP =
addresses, what is it supposed to do about identifying ASNs?  Deciding =
whether to reuse connections to DNS is directly related to the presence =
of a NAT, so it=E2=80=99s the same as NAT detection.=20



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 25 Mar 2019, at 19:38, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">On Monday, 25 March 2019 =
19:31:24 CET Yoav Nir wrote:</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">On=
 25 Mar 2019, at 19:23, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">On Monday, 25 March 2019 14:58:29 =
CET Yoav Nir wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Yeah, so this looks very much like the IKE mechanism (the =
draft even says<br class=3D"">so)<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">In IKE =
the reason for this is to detect NAT because IPsec does not<br =
class=3D"">traverse<br class=3D"">NAT. We need to detect the NAT so as =
to choose an IPsec variant that<br class=3D"">traverses NAT. &nbsp;If =
the server (or IKE Responder) lies, you might use the<br class=3D"">NAT =
Traversing method when it=E2=80=99s not required, or if the server is =
really<br class=3D"">good at lying, you might not use NAT Traversal when =
you should.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">With the proposed TLS =
extension, I would like to see a better analysis<br class=3D"">for<br =
class=3D"">what happens if the server lies. &nbsp;What happens if the =
client uses the<br class=3D"">answer to do geolocation? &nbsp;We can =
easily take this to a =E2=80=9Cgay kid in<br class=3D"">Uganda=E2=80=9D<br=
 class=3D"">scenario.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">But I think the more =
interesting question is why do it at this layer?<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">Why<br =
class=3D"">not use some web service such as the API version of<br =
class=3D""><a href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com</a> &lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com/" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com/</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com/" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com/</a><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>&lt;<a =
href=3D"https://www.whatismyip.com/" =
class=3D"">https://www.whatismyip.com/</a>&gt;&gt; ? &nbsp;The<br =
class=3D"">answer is a property of the device, not to the socket. =
&nbsp;We might as well<br class=3D"">have the device figure this out.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">how is it property of device? at =
best, it's a property of a LAN. And a LAN<br class=3D"">may have =
multiple Internet uplinks, every other connection may end up<br =
class=3D"">with a different IP (albeit from a small pool), so a public =
IP of any<br class=3D"">particular connection does not reliably indicate =
public IP of subsequent<br class=3D"">connections.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>It=E2=80=99s perhaps a property of the device at =
the current connection<br class=3D"">configuration. Pretty much any =
consumer device will have a preferred<br class=3D"">network where the =
default route is. Any phone with a metered and a<br class=3D"">non-metered=
 connection will prefer the non-metered connection, and PCs will<br =
class=3D"">use the link where the default route is. &nbsp;It is a =
reasonable approximation<br class=3D"">to assume that the web service =
connection to whatismyip will follow the<br class=3D"">same path as your =
other TLS connection.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Servers may have more =
complicated routing tables, where the =E2=80=9Cregular=E2=80=9D TLS<br =
class=3D"">connection might be using a dedicated link while the =
connection to<br class=3D"">whatismyip is going to the =E2=80=9CInternet=E2=
=80=9D. &nbsp;I don=E2=80=99t think this is the scenario<br =
class=3D"">that this draft is working on.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">An =
interesting twist even for consumer devices may be where one of the =
two<br class=3D"">connections chooses IPv4 while the other chooses IPv6. =
&nbsp;In that case, they<br class=3D"">might end up on different links =
if, for example, the metered connection<br class=3D"">offers IPv6 while =
the non-metered connection does not, or vice versa.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">I already gave you an example of situation where that's not =
the case.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">You can have =
a router with two Internet links that routes the connections to a<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">different ISP either based on a =
round-robin fashion or as a fallback when a<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">connection dies.</span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Neither of which would be =
visible to the device connected to a WiFi behind<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">such a router. The client in the =
context of this I-D.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div></div>True. &nbsp;As far as NAT detection, the answer =
would be the same =E2=80=94 such a client is behind NAT regardless of =
which Internet link the router chooses, so keepalives are necessary =
anyway. &nbsp;For the other use cases, I=E2=80=99m not so sure. &nbsp;If =
a client has two =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D IP addresses, what is it =
supposed to do about identifying ASNs? &nbsp;Deciding whether to reuse =
connections to DNS is directly related to the presence of a NAT, so =
it=E2=80=99s the same as NAT detection.&nbsp;<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Hi.

I=E2=80=99ve read this draft. For the most part it seems fine, but I =
have a few editorial nits:


Abstract:
I realize that all of section 3 is dedicated to motivation, but there =
really needs to be something in the abstract. Otherwise, I=E2=80=99m =
reading =E2=80=9Cauthenticate with a combination of a certificate and an =
external pre-shared key=E2=80=9D and wondering why you would want to use =
a certificate at all if you=E2=80=99ve managed to get a PSK between the =
client and the server.  It needs at least something like =E2=80=9C... in =
order to facilitate post-quantum forward secrecy.=E2=80=9D at the end.


Section 1 (Introduction):
The Introduction contains the following text: "The TLS 1.3 ... provides =
two mutually exclusive forms of server authentication... Second, the =
server can be authenticated by demonstrating that it possesses a =
pre-shared key (PSK) that was established by a previous handshake.=E2=80=9D=

This flatly says that all PSKs in TLS 1.3 are established by a previous =
handshake, and that is not true. The very next sentence calls these =
=E2=80=9Cresumption PSKs=E2=80=9D and describes other PSKs called =
=E2=80=9Cexternal PSKs=E2=80=9D.  So these external PSKs are part of TLS =
1.3, so the above sentence is incorrect.


Section 3 (Motivation and Design Rationale):
The section describes the threat to forward secrecy of a future =
large-scale quantum computer.  Then the third paragraph says this:
"In the near-term, this document describes [a] TLS 1.3 extension to =
protect today's communications from the future invention of a =
large-scale quantum computer by providing a strong external PSK as an =
input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule while preserving the authentication =
provided by the existing certificate and digital signature =
mechanisms.=E2=80=9D

It is not obvious to me that adding an external PSK to the TLS 1.3 key =
schedule protects against a large-scale quantum computer.  The IPsecME =
draft specifying the same thing ( =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2 ) has such =
rationale in the Introduction, in the Security Considerations section, =
and in Appendix A. I think this document needs some similar text as =
well.


Section 5 (Certificate with External PSK Extension):
There=E2=80=99s a lot of stuff repeated here from RFC 8446:=20
The extensions structure, including its fields
The rules for a server responding with an extension (only if the =
ClientHello contained it)
The rules for a repeated ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest
The PreSharedKeyExtension from RFC 8446.
The rules for handling an extension that appears in the wrong message.
I don=E2=80=99t believe repeating this information adds clarity.


Section 7 (Security Considerations):
The fifth paragraph says the following:
   Implementations must choose external PSKs with a secure key
   management technique, such as pseudo-random generation of the key or
   derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys.  The use of
   inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
   external PSKs can result in little or no security.  An attacker may
   find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
   the external PSKs and searching the resulting small set of
   possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space.
   The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [RFC4086]
   offers important guidance in this area.
That=E2=80=99s fine, but I=E2=80=99m missing the required length of such =
a PSK.  I believe the text should say =E2=80=9Cat least 256 =
randomly-generated bits=E2=80=9D

Yoav


--Apple-Mail=_E02B4F15-95C5-418B-B6C5-67852E53250A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Hi.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I=E2=80=
=99ve read this draft. For the most part it seems fine, but I have a few =
editorial nits:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Abstract:</div><div =
class=3D"">I realize that all of section 3 is dedicated to motivation, =
but there really needs to be something in the abstract. Otherwise, I=E2=80=
=99m reading =E2=80=9C<span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D"">authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an =
external pre-shared key=E2=80=9D and wondering why you would want to use =
a certificate at all if you=E2=80=99ve managed to get a PSK between the =
client and the server.  It needs at least something like =E2=80=9C... in =
order to facilitate post-quantum forward secrecy.=E2=80=9D at the =
end.</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 1 (Introduction):</span></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The =
Introduction contains the following text: "The TLS 1.3 ... provides two =
mutually exclusive forms of server authentication... Second, the server =
can be authenticated by demonstrating that it possesses a pre-shared key =
(PSK) that was established by a previous handshake.=E2=80=9D</span></div><=
div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">This =
flatly says that all PSKs in TLS 1.3 are established by a previous =
handshake, and that is not true. The very next sentence calls these =
=E2=80=9Cresumption PSKs=E2=80=9D and describes other PSKs called =
=E2=80=9Cexternal PSKs=E2=80=9D.  So these external PSKs are part of TLS =
1.3, so the above sentence is incorrect.</span></div><div class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 3 (Motivation and =
Design Rationale):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space:=
 pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The section describes the threat to forward =
secrecy of a future large-scale quantum computer.  Then the third =
paragraph says this:</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">"In the near-term, this =
document describes [a] TLS 1.3 extension to protect today's =
communications from the future invention of a large-scale quantum =
computer by providing a strong external PSK as an input to the TLS 1.3 =
key schedule while preserving the authentication provided by the =
existing certificate and digital signature =
mechanisms.=E2=80=9D</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">It is not obvious to me that adding an external =
PSK to the TLS 1.3 key schedule protects against a large-scale quantum =
computer.  The IPsecME draft specifying the same thing (&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2</a> ) =
has such rationale in the Introduction, in the Security Considerations =
section, and in Appendix A. I think this document needs some similar =
text as well.</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 5 (Certificate with External PSK =
Extension):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">There=E2=80=99s a lot of stuff repeated here from =
RFC 8446: </span></div><div class=3D""><ul class=3D"MailOutline"><li =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The =
extensions structure, including its fields</span></li><li class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The rules for a server =
responding with an extension (only if the ClientHello contained =
it)</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D"">The rules for a repeated ClientHello following a =
HelloRetryRequest</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The PreSharedKeyExtension</span><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""> from RFC =
8446.</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D"">The rules for handling an extension that appears in the wrong =
message.</span></li></ul><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t believe repeating this information =
adds clarity.</span></div></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 7 (Security =
Considerations):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The fifth paragraph says the =
following:</span></div><div class=3D""><pre style=3D"word-wrap: =
break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">   Implementations must =
choose external PSKs with a secure key
   management technique, such as pseudo-random generation of the key or
   derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys.  The use of
   inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
   external PSKs can result in little or no security.  An attacker may
   find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
   the external PSKs and searching the resulting small set of
   possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space.
   The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [RFC4086]
   offers important guidance in this area.</pre></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">That=E2=80=99=
s fine, but I=E2=80=99m missing the required length of such a PSK.  I =
believe the text should say =E2=80=9Cat least 256 randomly-generated =
bits=E2=80=9D</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Yoav</span></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] A flags extension
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Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about =
1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional =
feature. EKR commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that =
maybe we need to replace them with a flags extension.

So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just =
that [1].

Comments are welcome.

Yoav

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags/ =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags/>



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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi. =
&nbsp;Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about =
1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional =
feature. EKR commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that =
maybe we need to replace them with a flags extension.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">So I threw together a quick -00 draft =
with an extension that does just that [1].</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Comments are welcome.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Yoav</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">[1]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags/" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags/</a></d=
iv><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Mon Mar 25 15:15:00 2019
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Thanks for the review.  I will address these comments promptly, but it =
might not be until next week.

Russ


> On Mar 25, 2019, at 5:08 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi.
>=20
> I=E2=80=99ve read this draft. For the most part it seems fine, but I =
have a few editorial nits:
>=20
>=20
> Abstract:
> I realize that all of section 3 is dedicated to motivation, but there =
really needs to be something in the abstract. Otherwise, I=E2=80=99m =
reading =E2=80=9Cauthenticate with a combination of a certificate and an =
external pre-shared key=E2=80=9D and wondering why you would want to use =
a certificate at all if you=E2=80=99ve managed to get a PSK between the =
client and the server.  It needs at least something like =E2=80=9C... in =
order to facilitate post-quantum forward secrecy.=E2=80=9D at the end.
>=20
>=20
> Section 1 (Introduction):
> The Introduction contains the following text: "The TLS 1.3 ... =
provides two mutually exclusive forms of server authentication... =
Second, the server can be authenticated by demonstrating that it =
possesses a pre-shared key (PSK) that was established by a previous =
handshake.=E2=80=9D
> This flatly says that all PSKs in TLS 1.3 are established by a =
previous handshake, and that is not true. The very next sentence calls =
these =E2=80=9Cresumption PSKs=E2=80=9D and describes other PSKs called =
=E2=80=9Cexternal PSKs=E2=80=9D.  So these external PSKs are part of TLS =
1.3, so the above sentence is incorrect.
>=20
>=20
> Section 3 (Motivation and Design Rationale):
> The section describes the threat to forward secrecy of a future =
large-scale quantum computer.  Then the third paragraph says this:
> "In the near-term, this document describes [a] TLS 1.3 extension to =
protect today's communications from the future invention of a =
large-scale quantum computer by providing a strong external PSK as an =
input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule while preserving the authentication =
provided by the existing certificate and digital signature =
mechanisms.=E2=80=9D
>=20
> It is not obvious to me that adding an external PSK to the TLS 1.3 key =
schedule protects against a large-scale quantum computer.  The IPsecME =
draft specifying the same thing ( =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2 =
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2> ) has such =
rationale in the Introduction, in the Security Considerations section, =
and in Appendix A. I think this document needs some similar text as =
well.
>=20
>=20
> Section 5 (Certificate with External PSK Extension):
> There=E2=80=99s a lot of stuff repeated here from RFC 8446:=20
> The extensions structure, including its fields
> The rules for a server responding with an extension (only if the =
ClientHello contained it)
> The rules for a repeated ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest
> The PreSharedKeyExtension from RFC 8446.
> The rules for handling an extension that appears in the wrong message.
> I don=E2=80=99t believe repeating this information adds clarity.
>=20
>=20
> Section 7 (Security Considerations):
> The fifth paragraph says the following:
>    Implementations must choose external PSKs with a secure key
>    management technique, such as pseudo-random generation of the key =
or
>    derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys.  The use =
of
>    inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
>    external PSKs can result in little or no security.  An attacker may
>    find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
>    the external PSKs and searching the resulting small set of
>    possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key =
space.
>    The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [RFC4086]
>    offers important guidance in this area.
> That=E2=80=99s fine, but I=E2=80=99m missing the required length of =
such a PSK.  I believe the text should say =E2=80=9Cat least 256 =
randomly-generated bits=E2=80=9D
>=20
> Yoav
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Thanks for the review. &nbsp;I will address these comments =
promptly, but it might not be until next week.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Mar 25, 2019, at 5:08 PM, Yoav Nir &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" class=3D"">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta=
 http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I=E2=80=99ve read this draft. For the =
most part it seems fine, but I have a few editorial nits:</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Abstract:</div><div class=3D"">I realize that all of section =
3 is dedicated to motivation, but there really needs to be something in =
the abstract. Otherwise, I=E2=80=99m reading =E2=80=9C<span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">authenticate with a =
combination of a certificate and an external pre-shared key=E2=80=9D and =
wondering why you would want to use a certificate at all if you=E2=80=99ve=
 managed to get a PSK between the client and the server.  It needs at =
least something like =E2=80=9C... in order to facilitate post-quantum =
forward secrecy.=E2=80=9D at the end.</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 1 =
(Introduction):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The Introduction contains the following text: "The =
TLS 1.3 ... provides two mutually exclusive forms of server =
authentication... Second, the server can be authenticated by =
demonstrating that it possesses a pre-shared key (PSK) that was =
established by a previous handshake.=E2=80=9D</span></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">This flatly =
says that all PSKs in TLS 1.3 are established by a previous handshake, =
and that is not true. The very next sentence calls these =E2=80=9Cresumpti=
on PSKs=E2=80=9D and describes other PSKs called =E2=80=9Cexternal =
PSKs=E2=80=9D.  So these external PSKs are part of TLS 1.3, so the above =
sentence is incorrect.</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 3 (Motivation and =
Design Rationale):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space:=
 pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The section describes the threat to forward =
secrecy of a future large-scale quantum computer.  Then the third =
paragraph says this:</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">"In the near-term, this =
document describes [a] TLS 1.3 extension to protect today's =
communications from the future invention of a large-scale quantum =
computer by providing a strong external PSK as an input to the TLS 1.3 =
key schedule while preserving the authentication provided by the =
existing certificate and digital signature =
mechanisms.=E2=80=9D</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">It is not obvious to me that adding an external =
PSK to the TLS 1.3 key schedule protects against a large-scale quantum =
computer.  The IPsecME draft specifying the same thing (&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2</a> ) =
has such rationale in the Introduction, in the Security Considerations =
section, and in Appendix A. I think this document needs some similar =
text as well.</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 5 (Certificate with External PSK =
Extension):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">There=E2=80=99s a lot of stuff repeated here from =
RFC 8446: </span></div><div class=3D""><ul class=3D"MailOutline"><li =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The =
extensions structure, including its fields</span></li><li class=3D""><span=
 style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The rules for a server =
responding with an extension (only if the ClientHello contained =
it)</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D"">The rules for a repeated ClientHello following a =
HelloRetryRequest</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The PreSharedKeyExtension</span><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""> from RFC =
8446.</span></li><li class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" =
class=3D"">The rules for handling an extension that appears in the wrong =
message.</span></li></ul><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t believe repeating this information =
adds clarity.</span></div></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Section 7 (Security =
Considerations):</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D"">The fifth paragraph says the =
following:</span></div><div class=3D""><pre style=3D"word-wrap: =
break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">   Implementations must =
choose external PSKs with a secure key
   management technique, such as pseudo-random generation of the key or
   derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys.  The use of
   inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
   external PSKs can result in little or no security.  An attacker may
   find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
   the external PSKs and searching the resulting small set of
   possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space.
   The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [RFC4086]
   offers important guidance in this area.</pre></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">That=E2=80=99=
s fine, but I=E2=80=99m missing the required length of such a PSK.  I =
believe the text should say =E2=80=9Cat least 256 randomly-generated =
bits=E2=80=9D</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"white-space: =
pre-wrap;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap;" class=3D"">Yoav</span></div><div =
class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div>_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A flags extension
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From: michael cheng <mzhcheng@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 09:26:23 +0800
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10
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Of course, PKG should be protected tightly, which is normally equipped with
HSM.
On the other hand, this risk is not unique to PKG. Same risk and security
requirements apply to CA's certificate signing key.
In fact, PKG's key generation process is exactly a signing process with
master key signing on identity and other info.

Michael

Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> =E4=BA=8E2019=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=8825=E6=97=
=A5=E5=91=A8=E4=B8=80 =E4=B8=8B=E5=8D=8811:36=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A

> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 10:07:05PM +0800, michael cheng wrote:
> >
> >
> >   As for the key escrow problem frequently raised in the emails, indeed=
,
> > there is a PKG in the system which could generate each device's private
> > key. However, when IBS is used in TLS1.3, passively attack to recover t=
he
> > session key is not possible. Actively man-in-the-middle attack by
> replacing
> > exchanged DH tokens and signatures would certainly leave traces even
> > transiently. Similarly, a PKG could impersonate an entity to conduct a
> TLS
> > session, just as the KMS in the symmetric key solution, but forensic
> traces
> > could be also collected in this situation. It would be hugely risky for=
 a
> > PKG, which would usually be a trusted party, to launch such attacks. If
> > such an attack is caught in red-handed, no one would trust the PKG's
> > service anymore.
>
> The risk here is not just limited to the PKG violating the trust placed
> in it -- there is also new attack surface on the PKG itself, and the
> risk that the PKG could become operationally compromised and an attacker
> obtain secrets in that manner.
>
> -Ben
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Of course, PKG should be protected tightly, which is norma=
lly equipped with HSM.<div>On the other hand, this risk is not unique to PK=
G. Same risk and security requirements apply to CA&#39;s certificate signin=
g key.</div><div>In fact, PKG&#39;s key generation process is exactly a sig=
ning process with master key signing on identity and other info.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>Michael</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bkaduk@a=
kamai.com">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt; =E4=BA=8E2019=E5=B9=B43=E6=9C=8825=E6=
=97=A5=E5=91=A8=E4=B8=80 =E4=B8=8B=E5=8D=8811:36=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Mar 25,=
 2019 at 10:07:05PM +0800, michael cheng wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0As for the key escrow problem frequently raised in the ema=
ils, indeed,<br>
&gt; there is a PKG in the system which could generate each device&#39;s pr=
ivate<br>
&gt; key. However, when IBS is used in TLS1.3, passively attack to recover =
the<br>
&gt; session key is not possible. Actively man-in-the-middle attack by repl=
acing<br>
&gt; exchanged DH tokens and signatures would certainly leave traces even<b=
r>
&gt; transiently. Similarly, a PKG could impersonate an entity to conduct a=
 TLS<br>
&gt; session, just as the KMS in the symmetric key solution, but forensic t=
races<br>
&gt; could be also collected in this situation. It would be hugely risky fo=
r a<br>
&gt; PKG, which would usually be a trusted party, to launch such attacks. I=
f<br>
&gt; such an attack is caught in red-handed, no one would trust the PKG&#39=
;s<br>
&gt; service anymore.<br>
<br>
The risk here is not just limited to the PKG violating the trust placed<br>
in it -- there is also new attack surface on the PKG itself, and the<br>
risk that the PKG could become operationally compromised and an attacker<br=
>
obtain secrets in that manner.<br>
<br>
-Ben<br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 04:06:03 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ccHIYZx_mtsPceEInkzUFlgcusc>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small space.  If you are concerned with the size of the result, we have some variable-length integer encodings you could try.

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019, at 00:22, Salz, Rich wrote:
>  
> That was FAST.
> 
> 
> Looks good.
> 
> 
> *From: *Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Monday, March 25, 2019 at 10:10 PM
> *To: *"tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *[TLS] A flags extension
> 
> 
> Hi. Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about 
> 1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional 
> feature. EKR commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that 
> maybe we need to replace them with a flags extension. 
> 
> 
> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just that [1].
> 
> 
> Comments are welcome.
> 
> 
> Yoav
> 
> 
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags/ 
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dnir-2Dtls-2Dtlsflags_&d=DwMFAg&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=vI7f_lTRNmPJU_afvRwCfhhfrX-GjDMCcpRfUZF254A&s=rcJFjdA-91NCh1SnDreFMvQpvRnUwUJYHXgYOz05wzI&e=>
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 04:07:51 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kREfXuhhmYLXf3ppHPkCsMNn8wM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but onc=
e we have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and ca=
n be used.  We rely on this property for a bunch of things.

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019, at 19:12, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Monday, 25 March 2019 17:02:34 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting t=
he
> > server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has bee=
n
> > authenticated.
>=20
> exactly
>=20
> > David
> >=20
> > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wro=
te:
> > > On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > > > Hi Hubert,
> > > >=20
> > > > Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and authe=
nticity
> > >=20
> > > to
> > >=20
> > > > the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provi=
des
> > > > integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byt=
e stream
> > >=20
> > > is
> > >=20
> > > > being transported over the network.
> > >=20
> > > my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrit=
y
> > > protected
> > > on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an =
attacker
> > > can
> > > trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of i=
ts own
> > > and
> > > then he'll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtens=
ions
> > > message
> > >=20
> > > the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is pr=
ocessed
> > >=20
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > David
> > > >=20
> > > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com=
> wrote:
> > > > > I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran o=
ut of
> > >=20
> > > time:
> > > > > given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to th=
e IP
> > >=20
> > > address
> > >=20
> > > > > information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perf=
orm the
> > >=20
> > > full
> > >=20
> > > > > handshake and only then request information from the server? I=
.e. make
> > >=20
> > > it
> > >=20
> > > > > a
> > > > > post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extens=
ion.
> > > > >=20
> > > > > I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do =
the
> > > > > handshake
> > > > > only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing Certificate=
Verify
> > > > > or
> > > > > Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to =
MitM
> > > > > attacks.
> > > > > --
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > Hubert Kario
> > > > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech
> > > > > Republic_______________________________________________
> > > > > TLS mailing list
> > > > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > >=20
> > > --
> > > Regards,
> > > Hubert Kario
> > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Repub=
lic
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> Attachments:
> * signature.asc


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A flags extension
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> On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
>=20
> This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small space.  =
If you are concerned with the size of the result, we have some =
variable-length integer encodings you could try.

Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.  Like:

 - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations
 - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track
- 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting parties.

Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 =
optional features for TLS?=


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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 09:24:14 +0000
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On Tue, 26 Mar 2019 at 09:12, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 opti=
onal features for TLS?

Probably not; but what about an optional feature that needs 3 bits? Is
it better to kick them off into 4 bytes?

-tom


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On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:11 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> > 
> > This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small
> > space.  If you are concerned with the size of the result, we have
> > some variable-length integer encodings you could try.
> 
> Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.  Like:
> 
>  - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations
>  - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track
> - 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting parties.
> Are we really worried that weâ€™re going to have more than 255 optional
> features for TLS?

Given that adding an extended flags extension which can hold even more
flags is also easy, the 255-optional features do not seem so limited. 

Going into the extension itself, the array FlagExtensionType seems to
be the TLS-way to define such variable, but flags are easier, more
efficient to parse, and take less space if they are bits on an integer
value (32-bit or 64-bit). Have you considered a simpler structure like
that?

struct {
   uint64 flags;
   uint64 ext_flags1;
   uint64 ext_flags2;
   uint24 ext_flags3;
   uint16 priv_flags;
} Flags;

The advantage is that it can carry the same information with much less
bytes on the wire and it is easier to parse in low level languages.

The disadvantage is that an extension flag would now need to specify
the bit it occupies _and_ the particular element it is set to.

regards,
Nikos



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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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> On 26 Mar 2019, at 10:35, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:11 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small
>>> space.  If you are concerned with the size of the result, we have
>>> some variable-length integer encodings you could try.
>>=20
>> Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.  Like:
>>=20
>> - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations
>> - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track
>> - 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting parties.
>> Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 =
optional
>> features for TLS?
>=20
> Given that adding an extended flags extension which can hold even more
> flags is also easy, the 255-optional features do not seem so limited.=20=

>=20
> Going into the extension itself, the array FlagExtensionType seems to
> be the TLS-way to define such variable, but flags are easier, more
> efficient to parse, and take less space if they are bits on an integer
> value (32-bit or 64-bit). Have you considered a simpler structure like
> that?
>=20
> struct {
>   uint64 flags;
>   uint64 ext_flags1;
>   uint64 ext_flags2;
>   uint24 ext_flags3;
>   uint16 priv_flags;
> } Flags;
>=20
> The advantage is that it can carry the same information with much less
> bytes on the wire and it is easier to parse in low level languages.
>=20
> The disadvantage is that an extension flag would now need to specify
> the bit it occupies _and_ the particular element it is set to.

I thought about that. I guess it depends on how many of these optional =
features we expect to be declared at the same time.=20

With the current way the draft is written, if the client supports 12 =
such extensions, the extension takes 16 bytes.  With a bitstring, it=E2=80=
=99s always the same length. so we=E2=80=99d need 36 bytes for a 256-bit =
space. If the client supports 100 extensions, my encoding takes 104 =
bytes while the bitstring is still 36 bytes.

The question is which is more likely?

Yoav=


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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 10:58:27 +0100
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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One option for a bitstring could be to encode it in little endian and
truncate 0 bytes at the end of the encoding.

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 10:50 AM Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 26 Mar 2019, at 10:35, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:11 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
> >>> On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small
> >>> space.  If you are concerned with the size of the result, we have
> >>> some variable-length integer encodings you could try.
> >>
> >> Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.  Like:
> >>
> >> - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations
> >> - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track
> >> - 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting parties.
> >> Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 o=
ptional
> >> features for TLS?
> >
> > Given that adding an extended flags extension which can hold even more
> > flags is also easy, the 255-optional features do not seem so limited.
> >
> > Going into the extension itself, the array FlagExtensionType seems to
> > be the TLS-way to define such variable, but flags are easier, more
> > efficient to parse, and take less space if they are bits on an integer
> > value (32-bit or 64-bit). Have you considered a simpler structure like
> > that?
> >
> > struct {
> >   uint64 flags;
> >   uint64 ext_flags1;
> >   uint64 ext_flags2;
> >   uint24 ext_flags3;
> >   uint16 priv_flags;
> > } Flags;
> >
> > The advantage is that it can carry the same information with much less
> > bytes on the wire and it is easier to parse in low level languages.
> >
> > The disadvantage is that an extension flag would now need to specify
> > the bit it occupies _and_ the particular element it is set to.
>
> I thought about that. I guess it depends on how many of these optional
> features we expect to be declared at the same time.
>
> With the current way the draft is written, if the client supports 12 such
> extensions, the extension takes 16 bytes.  With a bitstring, it=E2=80=99s=
 always
> the same length. so we=E2=80=99d need 36 bytes for a 256-bit space. If th=
e client
> supports 100 extensions, my encoding takes 104 bytes while the bitstring =
is
> still 36 bytes.
>
> The question is which is more likely?
>
> Yoav
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">One option for a bitstring could be to encode it in little=
 endian and truncate 0 bytes at the end of the encoding.</div><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Mar 26, 201=
9 at 10:50 AM Yoav Nir &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com">ynir.ietf=
@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On 26 Mar 2019, at 10:35, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:nmav@redhat.com" target=3D"_blank">nmav@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:11 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
mt@lowentropy.net" target=3D"_blank">mt@lowentropy.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; This needs more space for each flag.=C2=A0 8 bits is a pretty =
small<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; space.=C2=A0 If you are concerned with the size of the result,=
 we have<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; some variable-length integer encodings you could try.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.=C2=A0 Like:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations<br>
&gt;&gt; - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track<br>
&gt;&gt; - 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting parties=
.<br>
&gt;&gt; Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 2=
55 optional<br>
&gt;&gt; features for TLS?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Given that adding an extended flags extension which can hold even more=
<br>
&gt; flags is also easy, the 255-optional features do not seem so limited. =
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Going into the extension itself, the array FlagExtensionType seems to<=
br>
&gt; be the TLS-way to define such variable, but flags are easier, more<br>
&gt; efficient to parse, and take less space if they are bits on an integer=
<br>
&gt; value (32-bit or 64-bit). Have you considered a simpler structure like=
<br>
&gt; that?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; struct {<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint64 flags;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint64 ext_flags1;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint64 ext_flags2;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint24 ext_flags3;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 priv_flags;<br>
&gt; } Flags;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The advantage is that it can carry the same information with much less=
<br>
&gt; bytes on the wire and it is easier to parse in low level languages.<br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The disadvantage is that an extension flag would now need to specify<b=
r>
&gt; the bit it occupies _and_ the particular element it is set to.<br>
<br>
I thought about that. I guess it depends on how many of these optional feat=
ures we expect to be declared at the same time. <br>
<br>
With the current way the draft is written, if the client supports 12 such e=
xtensions, the extension takes 16 bytes.=C2=A0 With a bitstring, it=E2=80=
=99s always the same length. so we=E2=80=99d need 36 bytes for a 256-bit sp=
ace. If the client supports 100 extensions, my encoding takes 104 bytes whi=
le the bitstring is still 36 bytes.<br>
<br>
The question is which is more likely?<br>
<br>
Yoav<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Are we really worried that we=92re going to have more than 255 optional=0A=
>features for TLS?=0A=
=0A=
You're new here aren't you?=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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Cc: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <A7EC005E-3463-406B-930F-925B4D2338E4@gmail.com> <B0FF00D7-8727-4371-8DAA-AD2A920504F8@akamai.com> <2e5a5623-7de9-4f12-b699-b0b248432f96@www.fastmail.com> <F5AD3A62-C0D1-49F7-8D10-27A7DA92DCCC@gmail.com> <1553598329003.21473@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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> On 26 Mar 2019, at 12:05, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> =
wrote:
>=20
> Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>=20
>> Are we really worried that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 =
optional
>> features for TLS?
>=20
> You're new here aren't you?
>=20

No, but I=E2=80=99m looking at the TLS registries ( =
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml =
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml> ) =
and the only one that has that many entires is the ciphersuites.




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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 26 Mar 2019, at 12:05, Peter Gutmann &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" =
class=3D"">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Yoav =
Nir &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Are we really worried =
that we=E2=80=99re going to have more than 255 optional<br =
class=3D"">features for TLS?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">You're new here aren't you?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>No, but =
I=E2=80=99m looking at the TLS registries (&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml=
" =
class=3D"">https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.=
xml</a>&nbsp;) and the only one that has that many entires is the =
ciphersuites.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br class=3D""></div><br=
 class=3D""></body></html>=

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From nobody Tue Mar 26 06:30:43 2019
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On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but once=
 we
> have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and can be
> used.  We rely on this property for a bunch of things.

yes, but those things are part of the protocol, not destined for applicatio=
n=20
(or even if they are, they are actionable only after the handshake finished)

> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019, at 19:12, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Monday, 25 March 2019 17:02:34 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > > Ah, I see - thanks. In other words, the proposal requires trusting the
> > > server and the reply comes before the identity of the server has been
> > > authenticated.
> >=20
> > exactly
> >=20
> > > David
> > >=20
> > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:54 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrot=
e:
> > > > On Monday, 25 March 2019 15:09:21 CET David Schinazi wrote:
> > > > > Hi Hubert,
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Can you elaborate on how "TLS is a providing integrity and
> > > > > authenticity
> > > >=20
> > > > to
> > > >=20
> > > > > the IP address information"? In my understanding, TLS only provid=
es
> > > > > integrity and authenticity to a byte stream, not to how your byte
> > > > > stream
> > > >=20
> > > > is
> > > >=20
> > > > > being transported over the network.
> > > >=20
> > > > my point is that EncryptedExtensions, while encrypted and integrity
> > > > protected
> > > > on record layer level, are _not yet_ bound to any identity, so an
> > > > attacker
> > > > can
> > > > trivially reply to any non-PSK ClientHello with a ServerHello of its
> > > > own
> > > > and
> > > > then he'll be able to generate arbitrary encrypted EncryptedExtensi=
ons
> > > > message
> > > >=20
> > > > the forgery will be noticed only after the CertificateVerify is
> > > > processed
> > > >=20
> > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > David
> > > > >=20
> > > > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:31 PM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>=
=20
wrote:
> > > > > > I wanted to rise one comment on the IETF session, but we ran out
> > > > > > of
> > > >=20
> > > > time:
> > > > > > given that TLS is a providing integrity and authenticity to the=
 IP
> > > >=20
> > > > address
> > > >=20
> > > > > > information, shouldn't the protocol require the client to perfo=
rm
> > > > > > the
> > > >=20
> > > > full
> > > >=20
> > > > > > handshake and only then request information from the server? I.=
e.
> > > > > > make
> > > >=20
> > > > it
> > > >=20
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > post-handshake messages, like KeyUpdate, rather than an extensi=
on.
> > > > > >=20
> > > > > > I worry that some clients may short-circuit processing and do t=
he
> > > > > > handshake
> > > > > > only up to EncryptedExtensions, without processing
> > > > > > CertificateVerify
> > > > > > or
> > > > > > Finished (in case of PSK), and in result expose themselves to M=
itM
> > > > > > attacks.
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > Hubert Kario
> > > > > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > > > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > > > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech
> > > > > > Republic_______________________________________________
> > > > > > TLS mailing list
> > > > > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > > > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > > >=20
> > > > --
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Hubert Kario
> > > > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> > > > Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> > > > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republ=
ic
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about 1-=
bit
> extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional feature. E=
KR
> commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that maybe we need to
> replace them with a flags extension.
>=20
> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just th=
at
> [1].
>=20
> Comments are welcome.

I don't think that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a flag is=
=20
worth the interoperability problems, and increased complexing of parsing=20
Client Hello. Especially if we go the route of actual bit flags.

I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible bytes saved=20
makes it a net negative.

yes, TLS is quite chatty protocol, it could encode values much more tightly=
,=20
but I think we all remember the bugs related to ASN.1 parsing from inside o=
f=20
PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Tue Mar 26 08:35:39 2019
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
                          Stephen Farrell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-03.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2019-03-26

Abstract:
   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
   these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
   for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
   industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
   these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
   IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
   away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
   increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
   for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
   additional effort for library and product maintenance.

   This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0
   [RFC6347] (but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version
   1.1).

   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLSv1.0 or
   TLSv1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates RFC 7525 and
   hence is part of BCP195.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-03
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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> On 26 Mar 2019, at 14:45, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic =
about 1-bit
>> extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional =
feature. EKR
>> commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that maybe we =
need to
>> replace them with a flags extension.
>>=20
>> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does =
just that
>> [1].
>>=20
>> Comments are welcome.
>=20
> I don't think that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a =
flag is=20
> worth the interoperability problems, and increased complexing of =
parsing=20
> Client Hello. Especially if we go the route of actual bit flags.

Right. Which is why I went with a 1-byte encoding rather than a =
bitstring.

> I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible bytes =
saved=20
> makes it a net negative.

I don=E2=80=99t think so. My encoding is not all that complex.

> yes, TLS is quite chatty protocol, it could encode values much more =
tightly,=20
> but I think we all remember the bugs related to ASN.1 parsing from =
inside of=20
> PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures

Complexity is on a spectrum.  DER encoding is pretty far on this =
spectrum.  A list of 1-octet identifiers is on the other end. A =
bitstring is more complex than the identifier list, but not anywhere =
near DER.

I don=E2=80=99t think we should project the failings of DER parsing to =
the parsing of much simpler structures.

Yoav




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From: "Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com>
To: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>
CC: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04.txt
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References: <153856977342.9010.10521757586695280@ietfa.amsl.com> <20181003123643.GA5454@mandy.flat11.house> <EC87E55E-A342-40D7-9E09-DB790B04BB9F@sn3rd.com>, <20181004170124.GA13528@mandy.flat11.house>
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 17:56:09 +0100
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To: "Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com>
Cc: Alessandro Ghedini <alessandro@ghedini.me>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04.txt
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On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 5:07 PM Sniffen, Brian <bsniffen@akamai.com> wrote:

> >> WG - I=E2=80=99d like to echo Alessandro request for reviews.   If thi=
s
> outstanding WG item is not resolved before IETF103 we will discuss the
> outstanding issue there, and barring any other major issues we are planni=
ng
> to WGLC the draft after IETF103.
> >>
> >> One question: There was some discussion earlier about dictionaries.
> Are dictionaries being used in the current deployments?
> >
> > No, neither Chrome nor Cloudflare are using dictionaries. Something I
> forgot
> > to mention in my previous email is that the numbers are for plain brotl=
i
> > compression, so without dictionary.
>
> Just to check: is this still true for the excellent numbers we saw today?
> Surely it=E2=80=99s only the text-like parts of the certificate that are
> compressed.  As EKR mentioned, presumably a bunch of the savings is from
> compressing the Subject of one cert against the Issuer of another.  Perha=
ps
> there=E2=80=99s some ASN.1 framing too?
>
> If the Brotli dictionary were there, I=E2=80=99d expect to see compressio=
n of
> =E2=80=9CMassachusetts=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9CCzechia.=E2=80=9D  But versi=
oning of that dictionary seems
> dangerous for the same reasons we talked about the hash table lookups bei=
ng
> dangerous.  Is there a space for a requirement that the decompression
> function contain no information flow from the algorithm, so that all bits
> in the output were present somewhere in the compressed input?
>

Brotli has a dictionary built into the algorithm. I believe that is indeed
being used, as it's a part of Brotli. I think the earlier email was saying
no external certificate-specific dictionary used.

I don't think "no information flow from the algorithm" is particularly
well-defined. The output of course takes information flow from the
algorithm as the algorithm is being run. One could replace Brotli's
dictionary from an array lookups to a series of ifs, etc., without changing
the function.

The transcript encoding must be injective, but we inherently have that
requirement: the receiver needs to decompress it! The transcript includes
all inputs to the receiver, notably the compression algorithm code point.
Were Brotli's static dictionary changed, it would no longer be Brotli. It
would perhaps be Brotli2 and would want a separate codepoint. To that end,
I think the discussion on hash table lookups similarly forgot this
decompressibility requirement. Let's define my_fancy_algorithm to be:

func compress(input) {
   if input =3D=3D some_particular_cert {
      return "0x00"
  }
  return "0x01" + input
}

This is silly, but still fine because the codepoint for my_fancy_algorithm
is in the transcript. It would even be fine if my_fancy_algorithm relied on
a separately-negotiated dictionary extension. The sender inherently must
unambiguously communicate the dictionary name. That ends up in the
transcript. (This is the same logic behind other uses of the handshake
transcript. Blindly stuffing the handshake bytes into the transcript lets
us align functional and security requirements.)

David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue,=
 Mar 26, 2019 at 5:07 PM Sniffen, Brian &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bsniffen@akam=
ai.com">bsniffen@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt;&gt; WG - I=E2=80=
=99d like to echo Alessandro request for reviews.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If this outst=
anding WG item is not resolved before IETF103 we will discuss the outstandi=
ng issue there, and barring any other major issues we are planning to WGLC =
the draft after IETF103.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; One question: There was some discussion earlier about dictionaries=
.=C2=A0 Are dictionaries being used in the current deployments?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; No, neither Chrome nor Cloudflare are using dictionaries. Something I =
forgot<br>
&gt; to mention in my previous email is that the numbers are for plain brot=
li<br>
&gt; compression, so without dictionary.<br>
<br>
Just to check: is this still true for the excellent numbers we saw today?=
=C2=A0 Surely it=E2=80=99s only the text-like parts of the certificate that=
 are compressed.=C2=A0 As EKR mentioned, presumably a bunch of the savings =
is from compressing the Subject of one cert against the Issuer of another.=
=C2=A0 Perhaps there=E2=80=99s some ASN.1 framing too?<br>
<br>
If the Brotli dictionary were there, I=E2=80=99d expect to see compression =
of =E2=80=9CMassachusetts=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9CCzechia.=E2=80=9D=C2=A0 But=
 versioning of that dictionary seems dangerous for the same reasons we talk=
ed about the hash table lookups being dangerous.=C2=A0 Is there a space for=
 a requirement that the decompression function contain no information flow =
from the algorithm, so that all bits in the output were present somewhere i=
n the compressed input?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Brotli has a di=
ctionary built into the algorithm. I believe that is indeed being used, as =
it&#39;s a part of Brotli. I think the earlier email was saying no external=
 certificate-specific dictionary used.</div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t=
 think &quot;no information flow from the algorithm&quot; is particularly w=
ell-defined. The output of course takes information flow from the algorithm=
 as the algorithm is being run.=C2=A0One could replace Brotli&#39;s diction=
ary from an array lookups to a series of ifs, etc., without changing the fu=
nction.</div><div><br></div><div>The transcript encoding must be injective,=
 but we inherently have that requirement: the receiver needs to decompress =
it! The transcript includes all inputs to the receiver, notably the compres=
sion algorithm code point. Were Brotli&#39;s static dictionary changed, it =
would no longer be Brotli. It would perhaps be Brotli2 and would want a sep=
arate codepoint. To that end, I think the discussion on hash table lookups =
similarly forgot this decompressibility requirement. Let&#39;s define my_fa=
ncy_algorithm to be:<br><br>func compress(input) {<br></div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0if input =3D=3D some_particular_cert {<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 return &q=
uot;0x00&quot;<br>=C2=A0 }<br>=C2=A0 return &quot;0x01&quot;=C2=A0+=C2=A0in=
put<br>}<br><br>This is silly, but still fine because the codepoint for my_=
fancy_algorithm is in the transcript. It would even be fine if my_fancy_alg=
orithm relied on a separately-negotiated dictionary extension. The sender i=
nherently must unambiguously=C2=A0communicate the dictionary name. That end=
s up in the transcript. (This is the same logic behind other uses of the ha=
ndshake transcript.=C2=A0Blindly stuffing the handshake bytes into the tran=
script lets us align functional and security requirements.)</div><div><br><=
/div><div>David</div></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000a629cd058502330c--


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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Elliptic Curve J-PAKE 
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Subject: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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Hi all,

in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I mention=
ed that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT device =
onboarding.
Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01

The mechanism is described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236

@Nick & Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.

Ciao
Hannes

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From: "Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04.txt
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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 17:21:01 +0000
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References: <153856977342.9010.10521757586695280@ietfa.amsl.com> <20181003123643.GA5454@mandy.flat11.house> <EC87E55E-A342-40D7-9E09-DB790B04BB9F@sn3rd.com> <20181004170124.GA13528@mandy.flat11.house> <63200ECA-5F92-44A1-970D-E96F90B89EE9@akamai.com>, <CAF8qwaCUVy-V7G4J6SPiSzg8oRurAK6VmtdCy242RuVPL3AGKw@mail.gmail.com>
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On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 16:38:11 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 26 Mar 2019, at 14:45, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> >> Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about
> >> 1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional
> >> feature. EKR commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that
> >> maybe we need to replace them with a flags extension.
> >>=20
> >> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just
> >> that
> >> [1].
> >>=20
> >> Comments are welcome.
> >=20
> > I don't think that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a flag
> > is
> > worth the interoperability problems, and increased complexing of parsing
> > Client Hello. Especially if we go the route of actual bit flags.
>=20
> Right. Which is why I went with a 1-byte encoding rather than a bitstring.
>=20
> > I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible bytes sav=
ed
> > makes it a net negative.
>=20
> I don=E2=80=99t think so. My encoding is not all that complex.
>=20
> > yes, TLS is quite chatty protocol, it could encode values much more
> > tightly, but I think we all remember the bugs related to ASN.1 parsing
> > from inside of PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures
>=20
> Complexity is on a spectrum.  DER encoding is pretty far on this spectrum=
=2E=20
> A list of 1-octet identifiers is on the other end. A bitstring is more
> complex than the identifier list, but not anywhere near DER.

1-octet identifiers may not be considered extensible enough
(yes, you can add another extension, but the first extension to use it will=
 be=20
paying an additional price of 2 bytes on top of the extension overhead; sam=
e=20
if you just need to use only one flag, then you are paying the same price f=
or=20
every connection)

2-octet identifiers asymptotically approach 2-octet saved per flag, which i=
s=20
about 50% saved per flag, I don't see it as much

to approach it from another way: while I think we will, sometime in the=20
future, reach a situation when we have few hundred flag extensions *defined=
* ,=20
I do not see a future in which we will need to *use* more than few dozen fl=
ag=20
extensions in any real world client. So we are talking about a possible sav=
ing=20
of around 100 bytes in ClientHello (36 extensions * 3 bytes saved) in this=
=20
proposal

won't this be completely erased by any post-quantum key share?

> I don=E2=80=99t think we should project the failings of DER parsing to th=
e parsing
> of much simpler structures.

yes, that was an extreme example; I was replying to all sent messages so far

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From nobody Tue Mar 26 11:26:20 2019
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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:25:56 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
To: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Cc: TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>, secdispatch@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 11:04:06PM +0300, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote:
> Please take a look at an initial submission of the draft.
> The draft describes a Fake SNI mechanism intended to cheat DPI systems in
> aÂ caseÂ 
> when a DPI system blocks the connection if ESNI is present.
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 10:43 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
> To: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
> 
> Abstract:
> Â  Â The document provides a specification of the Fake Server Name
> Â  Â Indication.Â  Being implemented, the Fake SNI specification provides a
> Â  Â way to work around the monitoring solutions without providing any
> Â  Â additional information to external observers.

I initially viewed this proposal negatively, but after thinking about it
more during Dmitry's talk today (https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/104/materials/slides-104-tls-slides-ietf104-tls-fake-sni-00),
I think there are ways in which it can make sense.

The reason I initially viewed it negatively was that it seemed to be a
naive attempt at addressing the "proxy distribution" problem--where you
have to somehow share secret information with your genuine users but not
let it fall into the hands of an adversary, with the challenge that you
don't have a secure way to distinguish genuine users from an adversary.
The draft acknowledges the challenge but, I think, treats it too
lightly, as for me it is the core consideration: "DPI solutions are able
to obtain the DNS _fakesni records as legitimate clients do." It's the
same problem you would face if you were to establish mirror sites to
mitigate blocking: how do you inform your users of the mirror sites'
URLs without also informing the adversary you're protecting against?
Another way way to think about it is: you have a large set of secret
tokens, and you want it so that *anyone* can discover one token, but
*no one* can discover all the tokens.

There's a fair amount of research on secure proxy distribution, but they
all work by imposing limits on the adversary, by leveraging trust
relationships among genuine users, tying discovery to real-world
resources, or some other method. Here is a selection of research:
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Nasr2019a
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Douglas2016a
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wang2013a
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#McCoy2011a
The Fake SNI draft's DNS discovery doesn't impose any significant
limits, so if there is only one or a few fake SNIs, I think the idea
won't work against an adversary that can afford to do continuous
polling, even if the set of fake SNIs is rotated frequently.

But if you ensure that each fake SNI value is distributed once and only
once, then I think the idea has some merit. Then, it doesn't help an
adversary to do its own polling, because any SNIs it discovers will
never be used by a legitimate client. It doesn't help if it blocks SNI
values that clients have been seen to use, because those values will not
be used again.

This all assumes trustworthy DNS, so an adversary can't see the SNI
you're about to use before you use it. And it also assumes some level of
colocation, or else there is nothing to prevent an intermediary from
blocking the IP address regardless of SNI. (The same observations apply
to ESNI as well as Fake SNI.)

However, even with one-time-use fake SNI values, the design still has a
problem with replay. The generic attack is described at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-04#section-3.1.
The adversary observes a client using an SNI value, then makes its own
connection to the same server using the same SNI value. Now the
adversary knows what particular colocated service on the server the
client is accessing, and even if it cannot block the server entirely
(because of colocation), it can terminate that client's specific
connection. Perhaps the server can check for and reject reused fake SNI
values--but then it also needs to be the case that all (or at least
many) of the users of the server's colocated services use Fake SNI, not
just the ones who are trying to access the services the adversary would
like to block, or else you violate the "Do not stick out" criterion.


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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:57:02 -0600
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On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 03:48:18PM -0800, Christian Huitema wrote:
> Out of all the requirements listed in the encryption requirements draft, the
> requirement to "not stand out" is probably the hardest to comply with. The
> current ESNI draft works but usage of ESNI can still be detected. As Dmitri
> points out, there are locales where standing out will enable censorship. So,
> what to do? Well, if we want to not stand out yet carry some information,
> that's pretty much the definition of a hidden channel.
> 
> Would it be possible to engineer a hidden channel in the TLS 1.3 Hello? I bet
> that's quite doable. I am sure that fields like "opaque Random[32]" or "opaque
> legacy_session_id<0..32>" could be used creatively, and there are other fields
> in common extensions that could also be of service. Of course, "could be done"
> does not mean that the IETF will want to standardize it.

There's prior research on embedding covert signaling into TLS as a means
of preventing blocking by middleboxes. The work I'm familiar with is in
the field of decoy routing or refraction networking. There's a list of
papers at https://refraction.network/ and there's a good survey in
Section 2 of https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Manfredi2018a.

Telex (https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wustrow2011a) is a good
representative example. Omitting some details: A router has a private
key r. On a new connection, the client generates a temporary private
key s. The client sets the Random field in its Client Hello to
g^s || H(g^(rs)) for some hash function H. The server, knowing r, can
distinguish this value from random, but other observers cannot. (There
are additional tricks to make g^s uniformly distributed.)

Lately the research has been less about the specific means of covert
signaling, and more about improving security and deployability, for
instance by working of asymmetric routes, or requiring only injection
and not flow blocking. There's been an ISP-scale deployment of one of
the designs, called TapDance: https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Frolov2017a.


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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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> On 26 Mar 2019, at 18:49, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 16:38:11 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 26 Mar 2019, at 14:45, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
>>>> Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic =
about
>>>> 1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support for an =
optional
>>>> feature. EKR commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and =
that
>>>> maybe we need to replace them with a flags extension.
>>>>=20
>>>> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does =
just
>>>> that
>>>> [1].
>>>>=20
>>>> Comments are welcome.
>>>=20
>>> I don't think that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a =
flag
>>> is
>>> worth the interoperability problems, and increased complexing of =
parsing
>>> Client Hello. Especially if we go the route of actual bit flags.
>>=20
>> Right. Which is why I went with a 1-byte encoding rather than a =
bitstring.
>>=20
>>> I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible bytes =
saved
>>> makes it a net negative.
>>=20
>> I don=E2=80=99t think so. My encoding is not all that complex.
>>=20
>>> yes, TLS is quite chatty protocol, it could encode values much more
>>> tightly, but I think we all remember the bugs related to ASN.1 =
parsing
>>> from inside of PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures
>>=20
>> Complexity is on a spectrum.  DER encoding is pretty far on this =
spectrum.=20
>> A list of 1-octet identifiers is on the other end. A bitstring is =
more
>> complex than the identifier list, but not anywhere near DER.
>=20
> 1-octet identifiers may not be considered extensible enough
> (yes, you can add another extension, but the first extension to use it =
will be=20
> paying an additional price of 2 bytes on top of the extension =
overhead; same=20
> if you just need to use only one flag, then you are paying the same =
price for=20
> every connection)
>=20
> 2-octet identifiers asymptotically approach 2-octet saved per flag, =
which is=20
> about 50% saved per flag, I don't see it as much
>=20
> to approach it from another way: while I think we will, sometime in =
the=20
> future, reach a situation when we have few hundred flag extensions =
*defined* ,=20
> I do not see a future in which we will need to *use* more than few =
dozen flag=20
> extensions in any real world client. So we are talking about a =
possible saving=20
> of around 100 bytes in ClientHello (36 extensions * 3 bytes saved) in =
this=20
> proposal

A few dozen?  I was thinking under 10 in a typical client.

> won't this be completely erased by any post-quantum key share?

I think implementing (or not) draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression =
would have a much more significant effect than anything we save here.

Yoav


--Apple-Mail=_4E62D852-5446-4102-BC2B-C672969A7F7A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 26 Mar 2019, at 18:49, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 =
16:38:11 CET Yoav Nir wrote:</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">On=
 26 Mar 2019, at 14:45, Hubert Kario &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hkario@redhat.com" class=3D"">hkario@redhat.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 =
CET Yoav Nir wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Hi.=
 &nbsp;Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic =
about<br class=3D"">1-bit extensions that only serve to indicate support =
for an optional<br class=3D"">feature. EKR commented that such =
extensions take 4 bytes each and that<br class=3D"">maybe we need to =
replace them with a flags extension.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">So I =
threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just<br =
class=3D"">that<br class=3D"">[1].<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Comments =
are welcome.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I don't think =
that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a flag<br =
class=3D"">is<br class=3D"">worth the interoperability problems, and =
increased complexing of parsing<br class=3D"">Client Hello. Especially =
if we go the route of actual bit flags.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">Right. Which is why I went with a 1-byte encoding rather than =
a bitstring.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible =
bytes saved<br class=3D"">makes it a net negative.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t think so. My =
encoding is not all that complex.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D"">yes, TLS is quite chatty protocol, it could =
encode values much more<br class=3D"">tightly, but I think we all =
remember the bugs related to ASN.1 parsing<br class=3D"">from inside of =
PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">Complexity is on a spectrum. &nbsp;DER encoding is pretty far =
on this spectrum.<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br =
class=3D"">A list of 1-octet identifiers is on the other end. A =
bitstring is more<br class=3D"">complex than the identifier list, but =
not anywhere near DER.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">1-octet identifiers may not be =
considered extensible enough</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">(yes, you can add another extension, but the first extension =
to use it will be<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">paying an additional price of 2 =
bytes on top of the extension overhead; same<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">if you just need to use only one =
flag, then you are paying the same price for<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">every connection)</span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">2-octet identifiers =
asymptotically approach 2-octet saved per flag, which is<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">about 50% saved per flag, I =
don't see it as much</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">to approach it from another way: while I think we will, =
sometime in the<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">future, reach a situation when =
we have few hundred flag extensions *defined* ,<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">I do not see a future in which =
we will need to *use* more than few dozen flag<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">extensions in any real world =
client. So we are talking about a possible saving<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">of around 100 bytes in =
ClientHello (36 extensions * 3 bytes saved) in this<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">proposal</span><br =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;" =
class=3D""></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>A few dozen? =
&nbsp;I was thinking under 10 in a typical client.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; =
display: inline !important;" class=3D"">won't this be completely erased =
by any post-quantum key share?</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>I think implementing (or not)&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: =
rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.85098); font-family: &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;;" =
class=3D"">draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression would have a much more =
significant effect than anything we save here.</span></div><div><font =
color=3D"rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.85098)" face=3D"Helvetica Neue" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.85098);" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></font></div><div><font color=3D"rgba(0, 0, 0, =
0.85098)" face=3D"Helvetica Neue" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: =
rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.85098);" class=3D"">Yoav</span></font></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_4E62D852-5446-4102-BC2B-C672969A7F7A--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 22:18:48 +0100
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On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 6:21 PM Sniffen, Brian <bsniffen@akamai.com> wrote:

> Brotli has a dictionary built into the algorithm. I believe that is indee=
d
> being used, as it's a part of Brotli. I think the earlier email was sayin=
g
> no external certificate-specific dictionary used.
>
>
> Brotli 1.03 and 1.05 each changed the standard dictionary=E2=80=94didn=E2=
=80=99t they?
> Perhaps I am misreading https://github.com/google/brotli/releases , but
> *even if* the Brotli maintainers are careful, I expect many less careful
> entities to version their compression schemes internally, without updatin=
g
> the codepoint.
>

I'm not personally familiar with Brotli's history, but looking through that
link, no I don't believe they changed the standard dictionary. The standard
dictionary is fixed in RFC 7932
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7932#appendix-A>. So is the rest of the
decoding algorithm <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7932#section-10>.
Looking through the commits, 1.0.5
<https://github.com/google/brotli/compare/v1.0.4...v1.0.5> is just talking
about a tool to extract the dictionary from the RFC
<https://github.com/google/brotli/commit/a4581c158ecad55360aa54f09a08bcc179=
0c560b>
. 1.0.3 <https://github.com/google/brotli/compare/v1.0.2...v1.0.3> appears
to be talking about adding a separate variant
<https://github.com/google/brotli/commit/35e69fc7cf9421ab04ffc9d52cb36d07fa=
12984a>
which
is not what the code point in the spec refers to. The spec says codepoint
brotli(2) corresponds to the algorithm defined RFC 7932. If you use another
algorithm, even a related one, it is not brotli(2). Maybe it's
large_window_brotli(123) or brotli(2) plus a separate large_window(456)
extension, but that will be reflected in the transcript.

Even without an RFC, not making wire-incompatible changes to a
serialization format is a rather fundamental requirement. Your decoding
needs to match, or you have not implemented the same thing and will not
interop. The spec can go call that out I suppose, but this is usually
considered redundant.

Compression is just a serialization format that attempts to use fewer bytes
for hopefully likely inputs (and thus more bytes for other, hopefully
unlikely, inputs). Maybe it is family of formats parameterized by a
dictionary, but then someone needs to pick an instantiation. Individual
instantiations are still serialization formats, with the usual expected
rules. Different instantiations will not interop or the dictionary didn't
do anything.

> I don't think "no information flow from the algorithm" is particularly
> well-defined. The output of course takes information flow from the
> algorithm as the algorithm is being run. One could replace Brotli's
> dictionary from an array lookups to a series of ifs, etc., without changi=
ng
> the function.
>
> The transcript encoding must be injective, but we inherently have that
> requirement: the receiver needs to decompress it! The transcript includes
> all inputs to the receiver, notably the compression algorithm code point.
>
>
> No, the time of the transaction is a silent input.  I=E2=80=99m worried a=
bout
> extremely persistent adversaries, including those who can update some of
> the involved software in apparently-innocent ways.
>

(Some aspects of time actually are part of the transcript by way of the
random values used for freshness.)

If your adversary can change your software, I don't think this is the part
you need to worry about. :-P

But, yeah, if you make wire-incompatible changes to your implementation
over time and introduce ambiguity, the transcript may not work as intended.
It will also presumably fail to interop. This equally true for code points
and length prefixes as compression formats.

David


> -Brian
>
> Were Brotli's static dictionary changed, it would no longer be Brotli. It
> would perhaps be Brotli2 and would want a separate codepoint. To that end=
,
> I think the discussion on hash table lookups similarly forgot this
> decompressibility requirement. Let's define my_fancy_algorithm to be:
>
> func compress(input) {
>    if input =3D=3D some_particular_cert {
>       return "0x00"
>   }
>   return "0x01" + input
> }
>
> This is silly, but still fine because the codepoint for my_fancy_algorith=
m
> is in the transcript. It would even be fine if my_fancy_algorithm relied =
on
> a separately-negotiated dictionary extension. The sender inherently must
> unambiguously communicate the dictionary name. That ends up in the
> transcript. (This is the same logic behind other uses of the handshake
> transcript. Blindly stuffing the handshake bytes into the transcript lets
> us align functional and security requirements.)
>
> David
>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On T=
ue, Mar 26, 2019 at 6:21 PM Sniffen, Brian &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bsniffen@a=
kamai.com" target=3D"_blank">bsniffen@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">



<div dir=3D"auto">
<div dir=3D"ltr"></div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div>Brotli has a dictionary built into the algorithm. I believe that is in=
deed being used, as it&#39;s a part of Brotli. I think the earlier email wa=
s saying no external certificate-specific dictionary used.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0)">Brotl=
i 1.03 and 1.05 each changed the standard dictionary=E2=80=94didn=E2=80=99t=
 they?=C2=A0 Perhaps I am misreading=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/goo=
gle/brotli/releases" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/google/brotli/rel=
eases</a>=C2=A0,
 but *even if* the Brotli maintainers are careful, I expect many less caref=
ul entities to version their compression schemes internally, without updati=
ng the codepoint.</span></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
I&#39;m not personally familiar with Brotli&#39;s history, but looking thro=
ugh that link, no I don&#39;t believe they changed the standard dictionary.=
 The standard dictionary is fixed in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html=
/rfc7932#appendix-A" target=3D"_blank">RFC 7932</a>. So is the <a href=3D"h=
ttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7932#section-10" target=3D"_blank">rest of th=
e decoding algorithm</a>. Looking through the commits,=C2=A0<a href=3D"http=
s://github.com/google/brotli/compare/v1.0.4...v1.0.5" target=3D"_blank">1.0=
.5</a>=C2=A0is just talking about=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/google=
/brotli/commit/a4581c158ecad55360aa54f09a08bcc1790c560b" target=3D"_blank">=
a tool to extract the dictionary from the RFC</a>.=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://=
github.com/google/brotli/compare/v1.0.2...v1.0.3" target=3D"_blank">1.0.3</=
a>=C2=A0appears to be talking about adding a <a href=3D"https://github.com/=
google/brotli/commit/35e69fc7cf9421ab04ffc9d52cb36d07fa12984a" target=3D"_b=
lank">separate variant</a>=C2=A0which is not what the code point in the spe=
c refers to. The spec says codepoint brotli(2) corresponds to the algorithm=
 defined RFC 7932. If you use another algorithm, even a related one, it is =
not brotli(2). Maybe it&#39;s large_window_brotli(123) or brotli(2) plus a =
separate large_window(456) extension, but that will be reflected in the tra=
nscript.</div><div><br></div><div>Even without an RFC, not making wire-inco=
mpatible changes to a serialization format is a rather fundamental requirem=
ent. Your decoding needs to match, or you have not implemented the same thi=
ng and will not interop. The spec can go call that out I suppose, but this =
is usually considered redundant.</div><div><br></div><div>Compression is ju=
st a serialization format that attempts to use fewer bytes for hopefully li=
kely inputs (and thus more bytes for other, hopefully unlikely, inputs). Ma=
ybe it is family of formats parameterized by a dictionary, but then someone=
 needs to pick an instantiation. Individual instantiations are still serial=
ization formats, with the usual expected rules. Different instantiations wi=
ll not interop or the dictionary didn&#39;t do anything.</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div>I don&#39;t think &quot;no information flow from the algorithm&quot; i=
s particularly well-defined. The output of course takes information flow fr=
om the algorithm as the algorithm is being run.=C2=A0One could replace Brot=
li&#39;s dictionary from an array lookups to a series of
 ifs, etc., without changing the function.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The transcript encoding must be injective, but we inherently have that=
 requirement: the receiver needs to decompress it! The transcript includes =
all inputs to the receiver, notably the compression algorithm code point.</=
div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>No, the time of the transaction is a silent input.=C2=A0 I=E2=80=99m w=
orried about extremely persistent adversaries, including those who can upda=
te some of the involved software in apparently-innocent ways.</div></div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>(Some aspects of time actually are part of t=
he transcript by way of the random values used for freshness.)<br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>If your adversary can change your software, I don&#39;t th=
ink this is the part you need to worry about. :-P</div><div><br></div><div>=
But, yeah, if you make wire-incompatible changes to your implementation ove=
r time and introduce ambiguity, the transcript may not work as intended. It=
 will also presumably fail to interop. This equally true for code points an=
d length prefixes as compression formats.</div><div><br></div><div>David<br=
></div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x"><div dir=3D"auto">
<div>-Brian</div>
<br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div>Were Brotli&#39;s static dictionary changed, it would no longer be Bro=
tli. It would perhaps be Brotli2 and would want a separate codepoint. To th=
at end, I think the discussion on hash table lookups similarly forgot this =
decompressibility requirement. Let&#39;s
 define my_fancy_algorithm to be:<br>
<br>
func compress(input) {<br>
</div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0if input =3D=3D some_particular_cert {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 return &quot;0x00&quot;<br>
=C2=A0 }<br>
=C2=A0 return &quot;0x01&quot;=C2=A0+=C2=A0input<br>
}<br>
<br>
This is silly, but still fine because the codepoint for my_fancy_algorithm =
is in the transcript. It would even be fine if my_fancy_algorithm relied on=
 a separately-negotiated dictionary extension. The sender inherently must u=
nambiguously=C2=A0communicate the dictionary
 name. That ends up in the transcript. (This is the same logic behind other=
 uses of the handshake transcript.=C2=A0Blindly stuffing the handshake byte=
s into the transcript lets us align functional and security requirements.)<=
/div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>David</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></=
div></div></div>

--000000000000e853a1058505ded1--


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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 16:53:55 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kCbTTDrADTvIB4HgZSJAd6dDeiA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 04:38:11PM +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
> 
> 
> > On 26 Mar 2019, at 14:45, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Monday, 25 March 2019 22:09:35 CET Yoav Nir wrote:
> >> Hi.  Today at the TLS meeting, there was a discussion at the mic about 1-bit
> >> extensions that only serve to indicate support for an optional feature. EKR
> >> commented that such extensions take 4 bytes each and that maybe we need to
> >> replace them with a flags extension.
> >> 
> >> So I threw together a quick -00 draft with an extension that does just that
> >> [1].
> >> 
> >> Comments are welcome.
> > 
> > I don't think that "penny-pinching" the 4 bytes necessary to send a flag is 
> > worth the interoperability problems, and increased complexing of parsing 
> > Client Hello. Especially if we go the route of actual bit flags.
> 
> Right. Which is why I went with a 1-byte encoding rather than a bitstring.
> 
> > I think the likelihood of bugs in that code over the possible bytes saved 
> > makes it a net negative.
> 
> I donâ€™t think so. My encoding is not all that complex.

It would be pretty easy to forget to sort the values (which, btw, maybe we
want to require, to make duplicate detection easier).

-Ben


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From: Watson Ladd <watson@cloudflare.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:56:10 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] kc2kdm.com should be live with delegated credentials -03
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Nick mentioned at the WG meeting today we were having some hiccups.
These hiccups have been fixed and we have a delegated credential.
Please let us know the results. Note the cert has an extra 05 00 in
the extension.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Tue Mar 26 19:49:12 2019
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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 22:48:24 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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--0000000000003c511c05850a7bdf
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Hi Hannes,

J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both parties store the same password. It is not
suitable for most client-server scenarios where using J-PAKE would mean
that an attacker that breaks into the server simply steals all plaintext
passwords. OPAQUE is an asymmetric (or augmented) PAKE where user remembers
a password (and nothing else, including no public key of the server) while
the server stores a one-way image of the password. Security requires that
if the server is compromised, the attacker needs to run an offline
dictionary attack for each user in the database to find the password.

If what you need is a symmetric PAKE then there are better candidates than
J-PAKE such as SPAKE2 described in draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08. SPAKE2 is
*much* more efficient than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and SPAKE2 have
proofs of security, SPAKE2 is proven in a stronger security model relative
to J-PAKE.

I am not aware of any advantage of J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be
missing something. Maybe the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify these
issues further.

Hugo




On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I
> mentioned that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT
> device onboarding.
> Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01
>
> The mechanism is described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236
>
> @Nick & Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the
> information in any medium. Thank you.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000003c511c05850a7bdf
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hi Hannes,</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font=
-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:ar=
ial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both =
parties store the same password. It is not suitable for most client-server =
scenarios where using J-PAKE would mean that an attacker that breaks into t=
he server simply steals all plaintext passwords. OPAQUE is an asymmetric (o=
r augmented) PAKE where user remembers a password (and nothing else, includ=
ing no public key of the server) while the server stores a one-way image of=
 the password. Security requires that if the server is compromised, the att=
acker needs to run an offline dictionary attack for each user in the databa=
se to find the password.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:small">If what you need is a symmetric PAKE then there are better candida=
tes than J-PAKE such as SPAKE2 described in=C2=A0draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08.=
 SPAKE2 is *much* more efficient than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and SPAK=
E2 have proofs of security, SPAKE2 is proven in a stronger security model r=
elative to J-PAKE.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fa=
mily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l">I am not aware of any advantage of J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be mis=
sing something. Maybe the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify these issu=
es further.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,he=
lvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo<br><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,s=
ans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"=
font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div></div></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On =
Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes=
.Tschofenig@arm.com">Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I mention=
ed that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT device =
onboarding.<br>
Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-=
ecjpake-01</a><br>
<br>
The mechanism is described in <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc823=
6" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236=
</a><br>
<br>
@Nick &amp; Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.<=
br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
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 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
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</blockquote></div>

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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugokraw@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 22:57:32 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] Security of OPAQUE in TLS
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In the TLS meeting on Tuesday, Kenny asked about the analysis of OPAQUE in
the context of TLS. One important property of OPAQUE is that its design and
analysis is modular. It applies to the composition of *any* OPRF with *any*
(KCI-secure) key exchange. This is why we can integrate OPAQUE with
different KE protocols including TLS 1.3 and get a combined proof of
security. Of course, these high level analyses do not take into account all
the details in a complex protocol like TLS 1.3 so any more specific
analysis, including those using automated tools (Tamarin, Everest, etc)
would be more than welcome.  However, if there is interest in defining an
asymmetric PAKE for TLS to replace old designs such as SRP then we can
start moving towards that goal with the draft Nick presented.  This will
also motivate more analysts (including those based on tools like the above)
to look into this question  more seriously.

Hugo

--000000000000df18e605850a9bb3
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_defa=
ult"><div class=3D"gmail_default"><font face=3D"arial, helvetica, sans-seri=
f">In the TLS meeting on Tuesday, Kenny asked about the analysis of OPAQUE =
in the context of TLS. One important property of OPAQUE is that its design =
and analysis is modular. It applies to the composition of *any* OPRF with *=
any* (KCI-secure) key exchange. This is why we can integrate OPAQUE with di=
fferent KE protocols including TLS 1.3 and get a combined proof of security=
. Of course, these high level analyses do not take into account all the det=
ails in a complex protocol like TLS 1.3 so any more specific analysis, incl=
uding those using automated tools (Tamarin, Everest, etc) would be more tha=
n welcome.=C2=A0 However, if there is interest in defining an asymmetric PA=
KE for TLS to replace old designs such as SRP then we can start moving towa=
rds that goal with the draft Nick presented.=C2=A0 This will also motivate =
more analysts (including those based on tools like the above) to look into =
this question=C2=A0 more seriously.=C2=A0=C2=A0</font><span style=3D"font-f=
amily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">=C2=A0</span><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_default"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></spa=
n></div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><span style=3D"font-family:arial,helve=
tica,sans-serif">Hugo</span></div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><span style=
=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></span></div></div></div></=
div></div>

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:49 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > On 26 Mar 2019, at 10:35, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
> > wrote:
> > 
> > On Tue, 2019-03-26 at 10:11 +0100, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > > > On 26 Mar 2019, at 9:06, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > This needs more space for each flag.  8 bits is a pretty small
> > > > space.  If you are concerned with the size of the result, we
> > > > have
> > > > some variable-length integer encodings you could try.
> > > 
> > > Ah, the beautiful variable length encodings.  Like:
> > > 
> > > - 0x00 - 0xBF - for standards-action allocations
> > > - 0xC0,0x00 - 0xEF,0xFF - for non-standards track
> > > - 0xF0,0x00 - 0xFF,0xFF - for private use among consenting
> > > parties.
> > > Are we really worried that weâ€™re going to have more than 255
> > > optional
> > > features for TLS?
> > 
> > Given that adding an extended flags extension which can hold even
> > more
> > flags is also easy, the 255-optional features do not seem so
> > limited. 
> > 
> > Going into the extension itself, the array FlagExtensionType seems
> > to
> > be the TLS-way to define such variable, but flags are easier, more
> > efficient to parse, and take less space if they are bits on an
> > integer
> > value (32-bit or 64-bit). Have you considered a simpler structure
> > like
> > that?
> > 
> > struct {
> >   uint64 flags;
> >   uint64 ext_flags1;
> >   uint64 ext_flags2;
> >   uint24 ext_flags3;
> >   uint16 priv_flags;
> > } Flags;
> > 
> > The advantage is that it can carry the same information with much
> > less
> > bytes on the wire and it is easier to parse in low level languages.
> > 
> > The disadvantage is that an extension flag would now need to
> > specify
> > the bit it occupies _and_ the particular element it is set to.
> 
> I thought about that. I guess it depends on how many of these
> optional features we expect to be declared at the same time. 
> 
> With the current way the draft is written, if the client supports 12
> such extensions, the extension takes 16 bytes.  With a bitstring,
> itâ€™s always the same length. so weâ€™d need 36 bytes for a 256-bit
> space. If the client supports 100 extensions, my encoding takes 104
> bytes while the bitstring is still 36 bytes.

Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) of
flags as:

struct {
   uint64 flags;
} Flags;

That way there are 128 different flags available for assignment with a
cost is 4+8-bytes for every 64 flags.

regards,
Nikos



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Content-Type: text/plain

On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) of
> flags as:
>
> struct {
>    uint64 flags;
> } Flags;

If we're going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is the way to
go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a
uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control.  If
we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extension.

If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, they
can always use an empty extension.  They can apply for a bit in
CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.

Keep it simple.

     --dkg

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 13:08:32 +0100
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Cc: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <A7EC005E-3463-406B-930F-925B4D2338E4@gmail.com> <B0FF00D7-8727-4371-8DAA-AD2A920504F8@akamai.com> <2e5a5623-7de9-4f12-b699-b0b248432f96@www.fastmail.com> <F5AD3A62-C0D1-49F7-8D10-27A7DA92DCCC@gmail.com> <be8f455bf446d6db3ba81a8ac98ed9d485cc43de.camel@redhat.com> <C1694B79-1CA2-44B5-A77E-8F12FE0C785D@gmail.com> <ac26657f9614afb3880135efeb06265393012777.camel@redhat.com> <87o95wfthk.fsf@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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> On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
>> Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) =
of
>> flags as:
>>=20
>> struct {
>>   uint64 flags;
>> } Flags;
>=20
> If we're going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is the way =
to
> go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a
> uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control.  =
If
> we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extension.
>=20
> If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, they
> can always use an empty extension.  They can apply for a bit in
> CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.
>=20

OK. You got me convinced.

In the spirit of revising quickly and revising often, I=E2=80=99ve =
uploaded version -01:

HTML: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags>
DIFF: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01 =
<https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01>

Yoav


--Apple-Mail=_72E443BF-D4DE-4103-A840-C344B742640F
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" =
class=3D"">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">On =
Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Right. What about =
defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) of<br class=3D"">flags =
as:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">struct {<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;uint64 flags;<br class=3D"">} Flags;<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">If we're going to be doing this =
kind of bit-shaving, this is the way to<br class=3D"">go, starting with =
a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a<br class=3D"">uint32 =
or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control. =
&nbsp;If<br class=3D"">we exhaust that space, then we just define a =
CommonFlags2 extension.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">If someone wants an =
experimental boolean extension to play with, they<br class=3D"">can =
always use an empty extension. &nbsp;They can apply for a bit in<br =
class=3D"">CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is =
warranted.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D""></div><div>OK. You got me convinced.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>In the spirit of revising quickly and revising =
often, I=E2=80=99ve uploaded version -01:</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>HTML:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags</a=
></div><div>DIFF:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01</=
a></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Yoav</div><br =
class=3D""></body></html>=

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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 09:42:49 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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Why not go all in - make this a byte string and start from 0x80 in the f=
irst byte.  When we define the 9th flag, we add another byte.  Then you =
have up to 2040 flags (though it might pay to split the space before tha=
t).

struct {
  opaque<1..255> flags;
} Flags;

Otherwise, the first adopter of this pays 10 bytes where they would prev=
iously have paid 4.  Obviously there is a network effect at the third.  =
Since I'm writing a draft that will aim to depend on this, I have a vest=
ed interest in using this.

If you wanted to make it more attractive to me, then maybe porting some =
of the existing flags across might make it more appealing.

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019, at 13:08, Yoav Nir wrote:
>=20
>=20
> > On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net=
> wrote:
> >=20
> > On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> >> Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions)=
 of
> >> flags as:
> >>=20
> >> struct {
> >>  uint64 flags;
> >> } Flags;
> >=20
> > If we're going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is the way=
 to
> > go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a=

> > uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control.=
 If
> > we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extension.=

> >=20
> > If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, the=
y
> > can always use an empty extension. They can apply for a bit in
> > CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.
> >=20
>=20
> OK. You got me convinced.
>=20
> In the spirit of revising quickly and revising often, I=E2=80=99ve upl=
oaded version -01:
>=20
> HTML: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags
> DIFF: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01
>=20
> Yoav
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


From nobody Wed Mar 27 06:47:08 2019
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 06:46:23 -0700
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/tQw-PwgukMJXLOtBk31_vpXqJPA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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Of course, at some point it starts to make sense to do RLE.

-Ekr


On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 6:43 AM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> Why not go all in - make this a byte string and start from 0x80 in the
> first byte.  When we define the 9th flag, we add another byte.  Then you
> have up to 2040 flags (though it might pay to split the space before that=
).
>
> struct {
>   opaque<1..255> flags;
> } Flags;
>
> Otherwise, the first adopter of this pays 10 bytes where they would
> previously have paid 4.  Obviously there is a network effect at the third=
.
> Since I'm writing a draft that will aim to depend on this, I have a veste=
d
> interest in using this.
>
> If you wanted to make it more attractive to me, then maybe porting some o=
f
> the existing flags across might make it more appealing.
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019, at 13:08, Yoav Nir wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > >> Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) =
of
> > >> flags as:
> > >>
> > >> struct {
> > >>  uint64 flags;
> > >> } Flags;
> > >
> > > If we're going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is the way =
to
> > > go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a
> > > uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control. =
If
> > > we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extension.
> > >
> > > If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, they
> > > can always use an empty extension. They can apply for a bit in
> > > CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.
> > >
> >
> > OK. You got me convinced.
> >
> > In the spirit of revising quickly and revising often, I=E2=80=99ve uplo=
aded
> version -01:
> >
> > HTML: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags
> > DIFF: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01
> >
> > Yoav
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Of course, at some point it starts to make sense to d=
o RLE.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at =
6:43 AM Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mt@lowentropy.net">mt@lowentro=
py.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">Why not go all in - make this a byte string and start from 0x80 in th=
e first byte.=C2=A0 When we define the 9th flag, we add another byte.=C2=A0=
 Then you have up to 2040 flags (though it might pay to split the space bef=
ore that).<br>
<br>
struct {<br>
=C2=A0 opaque&lt;1..255&gt; flags;<br>
} Flags;<br>
<br>
Otherwise, the first adopter of this pays 10 bytes where they would previou=
sly have paid 4.=C2=A0 Obviously there is a network effect at the third.=C2=
=A0 Since I&#39;m writing a draft that will aim to depend on this, I have a=
 vested interest in using this.<br>
<br>
If you wanted to make it more attractive to me, then maybe porting some of =
the existing flags across might make it more appealing.<br>
<br>
On Wed, Mar 27, 2019, at 13:08, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" target=3D"_blank">dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt; w=
rote:<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:<=
br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 exten=
sions) of<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; flags as:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; struct {<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 uint64 flags;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; } Flags;<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; If we&#39;re going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is =
the way to<br>
&gt; &gt; go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe eve=
n a<br>
&gt; &gt; uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG contr=
ol. If<br>
&gt; &gt; we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extensi=
on.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, =
they<br>
&gt; &gt; can always use an empty extension. They can apply for a bit in<br=
>
&gt; &gt; CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; OK. You got me convinced.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In the spirit of revising quickly and revising often, I=E2=80=99ve upl=
oaded version -01:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; HTML: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-t=
lsflags" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/=
doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags</a><br>
&gt; DIFF: <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tls=
flags-01" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff=
?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Yoav<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 09:50:13 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "'Eric Rescorla'" <ekr@rtfm.com>
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On Wed, Mar 27, 2019, at 14:47, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Of course, at some point it starts to make sense to do RLE.

I considered that, but I don't see this being sufficiently sparsely populated.


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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 09:51:43 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comment on draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address
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On Tue, Mar 26, 2019, at 14:30, Hubert Kario wrote:
> On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> > We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but once we
> > have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated and can be
> > used.  We rely on this property for a bunch of things.
> 
> yes, but those things are part of the protocol, not destined for application 
> (or even if they are, they are actionable only after the handshake finished)

Yep, but that's something that QUIC relies on already.  As does ALPN.  And it is likely that there are other things that I can't think of in my current frazzled state.


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On Wednesday, 27 March 2019 14:51:43 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019, at 14:30, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Tuesday, 26 March 2019 09:07:51 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> > > We don't trust that the key share or certificate is good either, but
> > > once we have a Finished message, that is retroactively authenticated
> > > and can be used.  We rely on this property for a bunch of things.
> >=20
> > yes, but those things are part of the protocol, not destined for
> > application (or even if they are, they are actionable only after the
> > handshake finished)
> Yep, but that's something that QUIC relies on already.  As does ALPN.  And
> it is likely that there are other things that I can't think of in my
> current frazzled state.

how is ALPN similar?

 a). the information gained by processing the handshake only up to=20
     EncryptedExtensions with ALPN is "what protocol server is willing to u=
se"
 b). that information is useful _only_ for establishing future _TLS_=20
     connections and guides what happens _after_ the handshake is finished

OTOH, the information gained from client-net-address is useful outside the =
TLS=20
scope
=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: [TLS] A use of flags
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Inspired by a few side discussions and Yoav's new draft, I have the pleasure of announcing the first proposal to use that mechanism:

 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-tls-sic-00

I'm sure that there are plenty of opportunities to bike shed on the flags format, but it's definitely useful in the abstract.  It make this easier.

( Read the draft for details of the idea.  It's based on the intermediate preloading work we've been doing at Mozilla: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CryptoEngineering/Intermediate_Preloading )


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A use of flags
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 18:19:05 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A use of flags
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Is the concern that servers which never renegotiate and do not send any
renegotiation_info are being flagged on ratings systems? That is desired
behavior. See the final paragraph of section 4.3
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-4.3>. Those servers should be
sending an empty renegotiation_info. "I never renegotiation" is vacuously
consistent with "all my renegotiations are secure".

This is important because fixing the renegotiation issue requires either:
- The server rejects *all* extension-less renegotiations, or...
- The client rejects *all* extension-less handshakes, including initial
handshakes <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-4.1>

That second point means that clients cannot protect themselves against
non-strict servers if there are any servers which do not implement at least
the minimal version of the extension. Server implementations which fail to
send the minimal renegotiation_info extension on the initial handshake
should indeed be flagged by ratings systems and fixed.

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 3:39 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> I would like to define a flag that says "no renegotiation allowed"  This
> has come up (for pre 1.3 of course) a couple of times, that while you can
> signal "defaut" or "only secure" renegotiation, you can't signal "no
> renegotiation" in a way that is visible purely on the wire, to things like
> SSLLabs ratings systems.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000006f5f94058516a33d
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Is the concern that servers which never renegotiate and do=
 not send any renegotiation_info are being flagged on ratings systems? That=
 is desired behavior.=C2=A0See the final paragraph of=C2=A0<a href=3D"https=
://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-4.3" target=3D"_blank">section 4.3</=
a>. Those servers should be sending an empty renegotiation_info. &quot;I ne=
ver renegotiation&quot; is vacuously consistent with &quot;all my renegotia=
tions are secure&quot;.<div><br></div><div>This is important because fixing=
 the renegotiation issue requires either:</div><div>- The server rejects *a=
ll* extension-less renegotiations, or...</div><div>- The client rejects *al=
l* extension-less handshakes, <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc574=
6#section-4.1" target=3D"_blank">including initial handshakes</a></div><div=
><br></div><div>That second point means that clients cannot protect themsel=
ves against non-strict servers if there are any servers which do not implem=
ent at least the minimal version of the extension. Server implementations w=
hich fail to send the minimal renegotiation_info extension on the initial h=
andshake should indeed be flagged by ratings systems and fixed.</div></div>=
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed=
, Mar 27, 2019 at 3:39 PM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com=
" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I would like to define a flag that says=
 &quot;no renegotiation allowed&quot;=C2=A0 This has come up (for pre 1.3 o=
f course) a couple of times, that while you can signal &quot;defaut&quot; o=
r &quot;only secure&quot; renegotiation, you can&#39;t signal &quot;no rene=
gotiation&quot; in a way that is visible purely on the wire, to things like=
 SSLLabs ratings systems.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000006f5f94058516a33d--


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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/iWvtrq_sVIxx7KxhTOdp3tiOtlU>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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--_000_6ADEC907127341AFA96468E654103645nclacuk_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
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Hi Hugo,

Thanks for your comments.

Just to clarify the difference between SPAKE2 and J-PAKE - The proof of SPA=
KE2 depends on the assumption of a trusted setup: the discrete logarithm be=
tween the two group generators must be unknown by anyone. If a powerful adv=
ersary (3 letter agency) gathers sufficient resources and time (say 1 year)=
 to break one instance of discrete logarithm, it will be a class attack, br=
eaking all instances of SPAKE2 without anyone knowing it. By contrast, they=
 can only break one session in J-PAKE, since by design the randomness is re=
freshed in every session rather than being built into a static setup. This =
explain why J-PAKE requires more computation than SPAKE2. Hope it clarifies=
.

Regards,
Feng

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of =
Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il<mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>>
Date: Wednesday, 27 March 2019 at 02:49
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com<mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@a=
rm.com>>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE

Hi Hannes,

J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both parties store the same password. It is not=
 suitable for most client-server scenarios where using J-PAKE would mean th=
at an attacker that breaks into the server simply steals all plaintext pass=
words. OPAQUE is an asymmetric (or augmented) PAKE where user remembers a p=
assword (and nothing else, including no public key of the server) while the=
 server stores a one-way image of the password. Security requires that if t=
he server is compromised, the attacker needs to run an offline dictionary a=
ttack for each user in the database to find the password.

If what you need is a symmetric PAKE then there are better candidates than =
J-PAKE such as SPAKE2 described in draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08. SPAKE2 is *mu=
ch* more efficient than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and SPAKE2 have proofs=
 of security, SPAKE2 is proven in a stronger security model relative to J-P=
AKE.

I am not aware of any advantage of J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be missin=
g something. Maybe the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify these issues =
further.

Hugo



On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.co=
m<mailto:Hannes..Tschofenig@arm.com>> wrote:
Hi all,

in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I mention=
ed that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT device =
onboarding.
Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01

The mechanism is described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236

@Nick & Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.

Ciao
Hannes

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_______________________________________________
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"20" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"E=
mphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Plain Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"E-mail Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Top of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Bottom of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Normal (Web)"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Acronym"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Cite"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Code"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Definition"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Keyboard"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Preformatted"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Sample"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Typewriter"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"HTML Variable"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Normal Table"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"annotation subject"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"No List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Grid 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Grid 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Grid 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table List 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table 3D effects 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table 3D effects 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Contemporary"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Elegant"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Professional"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Subtle 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Subtle 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Web 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Web 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Web 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Balloon Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"true=
" Name=3D"Table Theme"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" Name=3D"Placeholder Te=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"1" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"No=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1"/=
>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2"/=
>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading"/=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
ccent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
nt 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" SemiHidden=3D"true" Name=3D"Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"34" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"L=
ist Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"29" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Q=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"30" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"I=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 1=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 2=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 3=
"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
nt 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
ccent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 4=
"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 5=
"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
nt 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" Name=3D"Light Shading Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" Name=3D"Light List Accent =
6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent =
6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 A=
ccent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 A=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Acce=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 6=
"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" Name=3D"Colorful Shading A=
ccent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" Name=3D"Colorful List Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Acce=
nt 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"19" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"S=
ubtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"21" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"I=
ntense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"31" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"S=
ubtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"32" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"I=
ntense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"33" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"B=
ook Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"37" SemiHidden=3D"true" Unhide=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" SemiHidden=3D"true" Unhide=
WhenUsed=3D"true" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"TOC Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"41" Name=3D"Plain Table 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"42" Name=3D"Plain Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"43" Name=3D"Plain Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"44" Name=3D"Plain Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"45" Name=3D"Plain Table 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"40" Name=3D"Grid Table Light"/=
>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"46" Name=3D"Grid Table 1 Light=
"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"47" Name=3D"Grid Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"48" Name=3D"Grid Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"49" Name=3D"Grid Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"50" Name=3D"Grid Table 5 Dark"=
/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"51" Name=3D"Grid Table 6 Color=
ful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"52" Name=3D"Grid Table 7 Color=
ful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"46" Name=3D"Grid Table 1 Light=
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<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"47" Name=3D"Grid Table 2 Accen=
t 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"48" Name=3D"Grid Table 3 Accen=
t 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"49" Name=3D"Grid Table 4 Accen=
t 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"50" Name=3D"Grid Table 5 Dark =
Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"51" Name=3D"Grid Table 6 Color=
ful Accent 1"/>
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</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"word-wrap: bre=
ak-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Hi Hugo,<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><font size=3D"3">Thanks for your comments.&nbsp;</fo=
nt></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><font size=3D"3"><br>
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><font size=3D"3">Just to clarify the difference&nbsp=
;between SPAKE2 and J-PAKE -&nbsp;The proof of SPAKE2 depends on the assump=
tion of a trusted setup: the discrete logarithm between the two group gener=
ators must be unknown by anyone. If a powerful
 adversary (3 letter agency) gathers sufficient resources and time (say 1 y=
ear) to break one instance of discrete logarithm, it will be a class attack=
, breaking all instances of SPAKE2 without anyone knowing it. By contrast, =
they can only break one session
 in J-PAKE, since by design the randomness is refreshed in every session ra=
ther than being built into a static setup. This explain why J-PAKE requires=
 more computation than SPAKE2. Hope it clarifies.</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><font size=3D"3"><br>
</font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Regards,<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Feng<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;=
mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14px; border-style: solid none none; border-top-width: 1pt; border-top=
-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a name=3D"_MailOriginal"><b><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:black">F=
rom:
</span></b></a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:bl=
ack">TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org">tls-bounces@ietf.org</=
a>&gt; on behalf of Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac=
.il">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, 27 March 2019 at 02:49<br>
<b>To: </b>Hannes Tschofenig &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.co=
m">Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE<o:p></o:p></span></span></p=
>
</div>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14px;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></span></span></p>
</div>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14px;">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Hi Hannes,<o:p></o:p></span></spa=
n></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both =
parties store the same password. It is not suitable for most
 client-server scenarios where using J-PAKE would mean that an attacker tha=
t breaks into the server simply steals all plaintext passwords. OPAQUE is a=
n asymmetric (or augmented) PAKE where user remembers a password (and nothi=
ng else, including no public key
 of the server) while the server stores a one-way image of the password. Se=
curity requires that if the server is compromised, the attacker needs to ru=
n an offline dictionary attack for each user in the database to find the pa=
ssword.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">If what you need is a symmetric P=
AKE then there are better candidates than J-PAKE such as SPAKE2
 described in&nbsp;draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08. SPAKE2 is *much* more efficie=
nt than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and SPAKE2 have proofs of security, SP=
AKE2 is proven in a stronger security model relative to J-PAKE.&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">I am not aware of any advantage o=
f J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be missing something. Maybe
 the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify these issues further.<o:p></o:p=
></span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style=3D"mso-bo=
okmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ari=
al&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Hu=
go<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast=
-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></=
p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">
<span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-font-=
family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></span></p>
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14px;">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">On Tue, Mar 26, =
2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig &lt;</span></span><a href=3D"mailto:Hanne=
s..Tschofenig@arm.com"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Hannes.Tschofeni=
g@arm.com</span></span><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"></span></=
a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-fon=
t-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&gt;
 wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;mso-border=
-left-alt:solid #CCCCCC .75pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;m=
argin-right:0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span sty=
le=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Hi all,<br>
<br>
in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I mention=
ed that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT device =
onboarding.<br>
Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:<br>
</span></span><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpa=
ke-01" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span s=
tyle=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">https://tools.=
ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01</span></span><span style=3D"mso-b=
ookmark:_MailOriginal"></span></a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal=
"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><br>
<br>
The mechanism is described in </span></span><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.o=
rg/html/rfc8236" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOrigina=
l"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">http=
s://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236</span></span><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_M=
ailOriginal"></span></a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span st=
yle=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><br>
<br>
@Nick &amp; Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.<=
br>
<br>
Ciao<br>
Hannes<br>
<br>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
</span></span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=
=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quo=
t;Times New Roman&quot;">TLS@ietf.org</span></span><span style=3D"mso-bookm=
ark:_MailOriginal"></span></a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><s=
pan style=3D"mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><br>
</span></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=
=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"><span style=3D"mso-f=
areast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">https://www.ietf.org/mailma=
n/listinfo/tls</span></span><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"></sp=
an></a><span style=3D"mso-bookmark:_MailOriginal"></span><span style=3D"mso=
-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
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</html>

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 21:08:11 +0100
Message-ID: <CACsn0ckNiC27tbPr_QOboGuvQjsy+ERi2QuydD4pvW0JefnApQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
Cc: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 7:56 PM Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> Hi Hugo,
>
>
>
> Thanks for your comments.
>
>
> Just to clarify the difference between SPAKE2 and J-PAKE - The proof of S=
PAKE2 depends on the assumption of a trusted setup: the discrete logarithm =
between the two group generators must be unknown by anyone.

The above is not true: we rely on the common random string model, not
the common reference model. This matters for below.

>If a powerful adversary (3 letter agency) gathers sufficient resources and=
 time (say 1 year) to break one instance of discrete logarithm, it will be =
a class attack, breaking all >instances of SPAKE2 without anyone knowing it=
. By contrast, they can only break one session in J-PAKE, since by design t=
he randomness is refreshed in every session >rather than being built into a=
 static setup. This explain why J-PAKE requires more computation than SPAKE=
2. Hope it clarifies.

I don't know of a JPAKE proof that doesn't rely on Shamir-Fiat
heuristic, which implies common random string. Your proof is in the
ROM no? Also I do not see how one recovers the password from past
sessions or recovers the negotiated key in this case: certainly an
active attack is possible knowing a relation!

>
>
> Regards,
>
> Feng
>
>
>
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.tech=
nion.ac.il>
> Date: Wednesday, 27 March 2019 at 02:49
> To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
>
>
>
> Hi Hannes,
>
>
>
> J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both parties store the same password. It is n=
ot suitable for most client-server scenarios where using J-PAKE would mean =
that an attacker that breaks into the server simply steals all plaintext pa=
sswords. OPAQUE is an asymmetric (or augmented) PAKE where user remembers a=
 password (and nothing else, including no public key of the server) while t=
he server stores a one-way image of the password. Security requires that if=
 the server is compromised, the attacker needs to run an offline dictionary=
 attack for each user in the database to find the password.
>
>
>
> If what you need is a symmetric PAKE then there are better candidates tha=
n J-PAKE such as SPAKE2 described in draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08. SPAKE2 is *=
much* more efficient than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and SPAKE2 have proo=
fs of security, SPAKE2 is proven in a stronger security model relative to J=
-PAKE.
>
>
>
> I am not aware of any advantage of J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be miss=
ing something. Maybe the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify these issue=
s further.
>
>
>
> Hugo
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.=
com> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I menti=
oned that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for IoT devic=
e onboarding.
> Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01
>
> The mechanism is described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236
>
> @Nick & Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are conf=
idential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient,=
 please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to a=
ny other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information i=
n any medium. Thank you.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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References: <VI1PR0801MB2112CFD46565F1BC8B3697D8FA5F0@VI1PR0801MB2112.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com> <CADi0yUP+xwWzej7+uvQCaO5xzvJOdwZ-0c-Ot7WF30R25jRxjQ@mail.gmail.com> <WM!3b68eb47588f67d9aaca229cf8c9e30dd2ddb828af3905daaa86a4172d790fff2ad158c5fb15a70a4484183790470a68!@mailhub-mx4.ncl.ac.uk> <6ADEC907-1273-41AF-A964-68E654103645@ncl.ac.uk> <WM!624962044e5b7753628d65d82a819fc287f20b66b28b7326bc1508f7f7d97f90cbf3d0c6dc796efa81e820d8dab51428!@mailhub-mx4.ncl.ac.uk> <CACsn0ckNiC27tbPr_QOboGuvQjsy+ERi2QuydD4pvW0JefnApQ@mail.gmail.com> <WM!c4e3c9f13abc7000dfbbde9eb12c9144d5d8234a17a0174a6949c158c95ffbaf8a2f24ff15a15f8486836962cd47d319!@mailhub-mx5.ncl.ac.uk> <D8C1A660.42B1E%feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
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Hi Watson,

When the attacker knows the relation, besides the active attack, there may
be other things he can exploit. This however is not usually analysed as by
the assumption of the proof, this should never happen.

You=B9re correct that J-PAKE uses Shamir-Fiat heuristics, hence the proof i=
s
in ROM. The key design principle in J-PAKE is based on understanding the
importance of zero-knowledge proof. The use of Shamir-Fiat heuristics to
make ZKP non-interactive is a standard technique in cryptography. In the
field of secure two/multi-party computation, ZKP is almost universally
used in every protocol. However, in the field of PAKE, to my knowledge,
J-PAKE is the only protocol that uses ZKP. On the other hand, if you think
about PAKE, it=B9s fundamentally a two-party secure computation problem on
an equality function (with the side benefit that both sides produce a
common session key when the equality holds).

Cheers,
Feng

On 27/03/2019, 20:08, "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 7:56 PM Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Hugo,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for your comments.
>>
>>
>> Just to clarify the difference between SPAKE2 and J-PAKE - The proof of
>>SPAKE2 depends on the assumption of a trusted setup: the discrete
>>logarithm between the two group generators must be unknown by anyone.
>
>The above is not true: we rely on the common random string model, not
>the common reference model. This matters for below.
>
>>If a powerful adversary (3 letter agency) gathers sufficient resources
>>and time (say 1 year) to break one instance of discrete logarithm, it
>>will be a class attack, breaking all >instances of SPAKE2 without anyone
>>knowing it. By contrast, they can only break one session in J-PAKE,
>>since by design the randomness is refreshed in every session >rather
>>than being built into a static setup. This explain why J-PAKE requires
>>more computation than SPAKE2. Hope it clarifies.
>
>I don't know of a JPAKE proof that doesn't rely on Shamir-Fiat
>heuristic, which implies common random string. Your proof is in the
>ROM no? Also I do not see how one recovers the password from past
>sessions or recovers the negotiated key in this case: certainly an
>active attack is possible knowing a relation!
>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Feng
>>
>>
>>
>> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hugo Krawczyk
>><hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
>> Date: Wednesday, 27 March 2019 at 02:49
>> To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
>> Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] Elliptic Curve J-PAKE
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Hannes,
>>
>>
>>
>> J-PAKE is a symmetric PAKE. Both parties store the same password. It is
>>not suitable for most client-server scenarios where using J-PAKE would
>>mean that an attacker that breaks into the server simply steals all
>>plaintext passwords. OPAQUE is an asymmetric (or augmented) PAKE where
>>user remembers a password (and nothing else, including no public key of
>>the server) while the server stores a one-way image of the password.
>>Security requires that if the server is compromised, the attacker needs
>>to run an offline dictionary attack for each user in the database to
>>find the password.
>>
>>
>>
>> If what you need is a symmetric PAKE then there are better candidates
>>than J-PAKE such as SPAKE2 described in draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08.
>>SPAKE2 is *much* more efficient than J-PAKE and while both J-PAKE and
>>SPAKE2 have proofs of security, SPAKE2 is proven in a stronger security
>>model relative to J-PAKE.
>>
>>
>>
>> I am not aware of any advantage of J-PAKE over SPAKE2 - but I may be
>>missing something. Maybe the PAKE presentation in cfrg will clarify
>>these issues further.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hugo
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:03 PM Hannes Tschofenig
>><Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> in context of the OPAQUE talk by Nick today at the TLS WG meeting I
>>mentioned that the Thread Group has used the Elliptic Curve J-PAKE for
>>IoT device onboarding.
>> Here is the draft written for TLS 1.2:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01
>>
>> The mechanism is described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236
>>
>> @Nick & Richard: Have a look at it and see whether it fits your needs.
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
>>confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
>>recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
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>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
>--=20
>"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
>--Rousseau.


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On Wednesday, 27 March 2019 15:35:21 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> Inspired by a few side discussions and Yoav's new draft, I have the pleas=
ure
> of announcing the first proposal to use that mechanism:
>=20
>  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-tls-sic-00

in the situation when the server or client intend to use an "unpublished"=20
(term not defined in RFC) the behaviour of them is unspecified

what about resumption and renegotiation?

=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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On Wednesday, 27 March 2019 14:42:49 CET Martin Thomson wrote:
> Why not go all in - make this a byte string and start from 0x80 in the fi=
rst
> byte.  When we define the 9th flag, we add another byte.  Then you have up
> to 2040 flags (though it might pay to split the space before that).
>=20
> struct {
>   opaque<1..255> flags;
> } Flags;
>=20
> Otherwise, the first adopter of this pays 10 bytes where they would
> previously have paid 4.  Obviously there is a network effect at the third=
=2E=20
> Since I'm writing a draft that will aim to depend on this, I have a vested
> interest in using this.

this will be the only place with a bit mask in TLS, I have serious doubts=20
about the correctness of code that will handle this stuff
=20
> If you wanted to make it more attractive to me, then maybe porting some of
> the existing flags across might make it more appealing.

what about making sure that the legacy and flags remain in-sync? we will ha=
ve=20
to send the legacy encoding for many years to come, so only thing it would=
=20
possibly reduce the size of is ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions

> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019, at 13:08, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > > On 27 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
> > > wrote:> >=20
> > > On Wed 2019-03-27 10:52:20 +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > >> Right. What about defining a set of extensions (e.g., 2 extensions) =
of
> > >> flags as:
> > >>=20
> > >> struct {
> > >>=20
> > >>  uint64 flags;
> > >>=20
> > >> } Flags;
> > >=20
> > > If we're going to be doing this kind of bit-shaving, this is the way =
to
> > > go, starting with a single CommonFlags extension -- and maybe even a
> > > uint32 or uint16, with the bitfield registry under tight WG control. =
If
> > > we exhaust that space, then we just define a CommonFlags2 extension.
> > >=20
> > > If someone wants an experimental boolean extension to play with, they
> > > can always use an empty extension. They can apply for a bit in
> > > CommonFlags if they find that the compactness is warranted.
> >=20
> > OK. You got me convinced.
> >=20
> > In the spirit of revising quickly and revising often, I=E2=80=99ve uplo=
aded
> > version -01:
> >=20
> > HTML: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-tlsflags
> > DIFF: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-nir-tls-tlsflags-01
> >=20
> > Yoav
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


=2D-=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic
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From: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Comments on draft-stebila-tls-hybrid-design-00
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First of all, I would say that this is excellent work, and I would support =
making this a working group item.

As for my comments (both on the document itself, and my opinions on alterna=
tives that the document lists):


  *   2.1. Negotiation of the use of hybridization in general and component=
 algorithms specifically?

One point that the current doc does not address explicitly are the costs re=
levant to the negotiation method; that is, how do we judge that solution A =
is better than solution B.  From my view point, the (somewhat conflicting) =
goals that the solution should attempt to achieve are:

     *   Simplicity; in terms of ease of implementing it correctly (and har=
d to accidentally get it "almost right"), ease in testing that an implement=
ation is correct (especially, does not accept any proposal outside the secu=
rity policy), and the ease of documenting it clearly in an eventual RFC
     *   Simplicity 2; the hybridization solution should not complicate the=
 protocol in the case that you don't need to do hybridization (even if what=
 you're proposing is a Nextgen algorithm).
     *   Backwards compatibility; we'll need to live with older clients and=
 older servers (which don't implement this extension) for a long time; we n=
eed to ability to either (depending on our security policy) fall back to on=
ly traditional algorithms, or abort the negotiation cleanly.
     *   Performance; being fairly cheap in terms of the messages to be tra=
nsmitted, and the amount of processing required
     *   Completeness; being able to negotiate the most likely security pol=
icies (and in a manner that is consistent with the performance goal)
     *   Extensibility; being able to handle likely future requirements (ne=
w algorithms, etc) without excessive redesign.
These goals are somewhat nebulous (e.g. what are the "most likely security =
policies?  What sorts of future requirements are likely?), however I believ=
e we should write them down.

  *   3.2. How many component algorithms to combine?

My opinion: unless allowing three or more algorithms has significant cost (=
even if we are using only two), I would strongly prefer an alternative that=
 could scale to three or more.  The whole point of this design is that we d=
on't fully trust any one algorithm; I believe that there will be people who=
 would not want to rely on two partially trusted algorithms, but would pref=
er to use three (or possibly more).

  *   3.3.1. (Shares-concat) Concatenate key shares

My concern with this is that there may be algorithms with variable key shar=
e size (I don't know of any right now, but 'extensibility'); if we do this,=
 we would want internal length markers

  *   3.4.2. (Comb-XOR) XOR keys and then KDF

This one makes me nervous.  Yes, for practical key agreement protocols, thi=
s is probably safe; however to prove it, it would appear that you'd have to=
 make additional assumptions on the key agreement protocols.  It would appe=
ar to be safer to use one of the alternatives.  And, if you're concerned wi=
th the extra processing time running the KDF, I expect that the KDF time to=
 be insignificant compared to the time taken by the key agreement protocol.

  *   5.1. Active security

As for whether CPA is good enough, well, one of the overall goals of TLS 1.=
3 is PFS.  If we are negotiating a fresh set of key shares each time, then =
CPA works (the issue with CPA protocols is that an invalid key share will a=
llow the attacker to learn some information about the private key; however =
if we discard the private key each time, the attacker gains no benefit).  O=
n the other hand, a valid concern would be if an implementor decides to opt=
imize the protocol by reusing key shares.  Also, see 'Failures' below for a=
nother argument for CCA.

  *   5.3. Failures

Yes, some postquantum algorithms can fail between two honest parties (with =
probabilities ranging from 2**-40 to 2**-256).  On such a failure, the two =
sides would create distinct session keys, and so the encrypted portions of =
the Server Hello would not decrypt properly, and so there would not be a se=
curity issue here.  Three thoughts:

  1.  small failure probabilities might not happen in practice at all; if w=
e assume 2**39 TLS devices (about 100 for every person), and each device ma=
de an average of 2**30 TLS connections over its lifetime, then we probably =
will never see even one failure anywhere over the lifetime of the protocol =
if we had a security failure probability significantly less than 2**-69
  2.  TCP errors; a similar failure would happen if there was a TCP error t=
ransmitting the key_share (actually, any part of the client or server hello=
); if the key exchange failure rate is significantly smaller than this, we =
have not affected the reliability of the protocol.
  3.  If we do go with only with CCA alternatives, these always have very s=
mall (2**-128 or less) failure rates (because a failure does generally leak=
 some information about the private key, and so designers are forced to sel=
ect parameters with tiny failure rates); with the above two arguments, this=
 would appear to make it clear that failures are never a concern with CCA a=
lgorithms.

  *   Another comment that came up with the corresponding IPsec proposal; d=
o we want to support key agreement algorithms with extremely long key share=
s (motivator: Classical McEliece and NTS; they're the most generally truste=
d postquantum algorithms, but with public keys that range from 300k to 1.4M=
eg)?  If we do decide to support them, how do we do so?  URL and hash?  I'm=
 personally OK with us deciding not to support them; I'm just raising the q=
uestion.






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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">First of all, I would say that this is excellent wor=
k, and I would support making this a working group item.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As for my comments (both on the document itself, and=
 my opinions on alternatives that the document lists):<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">2.1. Negotiation of the use of hybridization in general and component=
 algorithms specifically?<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">One point that the current doc does not addre=
ss explicitly are the costs relevant to the negotiation method; that is, ho=
w do we judge that solution A is better than solution B.&nbsp; From my view=
 point, the (somewhat conflicting) goals
 that the solution should attempt to achieve are:<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"circle">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 =
lfo1">Simplicity; in terms of ease of implementing it correctly (and hard t=
o accidentally get it &#8220;almost right&#8221;), ease in testing that an =
implementation is correct (especially, does not
 accept any proposal outside the security policy), and the ease of document=
ing it clearly in an eventual RFC<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagr=
aph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Simplicity 2; the hy=
bridization solution should not complicate the protocol in the case that yo=
u don&#8217;t need to do hybridization (even if what you&#8217;re proposing=
 is a Nextgen algorithm).<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" sty=
le=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Backwards compatibility; we&=
#8217;ll need to live with older clients and older servers (which don&#8217=
;t implement this extension) for a long time; we need to ability to either =
(depending on
 our security policy) fall back to only traditional algorithms, or abort th=
e negotiation cleanly.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=
=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Performance; being fairly chea=
p in terms of the messages to be transmitted, and the amount of processing =
required<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left=
:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Completeness; being able to negotiate the mos=
t likely security policies (and in a manner that is consistent with the per=
formance goal)<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margi=
n-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Extensibility; being able to handle lik=
ely future requirements (new algorithms, etc) without excessive redesign.<o=
:p></o:p></li></ul>
</ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">These goals are somewhat =
nebulous (e.g. what are the &#8220;most likely security policies?&nbsp; Wha=
t sorts of future requirements are likely?), however I believe we should wr=
ite them down.<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">3.2. How many component algorithms to combine?<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">My opinion: unless allowing three or more alg=
orithms has significant cost (even if we are using only two), I would stron=
gly prefer an alternative that could scale to three or more.&nbsp; The whol=
e point of this design is that we don&#8217;t
 fully trust any one algorithm; I believe that there will be people who wou=
ld not want to rely on two partially trusted algorithms, but would prefer t=
o use three (or possibly more).<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">3.3.1. (Shares-concat) Concatenate key shares<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">My concern with this is that there may be alg=
orithms with variable key share size (I don&#8217;t know of any right now, =
but &#8216;extensibility&#8217;); if we do this, we would want internal len=
gth markers<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">3.4.2. (Comb-XOR) XOR keys and then KDF<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">This one makes me nervous.&nbsp; Yes, for pra=
ctical key agreement protocols, this is probably safe; however to prove it,=
 it would appear that you&#8217;d have to make additional assumptions on th=
e key agreement protocols.&nbsp; It would appear to
 be safer to use one of the alternatives.&nbsp; And, if you&#8217;re concer=
ned with the extra processing time running the KDF, I expect that the KDF t=
ime to be insignificant compared to the time taken by the key agreement pro=
tocol.<o:p></o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">5.1. Active security<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">As for whether CPA is good enough, well, one =
of the overall goals of TLS 1.3 is PFS.&nbsp; If we are negotiating a fresh=
 set of key shares each time, then CPA works (the issue with CPA protocols =
is that an invalid key share will allow
 the attacker to learn some information about the private key; however if w=
e discard the private key each time, the attacker gains no benefit).&nbsp; =
On the other hand, a valid concern would be if an implementor decides to op=
timize the protocol by reusing key shares.&nbsp;
 Also, see &#8216;Failures&#8217; below for another argument for CCA.<o:p><=
/o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">5.3. Failures<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">Yes, some postquantum algorithms can fail bet=
ween two honest parties (with probabilities ranging from 2**-40 to 2**-256)=
.&nbsp; On such a failure, the two sides would create distinct session keys=
, and so the encrypted portions of the
 Server Hello would not decrypt properly, and so there would not be a secur=
ity issue here.&nbsp; Three thoughts:<o:p></o:p></p>
<ol style=3D"margin-top:0in" start=3D"1" type=3D"1">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:.75in;mso-list:l1 level=
1 lfo2">small failure probabilities might not happen in practice at all; if=
 we assume 2**39 TLS devices (about 100 for every person), and each device =
made an average of 2**30 TLS connections
 over its lifetime, then we probably will never see even one failure anywhe=
re over the lifetime of the protocol if we had a security failure probabili=
ty significantly less than 2**-69
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:.75in;m=
so-list:l1 level1 lfo2">TCP errors; a similar failure would happen if there=
 was a TCP error transmitting the key_share (actually, any part of the clie=
nt or server hello); if the key exchange failure rate
 is significantly smaller than this, we have not affected the reliability o=
f the protocol.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"marg=
in-left:.75in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2">If we do go with only with CCA alter=
natives, these always have very small (2**-128 or less) failure rates (beca=
use a failure does generally leak some information about the private
 key, and so designers are forced to select parameters with tiny failure ra=
tes); with the above two arguments, this would appear to make it clear that=
 failures are never a concern with CCA algorithms.<o:p></o:p></li></ol>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">Another comment that came up with the corresponding IPsec proposal; d=
o we want to support key agreement algorithms with extremely long key share=
s (motivator: Classical McEliece and
 NTS; they&#8217;re the most generally trusted postquantum algorithms, but =
with public keys that range from 300k to 1.4Meg)?&nbsp; If we do decide to =
support them, how do we do so?&nbsp; URL and hash?&nbsp; I&#8217;m personal=
ly OK with us deciding not to support them; I&#8217;m just raising
 the question.<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_6045f6ad22fa407097e9282446386eb1XCHRTP006ciscocom_--


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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 21:37:14 +0200
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watson@cloudflare.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] kc2kdm.com should be live with delegated credentials -03
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On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:56:10AM +0100, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Nick mentioned at the WG meeting today we were having some hiccups.
> These hiccups have been fixed and we have a delegated credential.
> Please let us know the results. Note the cert has an extra 05 00 in
> the extension.

What TLS extension codepoint is used by this test server (trying to
test my own client implementation)? Reading BoringSSL source suggests
0xff02, but sending empty 0xff02 extension (request) seems to have no
effect.

Debug trace shows that the extension is sent in ClientHello, but
server does not seem to send it back (the TLS 1.3 handshake completes
with no errors, and certificate does have DelegationUsage).


-Ilari


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 01:22:36 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] kc2kdm.com should be live with delegated credentials -03
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On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 8:38 PM Ilari Liusvaara
<ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:56:10AM +0100, Watson Ladd wrote:
> > Nick mentioned at the WG meeting today we were having some hiccups.
> > These hiccups have been fixed and we have a delegated credential.
> > Please let us know the results. Note the cert has an extra 05 00 in
> > the extension.
>
> What TLS extension codepoint is used by this test server (trying to
> test my own client implementation)? Reading BoringSSL source suggests
> 0xff02, but sending empty 0xff02 extension (request) seems to have no
> effect.
>
> Debug trace shows that the extension is sent in ClientHello, but
> server does not seem to send it back (the TLS 1.3 handshake completes
> with no errors, and certificate does have DelegationUsage).

Unfortunately there was another hiccup due to a misconfiguration.
We'll fix it and let you know when it is fixed.

>
>
> -Ilari
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



-- 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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To: "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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On Thu, Mar 28, 2019, at 14:54, Hubert Kario wrote:
> what about making sure that the legacy and flags remain in-sync? we will have 
> to send the legacy encoding for many years to come, so only thing it would 
> possibly reduce the size of is ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions

Those are messages where we have size pressure.


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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 05:24:44 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A use of flags
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On Thu, Mar 28, 2019, at 14:46, Hubert Kario wrote:
> what about resumption and renegotiation?

No certificates in resumption.

No resumption in TLS 1.3 (and I don't care about TLS 1.2 any more).


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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] A use of flags
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-RgJ50ZsL-cwiuQKsB3Bapikkww>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A use of flags
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> No resumption in TLS 1.3...
You probably mean no renegotiation in TLS 1.3.

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Martin Thomson
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2019 10:25 AM
To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>; tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] A use of flags

On Thu, Mar 28, 2019, at 14:46, Hubert Kario wrote:
> what about resumption and renegotiation?

No certificates in resumption.

No resumption in TLS 1.3 (and I don't care about TLS 1.2 any more).

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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
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Thread-Topic: Comment on draft-thomson-tls-sic-00
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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 09:56:48 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Andrei Popov" <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A use of flags
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On Fri, Mar 29, 2019, at 11:18, Andrei Popov wrote:
> > No resumption in TLS 1.3...
> You probably mean no renegotiation in TLS 1.3.

Of course, thank you.  Not nearly enough sleep this week.


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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 11:28:54 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
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On Thu, Mar 28, 2019, at 16:58, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:
>  * 3.3.1. (Shares-concat) Concatenate key shares
> My concern with this is that there may be algorithms with variable key=
=20
> share size (I don=E2=80=99t know of any right now, but =E2=80=98extens=
ibility=E2=80=99); if we=20
> do this, we would want internal length markers

Anything injective should work.

>  * 3.4.2. (Comb-XOR) XOR keys and then KDF
> This one makes me nervous.=20

Me too.


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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Comment on draft-thomson-tls-sic-00
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hPkYKGIEM1eEB4TIQa24s5i9Fvk>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Comment on draft-thomson-tls-sic-00
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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 15:30:40 -0400
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/9wxZU1MQ0H7zX8vpACKx33Rs8zI>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A flags extension
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In addition to this, the document would seem to allow a server to set bit k if the client did not set that bit. (Or more generally, the responder can set bits the initiator did not set. )

In fitting with the TLS model, I would recommend allowing a responder to set only bits that the initiator sets. Other bits being set would be an error. 

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019, at 19:59, John Mattsson wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> The document only talks about use in ClientHello, ServerHello, and 
> EncryptedExtensions. I think it should also discuss usage in 
> CertificateRequest, Certificate from the server, and Certificate from 
> the client. It should likely be left to the document that specifies a 
> specific feature to determine where it can be used. 
> draft-thomson-tls-sic-00 uses the tls_flags extension in 
> CertificateRequest.
> 
> Cheers,
> John
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 17:44:07 -0400
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To: Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] More issues with current ESNIKEYS DNS approach
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--000000000000b0a62305854292f6
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Following the discussion this week I realized some other major issues we'll
need to make sure we cover:

1) Handling proxies here is going to be tricky.  The CONNECT generally
needs to specify the hostname which needs to go to the server which has the
ESNI key for what gets sent in the TLS handshake.  IPs don't come into play
here at all.  The only thing I can think of for handling this is to pass
the canonical name to the CONNECT when using a proxy, and making sure that
the canonical name is specific to a CDN.   There may be some related issues
in non-proxy environments.

2) The extension model breaks down if not all CDNs send it as mandatory.
In the hallway, Chris suggested we could require at least one extension be
manditory in any ESNIKey record in DNS.  There could be a bunch of similar
corner cases.  This issue also applies to switching off of using ESNIKeys
(eg, if there had been no extension included).

3) Trusting A and AAAA records from the EDNSKeys is going to break
environments relying on /etc/resolv.conf for spoofing to staging or other
testing environments.  (Services and Support staff will likely be unhappy
as they do this all the time.)

On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 9:08 PM Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
wrote:

> >> i'd also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges
> >> are really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive.
>

At least for one CDN, there are tens to hundreds of possible A/AAAA records
that could be used in a given cluster, and then many thousands of
clusters.  Especially on IPv4 this space is not dense as some comes from
local provider space.  (The net result for each is far more IPv4 and IPv6
addresses than can be enumerated reasonably.)

Some additional minor issues we'll want to address or specify, regardless,
if we take this path:

* We'll want to make sure to specify that clients must round-robin or
permute the A and AAAA records included in the address list.  Typically
most recursive and/or stub resolvers handle this, but since it's all in one
RR and not an RRSET it will be on clients to do this properly.

* We may wish to provide guidance on how to handle A vs AAAA (eg, reference
RFC 8305).  One thing that clients may lose out on is support features
provided by the OS, such as those which sort results based on past
knowledge about RTT and the like.

I'm increasingly thinking that while we may wish to define a
general-purpose ESNIKEY record for use by generic applications, we may wish
to define application-protocol specific use-cases and bindings for some of
the most persnickety applications.  For example, an HTTP-specific "HTTPS"
record that combined ALTSVC, ESNIKEY, and "ANAME" style information may
solve a bunch of these issues together.  I've been talking to some folks
and am tempted to try writing up a draft on this.  (Mail might be another
case that will just want its own binding...)

       Erik

--000000000000b0a62305854292f6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr"><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif" class=
=3D"gmail_default">Following the discussion this week I realized some other=
 major issues we&#39;ll need to make sure we cover:</div><div style=3D"font=
-family:tahoma,sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div style=3D"=
font-family:tahoma,sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default">1) Handling proxies =
here is going to be tricky.=C2=A0 The CONNECT generally needs to specify th=
e hostname which needs to go to the server which has the ESNI key for what =
gets sent in the TLS handshake.=C2=A0 IPs don&#39;t come into play here at =
all.=C2=A0 The only thing I can think of for handling this is to pass the c=
anonical name to the CONNECT when using a proxy, and making sure that the c=
anonical name is specific to a CDN.=C2=A0=C2=A0 There may be some related i=
ssues in non-proxy environments.<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,=
sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tah=
oma,sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default">2) The extension model breaks down =
if not all CDNs send it as mandatory.=C2=A0 In the hallway, Chris suggested=
 we could require at least one extension be manditory in any ESNIKey record=
 in DNS.=C2=A0 There could be a bunch of similar corner cases.=C2=A0 This i=
ssue also applies to switching off of using ESNIKeys (eg, if there had been=
 no extension included).<br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-ser=
if" class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans=
-serif" class=3D"gmail_default">3) Trusting A and AAAA records from the EDN=
SKeys is going to break environments relying on /etc/resolv.conf for spoofi=
ng to staging or other testing environments.=C2=A0 (Services and Support st=
aff will likely be unhappy as they do this all the time.)<br></div></div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gma=
il_attr">On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 9:08 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:christopherwood07@gmail.com">christopherwood07@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt;&gt; i&#39;=
d also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges <br>
&gt;&gt; are really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive=
.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-seri=
f" class=3D"gmail_default">At least for one CDN, there are tens to hundreds=
 of possible A/AAAA records that could be used in a given cluster, and then=
 many thousands of clusters.=C2=A0 Especially on IPv4 this space is not den=
se as some comes from local provider space.=C2=A0 (The net result for each =
is far more IPv4 and IPv6 addresses than can be enumerated reasonably.)<br>=
</div><div><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif" class=3D"=
gmail_default">Some additional minor issues we&#39;ll want to address or sp=
ecify, regardless, if we take this path:</div><div style=3D"font-family:tah=
oma,sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family=
:tahoma,sans-serif" class=3D"gmail_default"><div class=3D"gmail_attr">* We&=
#39;ll want to make sure to specify that clients must round-robin or permut=
e the A and AAAA records included in the address list.=C2=A0 Typically most=
 recursive and/or stub resolvers handle this, but since it&#39;s all in one=
 RR and not an RRSET it will be on clients to do this properly.<br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">* W=
e may wish to provide guidance on how to handle A vs AAAA (eg, reference RF=
C 8305).=C2=A0 One thing that clients may lose out on is support features p=
rovided by the OS, such as those which sort results based on past knowledge=
 about RTT and the like.</div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_attr">I&#39;m increasingly thinking that while we ma=
y wish to define a general-purpose ESNIKEY record for use by generic applic=
ations, we may wish to define application-protocol specific use-cases and b=
indings for some of the most persnickety applications.=C2=A0 For example, a=
n HTTP-specific &quot;HTTPS&quot; record that combined ALTSVC, ESNIKEY, and=
 &quot;ANAME&quot; style information may solve a bunch of these issues toge=
ther.=C2=A0 I&#39;ve been talking to some folks and am tempted to try writi=
ng up a draft on this.=C2=A0 (Mail might be another case that will just wan=
t its own binding...)<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_attr">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Erik</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_attr"><br></div></div></div></div></div>

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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04.txt
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04.txt
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Subject: Re: [TLS] More issues with current ESNIKEYS DNS approach
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>,
 Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org, Nick Sullivan <nick=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Message-ID: <93e145e9-2376-0520-e837-e70fdc729b17@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] More issues with current ESNIKEYS DNS approach
References: <CAO8oSX=sPoLo78oX4qEEyeuck7CxM_uAqYPHEsY7BuYqBUaorg@mail.gmail.com>
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Hiya,

On 29/03/2019 21:44, Erik Nygren wrote:
> Following the discussion this week I realized some other major issues w=
e'll
> need to make sure we cover:
>=20
> 1) Handling proxies here is going to be tricky.  The CONNECTi generally=

> needs to specify the hostname which needs to go to the server which has=
 the
> ESNI key for what gets sent in the TLS handshake.  IPs don't come into =
play
> here at all.  The only thing I can think of for handling this is to pas=
s
> the canonical name to the CONNECT when using a proxy, and making sure t=
hat
> the canonical name is specific to a CDN.   There may be some related is=
sues
> in non-proxy environments.

What do you mean by "canonical name"? (I wish we had a canonical set
of definitions for the names involved in ESNI! Maybe I'll try craft
some if nobody else has...)

> 2) The extension model breaks down if not all CDNs send it as mandatory=
=2E
> In the hallway, Chris suggested we could require at least one extension=
 be
> manditory in any ESNIKey record in DNS.  There could be a bunch of simi=
lar
> corner cases.  This issue also applies to switching off of using ESNIKe=
ys
> (eg, if there had been no extension included).

IMO there should be no extensions defined or needed for ESNIKeys - we
have the RRTYPE and internal version number which should be enough.

> 3) Trusting A and AAAA records from the EDNSKeys is going to break
> environments relying on /etc/resolv.conf for spoofing to staging or oth=
er
> testing environments.  (Services and Support staff will likely be unhap=
py
> as they do this all the time.)

That kind of thing and your points about the number of addresses
involved make me wonder if #136 is really a viable approach.

I'm generally not sure if the problem motivating #136 will turn
out to be as bad as feared, esp. if the same DoH/DoT session can
be used for the ESNIKeys and A/AAAA queries (though I'm also not
sure if browsers could easily ensure that.) I guess maybe more
testing may tell us more as DoH/DoT get better deployed.

S.

>=20
> On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 9:08 PM Christopher Wood <christopherwood07@gmai=
l.com>
> wrote:
>=20
>>>> i'd also like to hear from CDNs about whether their address ranges
>>>> are really small enough to not make the list of ranges prohobitive.
>>
>=20
> At least for one CDN, there are tens to hundreds of possible A/AAAA rec=
ords
> that could be used in a given cluster, and then many thousands of
> clusters.  Especially on IPv4 this space is not dense as some comes fro=
m
> local provider space.  (The net result for each is far more IPv4 and IP=
v6
> addresses than can be enumerated reasonably.)
>=20
> Some additional minor issues we'll want to address or specify, regardle=
ss,
> if we take this path:
>=20
> * We'll want to make sure to specify that clients must round-robin or
> permute the A and AAAA records included in the address list.  Typically=

> most recursive and/or stub resolvers handle this, but since it's all in=
 one
> RR and not an RRSET it will be on clients to do this properly.
>=20
> * We may wish to provide guidance on how to handle A vs AAAA (eg, refer=
ence
> RFC 8305).  One thing that clients may lose out on is support features
> provided by the OS, such as those which sort results based on past
> knowledge about RTT and the like.
>=20
> I'm increasingly thinking that while we may wish to define a
> general-purpose ESNIKEY record for use by generic applications, we may =
wish
> to define application-protocol specific use-cases and bindings for some=
 of
> the most persnickety applications.  For example, an HTTP-specific "HTTP=
S"
> record that combined ALTSVC, ESNIKEY, and "ANAME" style information may=

> solve a bunch of these issues together.  I've been talking to some folk=
s
> and am tempted to try writing up a draft on this.  (Mail might be anoth=
er
> case that will just want its own binding...)
>=20
>        Erik
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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I think I only allow the server to set bits that had been set by the =
client.

   A server that supports this extension and also supports at least one
   of the flag-type features that use this extension and that were
   declared by the ClientHello extension SHALL send this extension with
   the intersection of the flags it supports with the flags declared by
   the client.


> On 29 Mar 2019, at 22:30, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
>=20
> In addition to this, the document would seem to allow a server to set =
bit k if the client did not set that bit. (Or more generally, the =
responder can set bits the initiator did not set. )
>=20
> In fitting with the TLS model, I would recommend allowing a responder =
to set only bits that the initiator sets. Other bits being set would be =
an error.=20
>=20
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2019, at 19:59, John Mattsson wrote:
>> Hi,
>>=20
>> The document only talks about use in ClientHello, ServerHello, and=20
>> EncryptedExtensions. I think it should also discuss usage in=20
>> CertificateRequest, Certificate from the server, and Certificate from=20=

>> the client. It should likely be left to the document that specifies a=20=

>> specific feature to determine where it can be used.=20
>> draft-thomson-tls-sic-00 uses the tls_flags extension in=20
>> CertificateRequest.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> John
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


--Apple-Mail=_3E762E1B-114F-434B-8883-F5B8FFBDD75A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I =
think I only allow the server to set bits that had been set by the =
client.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><pre =
class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">   A server that supports this extension and also =
supports at least one
   of the flag-type features that use this extension and that were
   declared by the ClientHello extension SHALL send this extension with
   the intersection of the flags it supports with the flags declared by
   the client.</pre><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 29 =
Mar 2019, at 22:30, Martin Thomson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mt@lowentropy.net" class=3D"">mt@lowentropy.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">In addition to this, the document would seem to allow a =
server to set bit k if the client did not set that bit. (Or more =
generally, the responder can set bits the initiator did not set. )<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">In fitting with the TLS model, I would =
recommend allowing a responder to set only bits that the initiator sets. =
Other bits being set would be an error. <br class=3D""><br class=3D"">On =
Fri, Mar 29, 2019, at 19:59, John Mattsson wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Hi,<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">The document only talks about use in ClientHello, =
ServerHello, and <br class=3D"">EncryptedExtensions. I think it should =
also discuss usage in <br class=3D"">CertificateRequest, Certificate =
from the server, and Certificate from <br class=3D"">the client. It =
should likely be left to the document that specifies a <br =
class=3D"">specific feature to determine where it can be used. <br =
class=3D"">draft-thomson-tls-sic-00 uses the tls_flags extension in <br =
class=3D"">CertificateRequest.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Cheers,<br =
class=3D"">John<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 20:38:47 +0800
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Subject: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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Hi,

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
============
7.1.  Key Schedule

   The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
   HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
   functions defined below:

       HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
            HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)

       Where HkdfLabel is specified as:

       struct {
           uint16 length = Length;
           opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label;
           opaque context<0..255> = Context;
       } HkdfLabel;
============

In this struct, what is the value of label<0..6>?

with regards,
Saravanan


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 08:38:47PM +0800, M K Saravanan wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
> ============
> 7.1.  Key Schedule
> 
>    The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
>    HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
>    functions defined below:
> 
>        HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
>             HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
> 
>        Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
> 
>        struct {
>            uint16 length = Length;
>            opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label;
>            opaque context<0..255> = Context;
>        } HkdfLabel;
> ============
> 
> In this struct, what is the value of label<0..6>?

The syntax "opaque label<7..255>" means that label is octet string of
at least 7 and at most 255 octets, and that its length is encoded using
1 octet. The string "tls13 " is 6 octets long, so that impiles that
Label is at least 1 octet and at most 249 octets long.

So for example if Label is "s hs traffic", then the label (including
the length field) is:

\x12 "tls13 s hs traffic"

The \x12 is the octet with value 18 (which happens to be ASCII DC2)
because the remainder is 18 octets.

And as another example if Label is "c e traffic", then the label
(again including length field is: 

\x11 "tls13 c e traffic"

The \x11 is the octet with value 17 (which happens to be ASCII DC1)
because the remainder is 17 octets.


In the first case, if the ciphersuite has SHA-256 hash, then the
whole HkdfLabel looks like the following (in hex):

00 20					#32 octets of output (2 octets)
12					#18 octets label length (1 octet)
"tls13 s hs traffic"			#The actual label (18 octets)
20					#32 octet transcript input (1 octet).
hash(client_hello+server_hello)		#Transcript (32 octets).

In total, this is 54 bytes (64 bytes after adding HKDF and SHA-256
internal overhead). There is only one output block, and the input
fits into one block so evaluating the HKDF-Expand takes 4 SHA-256
block operations.


The one ciphersuite using SHA-384 would instead give (in hex):

00 30					#48 octets of output (2 octets)
12					#18 octets label length (1 octet)
"tls13 s hs traffic"			#The actual label (18 octets)
30					#48 octet transcript input (1 octet).
hash(client_hello+server_hello)		#Transcript (48 octets).

In total, 70 bytes. Again, only one output block and only one input
block, so evaluation takes 4 SHA-384 block operations.



-Ilari


From nobody Sun Mar 31 10:49:00 2019
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:48:53 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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A naive question: is HKDF implemented placing secret in the "salt" argument,=
 and label in the "key" argument, as NIST 800-56B says? Or putting label int=
o "salt" and secret into "key"?

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On Mar 31, 2019, at 09:46, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrot=
e:
>=20
>> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 08:38:47PM +0800, M K Saravanan wrote:
>> Hi,
>>=20
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>> 7.1.  Key Schedule
>>=20
>>   The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
>>   HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
>>   functions defined below:
>>=20
>>       HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =3D
>>            HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
>>=20
>>       Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
>>=20
>>       struct {
>>           uint16 length =3D Length;
>>           opaque label<7..255> =3D "tls13 " + Label;
>>           opaque context<0..255> =3D Context;
>>       } HkdfLabel;
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> In this struct, what is the value of label<0..6>?
>=20
> The syntax "opaque label<7..255>" means that label is octet string of
> at least 7 and at most 255 octets, and that its length is encoded using
> 1 octet. The string "tls13 " is 6 octets long, so that impiles that
> Label is at least 1 octet and at most 249 octets long.
>=20
> So for example if Label is "s hs traffic", then the label (including
> the length field) is:
>=20
> \x12 "tls13 s hs traffic"
>=20
> The \x12 is the octet with value 18 (which happens to be ASCII DC2)
> because the remainder is 18 octets.
>=20
> And as another example if Label is "c e traffic", then the label
> (again including length field is:=20
>=20
> \x11 "tls13 c e traffic"
>=20
> The \x11 is the octet with value 17 (which happens to be ASCII DC1)
> because the remainder is 17 octets.
>=20
>=20
> In the first case, if the ciphersuite has SHA-256 hash, then the
> whole HkdfLabel looks like the following (in hex):
>=20
> 00 20                    #32 octets of output (2 octets)
> 12                    #18 octets label length (1 octet)
> "tls13 s hs traffic"            #The actual label (18 octets)
> 20                    #32 octet transcript input (1 octet).
> hash(client_hello+server_hello)        #Transcript (32 octets).
>=20
> In total, this is 54 bytes (64 bytes after adding HKDF and SHA-256
> internal overhead). There is only one output block, and the input
> fits into one block so evaluating the HKDF-Expand takes 4 SHA-256
> block operations.
>=20
>=20
> The one ciphersuite using SHA-384 would instead give (in hex):
>=20
> 00 30                    #48 octets of output (2 octets)
> 12                    #18 octets label length (1 octet)
> "tls13 s hs traffic"            #The actual label (18 octets)
> 30                    #48 octet transcript input (1 octet).
> hash(client_hello+server_hello)        #Transcript (48 octets).
>=20
> In total, 70 bytes. Again, only one output block and only one input
> block, so evaluation takes 4 SHA-384 block operations.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -Ilari
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 07:40:48 +0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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On Sun, 31 Mar 2019 at 21:46, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> The syntax "opaque label<7..255>" means that label is octet string of
> at least 7 and at most 255 octets, and that its length is encoded using
> 1 octet. The string "tls13 " is 6 octets long, so that impiles that
> Label is at least 1 octet and at most 249 octets long.
[...]

Thank you so much for the detailed clarification with examples.

with regards,
Saravanan


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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 22:37:43 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 HkdfLabel - value of label<0..6> ?
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--0000000000003a364305856ee920
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What Illari describes is in accordance to TLS 1.3, which uses HKDF-Expand
correctly (as defined in RFC 5869 and the related extract-then-expand
scheme from
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr1.pdf,
Fig 1 in pg 18).
That is, it uses the "secret" as a key to HMAC (where secret is derived, in
most cases, from the preceding HKDF-Extract step, not shown in Illari
description) and the label as replacing the message input in HMAC.

The salt, to which you allude, is used in HKDF-Extract that applies HMAC
with the HMAC key replaced by a random salt if available and zero salt
otherwise, and with the keying material as the input, i.e., replacing the
message in HMAC. No label or other information is concatenated to the
keying  material,

Hugo

On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 1:49 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> A naive question: is HKDF implemented placing secret in the "salt"
> argument, and label in the "key" argument, as NIST 800-56B says? Or putting
> label into "salt" and secret into "key"?
>
> Regards,
> Uri
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> > On Mar 31, 2019, at 09:46, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 08:38:47PM +0800, M K Saravanan wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
> >> ============
> >> 7.1.  Key Schedule
> >>
> >>   The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and
> >>   HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the
> >>   functions defined below:
> >>
> >>       HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
> >>            HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
> >>
> >>       Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
> >>
> >>       struct {
> >>           uint16 length = Length;
> >>           opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label;
> >>           opaque context<0..255> = Context;
> >>       } HkdfLabel;
> >> ============
> >>
> >> In this struct, what is the value of label<0..6>?
> >
> > The syntax "opaque label<7..255>" means that label is octet string of
> > at least 7 and at most 255 octets, and that its length is encoded using
> > 1 octet. The string "tls13 " is 6 octets long, so that impiles that
> > Label is at least 1 octet and at most 249 octets long.
> >
> > So for example if Label is "s hs traffic", then the label (including
> > the length field) is:
> >
> > \x12 "tls13 s hs traffic"
> >
> > The \x12 is the octet with value 18 (which happens to be ASCII DC2)
> > because the remainder is 18 octets.
> >
> > And as another example if Label is "c e traffic", then the label
> > (again including length field is:
> >
> > \x11 "tls13 c e traffic"
> >
> > The \x11 is the octet with value 17 (which happens to be ASCII DC1)
> > because the remainder is 17 octets.
> >
> >
> > In the first case, if the ciphersuite has SHA-256 hash, then the
> > whole HkdfLabel looks like the following (in hex):
> >
> > 00 20                    #32 octets of output (2 octets)
> > 12                    #18 octets label length (1 octet)
> > "tls13 s hs traffic"            #The actual label (18 octets)
> > 20                    #32 octet transcript input (1 octet).
> > hash(client_hello+server_hello)        #Transcript (32 octets).
> >
> > In total, this is 54 bytes (64 bytes after adding HKDF and SHA-256
> > internal overhead). There is only one output block, and the input
> > fits into one block so evaluating the HKDF-Expand takes 4 SHA-256
> > block operations.
> >
> >
> > The one ciphersuite using SHA-384 would instead give (in hex):
> >
> > 00 30                    #48 octets of output (2 octets)
> > 12                    #18 octets label length (1 octet)
> > "tls13 s hs traffic"            #The actual label (18 octets)
> > 30                    #48 octet transcript input (1 octet).
> > hash(client_hello+server_hello)        #Transcript (48 octets).
> >
> > In total, 70 bytes. Again, only one output block and only one input
> > block, so evaluation takes 4 SHA-384 block operations.
> >
> >
> >
> > -Ilari
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000003a364305856ee920
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">What Illari describes =
is in accordance to TLS 1.3, which uses HKDF-Expand correctly (as defined i=
n RFC 5869 and the related extract-then-expand scheme from <a href=3D"https=
://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr1.pdf" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.S=
P.800-56Cr1.pdf</a>, Fig 1 in pg 18).</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" sty=
le=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">That is, it u=
ses the &quot;secret&quot; as a key to HMAC (where secret is derived, in mo=
st cases, from the preceding HKDF-Extract step, not shown in Illari descrip=
tion) and the label as replacing the message input in HMAC.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,=
helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">The salt, to which you allude, is use=
d in HKDF-Extract that applies HMAC with the HMAC key replaced by a random =
salt if available and zero salt otherwise, and with the keying material as =
the input, i.e., replacing the message in HMAC. No label or other informati=
on is concatenated to the keying=C2=A0 material,</div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,s=
ans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo</div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 1:49 PM =
Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=
=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">A naive question: is HKDF implemented placing sec=
ret in the &quot;salt&quot; argument, and label in the &quot;key&quot; argu=
ment, as NIST 800-56B says? Or putting label into &quot;salt&quot; and secr=
et into &quot;key&quot;?<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Uri<br>
<br>
Sent from my iPhone<br>
<br>
&gt; On Mar 31, 2019, at 09:46, Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilari=
liusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 08:38:47PM +0800, M K Saravanan wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446</a><br>
&gt;&gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
&gt;&gt; 7.1.=C2=A0 Key Schedule<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extra=
ct and<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], a=
s well as the<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0functions defined below:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context=
, Length) =3D<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfL=
abel, Length)<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Where HkdfLabel is specified as:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0struct {<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 length =3D Length;<=
br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque label&lt;7..255&gt;=
 =3D &quot;tls13 &quot; + Label;<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque context&lt;0..255&g=
t; =3D Context;<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} HkdfLabel;<br>
&gt;&gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; In this struct, what is the value of label&lt;0..6&gt;?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The syntax &quot;opaque label&lt;7..255&gt;&quot; means that label is =
octet string of<br>
&gt; at least 7 and at most 255 octets, and that its length is encoded usin=
g<br>
&gt; 1 octet. The string &quot;tls13 &quot; is 6 octets long, so that impil=
es that<br>
&gt; Label is at least 1 octet and at most 249 octets long.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So for example if Label is &quot;s hs traffic&quot;, then the label (i=
ncluding<br>
&gt; the length field) is:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; \x12 &quot;tls13 s hs traffic&quot;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The \x12 is the octet with value 18 (which happens to be ASCII DC2)<br=
>
&gt; because the remainder is 18 octets.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; And as another example if Label is &quot;c e traffic&quot;, then the l=
abel<br>
&gt; (again including length field is: <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; \x11 &quot;tls13 c e traffic&quot;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The \x11 is the octet with value 17 (which happens to be ASCII DC1)<br=
>
&gt; because the remainder is 17 octets.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In the first case, if the ciphersuite has SHA-256 hash, then the<br>
&gt; whole HkdfLabel looks like the following (in hex):<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 00 20=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 #32 octets of output (2 octets)<br>
&gt; 12=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #18 octets label length (1 octet)<br>
&gt; &quot;tls13 s hs traffic&quot;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #The actual label (18 octets)<br>
&gt; 20=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #32 octet transcript input (1 octet).<br>
&gt; hash(client_hello+server_hello)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 #Transcript=
 (32 octets).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In total, this is 54 bytes (64 bytes after adding HKDF and SHA-256<br>
&gt; internal overhead). There is only one output block, and the input<br>
&gt; fits into one block so evaluating the HKDF-Expand takes 4 SHA-256<br>
&gt; block operations.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The one ciphersuite using SHA-384 would instead give (in hex):<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 00 30=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 #48 octets of output (2 octets)<br>
&gt; 12=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #18 octets label length (1 octet)<br>
&gt; &quot;tls13 s hs traffic&quot;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #The actual label (18 octets)<br>
&gt; 30=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 #48 octet transcript input (1 octet).<br>
&gt; hash(client_hello+server_hello)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 #Transcript=
 (48 octets).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In total, 70 bytes. Again, only one output block and only one input<br=
>
&gt; block, so evaluation takes 4 SHA-384 block operations.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -Ilari<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
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</blockquote></div>

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