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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 11:34:55 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6120)
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Hi,

In what way is the old writing ambiguous? The semantics of that text is
correct. If someone wants to run the TLS protocol on paper as
"transport", it would still maintain the same guarantees. And "paper" is
arguably not a transport protocol or "stream delivery service".

I suggest to reject this change.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:05:04AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6120
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 1
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> the underlying transport is a reliable, in-order data stream
> 
> 
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> the underlying transport layer is a reliable, in-order stream delivery service
> 
> or
> 
> the underlying transport protocol is a reliable, in-order stream delivery service
> 
> or similar
> 
> Notes
> -----
> Similar elsewhere
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/4aSF91Rlri0RuVzE3j0rXTe43L0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation
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> > (*): Even if we optimize the CID away with cTLS the question about the
> > security implications will surface again.

> I think that cTLS is the answer to the size issue.  But there, the rule t=
ends to be that removing from the wire doesn't also remove from the canonic=
al value that is processed by the stack, so we > might be able to send with=
out a CID, but re-insert the value before processing.  As the canonical for=
m, DTLS always including the value seems fine to me.

On: "the rule tends to be that removing from the wire doesn't also remove f=
rom the canonical value that is processed by the stack"

I fully agree, and whether true or not, that's the reason why so far I thou=
ght that an AEAD that's agnostic of compression techniques
and operates as-if there's always a full header on the wire, is more robust=
 than what we have at the moment.

Regarding re-introducing the explicit CID in DTLS 1.3: My impression so far=
 was that DTLS 1.3 attempts to already
incorporate some record compression ideas through the flexible header forma=
t, and I'd find it cleaner to either explore
and use those ideas fully (including implicit CIDs, for example), or leave =
them for c[D]TLS entirely and stick to a single
header format for DTLS 1.3. But that's subjective.


Apart from that, thanks Martin for sharing the paper https://felixguenther.=
info/Q20_RC.pdf in the other thread,
I think it might be useful for this thread, too.

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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--_000_AM4PR08MB2627AC54581ACDE485A62D029BAB0AM4PR08MB2627eurp_
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>
<div class=3D"PlainText">&gt; &gt; (*): Even if we optimize the CID away wi=
th cTLS the question about the
<br>
&gt; &gt; security implications will surface again. <br>
<br>
&gt; I think that cTLS is the answer to the size issue.&nbsp; But there, th=
e rule tends to be that removing from the wire doesn't also remove from the=
 canonical value that is processed by the stack, so we &gt; might be able t=
o send without a CID, but re-insert the value
 before processing.&nbsp; As the canonical form, DTLS always including the =
value seems fine to me.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">On:&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-family: &quot;Segoe U=
I&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -a=
pple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-s=
erif; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !important">&qu=
ot;</span><span style=3D"margin: 0px; font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &q=
uot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system=
, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; backg=
round-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">the
 rule tends to be that removing from the wire doesn't also remove from the =
canonical value that is processed by the stack&quot;&nbsp;</span></div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><span style=3D"margin: 0px; font-family: &quot;Seg=
oe UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;=
, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sa=
ns-serif; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><br>
</span></div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">I fully agree,&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-family: &q=
uot;Segoe UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe U=
I&quot;, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&qu=
ot;, sans-serif; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !imp=
ortant">and
 whether true or not,<span>&nbsp;</span></span>that's the reason why so far=
 I thought that an AEAD that's agnostic of compression techniques&nbsp;</di=
v>
<div class=3D"PlainText">and operates as-if there's always a full header on=
 the wire, is more robust than what we have at the moment.&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Regarding re-introducing the explicit CID in DTLS =
1.3: My impression so far was that DTLS 1.3 attempts to already&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">incorporate some record compression ideas through =
the flexible header format, and I'd find it cleaner to either explore&nbsp;=
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">and use those ideas fully (including implicit CIDs=
, for example), or leave them for c[D]TLS entirely and stick to a single&nb=
sp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">header format for DTLS 1.3. But that's subjective.=
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Apart from that, thanks Martin for sharing the pap=
er&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://felixguenther.info/Q20_RC.pdf" id=3D"LPlnk592243=
">https://felixguenther.info/Q20_RC.pdf</a>&nbsp;in the other thread,</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">I think it might be useful for this thread, too.&n=
bsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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From nobody Fri May  1 02:47:13 2020
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 11:46:57 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6122)
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Hi,

The original text was not wrong. Originally TLS 1.2 and before defined a
PRF for key derivation, and there exist multiple instantiations with
different hash functions (e.g. SHA-256 and SHA-384). So each
instantiation could be considered a different function.

Your suggested text can also be considered correct as there is only
construction in TLS 1.2, but I don't think it is worth marking the text
as in error.

I suggest to reject this.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:08:11AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6122
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 1.2
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> The key derivation functions have been redesigned.
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> The key derivation function has been redesigned.
> 
> Notes
> -----
> 
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 12:13:47 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6123)
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Hi,

Throughout the document, it is pretty clear what optionality refers to:

    1.  Introduction
    [...]
    -  Authentication: The server side of the channel is always
       authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated.

and from the same Protocol Overview section, 2 pages later:


    -  Authentication: Authenticate the server (and, optionally, the
       client) and provide key confirmation and handshake integrity.

The "optionally authenticate each other" text appears to have been
carried over from TLS 1.2 and before where anonymous key exchanges were
still a thing.

I don't think there is any misinterpretation possible from someone
reading the whole section and I like the current conciseness. A longer,
but technically more accurate version could be:

    [..], authenticate the server to the client, optionally authenticate
    the client to the server, [..]

I suggest (reluctantly) accepting this ("Held for Document Update") or
rejecting it.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:15:22AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6123
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 2
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> The handshake protocol allows peers to negotiate a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and establish shared secret keying material.
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> 
> 
> Notes
> -----
> Only client authentication is optional (albeit, server authentication is implicit for PSK-only key exchange mode)
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
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From nobody Fri May  1 03:24:45 2020
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 12:24:32 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6124)
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The change is in "a list of symmetric cipher/HKDF hash pairs" and Ben
suggests changing "HKDF hash" to either "Hash algorithm" or "Hash
algorithm (to be used with HKDF)".

The hash is not just used for the HKDF, but also for Transcript-Hash, so
if this had to be changed, I would vote for "Hash algorithm". Note that
"HKDF hash" is used consistently in one other place, so that might have
to be changed as well.

Additionally, Section 7.1 defined relates both the three "hash"
functions:

    The Hash function used by Transcript-Hash and HKDF is the cipher
    suite hash algorithm.

This is a minor update to a text that was not incorrect. Not sure
whether this was really worth an errata report.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:18:39AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6124
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 2
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>    In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello                  
>    (Section 4.1.2) message, which contains a random nonce                       
>    (ClientHello.random); its offered protocol versions; a list of               
>    symmetric cipher/HKDF hash pairs; either a set of Diffie-Hellman key         
>    shares (in the "key_share" (Section 4.2.8) extension), a set of              
>    pre-shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" (Section 4.2.11)              
>    extension), or both; and potentially additional extensions.   
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>    In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello                  
>    (Section 4.1.2) message, which contains a random nonce                       
>    (ClientHello.random); its offered protocol versions; a list of               
>    symmetric cipher/Hash algorithm pairs; either a set of Diffie-Hellman key         
>    shares (in the "key_share" (Section 4.2.8) extension), a set of              
>    pre-shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" (Section 4.2.11)              
>    extension), or both; and potentially additional extensions.   
> 
> or
> 
>    In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello                  
>    (Section 4.1.2) message, which contains a random nonce                       
>    (ClientHello.random); its offered protocol versions; a list of               
>    symmetric cipher/Hash algorithm (to be used with HKDF) pairs; either a set of Diffie-Hellman key         
>    shares (in the "key_share" (Section 4.2.8) extension), a set of              
>    pre-shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" (Section 4.2.11)              
>    extension), or both; and potentially additional extensions.   
> 
> Notes
> -----
> 
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
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From nobody Fri May  1 03:31:18 2020
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 12:30:58 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6125)
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Hi Ben,

Do you have a specific sentence that caused confusion for you? Both
"out-of-band" and "external" can be used interchangeably. What is
unclear about https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-2.2 for
example?

If you are interested in use of external PSKs, I suggest following this
work: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer

This errat report lacks context, and even if accepted, it should
probably have been a new document. I suggest rejecting it.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:22:12AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6125
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: GLOBAL
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> PSKs are referred to as out-of-band and external
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Referring to PSKs as either out-of-band xor external would help at least one reader
> 
> Notes
> -----
> 
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Fri May  1 03:38:47 2020
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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 12:38:34 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6126)
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There is no error here, clarifications such as these which can already
be correctly interpreted by a careful reader should probably not be
reported through the errata system.

>From https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata-definitions/
Type Name: Editorial
Description: "a spelling, grammar, punctuation, or syntax error that
does not affect the technical meaning"

I suggest rejecting this report.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:41:19AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6126
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 4.1.1
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE, then
> non-overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, 
> as it is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph.
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE, then
> non-overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, 
> as it is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph, 
> because PSK-only key exchange mode does not need supported_groups.
> 
> Notes
> -----
> If "the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE", then PSK-only key exchange mode can be used, which doesn't require supported_groups. This is perhaps worthy of explanation.
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6125)
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Dear Peter,

On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 12:30, Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> wrote:

> Do you have a specific sentence that caused confusion for you? Both
> "out-of-band" and "external" can be used interchangeably.
>

Getting to grips with TLS 1.3 has been challenging for me! The use of
synonyms made it more difficult. I hope that the reports I have submitted
will aid others in understanding the specification. Longer-term they may
even aid the development for future documents. Many of the reports are
minor, others are preventing me from fully understanding the specification,
and several may highlight minor technical issues. They all came about
whilst writing a manual for TLS (
https://bensmyth.com/publications/2019-TLS-tutorial/), which I'm currently
extending. Since the reports are based on my private notes, I thought
sharing them (via reports) would be useful.


Best regards,

Ben

--000000000000b438a805a4940e6d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dear Peter, <br clear=3D"all"><div></div>=
</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">=
On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 12:30, Peter Wu &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:peter@lekenstey=
n.nl">peter@lekensteyn.nl</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
Do you have a specific sentence that caused confusion for you? Both<br>
&quot;out-of-band&quot; and &quot;external&quot; can be used interchangeabl=
y. <br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Getting to grips with TLS 1.3 has b=
een challenging for me! The use of synonyms made it more difficult. I hope =
that the reports I have submitted will aid others in understanding the spec=
ification. Longer-term they may even aid the development for future documen=
ts. Many of the reports are minor, others are preventing me from fully unde=
rstanding the specification, and several may highlight minor technical issu=
es. They all came about whilst writing a manual for TLS ( <a href=3D"https:=
//bensmyth.com/publications/2019-TLS-tutorial/" target=3D"_blank">https://b=
ensmyth.com/publications/2019-TLS-tutorial/</a>), which I&#39;m currently e=
xtending. Since the reports are based on my private notes, I thought sharin=
g them (via reports) would be useful. <br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Best re=
gards,</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><span class=3D"gmail-il">Ben</span></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000b438a805a4940e6d--


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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 12:59:58 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6127)
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The current section describes what a client should do when it faces a
HRR, and the referenced bullet point specifies how the HRR "key_share"
extension should be processed.

The errata suggests "clarifying" that point by adding:

> Note: A "key_share" extension may not be supplied in a
> HelloRetryRequest message when a server receives  an "early_data"
> (Section 4.2.10).

I interpret it as:

    If the client sends an "early_data" extension in its Client Hello,
    then the server responding with a HelloRetryRequest MAY include or
    omit the "key_share" extension in the HRR.

That is not a result that is unique to the presence of the "early_data".
Perhaps you misinterpreted the second bullet point in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-54

This report does not fix an error, and it adds only more confusion. I
suggest rejecting it.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:49:54AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6127
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: 4.1.2.
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> If a "key_share" extension was supplied in the HelloRetryRequest,
> replacing the list of shares with a list containing a single
> KeyShareEntry from the indicated group.
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> If a "key_share" extension was supplied in the HelloRetryRequest,
> replacing the list of shares with a list containing a single
> KeyShareEntry from the indicated group. Note: A "key_share" 
> extension may not be supplied in a HelloRetryRequest message 
> when a server receives  an "early_data" (Section 4.2.10).
> 
> Notes
> -----
> 
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 13:07:02 +0200
From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com, research@bensmyth.com, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6127)
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How could this affect the readers comprehension? This is not an
editorial issue in as defined at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata-definitions/

>From the context it is often clear what "abort" or "terminate" means.
An enumeration of the first occurrences in the document:

 - "A failure of the handshake or other protocol error triggers the
    termination of the connection, optionally preceded by an alert
    message (Section 6)."
 - "the server MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate alert."
 - "MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert."

I suggest rejecting this report.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:55:57AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6128
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
> 
> Section: GLOBAL
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
> terminate and abort are used interchangeable, but this isn't explained until after such use.
> 
> In Section 6.2, we have: In the rest of this specification, when the phrases "terminate the connection" and "abort the handshake" are used without a specific alert it means that the implementation SHOULD send the alert indicated by the
> descriptions below.  
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Perhaps explain terminology earlier. At the very least, in Section 6.2, open the above sentence with "Throughout this specification"
> 
> 
> 
> Notes
> -----
> 
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6127)
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>From the perspective of someone who spends a lot of his time writing/editin=
g standards, I agree with the Errata and disagree with Peter's comment. If =
"abort" and "terminate" mean the same thing, that should be made clear. Wor=
ds in standards need to have specific definitions. A developer who reads "a=
bort" in one place and "terminate" in another might reasonably assume that =
because two different words are used, two different things are meant, and b=
urn unnecessary cycles working out what the difference is.

William

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Peter Wu
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 7:07 AM
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: rdd@cert.org; sean+ietf@sn3rd.com; kaduk@mit.edu; tls@ietf.org
Subject: [EXT] Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6127)

How could this affect the readers comprehension? This is not an
editorial issue in as defined at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata-definitions/

>From the context it is often clear what "abort" or "terminate" means.
An enumeration of the first occurrences in the document:

 - "A failure of the handshake or other protocol error triggers the
    termination of the connection, optionally preceded by an alert
    message (Section 6)."
 - "the server MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate alert."
 - "MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert."

I suggest rejecting this report.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:55:57AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
>
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6128
>
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
>
> Section: GLOBAL
>
> Original Text
> -------------
> terminate and abort are used interchangeable, but this isn't explained un=
til after such use.
>
> In Section 6.2, we have: In the rest of this specification, when the phra=
ses "terminate the connection" and "abort the handshake" are used without a=
 specific alert it means that the implementation SHOULD send the alert indi=
cated by the
> descriptions below.
>
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Perhaps explain terminology earlier. At the very least, in Section 6.2, o=
pen the above sentence with "Throughout this specification"
>
>
>
> Notes
> -----
>
>
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version=
 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

_______________________________________________
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6120)
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I think the point here is that the "transport" isn't a "data stream", the t=
ransport is what the data stream is delivered over. I agree that the intend=
ed meaning is clear, but the text as written isn't correct, and if the draf=
t's being corrected anyway this should be corrected too.

William

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Peter Wu
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:35 AM
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: rdd@cert.org; sean+ietf@sn3rd.com; kaduk@mit.edu; tls@ietf.org
Subject: [EXT] Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6120)

Hi,

In what way is the old writing ambiguous? The semantics of that text is
correct. If someone wants to run the TLS protocol on paper as
"transport", it would still maintain the same guarantees. And "paper" is
arguably not a transport protocol or "stream delivery service".

I suggest to reject this change.

Kind regards,
Peter

On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 02:05:04AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
>
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6120
>
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com>
>
> Section: 1
>
> Original Text
> -------------
> the underlying transport is a reliable, in-order data stream
>
>
>
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> the underlying transport layer is a reliable, in-order stream delivery se=
rvice
>
> or
>
> the underlying transport protocol is a reliable, in-order stream delivery=
 service
>
> or similar
>
> Notes
> -----
> Similar elsewhere
>
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version=
 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

_______________________________________________
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Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 10:12:29 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi all,

I'm in need of a channel binding mechanism that works for TLS 1.3, but
as far as I can tell there isn't one. I've thrown together a document
defining a mechanism using RFC 5705 which I believe meets all of the
requirements for good channel binding.

Is anyone aware of work already being done in this area (I saw the token
binding stuff, but that's a lot more complicated and browser-focused
than a simple channel binding mechanism and work appears to have
stalled), and if not would the TLS WG be interested in such a document?

Thanks,
Sam

P.S. Note that I also sent this question to the KITTEN WG because I
     wasn't sure where this would belong.

-- 
Sam Whited


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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 17:00:27 +0100
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To: Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi Sam,

I believe TLS Exporters are what you are looking for.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-7.5

Exporters allow you to produce a key that is a bound to a particular
channel i.e. TLS session.

Regards,

Jonathan

On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 15:13, Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I'm in need of a channel binding mechanism that works for TLS 1.3, but
> as far as I can tell there isn't one. I've thrown together a document
> defining a mechanism using RFC 5705 which I believe meets all of the
> requirements for good channel binding.
>
> Is anyone aware of work already being done in this area (I saw the token
> binding stuff, but that's a lot more complicated and browser-focused
> than a simple channel binding mechanism and work appears to have
> stalled), and if not would the TLS WG be interested in such a document?
>
> Thanks,
> Sam
>
> P.S. Note that I also sent this question to the KITTEN WG because I
>      wasn't sure where this would belong.
>
> --
> Sam Whited
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Sam,<div><br></div><div>I believe TLS Exporters are wha=
t you are looking for.</div><div><a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/=
rfc8446.html#section-7.5">https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#secti=
on-7.5</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Exporters allow you to produce a ke=
y that is a bound to a particular channel i.e. TLS session.=C2=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div><br>Jonathan</div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, 1 May 2020 a=
t 15:13, Sam Whited &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sam@samwhited.com">sam@samwhited.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">Hi all,<br>
<br>
I&#39;m in need of a channel binding mechanism that works for TLS 1.3, but<=
br>
as far as I can tell there isn&#39;t one. I&#39;ve thrown together a docume=
nt<br>
defining a mechanism using RFC 5705 which I believe meets all of the<br>
requirements for good channel binding.<br>
<br>
Is anyone aware of work already being done in this area (I saw the token<br=
>
binding stuff, but that&#39;s a lot more complicated and browser-focused<br=
>
than a simple channel binding mechanism and work appears to have<br>
stalled), and if not would the TLS WG be interested in such a document?<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Sam<br>
<br>
P.S. Note that I also sent this question to the KITTEN WG because I<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0wasn&#39;t sure where this would belong.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Sam Whited<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 12:08:27 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jonathan Hoyland" <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi Jonathan,

On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 12:00, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> I believe TLS Exporters are what you are looking for.
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-7.5

Thanks for the follow up. That is indeed what the channel binding type
I've created uses. Would the TLS working group be interested in
standardizing such a document?

I've gone ahead and uploaded my initial draft that I threw together here=

in case you're interested:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-t=
ls13/

=E2=80=94Sam


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ticket request PR#20
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All,

We recommend that PR#20 be closed and we will progress the draft to Ben =
for his AD review. The suggested text is not strictly needed. As the =
name of the draft suggests, the client=E2=80=99s ticket requests are =
just that a request for tickets. The server is free to do whatever it =
wants with the request.

spt (for Joe and Sean)

> On Apr 19, 2020, at 18:23, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> =
wrote:
>=20
> I uploaded a small pull request for the ticket request draft:
>=20
>    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest/pull/20
>=20
> it stipulates that servers SHOULD send at least one ticket unless =
*both*
> counters are zero.  A client willing to accept tickets for either of =
the
> two handshake types is capable of accepting a ticket for the other.
>=20
> Yes, this leaves the door open to later define (or not) special
> semantics for the zero value to be used between mutually consenting
> clients and servers.
>=20
> --=20
>    Viktor.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 19:08:57 +0100
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To: Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/je7O1-3FdS1jU395gtPcMJ8vchQ>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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--000000000000d8051105a49a13f7
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Hi Sam,

I think the idea is that any unique=C2=B9 exporter _is_ an RFC
5056-compliant channel binding.

Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see what your draft adds?
If someone wants to construct a channel binding then they agree with their
peer on a context and a label, and use that to construct an exporter key.

If they mix that key into the key schedule of some other protocol then that
second protocol is bound to the TLS session=C2=B2.

If they want to pick the label "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" and the empty
context, then that's already covered by the spec.

Is the idea to reserve the string for some specific use? If so, then the
suggested string is far to general, as it describes _any_ use of the
interface.

What do you see as the difference between an Exporter key and a channel
binding?

Regards,

Jonathan

1. I'm assuming an exporter is unique within a given TLS session iff the
given label and context are unique.
2. Unless the second protocol does something stupid like leak the TLS
session's master secret.


On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 17:08, Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:

> Hi Jonathan,
>
> On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 12:00, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> > I believe TLS Exporters are what you are looking for.
> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-7.5
>
> Thanks for the follow up. That is indeed what the channel binding type
> I've created uses. Would the TLS working group be interested in
> standardizing such a document?
>
> I've gone ahead and uploaded my initial draft that I threw together here
> in case you're interested:
>
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-tl=
s13/
>
> =E2=80=94Sam
>

--000000000000d8051105a49a13f7
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Sam,<div><br></div><div>I think the idea is that any un=
ique=C2=B9 exporter _is_ an RFC 5056-compliant=C2=A0channel=C2=A0binding.=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Maybe I&#39;m missing=C2=A0something, but I=
 don&#39;t see what your draft adds?</div><div>If someone wants to construc=
t a channel binding then they agree with their peer on a context and a labe=
l, and use that to construct an exporter key.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><di=
v>If they mix that key into the key schedule of some other protocol then th=
at second protocol is bound to the TLS session=C2=B2.</div><div><br></div><=
div>If they want to pick the label &quot;<span style=3D"font-family:&quot;N=
oto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px">EXPORTER-Channel-=
Binding&quot; and the empty context, then that&#39;s already=C2=A0covered b=
y the spec.=C2=A0</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sa=
ns&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px"><br></span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:14px">Is the idea to reserve the string for some specific use? If=
 so, then the suggested string is far to general, as it describes _any_ use=
 of the interface.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto S=
ans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px"><br></span></div><div>=
<span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif=
;font-size:14px">What do you see as the difference between an Exporter key =
and a channel binding?</span></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-=
family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px">Reg=
ards,</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Ari=
al,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px"><br></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:=
14px">Jonathan</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&=
quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px"><br></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:14px">1. I&#39;m assuming an exporter is unique within a given TLS s=
ession iff the given label and context are unique.=C2=A0</span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:14px">2. Unless the second protocol does something stupid like le=
ak the TLS session&#39;s master secret.</span></div><div><span style=3D"fon=
t-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px"><=
br></span></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 17:08, Sam Whited &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:sam@samwhited.com">sam@samwhited.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Jonathan,<br>
<br>
On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 12:00, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:<br>
&gt; I believe TLS Exporters are what you are looking for.<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-7.5" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.h=
tml#section-7.5</a><br>
<br>
Thanks for the follow up. That is indeed what the channel binding type<br>
I&#39;ve created uses. Would the TLS working group be interested in<br>
standardizing such a document?<br>
<br>
I&#39;ve gone ahead and uploaded my initial draft that I threw together her=
e<br>
in case you&#39;re interested:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindin=
gs-for-tls13/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13/</a><br>
<br>
=E2=80=94Sam<br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000d8051105a49a13f7--


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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ticket request PR#20
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On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 01:03:58PM -0400, Sean Turner wrote:

> We recommend that PR#20 be closed and we will progress the draft to
> Ben for his AD review. The suggested text is not strictly needed. As
> the name of the draft suggests, the client’s ticket requests are just
> that a request for tickets. The server is free to do whatever it wants
> with the request.

This is unfortunate, because there's an opportunity here to specify
an extensible extension that could later be refined to support
reuse at negligible cost to the "complexity" of the specification,
indeed all the server has to do is issue at least one ticket like
it always did, unless both counters are zero.

I've agreed to defer actual consideration of reuse to a separate draft,
but this preëmptively shuts the door on getting that done, without
requiring a second largely redundant extension that would have to modify
the meaning of {0,1} to make the "1" be "as needed".  Now server that
(hypothetically) are willing to support reuse will have to consider the
interplay of two separate related extensions, which is definitely more
complex.

Declining this comes across hostile to me.  I read the objections to
"only {0, 0} means zero" as a blocking counter-measure against the
deferred discussion, and not a material objection on the merits. :-(

-- 
    Viktor.


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Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 14:16:28 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jonathan Hoyland" <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 14:08, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see what your draft adds? If
> someone wants to construct a channel binding then they agree with
> their peer on a context and a label, and use that to construct an
> exporter key.

The draft just registers a method of using it with the IANA Channel
Binding Types registry so that you can negotiate and use exported keying=

material in eg. SCRAM based SASL auth. Right now if I wanted to use EKM
for channel binding, what would I negotiate (ie. what would I set the p
field of a gs2 header to in SASL based auth?)


> Is the idea to reserve the string for some specific use? If so, then
> the suggested string is far to general, as it describes _any_ use of
> the interface.

Yes, that's the idea. This registers the "tls-exporter" channel binding
type in the registry, and the label EXPORTER-Channel-Binding to use with=

it. This is supposed to be a generic channel binding type that can be
used to negotiate channel binding when multiple are available, eg. if
the server supports both tls-unique (the last TLS finished message) and
exporter data, we need an identifier to decide that we want to use
exporter data. That also means having a label that we can associate with=

this context.

I'd be happy to change the name if the consensus is that this is too
general, but I didn't think it made sense to make this SASL or <other
auth system> specific.

=E2=80=94Sam


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Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 11:18:58 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ticket request PR#20
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Hi Viktor,

On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 02:11:31PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 01:03:58PM -0400, Sean Turner wrote:
> 
> > We recommend that PR#20 be closed and we will progress the draft to
> > Ben for his AD review. The suggested text is not strictly needed. As
> > the name of the draft suggests, the client’s ticket requests are just
> > that a request for tickets. The server is free to do whatever it wants
> > with the request.
> 
> This is unfortunate, because there's an opportunity here to specify
> an extensible extension that could later be refined to support
> reuse at negligible cost to the "complexity" of the specification,
> indeed all the server has to do is issue at least one ticket like
> it always did, unless both counters are zero.
> 
> I've agreed to defer actual consideration of reuse to a separate draft,
> but this preëmptively shuts the door on getting that done, without
> requiring a second largely redundant extension that would have to modify
> the meaning of {0,1} to make the "1" be "as needed".  Now server that
> (hypothetically) are willing to support reuse will have to consider the
> interplay of two separate related extensions, which is definitely more
> complex.
> 
> Declining this comes across hostile to me.  I read the objections to
> "only {0, 0} means zero" as a blocking counter-measure against the
> deferred discussion, and not a material objection on the merits. :-(

I don't think it's right to say that "only {0,0} means zero" -- after all,
this is a *request*, not a command from the client to the server.
In particular, I see it as an indication of what the client wants in order
to meet the client's policy for (non-)reuse, but when the server's policy
is different, the server can and should diverge from the client's request.
This divergence can occur in either direction (more or fewer tickets issued).

Since the signal we're sending is merely advisory, it seems more prudent
to leave discussion of what a server should do when it receives specific
values as guidance for what factors a server logic should take into account
rather than trying to assign specific semantics to pairs of values that are
advisory in the first place.  I think what people are objecting to is
trying to assign precise semantics to specific pairs of values when the
individual values themselves do not have such precise semantics.

I would need to go and re-read the text to be sure (and I guess I'll have
to when it gets to me for AD evaluation), but expect that some discussion
of how client policy can mismatch with server policy to be appropriate;
I expect to have more concrete text suggestions as part of my AD review.

Thanks,

Ben


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ticket request PR#20
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On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 11:18:58AM -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

> > Declining this comes across hostile to me.  I read the objections to
> > "only {0, 0} means zero" as a blocking counter-measure against the
> > deferred discussion, and not a material objection on the merits. :-(
> 
> I don't think it's right to say that "only {0,0} means zero" -- after all,
> this is a *request*, not a command from the client to the server.

And yet, RFC 8446 C.4 says servers SHOULD always send at least one, and
so this draft is modifying that to say that it is now "OK" to sometimes
send no tickets based on the applicable counter.  All I am asking for is
that the "OK" condition be made more strict, requiring both counters to
zero before C.4 is overriden.

The server can still start WW-III upong seeing the extension, but that
does not preclude clarity about the *intended* meaning.  That's what
the MUSTs/SHOULDs/MAYs etc. are for.

-- 
    Viktor.


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Subject: [TLS] Publication has been requested for draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-05
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Sean Turner has requested publication of draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-05 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the TLS working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests/



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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ticket request PR#20
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On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 02:39:58PM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Fri, May 01, 2020 at 11:18:58AM -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> 
> > > Declining this comes across hostile to me.  I read the objections to
> > > "only {0, 0} means zero" as a blocking counter-measure against the
> > > deferred discussion, and not a material objection on the merits. :-(
> > 
> > I don't think it's right to say that "only {0,0} means zero" -- after all,
> > this is a *request*, not a command from the client to the server.
> 
> And yet, RFC 8446 C.4 says servers SHOULD always send at least one, and
> so this draft is modifying that to say that it is now "OK" to sometimes
> send no tickets based on the applicable counter.  All I am asking for is
> that the "OK" condition be made more strict, requiring both counters to
> zero before C.4 is overriden.

I don't see how this draft is modifying that SHOULD -- SHOULD is for cases
where "do this if you don't know any better, but in some circumstances
doing the other thing is okay".  I see this draft as defining a mechanism
to convey information from client to server, so that the server can know
whether it's one of those "some circumstances" when "doing the other thing
is okay".  But that doesn't modify the SHOULD, and it's still up to the server.

> The server can still start WW-III upong seeing the extension, but that
> does not preclude clarity about the *intended* meaning.  That's what
> the MUSTs/SHOULDs/MAYs etc. are for.

I actually think that in this case prose is going to be better at conveying
the intended meaning than normative keywords will, but should probably
refrain from commenting further until I actually do the AD Evaluation.

-Ben


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC16)
  1 issues created:
  - Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/229=20

  10 issues received 16 new comments:
  - #223 Restrict ECHO inner/outer variance for interop purposes (1 by chri=
s-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/223=20
  - #219 cardinality of ECHOConfig vs. HTTPSSVC (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/219=20
  - #218 HPKE code points vs. TLS ciphersuites (2 by chris-wood, ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/218=20
  - #217 ECHOConfigContents.extensions is not needed (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/217=20
  - #216 where servers put CH details/hints: ECHOConfig or HTTPSSVC?  (1 by=
 chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/216=20
  - #214 Clarify 1.2 connection support (don't break connections, but also =
don't protect the certificate) (6 by bemasc, chris-wood, kazuho, sftcd)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/214=20
  - #206 Suggestion to support user@domain.name (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/206=20
  - #204 Anonymity sets (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/204=20
  - #182 Consider disabling server tickets if tickets are not uniform acros=
s the ESNI anonymity set (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/182=20
  - #177 GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones (1 =
by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/177=20

  7 issues closed:
  - Use HPKE codepoints for all HPKE-relevant operations https://github.com=
/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/218=20
  - Consider disabling server tickets if tickets are not uniform across the=
 ESNI anonymity set https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/182=
=20
  - Anonymity sets https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/204 =

  - Suggestion to support user@domain.name https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/issues/206=20
  - ECHOConfigContents.extensions is not needed https://github.com/tlswg/dr=
aft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/217=20
  - cardinality of ECHOConfig vs. HTTPSSVC https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/issues/219=20
  - Restrict ECHO inner/outer variance for interop purposes https://github.=
com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/223=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Integrity bounds (by martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/145=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC4)
  2 issues created:
  - A propose of signature context string (by william-zk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63=20
  - Will the next version of draft define how to store delegated credential=
 as file? (by william-zk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62=20

  1 issues received 4 new comments:
  - #63 A propose of signature context string (4 by jhoyla, william-zk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC3)
  6 pull requests submitted:
  - Add information about per-client tracking via unique ECHOConfig structu=
res (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/230=20
  - Clarify need for optional record digests. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/228=20
  - Clarify "do not stick out" signals. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/227=20
  - Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=20
  - Deterministic padding (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/225=20
  - Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points. (by chris-wo=
od)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=20

  3 pull requests received 3 new comments:
  - #224 Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points. (1 by e=
kr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=20
  - #209 padding scheme text (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/209=20
  - #122 Add CertificateVerify to padding recommendation (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/122=20

  1 pull requests merged:
  - Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
  - #20 Declining new tickets requires both counters =3D=3D 0 (1 by chris-w=
ood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest/pull/20=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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</style>
</head>

<body>
<h1>Sunday May 03, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC16)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#229 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
29">Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations.</a> (by chris-=
wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>10 issues received 16 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#223 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
23">Restrict ECHO inner/outer variance for interop purposes</a> (1 by chris=
-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#219 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
19">cardinality of ECHOConfig vs. HTTPSSVC</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#218 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
18">HPKE code points vs. TLS ciphersuites</a> (2 by chris-wood, ekr) </li>
 =20
  <li>#217 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
17">ECHOConfigContents.extensions is not needed</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#216 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
16">where servers put CH details/hints: ECHOConfig or HTTPSSVC? </a> (1 by =
chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#214 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
14">Clarify 1.2 connection support (don&#x27;t break connections, but also =
don&#x27;t protect the certificate)</a> (6 by bemasc, chris-wood, kazuho, s=
ftcd) </li>
 =20
  <li>#206 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
06">Suggestion to support user@domain.name</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#204 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
04">Anonymity sets</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#182 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
82">Consider disabling server tickets if tickets are not uniform across the=
 ESNI anonymity set</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#177 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
77">GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones</a> (1 b=
y chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>7 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#218 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
18">Use HPKE codepoints for all HPKE-relevant operations</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#182 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
82">Consider disabling server tickets if tickets are not uniform across the=
 ESNI anonymity set</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#204 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
04">Anonymity sets</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#206 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
06">Suggestion to support user@domain.name</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#217 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
17">ECHOConfigContents.extensions is not needed</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#219 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
19">cardinality of ECHOConfig vs. HTTPSSVC</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#223 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
23">Restrict ECHO inner/outer variance for interop purposes</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#145 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/145">Inte=
grity bounds</a> (by martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC4)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#63 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63">A pro=
pose of signature context string</a> (by william-zk) </li>
 =20
  <li>#62 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62">Will =
the next version of draft define how to store delegated credential as file?=
</a> (by william-zk) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues received 4 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#63 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63">A pro=
pose of signature context string</a> (4 by jhoyla, william-zk) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC3)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">6 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#230 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/230=
">Add information about per-client tracking via unique ECHOConfig structure=
s</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#228 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/228=
">Clarify need for optional record digests.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#227 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/227=
">Clarify &quot;do not stick out&quot; signals.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#226 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=
">Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#225 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/225=
">Deterministic padding</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#224 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=
">Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points.</a> (by chris-=
wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests received 3 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#224 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=
">Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points.</a> (1 by ekr)=
 </li>
 =20
  <li>#209 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/209=
">padding scheme text</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#122 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/122=
">Add CertificateVerify to padding recommendation</a> (1 by chris-wood) </l=
i>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#224 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=
">Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>

  <p>1 pull requests received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#20 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest/=
pull/20">Declining new tickets requires both counters =3D=3D 0</a> (1 by ch=
ris-wood) </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 14:14:42 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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--00000000000023ae2405a4d25115
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Hi Sam,

If you wanted to use a SCRAM based SASL auth then you could pick
`p=3DSCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any other very specific IANA-registered
string, and update the SCRAM RFC to require that string with TLS 1.3.
You actively don't want for the same channel binding to be an input to
multiple different protocols (or even the same protocol but with different
parameters) because it opens the door to confusion attacks.

I've only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to include
`client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as context to the
exporter interface, because it seems that the channel binding isn't needed
until the `client-final-message`.
The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel binding to the
negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to define a single
"TLS-SASL-SCRAM" string (or whatever makes sense), rather than have one for
each possible set of parameters.
Obviously you'd need to think some more about whether that was actually
secure, but at first glance it seems like a reasonable approach.

Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel and the higher-level
protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings that only identify the
underlying channel, because you don't have to worry about the (potentially
pathological) behaviours of other users of the binding.

Regards,

Jonathan






On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 19:16, Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:

> On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 14:08, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> > Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see what your draft adds? If
> > someone wants to construct a channel binding then they agree with
> > their peer on a context and a label, and use that to construct an
> > exporter key.
>
> The draft just registers a method of using it with the IANA Channel
> Binding Types registry so that you can negotiate and use exported keying
> material in eg. SCRAM based SASL auth. Right now if I wanted to use EKM
> for channel binding, what would I negotiate (ie. what would I set the p
> field of a gs2 header to in SASL based auth?)
>
>
> > Is the idea to reserve the string for some specific use? If so, then
> > the suggested string is far to general, as it describes _any_ use of
> > the interface.
>
> Yes, that's the idea. This registers the "tls-exporter" channel binding
> type in the registry, and the label EXPORTER-Channel-Binding to use with
> it. This is supposed to be a generic channel binding type that can be
> used to negotiate channel binding when multiple are available, eg. if
> the server supports both tls-unique (the last TLS finished message) and
> exporter data, we need an identifier to decide that we want to use
> exporter data. That also means having a label that we can associate with
> this context.
>
> I'd be happy to change the name if the consensus is that this is too
> general, but I didn't think it made sense to make this SASL or <other
> auth system> specific.
>
> =E2=80=94Sam
>

--00000000000023ae2405a4d25115
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi=C2=A0Sam,<div><br></div><div>If you wanted to use a SCR=
AM based SASL auth then you could pick `p=3DSCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any othe=
r very specific IANA-registered string,=C2=A0and update the SCRAM RFC to re=
quire that string with TLS 1.3.</div><div>You actively don&#39;t want for t=
he same channel binding to be an input to multiple different protocols (or =
even the same protocol but with different parameters) because it opens the =
door to confusion attacks.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve only skimmed t=
he SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to include `client-first-message` and=
 `server-first-message` as context to the exporter interface, because it se=
ems that the channel binding isn&#39;t needed until the `client-final-messa=
ge`.=C2=A0</div><div>The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel =
binding to the negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to defin=
e a single &quot;TLS-SASL-SCRAM&quot; string (or whatever makes sense), rat=
her than have one for each possible set of parameters.</div><div>Obviously =
you&#39;d need to think some more about whether that was actually secure, b=
ut at first glance it seems like a reasonable approach.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel an=
d the higher-level protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings tha=
t only identify the underlying channel, because you don&#39;t have to worry=
 about the (potentially pathological) behaviours of other users of the bind=
ing.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div><br></div><div>Jonathan</d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_att=
r">On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 19:16, Sam Whited &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sam@samwhi=
ted.com">sam@samwhited.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 14:08, Jonathan Hoyland w=
rote:<br>
&gt; Maybe I&#39;m missing something, but I don&#39;t see what your draft a=
dds? If<br>
&gt; someone wants to construct a channel binding then they agree with<br>
&gt; their peer on a context and a label, and use that to construct an<br>
&gt; exporter key.<br>
<br>
The draft just registers a method of using it with the IANA Channel<br>
Binding Types registry so that you can negotiate and use exported keying<br=
>
material in eg. SCRAM based SASL auth. Right now if I wanted to use EKM<br>
for channel binding, what would I negotiate (ie. what would I set the p<br>
field of a gs2 header to in SASL based auth?)<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; Is the idea to reserve the string for some specific use? If so, then<b=
r>
&gt; the suggested string is far to general, as it describes _any_ use of<b=
r>
&gt; the interface.<br>
<br>
Yes, that&#39;s the idea. This registers the &quot;tls-exporter&quot; chann=
el binding<br>
type in the registry, and the label EXPORTER-Channel-Binding to use with<br=
>
it. This is supposed to be a generic channel binding type that can be<br>
used to negotiate channel binding when multiple are available, eg. if<br>
the server supports both tls-unique (the last TLS finished message) and<br>
exporter data, we need an identifier to decide that we want to use<br>
exporter data. That also means having a label that we can associate with<br=
>
this context.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d be happy to change the name if the consensus is that this is too<br=
>
general, but I didn&#39;t think it made sense to make this SASL or &lt;othe=
r<br>
auth system&gt; specific.<br>
<br>
=E2=80=94Sam<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000023ae2405a4d25115--


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Date: Mon, 04 May 2020 10:39:45 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jonathan Hoyland" <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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On Mon, May 4, 2020, at 09:14, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> I've only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to include
> `client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as context to the
> exporter interface, because it seems that the channel binding isn't
> needed until the `client-final-message`. The idea is to use the
> transcript to bind the channel binding to the negotiation of SCRAM
> parameters, and thus allow you to define a single "TLS-SASL-SCRAM"
> string (or whatever makes sense), rather than have one for each
> possible set of parameters. Obviously you'd need to think some more
> about whether that was actually secure, but at first glance it seems
> like a reasonable approach.

I had originally written a long-ish reply about why we couldn't make
this SCRAM specific, but I've just realized after going back and
looking at the spec and one of my own implementations that I was
completely wrong.

This is a great idea, and I believe would be secure since the client-fir=
st-
message and server-first-message will contain their respective random
nonces. A malicious client or server *could* slip some arbitrary text
into either message, but if I understand TLS exporters security
properties correctly this should not pose a problem and the export data
should still be indistinguishable from random noise to someone without
the TLS master secret (a sanity check by an expert on this statement
would be appreciated).

I have updated the draft with these changes: https://datatracker.ietf.or=
g/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13/

I'm still not entirely clear if this would be a better draft for the
KITTEN WG or this one. If we update the SCRAM RFCs I think it may be
better to go through KITTEN, but I'm not sure that they'll want to take
that work on. I'll ask. Any advice here would be appreciated since I
know almost nothing about IETF policy or procedures.

Thanks for your feedback!

=E2=80=94Sam


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To: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>, Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi Jonathan,

On 04/05/2020 14:14, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> Hi=C2=A0Sam,
>
> If you wanted to use a SCRAM based SASL auth then you could pick=20
> `p=3DSCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any other very specific IANA-registered=20
> string,=C2=A0and update the SCRAM RFC to require that string with TLS 1.3.
> You actively don't want for the same channel binding to be an input to=20
> multiple different protocols (or even the same protocol but with=20
> different parameters) because it opens the door to confusion attacks.

Can you elaborate on what you are trying to protect from?

Historically channel bindings were constant once TLS negotiation was=20
complete (they could change if TLS renegotiation happens). So they never=20
depended on what was sent over the protocol above TLS.

> I've only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to include=20
> `client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as context to the=20
> exporter interface, because it seems that the channel binding isn't=20
> needed until the `client-final-message`.

"the channel binding isn't needed until the `client-final-message`" is=20
correct. Can you elaborate on what is problematic with this?

> The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel binding to the=20
> negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to define a single=20
> "TLS-SASL-SCRAM" string (or whatever makes sense), rather than have=20
> one for each possible set of parameters.
> Obviously you'd need to think some more about whether that was=20
> actually secure, but at first glance it seems like a reasonable approach.
>
> Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel and the=20
> higher-level protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings that=20
> only identify the underlying channel, because you don't have to worry=20
> about the (potentially pathological) behaviours of other users of the=20
> binding.
>
Best Regards,

Alexey



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To: Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>, Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Hi Sam,

On 04/05/2020 15:39, Sam Whited wrote:
> I'm still not entirely clear if this would be a better draft for the
> KITTEN WG or this one. If we update the SCRAM RFCs I think it may be
> better to go through KITTEN, but I'm not sure that they'll want to take
> that work on. I'll ask. Any advice here would be appreciated since I
> know almost nothing about IETF policy or procedures.

IETF doesn't really have rules about situations like this.

I think doing this in KITTEN makes more sense, as long as feedback is 
asked on the TLS mailing list. KITTEN is more likely to have interest to 
drive this work to completion. Having said that, if there is strong 
interest in getting this done in TLS, that would be fine with me.

Best Regards,

Alexey


From nobody Mon May  4 08:45:18 2020
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi Sam,

On 04/05/2020 15:39, Sam Whited wrote:
> I have updated the draft with these changes: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13/ 


In the Introduction of your draft you are referencing RFC 5705, which 
can't be used with TLS 1.3. Instead you should reference Section 7.5 of 
RFC 8446.

Best Regards,

Alexey


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Date: Mon, 04 May 2020 11:57:20 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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On Mon, May 4, 2020, at 11:44, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> In the Introduction of your draft you are referencing RFC 5705, which
> can't be used with TLS 1.3. Instead you should reference Section 7.5
> of RFC 8446.

Fixed on my local copy [1]. Thanks for your feedback!

=E2=80=94Sam

[1]: https://rfcs.samwhited.com/draft-whited-tls-channel-bindings-for-tl=
s13-02.html


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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 17:56:38 +0100
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Hi Alexey

On Mon, 4 May 2020 at 16:23, Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
wrote:

> Hi Jonathan,
>
> On 04/05/2020 14:14, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> > Hi Sam,
> >
> > If you wanted to use a SCRAM based SASL auth then you could pick
> > `p=SCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any other very specific IANA-registered
> > string, and update the SCRAM RFC to require that string with TLS 1.3.
> > You actively don't want for the same channel binding to be an input to
> > multiple different protocols (or even the same protocol but with
> > different parameters) because it opens the door to confusion attacks.
>
> Can you elaborate on what you are trying to protect from?
>
>
If two protocols use the same channel binding there is a risk that the
messages from one can be confused with the messages from the other.
This might happen accidentally, or an adversary might be able to forge one
from the other.
If you wanted to do a formal analysis of the of the security of TLS 1.3 +
SCRAM then a generic binding means you have to factor in what every other
possible protocol might do.
If you use a unique and specific channel binding then the analysis is far
easier and can be a lot more robust (this assumes a global coordinator of
unique strings, such as IANA).
>From an analysis perspective it's easier to rule out classes of attacks
than to consider all possible interactions between all users of the
interface, some of which you won't know about, or perhaps haven't even been
invented yet.

Historically channel bindings were constant once TLS negotiation was
> complete (they could change if TLS renegotiation happens). So they never
> depended on what was sent over the protocol above TLS.
>
>
Yeah, I think the design in TLS 1.3 is much more robust, especially from a
formal analysis perspective.
By constructing channel bindings based on the parameters negotiated over
the top you get a belt-and-braces design.
If you have a contributive channel binding [1] then if the security of
either the underlying protocol (in this case TLS) or the over-the-top
protocol (in this case SCRAM) fails, then the channel binding guarantees
the authentication still happened properly.
Consider the case where an adversary publishes the server's private key to
twitter.
If you have a contributive channel binding then if the SCRAM handshake
succeeds you could be sure that you were talking to the real server, and
weren't being MITMed.
If you don't base the channel binding on the parameters agreed in the
upper  protocol it's possible (in theory) that an adversary could compute
two SCRAM handshakes that appear to succeed, but that actually agree
different parameters.
In this particular case it's not obvious how that could happen, but it's
easy to think up pathological examples, and [1] has a few concrete examples
too.


> > I've only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to include
> > `client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as context to the
> > exporter interface, because it seems that the channel binding isn't
> > needed until the `client-final-message`.
>
> "the channel binding isn't needed until the `client-final-message`" is
> correct. Can you elaborate on what is problematic with this?
>

Sorry if I was unclear, there's nothing problematic with this per se.
It's just that the channel binding can't be dependent on itself, but
including everything that precedes the channel binding just seems like an
easy win, esp. as (in this case) that includes all parameter negotiation.


> > The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel binding to the
> > negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to define a single
> > "TLS-SASL-SCRAM" string (or whatever makes sense), rather than have
> > one for each possible set of parameters.
> > Obviously you'd need to think some more about whether that was
> > actually secure, but at first glance it seems like a reasonable approach.
> >
> > Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel and the
> > higher-level protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings that
> > only identify the underlying channel, because you don't have to worry
> > about the (potentially pathological) behaviours of other users of the
> > binding.
> >
> Best Regards,
>
> Alexey
>
> Regards,

Jonathan

[1] Bhargavan, Karthikeyan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, and Alfredo Pironti.
"Verified Contributive Channel Bindings for Compound Authentication." *NDSS*.
2015.
https://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/karthik/pubs/verified-channel-bindings-ndss15.pdf

--000000000000bdd35505a4d56a24
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Alexey</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, 4 May 2020 at 16:23, Ale=
xey Melnikov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:alexey.melnikov@isode.com">alexey.melnik=
ov@isode.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex">Hi Jonathan,<br>
<br>
On 04/05/2020 14:14, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi=C2=A0Sam,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If you wanted to use a SCRAM based SASL auth then you could pick <br>
&gt; `p=3DSCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any other very specific IANA-registered <b=
r>
&gt; string,=C2=A0and update the SCRAM RFC to require that string with TLS =
1.3.<br>
&gt; You actively don&#39;t want for the same channel binding to be an inpu=
t to <br>
&gt; multiple different protocols (or even the same protocol but with <br>
&gt; different parameters) because it opens the door to confusion attacks.<=
br>
<br>
Can you elaborate on what you are trying to protect from?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If two protocols use the same channel =
binding there is a risk that the messages from one can be confused with the=
 messages from the other.=C2=A0</div><div>This might happen accidentally, o=
r an adversary might be able to forge one from the other.=C2=A0</div><div>I=
f you wanted to do a formal analysis of the of the security of TLS 1.3=C2=
=A0+ SCRAM then a generic binding means you have to factor in what every ot=
her possible protocol might do.=C2=A0</div><div>If you use a unique and spe=
cific channel binding then the analysis is far easier and can be a lot more=
 robust (this assumes a global coordinator of unique strings, such as IANA)=
.=C2=A0</div><div>From an analysis perspective it&#39;s easier to rule out =
classes of attacks than to consider all possible interactions between all u=
sers of the interface,=C2=A0some of which you won&#39;t know about, or perh=
aps haven&#39;t even been invented yet.=C2=A0</div><div></div><div><br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Historically channel bindings were constant once TLS negotiation was <br>
complete (they could change if TLS renegotiation happens). So they never <b=
r>
depended on what was sent over the protocol above TLS.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah, I think the design in TLS 1.3 is=
 much more robust, especially from a formal analysis=C2=A0perspective.</div=
><div>By constructing channel bindings based on the parameters negotiated o=
ver the top you get a belt-and-braces design.=C2=A0</div><div>If you have a=
 contributive channel binding [1] then if the security of either the underl=
ying protocol (in this case TLS) or the over-the-top protocol (in this case=
 SCRAM) fails, then the channel binding guarantees the authentication still=
 happened properly.=C2=A0</div><div>Consider the case where an adversary pu=
blishes the server&#39;s private key to twitter.</div><div>If you have a co=
ntributive channel binding then if the SCRAM handshake succeeds you could b=
e sure that you were talking to the real server, and weren&#39;t being MITM=
ed.=C2=A0</div><div>If you don&#39;t base the channel binding on the parame=
ters agreed in the upper=C2=A0 protocol it&#39;s possible (in theory) that =
an adversary could compute two SCRAM handshakes that appear to succeed, but=
 that actually agree different parameters.</div><div>In this particular cas=
e it&#39;s not obvious how that could happen, but it&#39;s easy to think up=
 pathological=C2=A0examples, and [1] has a few concrete examples too.=C2=A0=
</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0p=
x 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; I&#39;ve only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to includ=
e <br>
&gt; `client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as context to the <b=
r>
&gt; exporter interface, because it seems that the channel binding isn&#39;=
t <br>
&gt; needed until the `client-final-message`.<br>
<br>
&quot;the channel binding isn&#39;t needed until the `client-final-message`=
&quot; is <br>
correct. Can you elaborate on what is problematic with this?<br></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div>Sorry if I was unclear, there&#39;s nothing problemat=
ic with this per se.=C2=A0</div><div>It&#39;s just that the channel binding=
 can&#39;t be dependent on itself, but including everything that precedes t=
he channel binding just seems like an easy win,=C2=A0esp. as (in this case)=
 that includes all parameter=C2=A0negotiation.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel binding to the <=
br>
&gt; negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to define a single=
 <br>
&gt; &quot;TLS-SASL-SCRAM&quot; string (or whatever makes sense), rather th=
an have <br>
&gt; one for each possible set of parameters.<br>
&gt; Obviously you&#39;d need to think some more about whether that was <br=
>
&gt; actually secure, but at first glance it seems like a reasonable approa=
ch.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel and the <br>
&gt; higher-level protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings that=
 <br>
&gt; only identify the underlying channel, because you don&#39;t have to wo=
rry <br>
&gt; about the (potentially pathological) behaviours of other users of the =
<br>
&gt; binding.<br>
&gt;<br>
Best Regards,<br>
<br>
Alexey<br><br></blockquote><div>Regards,</div><div><br>Jonathan=C2=A0</div>=
<div><br></div><div>[1]=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:13px;font-family:Aria=
l,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(248,248,248)">Bhargavan, Karthikeyan, Ant=
oine Delignat-Lavaud, and Alfredo Pironti. &quot;Verified Contributive Chan=
nel Bindings for Compound Authentication.&quot;=C2=A0</span><i style=3D"fon=
t-size:13px;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(248,248,248)"=
>NDSS</i><span style=3D"font-size:13px;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;backgro=
und-color:rgb(248,248,248)">. 2015.=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://prosecco=
.gforge.inria.fr/personal/karthik/pubs/verified-channel-bindings-ndss15.pdf=
">https://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/karthik/pubs/verified-channel-b=
indings-ndss15.pdf</a></div></div></div>

--000000000000bdd35505a4d56a24--


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Date: Mon, 04 May 2020 10:08:10 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
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Thanks, Alessandro! We'll aim to merge this PR on Friday. We ask that folks review it before then. 

   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/5

Thanks,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

On Thu, Apr 23, 2020, at 10:45 AM, Alessandro Ghedini wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 24, 2019 at 11:27:26AM -0500, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 8:40 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> > 
> > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 08:18:47PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > On Friday, 22 November 2019 03:25:24 CET, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 8:35 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2" draft available
> > > > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/.
> > > > > > Please review the document and send your comments to the list by
> > > 2359 UTC
> > > > > > on 13 December 2019.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I just re-read this.  Looks good. Perhaps a sentence of rationale in
> > > ...
> > > > >
> > > > > To that end, the combination of client advice in sections 2 and 4 is a
> > > bit
> > > > > odd. Section 2 uses SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1, but section 4
> > > says
> > > > > the client MUST NOT accept the MD5 SHA-1, even if it included it. Why
> > > would
> > > > > the client include it in that case? It seems the two should either
> > > both be
> > > > > MUST NOT or both be SHOULD NOT.
> > > >
> > > > because it also influences certificate selection, and getting a
> > > certificate
> > > > signed with SHA-1 isn't an automatically disqualifying property?
> > > > (it may be an intermediate CA that's not used, it may be an explicitly
> > > > trusted
> > > > certificate, etc.)
> > >
> > > If you don't want SHA-1 exchange signatures, you darn sure do not want
> > > actual SHA-1 certificates that are not trust anchors anyway. And because
> > > TLS 1.2 does not have separate lists for exchange signatures and
> > > certificate signatures, the client needs to withdraw advertisment for
> > > both in order to not send a misleading offer.
> > >
> > 
> > Right, I had a longer discussion of the certificate-but-not-TLS case but
> > omitted it. :-) Basically what Ilari said. In particular, I believe older
> > versions of Schannel will, despite being able to sign SHA-256,
> > preferentially sign SHA-1 if the client offers it. This is inconvenient
> > when it comes to predicting breakage but is perfectly consistent with the
> > client's offer. When I last looked at this a few years ago, this accounted
> > for a nontrivial portion of SHA-1-negotiating servers on the web, so
> > rejecting SHA-1 while still advertising it is probably not the best
> > strategy.
> > 
> > Fortunately, we've already distrusted SHA-1 X.509 signatures on the web, so
> > hopefully that will simplify things. There is a risk that some servers'
> > trust anchors' (otherwise irrelevant) signatures are SHA-1 and they are
> > trying to match it against the signature algorithms list, but I expect the
> > SHA-1-preferring servers to be the deciding concern. Issues with
> > trust-anchor-checking servers can likely be worked around by configuring
> > the server to not send the trust anchor, which is desirable anyway.
> > 
> > (All of this may not apply to non-web deployments, of course.)
> > 
> > 
> > > And I expect that in practice, not sending SHA-1 in
> > > signature_algorithms would cause very little breakage on top of what
> > > is already broken due to using SHA-1 exchange signatures.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > So I think both should be MUST NOT.
> 
> So, based on this discussion, I made the following PR to change this to MUST NOT
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/5
> 
> Thanks for the review!
> 
> Cheers
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
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I thought I would forward this for those would like to participate in =
the survey but are not on the ietf-announce list. Please take the time =
to fill out the survey below.

spt

> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> From: IETF Executive Director <exec-director@ietf.org>
> Subject: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF =
meetings
> Date: May 4, 2020 at 03:03:35 EDT
> To: "IETF Announcement List" <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: ietf108planning@ietf.org
>=20
> This is a reminder that we need the IETF community to help us plan for =
the possibility that one or more upcoming IETF meetings in 2020 and =
possibly 2021 may not be able to go ahead in person.  You can help us =
with this by filling out the following survey:=20
>=20
> 	https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ
>=20
> So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or more.
>=20
> The survey contains the following pages and will take 15-20 minutes to =
complete:
>=20
> 1. Welcome
> 2. Online IETF 107 and the subsequent virtual interims
> 3. Replacing a cancelled in-person meeting
> 4. Online meeting format and timezone
> 5. Replicating humming
> 6. Replicating the hallway environment
> 7. Fees
> 8. Thanks and anything else
>=20
> We run the survey in anonymous mode which means that we only see data =
that you explicitly provide.
>=20
> Thank you in advance for your help.
>=20
> --=20
> Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair
> Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director
> Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">I thought I would forward this for those would like to =
participate in the survey but are not on the ietf-announce list. Please =
take the time to fill out the survey below.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">spt<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Begin =
forwarded message:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">From: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">IETF Executive Director &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:exec-director@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">exec-director@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Reminder: Survey =
on planning for possible online IETF meetings</b><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Date: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">May 4, 2020 at 03:03:35 EDT<br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">"IETF Announcement List" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">ietf-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br class=3D""></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif; =
color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Reply-To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf108planning@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">ietf108planning@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""></span></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">This is a reminder that we =
need the IETF community to help us plan for the possibility that one or =
more upcoming IETF meetings in 2020 and possibly 2021 may not be able to =
go ahead in person. &nbsp;You can help us with this by filling out the =
following survey: <br class=3D""><br class=3D""><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span><a =
href=3D"https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ" =
class=3D"">https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ</a><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or =
more.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The survey contains the following =
pages and will take 15-20 minutes to complete:<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">1. Welcome<br class=3D"">2. Online IETF 107 and the =
subsequent virtual interims<br class=3D"">3. Replacing a cancelled =
in-person meeting<br class=3D"">4. Online meeting format and timezone<br =
class=3D"">5. Replicating humming<br class=3D"">6. Replicating the =
hallway environment<br class=3D"">7. Fees<br class=3D"">8. Thanks and =
anything else<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">We run the survey in =
anonymous mode which means that we only see data that you explicitly =
provide.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Thank you in advance for your =
help.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- <br class=3D"">Alissa Cooper, IETF =
Chair<br class=3D"">Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director<br class=3D"">Colin=
 Perkins, IRTF Chair<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">IETF-Announce mailing list<br =
class=3D"">IETF-Announce@ietf.org<br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_DFC641EE-F5AE-47A6-A4A2-15818A281733--


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Hi,

Sorry for chiming in with delay (thanks @Chris for pinging me); I'm not
following the list very closely, feel free to additionally CC me in case.=



First of all, let me make sure I correctly understand that
 * "on-the-wire header" is what's exemplified in Fig. 4 of the draft
 * "pseudo-header" would be a superset, esp. including full epoch, full
sequence number, length, connection ID, ... -- what else?

Further, I understand there is _no_ unique mapping from pseudo-header to
on-the-wire header (as the latter may be compressed in different ways).

The latter, to me, suggests that authenticating the pseudo-header alone
may not be sufficient. It would at least allow on-path modifications to
the on-the-wire header, which I don't expect is intended.


As for the current authentication of the on-the-wire header: We [1] did
an analysis of the record layer of DTLS 1.3 (and QUIC) in which
 + we establish confidentiality, integrity and robustness ("correct
operation under adversarial manipulation")
 + of the record layer deprotecting packets with encoded/abbreviated
sequence numbers to payload fragments
 + under an adversary that can arbitrarily tamper with the packets (in
particular truncate ciphertext, i.e., modify lengths)
 + based on standard AEAD security.

However, our work did not consider
 - epochs or key updates (analysis under one key only)
 - the full header (only model encoded sequence number entering the AAD)
[- processing of payload fragments into the actual multiplexed data
streams (as in the TLS-related models Chris mentioned [2,3]; this only
applies to QUIC's application interface, and arguably is beyond the
cryptographic operations).]


Our analysis supports the arguments that:

 1) The length is implicitly authenticated through the ciphertext itself
-- tampering with the ciphertext, in particular its length, will make
AEAD decryption fail.

 2) The full sequence number is implicitly authenticated through the
nonce -- decoding the wrong sequence number will (offset by the IV)
yield a different nonce, leading AEAD decryption to fail.


As said, we didn't consider connection IDs or epochs, but for both I'm wa=
ry:

 3) Implicit connection IDs clearly aren't authenticated. I'm not sure I
fully understood the concept, but this sounds like a bad idea.

 4) I slightly disagree with "epochs determine the key" (true) as, what
I understand is, an argument that "the full epoch is implicitly
authenticated by using the right key", at least in its absoluteness. My
*guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down
to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so
probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing
security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was
authenticated as part of the AAD.


So, overall I guess my tendency would be to authenticate both what's on
the wire and the reconstructed context. At least from a crypto
perspective, this would be the safest bet. But again, this is
extrapolating beyond what our analyses cover, hence just my two cents.

Best,
Felix


[1] Marc Fischlin, Felix G=C3=BCnther, Christian Janson. Robust Channels:=

Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record Layers of QUIC and DTLS.
Preprint for QUIPS 2020 Workshop at https://felixguenther.info/Q20_RC.pdf=


[2] Marc Fischlin, Felix G=C3=BCnther, Giorgia Azzurra Marson, Kenneth G.=

Paterson. Data Is a Stream: Security of Stream-Based Channels.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1191

[3] Christopher Patton, Thomas Shrimpton. Partially Specified Channels:
The TLS 1.3 Record Layer without Elision. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/63=
4


On 2020-04-27 02:13 +0200, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
> A few of the submissions to QUIPS addressed this question for QUIC (whi=
ch has a similar construction to DTLS) and concluded that this was broadl=
y OK.  What changes is the degree to which we rely on the strength of the=
 AEAD for prevention of spoofing.
>=20
> (I'm sorry, but I can't find the paper that was most directly applicabl=
e, perhaps Felix can help out.  https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/114.pdf does=
 a pretty good job, though it is a broader treatment.)


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To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Felix_G=FCnther?= <mail@felixguenther.info>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation
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--_000_AM4PR08MB262710CF5283E28709A8E4C99BA40AM4PR08MB2627eurp_
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Hi Felix,

Thanks for chiming in!

> First of all, let me make sure I correctly understand that
>  * "on-the-wire header" is what's exemplified in Fig. 4 of the draft
>  * "pseudo-header" would be a superset, esp. including full epoch, full
> sequence number, length, connection ID, ... -- what else?

Perhaps version and content type, though at least the latter is fixed.

> Further, I understand there is _no_ unique mapping from pseudo-header to
> on-the-wire header (as the latter may be compressed in different ways).

Yes.

> The latter, to me, suggests that authenticating the pseudo-header alone
> may not be sufficient. It would at least allow on-path modifications to
> the on-the-wire header, which I don't expect is intended.

Can we go a bit into this? As mentioned in the original thread
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/
there are some (arguable) considerations of why it has practical benefits
to not cryptographically bind the header _format_ to the record.

Those considerations, however, are secondary to security considerations,
so they didn't surface here so far.

Could we therefore clarify:

Are there any _security_ concerns arising from the modifiability of the
header format assuming the underlying pseudo-header is bound via AEAD?

I don't see one so far, but might miss something. In my head, once the logi=
cal
data is authenticated, the entire on-the-wire header merely degrades to a '=
hint'
to the receiver as to what the logical header data is, the precise form of =
which
is entirely irrelevant.

_If_ there are no security concerns (and only then), I'd like to bring up t=
hose secondary
considerations from https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVF=
c6tQNWNO8OThU8/
regarding modularity, efficiency and flexibility again, arguing in favor of=
 purely logical AEAD
omitting the wire-format.

> 1) The length is implicitly authenticated through the ciphertext itself
> -- tampering with the ciphertext, in particular its length, will make
> AEAD decryption fail.
> 2) The full sequence number is implicitly authenticated through the
> nonce -- decoding the wrong sequence number will (offset by the IV)
> yield a different nonce, leading AEAD decryption to fail.

Would you expect a change in proof complexity when switching
to explicit length and sequence number authentication in the AEAD?

>  4) I slightly disagree with "epochs determine the key" (true) as, what
> I understand is, an argument that "the full epoch is implicitly
> authenticated by using the right key", at least in its absoluteness. My
> *guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down
> to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so
> probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing
> security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was
> authenticated as part of the AAD.

Yes, that matches my thinking above - it's probably practically fine, but
a formal argument gets more complex without explicit epoch authentication
because it involves the mapping { epoch id } -> { keys }.

Regards,
Hanno
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
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</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hi Felix,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Thanks for chiming in!</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>
<div class=3D"PlainText">&gt; First of all, let me make sure I correctly un=
derstand that<br>
&gt;&nbsp; * &quot;on-the-wire header&quot; is what's exemplified in Fig. 4=
 of the draft<br>
&gt;&nbsp; * &quot;pseudo-header&quot; would be a superset, esp. including =
full epoch, full<br>
&gt; sequence number, length, connection ID, ... -- what else?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Perhaps version and content type, though at least =
the latter is fixed.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">&gt; Further, I understand there is _no_ unique ma=
pping from pseudo-header to<br>
&gt; on-the-wire header (as the latter may be compressed in different ways)=
.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Yes.<br>
<br>
&gt; The latter, to me, suggests that authenticating the pseudo-header alon=
e<br>
&gt; may not be sufficient. It would at least allow on-path modifications t=
o<br>
&gt; the on-the-wire header, which I don't expect is intended.<br>
<br>
Can we go a bit into this? As mentioned in the original thread</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/t=
ls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/" id=3D"LPlnk412558">https://mailarchive.iet=
f.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/</a>&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">there are some (arguable) considerations of why it=
 has practical benefits&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">to not cryptographically bind the header _format_ =
to the record.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Those considerations, however, are secondary to se=
curity considerations,</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">so they didn't surface here so far.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Could we therefore clarify:</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Are there any _security_ concerns arising from the=
 modifiability of the<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">header format assuming the underlying pseudo-heade=
r is bound via AEAD?</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">I don't see one so far, but might miss something. =
In my head, once the logical&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">data is authenticated, the entire on-the-wire head=
er merely degrades to a 'hint'&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">to the receiver as to what the logical header data=
 is, the precise form of which</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">is entirely irrelevant.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">_If_ there are no security concerns (and only then=
), I'd like to bring up those secondary&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">considerations from&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://mailar=
chive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/" id=3D"LPlnk740693=
">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/</a=
>&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">regarding modularity, efficiency and flexibility a=
gain, arguing in favor of purely logical AEAD&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">omitting the wire-format.</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
&gt; 1) The length is implicitly authenticated through the ciphertext itsel=
f<br>
&gt; -- tampering with the ciphertext, in particular its length, will make<=
br>
&gt; AEAD decryption fail.<br>
&gt; 2) The full sequence number is implicitly authenticated through the<br=
>
&gt; nonce -- decoding the wrong sequence number will (offset by the IV)<br=
>
&gt; yield a different nonce, leading AEAD decryption to fail.<br>
<br>
Would you expect a change in proof complexity when switching</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">to explicit length and sequence number authenticat=
ion in the AEAD?</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
&gt;&nbsp; 4) I slightly disagree with &quot;epochs determine the key&quot;=
 (true) as, what<br>
&gt; I understand is, an argument that &quot;the full epoch is implicitly<b=
r>
&gt; authenticated by using the right key&quot;, at least in its absolutene=
ss. My<br>
&gt; *guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes do=
wn<br>
&gt; to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, s=
o<br>
&gt; probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing=
<br>
&gt; security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was<br>
&gt; authenticated as part of the AAD.<br>
<br>
Yes, that matches my thinking above - it's probably practically fine, but&n=
bsp;</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">a formal argument gets more complex without explic=
it epoch authentication</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">because it involves the mapping { epoch id } -&gt;=
 { keys }.<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Regards,</div>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Hanno</div>
</span></font></div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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Subject: [TLS] Traffic secrets: What's in handshake transcripts?
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As far as I can tell, secret [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret is computed
over transcript CH || SH or CH || HRR || CH || SH. (A server can compute
their secret once they've computed SH, whereas a client must wait until
they've received SH before computing their secret.) Secret
server_application_traffic_0 is computed over an extended transcript which
additionally includes EE, (optionally) CR, (optionally) CT & CV, and FIN,
and secret client_application_traffic_0 further extends that transcript to
include (optionally) EndOfEarlyData, (optionally) CT, (optionally) CV, and
FIN. Is that right?


Best regards,

Ben

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<div dir=3D"ltr">As far as I can tell, secret [sender]_handshake_traffic_se=
cret is computed over transcript CH || SH or CH || HRR || CH || SH. (A serv=
er can compute their secret once they&#39;ve computed SH, whereas a client =
must wait until they&#39;ve received SH before computing their secret.) Sec=
ret server_application_traffic_0 is computed over an extended transcript wh=
ich additionally includes EE, (optionally) CR, (optionally) CT &amp; CV, an=
d FIN, and secret client_application_traffic_0 further extends that transcr=
ipt to include (optionally) EndOfEarlyData, (optionally) CT, (optionally) C=
V, and FIN. Is that right?<br><br><br>Best regards,<br><br>Ben</div>

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Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 17:12:04 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS
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On Fri, May 1, 2020, at 14:51, Martin Thomson wrote:
> Thanks to some good work from Felix G=C3=BCnther, Marc Fischlin, Chris=
tian=20
> Janson, and Kenny Paterson we now have a new result to share about the=
=20
> integrity limits in QUIC.
>=20
> There is a long write-up in=20
> https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3619, the conclusion of=20=

> which is that endpoints need to count the number of failed decryptions=
=20
> and stop using keys once a certain limit is reached.  Key updates can=20=

> be used to avoid this.
>=20
> The same concern applies to DTLS.  I believe that the same solution -=20=

> or at least a similar solution - is therefore necessary for DTLS.
>=20
> I know that we're past WGLC, but this is an important result regarding=
=20
> a key distinction between TLS and DTLS.

News here is that we resolved some issues with AEAD_AES_128_CCM.

For TLS, we need to resolve what to do with AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8.  For tho=
se who don't want to read a long issue, the number of forgery attempts p=
ermitted has to be less than 2^6 to keep the same bounds as other cipher=
s.  That's not very useful.  TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 is already a non-r=
ecommended cipher, so we're good there.  But it might still be good to h=
ave some parameters for it, even if it is guarded with some warning labe=
ls about differences in security margins.


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Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 15:52:43 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to... something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share it! 

Thanks,
Chris (no hat)

[1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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ECHO is more fun to say, but I do see how it can be confusing (sounding =
like some sort of ping) when out of the context of TLS.

To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=9D=
.

Thanks,
Tommy

> On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to... =
something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR =
include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the =
HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got =
this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an =
opinion on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share =
it!=20
>=20
> Thanks,
> Chris (no hat)
>=20
> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <bc04e657-a5bd-911c-7aa1-f2b7f0044696@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 00:05:45 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/cFPWurQqY9YTVRjwzSVwp2D62K0>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <bc04e657-a5bd-911c-7aa1-f2b7f0044696@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
References: <a8fc0d18-7fe0-4bee-84d3-767fadb914a9@www.fastmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <a8fc0d18-7fe0-4bee-84d3-767fadb914a9@www.fastmail.com>

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On 07/05/2020 23:52, Christopher Wood wrote:
> Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO
> to... something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates
> from the PR include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and
> EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it
> would be good if we got this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that
> end, if you have an opinion on the name and whether or not we should
> change it, please share it!

I don't care as long as it's decided asap.

S

>=20
> Thanks, Chris (no hat)
>=20
> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
>=20
> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 19:06:52 -0400
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To: Tommy Pauly <tpauly=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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'ELLO

On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:03 PM Tommy Pauly
<tpauly=3D40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> ECHO is more fun to say, but I do see how it can be confusing (sounding l=
ike some sort of ping) when out of the context of TLS.
>
> To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=
=9D.
>
> Thanks,
> Tommy
>
> > On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrot=
e:
> >
> > Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to... =
something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR inc=
lude ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSVC=
 draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got this bikes=
hedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion on the name=
 and whether or not we should change it, please share it!
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Chris (no hat)
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls



--=20
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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--000000000000be8d2f05a517e1d8
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+1 on sooner rather than later

tim
terrible at picking colors

On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:06 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 07/05/2020 23:52, Christopher Wood wrote:
> > Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO
> > to... something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates
> > from the PR include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and
> > EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it
> > would be good if we got this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that
> > end, if you have an opinion on the name and whether or not we should
> > change it, please share it!
>
> I don't care as long as it's decided asap.
>
> S
>
> >
> > Thanks, Chris (no hat)
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
> >
> > _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000be8d2f05a517e1d8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:monospac=
e">+1 on sooner rather than later<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" sty=
le=3D"font-family:monospace"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:monospace">tim=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl=
e=3D"font-family:monospace"></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:monospace">terrible at picking colors=C2=A0</div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 7, 20=
20 at 7:06 PM Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.=
ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 07/05/2020 23:52, Christopher Wood wrote:<br>
&gt; Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO<br>
&gt; to... something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates<br>
&gt; from the PR include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and<br>
&gt; EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it<br>
&gt; would be good if we got this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that<=
br>
&gt; end, if you have an opinion on the name and whether or not we should<b=
r>
&gt; change it, please share it!<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t care as long as it&#39;s decided asap.<br>
<br>
S<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks, Chris (no hat)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-=
tls-esni/issues/232</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list <br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 03:52:43PM -0700, Christopher Wood wrote:

> Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...
> something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the
> PR include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since
> the HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if
> we got this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have
> an opinion on the name and whether or not we should change it, please
> share it! 

Well, there's the Russian for "Hello": привет.  Which in a Latin
alphabet would be written "privyet" (pronounced more like pree-vyet).
The cuteness factor is that it starts with "priv" for privacy.  E.
Snowden can probably pronounce it correctly by now. :-)

-- 
    Viktor.

Looking forward to all those TLS PRIVYET messages.


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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> On May 7, 2020, at 19:03, Tommy Pauly =
<tpauly=3D40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=
=9D.

If we could just work an =E2=80=9Ca" and =E2=80=9Csketch=E2=80=9D into =
the name =E2=80=A6 I am all in.

More seriously, let=E2=80=99s knock this decision out by end of next =
week, i.e., the 15th.

spt=


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 00:12:46 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 11:00 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On May 7, 2020, at 19:03, Tommy Pauly <tpauly=3D40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.=
org>
> wrote:
> >
> > To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=
=80=9D.
>
> If we could just work an =E2=80=9Ca" and =E2=80=9Csketch=E2=80=9D into th=
e name =E2=80=A6 I am all in.
>
> More seriously, let=E2=80=99s knock this decision out by end of next week=
, i.e.,
> the 15th.
>

It doesn't matter, and I don't care what it is called.

Very few people on the planet know what this is, so leaving "ECHO" is fine
too.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 11:00 PM Sean Turn=
er &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On May 7, 2020, at 19:03, Tommy Pauly &lt;tpauly=3D<a href=3D"mailto:4=
0apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=
=80=9D.<br>
<br>
If we could just work an =E2=80=9Ca&quot; and =E2=80=9Csketch=E2=80=9D into=
 the name =E2=80=A6 I am all in.<br>
<br>
More seriously, let=E2=80=99s knock this decision out by end of next week, =
i.e., the 15th.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It doesn&#39;t matter, =
and I don&#39;t care what it is called.</div><div><br></div><div>Very few p=
eople on the planet know what this is, so leaving &quot;ECHO&quot; is fine =
too.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
/div></div>

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From: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 12:30:37 -0400
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To: Tommy Pauly <tpauly=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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+1 to "ETCH"

Any objections to that or concerns with that?
(Agreed it would be good to finalize this ASAP.)

On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:03 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly=3D
40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> ECHO is more fun to say, but I do see how it can be confusing (sounding
> like some sort of ping) when out of the context of TLS.
>
> To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=
=9D.
>
> Thanks,
> Tommy
>
> > On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> wrote:
> >
> > Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...
> something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR
> include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the
> HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got
> this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion
> on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share it!
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Chris (no hat)
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,s=
ans-serif">+1 to &quot;ETCH&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">Any objections to that or concerns w=
ith that?=C2=A0 <br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:tahoma,sans-serif">(Agreed it would be good to finalize this ASAP.)<br></d=
iv></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_att=
r">On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:03 PM Tommy Pauly &lt;tpauly=3D<a href=3D"mailt=
o:40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">ECHO is more fun to=
 say, but I do see how it can be confusing (sounding like some sort of ping=
) when out of the context of TLS.<br>
<br>
To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=9D=
.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Tommy<br>
<br>
&gt; On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw=
@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...=
 something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR in=
clude ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSV=
C draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got this bike=
shedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion on the nam=
e and whether or not we should change it, please share it! <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Chris (no hat)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-=
tls-esni/issues/232</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Subject: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
>
> NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-
> Establishment Schemes) is currently a draft in review.... with a deadline of
> May 15.  That is not a lot of time.  The NIST crypto group is currently 
> unlikely
> to include HKDF, which means that TLS 1.3 would not be part of FIPS. The
> CMVP folks at NIST understand this, and agree that this would be bad; they 
> are
> looking at adding it, perhaps via an Implementation Guidance update.

[DB] But NIST Draft SP 800-56Cr2 cites RFC 5869, which is HKDF, and says HKDF 
is a version of 56C Section 5.1. So, I had thought that 56C would allow HKDF. 
What am I missing?


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 21:08:06 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 21:28:15 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>
>
> >    [DB] But NIST Draft SP 800-56Cr2 cites RFC 5869, which is HKDF, and 
> > says
> HKDF
>     is a version of 56C Section 5.1. So, I had thought that 56C would allow 
> HKDF.
>     What am I missing?
>
> It cites it, but doesn't include it in the 800-56 doc.

To be clear, are you saying that RFC 5869 HKDF is not compatible with 
800-56Cr2?

(I had assumed they were compatible, but just used different notation for the 
same idea.)

Looking just now, I see 800-56C refers to 800-108, whose Section 5.2, KDF in 
Feedback Mode looks really close to HKDF in RFC 5869.  I see the same overall 
design, but some different orderings of inputs, which could cause non-interop. 
Is that the case?


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Date: Fri, 08 May 2020 17:29:26 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hMcskXkWU6rJ2FuwX2lpKlti0u4>
Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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On Fri, May 8, 2020, at 17:08, Salz, Rich wrote:
> It cites it, but doesn't include it in the 800-56 doc.

Maybe I'm confused too, but it sounds like it's included to me. The
definition of the KDF includes:

> The  first  (randomness-extraction)  step  uses  either  HMAC  =E2=80=A6=
 If
> HMAC-hash is used in the randomness- extraction step, then the same
> HMAC-hash (i.e., using the same hash function, hash) shall be used as
> the PRF in the key-expansion step

This sounds like this would allow for HKDF as defined in RFC 5869 (which=

as far as I can tell is the same thing except with HMAC required in both=

steps instead of giving you the option of using AES-CMAC), unless I've
misunderstood something (not being anywhere near an expert on this
topic, this is quite possible =E2=80=94 even likely).

Afterwards, it cites 5869 in such a way that sounds like it's saying
that it's a subset of the approved algorithm (although "a version" is
vague and confusing):

> [RFC 5869] specifies a version of the above extraction-then-expansion
> key-derivation procedure using HMAC for both the extraction and
> expansion steps. For an extensive discussion concerning the rationale
> for the extract-and-expand mechanisms specified in this
> Recommendation, see [LNCS 6223].

The last citation in that paragraph to LNCS 6223 appears to give a long
justification for why HKDF is secure, which all together makes it sound
like HKDF is an approved algorithm and thus TLS 1.3 will be okay.

=E2=80=94Sam

--=20
Sam Whited


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From: Yevgeniy Dodis <dodis@cs.nyu.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 17:52:56 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, Harish Karthikeyan <hk2617@nyu.edu>, Sandro Coretti <corettis@gmail.com>, Stefano Tessaro <tessaro@cs.washington.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Dear all.

I just now noticed the call for comment for SP-800-56c. Please note
the state-of-the-art paper
on seedless randomness extraction in the recent CRYPTO'19 paper by
Sandro Coretti, Harish Karthikeyan, Stefano Tessaro and myself:
"Seedless Fruit is the Sweetest: Random Number Generation, Revisited",

https://cs.nyu.edu/~dodis/ps/seedless.pdf

Along its results, it strongly advises AGAINST using CBC-mode, such as
AES-CMAC, for
randomness extraction. It also gives very clean randomness extraction
modules based on
existing functions, such as SHA2 and SHA3, and also analyzes HKDF.

I (and likely my co-authors, cc'ed) will be happy to work with NIST on
making sure they follow state-of-the-art recommendation validated by
the top conferences such as CRYPTO. I admit I did not read the
document in detail, but it looks like it does not include any of the
optimized constructions from our paper, but still includes (at least
theoretically) insecure CMAC mode.

Can somebody recommend a proper course of action if my suspicion is correct=
?

Yevgeniy

On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 4:21 PM Salz, Rich
<rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> If you don=E2=80=99t care about FIPS-140, just delete this message, and a=
void the temptation to argue how bad it is.
>
> NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establi=
shment Schemes) is currently a draft in review. The document is at https://=
csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft  Email comments ca=
n be sent to 800-56C_Comments@nist.gov with a deadline of May 15.  That is =
not a lot of time.  The NIST crypto group is currently unlikely to include =
HKDF, which means that TLS 1.3 would not be part of FIPS. The CMVP folks at=
 NIST understand this, and agree that this would be bad; they are looking a=
t adding it, perhaps via an Implementation Guidance update.
>
> If you have a view of HKDF (and perhaps TLS 1.3), I strongly encourage yo=
u to comment at the above address.  Please do not comment here. I know that=
 many members of industry and academia have been involved with TLS 1.3, and=
 performed security analysis of it. If you are one of those people, *please=
* send email and ask the NIST Crypto Team to reconsider.
>
> Thank you.
>         /r$
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 15:38:33 -0700
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To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Cc: Tommy Pauly <tpauly=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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I rather prefer ECHO.

-Ekr



On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 9:31 AM Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:

> +1 to "ETCH"
>
> Any objections to that or concerns with that?
> (Agreed it would be good to finalize this ASAP.)
>
> On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:03 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly=3D
> 40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> ECHO is more fun to say, but I do see how it can be confusing (sounding
>> like some sort of ping) when out of the context of TLS.
>>
>> To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=
=9D..
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tommy
>>
>> > On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...
>> something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR
>> include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the
>> HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got
>> this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinio=
n
>> on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share it!
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> > Chris (no hat)
>> >
>> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I rather prefer ECHO.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-E=
kr</div><div><br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, =
May 8, 2020 at 9:31 AM Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik%2Bietf@nygren=
.org" target=3D"_blank">erik+ietf@nygren.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"=
font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">+1 to &quot;ETCH&quot;</div><div style=3D"fo=
nt-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,san=
s-serif">Any objections to that or concerns with that?=C2=A0 <br></div><div=
 style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">(Agreed it would be good to finali=
ze this ASAP.)<br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 7:03 PM Tommy Pauly &lt;tpau=
ly=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40appl=
e.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">ECHO is more fun to say, but I do see how it can be con=
fusing (sounding like some sort of ping) when out of the context of TLS.<br=
>
<br>
To that end, I=E2=80=99d have a minor preference for =E2=80=9CETCH=E2=80=9D=
..<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Tommy<br>
<br>
&gt; On May 7, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw=
@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...=
 something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR in=
clude ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSV=
C draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got this bike=
shedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion on the nam=
e and whether or not we should change it, please share it! <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Chris (no hat)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-=
tls-esni/issues/232</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I rather prefer ECHO.

Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion, other than
your personal preference?

-Ben


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=
40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I rather prefer ECHO.
>
> Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion, other
> than
> your personal preference?
>

There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the name
does not matter).

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin K=
aduk &lt;bkaduk=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40akamai.c=
om@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:3=
3PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; I rather prefer ECHO.<br>
<br>
Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion, other th=
an<br>
your personal preference?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There&#39;s n=
o confusion. I couldn&#39;t believe the issue was raised (the name does not=
 matter).</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div></div>

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Date: Sat, 09 May 2020 08:34:17 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jonathan Hoyland" <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>, "Alexey Melnikov" <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/pcnK8-bZKf4Vh1Lg88vepYdT3Yo>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Export Channel Binding
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Hi all,

After thinking about this a little more, I think we should keep the
draft generic and not make it SCRAM specific. While I generally agree
with Jonathan's defense-in-depth strategy, there is also value in having=

a direct replacement for tls-unique that can be substituted in
everywhere tls-unique is used to make the upgrade path easier. If we do
that, we can always add a SCRAM specific channel binding type later on
and slowly start the process of upgrading the n-places that use tls-
unique with protocol specific binding types.

Thoughts?

=E2=80=94Sam

On Mon, May 4, 2020, at 12:56, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> Hi Alexey
>
> On Mon, 4 May 2020 at 16:23, Alexey Melnikov
> <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> wrote:
> > Hi Jonathan,
> >
> >  On 04/05/2020 14:14, Jonathan Hoyland wrote:
> >  > Hi Sam,
> >  >
> >  > If you wanted to use a SCRAM based SASL auth then you could pick
> >  > `p=3DSCRAM-SHA256-PLUS`, or any other very specific IANA-register=
ed
> >  > string, and update the SCRAM RFC to require that string with TLS
> >  > 1.3. You actively don't want for the same channel binding to be
> >  >      an input to multiple different protocols (or even the same
> >  >      protocol but with different parameters) because it opens the=

> >  >      door to confusion attacks.
> >
> >  Can you elaborate on what you are trying to protect from?
> >
>
> If two protocols use the same channel binding there is a risk that the=

> messages from one can be confused with the messages from the other.
> This might happen accidentally, or an adversary might be able to forge=

> one from the other. If you wanted to do a formal analysis of the of
> the security of TLS 1.3
> + SCRAM then a generic binding means you have to factor in what every
>   other possible protocol might do. If you use a unique and specific
>   channel binding then the analysis is far easier and can be a lot
>   more robust (this assumes a global coordinator of unique strings,
>   such as IANA). From an analysis perspective it's easier to rule out
>   classes of attacks than to consider all possible interactions
>   between all users of the interface, some of which you won't know
>   about, or perhaps haven't even been invented yet.
>
> >  Historically channel bindings were constant once TLS negotiation
> >  was complete (they could change if TLS renegotiation happens). So
> >  they never depended on what was sent over the protocol above TLS.
> >
>
> Yeah, I think the design in TLS 1.3 is much more robust, especially
> from a formal analysis perspective. By constructing channel bindings
> based on the parameters negotiated over the top you get a belt-and-
> braces design. If you have a contributive channel binding [1] then if
> the security of either the underlying protocol (in this case TLS) or
> the over-the-top protocol (in this case SCRAM) fails, then the channel=

> binding guarantees the authentication still happened properly.
> Consider the case where an adversary publishes the server's private
> key to twitter. If you have a contributive channel binding then if the=

> SCRAM handshake succeeds you could be sure that you were talking to
> the real server, and weren't being MITMed. If you don't base the
> channel binding on the parameters agreed in the upper protocol it's
> possible (in theory) that an adversary could compute two SCRAM
> handshakes that appear to succeed, but that actually agree different
> parameters. In this particular case it's not obvious how that could
> happen, but it's easy to think up pathological examples, and [1] has a=

> few concrete examples too.
> >  > I've only skimmed the SCRAM RFC, but it might make sense to
> >  > include `client-first-message` and `server-first-message` as
> >  > context to the exporter interface, because it seems that the
> >  > channel binding isn't needed until the `client-final-message`.
> >
> >  "the channel binding isn't needed until the `client-final-message`"=

> >  is correct. Can you elaborate on what is problematic with this?
>
> Sorry if I was unclear, there's nothing problematic with this per se.
> It's just that the channel binding can't be dependent on itself, but
> including everything that precedes the channel binding just seems like=

> an easy win, esp. as (in this case) that includes all parameter
> negotiation.
>
> >
> >  > The idea is to use the transcript to bind the channel binding to
> >  > the negotiation of SCRAM parameters, and thus allow you to define=

> >  > a single "TLS-SASL-SCRAM" string (or whatever makes sense),
> >  > rather than have one for each possible set of parameters.
> >  > Obviously you'd need to think some more about whether that was
> >  > actually secure, but at first glance it seems like a reasonable
> >  > approach.
> >  >
> >  > Channel bindings that bind both the underlying channel and the
> >  > higher-level protocol make more sense to me that channel bindings=

> >  > that only identify the underlying channel, because you don't have=

> >  > to worry about the (potentially pathological) behaviours of other=

> >  > users of the binding.
> >  >
> >  Best Regards,
> >
> >  Alexey
> >
> Regards,
>
> Jonathan
>
> [1] Bhargavan, Karthikeyan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, and Alfredo
>     Pironti. "Verified Contributive Channel Bindings for Compound
>     Authentication." *NDSS*. 2015.
>     https://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/karthik/pubs/verified-ch=
annel-bindings-ndss15.pdf

--=20
Sam Whited


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 11:40:49 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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On Sat, May 9, 2020 at 9:08 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
wrote:
>
> Sorry for the confusion I caused.
>
> HKDF is part of SP 800-56C.  NIST says that what TLS 1.3 does isn't quite
the same, and therefore will not be covered by 56C. NIST wants to get TLS
1.3 validated for FIPS, and is currently trying to figure out how to do
so.  The comment period for 56C closes Friday, and getting the TLS 1.3 KDF
accepted into that is one way to get TLS 1.3 into FIPS.

Well, now I'm really confused. Can't NIST look at the spec and ensure they
have documents covering all parts of TLS 1.3 for FIPS?

>
> Hope this helps clear things up.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--000000000000da593405a538f075
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<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
<br>
On Sat, May 9, 2020 at 9:08 AM Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40a=
kamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">40akamai.com=
@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Sorry for the confusion I caused.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; HKDF is part of SP 800-56C.=C2=A0 NIST says that what TLS 1.3 does isn=
&#39;t quite the same, and therefore will not be covered by 56C. NIST wants=
 to get TLS 1.3 validated for FIPS, and is currently trying to figure out h=
ow to do so.=C2=A0 The comment period for 56C closes Friday, and getting th=
e TLS 1.3 KDF accepted into that is one way to get TLS 1.3 into FIPS.<br>
<br>
Well, now I&#39;m really confused. Can&#39;t NIST look at the spec and ensu=
re they have documents covering all parts of TLS 1.3 for FIPS?<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hope this helps clear things up.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">T=
LS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</=
a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br></div>

--000000000000da593405a538f075--


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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/V6OkClTQmhtWLcCcMp8Mpm0kp_o>
Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Rich,

Check out SP 800-52r2. Section 3.1 includes the following:

servers =E2=80=A6 should be configured to negotiate TLS 1.3.

and

Agencies shall support TLS 1.3 by January 1, 2024.

=E2=80=9Cshould=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cshall=E2=80=9D are defined in RFC =
2119. One could make the case that you are already there ;} If not, then =
I=E2=80=99m going to guess that SP 800-135r1, which includes a bunch of =
Application-Specific KDFs (e.g., IKEv2, TLS 1.2) needs a rev.

spt

> On May 9, 2020, at 09:07, Salz, Rich =
<rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Sorry for the confusion I caused.
>=20
> HKDF is part of SP 800-56C.  NIST says that what TLS 1.3 does isn't =
quite the same, and therefore will not be covered by 56C. NIST wants to =
get TLS 1.3 validated for FIPS, and is currently trying to figure out =
how to do so.  The comment period for 56C closes Friday, and getting the =
TLS 1.3 KDF accepted into that is one way to get TLS 1.3 into FIPS.
>=20
> Hope this helps clear things up.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
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FYI: This PR has been merged.

Best,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

On Mon, May 4, 2020, at 10:08 AM, Christopher Wood wrote:
> Thanks, Alessandro! We'll aim to merge this PR on Friday. We ask that 
> folks review it before then. 
> 
>    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/5
> 
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
> 
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2020, at 10:45 AM, Alessandro Ghedini wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 24, 2019 at 11:27:26AM -0500, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 8:40 AM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > 
> > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 08:18:47PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > > On Friday, 22 November 2019 03:25:24 CET, David Benjamin wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 8:35 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2" draft available
> > > > > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/.
> > > > > > > Please review the document and send your comments to the list by
> > > > 2359 UTC
> > > > > > > on 13 December 2019.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I just re-read this.  Looks good. Perhaps a sentence of rationale in
> > > > ...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > To that end, the combination of client advice in sections 2 and 4 is a
> > > > bit
> > > > > > odd. Section 2 uses SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1, but section 4
> > > > says
> > > > > > the client MUST NOT accept the MD5 SHA-1, even if it included it. Why
> > > > would
> > > > > > the client include it in that case? It seems the two should either
> > > > both be
> > > > > > MUST NOT or both be SHOULD NOT.
> > > > >
> > > > > because it also influences certificate selection, and getting a
> > > > certificate
> > > > > signed with SHA-1 isn't an automatically disqualifying property?
> > > > > (it may be an intermediate CA that's not used, it may be an explicitly
> > > > > trusted
> > > > > certificate, etc.)
> > > >
> > > > If you don't want SHA-1 exchange signatures, you darn sure do not want
> > > > actual SHA-1 certificates that are not trust anchors anyway. And because
> > > > TLS 1.2 does not have separate lists for exchange signatures and
> > > > certificate signatures, the client needs to withdraw advertisment for
> > > > both in order to not send a misleading offer.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > Right, I had a longer discussion of the certificate-but-not-TLS case but
> > > omitted it. :-) Basically what Ilari said. In particular, I believe older
> > > versions of Schannel will, despite being able to sign SHA-256,
> > > preferentially sign SHA-1 if the client offers it. This is inconvenient
> > > when it comes to predicting breakage but is perfectly consistent with the
> > > client's offer. When I last looked at this a few years ago, this accounted
> > > for a nontrivial portion of SHA-1-negotiating servers on the web, so
> > > rejecting SHA-1 while still advertising it is probably not the best
> > > strategy.
> > > 
> > > Fortunately, we've already distrusted SHA-1 X.509 signatures on the web, so
> > > hopefully that will simplify things. There is a risk that some servers'
> > > trust anchors' (otherwise irrelevant) signatures are SHA-1 and they are
> > > trying to match it against the signature algorithms list, but I expect the
> > > SHA-1-preferring servers to be the deciding concern. Issues with
> > > trust-anchor-checking servers can likely be worked around by configuring
> > > the server to not send the trust anchor, which is desirable anyway.
> > > 
> > > (All of this may not apply to non-web deployments, of course.)
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > And I expect that in practice, not sending SHA-1 in
> > > > signature_algorithms would cause very little breakage on top of what
> > > > is already broken due to using SHA-1 exchange signatures.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > So I think both should be MUST NOT.
> > 
> > So, based on this discussion, I made the following PR to change this to MUST NOT
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/5
> > 
> > Thanks for the review!
> > 
> > Cheers
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC4)
  1 issues created:
  - Bikeshed: finalize on naming of "ECHO" (by enygren)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=20

  2 issues received 4 new comments:
  - #232 Bikeshed: finalize on naming of "ECHO" (3 by enygren, martinthomso=
n)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=20
  - #216 Clarify ECHOConfig (HTTPSSVC) extension purpose (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/216=20

  4 issues closed:
  - Clarify ECHOConfig (HTTPSSVC) extension purpose https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/216=20
  - User tracking via ESNI keys https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esn=
i/issues/146 [help wanted]=20
  - Limit "Don't stick out" to explicit signals https://github.com/tlswg/dr=
aft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/215=20
  - Include "receiver anonymity" as motivation for empty record_digest valu=
es https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/205=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Should sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismatch S=
ignatureSchemeList in client dc extension? (by william-zk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/64=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  2 pull requests merged:
  - Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms exte=
nsion
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/5=20
  - Add reference to transcript collision paper
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/6=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC4)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Fix remaining HPKE issues. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/231=20

  2 pull requests received 4 new comments:
  - #226 Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage. (2 by MikeBishop, =
chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=20
  - #224 Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points. (2 by c=
hris-wood, ocheron)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=20

  7 pull requests merged:
  - Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=20
  - Add information about per-client tracking via unique ECHOConfig structu=
res
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/230=20
  - Clarify "do not stick out" signals.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/227=20
  - Fix remaining HPKE issues.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/231=20
  - padding scheme text
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/209=20
  - Deterministic padding
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/225=20
  - Clarify need for optional record digests.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/228=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<body>
<h1>Sunday May 10, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC4)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#232 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
32">Bikeshed: finalize on naming of &quot;ECHO&quot;</a> (by enygren) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 issues received 4 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#232 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
32">Bikeshed: finalize on naming of &quot;ECHO&quot;</a> (3 by enygren, mar=
tinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#216 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
16">Clarify ECHOConfig (HTTPSSVC) extension purpose</a> (1 by chris-wood) <=
/li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#216 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
16">Clarify ECHOConfig (HTTPSSVC) extension purpose</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#146 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
46">User tracking via ESNI keys</a> <span class=3D"label" style=3D"backgrou=
nd-color: #008672; color: #ffffff">help wanted</span> </li>
 =20
  <li>#215 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
15">Limit &quot;Don&#x27;t stick out&quot; to explicit signals</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#205 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
05">Include &quot;receiver anonymity&quot; as motivation for empty record_d=
igest values</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#64 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/64">Shoul=
d sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismatch SignatureS=
chemeList in client dc extension?</a> (by william-zk) </li>
  </ul>





<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>


  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#5 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/5">Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorit=
hms extension</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#6 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/6">Add reference to transcript collision paper</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC4)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#231 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/231=
">Fix remaining HPKE issues.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 4 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#226 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=
">Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage.</a> (2 by MikeBishop, chr=
is-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#224 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/224=
">Replace ECHOConfig TLS ciphersuites with HPKE code points.</a> (2 by chri=
s-wood, ocheron) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>7 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#226 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/226=
">Provide guidance on ECHOConfig extension usage.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#230 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/230=
">Add information about per-client tracking via unique ECHOConfig structure=
s</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#227 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/227=
">Clarify &quot;do not stick out&quot; signals.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#231 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/231=
">Fix remaining HPKE issues.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#209 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/209=
">padding scheme text</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#225 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/225=
">Deterministic padding</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#228 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/228=
">Clarify need for optional record digests.</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============2123620353453815693==--


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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Hi Rob,

On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:
> On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=
> 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > I rather prefer ECHO.
> >
> > Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion, other
> > than
> > your personal preference?
> >
> 
> There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the name
> does not matter).

I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have
the confidence to make such a blanket statement ("there's no confusion") that
in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent supporting
evidence.  If someone appears and says that they are confused, what are you
going to tell them?

-Ben


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 12:37:55 -0700
Message-ID: <CAChr6SyPvdy_g8NOE82VH_SEwP0phQPzr_LS8dk9L1JpT8H4Cg@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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--00000000000093306405a5505e47
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:10 AM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> Hi Rob,
>
> On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:
> > On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=
> > 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > > I rather prefer ECHO.
> > >
> > > Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion,
> other
> > > than
> > > your personal preference?
> > >
> >
> > There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the name
> > does not matter).
>
> I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have
> the confidence to make such a blanket statement ("there's no confusion")
> that
> in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent supporting
> evidence.


I don't believe it makes sense to demand "evidence" on a completely
subjective issue.

As I wrote in my other email in this thread, not very many people on the
planet are going to need to know what this is. I haven't run into
anyone confused as I've worked on it, and the name was presented 6 months
ago at IETF 106.


> If someone appears and says that they are confused, what are you
> going to tell them?
>

That all of the proposals collide with other meanings too (ETH, ETCH, etc).
This is one reason we expand acronyms on first use in IETF documents.

I don't think there's confusion here, but just preferences and annoyances.
The choice also doesn't matter to me.

thanks,
Rob

--00000000000093306405a5505e47
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:10 AM Benj=
amin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Rob=
,<br>
<br>
On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;bkaduk=3D<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40aka=
mai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br=
>
&gt; &gt; &gt; I rather prefer ECHO.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion=
, other<br>
&gt; &gt; than<br>
&gt; &gt; your personal preference?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; There&#39;s no confusion. I couldn&#39;t believe the issue was raised =
(the name<br>
&gt; does not matter).<br>
<br>
I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have<br>
the confidence to make such a blanket statement (&quot;there&#39;s no confu=
sion&quot;) that<br>
in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent supporting<b=
r>
evidence.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t believe it makes sens=
e to demand &quot;evidence&quot; on a completely subjective issue.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>As I wrote in my other=C2=A0email in this=C2=A0thread, not=
 very many people on the planet are going to need to know what this is. I h=
aven&#39;t run into anyone=C2=A0confused as I&#39;ve worked on it, and the =
name was presented 6 months ago at IETF 106.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> If someone appears and says that=
 they are confused, what are you<br>
going to tell them?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That all of the pro=
posals collide with other=C2=A0meanings too (ETH, ETCH, etc). This is one r=
eason we expand acronyms on first use in IETF documents.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>I don&#39;t think there&#39;s confusion here, but just preferences a=
nd annoyances. The choice also doesn&#39;t matter to me.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=
</div></div></div>

--00000000000093306405a5505e47--


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From: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 12:09:36 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/h4LgfxPIIXPEcD7rMsMAXpPlNNg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Rich, Sean and all,

1) Traditionally, a HKDF-Extract is used to extract entropy from a DH type =
shared secret. However, the first HKDF-Extract in the key schedule takes a =
PSK instead of a DH shared secret.

We don't see security problems with this instance in TLS 1.3. NIST requires=
 the PSK to have efficient amount of entropy (to achieve a security strengt=
h required by NIST) when it is externally generated. When it is externally =
generated, one of NIST's approved random bit generation methods in SP 800-9=
0 series must be used.

When the PSK is a resumption key, then its original key exchange and its ke=
y derivation function(s) must meet the security strength desired/required f=
or the PSK.

NIST plans to allow/approve the function in SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3, item=
 # 3 on pages 22 and 23: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublicati=
ons/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf

2) Traditionally, HKDF is extract-then-expand. However, in TLS 1.3, we have=
 extract-then-multiple expands.

We don't see security problems for this new version of HKDF as specified in=
 TLS 1.3.  NIST plans to approve a general method for this approach in SP 8=
00-56C revision 2, section 5.3: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPu=
blications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf

NIST plans to handle the issues above that way to avoid repeating the work =
when one or both of the same HKDF instances or new variant(s) for one or bo=
th of them is/are used in different application(s).

The other KDFs are already compliant with NIST's existing KDFs.

Regards,
Quynh.
Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes<http=
s://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.p=
df>
23 . Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56C 24 . Revision 2 25 Recommendati=
on for Key-Derivation 26 . Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes 27 . 28 . 2=
9 Elaine Barker 30 Lily Chen 31 Computer Security Division 32 . Information=
 Technology Laboratory
nvlpubs.nist.gov

________________________________
From: Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> on behalf of Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D40akama=
i.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 4:21 PM
To: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>; cfrg@ietf.org <cfrg@ietf.org>
Subject: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)

If you don=92t care about FIPS-140, just delete this message, and avoid the=
 temptation to argue how bad it is.

NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establish=
ment Schemes) is currently a draft in review. The document is at https://cs=
rc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft  Email comments can =
be sent to 800-56C_Comments@nist.gov with a deadline of May 15.  That is no=
t a lot of time.  The NIST crypto group is currently unlikely to include HK=
DF, which means that TLS 1.3 would not be part of FIPS. The CMVP folks at N=
IST understand this, and agree that this would be bad; they are looking at =
adding it, perhaps via an Implementation Guidance update.

If you have a view of HKDF (and perhaps TLS 1.3), I strongly encourage you =
to comment at the above address.  Please do not comment here. I know that m=
any members of industry and academia have been involved with TLS 1.3, and p=
erformed security analysis of it. If you are one of those people, *please* =
send email and ask the NIST Crypto Team to reconsider.

Thank you.
        /r$



_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.irt=
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<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hi Rich, Sean and all,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
1) Traditionally, a HKDF-Extract is used to extract entropy from a DH type =
shared secret. However, the first HKDF-Extract in the key schedule takes a =
PSK instead of a DH shared secret.&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
We don't see security problems with this instance in TLS 1.3. NIST requires=
 the PSK to have efficient amount of entropy (to achieve a security strengt=
h required by NIST) when it is externally generated. When it is externally =
generated, one of NIST's approved
 random bit generation methods in SP 800-90 series must be used.&nbsp;</div=
>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
When the PSK is a resumption key, then its original key exchange and its ke=
y derivation function(s) must meet the security strength desired/required f=
or the PSK.&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
NIST plans to allow/approve the function in SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3, item=
 # 3 on pages 22 and 23:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/=
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/n=
istpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf</a></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
2) Traditionally, HKDF is extract-then-expand. However, in TLS 1.3, we have=
 extract-then-multiple expands.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
We don't see security problems for this new version of HKDF as specified in=
 TLS 1.3.&nbsp; NIST plans to approve a general method for this approach in=
 SP 800-56C revision 2, section 5.3:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.g=
ov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf" id=3D"LPlnk455=
986">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr=
2-draft.pdf</a></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
NIST plans to handle the issues above that way to avoid repeating the work =
when one or both of the same HKDF instances or new variant(s) for one or bo=
th of them is/are used in different application(s).</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
The other KDFs are already compliant with NIST's existing KDFs.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Regards,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Quynh.&nbsp;</div>
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<a target=3D"_blank" id=3D"LPUrlAnchor229907" href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.=
gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf" style=3D"text=
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23 . Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56C 24 . Revision 2 25 Recommendati=
on for Key-Derivation 26 . Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes 27 . 28 . 2=
9 Elaine Barker 30 Lily Chen 31 Computer Security Division 32 . Information=
 Technology Laboratory</div>
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nvlpubs.nist.gov</div>
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<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Cfrg &lt;cfrg-bounces=
@irtf.org&gt; on behalf of Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.o=
rg&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, May 8, 2020 4:21 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> tls@ietf.org &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;; cfrg@ietf.org &lt;cfrg@ietf.o=
rg&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)</=
font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
">
<div class=3D"PlainText">If you don=92t care about FIPS-140, just delete th=
is message, and avoid the temptation to argue how bad it is.<br>
<br>
NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establish=
ment Schemes) is currently a draft in review. The document is at
<a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft=
">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft</a>&nbsp=
; Email comments can be sent to 800-56C_Comments@nist.gov with a deadline o=
f May 15.&nbsp; That is not a lot of time.&nbsp;
 The NIST crypto group is currently unlikely to include HKDF, which means t=
hat TLS 1.3 would not be part of FIPS. The CMVP folks at NIST understand th=
is, and agree that this would be bad; they are looking at adding it, perhap=
s via an Implementation Guidance
 update.<br>
<br>
If you have a view of HKDF (and perhaps TLS 1.3), I strongly encourage you =
to comment at the above address.&nbsp; Please do not comment here. I know t=
hat many members of industry and academia have been involved with TLS 1.3, =
and performed security analysis of it.
 If you are one of those people, *please* send email and ask the NIST Crypt=
o Team to reconsider.<br>
<br>
Thank you.<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; /r$<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
Cfrg@irtf.org<br>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 05:29:31 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Traffic secrets: What's in handshake transcripts?
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On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 1:09 AM Ben Smyth <research@bensmyth.com> wrote:

> As far as I can tell, secret [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret is computed
> over transcript CH || SH or CH || HRR || CH || SH. (A server can compute
> their secret once they've computed SH, whereas a client must wait until
> they've received SH before computing their secret.)
>

Correct. The figure here is intended to clarify this
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=8446#section-7.1, though see
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=8446#section-4.4.1 for how to handle
HRR.


Secret server_application_traffic_0 is computed over an extended transcript
> which additionally includes EE, (optionally) CR, (optionally) CT & CV, and
> FIN, and secret client_application_traffic_0 further extends that
> transcript to include (optionally) EndOfEarlyData, (optionally) CT,
> (optionally) CV, and FIN. Is that right?
>

No. These are computed over the same transcript, which goes up to SFIN. We
have discussed extending the client transcript as you suggest, but so far
have not done so (this would need an extension).

-Ekr


>
> Best regards,
>
> Ben
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 1:09 AM Ben Sm=
yth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:research@bensmyth.com">research@bensmyth.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">As far as I can tell, secret [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret =
is computed over transcript CH || SH or CH || HRR || CH || SH. (A server ca=
n compute their secret once they&#39;ve computed SH, whereas a client must =
wait until they&#39;ve received SH before computing their secret.) </div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>Correct. The figure here is intended to clar=
ify this <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D8446#section-7.1=
">https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D8446#section-7.1</a>, though see <=
a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D8446#section-4.4.1">https:=
//tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=3D8446#section-4.4.1</a> for how to handle H=
RR.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Secret server_application_traffic_0 is compu=
ted over an extended transcript which additionally includes EE, (optionally=
) CR, (optionally) CT &amp; CV, and FIN, and secret client_application_traf=
fic_0 further extends that transcript to include (optionally) EndOfEarlyDat=
a, (optionally) CT, (optionally) CV, and FIN. Is that right?<br></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>No. These are computed over the same transcript=
, which goes up to SFIN. We have discussed extending the client transcript =
as you suggest, but so far have not done so (this would need an extension).=
<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br>Best regards,<br><br=
>Ben</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 13:16:16 -0400
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To: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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I will forward this to the official comment address as well.

I don't support making HKDF a NIST standard in its current form because
there is a flaw.

Consider the case in which the initial keying material is formed by
concatenating two items, the second of which is a variable length string.

As currently specified, the values for o_key and i_key are the same for a
key k and that same key with a zero byte concatenated. This might not seem
like a big deal but the whole point of defining common building blocks for
crypto is to eliminate all the bear traps we can.

The problem can be eliminated as follows:

1) Generate i_key by padding the key value with byte x before XORing with
the i_mask

2) Generate o_key by padding the key value with byte y (y <> x) before
XORing with the o_mask

This ensures that the values of o_key and i_key will change if zeros are
appended.

This would require us to issue a revised version of HKDF. But I think we
should do just that. Crypto utility functions should be robust under all
known forms of mistreatment. I am probably not the only person who has
multiple salt inputs to a KDF. Fortunately my unit tests caught the issue.

--000000000000dc486905a562817b
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small">I will forward this to the official comment address as well.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I don&#39;t support makin=
g HKDF a NIST standard in its current form because there is a flaw.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Consider the case in which the=
 initial keying material is formed by concatenating two items, the second o=
f which is a variable length string.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl=
e=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
size:small">As currently specified, the values for o_key and i_key are the =
same for a key k and that same key with a zero byte concatenated. This migh=
t not seem like a big deal but the whole point of defining common building =
blocks for crypto is to eliminate all the bear traps we can.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The problem can be eliminated as follow=
s:</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">1) Generate i_key by p=
adding the key value with byte x before XORing with the i_mask</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><div class=3D"gmail_default=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">2) Generate o_key by padding the k=
ey value with byte y (y &lt;&gt; x) before XORing with the o_mask</div></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">This ensures that the values=
 of o_key and i_key will change if zeros are appended.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-size:small">This would require us to issue=C2=A0a revised=
 version of HKDF. But I think we should do just that. Crypto utility functi=
ons should be robust under all known forms of mistreatment. I am probably n=
ot the only person who has multiple salt inputs to a KDF. Fortunately my un=
it tests caught the issue.</div></div></div>

--000000000000dc486905a562817b--


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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 16:36:24 -0400
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Cc: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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There is no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.

The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not random) salt
values in HKDF, you are probably using it with  domain separation
functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info field
not the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rationale.

More below.


On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 1:19 PM Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
wrote:

> I will forward this to the official comment address as well.
>
> I don't support making HKDF a NIST standard in its current form because
> there is a flaw.
>
> Consider the case in which the initial keying material is formed by
> concatenating two items, the second of which is a variable length string.
>
> As currently specified, the values for o_key and i_key are the same for a
> key k and that same key with a zero byte concatenated. This might not seem
> like a big deal but the whole point of defining common building blocks for
> crypto is to eliminate all the bear traps we can.
>

I assume that by o_key and i_key you mean the key xor-ed with opad and
ipad, respectively. Is that right?
It is true that in HMAC, and then in HKDF, you do not distinguish between a
key K shorter than a block and the same key with appended 0s.
This is OK in HMAC because as a MAC or PRF you must use HMAC with random
keys for which the probability to have the above property (choosing two
keys of different lengths, one  being the prefix of the other) is virtually
0.
For HKDF, this issue applies to the salt value. Salt values (read the RFC)
should either be random or set to the all-zero string. Hence no issue there.

You can read the HKDF paper for extensive rationale for these choices.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264


> The problem can be eliminated as follows:
>
> 1) Generate i_key by padding the key value with byte x before XORing with
> the i_mask
>
> 2) Generate o_key by padding the key value with byte y (y <> x) before
> XORing with the o_mask
>
> This ensures that the values of o_key and i_key will change if zeros are
> appended.
>

It will not solve the issue if one of the keys is of a block length
Historical anecdote: The original design of HMAC had the concatenation
scheme as you suggest, Adi Shamir suggested changing it to xoring method
that was eventually adopted (see the Acknowledgment section in the HMAC
1996 paper),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1.pdf
So you can see that thought was put into these issues.


>
> This would require us to issue a revised version of HKDF. But I think we
> should do just that. Crypto utility functions should be robust under all
> known forms of mistreatment. I am probably not the only person who has
> multiple salt inputs to a KDF. Fortunately my unit tests caught the issue.
>

You should not have multiple salt inputs if they are not independently
random.
If you want to use them for "domain separation", use the info field.

_______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">There is no flaw if yo=
u use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"=
><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetic=
a,sans-serif;font-size:small">The bottom line advise is: If you are using r=
elated (not random) salt values in HKDF, you are probably using it with=C2=
=A0 domain separation functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced=
 via the info field not the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for backgroun=
d and rationale.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">M=
ore below.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,hel=
vetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mo=
n, May 11, 2020 at 1:19 PM Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill=
@hallambaker.com">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv style=3D"font-size:small">I will forward this to the official comment ad=
dress as well.</div><div style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"=
font-size:small">I don&#39;t support making HKDF a NIST standard in its cur=
rent form because there is a flaw.</div><div style=3D"font-size:small"><br>=
</div><div style=3D"font-size:small">Consider the case in which the initial=
 keying material is formed by concatenating two items, the second of which =
is a variable length string.</div><div style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div>=
<div style=3D"font-size:small">As currently specified, the values for o_key=
 and i_key are the same for a key k and that same key with a zero byte conc=
atenated. This might not seem like a big deal but the whole point of defini=
ng common building blocks for crypto is to eliminate all the bear traps we =
can.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">I assu=
me that by o_key and i_key you mean the key xor-ed with opad=C2=A0and ipad,=
 respectively. Is that right?<br>It is true that in HMAC, and then in HKDF,=
 you do not distinguish between a key K shorter than a block and the same k=
ey with appended 0s.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">This is OK in HMAC because as =
a MAC or PRF you must use HMAC with random keys for which the probability t=
o have the above property (choosing two keys of different lengths, one=C2=
=A0 being the prefix of the other) is virtually 0.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall">For HKDF, this issue applies to the salt value. Salt values (read the=
 RFC) should either be random or set to the all-zero string. Hence no issue=
 there.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvet=
ica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl=
e=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">You can read t=
he HKDF paper for extensive rationale for these choices.=C2=A0<a href=3D"ht=
tps://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264" style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif">https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264</a></div><div class=3D"gmail_default=
" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-size=
:small">The problem can be eliminated as follows:</div><div style=3D"font-s=
ize:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-size:small">1) Generate i_key by pa=
dding the key value with byte x before XORing with the i_mask</div><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:small"><div><br></div><div>2) Generate o_key by padding the=
 key value with byte y (y &lt;&gt; x) before XORing with the o_mask</div></=
div><div style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-size:small"=
>This ensures that the values of o_key and i_key will change if zeros are a=
ppended.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">It=
 will not solve the issue if one of the keys is of a block length</div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:small"></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:aria=
l,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Historical anecdote: The original d=
esign of HMAC had the concatenation scheme as you suggest, Adi Shamir sugge=
sted changing it to xoring method that was eventually adopted (see the Ackn=
owledgment section in the HMAC 1996 paper), </div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><a hre=
f=3D"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1.pdf">htt=
ps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1.pdf</a>=C2=A0=C2=
=A0<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvet=
ica,sans-serif;font-size:small">So you can see that thought was put into th=
ese issues.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:ar=
ial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div sty=
le=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div style=3D"font-size:small">This would =
require us to issue=C2=A0a revised version of HKDF. But I think we should d=
o just that. Crypto utility functions should be robust under all known form=
s of mistreatment. I am probably not the only person who has multiple salt =
inputs to a KDF. Fortunately my unit tests caught the issue.</div></div></d=
iv></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-f=
amily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">You should not have multi=
ple salt inputs if they are not independently random.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l">If you want to use them for &quot;domain separation&quot;, use the info =
field.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helveti=
ca,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 17:04:37 -0400
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To: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Quynh, see a couple of remarks below,

On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 8:10 AM Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) <quynh.dang=3D
40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi Rich, Sean and all,
>
> 1) Traditionally, a HKDF-Extract is used to extract entropy from a DH typ=
e
> shared secret. However, the first HKDF-Extract in the key schedule takes =
a
> PSK instead of a DH shared secret.
>

The whole point of HKDF is to define a KDF that can be applied to different
uses and settings for key derivation. A single KDF mechanism that can
address a DH setting as well as a PSK, or  anything else, with
functionalities of PRF, random oracle, randomness extraction, etc., and
with some theoretical basis. Btw, TLS 1.3 is an application where
essentially all these aspects of HKDF show up.

NIST has adopted the view of HKDF in a very general sense via
the standardization of the extract-then-expand approach at the basis of
HKDF . This applies equally to extracting entropy from a DH value, the
output of an RNG, a PSK, etc.

>
> We don't see security problems with this instance in TLS 1.3. NIST
> requires the PSK to have efficient amount of entropy (to achieve a securi=
ty
> strength required by NIST) when it is externally generated. When it is
> externally generated, one of NIST's approved random bit generation method=
s
> in SP 800-90 series must be used.
>
> When the PSK is a resumption key, then its original key exchange and its
> key derivation function(s) must meet the security strength desired/requir=
ed
> for the PSK.
>
> NIST plans to allow/approve the function in SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3,
> item # 3 on pages 22 and 23:
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-d=
raft.pdf
>
> 2) Traditionally, HKDF is extract-then-expand. However, in TLS 1.3, we
> have extract-then-multiple expands.
>

The HKDF RFC 5869 says that in the case where the amount of required key
bits, L, is no more than HashLen, one could use PRK directly as the OKM.

In the usage by TLS, you are using the output of extract as a key to a PRF
(implemented as HKDF-expand, essentially HMAC) with multiple, different
inputs (different thanks to the use of the info field) which is perfectly
secure. Also, note that the composition of the extract step in TLS with
each of the subsequent expands can be represented as a full HKDF
application. This was part of the design for cases (maybe  hardware) where
one may have an interface to HKDF but not a separate interface to
the extract and expand steps.


> We don't see security problems for this new version of HKDF as specified
> in TLS 1.3.  NIST plans to approve a general method for this approach in =
SP
> 800-56C revision 2, section 5.3:
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-d=
raft.pdf
>

Agreed. The above comment summarizes why there should be no security
problems with these mechanisms.

I haven't looked at the revisions. But in previous versions you needed
lawyer skills to go through the language to see that RFC 5869 was indeed
compliant with the NIST recommendation. It would be nice if this time it
would make very explicit that RFC 5869 is compliant with this
Recommendation.

Hugo

>
> NIST plans to handle the issues above that way to avoid repeating the wor=
k
> when one or both of the same HKDF instances or new variant(s) for one or
> both of them is/are used in different application(s).
>
> The other KDFs are already compliant with NIST's existing KDFs.
>
> Regards,
> Quynh.
> Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes
> <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-=
draft.pdf>
> 23 . Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56C 24 . Revision 2 25
> Recommendation for Key-Derivation 26 . Methods in Key-Establishment Schem=
es
> 27 . 28 . 29 Elaine Barker 30 Lily Chen 31 Computer Security Division 32 =
.
> Information Technology Laboratory
> nvlpubs.nist.gov
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> on behalf of Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D
> 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> *Sent:* Friday, May 8, 2020 4:21 PM
> *To:* tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>; cfrg@ietf.org <cfrg@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
>
> If you don=E2=80=99t care about FIPS-140, just delete this message, and a=
void the
> temptation to argue how bad it is.
>
> NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in
> Key-Establishment Schemes) is currently a draft in review. The document i=
s
> at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft
> Email comments can be sent to 800-56C_Comments@nist.gov with a deadline
> of May 15.  That is not a lot of time.  The NIST crypto group is currentl=
y
> unlikely to include HKDF, which means that TLS 1.3 would not be part of
> FIPS. The CMVP folks at NIST understand this, and agree that this would b=
e
> bad; they are looking at adding it, perhaps via an Implementation Guidanc=
e
> update.
>
> If you have a view of HKDF (and perhaps TLS 1.3), I strongly encourage yo=
u
> to comment at the above address.  Please do not comment here. I know that
> many members of industry and academia have been involved with TLS 1.3, an=
d
> performed security analysis of it. If you are one of those people, *pleas=
e*
> send email and ask the NIST Crypto Team to reconsider.
>
> Thank you.
>         /r$
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
>
> https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.i=
rtf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcfrg&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Cquynh.dang%40nist.=
gov%7C6ba71a06d50f41e6582508d7f38d7d80%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7=
C1%7C0%7C637245661358887556&amp;sdata=3D5DEzorMNakxeh%2Bkb4wYJ00QxyRmcXbsDF=
m7wlVw9iig%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
> <https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.=
irtf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcfrg&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Cquynh..dang%40nis=
t.gov%7C6ba71a06d50f41e6582508d7f38d7d80%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec=
%7C1%7C0%7C637245661358887556&amp;sdata=3D5DEzorMNakxeh%2Bkb4wYJ00QxyRmcXbs=
DFm7wlVw9iig%3D&amp;reserved=3D0>
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>

--0000000000008041cd05a565b3a9
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hi Quynh, see a couple=
 of remarks below,</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 8:10 AM Dang, Quynh H. (Fed=
) &lt;quynh.dang=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org">40nist.gov@=
dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">




<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Hi Rich, Sean and all,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
1) Traditionally, a HKDF-Extract is used to extract entropy from a DH type =
shared secret. However, the first HKDF-Extract in the key schedule takes a =
PSK instead of a DH shared secret.=C2=A0</div></div></blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans=
-serif;font-size:small">The whole point of HKDF is to define a KDF that can=
 be applied to different uses and settings for key derivation. A single KDF=
 mechanism that can address a DH setting as well as a PSK, or=C2=A0 anythin=
g else, with functionalities of PRF, random oracle, randomness extraction, =
etc., and with some theoretical basis. Btw, TLS 1.3 is an application where=
 essentially all these aspects of HKDF show up.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvet=
ica,sans-serif;font-size:small">NIST has adopted the=C2=A0view of HKDF in a=
=C2=A0very general sense via the=C2=A0standardization of the extract-then-e=
xpand approach at the=C2=A0basis of HKDF . This applies equally to extracti=
ng entropy from a DH value, the output of an RNG, a PSK, etc.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:small"></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0p=
x 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
We don&#39;t see security problems with this instance in TLS 1.3. NIST requ=
ires the PSK to have efficient amount of entropy (to achieve a security str=
ength required by NIST) when it is externally generated. When it is externa=
lly generated, one of NIST&#39;s approved
 random bit generation methods in SP 800-90 series must be used.=C2=A0</div=
>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
When the PSK is a resumption key, then its original key exchange and its ke=
y derivation function(s) must meet the security strength desired/required f=
or the PSK.=C2=A0</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
NIST plans to allow/approve the function in SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3, item=
 # 3 on pages 22 and 23:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/=
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://=
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf</=
a></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
2) Traditionally, HKDF is extract-then-expand. However, in TLS 1.3, we have=
 extract-then-multiple expands.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:small">The HKDF RFC 5869 says that in=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb=
(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">the cas=
e where the amount of required key bits, L, is no more than</span><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans=
-serif">=C2=A0HashLen, one could use PRK directly as the OKM.=C2=A0</span><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans=
-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">In the usage by TLS, y=
ou are using the output of extract as a key to a PRF (implemented as HKDF-e=
xpand, essentially HMAC) with multiple, different inputs (different thanks =
to the use of the info field) which is perfectly secure.  Also, note that t=
he composition of the extract step in TLS with each of the subsequent expan=
ds can be represented as a full HKDF application. This was part of the desi=
gn for cases (maybe=C2=A0 hardware) where one may have an interface to HKDF=
 but not a separate interface to the=C2=A0extract and expand steps.</div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:small"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
We don&#39;t see security problems for this new version of HKDF as specifie=
d in TLS 1.3.=C2=A0 NIST plans to approve a general method for this approac=
h in SP 800-56C revision 2, section 5.3:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://nvlpubs.ni=
st.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf" id=3D"gmai=
l-m_-3153651020057685352LPlnk455986" target=3D"_blank">https://nvlpubs.nist=
.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf</a></div></di=
v></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fa=
mily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Agreed. The above comment =
summarizes why there should be no security problems with these mechanisms.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans=
-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">I haven&#39;t looked a=
t the revisions. But in previous versions you needed lawyer=C2=A0skills to =
go through the language to see that RFC 5869 was indeed compliant with the =
NIST recommendation. It would be nice if this time it would make very expli=
cit that RFC 5869 is compliant with this Recommendation.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,hel=
vetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
NIST plans to handle the issues above that way to avoid repeating the work =
when one or both of the same HKDF instances or new variant(s) for one or bo=
th of them is/are used in different application(s).</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
The other KDFs are already compliant with NIST&#39;s existing KDFs.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Regards,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Quynh.=C2=A0</div>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPBorder_GTaHR0cHM6Ly9udmxwdWJzLm5pc=
3QuZ292L25pc3RwdWJzL1NwZWNpYWxQdWJsaWNhdGlvbnMvTklTVC5TUC44MDAtNTZDcjItZHJh=
ZnQucGRm" style=3D"width:100%;margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;max-width:=
800px;min-width:424px">
<table id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPContainer229907" style=3D"paddin=
g:12px 36px 12px 12px;width:100%;border-width:1px;border-style:solid;border=
-color:rgb(200,200,200);border-radius:2px">
<tbody>
<tr valign=3D"top" style=3D"border-spacing:0px">
<td style=3D"width:100%">
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPTitle229907" style=3D"font-size:21=
px;font-weight:300;margin-right:8px;font-family:wf_segoe-ui_light,&quot;Seg=
oe UI Light&quot;,&quot;Segoe WP Light&quot;,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,&quot;Seg=
oe WP&quot;,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;margin-bottom:12px">
<a id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPUrlAnchor229907" href=3D"https://nvl=
pubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2-draft.pdf" sty=
le=3D"text-decoration:none" target=3D"_blank">Recommendation for Key-Deriva=
tion Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes</a></div>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPDescription229907" style=3D"font-s=
ize:14px;max-height:100px;color:rgb(102,102,102);font-family:wf_segoe-ui_no=
rmal,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,&quot;Segoe WP&quot;,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;marg=
in-bottom:12px;margin-right:8px;overflow:hidden">
23 . Draft NIST Special Publication 800-56C 24 . Revision 2 25 Recommendati=
on for Key-Derivation 26 . Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes 27 . 28 . 2=
9 Elaine Barker 30 Lily Chen 31 Computer Security Division 32 . Information=
 Technology Laboratory</div>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352LPMetadata229907" style=3D"font-size=
:14px;font-weight:400;color:rgb(166,166,166);font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal=
,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,&quot;Segoe WP&quot;,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif">
<a href=3D"http://nvlpubs.nist.gov" target=3D"_blank">nvlpubs.nist.gov</a><=
/div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<br>
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%">
<div id=3D"gmail-m_-3153651020057685352divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font fac=
e=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" style=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>Fro=
m:</b> Cfrg &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D<a href=
=3D"mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40akamai.com@dmar=
c.ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, May 8, 2020 4:21 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</=
a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&g=
t;; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfrg@ietf.org</a> &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfrg@ietf.org</a>&gt;<=
br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)</=
font>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
</div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">
<div>If you don=E2=80=99t care about FIPS-140, just delete this message, an=
d avoid the temptation to argue how bad it is.<br>
<br>
NIST SP 800-56C (Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establish=
ment Schemes) is currently a draft in review. The document is at
<a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-2/draft=
" target=3D"_blank">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/re=
v-2/draft</a>=C2=A0 Email comments can be sent to <a href=3D"mailto:800-56C=
_Comments@nist.gov" target=3D"_blank">800-56C_Comments@nist.gov</a> with a =
deadline of May 15.=C2=A0 That is not a lot of time.=C2=A0
 The NIST crypto group is currently unlikely to include HKDF, which means t=
hat TLS 1.3 would not be part of FIPS. The CMVP folks at NIST understand th=
is, and agree that this would be bad; they are looking at adding it, perhap=
s via an Implementation Guidance
 update.<br>
<br>
If you have a view of HKDF (and perhaps TLS 1.3), I strongly encourage you =
to comment at the above address.=C2=A0 Please do not comment here. I know t=
hat many members of industry and academia have been involved with TLS 1.3, =
and performed security analysis of it.
 If you are one of those people, *please* send email and ask the NIST Crypt=
o Team to reconsider.<br>
<br>
Thank you.<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 /r$<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Cfrg mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">Cfrg@irtf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2=
F%2Fwww.irtf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcfrg&amp;amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Cquynh=
..dang%40nist.gov%7C6ba71a06d50f41e6582508d7f38d7d80%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e=
054655c61dec%7C1%7C0%7C637245661358887556&amp;amp;sdata=3D5DEzorMNakxeh%2Bk=
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ps://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.irtf.o=
rg%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fcfrg&amp;amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Cquynh.dang%40nist.g=
ov%7C6ba71a06d50f41e6582508d7f38d7d80%7C2ab5d82fd8fa4797a93e054655c61dec%7C=
1%7C0%7C637245661358887556&amp;amp;sdata=3D5DEzorMNakxeh%2Bkb4wYJ00QxyRmcXb=
sDFm7wlVw9iig%3D&amp;amp;reserved=3D0</a><br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000008041cd05a565b3a9--


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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 15:52:40 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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I see how the name ECHO can be confusing and support renaming it. All of
the proposed replacement names are fine with me.

On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 12:38 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:10 AM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Rob,
>>
>> On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:
>> > On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=
>> > 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > > > I rather prefer ECHO.
>> > >
>> > > Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion,
>> other
>> > > than
>> > > your personal preference?
>> > >
>> >
>> > There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the name
>> > does not matter).
>>
>> I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have
>> the confidence to make such a blanket statement ("there's no confusion")
>> that
>> in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent supporting
>> evidence.
>
>
> I don't believe it makes sense to demand "evidence" on a completely
> subjective issue.
>
> As I wrote in my other email in this thread, not very many people on the
> planet are going to need to know what this is. I haven't run into
> anyone confused as I've worked on it, and the name was presented 6 months
> ago at IETF 106.
>
>
>> If someone appears and says that they are confused, what are you
>> going to tell them?
>>
>
> That all of the proposals collide with other meanings too (ETH, ETCH,
> etc). This is one reason we expand acronyms on first use in IETF documents.
>
> I don't think there's confusion here, but just preferences and annoyances.
> The choice also doesn't matter to me.
>
> thanks,
> Rob
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I see how the name ECHO can be confusing and support renam=
ing it. All of the proposed replacement names are fine with me.</div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May =
10, 2020 at 12:38 PM Rob Sayre &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sayrer@gmail.com">sayr=
er@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 1=
0:10 AM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com" target=3D"_=
blank">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Rob,<br>
<br>
On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;bkaduk=3D<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40aka=
mai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br=
>
&gt; &gt; &gt; I rather prefer ECHO.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion=
, other<br>
&gt; &gt; than<br>
&gt; &gt; your personal preference?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; There&#39;s no confusion. I couldn&#39;t believe the issue was raised =
(the name<br>
&gt; does not matter).<br>
<br>
I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have<br>
the confidence to make such a blanket statement (&quot;there&#39;s no confu=
sion&quot;) that<br>
in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent supporting<b=
r>
evidence.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t believe it makes sens=
e to demand &quot;evidence&quot; on a completely subjective issue.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>As I wrote in my other=C2=A0email in this=C2=A0thread, not=
 very many people on the planet are going to need to know what this is. I h=
aven&#39;t run into anyone=C2=A0confused as I&#39;ve worked on it, and the =
name was presented 6 months ago at IETF 106.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> If someone appears and says that=
 they are confused, what are you<br>
going to tell them?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That all of the pro=
posals collide with other=C2=A0meanings too (ETH, ETCH, etc). This is one r=
eason we expand acronyms on first use in IETF documents.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>I don&#39;t think there&#39;s confusion here, but just preferences a=
nd annoyances. The choice also doesn&#39;t matter to me.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=
</div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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I agree that it=E2=80=99s misleading and potentially confusing to =
newcomers.=20

ETCH sounds like a good alternative.


> On May 11, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Nick Harper =
<nharper=3D40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> I see how the name ECHO can be confusing and support renaming it. All =
of the proposed replacement names are fine with me.
>=20
> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 12:38 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com =
<mailto:sayrer@gmail.com>> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:10 AM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com =
<mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com>> wrote:
> Hi Rob,
>=20
> On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:
> > On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=3D
> > 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> =
wrote:
> >=20
> > > On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > > I rather prefer ECHO.
> > >
> > > Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about confusion, =
other
> > > than
> > > your personal preference?
> > >
> >=20
> > There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the =
name
> > does not matter).
>=20
> I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have
> the confidence to make such a blanket statement ("there's no =
confusion") that
> in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent =
supporting
> evidence.
>=20
> I don't believe it makes sense to demand "evidence" on a completely =
subjective issue.
>=20
> As I wrote in my other email in this thread, not very many people on =
the planet are going to need to know what this is. I haven't run into =
anyone confused as I've worked on it, and the name was presented 6 =
months ago at IETF 106.
> =20
> If someone appears and says that they are confused, what are you
> going to tell them?
>=20
> That all of the proposals collide with other meanings too (ETH, ETCH, =
etc). This is one reason we expand acronyms on first use in IETF =
documents.
>=20
> I don't think there's confusion here, but just preferences and =
annoyances. The choice also doesn't matter to me.
>=20
> thanks,
> Rob
>=20
>=20
> =20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I =
agree that it=E2=80=99s misleading and potentially confusing to =
newcomers.&nbsp;<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">ETCH =
sounds like a good alternative.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On May 11, 2020, at 3:52 PM, Nick Harper &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nharper=3D40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">nharper=3D40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">I see how the name ECHO can be confusing and support renaming =
it. All of the proposed replacement names are fine with me.</div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 12:38 PM Rob Sayre &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:sayrer@gmail.com" class=3D"">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May =
10, 2020 at 10:10 AM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bkaduk@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">bkaduk@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Rob,<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 10:51:00PM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt; On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 3:43 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;bkaduk=3D<br =
class=3D"">
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 03:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla =
wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; &gt; I rather prefer ECHO.<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; Do you have some arguments to dispel the concerns about =
confusion, other<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; than<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt; your personal preference?<br class=3D"">
&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; There's no confusion. I couldn't believe the issue was raised (the =
name<br class=3D"">
&gt; does not matter).<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
I regret to say that I completely fail to understand how you can have<br =
class=3D"">
the confidence to make such a blanket statement ("there's no confusion") =
that<br class=3D"">
in principle applies to all human beings, without any apparent =
supporting<br class=3D"">
evidence.</blockquote><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I don't believe it makes sense to demand "evidence" on a =
completely subjective issue.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As I wrote in my other&nbsp;email in =
this&nbsp;thread, not very many people on the planet are going to need =
to know what this is. I haven't run into anyone&nbsp;confused as I've =
worked on it, and the name was presented 6 months ago at IETF =
106.</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> If someone appears and says that =
they are confused, what are you<br class=3D"">
going to tell them?<br class=3D""></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">That all of the proposals collide with =
other&nbsp;meanings too (ETH, ETCH, etc). This is one reason we expand =
acronyms on first use in IETF documents.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I don't think there's confusion here, =
but just preferences and annoyances. The choice also doesn't matter to =
me.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">thanks,</div><div class=3D"">Rob</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">TLS =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 01:49:13 -0400
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To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Cc: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> There is no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.
>

One time pads aren't flawed if you use them right. When they become a two
time pad, there is a problem.

My point is that if we are developing schemes that are supposed to be used
as utility building blocks, we need to consider all the ways they might be
used and not just limit ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the
argument made for defining authenticated encryption modes, it holds here as
well.


> The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not random) salt
> values in HKDF, you are probably using it with  domain separation
> functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info field
> not the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rationale.
>

I am already using the info field for domain separation. I use info to
generate separate keys for encryption, authentication, any IVs etc. by
concatenating the IANA protocol name and the encryption function. So I
don't want to put any more in there.

It is easy enough to fix if you are aware of it. I noticed the issue while
I was implementing HMAC by hand. But the person who is using the function
using a library call (i.e. myself five years from now) might not be aware.

Saying 'read my paper' really isn't an argument. I know the design
rationale. I am saying it is the wrong one for the future. And regardless,
I don't see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of the paper you cite nor
is there mention of the issue in RFC 2104.

If I have to go hunting to find security issues with a standard, that is a
problem in itself.


BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an attempt to address the problem
of 'encrypting the subject header' and other metadata separately from the
content data. But under the same key. Bearing in mind that we want to be
able to encrypt multiple data items under a single key exchange.

So starting from the result of the key agreement, I add in a per envelope
salt which is typically 128 bits. That allows for erasure of the message by
overwriting the salt value. The main data content is encrypted under a KDF
with the IKM and envelope salt. If additional encrypted data sequences are
required, they are encrypted under the IKM, salt and an additional counter.

Now I can fix my designs, but others won't. Considering the EDS counter to
be an extension to the key led to the unexpected result that the EDS and
content were encrypted with the same key. Now, it is arguably better
considered to be a part of the salt which is where I think the current code
is (have to check). But my general point stands, this should be a utility
function but the Feb 1997 spec does not meet our standards today.

--00000000000098bf9c05a56d0634
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:small">There is no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See=
 details below.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">One time pads aren&#39;t flaw=
ed if you use them right. When they become a two time pad, there is a probl=
em.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">My point is that if w=
e are developing schemes that are supposed to be used as utility building b=
locks, we need to consider all the ways they might be used and not just lim=
it ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the argument made for defining=
 authenticated encryption modes, it holds here as well.</div></div><div>=C2=
=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:small">The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not r=
andom) salt values in HKDF, you are probably using it with=C2=A0 domain sep=
aration functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info =
field not the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rational=
e.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_de=
fault" style=3D"font-size:small">I am already using the info field for doma=
in separation. I use info to generate separate keys for encryption, authent=
ication, any IVs etc. by concatenating the IANA protocol name and the encry=
ption function. So I don&#39;t want to put any more in there.</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_default" style=3D"font-size:small">It is easy enough to fix if you are aw=
are of it. I noticed the issue while I was implementing HMAC by hand. But t=
he person who is using the function using a library call (i.e. myself five =
years from now) might not be aware.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-s=
ize:small">Saying &#39;read my paper&#39; really isn&#39;t an argument. I k=
now the design rationale. I am saying it is the wrong one for the future. A=
nd regardless, I don&#39;t see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of the p=
aper you cite nor is there mention of the issue in RFC 2104.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default" style=3D"font-size:small">If I have to go hunting to find securit=
y issues with a standard, that is a problem in itself.</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small">BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an attempt to=
 address the problem of &#39;encrypting the subject=C2=A0header&#39; and ot=
her metadata separately from the content data. But under the same key. Bear=
ing in mind that we want to be able to encrypt multiple data items under a =
single key exchange.</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small=
">So starting from the result of the key agreement, I add in a per envelope=
 salt which is typically 128 bits. That allows for erasure of the message b=
y overwriting the salt value. The main data content is encrypted under a KD=
F with the IKM and envelope salt. If additional encrypted data sequences ar=
e required, they are encrypted under the IKM, salt and an additional counte=
r.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Now I can fix my desig=
ns, but others won&#39;t. Considering the EDS counter to be an extension to=
 the key led to the unexpected result that the EDS and content were encrypt=
ed with the same key. Now, it is arguably better considered to be a part of=
 the salt which is where I think the current code is (have to check). But m=
y general point stands, this should be a utility function but the Feb 1997 =
spec does not meet our standards today.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fo=
nt-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sm=
all"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br><=
/div></div></div>

--00000000000098bf9c05a56d0634--


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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
References: <20191111195325.GE32847@kduck.mit.edu> <0390e6c8-dd19-8d5a-45b2-79ac0f1461c5@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 10:59:59 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/t5ksotjVjuJ7oYySKk2Su3nrR9w>
Subject: Re: [TLS] preliminary AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-05
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <a34954b1-dfd4-ccf7-752f-655787ce11fc@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] preliminary AD review of
 draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-05
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Hi,

It's now four and a bit months later. It's true those have
been very distracting months for us all but when are we
hoping to progress this draft?

Thanks,
S.

On 06/01/2020 15:16, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> I've just submitted -06 that (I think/hope:-) addresses
> the issues in Ben's preliminary AD review.
>=20
> So the ball's back in Ben's court until he finds more
> stuff that needs fixing or starts IETF LC:-)
>=20
> Cheers,
> S.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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=3DYzQY
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

--------------D66310F4A33C68462A958B8C--

--mLy6aA4OGgS6aEM1Ze9BkGRioVce8gEvD--

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Cc: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Hugo, hi Quynh,
=C2=A0
on Monday, 2020-05-11 Hugo Krawzcyk wrote:=C2=A0
=C2=A0
> I haven't looked at the revisions=2E But in previous versions you needed=
 lawyer=C2=A0skills to go through the language to see that RFC 5869 was ind=
eed compliant with the NIST recommendation=2E It would be nice if this time=
 it would make very explicit that RFC 5869 is compliant with this Recommend=
ation=2E
=C2=A0
Indeed=2E In SP800-56C Rev=2E 2 draft we have in lines 545, 546:=20

"[RFC 5869] specifies a version of the above extraction-then-expansion key=
-derivation procedure using HMAC for both the extraction and expansion step=
s=2E"  so one would assume that HKDF according to RFC 5869 is compliant wit=
h SP800-56CR2=2E

However, for key expansion it refers in line 533, 532 to=20

"2=2E Call KDF( K_DK, L, {IV,} FixedInfo ) to obtain DerivedKeyingMaterial=
 or an error indicator (see [SP 800-108] for details)=2E"=20

Everything would be fine if we find KDF( K_DK, L, {IV}, FixedInfo) as=20

HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM

The output OKM is calculated as follows:

   N =3D ceil(L/HashLen)
   T =3D T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | =2E=2E=2E | T(N)
   OKM =3D first L octets of T

   where:
   T(0) =3D empty string (zero length)
   T(1) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
   T(2) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
   T(3) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)

i=2Ee=2E the definitions of RFC 5869 in SP800-108=2E Unfortunately, the cl=
osest one could find in SP800-108 is=20

5=2E2 KDF in Feedback Mode

1=2E  n: =3D \ceil{L/h}=2E
2=2E  If n > 2^{32} -1, then indicate an error and stop=2E
3=2E  result(0):=3D =E2=88=85 and K(0):=3D IV=2E
4=2E  For i =3D 1 to n, do
    a=2E
        K(i) :=3D PRF (KI, K(i-1) {|| [i]2 }|| Label || 0x00 || Context ||=
 [L]2)
    b=2E
        result(i) :=3D result(i-1) || K(i)
5=2E Return: K_O :=3D the leftmost L bits of result(n)=2E

With the substitutions PRK =3D KI, HashLen =3D h, N =3D n, T(i) =3D K(i-1)=
 0x01, 0x02 =3D [i]_2, PKM =3D K_O and info =3D Label || 0x00 || Context ||=
 [L]_2 one is almost there, EXCEPT

- the counter 0x01, 0x02, 0x03 is at the end of the string in HKDF RFC 586=
9 and right-after the K(i-1), respectively T(i), in SP800-108=2E At least t=
his gives different results=2E (This is what already Dan Brown wrote in a r=
ecent mail)=2E I don't think this has security implications, but I'm no exp=
ert=2E

- With HKDF, it is only allowed to iterate up to N =3D 255 as L \le 255 Ha=
shLen while in SP800-108 we have n \le 2^{32}-1=2E=20

So, with this interpretation I don't see that HKDF RFC5869 is a concrete i=
nstantiation of SP800-56C rev2 draft + SP800-108=2E At least I couldn't fin=
d any official CAVP test vectors for such an HKDF-HMAC-SHA-256 construct=2E=
 BTW, while we have such test vectors in RFC 5869 for SHA-384 (and SHA-1) t=
here are no such things for SHA-384 or SHA-512, i=2Ee=2E higher security le=
vels=2E As a practitioner I would first test my HKDF RFC 5869 implementatio=
n if it is allows to iterate above N =3D 255=2E BTW, I don't have a good fe=
eling with extracting up to 2^{32}-1 keys from a single IKM=2E

I would like to hear from NIST if there are any plans to provide CAVP test=
 vectors for HKDF-HMAC-SHA-2 according to RFC 5869=2E In my opinion, SP800-=
56C rev2 draft is suboptimal as it refers for a very important component, i=
=2Ee=2E key expansion, to another, quite old document=2E

Torsten


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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Cc: "Hugo Krawczyk" <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "rsalz@akamai.com" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Quynh,

thank you for your quick response=2E I knew that omitting some fields was =
allowed, but not that permutations are allowed, too=2E Okay, this makes HKD=
F RFC 5869 definitely to a NIST SP800-56C rev 2 compliant KDF=2E But what t=
o do about the CAVP tests or approved test vectors=2E Couldn't NIST provide=
 for the very often used RFC 5869 HKDF approved test vectors? I coulnd't fi=
nd any=2E Only for some older, application specific KDFs=2E Of course, I ca=
n generate them by myself with an independent implementation, but I'm talki=
ng about evaluation/approval business here=2E

Regards=20

Torsten
=C2=A0

Gesendet:=C2=A0Dienstag, 12=2E Mai 2020 um 14:04 Uhr
Von:=C2=A0"Dang, Quynh H=2E (Fed)" <quynh=2Edang@nist=2Egov>
An:=C2=A0"Torsten Sch=C3=BCtze" <Torsten=2ESchuetze@gmx=2Enet>, "Hugo Kraw=
czyk" <hugo@ee=2Etechnion=2Eac=2Eil>
Cc:=C2=A0"cfrg@ietf=2Eorg" <cfrg@ietf=2Eorg>, "tls@ietf=2Eorg" <tls@ietf=
=2Eorg>, "rsalz@akamai=2Ecom" <rsalz@akamai=2Ecom>
Betreff:=C2=A0Re: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1=
=2E3)

Hi Torsten,
=C2=A0
Thank you for the review=2E I think the review helps many people to unders=
tand the HKDF's spec and its NIST's approval better=2E=C2=A0
=C2=A0
In SP 800-108 (https://nvlpubs=2Enist=2Egov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecial=
publication800-108=2Epdf, at the end of Section 5=2E (before 5=2E1), it say=
s that "=C2=A0=C2=A0Alternative orders for the input data fields may be use=
d
for different KDFs=2E " =2E
=C2=A0
And, at the end of the paragraph before that, it says "One or more of thes=
e fixed input data fields may be omitted unless required for
certain purposes as discussed in Section 7=2E5 and Section 7=2E6=2E"=2E
=C2=A0
After an extraction step, the output is a pseudorandom key=2E The KDFs in =
SP 800-108 are NIST's approved KDFs to derive key(s) from a pseudorandom ke=
y=2E=C2=A0 The purpose of any of these KDFs in SP 800-108 is the same with =
the purpose of the expansion step=2E Therefore, they are allowed for being =
used as expansion steps=2E=C2=A0
=C2=A0
Regards,
Quynh=2E=C2=A0
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
------------------------------------------------------------

From: "Torsten Sch=C3=BCtze" <Torsten=2ESchuetze@gmx=2Enet>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:39 AM
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee=2Etechnion=2Eac=2Eil>
Cc: Dang, Quynh H=2E (Fed) <quynh=2Edang@nist=2Egov>; cfrg@ietf=2Eorg <cfr=
g@ietf=2Eorg>; tls@ietf=2Eorg <tls@ietf=2Eorg>; rsalz@akamai=2Ecom <rsalz@a=
kamai=2Ecom>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1=2E3)
=C2=A0

Hi Hugo, hi Quynh,
=C2=A0
on Monday, 2020-05-11 Hugo Krawzcyk wrote:=C2=A0
=C2=A0
> I haven't looked at the revisions=2E But in previous versions you needed=
 lawyer=C2=A0skills to go through the language to see that RFC 5869 was ind=
eed compliant with the NIST recommendation=2E It would be nice if this time=
 it would make very explicit that RFC 5869 is compliant with this Recommend=
ation=2E
=C2=A0
Indeed=2E In SP800-56C Rev=2E 2 draft we have in lines 545, 546:

"[RFC 5869] specifies a version of the above extraction-then-expansion key=
-derivation procedure using HMAC for both the extraction and expansion step=
s=2E"=C2=A0 so one would assume that HKDF according to RFC 5869 is complian=
t with SP800-56CR2=2E

However, for key expansion it refers in line 533, 532 to

"2=2E Call KDF( K_DK, L, {IV,} FixedInfo ) to obtain DerivedKeyingMaterial=
 or an error indicator (see [SP 800-108] for details)=2E"

Everything would be fine if we find KDF( K_DK, L, {IV}, FixedInfo) as

HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM

The output OKM is calculated as follows:

=C2=A0=C2=A0 N =3D ceil(L/HashLen)
=C2=A0=C2=A0 T =3D T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | =2E=2E=2E | T(N)
=C2=A0=C2=A0 OKM =3D first L octets of T

=C2=A0=C2=A0 where:
=C2=A0=C2=A0 T(0) =3D empty string (zero length)
=C2=A0=C2=A0 T(1) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
=C2=A0=C2=A0 T(2) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
=C2=A0=C2=A0 T(3) =3D HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)

i=2Ee=2E the definitions of RFC 5869 in SP800-108=2E Unfortunately, the cl=
osest one could find in SP800-108 is

5=2E2 KDF in Feedback Mode

1=2E=C2=A0 n: =3D \ceil{L/h}=2E
2=2E=C2=A0 If n > 2^{32} -1, then indicate an error and stop=2E
3=2E=C2=A0 result(0):=3D =E2=88=85 and K(0):=3D IV=2E
4=2E=C2=A0 For i =3D 1 to n, do
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 a=2E
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 K(i) :=3D PRF (KI, K(i-1) {|| [=
i]2 }|| Label || 0x00 || Context || [L]2)
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 b=2E
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 result(i) :=3D result(i-1) || K=
(i)
5=2E Return: K_O :=3D the leftmost L bits of result(n)=2E

With the substitutions PRK =3D KI, HashLen =3D h, N =3D n, T(i) =3D K(i-1)=
 0x01, 0x02 =3D [i]_2, PKM =3D K_O and info =3D Label || 0x00 || Context ||=
 [L]_2 one is almost there, EXCEPT

- the counter 0x01, 0x02, 0x03 is at the end of the string in HKDF RFC 586=
9 and right-after the K(i-1), respectively T(i), in SP800-108=2E At least t=
his gives different results=2E (This is what already Dan Brown wrote in a r=
ecent mail)=2E I don't think this has security implications, but I'm no exp=
ert=2E

- With HKDF, it is only allowed to iterate up to N =3D 255 as L \le 255 Ha=
shLen while in SP800-108 we have n \le 2^{32}-1=2E

So, with this interpretation I don't see that HKDF RFC5869 is a concrete i=
nstantiation of SP800-56C rev2 draft + SP800-108=2E At least I couldn't fin=
d any official CAVP test vectors for such an HKDF-HMAC-SHA-256 construct=2E=
 BTW, while we have such test vectors in RFC 5869 for SHA-384 (and SHA-1) t=
here are no such things for SHA-384 or SHA-512, i=2Ee=2E higher security le=
vels=2E As a practitioner I would first test my HKDF RFC 5869 implementatio=
n if it is allows to iterate above N =3D 255=2E BTW, I don't have a good fe=
eling with extracting up to 2^{32}-1 keys from a single IKM=2E

I would like to hear from NIST if there are any plans to provide CAVP test=
 vectors for HKDF-HMAC-SHA-2 according to RFC 5869=2E In my opinion, SP800-=
56C rev2 draft is suboptimal as it refers for a very important component, i=
=2Ee=2E key expansion, to another, quite old document=2E

Torsten


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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
CC: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
Thread-Index: AQHWJXY75SUMYNJzo0q8VSbsRy8U7aiiv0STgAConwCAADfrAIAAmnSAgABaSAA=
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Hugo,

=20

Some curious molehill questions. Please take with a grain of salt.

=20

In short, does HKDF-Extract suffer from related-salt and repeated-IKM?

=20

To elaborate:

=20

Phillip raises a good point below about HMAC suffering from key-extension (=
by zero bytes).  You are right that this is not a MAC attack, the main inte=
nded use of HMAC, but now the scope of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC purpose=
s.=20=20=20

=20

Surely HMAC has good PRF properties, so non-MAC applications make sense.  F=
or what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I had just presumed that HKDF always use=
d HMAC with the a strong secret key, like a good PRF should.  (I failed to =
verify this, though.)

=20

But Phillip seems to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly d=
istributed keys), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.  Under=
 my presumption, this would not be best practice (using structure or relate=
d keys).

=20

So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basically expecting to find this clearly disall=
owed.  Re-reading the RFC, it was unclear to me what kind of salt was allow=
ed. (The eprint might be clearer, but it is longer to find this needle.) Wo=
uld it (dis)allow the structured salts Phillip described?=20

=20

Then, I saw a phrase in the HKDF RFC that salts were unlike IKM, because th=
ey could be re-used.  I inferred that IKM was not to be re-used.  If so, re=
lated salts should cause no problem for extraction, because a different IKM=
 would always be used.  But might IKM be re-used?  For example, the rare ev=
ent that TLS client and server both re-use their ECDHE keys.  So, I went to=
 look at TLS 1.3.

=20

In TLS 1.3, HKDF-Extract is used with both structured salts (e.g. 0), and s=
tructured IKMs (e.g. 0).  In the end, all is fine, because at least one of =
the salt or IKM has lots of entropy, and there were no related salts.  (The=
 case HKDF-Extract(0,0) is mentioned in TLS 1.3, but very clearly that this=
 case does not provide security.)  I presume TLS 1.3 designers were adherin=
g to the intended use of HKDF-Extract.=20=20

=20

To summarize, related-salt + repeated-IKM in HKDF-Extract might lead to rep=
eated PRK, right? This could be bad if PRK used in HKDF-Expand to create tw=
o identical stream cipher keys.  If two identical authentication keys, perh=
aps an unexpected replay attack might apply?  Are these a concern?  Is TLS =
1.3 fine, mainly because HKDF was used correctly?  Are these related-salts =
really realistic: would an implementer do this? Do you think better impleme=
nter guidance is needed to prevent this type of accident?=20=20

=20

Best regards,

=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B

Dan

=20

PS

=20

The HKDF RFC clearly excludes an adversary causing related salts, so that=
=E2=80=99s good.

=20

I really like both defense in depth and provable security, but I would also=
 like it to be clear that is the main motivation for HKDF in key derivation=
.  To wit, HMAC itself internally derives two closely-related keys using XO=
R ipad and XOR opad.   You have proved this turns out fine, despite the rel=
atedness of the two keys, because the robust property of hash function.  My=
 point here, is if we assumed the derived keys are used in robust algorithm=
s, e.g. AES-GCM, could they tolerate simpler ways of deriving keys, i.e. XO=
Ring a key with a non-random separation string?  To repeat, I am totally fi=
ne to use robust key derivation, like HKDF, but I would want the reason to =
be clear.  E.g. TLS 1.3 handshake uses HKDF as hedge against possible relat=
ed-key attacks on the symmetric-key crypto in the record layer, or for bett=
er or simpler security proofs (e.g. compared to past key derivation methods=
).

=20

As many know, hashes were, once upon a time, only used for message digests =
in signatures. Message-extension in hashes did not result in signature forg=
ery.   But then people naturally wanted to use hashes (as a =E2=80=9Cutilit=
y function=E2=80=9D in Phillip=E2=80=99s terms) for a MAC.  But hashes with=
 message extension suffer from MAC forgery. Along came HMAC to the rescue, =
saving the day, and the rest is history.  (To exaggerate: it is, on a minut=
e scale, repeating;)

=20

=20

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Phillip Hallam-Baker
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 1:49 AM
To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Cc: Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) <quynh.dang=3D40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>; cfrg@iet=
f.org; tls@ietf.org; Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)

=20

=20

=20

On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il <mail=
to:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> > wrote:

There is no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.

=20

One time pads aren't flawed if you use them right. When they become a two t=
ime pad, there is a problem.

=20

My point is that if we are developing schemes that are supposed to be used =
as utility building blocks, we need to consider all the ways they might be =
used and not just limit ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the argum=
ent made for defining authenticated encryption modes, it holds here as well.

=20

The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not random) salt value=
s in HKDF, you are probably using it with  domain separation functionality.=
 In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info field not the salt. Re=
ad the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rationale.

=20

I am already using the info field for domain separation. I use info to gene=
rate separate keys for encryption, authentication, any IVs etc. by concaten=
ating the IANA protocol name and the encryption function. So I don't want t=
o put any more in there.

=20

It is easy enough to fix if you are aware of it. I noticed the issue while =
I was implementing HMAC by hand. But the person who is using the function u=
sing a library call (i.e. myself five years from now) might not be aware.

=20

Saying 'read my paper' really isn't an argument. I know the design rational=
e. I am saying it is the wrong one for the future. And regardless, I don't =
see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of the paper you cite nor is there =
mention of the issue in RFC 2104.

=20

If I have to go hunting to find security issues with a standard, that is a =
problem in itself.

=20

=20

BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an attempt to address the problem =
of 'encrypting the subject header' and other metadata separately from the c=
ontent data. But under the same key. Bearing in mind that we want to be abl=
e to encrypt multiple data items under a single key exchange.

=20

So starting from the result of the key agreement, I add in a per envelope s=
alt which is typically 128 bits. That allows for erasure of the message by =
overwriting the salt value. The main data content is encrypted under a KDF =
with the IKM and envelope salt. If additional encrypted data sequences are =
required, they are encrypted under the IKM, salt and an additional counter.

=20

Now I can fix my designs, but others won't. Considering the EDS counter to =
be an extension to the key led to the unexpected result that the EDS and co=
ntent were encrypted with the same key. Now, it is arguably better consider=
ed to be a part of the salt which is where I think the current code is (hav=
e to check). But my general point stands, this should be a utility function=
 but the Feb 1997 spec does not meet our standards today.

=20

=20

=20

=20

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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Hugo,<o:p></o=
:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Some =
curious molehill questions. Please take with a grain of salt.<o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>In short, d=
oes HKDF-Extract suffer from related-salt and repeated-IKM?<o:p></o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>To elaborate:=
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>Phillip raises a good point below about HMAC suffering from key-extensio=
n (by zero bytes).=C2=A0 You are right that this is not a MAC attack, the m=
ain intended use of HMAC, but now the scope of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC=
 purposes. =C2=A0=C2=A0<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Surely HMAC has good PRF properties, so non-MAC a=
pplications make sense. =C2=A0For what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I had jus=
t presumed that HKDF always used HMAC with the a strong secret key, like a =
good PRF should.=C2=A0 (I failed to verify this, though.)<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>But Phillip see=
ms to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly distributed keys=
), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.=C2=A0 Under my presum=
ption, this would not be best practice (using structure or related keys).<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
>So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basically expecting to find this clearly disal=
lowed.=C2=A0 Re-reading the RFC, it was unclear to me what kind of salt was=
 allowed. (The eprint might be clearer, but it is longer to find this needl=
e.) Would it (dis)allow the structured salts Phillip described? <o:p></o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Then, I =
saw a phrase in the HKDF RFC that salts were unlike IKM, because they could=
 be re-used.=C2=A0 I inferred that IKM was not to be re-used.=C2=A0 If so, =
related salts should cause no problem for extraction, because a different I=
KM would always be used.=C2=A0 But might IKM be re-used?=C2=A0 For example,=
 the rare event that TLS client and server both re-use their ECDHE keys.=C2=
=A0 So, I went to look at TLS 1.3.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>In TLS 1.3, HKDF-Extract is used with =
both structured salts (e.g. 0), and structured IKMs (e.g. 0).=C2=A0 In the =
end, all is fine, because at least one of the salt or IKM has lots of entro=
py, and there were no related salts.=C2=A0 (The case HKDF-Extract(0,0) is m=
entioned in TLS 1.3, but very clearly that this case does not provide secur=
ity.)=C2=A0 I presume TLS 1.3 designers were adhering to the intended use o=
f HKDF-Extract.=C2=A0 <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal>To summarize, related-salt + repeated-IKM in HKDF-=
Extract might lead to repeated PRK, right? This could be bad if PRK used in=
 HKDF-Expand to create two identical stream cipher keys. =C2=A0If two ident=
ical authentication keys, perhaps an unexpected replay attack might apply?=
=C2=A0 Are these a concern?=C2=A0 Is TLS 1.3 fine, mainly because HKDF was =
used correctly?=C2=A0 Are these related-salts really realistic: would an im=
plementer do this? Do you think better implementer guidance is needed to pr=
event this type of accident?=C2=A0 <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Best regards,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B<o:p></o:p></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>Dan<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span lang=3DEN-CA>PS<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lan=
g=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The HKDF RFC cle=
arly excludes an adversary causing related salts, so that=E2=80=99s good.<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>I really like both defense in=
 depth and provable security, but I would also like it to be clear that is =
the main motivation for HKDF in key derivation.=C2=A0 To wit, HMAC itself i=
nternally derives two closely-related keys using XOR ipad and XOR opad. =C2=
=A0=C2=A0You have proved this turns out fine, despite the relatedness of th=
e two keys, because the robust property of hash function. =C2=A0My point he=
re, is if we assumed the derived keys are used in robust algorithms, e.g. A=
ES-GCM, could they tolerate simpler ways of deriving keys, i.e. XORing a ke=
y with a non-random separation string? =C2=A0To repeat, I am totally fine t=
o use robust key derivation, like HKDF, but I would want the reason to be c=
lear.=C2=A0 E.g. TLS 1.3 handshake uses HKDF as hedge against possible rela=
ted-key attacks on the symmetric-key crypto in the record layer, or for bet=
ter or simpler security proofs (e.g. compared to past key derivation method=
s).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>As many know, hashes were, once upon a time, only used for mes=
sage digests in signatures. Message-extension in hashes did not result in s=
ignature forgery.=C2=A0=C2=A0 But then people naturally wanted to use hashe=
s (as a =E2=80=9Cutility function=E2=80=9D in Phillip=E2=80=99s terms) for =
a MAC. =C2=A0But hashes with message extension suffer from MAC forgery. Alo=
ng came HMAC to the rescue, saving the day, and the rest is history.=C2=A0 =
(To exaggerate: it is, on a minute scale, repeating;)<o:p></o:p></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0i=
n 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padd=
ing:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounce=
s@ietf.org&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Phillip Hallam-Baker<br><b>Sent:</b> Tue=
sday, May 12, 2020 1:49 AM<br><b>To:</b> Hugo Krawczyk &lt;hugo@ee.technion=
.ac.il&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) &lt;quynh.dang=3D40nist.gov@d=
marc.ietf.org&gt;; cfrg@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org; Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D40ak=
amai.com@dmarc.ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto=
 group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, M=
ay 11, 2020 at 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion=
.ac.il">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquo=
te style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in=
 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>There i=
s no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0pt'>One time pads aren't flawed if you use them right. When they bec=
ome a two time pad, there is a problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>My poi=
nt is that if we are developing schemes that are supposed to be used as uti=
lity building blocks, we need to consider all the ways they might be used a=
nd not just limit ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the argument ma=
de for defining authenticated encryption modes, it holds here as well.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p=
></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;pad=
ding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",san=
s-serif'>The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not random) s=
alt values in HKDF, you are probably using it with&nbsp; domain separation =
functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info field no=
t the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rationale.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt'>I am already using the info field for domain separation. I us=
e info to generate separate keys for encryption, authentication, any IVs et=
c. by concatenating the IANA protocol name and the encryption function. So =
I don't want to put any more in there.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>It is e=
asy enough to fix if you are aware of it. I noticed the issue while I was i=
mplementing HMAC by hand. But the person who is using the function using a =
library call (i.e. myself five years from now) might not be aware.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Saying 'read my paper' really isn't an argument. I kn=
ow the design rationale. I am saying it is the wrong one for the future. An=
d regardless, I don't see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of the paper =
you cite nor is there mention of the issue in RFC 2104.<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt'>If I have to go hunting to find security issues with a standard, =
that is a problem in itself.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
>BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an attempt to address the problem=
 of 'encrypting the subject&nbsp;header' and other metadata separately from=
 the content data. But under the same key. Bearing in mind that we want to =
be able to encrypt multiple data items under a single key exchange.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>So starting from the result of the key agreemen=
t, I add in a per envelope salt which is typically 128 bits. That allows fo=
r erasure of the message by overwriting the salt value. The main data conte=
nt is encrypted under a KDF with the IKM and envelope salt. If additional e=
ncrypted data sequences are required, they are encrypted under the IKM, sal=
t and an additional counter.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Now I can fix my =
designs, but others won't. Considering the EDS counter to be an extension t=
o the key led to the unexpected result that the EDS and content were encryp=
ted with the same key. Now, it is arguably better considered to be a part o=
f the salt which is where I think the current code is (have to check). But =
my general point stands, this should be a utility function but the Feb 1997=
 spec does not meet our standards today.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></div></di=
v></div></div>
<HR>This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential =
information, privileged material (including material protected by the solic=
itor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public infor=
mation. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recip=
ient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please=
 immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from your syst=
em. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission =
by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.<BR>
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 13:03:49 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhtLDD+VkjzmwcoPBbvV2vEwhy0bcUg+S4=XnwSO+D7iw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
Cc: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>,  "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 12:31 PM Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote=
:

> Hi Hugo,
>
>
>
> Some curious molehill questions. Please take with a grain of salt.
>
>
>
> In short, does HKDF-Extract suffer from related-salt and repeated-IKM?
>
>
>
> To elaborate:
>
>
>
> Phillip raises a good point below about HMAC suffering from key-extension
> (by zero bytes).  You are right that this is not a MAC attack, the main
> intended use of HMAC, but now the scope of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC
> purposes.
>
>
>
> Surely HMAC has good PRF properties, so non-MAC applications make sense.
> For what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I had just presumed that HKDF always =
used HMAC
> with the a strong secret key, like a good PRF should.  (I failed to verif=
y
> this, though.)
>
>
>
> But Phillip seems to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly
> distributed keys), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.
> Under my presumption, this would not be best practice (using structure or
> related keys).
>
>
>
> So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basically expecting to find this clearly
> disallowed.  Re-reading the RFC, it was unclear to me what kind of salt w=
as
> allowed. (The eprint might be clearer, but it is longer to find this
> needle.) Would it (dis)allow the structured salts Phillip described?
>

The HMAC RFC is from 1997. While we have revised the spec to add new digest
algorithms, we have never revised the security considerations.

I think we should take the opportunity to level up to our current best
practices rather than relying on the old. Back in 1997 we were still using
DES as the blockcipher but very few folk were talking about the fact that
we should be considering birthday attacks and limiting the amount of
cipherstream generated under a particular key. We do consider that type of
issue today.

The concern I have is not the number of keys generated from a given IKM or
PRK so much as the amount of data those keys are used to encrypt. If I have
a log file with 1 million entries of 120 bytes, am I worse off by
generating 1 million keys from the same IKM or by generating one key and
using different IVs? The second is closer to customary practice but only
because we are considering the KDF as being a completely separate thing
from the block cipher key schedule.

Since I cannot do a key agreement for every log entry, there will be
related keys or repeated keys. The question is which we prefer.

Another application of the same approach is to encrypt a live video stream
and its associated data frame by frame with the intention of retaining
random access, fast forward etc. capabilities. I cannot perform a key
exchange per frame. But I can do a KDF per frame. Regarding the salt input
to the KDF as being a substitute for the IV gives me the performance and
flexibility I need without increasing the amount of data per entry. I just
generate an IV along with my session key.

The whole point of this approach is to construct a mechanism that allows me
to be very sure that every piece of encrypted data is encrypted under a
different key. It is really hard to screw up without it being apparent.

So in summary:

* Consider the NIST certification process to be an opportunity, not a
burden.

* We should revise the RFCs for HMAC and KDF. HMAC in particular needs
proper security considerations.

* We should look at the security of both the individual components and the
composition of the components in a system and require that both be sound as
opposed to allowing either.

* We should propose a simple, backwards compatible means of protecting
against the zero key padding issue on HMAC. One approach is simply
appending a non zero byte to the key. 0x50 is what I plan to use for my
HMAC variant unless someone has a better idea.

--000000000000281bc205a57673d2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 12:31 PM Dan Brown &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:danibrown@blackberry.com">danibrown@blackberry.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=
=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_-2714699690157379252WordSection1"><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Hugo,<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some curious molehill questions. Pleas=
e take with a grain of salt.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u=
>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">In short, does HKDF-Extract suffer=
 from related-salt and repeated-IKM?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To elaborate:<u></u><u></u=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
Phillip raises a good point below about HMAC suffering from key-extension (=
by zero bytes).=C2=A0 You are right that this is not a MAC attack, the main=
 intended use of HMAC, but now the scope of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC pu=
rposes. =C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Surely HMAC has good PRF properties, so no=
n-MAC applications make sense.=C2=A0 For what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I =
had just presumed that HKDF always used HMAC with the a strong secret key, =
like a good PRF should.=C2=A0 (I failed to verify this, though.)<u></u><u><=
/u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
">But Phillip seems to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly=
 distributed keys), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.=C2=
=A0 Under my presumption, this would not be best practice (using structure =
or related keys).<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u><=
/u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basically expecti=
ng to find this clearly disallowed.=C2=A0 Re-reading the RFC, it was unclea=
r to me what kind of salt was allowed. (The eprint might be clearer, but it=
 is longer to find this needle.) Would it (dis)allow the structured salts P=
hillip described?</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The HMAC RFC is from 1997. Wh=
ile we have revised the spec to add new digest algorithms, we have never re=
vised the security considerations.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-s=
ize:small">I think we should take the opportunity to level up to our curren=
t best practices rather than relying on the old. Back in 1997 we were still=
 using DES as the blockcipher but very few folk were talking about the fact=
 that we should be considering birthday attacks and limiting the amount of =
cipherstream generated under a particular key. We do consider that type of =
issue today.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The concern =
I have is not the number of keys generated from a given IKM or PRK so much =
as the amount of data those keys are used to encrypt. If I have a log file =
with 1 million entries of 120 bytes, am I worse off by generating 1 million=
 keys from the same IKM or by generating one key and using different IVs? T=
he second is closer to customary practice but only because we are consideri=
ng the KDF as being a completely separate thing from the block cipher key s=
chedule.</div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-siz=
e:small">Since I cannot do a key agreement for every log entry, there will =
be related keys or repeated keys. The question is which we prefer.</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Another application of the same a=
pproach is to encrypt a live video stream and its associated data frame by =
frame with the intention of retaining random access, fast forward etc. capa=
bilities. I cannot perform a key exchange per frame. But I can do a KDF per=
 frame. Regarding the salt input to the KDF as being a substitute for the I=
V gives me the performance and flexibility I need without increasing the am=
ount of data per entry. I just generate an IV along with my session key.</d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The whole point of this app=
roach is to construct a mechanism that allows me to be very sure that every=
 piece of encrypted data is encrypted under a different key. It is really h=
ard to screw up without it being apparent.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default=
" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-size:small">So in summary:</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size=
:small">* Consider the NIST certification process to be an opportunity, not=
 a burden.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">* We sho=
uld revise the RFCs for HMAC and KDF. HMAC in particular needs proper secur=
ity considerations.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sm=
all"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">* We =
should look at the security of both the individual components and the compo=
sition of the components in a system and require that both be sound as oppo=
sed to allowing either.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-siz=
e:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">*=
 We should propose a simple, backwards compatible means of protecting again=
st the zero key padding issue on HMAC. One approach is simply appending a n=
on zero byte to the key. 0x50 is what I plan to use for my HMAC variant unl=
ess someone has a better idea.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-size:small"><br></div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div></div></div>

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In-Reply-To: <ff7ab616c7714a9789d387028df14bd0@blackberry.com>
From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 22:29:28 -0400
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To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>,  "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 12:31 PM Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote=
:

> Hi Hugo,
>
>
>
> Some curious molehill questions. Please take with a grain of salt.
>
>
>
> In short, does HKDF-Extract suffer from related-salt and repeated-IKM?
>
>
>
> To elaborate:
>
>
>
> Phillip raises a good point below about HMAC suffering from key-extension
> (by zero bytes).  You are right that this is not a MAC attack, the main
> intended use of HMAC, but now the scope of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC
> purposes.
>
>
>
> Surely HMAC has good PRF properties, so non-MAC applications make sense.
> For what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I had just presumed that HKDF always =
used HMAC
> with the a strong secret key, like a good PRF should.  (I failed to verif=
y
> this, though.)
>

If you what you wanted is a PRF, there was no need for HKDF. HMAC is a PRF.
The whole point of HKDF is to transform non-uniform entropy  into strong
(pseudo) random keys. If you had a strong secret key you not need HKDF.


>
> But Phillip seems to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly
> distributed keys), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.
> Under my presumption, this would not be best practice (using structure or
> related keys).
>

This may be what Philip wants but not what HKDF gives (I too want some
things that even HKDF cannot give me). Not all combinations of keys and
inputs to HMAC produce magic outputs. HKDF was built and analyzed to
identify uses and combinations that go well together for the KDF
functionality. The RFC (and paper) say it clearly: The HMAC key can be
replaced with a random salt (meaning a random but not necessarily secret
value) and if such value is not availalble then the salt (or HMAC key) is
set to 0. If someone wants to use HMAC differently, they are welcome. But
that's not HKDF. They are welcome to analyze their design.


>
> So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basically expecting to find this clearly
> disallowed.  Re-reading the RFC, it was unclear to me what kind of salt w=
as
> allowed. (The eprint might be clearer, but it is longer to find this
> needle.) Would it (dis)allow the structured salts Phillip described?
>
>
>
> Then, I saw a phrase in the HKDF RFC that salts were unlike IKM, because
> they could be re-used.  I inferred that IKM was not to be re-used.  If so=
,
> related salts should cause no problem for extraction, because a different
> IKM would always be used.  But might IKM be re-used?
>

The security of HKDF as an extractor requires IKM values produced by an
application to be fresh and independent . The RFC (section 3.4) and paper
say that clearly.

If you use dependent IKMs then you need to analyze HKDF under random oracle
modeling.  You can use a fixed random oracle setting salt to 0 or a
randomized family with random salts.

For example, the rare event that TLS client and server both re-use their
> ECDHE keys.  So, I went to look at TLS 1.3.
>
>
>
> In TLS 1.3, HKDF-Extract is used with both structured salts (e.g. 0), and
> structured IKMs (e.g. 0).  In the end, all is fine, because at least one =
of
> the salt or IKM has lots of entropy, and there were no related salts.  (T=
he
> case HKDF-Extract(0,0) is mentioned in TLS 1.3, but very clearly that thi=
s
> case does not provide security.)  I presume TLS 1.3 designers were adheri=
ng
> to the intended use of HKDF-Extract.
>

Indeed.

>
>
> To summarize, related-salt + repeated-IKM in HKDF-Extract might lead to
> repeated PRK, right?
>
This could be bad if PRK used in HKDF-Expand to create two identical stream
> cipher keys.  If two identical authentication keys, perhaps an unexpected
> replay attack might apply?  Are these a concern?  Is TLS 1.3 fine, mainly
> because HKDF was used correctly?  Are these related-salts really realisti=
c:
> would an implementer do this? Do you think better implementer guidance is
> needed to prevent this type of accident?
>

RFC 5869 gives clear guidance that addresses the issues raised here. One
can expand on it. But if people do not read or follow it then what good it
does? Anyway, I am not opposed to give more guidance of course. But there
is never a way to exhaust what people can think of doing with a
cryptographic function, especially one to which we attach magic powers. For
example, the solution Philip suggested for his problem (appending a fixed
byte) does not fully  solve his problem and leaves others uncovered. For
example, in HKDF, if you choose a salt that is larger than a block size and
then choose a salt that equals the hash of that other salt, you get the
same function even though these were different salts. By saying use random
salt or otherwise set to 0 (and allowing arbitrary inputs through the  info
field) we addressed all these variations and limited other inventive ways
to use the function.

Hugo


>
> Best regards,
>
> Dan
>
>
>
> PS
>
>
>
> The HKDF RFC clearly excludes an adversary causing related salts, so
> that=E2=80=99s good.
>
>
>
> I really like both defense in depth and provable security, but I would
> also like it to be clear that is the main motivation for HKDF in key
> derivation.  To wit, HMAC itself internally derives two closely-related
> keys using XOR ipad and XOR opad.   You have proved this turns out fine,
> despite the relatedness of the two keys, because the robust property of
> hash function.  My point here, is if we assumed the derived keys are used
> in robust algorithms, e.g. AES-GCM, could they tolerate simpler ways of
> deriving keys, i.e. XORing a key with a non-random separation string?  To
> repeat, I am totally fine to use robust key derivation, like HKDF, but I
> would want the reason to be clear.  E.g. TLS 1.3 handshake uses HKDF as
> hedge against possible related-key attacks on the symmetric-key crypto in
> the record layer, or for better or simpler security proofs (e.g. compared
> to past key derivation methods).
>
>
>
> As many know, hashes were, once upon a time, only used for message digest=
s
> in signatures. Message-extension in hashes did not result in signature
> forgery.   But then people naturally wanted to use hashes (as a =E2=80=9C=
utility
> function=E2=80=9D in Phillip=E2=80=99s terms) for a MAC.  But hashes with=
 message extension
> suffer from MAC forgery. Along came HMAC to the rescue, saving the day, a=
nd
> the rest is history.  (To exaggerate: it is, on a minute scale, repeating=
;)
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Phillip Hallam-Baker
> *Sent:* Tuesday, May 12, 2020 1:49 AM
> *To:* Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
> *Cc:* Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) <quynh.dang=3D40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>;
> cfrg@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org; Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.=
org
> >
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS
> 1.3)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
> wrote:
>
> There is no flaw if you use HMAC and HKDF as intended. See details below.
>
>
>
> One time pads aren't flawed if you use them right. When they become a two
> time pad, there is a problem.
>
>
>
> My point is that if we are developing schemes that are supposed to be use=
d
> as utility building blocks, we need to consider all the ways they might b=
e
> used and not just limit ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the
> argument made for defining authenticated encryption modes, it holds here =
as
> well.
>
>
>
> The bottom line advise is: If you are using related (not random) salt
> values in HKDF, you are probably using it with  domain separation
> functionality. In HKDF, domain separation is enforced via the info field
> not the salt. Read the HKDF RFC and paper for background and rationale.
>
>
>
> I am already using the info field for domain separation. I use info to
> generate separate keys for encryption, authentication, any IVs etc. by
> concatenating the IANA protocol name and the encryption function. So I
> don't want to put any more in there.
>
>
>
> It is easy enough to fix if you are aware of it. I noticed the issue whil=
e
> I was implementing HMAC by hand. But the person who is using the function
> using a library call (i.e. myself five years from now) might not be aware=
.
>
>
>
> Saying 'read my paper' really isn't an argument. I know the design
> rationale. I am saying it is the wrong one for the future. And regardless=
,
> I don't see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of the paper you cite nor
> is there mention of the issue in RFC 2104.
>
>
>
> If I have to go hunting to find security issues with a standard, that is =
a
> problem in itself.
>
>
>
>
>
> BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an attempt to address the proble=
m
> of 'encrypting the subject header' and other metadata separately from the
> content data. But under the same key. Bearing in mind that we want to be
> able to encrypt multiple data items under a single key exchange.
>
>
>
> So starting from the result of the key agreement, I add in a per envelope
> salt which is typically 128 bits. That allows for erasure of the message =
by
> overwriting the salt value. The main data content is encrypted under a KD=
F
> with the IKM and envelope salt. If additional encrypted data sequences ar=
e
> required, they are encrypted under the IKM, salt and an additional counte=
r.
>
>
>
> Now I can fix my designs, but others won't. Considering the EDS counter t=
o
> be an extension to the key led to the unexpected result that the EDS and
> content were encrypted with the same key. Now, it is arguably better
> considered to be a part of the salt which is where I think the current co=
de
> is (have to check). But my general point stands, this should be a utility
> function but the Feb 1997 spec does not meet our standards today.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential
> information, privileged material (including material protected by the
> solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-publi=
c
> information. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intende=
d
> recipient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error,
> please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from
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ul.
>

--00000000000026788405a57e5bb6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div></div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May =
12, 2020 at 12:31 PM Dan Brown &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:danibrown@blackberry.c=
om">danibrown@blackberry.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_54950=
50315273670053WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Hugo,<u></u><u></u></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Som=
e curious molehill questions. Please take with a grain of salt.<u></u><u></=
u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
>In short, does HKDF-Extract suffer from related-salt and repeated-IKM?<u><=
/u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal">To elaborate:<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Phillip raises a good point below abou=
t HMAC suffering from key-extension (by zero bytes).=C2=A0 You are right th=
at this is not a MAC attack, the main intended use of HMAC, but now the sco=
pe of HMAC has expanded to non-MAC purposes. =C2=A0=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Surel=
y HMAC has good PRF properties, so non-MAC applications make sense.=C2=A0 F=
or what little it=E2=80=99s worth, I had just presumed that HKDF always use=
d HMAC with the a strong secret key, like a good PRF should.=C2=A0 (I faile=
d to verify this, though.)</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;fon=
t-size:small">If you what=C2=A0you wanted is a PRF, there was no need for H=
KDF. HMAC is a PRF. The whole point of HKDF is to transform non-uniform ent=
ropy=C2=A0 into strong (pseudo) random keys. If you had a strong secret key=
 you not=C2=A0need HKDF.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"g=
mail-m_5495050315273670053WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></=
u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
>But Phillip seems to want to use structured HMAC keys (i.e. not uniformly =
distributed keys), specifically the salts in HKDF-Extract, I presume.=C2=A0=
 Under my presumption, this would not be best practice (using structure or =
related keys).</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small=
">This may be what Philip wants but not what HKDF gives (I too want some th=
ings that even HKDF cannot give me). Not all combinations of keys and input=
s to HMAC produce magic outputs. HKDF was built and analyzed to identify us=
es=C2=A0and combinations that=C2=A0go well together for=C2=A0the KDF functi=
onality. The=C2=A0RFC (and paper) say it clearly: The=C2=A0HMAC key can be =
replaced with a random salt (meaning a random but not necessarily secret va=
lue) and if such value is not availalble=C2=A0then the salt (or HMAC key) i=
s set to 0. If someone wants to use HMAC differently, they are welcome. But=
 that&#39;s not HKDF. They are welcome to analyze their=C2=A0design.</div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif=
;font-size:small"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_5495050315273670053WordSection=
1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So, I went to the HKDF RFC, basical=
ly expecting to find this clearly disallowed.=C2=A0 Re-reading the RFC, it =
was unclear to me what kind of salt was allowed. (The eprint might be clear=
er, but it is longer to find this needle.) Would it (dis)allow the structur=
ed salts Phillip described? <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u=
>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Then, I saw a phrase in the HKDF R=
FC that salts were unlike IKM, because they could be re-used.=C2=A0 I infer=
red that IKM was not to be re-used.=C2=A0 If so, related salts should cause=
 no problem for extraction, because a different IKM would always be used.=
=C2=A0 But might IKM be re-used?=C2=A0 </p></div></div></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,s=
ans-serif;font-size:small">The security of HKDF as an extractor requires IK=
M values produced by an application to be fresh and independent . The RFC (=
section 3.4) and paper say that clearly.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_def=
ault" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,san=
s-serif;font-size:small">If you use dependent IKMs then you need to analyze=
 HKDF under random oracle modeling.=C2=A0 You can use a fixed random oracle=
 setting salt to 0 or a randomized family with random salts.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-si=
ze:small"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_5495050315273670053WordSection1"><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">For example, the rare event that TLS client and server bo=
th re-use their ECDHE keys.=C2=A0 So, I went to look at TLS 1.3.<u></u><u><=
/u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
">In TLS 1.3, HKDF-Extract is used with both structured salts (e.g. 0), and=
 structured IKMs (e.g. 0).=C2=A0 In the end, all is fine, because at least =
one of the salt or IKM has lots of entropy, and there were no related salts=
.=C2=A0 (The case HKDF-Extract(0,0) is mentioned in TLS 1.3, but very clear=
ly that this case does not provide security.)=C2=A0 I presume TLS 1.3 desig=
ners were adhering to the intended use of HKDF-Extract.=C2=A0</p></div></di=
v></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fa=
mily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Indeed.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:s=
mall"></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"=
EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_5495050315273670053WordSection1"><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To summarize, related-salt + repeated-IKM in HKDF-E=
xtract might lead to repeated PRK, right?</p></div></div></blockquote><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=
=3D"gmail-m_5495050315273670053WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">This co=
uld be bad if PRK used in HKDF-Expand to create two identical stream cipher=
 keys.=C2=A0 If two identical authentication keys, perhaps an unexpected re=
play attack might apply?=C2=A0 Are these a concern?=C2=A0 Is TLS 1.3 fine, =
mainly because HKDF was used correctly?=C2=A0 Are these related-salts reall=
y realistic: would an implementer do this? Do you think better implementer =
guidance is needed to prevent this type of accident?=C2=A0</p></div></div><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-famil=
y:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">RFC 5869 gives clear guidance=
 that addresses the=C2=A0issues raised here. One can expand on it. But if p=
eople do not read or follow it then what good it does? Anyway, I am not opp=
osed to give=C2=A0more guidance of course. But there is never a way to exha=
ust what people can think of doing with a cryptographic function, especiall=
y one to which we attach magic powers. For example, the solution Philip sug=
gested for his problem (appending a fixed byte) does not fully=C2=A0 solve =
his problem and leaves others uncovered. For example, in HKDF, if you choos=
e a salt that is larger than a block size and then choose a salt that equal=
s the hash of that other salt, you get the same function even though these =
were different salts. By saying use random salt or otherwise set to 0 (and =
allowing arbitrary inputs through the=C2=A0 info field) we addressed all th=
ese variations and limited=C2=A0other=C2=A0inventive=C2=A0ways to use the=
=C2=A0function.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:aria=
l,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hugo</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-=
serif;font-size:small"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_5495050315273670053WordSe=
ction1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u=
></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Best regards,<u></u><u></u></p=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=
=3D"EN-CA">Dan<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D=
"EN-CA"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D=
"EN-CA">PS<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-=
CA"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">The HKDF RFC clea=
rly excludes an adversary causing related salts, so that=E2=80=99s good.<u>=
</u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-CA"><u></u>=C2=A0<u>=
</u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-CA">I really like bo=
th defense in depth and provable security, but I would also like it to be c=
lear that is the main motivation for HKDF in key derivation.=C2=A0 To wit, =
HMAC itself internally derives two closely-related keys using XOR ipad and =
XOR opad. =C2=A0=C2=A0You have proved this turns out fine, despite the rela=
tedness of the two keys, because the robust property of hash function.=C2=
=A0 My point here, is if we assumed the derived keys are used in robust alg=
orithms, e.g. AES-GCM, could they tolerate simpler ways of deriving keys, i=
.e. XORing a key with a non-random separation string?=C2=A0 To repeat, I am=
 totally fine to use robust key derivation, like HKDF, but I would want the=
 reason to be clear.=C2=A0 E.g. TLS 1.3 handshake uses HKDF as hedge agains=
t possible related-key attacks on the symmetric-key crypto in the record la=
yer, or for better or simpler security proofs (e.g. compared to past key de=
rivation methods).<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">As many know, hashes were, once upo=
n a time, only used for message digests in signatures. Message-extension in=
 hashes did not result in signature forgery.=C2=A0=C2=A0 But then people na=
turally wanted to use hashes (as a =E2=80=9Cutility function=E2=80=9D in Ph=
illip=E2=80=99s terms) for a MAC.=C2=A0 But hashes with message extension s=
uffer from MAC forgery. Along came HMAC to the rescue, saving the day, and =
the rest is history.=C2=A0 (To exaggerate: it is, on a minute scale, repeat=
ing;)<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div style=3D"border-top:none;bor=
der-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1.5pt solid blue;padding:0in =
0in 0in 4pt"><div><div style=3D"border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border=
-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.o=
rg" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Phil=
lip Hallam-Baker<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, May 12, 2020 1:49 AM<br><b>To:</b=
> Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" target=3D"_bl=
ank">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) &lt;=
quynh.dang=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">cfrg@ietf.org</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">tls@ietf.org</a>; Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40akamai.c=
om@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;<br=
><b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore=
 TLS 1.3)<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0=
<u></u></p><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><=
/u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, May 11, 2020 a=
t 4:36 PM Hugo Krawczyk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hugo@ee.technion.ac.il" targe=
t=3D"_blank">hugo@ee.technion.ac.il</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><=
blockquote style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;bo=
rder-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.=
8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"=
font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">There is no flaw if you use HM=
AC and HKDF as intended. See details below.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><=
/div></div></blockquote><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
></div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">One =
time pads aren&#39;t flawed if you use them right. When they become a two t=
ime pad, there is a problem.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">My point is=
 that if we are developing schemes that are supposed to be used as utility =
building blocks, we need to consider all the ways they might be used and no=
t just limit ourselves to the ones we expect. That was the argument made fo=
r defining authenticated encryption modes, it holds here as well.<u></u><u>=
</u></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u>=
</p></div><blockquote style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bot=
tom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;mar=
gin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif">The bottom line adv=
ise is: If you are using related (not random) salt values in HKDF, you are =
probably using it with=C2=A0 domain separation functionality. In HKDF, doma=
in separation is enforced via the info field not the salt. Read the HKDF RF=
C and paper for background and rationale.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div></d=
iv></div></blockquote><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><=
/div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">I am a=
lready using the info field for domain separation. I use info to generate s=
eparate keys for encryption, authentication, any IVs etc. by concatenating =
the IANA protocol name and the encryption function. So I don&#39;t want to =
put any more in there.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">It is easy enough=
 to fix if you are aware of it. I noticed the issue while I was implementin=
g HMAC by hand. But the person who is using the function using a library ca=
ll (i.e. myself five years from now) might not be aware.<u></u><u></u></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u><=
/u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12pt">Saying &#39;read my paper&#39; really isn&#39;t an argumen=
t. I know the design rationale. I am saying it is the wrong one for the fut=
ure. And regardless, I don&#39;t see mention of the issue in section 4.2 of=
 the paper you cite nor is there mention of the issue in RFC 2104.<u></u><u=
></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12pt">If I have to go hunting to find security issues =
with a standard, that is a problem in itself.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12pt">BTW, the reason it came up with DARE was an atte=
mpt to address the problem of &#39;encrypting the subject=C2=A0header&#39; =
and other metadata separately from the content data. But under the same key=
. Bearing in mind that we want to be able to encrypt multiple data items un=
der a single key exchange.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">So star=
ting from the result of the key agreement, I add in a per envelope salt whi=
ch is typically 128 bits. That allows for erasure of the message by overwri=
ting the salt value. The main data content is encrypted under a KDF with th=
e IKM and envelope salt. If additional encrypted data sequences are require=
d, they are encrypted under the IKM, salt and an additional counter.<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12pt">Now I can fix my designs, but others won&#39;t=
. Considering the EDS counter to be an extension to the key led to the unex=
pected result that the EDS and content were encrypted with the same key. No=
w, it is arguably better considered to be a part of the salt which is where=
 I think the current code is (have to check). But my general point stands, =
this should be a utility function but the Feb 1997 spec does not meet our s=
tandards today.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u>=
</u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div></div></div></div>=
</div>
<hr>This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential =
information, privileged material (including material protected by the solic=
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mation. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recip=
ient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please=
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em. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission =
by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.<br>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div>

--00000000000026788405a57e5bb6--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
        Authors         : Loganaden Velvindron
                          Kathleen Moriarty
                          Alessandro Ghedini
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2020-05-14

Abstract:
   The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening in
   strength and their deprecation process should begin for their use in
   TLS 1.2 digital signatures.  However, this document does not
   deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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From: "Dang, Quynh H. (Fed)" <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
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CC: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "rsalz@akamai.com" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)
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Hi Torsten,

The HKDF is one of the approved KDFs for being used together with an approv=
ed key exchange as specified in 56C.

At this moment, a standalone HKDF is not approved yet.

Draft version 2 of SP 800-133 (Section 6.3, item# 3: https://nvlpubs.nist.g=
ov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf )specifies an o=
ption for a HKDF's extraction step when the IKM is a shared secret generate=
d from a NIST's approved random bit generator in SP 800-90 series (like ext=
ernal pre-shared key in TLS 1.3) or when the IKM is a pseudorandom key deri=
ved from a previous approved key exchange (like a resumption in TLS 1.3).


Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/ni=
stpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf>
Draft NIST Special Publication 800-133 . Revision 2. Recommendation for Cry=
ptographic Key Generation. Elaine Barker . Allen Roginsky . Richard Davis .=
 This publication is available free of charge from:
nvlpubs.nist.gov


When/if that extraction step option is officially approved, meaning the cur=
rent NIST's approved HKDFs in key exchanges in SP 800-56C would become NIST=
-approved standalone HKDFs, we'll publish their test vectors.

Regards,
Quynh.

________________________________
From: "Torsten Sch=FCtze" <Torsten.Schuetze@gmx.net>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 8:36 AM
To: Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
Cc: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>; cfrg@ietf.org <cfrg@ietf.org>; =
tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>; rsalz@akamai.com <rsalz@akamai.com>
Subject: Aw: Re: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TLS 1.3)

Hi Quynh,

thank you for your quick response. I knew that omitting some fields was all=
owed, but not that permutations are allowed, too. Okay, this makes HKDF RFC=
 5869 definitely to a NIST SP800-56C rev 2 compliant KDF. But what to do ab=
out the CAVP tests or approved test vectors. Couldn't NIST provide for the =
very often used RFC 5869 HKDF approved test vectors? I coulnd't find any. O=
nly for some older, application specific KDFs. Of course, I can generate th=
em by myself with an independent implementation, but I'm talking about eval=
uation/approval business here.

Regards

Torsten




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<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
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Hi Torsten,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
The HKDF is one of the approved KDFs for being used together with an approv=
ed key exchange as specified in 56C.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
At this moment, a standalone HKDF is not approved yet.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Draft version 2 of SP 800-133 (Section 6.3, item# 3:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https:=
//nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf=
" id=3D"LPlnk935392">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/=
NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf</a>&nbsp;)specifies
 an option for a HKDF's extraction step when the IKM is a shared secret gen=
erated from a NIST's approved random bit generator in SP 800-90 series (lik=
e external pre-shared key in TLS 1.3) or when the IKM is a pseudorandom key=
 derived from a previous approved
 key exchange (like a resumption in TLS 1.3).</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
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: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"LPBorder_GTaHR0cHM6Ly9udmxwdWJzLm5pc3QuZ292L25pc3RwdWJzL1NwZWNpY=
WxQdWJsaWNhdGlvbnMvTklTVC5TUC44MDAtMTMzcjItZHJhZnQucGRm" class=3D"LPBorder5=
00578" contenteditable=3D"false" style=3D"width: 100%; margin-top: 16px; ma=
rgin-bottom: 16px; position: relative; max-width: 800px; min-width: 424px;"=
>
<table id=3D"LPContainer500578" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"padding: 12p=
x 36px 12px 12px; width: 100%; border-width: 1px; border-style: solid; bord=
er-color: rgb(200, 200, 200); border-radius: 2px;">
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<td style=3D"width: 100%;">
<div id=3D"LPTitle500578" style=3D"font-size: 21px; font-weight: 300; margi=
n-right: 8px; font-family: wf_segoe-ui_light, &quot;Segoe UI Light&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe WP Light&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe WP&quot;, Taho=
ma, Arial, sans-serif; margin-bottom: 12px;">
<a target=3D"_blank" id=3D"LPUrlAnchor500578" href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.=
gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2-draft.pdf" style=3D"text=
-decoration: none; color: var(--themePrimary);">Recommendation for Cryptogr=
aphic Key Generation</a></div>
<div id=3D"LPDescription500578" style=3D"font-size: 14px; max-height: 100px=
; color: rgb(102, 102, 102); font-family: wf_segoe-ui_normal, &quot;Segoe U=
I&quot;, &quot;Segoe WP&quot;, Tahoma, Arial, sans-serif; margin-bottom: 12=
px; margin-right: 8px; overflow: hidden;">
Draft NIST Special Publication 800-133 . Revision 2. Recommendation for Cry=
ptographic Key Generation. Elaine Barker . Allen Roginsky . Richard Davis .=
 This publication is available free of charge from:</div>
<div id=3D"LPMetadata500578" style=3D"font-size: 14px; font-weight: 400; co=
lor: rgb(166, 166, 166); font-family: wf_segoe-ui_normal, &quot;Segoe UI&qu=
ot;, &quot;Segoe WP&quot;, Tahoma, Arial, sans-serif;">
nvlpubs.nist.gov</div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<br>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
When/if that extraction step option is officially approved, meaning the cur=
rent NIST's approved HKDFs in key exchanges in SP 800-56C would become NIST=
-approved standalone HKDFs, we'll publish their test vectors.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Regards,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Quynh.&nbsp;</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" co=
lor=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> &quot;Torsten Sch=FCt=
ze&quot; &lt;Torsten.Schuetze@gmx.net&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, May 12, 2020 8:36 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Dang, Quynh H. (Fed) &lt;quynh.dang@nist.gov&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Hugo Krawczyk &lt;hugo@ee.technion.ac.il&gt;; cfrg@ietf.org &lt;=
cfrg@ietf.org&gt;; tls@ietf.org &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;; rsalz@akamai.com &lt;=
rsalz@akamai.com&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Aw: Re: [Cfrg] NIST crypto group and HKDF (and therefore TL=
S 1.3)</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"=
>
<div class=3D"PlainText">Hi Quynh,<br>
<br>
thank you for your quick response. I knew that omitting some fields was all=
owed, but not that permutations are allowed, too. Okay, this makes HKDF RFC=
 5869 definitely to a NIST SP800-56C rev 2 compliant KDF. But what to do ab=
out the CAVP tests or approved test
 vectors. Couldn't NIST provide for the very often used RFC 5869 HKDF appro=
ved test vectors? I coulnd't find any. Only for some older, application spe=
cific KDFs. Of course, I can generate them by myself with an independent im=
plementation, but I'm talking about
 evaluation/approval business here.<br>
<br>
Regards <br>
<br>
Torsten<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
</body>
</html>

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Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 10:51:06 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS
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Continuing the trend where I am the only one to post to this thread...

I just posted a proposal:

https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147

This is essentially a transcription of the work done for QUIC to DTLS.  There is one major change, in the addition of TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.  QUIC prohibits the use of this cipher suite, so it doesn't have to worry about it.  The proposed text does not define limits for this cipher, essentially suggesting that it's not good for general use.

My personal conclusion is that this suite is fine for use in TLS, but unless we dramatically revise our expectations, it's no good for DTLS.  To that end, I'd be happier prohibiting the use of this cipher suite outright in DTLS.  I didn't put that in the proposal as I believe that would be counter to our established position, which is that this is not generally recommended, but it might have specialized uses in which it is OK.  The proposal therefore attempts to hedge by saying that you need special circumstances and further analysis before using it.

So I see two paths and one maybe option:

1. Prohibit use of TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 in DTLS.
2. Allow TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 in DTLS under special circumstances (the PR).
3. An unspecified proposal that allows TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 more generally somehow.


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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS
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FYI in case you are not subscribed to the IETF announce list.

> Begin forwarded message:
>=20
> From: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
> Subject: IETF 108 will be an online meeting
> Date: May 14, 2020 at 17:07:47 EDT
> To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>, irtf-announce@irtf.org, =
IETF <ietf@ietf.org>
> Reply-To: IETF <ietf@ietf.org>
>=20
> The Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the IETF LLC Board of =
Directors, and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Chair have =
decided to replace the in-person IETF 108 Madrid meeting with an online =
meeting. This decision is based on the IETF Executive Director=E2=80=99s =
recommendation, which was made after conducting an assessment of local =
conditions using the criteria set out in the assessment framework [1] =
developed with community input.
>=20
> The recommendation and full assessment are available at: =
https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/IETF_108_Madrid_go_no-go_assessment.p=
df
>=20
> The online IETF 108 meeting will take place 27-31 July from 11:00 to =
16:00 UTC each day. The end time of 16:00 UTC is approximate; some days =
may be shorter depending on scheduling. These time blocks were chosen =
based on the survey feedback [2] we received.
>=20
> Further details about the online meeting will be shared as they become =
available.
>=20
> Sincerely,
> Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair
> Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair
> Jason Livingood, IETF LLC Board Chair
>=20
> [1] =
https://www.ietf.org/blog/assessment-criteria-decision-personvirtual-ietf-=
108/?
> [2] =
https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/survey-planning-possible-online-meeti=
ngs-responses.pdf
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
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in case you are not subscribed to the IETF announce list.<br =
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class=3D"">Begin forwarded message:</div><br =
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Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">IETF Chair &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:chair@ietf.org" class=3D"">chair@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
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style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Subject: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">IETF 108 will be =
an online meeting</b><br class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top:=
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class=3D"">Date: </b></span><span style=3D"font-family: =
-webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">May 14, 2020 at 17:07:47 EDT<br class=3D""></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; =
margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: =
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style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif;" class=3D"">IETF-Announce &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">ietf-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;, <a =
href=3D"mailto:irtf-announce@irtf.org" =
class=3D"">irtf-announce@irtf.org</a>, IETF &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@ietf.org" class=3D"">ietf@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1.0);" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Reply-To: =
</b></span><span style=3D"font-family: -webkit-system-font, Helvetica =
Neue, Helvetica, sans-serif;" class=3D"">IETF &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@ietf.org" class=3D"">ietf@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D""></span></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">The=
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the IETF LLC Board of =
Directors, and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Chair have =
decided to replace the in-person IETF 108 Madrid meeting with an online =
meeting. This decision is based on the IETF Executive Director=E2=80=99s =
recommendation, which was made after conducting an assessment of local =
conditions using the criteria set out in the assessment framework [1] =
developed with community input.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The =
recommendation and full assessment are available at: <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/IETF_108_Madrid_go_no-go_asse=
ssment.pdf" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/IETF_108_Madrid_go_no-go_a=
ssessment.pdf</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The online IETF 108 =
meeting will take place 27-31 July from 11:00 to 16:00 UTC each day. The =
end time of 16:00 UTC is approximate; some days may be shorter depending =
on scheduling. These time blocks were chosen based on the survey =
feedback [2] we received.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Further details =
about the online meeting will be shared as they become available.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">Sincerely,<br class=3D"">Alissa Cooper, IETF =
Chair<br class=3D"">Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair<br class=3D"">Jason =
Livingood, IETF LLC Board Chair<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">[1] <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/blog/assessment-criteria-decision-personvirtu=
al-ietf-108/?" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/blog/assessment-criteria-decision-personvi=
rtual-ietf-108/?</a><br class=3D"">[2] <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/survey-planning-possible-onli=
ne-meetings-responses.pdf" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/media/documents/survey-planning-possible-o=
nline-meetings-responses.pdf</a><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">IETF-Announce mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:IETF-Announce@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">IETF-Announce@ietf.org</a><br =
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:55 AM Felix G=C3=BCnther <mail@felixguenther.info=
>
wrote:

>   4) I slightly disagree with "epochs determine the key" (true) as, what
> I understand is, an argument that "the full epoch is implicitly
> authenticated by using the right key", at least in its absoluteness. My
> *guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down
> to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so
> probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing
> security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was
> authenticated as part of the AAD.
>

Actually, the full epoch is included in the overall sequence number and
hence used to generate the nonce.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4

Does that help?

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:55 AM Felix=
 G=C3=BCnther &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mail@felixguenther.info">mail@felixguen=
ther.info</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">=C2=A0
4) I slightly disagree with &quot;epochs determine the key&quot; (true) as,=
 what<br>
I understand is, an argument that &quot;the full epoch is implicitly<br>
authenticated by using the right key&quot;, at least in its absoluteness. M=
y<br>
*guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down<br=
>
to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so<br>
probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing<br>
security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was<br>
authenticated as part of the AAD.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Actua=
lly, the full epoch is included in the overall sequence number and hence us=
ed to generate the nonce. <br></div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4">https://tools.ietf.=
org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4</a></div><div><br></div><div>Do=
es that help? <br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>=
</div>

--000000000000c85b9505a5b554e2--


From nobody Fri May 15 13:20:36 2020
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-12.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Exported Authenticators in TLS
        Author          : Nick Sullivan
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-12.txt
	Pages           : 14
	Date            : 2020-05-15

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   for peers to provide a proof of ownership of an identity, such as an
   X.509 certificate.  This proof can be exported by one peer,
   transmitted out-of-band to the other peer, and verified by the
   receiving peer.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-12
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-12

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-12


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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To: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <61cb07cb-9a9d-f3d4-c466-343cdae386ed@felixguenther.info>
Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 11:53:35 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation
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Hi,

On 2020-05-15 22:04 +0200, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> Actually, the full epoch is included in the overall sequence number and
> hence used to generate the nonce.
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4
> 
> Does that help?

Sorry, I forgot about reading this difference in how the record sequence
number is constructed in DTLS (vs. TLS, and also QUIC). Yes, this should
effectively separate the nonce spaces between the different epochs /
epoch keys, and implicitly authenticate the epoch through the nonce.

Cheers,
Felix


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From: Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Felix_G=FCnther?= <mail@felixguenther.info>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/EwOj8EgdSu3wbqrAK1EJRZL3JiI>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation
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> Actually, the full epoch is included in the overall sequence number and h=
ence used to generate the nonce.

Good point Ekr, I missed that.

So, we're here at the moment:
(1) Only the CID issue really _needs_ fixing somehow.
(2) Other header fields are currently authenticated through a mixture of AA=
D, nonce, and implicit properties of the AEAD,
and proof complexity doesn't seem to grow significantly because of that non=
-uniformity (the latter was slightly in doubt
so far for epoch authentication, but Ekr's remark clarifies that it isn't a=
ctually the case).
(3) No security issues with the proposed alternative -- uniformly pseudo-he=
ader based AAD -- have been raised yet.
(4) Non-security arguments for a pseudo-header AAD have been proposed, e.g.=
 network bandwidth reduction.
Those aren't discussed until the question of security reaches some clarity.

Felix, could you give some input on (3) as detailed in my last post?

We still need to change _something_ to address (1), the pseudo-header appro=
ach does so while bringing other
advantages, and no concrete security have been pointed out so far. So, once=
 again:

Are there objections in terms of security towards the (purely) pseudo-heade=
r AAD?

Cheers,
Hanno

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2020 9:04 PM
To: Felix G=FCnther <mail@felixguenther.info>
Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation



On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:55 AM Felix G=FCnther <mail@felixguenther.info<ma=
ilto:mail@felixguenther.info>> wrote:
  4) I slightly disagree with "epochs determine the key" (true) as, what
I understand is, an argument that "the full epoch is implicitly
authenticated by using the right key", at least in its absoluteness. My
*guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down
to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so
probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing
security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was
authenticated as part of the AAD.

>

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4

Does that help?

-Ekr

IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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--_000_AM4PR08MB26273DA4DCF47334C85DD7EB9BBB0AM4PR08MB2627eurp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
&gt;&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: rgb(50, 49, 48); font-family: &quot;Segoe U=
I&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -a=
pple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-s=
erif; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !important">Act=
ually,
 the full epoch is included in the overall sequence number and hence used t=
o generate the nonce.<span>&nbsp;</span></span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(50, 49, 48); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; back=
ground-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !important"><span><br>
</span></span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(50, 49, 48); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; back=
ground-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !important"><span>Good po=
int
 Ekr, I missed that.</span></span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(50, 49, 48); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; back=
ground-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !important"><span><br>
</span></span></div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">So, we're here at the moment:</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">(1) Only the CID issue really _needs_ fixin=
g somehow.</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">(2) Other header fields are currently authe=
nticated through a mixture of AAD, nonce, and implicit properties of the AE=
AD,</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">and proof complexity doesn't seem to grow s=
ignificantly because of that non-uniformity (the latter was slightly in dou=
bt</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">so far for epoch authentication, but Ekr's =
remark clarifies that it isn't actually the case).&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">(3) No security issues with the proposed al=
ternative -- uniformly pseudo-header based AAD -- have been raised yet.</di=
v>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">(4) Non-security arguments for a pseudo-hea=
der AAD have been proposed, e.g. network bandwidth reduction.</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">Those aren=
't discussed until the question of security reaches some clarity.</span></d=
iv>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">Felix, could you give some input on (3) as =
detailed in my last post?&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">We still need to change _something_ to addr=
ess (1), the pseudo-header approach does so while bringing other</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">advantages, and no concrete security have b=
een pointed out so far. So, once again:</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">Are there objections in terms of security t=
owards the (purely) pseudo-header AAD?</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">Cheers,</div>
<div style=3D"font-size: 12pt;">Hanno</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" co=
lor=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@i=
etf.org&gt; on behalf of Eric Rescorla &lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, May 15, 2020 9:04 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Felix G=FCnther &lt;mail@felixguenther.info&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt; &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"x_gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"x_gmail_attr">On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:55 AM Fel=
ix G=FCnther &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mail@felixguenther.info">mail@felixguent=
her.info</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"x_gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204); padding-left:1ex">
&nbsp; 4) I slightly disagree with &quot;epochs determine the key&quot; (tr=
ue) as, what<br>
I understand is, an argument that &quot;the full epoch is implicitly<br>
authenticated by using the right key&quot;, at least in its absoluteness. M=
y<br>
*guess* would be that, due to the key schedule, this argument comes down<br=
>
to the probability of keys colliding (which is anyway to be avoided, so<br>
probably fine). Still, from a security analysis point of view, showing<br>
security with key updates might be easier if the (full) epoch was<br>
authenticated as part of the AAD.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>&gt;&nbsp;<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#sectio=
n-4">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-4</a></di=
v>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Does that help? <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Ekr</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
</body>
</html>

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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Trial decryption after HelloRetryRequest (by ocheron)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/233=20

* tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC4)
  1 issues created:
  - Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers (by th=
omas-fossati)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72=20

  1 issues received 4 new comments:
  - #72 Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers (4=
 by boaks, thomas-fossati)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+0/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC3)
  3 issues received 3 new comments:
  - #64 Should sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismat=
ch SignatureSchemeList in client dc extension? (1 by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/64=20
  - #63 A propose of signature context string (1 by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63=20
  - #62 Will the next version of draft define how to store delegated creden=
tial as file? (1 by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62=20

  3 issues closed:
  - Should sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismatch S=
ignatureSchemeList in client dc extension? https://github.com/tlswg/tls-sub=
certs/issues/64=20
  - A propose of signature context string https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subc=
erts/issues/63=20
  - Will the next version of draft define how to store delegated credential=
 as file? https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62=20

* tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Clarify TLS framing (by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/issues/57=20

  2 issues closed:
  - Generalize authentication terminology https://github.com/tlswg/tls-expo=
rted-authenticator/issues/56=20
  - Clarify TLS framing https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator=
/issues/57=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=20
  - Describe known active attacks (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC2)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Define anti-forgery limits for DTLS (by martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147=20
  - Cleanup whitespace (by martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146=20

  2 pull requests received 2 new comments:
  - #147 Define anti-forgery limits for DTLS (1 by hannestschofenig)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147=20
  - #146 Cleanup whitespace (1 by hannestschofenig)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146=20

* tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers (by th=
omas-fossati)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/73=20

* tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+4/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC5)
  4 pull requests submitted:
  - Fix nits (by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/61=20
  - Review as PR (by MikeBishop)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/60=20
  - Focus on generic identities rather than certificates. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/59=20
  - clarify TLS framing #57 (by tatianab)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/58=20

  3 pull requests received 5 new comments:
  - #61 Fix nits (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/61=20
  - #60 Review as PR (1 by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/60=20
  - #58 clarify TLS framing (3 by Lekensteyn, chris-wood, grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/58=20

  3 pull requests merged:
  - Review as PR
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/60=20
  - Focus on generic identities rather than certificates.
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/59=20
  - clarify TLS framing
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pull/58=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

--===============3314994156020641685==
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<body>
<h1>Sunday May 17, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#233 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
33">Trial decryption after HelloRetryRequest</a> (by ocheron) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC4)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#72 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72">Disal=
low sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers</a> (by thomas-=
fossati) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues received 4 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#72 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72">Disal=
low sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers</a> (4 by boaks=
, thomas-fossati) </li>
  </ul>


<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+0/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC3)</h3>

  <p>3 issues received 3 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#64 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/64">Shoul=
d sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismatch SignatureS=
chemeList in client dc extension?</a> (1 by grittygrease) </li>
 =20
  <li>#63 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63">A pro=
pose of signature context string</a> (1 by grittygrease) </li>
 =20
  <li>#62 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62">Will =
the next version of draft define how to store delegated credential as file?=
</a> (1 by grittygrease) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#64 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/64">Shoul=
d sever abort connection when server dc SignatureScheme mismatch SignatureS=
chemeList in client dc extension?</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#63 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/63">A pro=
pose of signature context string</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#62 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/62">Will =
the next version of draft define how to store delegated credential as file?=
</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#57 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/is=
sues/57">Clarify TLS framing</a> (by grittygrease) </li>
  </ul>


  <p>2 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#56 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/is=
sues/56">Generalize authentication terminology</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#57 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/is=
sues/57">Clarify TLS framing</a> </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#235 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=
">Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value.</a> (by chris-wood) =
</li>
 =20
  <li>#234 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=
">Describe known active attacks</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC2)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#147 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147">Define=
 anti-forgery limits for DTLS</a> (by martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#146 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146">Cleanu=
p whitespace</a> (by martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 2 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#147 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147">Define=
 anti-forgery limits for DTLS</a> (1 by hannestschofenig) </li>
 =20
  <li>#146 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146">Cleanu=
p whitespace</a> (1 by hannestschofenig) </li>
  </ul>


<h3>tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#73 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/73">Disallo=
w sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers</a> (by thomas-fo=
ssati) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+4/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC5)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">4 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#61 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/61">Fix nits</a> (by grittygrease) </li>
 =20
  <li>#60 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/60">Review as PR</a> (by MikeBishop) </li>
 =20
  <li>#59 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/59">Focus on generic identities rather than certificates.</a> (by chris-=
wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#58 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/58">clarify TLS framing #57</a> (by tatianab) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests received 5 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#61 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/61">Fix nits</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#60 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/60">Review as PR</a> (1 by grittygrease) </li>
 =20
  <li>#58 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/58">clarify TLS framing</a> (3 by Lekensteyn, chris-wood, grittygrease) =
</li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#60 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/60">Review as PR</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#59 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/59">Focus on generic identities rather than certificates.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#58 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/pu=
ll/58">clarify TLS framing</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============3314994156020641685==--


From jack@randombit.net  Sun May 17 04:46:50 2020
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Date: Sun, 17 May 2020 07:46:46 -0400
From: Jack Lloyd <jack@randombit.net>
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Subject: [TLS] Is client authentication allowed using PSK/SRP suites
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RFC 5246 sec 7.4.4 states that "non-anonymous" servers can request a
client certificate, and otherwise attempting to request a certificate
should result in a fatal alert.

I would generally think of a handshake using PSK or SRP to not be
anonymous but rather the peer identity is implicitly verified via use
of the shared secret. But in this context I'm not sure that's the intent.

For purpose of 7.4.4 does "non-anonymous" mean:

- Anything besides a DH_anon_*/ECDH_anon_* ciphersuite

- A ciphersuite which involves the server sending a Certificate message.

- Something else?

Thanks,
  Jack


From nobody Sun May 17 10:42:42 2020
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Subject: [TLS] Publication has been requested for draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03
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Joseph Salowey has requested publication of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the TLS working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/



From nobody Sun May 17 17:47:12 2020
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Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 10:46:51 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Thomas Fossati" <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS
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On Fri, May 15, 2020, at 20:29, Thomas Fossati wrote:
> While the specific behaviours might more or less differ, the same
> considerations apply to 1.2.  How do we make sure that the message
> doesn't get ignored?  Would it be worth drafting this separately to
> cover both versions (+ an explicit "Updates: 6347" label)?

We're already marking TLS 1.2 obsolete with this, so I don't think that labels are going to change.

The question is whether it is clear that these limits apply to the use of AEADs in TLS more generally.  I think that is clear enough, but I doubt that people will pay any mind unless they are implementing TLS 1.3.

The problem with TLS 1.2 is that there is no option for key updates, unless you count renegotiation, which is often disabled.  When I added limits to NSS, all I could reliably do was make the connection terminate if the limit was hit (which is why the limits used are larger than advised in the spec).


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Hi,

On 2020-05-06 08:00 +0200, Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com> wrote:
>> The latter, to me, suggests that authenticating the pseudo-header alone
>> may not be sufficient. It would at least allow on-path modifications to
>> the on-the-wire header, which I don't expect is intended.
> 
> Can we go a bit into this? As mentioned in the original thread
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VK9e6fA9jdQVFc6tQNWNO8OThU8/ 
> there are some (arguable) considerations of why it has practical benefits 
> to not cryptographically bind the header _format_ to the record.
> 
> Those considerations, however, are secondary to security considerations,
> so they didn't surface here so far.
> 
> Could we therefore clarify:
> 
> Are there any _security_ concerns arising from the modifiability of the
> header format assuming the underlying pseudo-header is bound via AEAD?

This will depend on what security you want to aim at. Clearly, if
non-malleability of headers is a goal, then yes.

More generally, cryptographic models of secure communication channels
would carve out "a ciphertext" (in quotes, as its not only the AEAD
ciphertext) from the spec. Now, it's always a modeling choice what this
ciphertext should include. A reasonable and natural choice for DTLS
would be to include the full on-the-wire header. Integrity would then
require that any modification of that header leads to the ciphertext
being rejected.
At the minimum, one would need to include all cryptographically relevant
information (esp. epoch, sequence number) enabling decryption, but then
singling those out from the wire format feels a little odd.

Hence, I would say that a natural cryptographic security notion most
likely suggests full on-the-wire header authentication. But again, it
all comes down to what's the goal.


> I don't see one so far, but might miss something. In my head, once the
> logical 
> data is authenticated, the entire on-the-wire header merely degrades to
> a 'hint' 
> to the receiver as to what the logical header data is, the precise form
> of which
> is entirely irrelevant.

This depends on the perspective. For analyzing channel security, it is
often conceptually easier to follow a modular approach that combines
confidentiality under passive attacks (usually straightforward) and
integrity of ciphertexts under active attacks. The latter means: no
modification of the ciphertext on the wire is permitted (in contrast to
plaintext integrity, demanding only that no modifications to the payload
can be made). This argument hence indeed relies on headers not being
malleable.

Our security analysis [1] for example models that the decision logic of
whether receiver should be accepting a certain next packet must be
decidable from the transcript of sent and received packets so far
(publicly, without internal keys or state).
Whether this would still work with a malleable 'hint' to the logical
header I don't know. Not saying this can't work, but our analysis
doesn't speak to that.


> Would you expect a change in proof complexity when switching
> to explicit length and sequence number authentication in the AEAD?

Length: no.
Sequence number (and epoch): only minor, as it merely obviates one level
of indirection (authentication via the nonce input).


Cheers,
Felix

[1] Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, Christian Janson. Robust Channels:
Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record Layers of QUIC and DTLS.
Preprint for QUIPS 2020 Workshop at https://felixguenther.info/Q20_RC.pdf


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To: tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <0b036723-5565-ae7c-49d4-7b43d0094713@felixguenther.info>
Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 08:37:36 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Choice of Additional Data Computation
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Hi,

On 2020-05-17 07:35 +0200, Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com> wrote:
> So, we're here at the moment:
> (1) Only the CID issue really _needs_ fixing somehow.
> (2) Other header fields are currently authenticated through a mixture of
> AAD, nonce, and implicit properties of the AEAD,
> and proof complexity doesn't seem to grow significantly because of that
> non-uniformity (the latter was slightly in doubt
> so far for epoch authentication, but Ekr's remark clarifies that it
> isn't actually the case). 
> (3) No security issues with the proposed alternative -- uniformly
> pseudo-header based AAD -- have been raised yet.
> (4) Non-security arguments for a pseudo-header AAD have been proposed,
> e.g. network bandwidth reduction.
> Those aren't discussed until the question of security reaches some clarity.
> 
> Felix, could you give some input on (3) as detailed in my last post? 

Our security analysis doesn't speak to (3) --- I added some more
detailed remarks in reply to your last post. Cearly, you wouldn't
achieve the same security definition (as headers are intentionally
malleable). Whether that's a problem or not depends on the goal, and if
you can indeed prove the corresponding, to-be-formalized security
statements.


Cheers,
Felix


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Subject: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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--00000000000060471c05a5f191d2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

This is the Working Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for TLS"
available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/.
Please review the document and respond to the list with any comments by
June 2, 2020.

Cheers,

Chris, Joe & Sean

--00000000000060471c05a5f191d2
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<div dir=3D"ltr">This is the Working Group Last Call for &quot;Delegated Cr=
edentials for TLS&quot; available at=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.=
ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/</a>.=C2=A0 Please review the document=
 and respond to the list with any comments by June 2, 2020. =C2=A0<br><br><=
div>Cheers,<br><br>Chris, Joe &amp; Sean</div></div>

--00000000000060471c05a5f191d2--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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I am glad this bikeshed was shorter than I expected. Because most people =
didn=E2=80=99t have a strong preference and there might be some =
(possibly small) chance of confusion, it seems like we should change the =
name to ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello).

spt

> On May 7, 2020, at 18:52, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to... =
something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR =
include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the =
HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got =
this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an =
opinion on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share =
it!=20
>=20
> Thanks,
> Chris (no hat)
>=20
> [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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If we must change it, let's do ECH, as the T seems entirely superfluous.
After all, it's not TSNI.

-Ekr


On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:32 AM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> I am glad this bikeshed was shorter than I expected. Because most people
> didn=E2=80=99t have a strong preference and there might be some (possibly=
 small)
> chance of confusion, it seems like we should change the name to ETCH
> (Encrypted TLS Client Hello).
>
> spt
>
> > On May 7, 2020, at 18:52, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> >
> > Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...
> something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR
> include ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the
> HTTPSSVC draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got
> this bikeshedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion
> on the name and whether or not we should change it, please share it!
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Chris (no hat)
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>If we must change it, let&#39;s do ECH, as the T seem=
s entirely superfluous. After all, it&#39;s not TSNI.<br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:32 AM Sean Turne=
r &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I am glad this bikesh=
ed was shorter than I expected. Because most people didn=E2=80=99t have a s=
trong preference and there might be some (possibly small) chance of confusi=
on, it seems like we should change the name to ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client H=
ello).<br>
<br>
spt<br>
<br>
&gt; On May 7, 2020, at 18:52, Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@h=
eapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Erik raises some compelling reasons to change the name from ECHO to...=
 something else less confusing or misleading [1]. Candidates from the PR in=
clude ETCH (Encrypted TLS Client Hello), ECH, and EHELLO. Since the HTTPSSV=
C draft aims for WGLC before IETF 108, it would be good if we got this bike=
shedding out of the way now. To that end, if you have an opinion on the nam=
e and whether or not we should change it, please share it! <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Chris (no hat)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/232=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-=
tls-esni/issues/232</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 09:23:34 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "Hollenbeck, Scott" <shollenbeck@verisign.com>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-04
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We chatted offline and updated the draft to refine some points:

   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/pull/36

Thanks for helping improving the document!

Best,
Chris

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, at 7:08 AM, Hollenbeck, Scott wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> > Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 7:09 PM
> > To: Hollenbeck, Scott <shollenbeck@verisign.com>; TLS@ietf.org
> > Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TLS] Comments on draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-
> > importer-04
> 
> [snip]
> 
> > > > Hmm, not quite. The statement intends to say that if you need EPSK k
> > > > into an importer and into TLS 1.2 then the resulting keys used in
> > > > TLS 1.3 and 1.2 are different. I'm not sure further clarification is
> > > > needed, though I'm happy to review suggestions if you have them!
> > >
> > > Agree with that as the goal.  Here's our concern in brief.  If our
> > > understanding is correct, prior to this draft, the client could use an
> > > EPSK k in two ways:
> > >
> > > * as input to the TLS 1.2 PRF (based on any hash function)
> > > * as input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule via HKDF-extract (based on a
> > > single hash function)
> > >
> > > Following this draft, the client could use k in two ways:
> > >
> > > * as input to the TLS 1.2 PRF (based on any hash function) [same as
> > > before]
> > > * as input to the importer function via HKDF-extract (based on a
> > > single hash function)
> > >
> > > So there is still a potential cryptographic overlap in the use of k
> > > between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.  The imported keys don't have this
> > > overlap, because they're separated from one another and from the
> > > underlying EPSK through the use of the importer function.  But doesn't
> > > the security proof for k still need to take into account that the
> > > input to HKDF-extract might also be input to the TLS 1.2 PRF (with the
> > > same or a different hash function)?
> > >
> > > In other words, if it was a problem for the security proof that k
> > > could be input to the PRF and to HKDF-extract before the draft, isn't
> > > it still a problem afterwards?  The conclusion that there are no
> > > cross-protocol collisions depends on the specifics of the TLS 1.2 PRF
> > > and how it's used, compared to HKDF-extract.
> > >
> > > We're not suggesting there is any attack here, just trying to
> > > understand the design actually addresses the statement in the
> > > introduction that k "could possibly be re-used in two different
> > > contexts with the same hash functions during key derivation".
> > 
> > For lack of a better way to describe this (sorry!), we're trying to avoid this
> > input collision during the key derivation process of a TLS connection. As the
> > importer happens before a connection, and can be viewed as part of the
> > provisioning process that produces unique PSKs for each target hash
> > function, we achieve the goal for TLS 1.3 of not re-using a PSK with different
> > hash functions.
> > 
> > I'm not sure how to better clarify that right now, so suggestions are very
> > much welcome.
> 
> We're okay with the arguments in the draft that the design preserves 
> security proofs when the same EPSK is used to produce internal PSKs 
> associated with different hash functions within TLS 1.3 only. However, 
> it isn't clear enough to us how the design preserves security proofs 
> when the same EPSK is used with both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.  I don't yet 
> have any text to suggest, because we're not sure we understand the 
> rationale. What is the rationale for the design in that situation?
> 
> Scott
>


From nobody Tue May 19 09:33:36 2020
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Importing External PSKs for TLS
        Authors         : David Benjamin
                          Christopher A. Wood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05.txt
	Pages           : 11
	Date            : 2020-05-19

Abstract:
   This document describes an interface for importing external Pre-
   Shared Keys (PSKs) into TLS 1.3.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05


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Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 23:18:38 -0400
From: "Filippo Valsorda" <filippo@ml.filippo.io>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific name.

ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH

Filippo
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<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title></title><style type="text/css">p.MsoNormal,p.MsoNoSpacing{margin:0}</style></head><body><div>As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific name.<br></div><div><br></div><div>ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.&nbsp;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Filippo</div></body></html>
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Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 11:19:09 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in 
> conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have 
> had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it 
> were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific 
> name.
> 
> ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH

ECH also works for me.

Best,
Chris (no hat)


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From: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 14:34:09 -0400
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ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing both
are fine.)

    Erik


On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in
> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have
> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it
> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific
> > name.
> >
> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>
> ECH also works for me.
>
> Best,
> Chris (no hat)
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000000338b305a618a583
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,s=
ans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:taho=
ma,sans-serif">ECH works for me.=C2=A0 (I really don&#39;t care between ECH=
 and ETCH and thing both are fine.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Erik</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On =
Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@hea=
pingbits.net">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo =
Valsorda wrote:<br>
&gt; As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in <br>
&gt; conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have=
 <br>
&gt; had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it <b=
r>
&gt; were called ECH, but don&#39;t have a strong preference for any specif=
ic <br>
&gt; name.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. =
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH</a><br>
<br>
ECH also works for me.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris (no hat)<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000000338b305a618a583--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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> This is the Working Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for =
TLS" available at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/ =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/>.  Please =
review the document and respond to the list with any comments by June 2, =
2020. =20

I just reread draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07.  I have a few comments.


MAJOR

In section 3, the document says:

   The secret key used to sign ...

Please change "secret" to "private".  Later in the sentence, [RFC5280]
is referenced, and it talks about "private key" in this context.


MINOR

Section 1 says:

   This allows server operators to limit the exposure of keys
   in cases where they do not realize a compromise has occurred.

I suggest an alternative:

   This allows server operators to limit the exposure of keys
   in cases where it might be difficult to determine whether a
   compromise has occurred.


Section 1 also says:

   Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent
   function of validating possession of names, ...

The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the
certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the
certificate subject.  This is usually done by a proof of possession
mechanism.  So, I think that the start of this sentence should be
reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the
name.


QUESTION

While I have no objection to the DelegationUsage extension,
I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same
confidence in the certificate.


ASN.1 MODULE

After assigning a place holder vale for "TBD", I compiled the
module, and it works just fine.


--Apple-Mail=_404A63F5-7234-4B8F-BAE7-CA0DCFAA6C41
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">This is the Working =
Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for TLS" available at&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/" =
target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/</a>.&=
nbsp; Please review the document and respond to the list with any =
comments by June 2, 2020. &nbsp;<br class=3D""></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">I just =
reread&nbsp;draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07. &nbsp;I have a few =
comments.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">MAJOR</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In section 3, the document =
says:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; =
&nbsp;The secret key used to sign ...</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Please change "secret" to "private". =
&nbsp;Later in the sentence, [RFC5280]</div><div class=3D"">is =
referenced, and it talks about "private key" in this context.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">MINOR</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Section 1 says:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;This allows server operators to =
limit the exposure of keys</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;in cases =
where they do not realize a compromise has occurred.</div></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I suggest an =
alternative:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;This allows server operators to =
limit the exposure of keys</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;in cases =
where it might be difficult to determine whether a</div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;compromise has occurred.</div></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Section 1 also says:</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;Because =
the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent</div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;function of validating possession of names, =
...</div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The =
CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the</div><div =
class=3D"">certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by =
the</div><div class=3D"">certificate subject. &nbsp;This is usually done =
by a proof of possession</div><div class=3D"">mechanism. &nbsp;So, I =
think that the start of this sentence should be</div><div =
class=3D"">reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates =
the</div><div class=3D"">name.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">QUESTION</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">While I have no objection to the&nbsp;DelegationUsage =
extension,</div><div class=3D"">I wonder is an extended key usage would =
provide the same</div><div class=3D"">confidence in the =
certificate.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br=
 class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">ASN.1 MODULE</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">After assigning a place holder vale for =
"TBD", I compiled the</div><div class=3D"">module, and it works just =
fine.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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ECH is good. Go for it!

Tommy

> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BF
>=20
> ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing bot=
h are fine.)
>=20
>     Erik
>=20
>=20
>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wr=
ote:
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
>> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in=20
>> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have=20=

>> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it=20
>> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific=20=

>> > name.
>> >=20
>> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.=20=

>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>>=20
>> ECH also works for me.
>>=20
>> Best,
>> Chris (no hat)
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">ECH is good. Go for it!</d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Tommy</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren &lt;e=
rik+ietf@nygren.org&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_def=
ault" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">ECH works for me.&nbsp; (I rea=
lly don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing both are fine.)</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp; Erik</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,san=
s-serif"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8=
:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:<br>
&gt; As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in <br>
&gt; conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have <=
br>
&gt; had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it <br=
>
&gt; were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific <b=
r>
&gt; name.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. <=
br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH</a><br>
<br>
ECH also works for me.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris (no hat)<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
<span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>TLS ma=
iling list</span><br><span>TLS@ietf.org</span><br><span>https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=

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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 10:12:03 -0400
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On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> MINOR
>
> Section 1 also says:
>
>    Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent
>    function of validating possession of names, ....
>
> The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the
> certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the
> certificate subject.  This is usually done by a proof of possession
> mechanism.  So, I think that the start of this sentence should be
> reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the
> name.
>

The existing framing is correct. The most widely used Internet PKI, the Web
PKI, intentionally doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proof of possession mechan=
ism. It
is not used as an authentication mechanism (i.e. a binding of a key to an
identity) but an authorization mechanism (i.e. a binding of an authorized
set of identities to a key).

The =E2=80=9CCA only validates the name=E2=80=9D is not just an impression,=
 it=E2=80=99s the
widespread running code. Due to how TLS certificates are used (online
protocol negotiation, without non-repudiation support), there=E2=80=99s no =
risk
opened nor any necessity to do a strong proof of possession binding, even
in cases of strong identity binding.

QUESTION
>
> While I have no objection to the DelegationUsage extension,
> I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same
> confidence in the certificate.
>

In practice, no. As things currently are, it would unfortunately undermine
the confidence, although this an entirely fair and reasonable question.

As a recap (and more for those without the same context you have) the way
5280 and it=E2=80=99s predecessors were designed, the Certificate Policies
extension is the primary means of expressing or indicating compliance to a
particular policy. If a relying party explicitly attempts to validate a
certificate, for a RP-determined Certificate Policy, then they can know
whether or not that certificate complied with their expectations for
issuance and management. This is all defined within 5280, albeit quite
complex, and involves processing rules for both leaves and intermediates,
as well as the ability to map between different policies (via
policyMappings), such that an RP expecting policy A can validate a
certificate bearing only policy B, provided some trusted party in the
certification path asserted that B was equal-or-equivalent-to A

Additionally, certificates have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most
commonly used to restrict the protocol or protocols a given certificate can
be used for. In RFC 5280 and friends, this restriction only applies to lead
certificates. However, from the very earliest days of PKIX, the two main
implementations (Microsoft and Netscape) diverged from this, in unspecified
ways that ultimately PKIX declined to incorporate, to allow EKUs to be used
on intermediates to restrict the protocols that certificates can be issued
for. If a leaf EKU is not a subset of its issuing chain, then that EKU is
not permitted; much like policy OIDs.

This divergence, which has existed since the very earliest days of TLS,
resulted in a different approach to managing policy than the idealized goal
of PKIX. Rather than having every relying party application provide an
initial policy, such as a policy OID assigned by the root store vendor
(typically the OS/browser vendor), to indicate compliance with the root
store=E2=80=99s policy, and using policy mappings for that, implementations=
 simply
used the EKU as a joint indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and complies=
 with
the issuance policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store vendor=
=E2=80=9D.

This whole long preamble builds to our present day. In wide practice, and
even for those root stores/OSes/applications that do not implement EKU
chaining in the fashion mentioned above, the mere presence of an EKU is the
indicator for compliance with a set of policies, and altering EKUs, like
altering policy OIDs, requires issuing new intermediates permitted for that
EKU.

If DC certificates only bore a DC EKU, they would, in effect, be exempt
from all of the certificate policies widely practiced for the issuance of
TLS certificates, which would reduce the confidence in the certificate.
They would also typically require the CA to issue new intermediate
certificates prior to being able to issue such certificates that were
accepted. For applications, the certificate validation libraries apply
local policy to certificates based on their EKU via technical measures, to
ensure they match the expected issuance policy, such as checking for
certificate transparency information or limiting the maximum validity
period the application will accept.

Recall that the design of DC is also possible via simply nameConstrained
subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that it does not require or
reduces dependencies on external PKIs in order to satisfy local protocol
needs. The same argument applies here against EKU: to use EKU would place
ongoing dependencies back on those external PKI, be incompatible with how
those PKIs are typically administered, and would cause significant
challenges for applications implementing on common libraries (such as those
provided by their OS).

It=E2=80=99s far from perfect, but the current state of the art is this app=
roach.
If something is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D TLS, at minimum, it need=
s to contain the
TLS EKU, so it is subjected to the TLS policies and usable with TLS
validation stacks. Extensions, with or without the critical bit set, serve
as the way to distinguish whether and how it should be usable with TLS and
the =E2=80=9Csomething like TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.

An EKU certainly could be pursued, and it=E2=80=99s by no means an unreason=
able
question, but in order to provide the same confidence as currently
specified, existing root store policies would need to be rewritten and
redefined to include that EKU in scope of their =E2=80=9Csubject to TLS=E2=
=80=9D, as would
their software and validation libraries similarly be updated to process
that.

--0000000000000e7eb005a6291b9e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:af=
ter-white-space"><div>MINOR</div><div><br></div><div>Section 1 also says:</=
div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Because the above problems do not=
 relate to the CA&#39;s inherent</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0function of validat=
ing possession of names, ....</div></div><div><br></div><div>The CA is resp=
onsible for confirming that the public key in the</div><div>certificate cor=
responds to a private key that can be used by the</div><div>certificate sub=
ject.=C2=A0 This is usually done by a proof of possession</div><div>mechani=
sm.=C2=A0 So, I think that the start of this sentence should be</div><div>r=
eworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the</div><div>na=
me.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">T=
he existing framing is correct. The most widely used Internet PKI, the Web =
PKI, intentionally doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proof of possession mechan=
ism. It is not used as an authentication mechanism (i.e. a binding of a key=
 to an identity) but an authorization mechanism (i.e. a binding of an autho=
rized set of identities to a key).</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div di=
r=3D"auto">The =E2=80=9CCA only validates the name=E2=80=9D is not just an =
impression, it=E2=80=99s the widespread running code. Due to how TLS certif=
icates are used (online protocol negotiation, without non-repudiation suppo=
rt), there=E2=80=99s no risk opened nor any necessity to do a strong proof =
of possession binding, even in cases of strong identity binding.</div><div =
dir=3D"auto"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wr=
ap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div>QUESTION</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>While I have no objection to the=C2=A0DelegationUsage extension,</d=
iv><div>I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same</div><div>=
confidence in the certificate.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"auto">In practice, no. As things currently are, it woul=
d unfortunately undermine the confidence, although this an entirely fair an=
d reasonable question.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">A=
s a recap (and more for those without the same context you have) the way 52=
80 and it=E2=80=99s predecessors were designed, the Certificate Policies ex=
tension is the primary means of expressing or indicating compliance to a pa=
rticular policy. If a relying party explicitly attempts to validate a certi=
ficate, for a RP-determined Certificate Policy, then they can know whether =
or not that certificate complied with their expectations for issuance and m=
anagement. This is all defined within 5280, albeit quite complex, and invol=
ves processing rules for both leaves and intermediates, as well as the abil=
ity to map between different policies (via policyMappings), such that an RP=
 expecting policy A can validate a certificate bearing only policy B, provi=
ded some trusted party in the certification path asserted that B was equal-=
or-equivalent-to A</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Addit=
ionally, certificates have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most commonly use=
d to restrict the protocol or protocols a given certificate can be used for=
. In RFC 5280 and friends, this restriction only applies to lead certificat=
es. However, from the very earliest days of PKIX, the two main implementati=
ons (Microsoft and Netscape) diverged from this, in unspecified ways that u=
ltimately PKIX declined to incorporate, to allow EKUs to be used on interme=
diates to restrict the protocols that certificates can be issued for. If a =
leaf EKU is not a subset of its issuing chain, then that EKU is not permitt=
ed; much like policy OIDs.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"aut=
o">This divergence, which has existed since the very earliest days of TLS, =
resulted in a different approach to managing policy than the idealized goal=
 of PKIX. Rather than having every relying party application provide an ini=
tial policy, such as a policy OID assigned by the root store vendor (typica=
lly the OS/browser vendor), to indicate compliance with the root store=E2=
=80=99s policy, and using policy mappings for that, implementations simply =
used the EKU as a joint indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and complies=
 with the issuance policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store ve=
ndor=E2=80=9D.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">This whol=
e long preamble builds to our present day. In wide practice, and even for t=
hose root stores/OSes/applications that do not implement EKU chaining in th=
e fashion mentioned above, the mere presence of an EKU is the indicator for=
 compliance with a set of policies, and altering EKUs, like altering policy=
 OIDs, requires issuing new intermediates permitted for that EKU.</div><div=
 dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">If DC certificates only bore a DC=
 EKU, they would, in effect, be exempt from all of the certificate policies=
 widely practiced for the issuance of TLS certificates, which would reduce =
the confidence in the certificate. They would also typically require the CA=
 to issue new intermediate certificates prior to being able to issue such c=
ertificates that were accepted. For applications, the certificate validatio=
n libraries apply local policy to certificates based on their EKU via techn=
ical measures, to ensure they match the expected issuance policy, such as c=
hecking for certificate transparency information or limiting the maximum va=
lidity period the application will accept.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"auto">Recall that the design of DC is also possible via simply=
 nameConstrained subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that it does not =
require or reduces dependencies on external PKIs in order to satisfy local =
protocol needs. The same argument applies here against EKU: to use EKU woul=
d place ongoing dependencies back on those external PKI, be incompatible wi=
th how those PKIs are typically administered, and would cause significant c=
hallenges for applications implementing on common libraries (such as those =
provided by their OS).</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">I=
t=E2=80=99s far from perfect, but the current state of the art is this appr=
oach. If something is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D TLS, at minimum, i=
t needs to contain the TLS EKU, so it is subjected to the TLS policies and =
usable with TLS validation stacks. Extensions, with or without the critical=
 bit set, serve as the way to distinguish whether and how it should be usab=
le with TLS and the =E2=80=9Csomething like TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.</div><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">An EKU certainly could be pursue=
d, and it=E2=80=99s by no means an unreasonable question, but in order to p=
rovide the same confidence as currently specified, existing root store poli=
cies would need to be rewritten and redefined to include that EKU in scope =
of their =E2=80=9Csubject to TLS=E2=80=9D, as would their software and vali=
dation libraries similarly be updated to process that.</div></div></div></d=
iv>

--0000000000000e7eb005a6291b9e--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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> On May 21, 2020, at 10:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com =
<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
> MINOR
>=20
> Section 1 also says:
>=20
>    Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent
>    function of validating possession of names, ....
>=20
> The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the
> certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the
> certificate subject.  This is usually done by a proof of possession
> mechanism.  So, I think that the start of this sentence should be
> reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the
> name.
>=20
> The existing framing is correct. The most widely used Internet PKI, =
the Web PKI, intentionally doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proof of =
possession mechanism. It is not used as an authentication mechanism =
(i.e. a binding of a key to an identity) but an authorization mechanism =
(i.e. a binding of an authorized set of identities to a key).
>=20
> The =E2=80=9CCA only validates the name=E2=80=9D is not just an =
impression, it=E2=80=99s the widespread running code. Due to how TLS =
certificates are used (online protocol negotiation, without =
non-repudiation support), there=E2=80=99s no risk opened nor any =
necessity to do a strong proof of possession binding, even in cases of =
strong identity binding.

The CSR is signed with the key to be certified.  That is proof of =
possession.

>=20
> QUESTION
>=20
> While I have no objection to the DelegationUsage extension,
> I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same
> confidence in the certificate.
>=20
> In practice, no. As things currently are, it would unfortunately =
undermine the confidence, although this an entirely fair and reasonable =
question.
>=20
> As a recap (and more for those without the same context you have) the =
way 5280 and it=E2=80=99s predecessors were designed, the Certificate =
Policies extension is the primary means of expressing or indicating =
compliance to a particular policy. If a relying party explicitly =
attempts to validate a certificate, for a RP-determined Certificate =
Policy, then they can know whether or not that certificate complied with =
their expectations for issuance and management. This is all defined =
within 5280, albeit quite complex, and involves processing rules for =
both leaves and intermediates, as well as the ability to map between =
different policies (via policyMappings), such that an RP expecting =
policy A can validate a certificate bearing only policy B, provided some =
trusted party in the certification path asserted that B was =
equal-or-equivalent-to A
>=20
> Additionally, certificates have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most =
commonly used to restrict the protocol or protocols a given certificate =
can be used for. In RFC 5280 and friends, this restriction only applies =
to lead certificates. However, from the very earliest days of PKIX, the =
two main implementations (Microsoft and Netscape) diverged from this, in =
unspecified ways that ultimately PKIX declined to incorporate, to allow =
EKUs to be used on intermediates to restrict the protocols that =
certificates can be issued for. If a leaf EKU is not a subset of its =
issuing chain, then that EKU is not permitted; much like policy OIDs.
>=20
> This divergence, which has existed since the very earliest days of =
TLS, resulted in a different approach to managing policy than the =
idealized goal of PKIX. Rather than having every relying party =
application provide an initial policy, such as a policy OID assigned by =
the root store vendor (typically the OS/browser vendor), to indicate =
compliance with the root store=E2=80=99s policy, and using policy =
mappings for that, implementations simply used the EKU as a joint =
indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and complies with the issuance =
policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store vendor=E2=80=9D.
>=20
> This whole long preamble builds to our present day. In wide practice, =
and even for those root stores/OSes/applications that do not implement =
EKU chaining in the fashion mentioned above, the mere presence of an EKU =
is the indicator for compliance with a set of policies, and altering =
EKUs, like altering policy OIDs, requires issuing new intermediates =
permitted for that EKU.
>=20
> If DC certificates only bore a DC EKU, they would, in effect, be =
exempt from all of the certificate policies widely practiced for the =
issuance of TLS certificates, which would reduce the confidence in the =
certificate. They would also typically require the CA to issue new =
intermediate certificates prior to being able to issue such certificates =
that were accepted. For applications, the certificate validation =
libraries apply local policy to certificates based on their EKU via =
technical measures, to ensure they match the expected issuance policy, =
such as checking for certificate transparency information or limiting =
the maximum validity period the application will accept.
>=20
> Recall that the design of DC is also possible via simply =
nameConstrained subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that it does =
not require or reduces dependencies on external PKIs in order to satisfy =
local protocol needs. The same argument applies here against EKU: to use =
EKU would place ongoing dependencies back on those external PKI, be =
incompatible with how those PKIs are typically administered, and would =
cause significant challenges for applications implementing on common =
libraries (such as those provided by their OS).
>=20
> It=E2=80=99s far from perfect, but the current state of the art is =
this approach. If something is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D TLS, =
at minimum, it needs to contain the TLS EKU, so it is subjected to the =
TLS policies and usable with TLS validation stacks. Extensions, with or =
without the critical bit set, serve as the way to distinguish whether =
and how it should be usable with TLS and the =E2=80=9Csomething like =
TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.
>=20
> An EKU certainly could be pursued, and it=E2=80=99s by no means an =
unreasonable question, but in order to provide the same confidence as =
currently specified, existing root store policies would need to be =
rewritten and redefined to include that EKU in scope of their =E2=80=9Csub=
ject to TLS=E2=80=9D, as would their software and validation libraries =
similarly be updated to process that.

I am aware of the "fight" about EKU chaining.  I have a view, but I did =
not really want to drag subcerts into that controversy.

I guess I ask the authors to add a paragraph to the rationale section =
that says something about why this extension was used instead of an =
extended key usage.

Russ


--Apple-Mail=_5F83E906-C2A3-4157-B38A-A04004202FFC
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On May 21, 2020, at 10:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com" =
class=3D"">ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May =
20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">MINOR</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Section 1 also says:</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">&nbsp; =
&nbsp;Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's =
inherent</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;function of validating =
possession of names, ....</div></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The CA is responsible for confirming =
that the public key in the</div><div class=3D"">certificate corresponds =
to a private key that can be used by the</div><div class=3D"">certificate =
subject.&nbsp; This is usually done by a proof of possession</div><div =
class=3D"">mechanism.&nbsp; So, I think that the start of this sentence =
should be</div><div class=3D"">reworded to avoid the impression that the =
CA only validates the</div><div =
class=3D"">name.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">The existing framing is =
correct. The most widely used Internet PKI, the Web PKI, intentionally =
doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proof of possession mechanism. It is not =
used as an authentication mechanism (i.e. a binding of a key to an =
identity) but an authorization mechanism (i.e. a binding of an =
authorized set of identities to a key).</div><div dir=3D"auto" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">The =E2=80=9C=
CA only validates the name=E2=80=9D is not just an impression, it=E2=80=99=
s the widespread running code. Due to how TLS certificates are used =
(online protocol negotiation, without non-repudiation support), =
there=E2=80=99s no risk opened nor any necessity to do a strong proof of =
possession binding, even in cases of strong identity =
binding.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>The CSR is signed with the key to be certified. =
&nbsp;That is proof of possession.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">QUESTION</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">While I have no objection to =
the&nbsp;DelegationUsage extension,</div><div class=3D"">I wonder is an =
extended key usage would provide the same</div><div class=3D"">confidence =
in the certificate.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">In =
practice, no. As things currently are, it would unfortunately undermine =
the confidence, although this an entirely fair and reasonable =
question.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">As a recap (and more for those without the same =
context you have) the way 5280 and it=E2=80=99s predecessors were =
designed, the Certificate Policies extension is the primary means of =
expressing or indicating compliance to a particular policy. If a relying =
party explicitly attempts to validate a certificate, for a RP-determined =
Certificate Policy, then they can know whether or not that certificate =
complied with their expectations for issuance and management. This is =
all defined within 5280, albeit quite complex, and involves processing =
rules for both leaves and intermediates, as well as the ability to map =
between different policies (via policyMappings), such that an RP =
expecting policy A can validate a certificate bearing only policy B, =
provided some trusted party in the certification path asserted that B =
was equal-or-equivalent-to A</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">Additionally, certificates =
have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most commonly used to restrict the =
protocol or protocols a given certificate can be used for. In RFC 5280 =
and friends, this restriction only applies to lead certificates. =
However, from the very earliest days of PKIX, the two main =
implementations (Microsoft and Netscape) diverged from this, in =
unspecified ways that ultimately PKIX declined to incorporate, to allow =
EKUs to be used on intermediates to restrict the protocols that =
certificates can be issued for. If a leaf EKU is not a subset of its =
issuing chain, then that EKU is not permitted; much like policy =
OIDs.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">This divergence, which has existed since the =
very earliest days of TLS, resulted in a different approach to managing =
policy than the idealized goal of PKIX. Rather than having every relying =
party application provide an initial policy, such as a policy OID =
assigned by the root store vendor (typically the OS/browser vendor), to =
indicate compliance with the root store=E2=80=99s policy, and using =
policy mappings for that, implementations simply used the EKU as a joint =
indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and complies with the issuance =
policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store =
vendor=E2=80=9D.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">This whole long preamble =
builds to our present day. In wide practice, and even for those root =
stores/OSes/applications that do not implement EKU chaining in the =
fashion mentioned above, the mere presence of an EKU is the indicator =
for compliance with a set of policies, and altering EKUs, like altering =
policy OIDs, requires issuing new intermediates permitted for that =
EKU.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">If DC certificates only bore a DC EKU, they =
would, in effect, be exempt from all of the certificate policies widely =
practiced for the issuance of TLS certificates, which would reduce the =
confidence in the certificate. They would also typically require the CA =
to issue new intermediate certificates prior to being able to issue such =
certificates that were accepted. For applications, the certificate =
validation libraries apply local policy to certificates based on their =
EKU via technical measures, to ensure they match the expected issuance =
policy, such as checking for certificate transparency information or =
limiting the maximum validity period the application will =
accept.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">Recall that the design of DC is also possible =
via simply nameConstrained subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that =
it does not require or reduces dependencies on external PKIs in order to =
satisfy local protocol needs. The same argument applies here against =
EKU: to use EKU would place ongoing dependencies back on those external =
PKI, be incompatible with how those PKIs are typically administered, and =
would cause significant challenges for applications implementing on =
common libraries (such as those provided by their OS).</div><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" =
class=3D"">It=E2=80=99s far from perfect, but the current state of the =
art is this approach. If something is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D =
TLS, at minimum, it needs to contain the TLS EKU, so it is subjected to =
the TLS policies and usable with TLS validation stacks. Extensions, with =
or without the critical bit set, serve as the way to distinguish whether =
and how it should be usable with TLS and the =E2=80=9Csomething like =
TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">An EKU certainly could be =
pursued, and it=E2=80=99s by no means an unreasonable question, but in =
order to provide the same confidence as currently specified, existing =
root store policies would need to be rewritten and redefined to include =
that EKU in scope of their =E2=80=9Csubject to TLS=E2=80=9D, as would =
their software and validation libraries similarly be updated to process =
that.</div></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>I am aware of the "fight" =
about EKU chaining. &nbsp;I have a view, but I did not really want to =
drag subcerts into that controversy.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>I=
 guess I ask the authors to add a paragraph to the rationale section =
that says something about why this extension was used instead of an =
extended key usage.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><br =
class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_5F83E906-C2A3-4157-B38A-A04004202FFC--


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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:23:03 -0400
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On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:51 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

>
>
> On May 21, 2020, at 10:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com> wrote=
:
>
>
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote=
:
>
>> MINOR
>>
>> Section 1 also says:
>>
>>    Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent
>>    function of validating possession of names, ....
>>
>> The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the
>> certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the
>> certificate subject.  This is usually done by a proof of possession
>> mechanism.  So, I think that the start of this sentence should be
>> reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the
>> name.
>>
>
> The existing framing is correct. The most widely used Internet PKI, the
> Web PKI, intentionally doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proof of possession =
mechanism.
> It is not used as an authentication mechanism (i.e. a binding of a key to
> an identity) but an authorization mechanism (i.e. a binding of an
> authorized set of identities to a key).
>
> The =E2=80=9CCA only validates the name=E2=80=9D is not just an impressio=
n, it=E2=80=99s the
> widespread running code. Due to how TLS certificates are used (online
> protocol negotiation, without non-repudiation support), there=E2=80=99s n=
o risk
> opened nor any necessity to do a strong proof of possession binding, even
> in cases of strong identity binding.
>
>
> The CSR is signed with the key to be certified.  That is proof of
> possession.
>

None of these CAs are required to use CSRs or validate signatures. You=E2=
=80=99re
describing ways a CA could implement POP, but as I said, proof of
possession is not required.

That=E2=80=99s why the current text more accurately reflects the rough cons=
ensus of
popular root programs and the running code that trusts those CAs.

It=E2=80=99s certainly true that implementors of DC could reach agreements =
with CAs
to require POPs, but it=E2=80=99s also not necessary for the protocol (DC o=
r
broadly TLS), which is why it=E2=80=99s not done or required.


>
> QUESTION
>>
>> While I have no objection to the DelegationUsage extension,
>> I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same
>> confidence in the certificate.
>>
>
> In practice, no. As things currently are, it would unfortunately undermin=
e
> the confidence, although this an entirely fair and reasonable question.
>
> As a recap (and more for those without the same context you have) the way
> 5280 and it=E2=80=99s predecessors were designed, the Certificate Policie=
s
> extension is the primary means of expressing or indicating compliance to =
a
> particular policy. If a relying party explicitly attempts to validate a
> certificate, for a RP-determined Certificate Policy, then they can know
> whether or not that certificate complied with their expectations for
> issuance and management. This is all defined within 5280, albeit quite
> complex, and involves processing rules for both leaves and intermediates,
> as well as the ability to map between different policies (via
> policyMappings), such that an RP expecting policy A can validate a
> certificate bearing only policy B, provided some trusted party in the
> certification path asserted that B was equal-or-equivalent-to A
>
> Additionally, certificates have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most
> commonly used to restrict the protocol or protocols a given certificate c=
an
> be used for. In RFC 5280 and friends, this restriction only applies to le=
ad
> certificates. However, from the very earliest days of PKIX, the two main
> implementations (Microsoft and Netscape) diverged from this, in unspecifi=
ed
> ways that ultimately PKIX declined to incorporate, to allow EKUs to be us=
ed
> on intermediates to restrict the protocols that certificates can be issue=
d
> for. If a leaf EKU is not a subset of its issuing chain, then that EKU is
> not permitted; much like policy OIDs.
>
> This divergence, which has existed since the very earliest days of TLS,
> resulted in a different approach to managing policy than the idealized go=
al
> of PKIX. Rather than having every relying party application provide an
> initial policy, such as a policy OID assigned by the root store vendor
> (typically the OS/browser vendor), to indicate compliance with the root
> store=E2=80=99s policy, and using policy mappings for that, implementatio=
ns simply
> used the EKU as a joint indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and compli=
es with
> the issuance policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store vendor=
=E2=80=9D.
>
> This whole long preamble builds to our present day. In wide practice, and
> even for those root stores/OSes/applications that do not implement EKU
> chaining in the fashion mentioned above, the mere presence of an EKU is t=
he
> indicator for compliance with a set of policies, and altering EKUs, like
> altering policy OIDs, requires issuing new intermediates permitted for th=
at
> EKU.
>
> If DC certificates only bore a DC EKU, they would, in effect, be exempt
> from all of the certificate policies widely practiced for the issuance of
> TLS certificates, which would reduce the confidence in the certificate.
> They would also typically require the CA to issue new intermediate
> certificates prior to being able to issue such certificates that were
> accepted. For applications, the certificate validation libraries apply
> local policy to certificates based on their EKU via technical measures, t=
o
> ensure they match the expected issuance policy, such as checking for
> certificate transparency information or limiting the maximum validity
> period the application will accept.
>
> Recall that the design of DC is also possible via simply nameConstrained
> subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that it does not require or
> reduces dependencies on external PKIs in order to satisfy local protocol
> needs. The same argument applies here against EKU: to use EKU would place
> ongoing dependencies back on those external PKI, be incompatible with how
> those PKIs are typically administered, and would cause significant
> challenges for applications implementing on common libraries (such as tho=
se
> provided by their OS).
>
> It=E2=80=99s far from perfect, but the current state of the art is this a=
pproach.
> If something is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D TLS, at minimum, it ne=
eds to contain the
> TLS EKU, so it is subjected to the TLS policies and usable with TLS
> validation stacks. Extensions, with or without the critical bit set, serv=
e
> as the way to distinguish whether and how it should be usable with TLS an=
d
> the =E2=80=9Csomething like TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.
>
> An EKU certainly could be pursued, and it=E2=80=99s by no means an unreas=
onable
> question, but in order to provide the same confidence as currently
> specified, existing root store policies would need to be rewritten and
> redefined to include that EKU in scope of their =E2=80=9Csubject to TLS=
=E2=80=9D, as would
> their software and validation libraries similarly be updated to process
> that.
>
>
> I am aware of the "fight" about EKU chaining.  I have a view, but I did
> not really want to drag subcerts into that controversy.
>

Sure, but unfortunately, the design of DC/subcerts is a direct result of
that running code.

Certain root programs are trying to bridge those gaps (Google and
Microsoft, notably), in a way that perhaps 5-10 years from now we might see
a change to how things were imagined 20-25 years ago, but unfortunately,
that=E2=80=99s the reality of software today, and DC is living in those con=
straints.

I guess I ask the authors to add a paragraph to the rationale section that
> says something about why this extension was used instead of an extended k=
ey
> usage.
>

Sure, I think that could be useful, since if only looking at this and 5280,
the gap I mentioned previously is not at all obvious, and why I wanted to
capture some of it on the list, for those not familiar.

>

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<div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:51 AM Russ Housley &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-b=
reak:after-white-space"><br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>On May =
21, 2020, at 10:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ryan-ietftls@sleev=
i.com" target=3D"_blank">ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><d=
iv><div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 6:40 PM Russ Housley &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target=3D"_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:bre=
ak-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div>MINOR</div><div><br></div><div>S=
ection 1 also says:</div><div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Because the =
above problems do not relate to the CA&#39;s inherent</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0function of validating possession of names, ....</div></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the</di=
v><div>certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the</di=
v><div>certificate subject.=C2=A0 This is usually done by a proof of posses=
sion</div><div>mechanism.=C2=A0 So, I think that the start of this sentence=
 should be</div><div>reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only vali=
dates the</div><div>name.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto">The existing framing is correct. The most widely used =
Internet PKI, the Web PKI, intentionally doesn=E2=80=99t not require a proo=
f of possession mechanism. It is not used as an authentication mechanism (i=
.e. a binding of a key to an identity) but an authorization mechanism (i.e.=
 a binding of an authorized set of identities to a key).</div><div dir=3D"a=
uto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">The =E2=80=9CCA only validates the name=E2=
=80=9D is not just an impression, it=E2=80=99s the widespread running code.=
 Due to how TLS certificates are used (online protocol negotiation, without=
 non-repudiation support), there=E2=80=99s no risk opened nor any necessity=
 to do a strong proof of possession binding, even in cases of strong identi=
ty binding.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>The CS=
R is signed with the key to be certified.=C2=A0 That is proof of possession=
.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Non=
e of these CAs are required to use CSRs or validate signatures. You=E2=80=
=99re describing ways a CA could implement POP, but as I said, proof of pos=
session is not required.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"=
>That=E2=80=99s why the current text more accurately reflects the rough con=
sensus of popular root programs and the running code that trusts those CAs.=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">It=E2=80=99s certainly =
true that implementors of DC could reach agreements with CAs to require POP=
s, but it=E2=80=99s also not necessary for the protocol (DC or broadly TLS)=
, which is why it=E2=80=99s not done or required.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;l=
ine-break:after-white-space"><div></div><div><br></div><div><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"auto"><br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;lin=
e-break:after-white-space"><div>QUESTION</div><div><br></div><div>While I h=
ave no objection to the=C2=A0DelegationUsage extension,</div><div>I wonder =
is an extended key usage would provide the same</div><div>confidence in the=
 certificate.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto">In practice, no. As things currently are, it would unfortunately =
undermine the confidence, although this an entirely fair and reasonable que=
stion.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">As a recap (and m=
ore for those without the same context you have) the way 5280 and it=E2=80=
=99s predecessors were designed, the Certificate Policies extension is the =
primary means of expressing or indicating compliance to a particular policy=
. If a relying party explicitly attempts to validate a certificate, for a R=
P-determined Certificate Policy, then they can know whether or not that cer=
tificate complied with their expectations for issuance and management. This=
 is all defined within 5280, albeit quite complex, and involves processing =
rules for both leaves and intermediates, as well as the ability to map betw=
een different policies (via policyMappings), such that an RP expecting poli=
cy A can validate a certificate bearing only policy B, provided some truste=
d party in the certification path asserted that B was equal-or-equivalent-t=
o A</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Additionally, certif=
icates have the extendedKeyUsage, which is most commonly used to restrict t=
he protocol or protocols a given certificate can be used for. In RFC 5280 a=
nd friends, this restriction only applies to lead certificates. However, fr=
om the very earliest days of PKIX, the two main implementations (Microsoft =
and Netscape) diverged from this, in unspecified ways that ultimately PKIX =
declined to incorporate, to allow EKUs to be used on intermediates to restr=
ict the protocols that certificates can be issued for. If a leaf EKU is not=
 a subset of its issuing chain, then that EKU is not permitted; much like p=
olicy OIDs.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">This diverge=
nce, which has existed since the very earliest days of TLS, resulted in a d=
ifferent approach to managing policy than the idealized goal of PKIX. Rathe=
r than having every relying party application provide an initial policy, su=
ch as a policy OID assigned by the root store vendor (typically the OS/brow=
ser vendor), to indicate compliance with the root store=E2=80=99s policy, a=
nd using policy mappings for that, implementations simply used the EKU as a=
 joint indicator for =E2=80=9Cuses protocol X and complies with the issuanc=
e policies for protocol X, as defined by the root store vendor=E2=80=9D.</d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">This whole long preamble b=
uilds to our present day. In wide practice, and even for those root stores/=
OSes/applications that do not implement EKU chaining in the fashion mention=
ed above, the mere presence of an EKU is the indicator for compliance with =
a set of policies, and altering EKUs, like altering policy OIDs, requires i=
ssuing new intermediates permitted for that EKU.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br=
></div><div dir=3D"auto">If DC certificates only bore a DC EKU, they would,=
 in effect, be exempt from all of the certificate policies widely practiced=
 for the issuance of TLS certificates, which would reduce the confidence in=
 the certificate. They would also typically require the CA to issue new int=
ermediate certificates prior to being able to issue such certificates that =
were accepted. For applications, the certificate validation libraries apply=
 local policy to certificates based on their EKU via technical measures, to=
 ensure they match the expected issuance policy, such as checking for certi=
ficate transparency information or limiting the maximum validity period the=
 application will accept.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto=
">Recall that the design of DC is also possible via simply nameConstrained =
subCAs, but part of the reason for DC is that it does not require or reduce=
s dependencies on external PKIs in order to satisfy local protocol needs. T=
he same argument applies here against EKU: to use EKU would place ongoing d=
ependencies back on those external PKI, be incompatible with how those PKIs=
 are typically administered, and would cause significant challenges for app=
lications implementing on common libraries (such as those provided by their=
 OS).</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">It=E2=80=99s far f=
rom perfect, but the current state of the art is this approach. If somethin=
g is meant to be =E2=80=9Clike=E2=80=9D TLS, at minimum, it needs to contai=
n the TLS EKU, so it is subjected to the TLS policies and usable with TLS v=
alidation stacks. Extensions, with or without the critical bit set, serve a=
s the way to distinguish whether and how it should be usable with TLS and t=
he =E2=80=9Csomething like TLS=E2=80=9D protocol.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"auto">An EKU certainly could be pursued, and it=E2=80=
=99s by no means an unreasonable question, but in order to provide the same=
 confidence as currently specified, existing root store policies would need=
 to be rewritten and redefined to include that EKU in scope of their =E2=80=
=9Csubject to TLS=E2=80=9D, as would their software and validation librarie=
s similarly be updated to process that.</div></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote><br></div><div>I am aware of the &quot;fight&quot; about=
 EKU chaining.=C2=A0 I have a view, but I did not really want to drag subce=
rts into that controversy.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></=
div><div dir=3D"auto">Sure, but unfortunately, the design of DC/subcerts is=
 a direct result of that running code.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"auto">Certain root programs are trying to bridge those gaps (Googl=
e and Microsoft, notably), in a way that perhaps 5-10 years from now we mig=
ht see a change to how things were imagined 20-25 years ago, but unfortunat=
ely, that=E2=80=99s the reality of software today, and DC is living in thos=
e constraints.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div>I=
 guess I ask the authors to add a paragraph to the rationale section that s=
ays something about why this extension was used instead of an extended key =
usage.</div></div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto=
">Sure, I think that could be useful, since if only looking at this and 528=
0, the gap I mentioned previously is not at all obvious, and why I wanted t=
o capture some of it on the list, for those not familiar.</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-whit=
e-space"><div></div></div></blockquote></div></div>

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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:52:41 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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Are there any objections to "ECH" or should we just go with that?
(I'd like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC accordingly based
on what gets decided.)


On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com> wrote:

> ECH is good. Go for it!
>
> Tommy
>
> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
>
> =EF=BB=BF
>
> ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing
> both are fine.)
>
>     Erik
>
>
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
>> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in
>> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have
>> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it
>> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific
>> > name.
>> >
>> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.
>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>>
>> ECH also works for me.
>>
>> Best,
>> Chris (no hat)
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,s=
ans-serif">Are there any objections to &quot;ECH&quot; or should we just go=
 with that?</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,s=
ans-serif">(I&#39;d like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC acco=
rdingly based on what gets decided.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl=
e=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37=
 PM Tommy Pauly &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tpauly@apple.com">tpauly@apple.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">ECH is good. Go for it!</div><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Tommy</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite">On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:erik%2Bietf@nygren.org" target=3D"_blank">erik+ietf@nygren.org</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family=
:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-fa=
mily:tahoma,sans-serif">ECH works for me.=C2=A0 (I really don&#39;t care be=
tween ECH and ETCH and thing both are fine.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Erik</di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br>=
</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_=
attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:caw@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, May 19,=
 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:<br>
&gt; As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in <br>
&gt; conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have=
 <br>
&gt; had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it <b=
r>
&gt; were called ECH, but don&#39;t have a strong preference for any specif=
ic <br>
&gt; name.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. =
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH</a><br>
<br>
ECH also works for me.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris (no hat)<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
<span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>TLS m=
ailing list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:58:34 -0400
Cc: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>, tls@ietf.org
To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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=EF=BB=BFOkay let=E2=80=99s call this done! ECH it is.

spt

Sent from my iPhone

>> On May 21, 2020, at 11:53, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
> =EF=BB=BF
> Are there any objections to "ECH" or should we just go with that?
> (I'd like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC accordingly based o=
n what gets decided.)
>=20
>=20
>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com> wrote:
>> ECH is good. Go for it!
>>=20
>> Tommy
>>=20
>>>> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:=

>>> =EF=BB=BF
>>>=20
>>> ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing b=
oth are fine.)
>>>=20
>>>     Erik
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> w=
rote:
>>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
>>>> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in=20
>>>> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would hav=
e=20
>>>> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it=20=

>>>> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific=20=

>>>> > name.
>>>> >=20
>>>> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.=
=20
>>>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>>>>=20
>>>> ECH also works for me.
>>>>=20
>>>> Best,
>>>> Chris (no hat)
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<meta http-equiv=3D=
"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">Okay let=E2=80=99s cal=
l this done! ECH it is.</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">spt=
<br><br><div dir=3D"ltr">Sent from my iPhone</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><bloc=
kquote type=3D"cite">On May 21, 2020, at 11:53, Erik Nygren &lt;erik+ietf@ny=
gren.org&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif">Are there any objections to "ECH" or should w=
e just go with that?</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:=
tahoma,sans-serif">(I'd like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC a=
ccordingly based on what gets decided.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" st=
yle=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37=
 PM Tommy Pauly &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tpauly@apple.com">tpauly@apple.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div d=
ir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">ECH is good. Go for it!</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">Tommy</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D=
"cite">On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik%=
2Bietf@nygren.org" target=3D"_blank">erik+ietf@nygren.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>=
<br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF<=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,san=
s-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,=
sans-serif">ECH works for me.&nbsp; (I really don't care between ECH and ETC=
H and thing both are fine.)</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fo=
nt-family:tahoma,sans-serif">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Erik</div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_default" style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div></div><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 20, 2=
020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net" t=
arget=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo V=
alsorda wrote:<br>
&gt; As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in <br>
&gt; conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have <=
br>
&gt; had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it <br=
>
&gt; were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific <b=
r>
&gt; name.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. <=
br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH</a><br>
<br>
ECH also works for me.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris (no hat)<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
<span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>TLS ma=
iling list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>TLS@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/li=
stinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><=
/span><br></div></blockquote></div></blockquote></div>
<span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>TLS ma=
iling list</span><br><span>TLS@ietf.org</span><br><span>https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/tls</span><br></div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 08:58:35 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148) proposes banning implicit CIDs. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the wire. However, in discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it's noted that this removes header malleability. 

Given that we don't have backing analysis suggesting that malleability (with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this PR as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020, indicating whether or not you support this PR.

Thanks,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

*One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence from QUIC.

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 09:21:12 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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This would be my preferred resolution

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 8:59 AM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148) proposes banning implicit
> CIDs. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the wire. However,
> in discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it's noted that this
> removes header malleability.
>
> Given that we don't have backing analysis suggesting that malleability
> (with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this
> PR as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020,
> indicating whether or not you support this PR.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>
> *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the
> pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence
> from QUIC.
>
> [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This would be my preferred resolution<br></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 21, 2=
020 at 8:59 AM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net">=
caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204)=
;padding-left:1ex">PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (<a href=3D"https://github=
.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https=
://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148</a>) proposes banning implicit CID=
s. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the wire. However, in=
 discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it&#39;s noted that this=
 removes header malleability. <br>
<br>
Given that we don&#39;t have backing analysis suggesting that malleability =
(with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this P=
R as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020, indicatin=
g whether or not you support this PR.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, on behalf of the chairs<br>
<br>
*One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the pseudo=
-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence from QU=
IC.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9=
UQdf_1t_o/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.o=
rg/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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On 5/21/20 11:52 AM, Erik Nygren wrote:
> Are there any objections to "ECH" or should we just go with that?

I have no objection, but would benefit from consensus on whether it 
(ECH) is an initialism or acronym. My opinion is that it is best as an 
initialism (as is, e.g., TLS).


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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 12:46:23 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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To make it official, here's a PR making that change:

   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236

Please have a look. I'll merge in the next day or so.

Thanks!
Chris (no hat)

On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 8:58 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>  Okay let=E2=80=99s call this done! ECH it is.
>=20
> spt
>=20
> Sent from my iPhone
>=20
> > On May 21, 2020, at 11:53, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:=

> >=20
> > Are there any objections to "ECH" or should we just go with that?
> > (I'd like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC accordingly =
based on what gets decided.)
> >=20
> >=20
> > On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com> wrot=
e:
> >> ECH is good. Go for it!
> >>=20
> >> Tommy
> >>=20
> >>> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org <m=
ailto:erik%2Bietf@nygren.org>> wrote:
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>> ECH works for me. (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and th=
ing both are fine.)
> >>>=20
> >>>  Erik
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.=
net> wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> >>>>  > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in=20=

> >>>>  > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I wo=
uld have=20
> >>>>  > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search =
if it=20
> >>>>  > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any sp=
ecific=20
> >>>>  > name.
> >>>>  >=20
> >>>>  > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list=
, FWIW.=20
> >>>>  > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
> >>>>=20
> >>>>  ECH also works for me.
> >>>>=20
> >>>>  Best,
> >>>>  Chris (no hat)
> >>>>=20
> >>>>  _______________________________________________
> >>>>  TLS mailing list
> >>>> TLS@ietf.org
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> TLS mailing list
> >>> TLS@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 12:56:08 -0700
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO
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I actually already merged it :)

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 12:48 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> To make it official, here's a PR making that change:
>
>    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236
>
> Please have a look. I'll merge in the next day or so.
>
> Thanks!
> Chris (no hat)
>
> On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 8:58 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
> >  Okay let=E2=80=99s call this done! ECH it is.
> >
> > spt
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone
> >
> > > On May 21, 2020, at 11:53, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Are there any objections to "ECH" or should we just go with that?
> > > (I'd like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC accordingly
> based on what gets decided.)
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37 PM Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com> wrote=
:
> > >> ECH is good. Go for it!
> > >>
> > >> Tommy
> > >>
> > >>> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org
> <mailto:erik%2Bietf@nygren.org>> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> ECH works for me. (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and
> thing both are fine.)
> > >>>
> > >>>  Erik
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood <
> caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> > >>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> > >>>>  > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in
> > >>>>  > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I
> would have
> > >>>>  > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search i=
f
> it
> > >>>>  > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any
> specific
> > >>>>  > name.
> > >>>>  >
> > >>>>  > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list,
> FWIW.
> > >>>>  > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
> > >>>>
> > >>>>  ECH also works for me.
> > >>>>
> > >>>>  Best,
> > >>>>  Chris (no hat)
> > >>>>
> > >>>>  _______________________________________________
> > >>>>  TLS mailing list
> > >>>> TLS@ietf.org
> > >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > >>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> TLS mailing list
> > >>> TLS@ietf.org
> > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > TLS mailing list
> > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I actually already merged it :)<br></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 21, 2020 at=
 12:48 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net">caw@h=
eapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">To make it official, here&#39;s a PR making that change:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/2=
36" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-iet=
f-tls-esni/pull/236</a><br>
<br>
Please have a look. I&#39;ll merge in the next day or so.<br>
<br>
Thanks!<br>
Chris (no hat)<br>
<br>
On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 8:58 AM, Sean Turner wrote:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 Okay let=E2=80=99s call this done! ECH it is.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; spt<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Sent from my iPhone<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On May 21, 2020, at 11:53, Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik=
%2Bietf@nygren.org" target=3D"_blank">erik+ietf@nygren.org</a>&gt; wrote:<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Are there any objections to &quot;ECH&quot; or should we just go =
with that?<br>
&gt; &gt; (I&#39;d like to update the parameter name in SRVB/HTTPSSVC accor=
dingly based on what gets decided.)<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:37 PM Tommy Pauly &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:tpauly@apple.com" target=3D"_blank">tpauly@apple.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; ECH is good. Go for it!<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Tommy<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:erik%2Bietf@nygren.org" target=3D"_blank">erik+ietf@nygren.org</a> &=
lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:erik%252Bietf@nygren.org" target=3D"_blank">eri=
k%2Bietf@nygren.org</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; ECH works for me. (I really don&#39;t care between ECH an=
d ETCH and thing both are fine.)<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Erik<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wr=
ote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; As a data point, I was fairly confused whe=
n ECHO came up in <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; conversation, and had to stop to ask what =
it was. I think I would have <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; had a better chance of figuring it out fro=
m context or search if it <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; were called ECH, but don&#39;t have a stro=
ng preference for any specific <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; name.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia=
 disambiguation list, FWIW. <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; <a href=3D"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E=
CH" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH<=
/a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 ECH also works for me.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Best,<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 Chris (no hat)<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 _______________________________________________=
<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS=
@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
/tls</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@iet=
f.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=
</a><br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a=
><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 09:49:14 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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On Fri, May 22, 2020, at 01:58, Christopher Wood wrote:
> PR #148 

I think that this is the right solution to this problem.

> *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the 
> pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary 
> divergence from QUIC.

I'm not sure that we need to concern ourselves with avoiding divergence.  I would instead point to the advantages of only authenticating what is on the wire: with multiple records in a datagram, having to prepend to the AAD means a performance hit of some kind.  Either because you need to pass AAD in two chunks (one for the extra bit, one for the on-the-wire header), which is not commonly supported in APIs, or you need to move or copy stuff around to create a single contiguous AAD.  The result is a small amount of complexity.

I can probably make a case for not including connection ID in the AAD entirely on the basis of it being analogous to IP or port, but unless that was formally verified, I wouldn't want to rely on that. So #148 WFM.  The number of cases where a connection ID can be omitted are vanishingly small anyway.


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Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 17:09:00 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "Thomas Fossati" <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/zFzRTQ2Spajsz1gQ723uWqqQU1k>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 9:22 AM, Thomas Fossati wrote:
> Hi Chris,
> 
> On 21/05/2020, 17:00, "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> > *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the
> > pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary
> > divergence from QUIC.
> 
> I don't understand the "unnecessary" in the above para, i.e., why are we
> so tied to QUIC in this case?  I'm asking because it looks like this was
> a core criterion in the Chairs' proposal.

Sorry for the confusion! The point here was that QUIC authenticates what's on the wire, which we felt was important. I should have spelled that out. There are of course other things to consider, as Martin points out.

Best,
Chris


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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It looks like the intended status for both draft-ietf-tls-ctls (aka =
cTLS) and draft-ietf-tls-esni (aka ECH) should be changed. It appears =
that both should be set to standards track; cTLS is now Informational =
and ECH is Experimental. If you object to changing the track for either =
of these drafts please send an email to the list stating why by 2359 UTC =
on 5 June 2020.

Cheers,
spt (for the Chairs)=


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Subject: [TLS] adoption call for draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance
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This is a WG document adoption call for =
draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance (aka Guidance for External PSK Usage =
in TLS). This effort was kicked off @IETF106 by Ben Kaduk and supported =
by others in the audience. There was also some nominal amount of support =
for adopting the draft at the last virtual interim though no formal =
adoption call was issued at the interim.

If you support adopting this draft as a WG Document, then please send =
email indicating your support to the list. If you have any comments or =
reservations send them to the list too.

This adoption call completes at 2359 UTC 5 June 2020.

Cheers,
spt (for the chairs)=


From nobody Thu May 21 19:12:43 2020
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Subject: [TLS] The TLS WG has placed draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance in state "Call For Adoption By WG Issued"
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The TLS WG has placed draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance in state
Call For Adoption By WG Issued (entered by Sean Turner)

The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance/



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To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] adoption call for draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance
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I support adoption.

> On May 21, 2020, at 10:12 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> This is a WG document adoption call for =
draft-dt-tls-external-psk-guidance (aka Guidance for External PSK Usage =
in TLS). This effort was kicked off @IETF106 by Ben Kaduk and supported =
by others in the audience. There was also some nominal amount of support =
for adopting the draft at the last virtual interim though no formal =
adoption call was issued at the interim.
>=20
> If you support adopting this draft as a WG Document, then please send =
email indicating your support to the list. If you have any comments or =
reservations send them to the list too.
>=20
> This adoption call completes at 2359 UTC 5 June 2020.
>=20
> Cheers,
> spt (for the chairs)
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 09:19:03 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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I don't support this PR. Compactness of wire presentation is important
(and acknowledged - why would there be a compressed header otherwise)
and implicit CIDs should hence allowed and authenticated via AEAD additiona=
l data,
preferably by generally adopting the pseudo header AAD approach.
Disappointingly, despite its length the discussion so far has failed to poi=
nt
out concrete problems with the resulting header format malleability.

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Christopher Wood <caw@heaping=
bits.net>
Sent: Friday, May 22, 2020 1:09 AM
To: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>; TLS@ietf.org <TLS@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS

On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 9:22 AM, Thomas Fossati wrote:
> Hi Chris,
>
> On 21/05/2020, 17:00, "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> > *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the
> > pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary
> > divergence from QUIC.
>
> I don't understand the "unnecessary" in the above para, i.e., why are we
> so tied to QUIC in this case?  I'm asking because it looks like this was
> a core criterion in the Chairs' proposal.

Sorry for the confusion! The point here was that QUIC authenticates what's =
on the wire, which we felt was important. I should have spelled that out. T=
here are of course other things to consider, as Martin points out.

Best,
Chris

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<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span>I don't support this PR. Compactness of wire presentation is importan=
t</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span>(and acknowledged - why would there be a compressed header otherwise)=
&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span>and implicit CIDs should hence allowed and authenticated via AEAD add=
itional data,&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span>preferably by generally adopting the pseudo header AAD approach.</spa=
n></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<div>Disappointingly, despite its length the discussion so far has failed t=
o point&nbsp;</div>
<div>out concrete problems with the resulting header format malleability.</=
div>
<span></span><br>
</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@i=
etf.org&gt; on behalf of Christopher Wood &lt;caw@heapingbits.net&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, May 22, 2020 1:09 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Thomas Fossati &lt;Thomas.Fossati@arm.com&gt;; TLS@ietf.org &lt;=
TLS@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
">
<div class=3D"PlainText">On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 9:22 AM, Thomas Fossati w=
rote:<br>
&gt; Hi Chris,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On 21/05/2020, 17:00, &quot;Christopher Wood&quot; &lt;caw@heapingbits=
.net&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include =
the<br>
&gt; &gt; pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary<br=
>
&gt; &gt; divergence from QUIC.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don't understand the &quot;unnecessary&quot; in the above para, i.e.=
, why are we<br>
&gt; so tied to QUIC in this case?&nbsp; I'm asking because it looks like t=
his was<br>
&gt; a core criterion in the Chairs' proposal.<br>
<br>
Sorry for the confusion! The point here was that QUIC authenticates what's =
on the wire, which we felt was important. I should have spelled that out. T=
here are of course other things to consider, as Martin points out.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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Subject: [TLS] 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators
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This is the 3rd WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" draft =
available at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/. =
The secdir review during IETF LC raised some issues and as a result =
there have been a couple of new versions. Please respond to the list =
with any comments by 2359 UTC on 8 June 2020.

Cheers,
spt (for the chairs)=


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 06:27:14 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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--000000000000829ab005a63c9835
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

We have already implemented ECH (old versions) for NSS and are eager to
deploy it in Firefox.

We are likely to implement cTLS.

-Ekr


On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 6:20 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz=
40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I am reluctant to make CTLS standards-track without a statement from
> someone that they are likely to implement it.  We already have such a
> statement from Stephen about OpenSSL for ECH, and I'll add to that.
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>We have already implemented ECH (old versions) for NS=
S and are eager to deploy it in Firefox.</div><div><br></div><div>We are li=
kely to implement cTLS.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><=
/div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">O=
n Fri, May 22, 2020 at 6:20 AM Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40a=
kamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I am reluctant to make=
 CTLS standards-track without a statement from someone that they are likely=
 to implement it.=C2=A0 We already have such a statement from Stephen about=
 OpenSSL for ECH, and I&#39;ll add to that. <br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 11:38:47 -0400
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To: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 11:23 AM Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com> wrote
<snip>
>>
>> I am aware of the "fight" about EKU chaining.  I have a view, but I did not really want to drag subcerts into that controversy.
>
>
> Sure, but unfortunately, the design of DC/subcerts is a direct result of that running code.

One of the hard requirements for our deployment was that the same
certificate be useable with DCs and without. A different EKU would be
more problematic then an extension for this purpose, and while it
might be more or less irritating for implementors depending on how
their stack works (sorry Rich -
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/33666/1 might
serve as inspiration, but the client side got dropped for similar
issues). We know the extension doesn't bust things, I don't know an
EKU would, and the root program issues make me hesitate.

Anyway it sounds like no one really has a problem with an extension,
just a question.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Fri May 22 08:55:32 2020
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators
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> On May 22, 2020, at 9:23 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> This is the 3rd WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" draft =
available at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/. =
The secdir review during IETF LC raised some issues and as a result =
there have been a couple of new versions. Please respond to the list =
with any comments by 2359 UTC on 8 June 2020.


I would like to see this published soon.  I have one comment.

Section 4: I find this confusing:

   extensions:  The set of extensions allowed in the CertificateRequest
      structure are those defined in the TLS ExtensionType Values IANA
      registry containing CR in the TLS 1.3 column.  The extensions
      allowed in the ClientCertificateRequest are those containing CR in
      the TLS 1.3 column, along with the server_name [RFC6066]
      extension.

I think it means:

   extensions:  The set of extensions allowed in the CertificateRequest
      structure and the ClientCertificateRequest structure are those
      defined in the TLS ExtensionType Values IANA registry [cite]
      containing CR in the TLS 1.3 column.  In addition, the set of
      extensions in the ClientCertificateRequest structure MAY
      include the server_name [RFC6066] extension.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-tQMyr5vjW9m_iVlATAdTLXYMNY>
Subject: Re: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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Subject: Re: [TLS] consensus call: changing cTLS and ECH to standards track
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I support moving both drafts to standards track.=20

For ECH, there is a definite need to encrypt the SNI and other fields as a c=
omplement to using encrypted DNS. We have implemented draft versions, and wi=
ll implement and use the final certain of ECH + HTTPSSVC.=20

For cTLS, this is a prime candidate for use by future versions of QUIC. Sinc=
e that would want to be a normative reference from a standards track documen=
t, it would need to be standards track at the time it was used.

Thanks,
Tommy=20

> On May 21, 2020, at 7:11 PM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BFIt looks like the intended status for both draft-ietf-tls-ctls (a=
ka cTLS) and draft-ietf-tls-esni (aka ECH) should be changed. It appears tha=
t both should be set to standards track; cTLS is now Informational and ECH i=
s Experimental. If you object to changing the track for either of these draf=
ts please send an email to the list stating why by 2359 UTC on 5 June 2020.
>=20
> Cheers,
> spt (for the Chairs)
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Sat May 23 09:09:49 2020
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Subject: [TLS] Publication has been requested for draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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Joseph Salowey has requested publication of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the TLS working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/



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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC5)
  1 issues created:
  - Remove 1.3 from the title (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/237=20

  3 issues received 5 new comments:
  - #229 Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations. (1 by chr=
is-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/229=20
  - #214 Clarify 1.2 connection support (don't break connections, but also =
don't protect the certificate) (3 by chris-wood, davidben, ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/214=20
  - #177 GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones (1 =
by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/177=20

  3 issues closed:
  - Clarify 1.2 connection support (don't break connections, but also don't=
 protect the certificate) https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issu=
es/214=20
  - Bikeshed: finalize on naming of "ECHO" https://github.com/tlswg/draft-i=
etf-tls-esni/issues/232=20
  - Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations. https://github=
.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/229=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Linkability via epoch (by martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/150=20

  1 issues closed:
  - Integrity bounds https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/145=20

* tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC6)
  1 issues received 6 new comments:
  - #72 Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers (6=
 by boaks, thomas-fossati)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC3)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - s/ECHO/ECH (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236=20

  3 pull requests received 3 new comments:
  - #235 Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value. (1 by chris-w=
ood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=20
  - #234 Describe known active attacks (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=20
  - #154 Switch to record_digest_mac to prevent GREASE detection. (1 by chr=
is-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/154=20

  3 pull requests merged:
  - s/ECHO/ECH
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236=20
  - Describe known active attacks
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=20
  - Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Address comments raised by Verisign. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/pull/36=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - Address comments raised by Verisign.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/pull/36=20
  - Couple of other notes
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/pull/35=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+2/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC2)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Clear up that the ACK logic is the union (by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149=20
  - Ban implicit CIDs (by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148=20

  2 pull requests received 2 new comments:
  - #149 Clear up that the ACK logic is the union (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149=20
  - #147 Define anti-forgery limits for DTLS (1 by martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147=20

  3 pull requests merged:
  - Clear up that the ACK logic is the union
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149=20
  - Define anti-forgery limits for DTLS
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147=20
  - Cleanup whitespace
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146=20

* tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC3)
  1 pull requests received 3 new comments:
  - #73 Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers (3=
 by boaks, hanno-arm, thomas-fossati)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/73=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<title>Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)</title>
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<body>
<h1>Sunday May 24, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC5)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#237 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
37">Remove 1.3 from the title</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 issues received 5 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#229 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
29">Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations.</a> (1 by chri=
s-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#214 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
14">Clarify 1.2 connection support (don&#x27;t break connections, but also =
don&#x27;t protect the certificate)</a> (3 by chris-wood, davidben, ekr) </=
li>
 =20
  <li>#177 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
77">GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones</a> (1 b=
y chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#214 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
14">Clarify 1.2 connection support (don&#x27;t break connections, but also =
don&#x27;t protect the certificate)</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#232 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
32">Bikeshed: finalize on naming of &quot;ECHO&quot;</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#229 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
29">Describe HRR cut-and-paste 1 in Security Considerations.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#150 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/150">Link=
ability via epoch</a> (by martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>


  <p>1 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#145 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/145">Inte=
grity bounds</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC6)</h3>

  <p>1 issues received 6 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#72 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/72">Disal=
low sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers</a> (6 by boaks=
, thomas-fossati) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC3)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#236 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236=
">s/ECHO/ECH</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests received 3 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#235 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=
">Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value.</a> (1 by chris-wood=
) </li>
 =20
  <li>#234 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=
">Describe known active attacks</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#154 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/154=
">Switch to record_digest_mac to prevent GREASE detection.</a> (1 by chris-=
wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#236 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/236=
">s/ECHO/ECH</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#234 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/234=
">Describe known active attacks</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#235 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/235=
">Suggest size of GREASE encrypted_ch extension value.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#36 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-i=
mporter/pull/36">Address comments raised by Verisign.</a> (by chris-wood) <=
/li>
  </ul>


  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#36 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-i=
mporter/pull/36">Address comments raised by Verisign.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#35 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-i=
mporter/pull/35">Couple of other notes</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+2/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC2)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#149 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149">Clear =
up that the ACK logic is the union</a> (by ekr) </li>
 =20
  <li>#148 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148">Ban im=
plicit CIDs</a> (by ekr) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 2 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#149 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149">Clear =
up that the ACK logic is the union</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#147 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147">Define=
 anti-forgery limits for DTLS</a> (1 by martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#149 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/149">Clear =
up that the ACK logic is the union</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#147 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/147">Define=
 anti-forgery limits for DTLS</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#146 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/146">Cleanu=
p whitespace</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+0/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC3)</h3>

  <p>1 pull requests received 3 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#73 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/73">Disallo=
w sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers</a> (3 by boaks, =
hanno-arm, thomas-fossati) </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============0093302616213588675==--


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From: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LLjpwGBFQF85aEvWYE4RQ-0vuLw>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 24 May 2020 12:44:55 -0700
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To: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 11:01 AM Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
wrote:

> On 22/05/2020, 01:09, "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> > On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 9:22 AM, Thomas Fossati wrote:
> > > Hi Chris,
> > >
> > > On 21/05/2020, 17:00, "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include
> > > > the pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary
> > > > divergence from QUIC.
> > >
> > > I don't understand the "unnecessary" in the above para, i.e., why
> > > are we so tied to QUIC in this case?  I'm asking because it looks
> > > like this was a core criterion in the Chairs' proposal.
>
> > Sorry for the confusion! The point here was that QUIC authenticates
> > what's on the wire, which we felt was important. I should have spelled
> > that out. There are of course other things to consider, as Martin
> > points out.
>
> OK, thanks for clarifying.
>
> I want to be able to use implicit CIDs so I don't support PR#148 as-is.
>

In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?

-Ekr


> As much as I'd like to go for a pure pseudo-header approach, I don't
> think I have enough data at this point in time that I'd feel safe going
> that way.
>
> Since adding implicit CID to the AD doesn't look like a big deal in
> terms of performance overhead, that would be my preference.
>
> cheers, t
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
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> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 11:01 AM Thom=
as Fossati &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Thomas.Fossati@arm.com">Thomas.Fossati@arm=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">On 22/05/2020, 01:09, &quot;Christopher Wood&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:caw@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br>
&gt; On Thu, May 21, 2020, at 9:22 AM, Thomas Fossati wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Hi Chris,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On 21/05/2020, 17:00, &quot;Christopher Wood&quot; &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt;<=
br>
&gt; &gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to inc=
lude<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnec=
essary<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; divergence from QUIC.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I don&#39;t understand the &quot;unnecessary&quot; in the above p=
ara, i.e., why<br>
&gt; &gt; are we so tied to QUIC in this case?=C2=A0 I&#39;m asking because=
 it looks<br>
&gt; &gt; like this was a core criterion in the Chairs&#39; proposal.<br>
<br>
&gt; Sorry for the confusion! The point here was that QUIC authenticates<br=
>
&gt; what&#39;s on the wire, which we felt was important. I should have spe=
lled<br>
&gt; that out. There are of course other things to consider, as Martin<br>
&gt; points out.<br>
<br>
OK, thanks for clarifying.<br>
<br>
I want to be able to use implicit CIDs so I don&#39;t support PR#148 as-is.=
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In what context do you have a use for =
implicit CIDs?<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
As much as I&#39;d like to go for a pure pseudo-header approach, I don&#39;=
t<br>
think I have enough data at this point in time that I&#39;d feel safe going=
<br>
that way.<br>
<br>
Since adding implicit CID to the AD doesn&#39;t look like a big deal in<br>
terms of performance overhead, that would be my preference.<br>
<br>
cheers, t<br>
<br>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>, Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators
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Just a reminder ...

> On May 22, 2020, at 09:23, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> This is the 3rd WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" draft =
available at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/. =
The secdir review during IETF LC raised some issues and as a result =
there have been a couple of new versions. Please respond to the list =
with any comments by 2359 UTC on 8 June 2020.
>=20
> Cheers,
> spt (for the chairs)


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Hi Thomas,

 > Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
 > framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
 > might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
 > single record, making the need for CID compression moot.

I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size
of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS "application_data" part). Only
for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's
not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you
share some details to help me out.

In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type
"multi_application_data" would help in a more general way. Even without
the "implicit CIDs" discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple
of "very small" "application_data"-messages are sent at once.

best regards
Achim

Am 27.05.20 um 12:03 schrieb Thomas Fossati:
> On 24/05/2020, 20:45, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?
>
> The specific use case I had in mind is that of an endpoint sending small
> and frequent application data units to the same peer - e.g., sensor
> readings through CoAP observe.  In this (and similar) situation(s) where
> the payload / header ratio is low one wants to have as little transport
> overhead as possible.
>
> Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
> framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
> might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
> single record, making the need for CID compression moot.
>
> So, I am now convinced I don't have a compelling case to bring to the
> table and might as well move into Martin's "vanishingly small use cases"
> camp, therefore subscribing the gist of PR#148.
>
>
> PS  A note about the more general argument of a pure pseudo-header
> approach: it'd enable compression boxes at ingress into a constrained
> network, which would be really useful.  Without a thorough analysis wrt
> header malleability this is unfortunately out of reach.
>
> --
>
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From: Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Hi Achim and all,

> > Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
> > framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
> > might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
> > single record, making the need for CID compression moot.

> I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size
> of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS "application_data" part). Only
> for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's
> not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you
> share some details to help me out.

> In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type
> "multi_application_data" would help in a more general way. Even without
> the "implicit CIDs" discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple
> of "very small" "application_data"-messages are sent at once.

As mentioned before, I second that wish for more efficient stacking
of multiple records within a single datagram.

Note that this goal could also be achieved without an additional content
type if we'd go for the pseudo-header AAD. Namely, in this case, one could
generalize the implicit CID to allow dropping further header fields and
defining their implicit value for non-initial records, as Thomas mentioned =
before:
(a) For CID, the value is the same as for the previous record in the datagr=
am
(perhaps transitively continued). (b) For record sequence numbers, an omitt=
ed
sequence number means that it's the successor of the one used in the previo=
us
record. (c) For epochs, the value is the same as for the previous record in=
 the
same datagram.
If you follow this through, you end up with the extreme possibility of havi=
ng
multiple DTLS records within a single datagram, where the explicit headers
of the non-initial records consist solely of their length. This would still=
 be
longer than what you'd get with a multi_application_data content type,
or application layer framing, because the authentication tag overhead occur=
s multiple
times, but it comes at the benefit of not changing the protection of the re=
cords, since
the input to the AEAD algorithm is unchanged. It's only the record  header =
_format_
that can be chosen freely and optimized dynamically.

Regards,
Hanno

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.n=
et>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:02 AM
To: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS

Hi Thomas,

 > Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
 > framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
 > might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
 > single record, making the need for CID compression moot.

I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size
of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS "application_data" part). Only
for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's
not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you
share some details to help me out.

In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type
"multi_application_data" would help in a more general way. Even without
the "implicit CIDs" discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple
of "very small" "application_data"-messages are sent at once.

best regards
Achim

Am 27.05.20 um 12:03 schrieb Thomas Fossati:
> On 24/05/2020, 20:45, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?
>
> The specific use case I had in mind is that of an endpoint sending small
> and frequent application data units to the same peer - e.g., sensor
> readings through CoAP observe.  In this (and similar) situation(s) where
> the payload / header ratio is low one wants to have as little transport
> overhead as possible.
>
> Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
> framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
> might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
> single record, making the need for CID compression moot.
>
> So, I am now convinced I don't have a compelling case to bring to the
> table and might as well move into Martin's "vanishingly small use cases"
> camp, therefore subscribing the gist of PR#148.
>
>
> PS  A note about the more general argument of a pure pseudo-header
> approach: it'd enable compression boxes at ingress into a constrained
> network, which would be really useful.  Without a thorough analysis wrt
> header malleability this is unfortunately out of reach.
>
> --
>
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pan><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;,=
 &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-sys=
tem, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 &gt; framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one=
</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quo=
t;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-=
system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif;=
 font-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 &gt; might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one<=
/span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot=
;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-s=
ystem, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; =
font-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 &gt; single record, making the need for CID compression moot.</span><br st=
yle=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &quot;Seg=
oe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system, Blink=
MacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font-size: 1=
4.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &qu=
ot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system,=
 BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size</=
span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;=
, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-sy=
stem, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; f=
ont-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS &quot;application_data&quot; part)=
. Only</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe =
UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -=
apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-=
serif; font-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's</s=
pan><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;,=
 &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-sys=
tem, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you</s=
pan><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;,=
 &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-sys=
tem, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 share some details to help me out.</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 3=
0); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&q=
uot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quo=
t;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font-size: 14.6667px; background-color:=
 rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &qu=
ot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system,=
 BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font-s=
ize: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type</span><br style=3D"color=
: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (W=
est European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFon=
t, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font-size: 14.6667px; ba=
ckground-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 &quot;multi_application_data&quot; would help in a more general way. Even =
without</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe=
 UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, =
-apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans=
-serif; font-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 the &quot;implicit CIDs&quot; discussion it may help in some cases, where =
a couple</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Sego=
e UI&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;,=
 -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, san=
s-serif; font-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant">&gt;
 of &quot;very small&quot; &quot;application_data&quot;-messages are sent a=
t once.</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
As mentioned before, I second that wish for more efficient stacking&nbsp;</=
div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
of multiple records within&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-fa=
mily: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">a single dat=
agram.</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Note that this goal could also be achieved without an additional content</d=
iv>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
type&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, =
Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">if we'd go for the pseudo-header A=
AD. Namely, in this case, one could</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
generalize the implicit CID to allow dropping further header fields and</di=
v>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
defining their implicit value for non-initial records, as Thomas mentioned =
before:&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
(a) For CID, the value is the same as for the previous record in the datagr=
am</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
(perhaps transitively continued).&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">(b) F=
or record&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Cali=
bri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">sequence
 numbers, an omitted&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">sequence number means that&nbsp;</span><span=
 style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans=
-serif; font-size: 12pt;">it's the successor
 of the one used in the previous</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">record. (c) For epochs,&nbsp;</span><span st=
yle=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-se=
rif; font-size: 12pt;">the value is the same
 as for the previous record in the</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
same datagram.&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">If you follow this through, you end up with =
the extreme possibility&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); fon=
t-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">of
 having&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">multiple DTLS records within a single datagr=
am, where&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Cali=
bri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">the
 explicit headers&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">of the non-initial records consist solely of=
 their&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">length.
 This would still be</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">longer than what you'd get with a multi_appl=
ication_data content type,</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">or application layer framing, because the au=
thentication tag overhead occurs multiple</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">times, but it comes at the benefit of not</s=
pan><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvet=
ica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">&nbsp;changing&nbsp;</span><span style=
=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif=
; font-size: 12pt;">the
 protection&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Ca=
libri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">of&nbsp;</span><span=
 style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans=
-serif; font-size: 12pt;">the records, since&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">the input to the AEAD algorithm is unchanged=
.&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Ari=
al, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">It's
 only&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri,=
 Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">the record&nbsp;&nbsp;</sp=
an><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helveti=
ca, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">header _format_&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">that can be chosen freely and optimized dyna=
mically.</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Regards,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hanno</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(32, 31, 30); font-family: &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, &=
quot;Segoe UI Web (West European)&quot;, &quot;Segoe UI&quot;, -apple-syste=
m, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;, sans-serif; font=
-size: 14.6667px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); display: inline !im=
portant"><br>
</span></div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@i=
etf.org&gt; on behalf of Achim Kraus &lt;achimkraus@gmx.net&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:02 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> tls@ietf.org &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Hi Thomas,<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&gt; Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the da=
ta<br>
&nbsp;&gt; framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS=
) one<br>
&nbsp;&gt; might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into=
 one<br>
&nbsp;&gt; single record, making the need for CID compression moot.<br>
<br>
I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size<br=
>
of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS &quot;application_data&quot; part).=
 Only<br>
for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's<br>
not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you<br>
share some details to help me out.<br>
<br>
In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type<br>
&quot;multi_application_data&quot; would help in a more general way. Even w=
ithout<br>
the &quot;implicit CIDs&quot; discussion it may help in some cases, where a=
 couple<br>
of &quot;very small&quot; &quot;application_data&quot;-messages are sent at=
 once.<br>
<br>
best regards<br>
Achim<br>
<br>
Am 27.05.20 um 12:03 schrieb Thomas Fossati:<br>
&gt; On 24/05/2020, 20:45, &quot;Eric Rescorla&quot; &lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt; w=
rote:<br>
&gt;&gt; In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The specific use case I had in mind is that of an endpoint sending sma=
ll<br>
&gt; and frequent application data units to the same peer - e.g., sensor<br=
>
&gt; readings through CoAP observe.&nbsp; In this (and similar) situation(s=
) where<br>
&gt; the payload / header ratio is low one wants to have as little transpor=
t<br>
&gt; overhead as possible.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data<br>
&gt; framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one<=
br>
&gt; might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one<b=
r>
&gt; single record, making the need for CID compression moot.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So, I am now convinced I don't have a compelling case to bring to the<=
br>
&gt; table and might as well move into Martin's &quot;vanishingly small use=
 cases&quot;<br>
&gt; camp, therefore subscribing the gist of PR#148.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; PS&nbsp; A note about the more general argument of a pure pseudo-heade=
r<br>
&gt; approach: it'd enable compression boxes at ingress into a constrained<=
br>
&gt; network, which would be really useful.&nbsp; Without a thorough analys=
is wrt<br>
&gt; header malleability this is unfortunately out of reach.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are c=
onfidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipie=
nt, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents t=
o any other person, use it for any
 purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; TLS@ietf.org<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf=
.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
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TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
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mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
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From: Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 09:36:32 -0400
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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I agree with EKR that this seems like the most expedient solution to the
issue.

--Richard

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 12:00 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148) proposes banning implicit
> CIDs. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the wire. However,
> in discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it's noted that this
> removes header malleability.
>
> Given that we don't have backing analysis suggesting that malleability
> (with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this
> PR as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020,
> indicating whether or not you support this PR.
>
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>
> *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the
> pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence
> from QUIC.
>
> [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I agree with EKR that this seems like the most expedi=
ent solution to the issue.<br></div><div><br></div><div>--Richard<br></div>=
</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">=
On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 12:00 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw=
@heapingbits.net">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (<a href=
=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148</a>) proposes ba=
nning implicit CIDs. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the=
 wire. However, in discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it&#39=
;s noted that this removes header malleability. <br>
<br>
Given that we don&#39;t have backing analysis suggesting that malleability =
(with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this P=
R as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020, indicatin=
g whether or not you support this PR.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, on behalf of the chairs<br>
<br>
*One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the pseudo=
-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence from QU=
IC.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9=
UQdf_1t_o/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.o=
rg/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@arm.com>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/0WDHb39Pu72yViWv1nT44qnZ7yg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Hi,

I changed my mind and support PR #148 on removing implicit CIDs.

Reason, FWIW: The main use of implicit CIDs is reduced transmission bandwid=
th
in case of multiple records within a single datagram, which I still conside=
r valid.
However, firstly there doesn't appear to be consensus on the relevance of t=
his
case, and secondly, if so, there's more to optimize than just the CID: Conc=
retely,
going down the route of adding a new content type as suggested by Achim, or
alternatively adding a framing in the already existing intermediate layer g=
iven
by the DTLSInnerPlaintext, seems preferable, since it saves the header plus=
 the
record protection overhead, instead of just parts of the header. Such a cha=
nge
could moreover be added as an extension to DTLS 1.3 at a later point, if de=
sired.

My support for the use of a pseudo header for the AAD isn't impacted by thi=
s,
but that's not the point of this thread.

Cheers,
Hanno

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hanno Becker <Hanno.Becker@ar=
m.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:17 AM
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>; TLS@ietf.org <TLS@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS

Hi Achim and all,

> > Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
> > framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
> > might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
> > single record, making the need for CID compression moot.

> I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size
> of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS "application_data" part).. Only
> for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's
> not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you
> share some details to help me out.

> In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type
> "multi_application_data" would help in a more general way. Even without
> the "implicit CIDs" discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple
> of "very small" "application_data"-messages are sent at once.

As mentioned before, I second that wish for more efficient stacking
of multiple records within a single datagram.

Note that this goal could also be achieved without an additional content
type if we'd go for the pseudo-header AAD. Namely, in this case, one could
generalize the implicit CID to allow dropping further header fields and
defining their implicit value for non-initial records, as Thomas mentioned =
before:
(a) For CID, the value is the same as for the previous record in the datagr=
am
(perhaps transitively continued). (b) For record sequence numbers, an omitt=
ed
sequence number means that it's the successor of the one used in the previo=
us
record. (c) For epochs, the value is the same as for the previous record in=
 the
same datagram.
If you follow this through, you end up with the extreme possibility of havi=
ng
multiple DTLS records within a single datagram, where the explicit headers
of the non-initial records consist solely of their length. This would still=
 be
longer than what you'd get with a multi_application_data content type,
or application layer framing, because the authentication tag overhead occur=
s multiple
times, but it comes at the benefit of not changing the protection of the re=
cords, since
the input to the AEAD algorithm is unchanged.. It's only the record  header=
 _format_
that can be chosen freely and optimized dynamically.

Regards,
Hanno

________________________________
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.n=
et>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:02 AM
To: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS

Hi Thomas,

 > Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
 > framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
 > might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
 > single record, making the need for CID compression moot.

I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size
of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS "application_data" part). Only
for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's
not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you
share some details to help me out.

In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type
"multi_application_data" would help in a more general way. Even without
the "implicit CIDs" discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple
of "very small" "application_data"-messages are sent at once.

best regards
Achim

Am 27.05.20 um 12:03 schrieb Thomas Fossati:
> On 24/05/2020, 20:45, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?
>
> The specific use case I had in mind is that of an endpoint sending small
> and frequent application data units to the same peer - e.g., sensor
> readings through CoAP observe.  In this (and similar) situation(s) where
> the payload / header ratio is low one wants to have as little transport
> overhead as possible.
>
> Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data
> framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one
> might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one
> single record, making the need for CID compression moot.
>
> So, I am now convinced I don't have a compelling case to bring to the
> table and might as well move into Martin's "vanishingly small use cases"
> camp, therefore subscribing the gist of PR#148.
>
>
> PS  A note about the more general argument of a pure pseudo-header
> approach: it'd enable compression boxes at ingress into a constrained
> network, which would be really useful.  Without a thorough analysis wrt
> header malleability this is unfortunately out of reach.
>
> --
>
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 please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to a=
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IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
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lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in =
any medium. Thank you.

--_000_DB8PR08MB51775E1C41AFAD4B9BD3D1FA9B8E0DB8PR08MB5177eurp_
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hi,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I changed my mind and support PR #148 on removing implicit CIDs.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Reason, FWIW: The main use of implicit CIDs is reduced transmission bandwid=
th</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
in case of multiple records within a single datagram, which I still conside=
r valid.&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
However, firstly there doesn't appear to be consensus on the relevance of t=
his</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
case, and secondly, if so<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: C=
alibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">, there's more to o=
ptimize than just the CID: Concretely,</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
going down the route of adding a new content type as suggested by Achim, or=
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
alternatively adding a framing in the already existing intermediate layer g=
iven</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
by the DTLSInnerPlaintext, seems preferable, since it saves the header plus=
 the&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
record protection&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Cal=
ibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">overhead, instead of =
just parts of the header. Such a change&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">could moreover be added as an&nbsp;</span><s=
pan style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, s=
ans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">extension to
 DTLS 1.3 at a later point, if desired.</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
My support for the use of a pseudo header for the AAD&nbsp;<span style=3D"c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; fon=
t-size: 12pt;">isn't impacted by this,</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica,=
 sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">but that's not the point of this thread.</sp=
an></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Cheers,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hanno</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size=
: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" co=
lor=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces@i=
etf.org&gt; on behalf of Hanno Becker &lt;Hanno.Becker@arm.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:17 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Achim Kraus &lt;achimkraus@gmx.net&gt;; TLS@ietf.org &lt;TLS@iet=
f.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Hi Achim and all,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; &gt; Now, it turns out in t=
he specific situation (and whenever the data</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(3=
2,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; &gt; framing is provided by=
 a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one</span><br style=3D"color:rg=
b(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; &gt; might as well buffer a=
nd coalesce all the application stuff into one</span><br style=3D"color:rgb=
(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; &gt; single record, making =
the need for CID compression moot.</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); =
font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<br style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC=
 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(=
32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; of the UDP message (or that=
 of the DTLS &quot;application_data&quot; part).. Only</span><br style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
>
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; for TCP the size is explici=
tly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(3=
2,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; not RFC7252). If I miss som=
ething about that, it would be great, if you</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(3=
2,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; share some details to help =
me out.</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<br style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb=
(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; In my opinion, introducing =
a new TLS Content Type</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14=
.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; &quot;multi_application_dat=
a&quot; would help in a more general way. Even without</span><br style=3D"c=
olor:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
>
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; the &quot;implicit CIDs&quo=
t; discussion it may help in some cases, where a couple</span><br style=3D"=
color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important">&gt; of &quot;very small&quot; &=
quot;application_data&quot;-messages are sent at once.</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
As mentioned before, I second that wish for more efficient stacking&nbsp;</=
div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
of multiple records within&nbsp;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-famil=
y:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">a single datagram.</s=
pan></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Note that this goal could also be achieved without an additional content</d=
iv>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
type&nbsp;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">if we'd go for the pseudo-header AAD. Namel=
y, in this case, one could</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
generalize the implicit CID to allow dropping further header fields and</di=
v>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
defining their implicit value for non-initial records, as Thomas mentioned =
before:&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
(a) For CID, the value is the same as for the previous record in the datagr=
am</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
(perhaps transitively continued).&nbsp;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); fon=
t-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">(b) For record=
&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Hel=
vetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">sequence numbers,
 an omitted&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">sequence number means that&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-siz=
e:12pt">it's the successor of the one used
 in the previous</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">record. (c) For epochs,&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:1=
2pt">the value is the same as for the previous
 record in the</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
same datagram.&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">If you follow this through, you end up with the extre=
me possibility&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Cal=
ibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">of
 having&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">multiple DTLS records within a single datagram, where=
&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Hel=
vetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">the explicit
 headers&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">of the non-initial records consist solely of their&nb=
sp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">length. This
 would still be</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">longer than what you'd get with a multi_application_d=
ata content type,</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">or application layer framing, because the authenticat=
ion tag overhead occurs multiple</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">times, but it comes at the benefit of not</span><span=
 style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
 font-size:12pt">&nbsp;changing&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)=
; font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">the
 protection&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibr=
i,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">of&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-siz=
e:12pt">the records, since&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">the input to the AEAD algorithm is unchanged..&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif; font-size:12pt">It's only&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(=
0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">the
 record&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Cali=
bri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt">header _format_&nbsp;</span=
></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0); font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif; font-size:12pt">that can be chosen freely and optimized dynamically.<=
/span></div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Regards,</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
Hanno</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12p=
t; color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<span style=3D"color:rgb(32,31,30); font-size:14.6667px; background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255); display:inline!important"><br>
</span></div>
<div id=3D"x_appendonsend"></div>
<hr tabindex=3D"-1" style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" =
color=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</b> TLS &lt;tls-bounces=
@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Achim Kraus &lt;achimkraus@gmx.net&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:02 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> tls@ietf.org &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"x_BodyFragment"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11p=
t">
<div class=3D"x_PlainText">Hi Thomas,<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&gt; Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the da=
ta<br>
&nbsp;&gt; framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS=
) one<br>
&nbsp;&gt; might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into=
 one<br>
&nbsp;&gt; single record, making the need for CID compression moot.<br>
<br>
I'm not sure, how CoAP (RFC 7252) offers framing. AFAIK it uses the size<br=
>
of the UDP message (or that of the DTLS &quot;application_data&quot; part).=
 Only<br>
for TCP the size is explicitly encoded in the CoAP messages (but that's<br>
not RFC7252). If I miss something about that, it would be great, if you<br>
share some details to help me out.<br>
<br>
In my opinion, introducing a new TLS Content Type<br>
&quot;multi_application_data&quot; would help in a more general way. Even w=
ithout<br>
the &quot;implicit CIDs&quot; discussion it may help in some cases, where a=
 couple<br>
of &quot;very small&quot; &quot;application_data&quot;-messages are sent at=
 once.<br>
<br>
best regards<br>
Achim<br>
<br>
Am 27.05.20 um 12:03 schrieb Thomas Fossati:<br>
&gt; On 24/05/2020, 20:45, &quot;Eric Rescorla&quot; &lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt; w=
rote:<br>
&gt;&gt; In what context do you have a use for implicit CIDs?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The specific use case I had in mind is that of an endpoint sending sma=
ll<br>
&gt; and frequent application data units to the same peer - e.g., sensor<br=
>
&gt; readings through CoAP observe.&nbsp; In this (and similar) situation(s=
) where<br>
&gt; the payload / header ratio is low one wants to have as little transpor=
t<br>
&gt; overhead as possible.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Now, it turns out in the specific situation (and whenever the data<br>
&gt; framing is provided by a higher layer protocol - CoAP, SCTP, DNS) one<=
br>
&gt; might as well buffer and coalesce all the application stuff into one<b=
r>
&gt; single record, making the need for CID compression moot.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So, I am now convinced I don't have a compelling case to bring to the<=
br>
&gt; table and might as well move into Martin's &quot;vanishingly small use=
 cases&quot;<br>
&gt; camp, therefore subscribing the gist of PR#148.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; PS&nbsp; A note about the more general argument of a pure pseudo-heade=
r<br>
&gt; approach: it'd enable compression boxes at ingress into a constrained<=
br>
&gt; network, which would be really useful.&nbsp; Without a thorough analys=
is wrt<br>
&gt; header malleability this is unfortunately out of reach.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are c=
onfidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipie=
nt, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents t=
o any other person, use it for any
 purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; TLS@ietf.org<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf=
..org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
TLS@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</div>
</span></font></div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. </div>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confid=
ential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, p=
lease notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any=
 other person, use it for any purpose,
 or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 08:57:01 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "Hannes Tschofenig" <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, "Richard Barnes" <rlb@ipv.sx>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
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Thanks, all! It looks like we have consensus on #148, so I merged it. Let's spin a new version with these changes and move forward.

Best,
Chris

On Fri, May 29, 2020, at 8:29 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>  
> I also agree. Even without implicit CIDs we can still put multiple 
> handshake messages into a single record. Hence, there is no performance 
> problem. 
> 
> 
> *From:* TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of * Richard Barnes
> *Sent:* Thursday, May 28, 2020 3:37 PM
> *To:* Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> *Cc:* TLS@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Banning implicit CIDs in DTLS
> 
> 
> I agree with EKR that this seems like the most expedient solution to the issue.
> 
> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 12:00 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> 
> > PR #148 in the DTLS 1.3 draft (https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148) proposes banning implicit CIDs. This comes at an obvious cost in terms of bytes on the wire. However, in discussions on a parallel thread [1 and related], it's noted that this removes header malleability. 
> > 
> >  Given that we don't have backing analysis suggesting that malleability (with the other AAD properties) is safe*, the chairs propose merging this PR as-is. To that end, please respond to the list by May 28, 2020, indicating whether or not you support this PR.
> > 
> >  Thanks,
> >  Chris, on behalf of the chairs
> > 
> >  *One proposal to address this is by extending the AAD to include the pseudo-header. However, the chairs feel this is an unnecessary divergence from QUIC.
> > 
> >  [1]  https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kFnlBW-TmlArcU0lD9UQdf_1t_o/
> > 
> >  _______________________________________________
> >  TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
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From nobody Fri May 29 11:02:43 2020
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Hannes Tschofenig
                          Nagendra Modadugu
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38.txt
	Pages           : 61
	Date            : 2020-05-29

Abstract:
   This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications
   to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent
   eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

   The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security
   guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability.
   Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the
   DTLS protocol.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Fri May 29 14:00:43 2020
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--00000000000044c29505a6cfbb83
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi all,

As we=E2=80=99ve been using TLS 1.3 in more scenarios, we=E2=80=99ve encoun=
tered some
interesting interactions with TCP. We thought we=E2=80=99d document these a=
nd send
a note here. In general, we've found that TLS implementations need to be
wary of post-handshake messages and =E2=80=9Cunexpected=E2=80=9D transport =
writes. This
unfortunately also includes some server handshake alerts.

TLS APIs

First, some background on APIs for TLS libraries. TLS is often deployed
=E2=80=9Ctransparently=E2=80=9D underneath a TCP-based protocol. HTTPS sand=
wiches TLS
between HTTP and TCP, etc. By and large, reads and writes over TLS are
one-to-one with reads and writes over TCP.

TLS APIs and callers can subtly rely on this. Some libraries expose an
interface like the POSIX sockets API, including non-blocking behavior. If
the transport is blocked on I/O, this is surfaced as an error for the
caller to retry later. Importantly, the library cannot drive transport I/O
on its own. The caller must drive the operation to completion. Other APIs
transform bytes and leave I/O to the application. Any TCP writes triggered
by TLS reads and vice versa are even more directly part of the API surface.
In contrast, sometimes the TLS library can drive I/O itself. For example, a
Go TLS implementation can do background work in a goroutine.

Also note that libraries may predate TLS 1.3, but now enable TLS 1.3 by
default. Those libraries must ensure callers written against TLS 1.2 work
in TLS 1.3.

Post-handshake messages and flow control

TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 both have post-handshake messages, but TLS 1.2 only
uses them for renegotiation, which is rare and often disabled. TLS 1.3 has
post-handshake NewSessionTickets. A server will typically send tickets
immediately after the handshake

We initially treated NewSessionTicket as an extra flight in the server
handshake. After receiving the client Finished, the server would write
NewSessionTicket and then signal handshake completion. This kept tickets
working in unmodified server callers.

However, this can lead to a deadlock in some cases. A typical HTTP/1.1
client will first write its request and, only when this is complete, read
the response. If the write exceeds the transport buffer, it will not
complete, and thus the client will not read, until after the server starts
reading. An HTTP/1.1 server caller knows to read first, but only after the
handshake completes. If NewSessionTicket also exceeds the transport buffer,
this strategy means the server won=E2=80=99t complete the handshake until t=
he
client starts reading. Thus the connection deadlocks.

While these messages usually fit in transport buffers, we don=E2=80=99t lik=
e
systems with invisible cliffs, particularly deadlocks. Some TLS
implementations embed client certificates in tickets, which can make them
large. Additionally, mock transports in tests sometimes use artificially
small buffers.

Recommendation: We switched to deferring NewSessionTicket to the first
application write by default. Server callers which wish to flush them
earlier may, but they should not block normal I/O on it. TLS
implementations which can drive transport I/O themselves may be able to
instead write them in the background after the handshake. Note, however,
the discussion on =E2=80=9CClient-write-only protocols=E2=80=9D below.

Separately, in case the server does not do this, TLS 1.3 client
implementations should eagerly read from the socket after the handshake,
even if the caller isn=E2=80=99t expecting application data. However, this =
is only
possible at a layer which can drive I/O itself. We implement this in
Chromium=E2=80=99s abstractions over BoringSSL, but cannot do so in BoringS=
SL
itself.

Likewise, while they are unlikely to exceed the transport buffer, TLS
libraries should defer KeyUpdate acknowledgements to the next application
write, possible from the KeyUpdate tweaks
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/cfw4paCGxI7Fj8QNmj6k1I66VII/>
made early on.

0-RTT and flow control

There is a similar effect in 0-RTT. The client writes the ClientHello and
early data. The server responds with ServerHello..Finished. Depending on
I/O strategy, implementations may hit a similar deadlock if the client
won=E2=80=99t read the ServerHello flight until it has written its early da=
ta, but
the server won=E2=80=99t read early data until it has written the ServerHel=
lo
flight.

Some factors make this deadlock less of a concern than NewSessionTicket:


   -

   0-RTT is new as of TLS 1.3 and should not be enabled by default. 0-RTT
   clients are already expected to handle extra cases such as 0-RTT rejects
   and replayability. That means libraries can impose extra requirements or
   introduce APIs for these I/O patterns.
   -

   The ServerHello flight does not contain a certificate. It is more likely
   to fit in transport buffers and has more-or-less fixed size.
   -

   For HTTP, RFC8470 only sends GETs over early data by default, which are
   smaller than POSTs and more likely to fit in transport buffers. But this=
 is
   another invisible cliff in the system.


Recommendation: 0-RTT clients should eagerly read from the connection, even
if the application isn=E2=80=99t expecting data yet. This avoids this deadl=
ock and
opportunistically confirms the handshake sooner, so more data is sent over
1-RTT. Note this must be done at a layer which can drive transport I/O
itself.

Client certificate errors and TCP resets

If a server rejects a client certificate, it should end an alert, so the
client can react accordingly. The client may display an error to the user,
clear a cache of certificate decisions, or prompt the user to select a
different certificate.

TLS 1.2 has a two round-trip handshake:

      ClientHello        -------->

                                            ServerHello

                                           Certificate*

                                     ServerKeyExchange*

                                    CertificateRequest*

                         <--------      ServerHelloDone

      Certificate*

      ClientKeyExchange

      CertificateVerify*

      [ChangeCipherSpec]

      Finished           -------->

                                     [ChangeCipherSpec]

                         <--------             Finished

The server has a handshake flight after the client certificate. If it
rejects the certificate, the TLS implementation will write an alert and
then report failure, at which point the caller will close the socket and
discard the connection. From the client=E2=80=99s perspective, this alert c=
omes
instead of ChangeCipherSpec/Finished, during the handshake. It processes
the alert and cleanly fails the handshake, before any application data
flows.

TLS 1.3 reduces the handshake to one round-trip:

       ClientHello       -------->

                                            ServerHello

                                  {EncryptedExtensions}

                                  {CertificateRequest*}

                                         {Certificate*}

                                   {CertificateVerify*}

                                             {Finished}

                         <--------  [Application Data*]

       {Certificate*}

       {CertificateVerify*}

       {Finished}        -------->

There is no server flight after the client certificate. If the server
rejects it, it will again write an alert and report failure. However, now
the client receives it instead of the first application data record. This
is a behavior change to callers, who now must handle client certificate
errors out of read as well as connect.

Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes after the
client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior change but
makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:


   1.

   Client: write(ClientHello);
   2.

   Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);
   3.

   Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);
   4.

   Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificate); close();
   5.

   Client: write(=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(???);


Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a bad_certificate
alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=E2=80=99m not a TCP expert, but I=
 believe
this is because the client writes data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D) the se=
rver never
consumes. If it arrives at the server TCP stack before close(), the socket
is closed with unread data. If it arrives after close(), the socket
receives data after close(). TCP appears to consider either condition an
application protocol error and triggers a reset shortly after sending the
alert. If the client consumes the alert before its TCP stack sees the
reset, the alert gets through. Otherwise, TCP will not reliably deliver the
alert. Receive buffers may be cleared, data isn=E2=80=99t retransmitted, et=
c. This
is particularly pronounced on loopback.

Note, if TCP did not reset, we=E2=80=99d deadlock other scenarios. Suppose =
the
client request did not fit in transport buffers. The client would not read
until that is flushed, but the server will never ACK it. The client would
then never progress to the alert and get stuck. By resetting, TCP
interrupts large client writes with some error, albeit the wrong one.

Recommendation: We do not have a good answer here. The deadlock scenario
means we cannot hope to reliably deliver alerts unless the client eagerly
reads as above. But servers cannot rely on clients to do this, and this is
not sufficient because of the TCP reset.

It seems the only fix is for the server to keep the connection alive for
some time after the failure, maybe draining some bytes from the
application, with some limit before giving up and resetting if the client
seems to be writing a lot of data without ever reading. This would need to
be quite up the stack. We have not implemented this.


TLS False Start (RFC7918) exposes much of the same issues, but, in TLS 1.3,
this flow is not optional. Clients cannot even choose to pay a round-trip
to restore the TLS 1.2 flow because, in the successful case, there is
nothing to wait for. One could imagine an extension that adds an optional
server flight, but a round-trip to fix an error condition is an
unsatisfying trade-off.

Clients could also consider TCP resets to be potential client certificate
errors. This is also unsatisfying as TCP resets are unauthenticated and may
have other causes.

Client-write-only protocols

Edge cases may have other unexpected writes. Consider a protocol where the
server never writes, and thus the client never reads. TLS 1.3 introduces
server NewSessionTicket messages, so we again trigger the deadlock above.
If the client further shuts down the read half of the connection, the
NewSessionTicket message will also trigger the TCP reset behavior above.

Recommendation: Don=E2=80=99t do this. If you must, either the client must =
read
anyway to pick up the ticket, or the server must not send tickets. A TLS
server library probably should default to deferring tickets to application
write, which would do the latter. Note this means such protocols don=E2=80=
=99t get
resumption.

Half-RTT data

We haven=E2=80=99t done much with half-RTT data outside of 0-RTT connection=
s, but
half-RTT may risk similar issues. Half-RTT data in a client certificate
connection is sent before the server learns the client identity. That means
the connection is writable before all its properties are established, which
is an awkward API.

One might think to avoid this state by configuring half-RTT data ahead of
time for the library to write during the handshake, immediately after
ServerHello..Finished. A half-RTT HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame doesn=E2=80=99t nee=
d a
streaming API, and this avoids exposing the incomplete state to the caller.

However, this also risks flow control issues, depending on sizes and I/O
patterns. If both half-RTT data and client Certificate..Finished are too
large, this design has another flow control deadlock: the server will not
read client Certificate..Finished until writing half-RTT data, and the
client will not read half-RTT data until it has written its flight.

Recommendation: Sadly, it seems half-RTT APIs need to be more complicated
than this.


Hopefully this is helpful to folks.

David

--00000000000044c29505a6cfbb83
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"gmail-docs-internal-guid-c9db51d2-7fff-2887-5f=
70-fe87fb4fcf58"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;ma=
rgin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(=
0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-varian=
t-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Hi all,</=
span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin=
-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,=
0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-ea=
st-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">As we=E2=80=
=99ve been using TLS 1.3 in more scenarios, we=E2=80=99ve encountered some =
interesting interactions with TCP. We thought we=E2=80=99d document these a=
nd send a note here. In general, we&#39;ve found that TLS implementations n=
eed to be wary of post-handshake messages and =E2=80=9Cunexpected=E2=80=9D =
transport writes. This unfortunately also includes some server handshake al=
erts.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt=
;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-variant-numeric=
:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:=
pre-wrap">TLS APIs</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margi=
n-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Aria=
l;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal=
;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p">First, some background on APIs for TLS libraries. TLS is often deployed =
=E2=80=9Ctransparently=E2=80=9D underneath a TCP-based protocol. HTTPS sand=
wiches TLS between HTTP and TCP, etc. By and large, reads and writes over T=
LS are one-to-one with reads and writes over TCP.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"l=
tr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tran=
sparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">TLS APIs and callers can subtly rely =
on this. Some libraries expose an interface like the POSIX sockets API, inc=
luding non-blocking behavior. If the transport is blocked on I/O, this is s=
urfaced as an error for the caller to retry later. Importantly, the library=
 cannot drive transport I/O on its own. The caller must drive the operation=
 to completion. Other APIs transform bytes and leave I/O to the application=
. Any TCP writes triggered by TLS reads and vice versa are even more direct=
ly part of the API surface. In contrast, sometimes the TLS library can driv=
e I/O itself. For example, a Go TLS implementation can do background work i=
n a goroutine.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margi=
n-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Aria=
l;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal=
;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p">Also note that libraries may predate TLS 1.3, but now enable TLS 1.3 by =
default. Those libraries must ensure callers written against TLS 1.2 work i=
n TLS 1.3.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-to=
p:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-variant-nu=
meric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-s=
pace:pre-wrap">Post-handshake messages and flow control</span></p><p dir=3D=
"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tr=
ansparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertic=
al-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 both have post-=
handshake messages, but TLS 1.2 only uses them for renegotiation, which is =
rare and often disabled. TLS 1.3 has post-handshake NewSessionTickets. A se=
rver will typically send tickets immediately after the handshake</span></p>=
<br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0=
pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgr=
ound-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:=
normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">We initially treated N=
ewSessionTicket as an extra flight in the server handshake. After receiving=
 the client Finished, the server would write NewSessionTicket and then sign=
al handshake completion. This kept tickets working in unmodified server cal=
lers.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt=
;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-var=
iant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Howeve=
r, this can lead to a deadlock in some cases. A typical HTTP/1.1 client wil=
l first write its request and, only when this is complete, read the respons=
e. If the write exceeds the transport buffer, it will not complete, and thu=
s the client will not read, until after the server starts reading. An HTTP/=
1.1 server caller knows to read first, but only after the handshake complet=
es. If NewSessionTicket also exceeds the transport buffer, this strategy me=
ans the server won=E2=80=99t complete the handshake until the client starts=
 reading. Thus the connection deadlocks.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-=
size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;f=
ont-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:ba=
seline;white-space:pre-wrap">While these messages usually fit in transport =
buffers, we don=E2=80=99t like systems with invisible cliffs, particularly =
deadlocks. Some TLS implementations embed client certificates in tickets, w=
hich can make them large. Additionally, mock transports in tests sometimes =
use artificially small buffers.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-=
height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt=
;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-style=
:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Recommendation:</span><span style=3D"=
font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpar=
ent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> We switched to deferring NewSessionTicke=
t to the first application write by default. Server callers which wish to f=
lush them earlier may, but they should not block normal I/O on it. TLS impl=
ementations which can drive transport I/O themselves may be able to instead=
 write them in the background after the handshake. Note, however, the discu=
ssion on =E2=80=9CClient-write-only protocols=E2=80=9D below.</span></p><br=
><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"=
><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgroun=
d-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:nor=
mal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Separately, in case the s=
erver does not do this, TLS 1.3 client implementations should eagerly read =
from the socket after the handshake, even if the caller isn=E2=80=99t expec=
ting application data. However, this is only possible at a layer which can =
drive I/O itself. We implement this in Chromium=E2=80=99s abstractions over=
 BoringSSL, but cannot do so in BoringSSL itself.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"l=
tr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tran=
sparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Likewise, while they are unlikely to =
exceed the transport buffer, TLS libraries should defer KeyUpdate acknowled=
gements to the next application write, possible from the </span><a href=3D"=
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/cfw4paCGxI7Fj8QNmj6k1I66VII/" sty=
le=3D"text-decoration-line:none"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:=
Arial;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant=
-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;w=
hite-space:pre-wrap">KeyUpdate tweaks</span></a><span style=3D"font-size:11=
pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-var=
iant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;=
white-space:pre-wrap"> made early on.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D=
"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font=
-weight:700;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vert=
ical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">0-RTT and flow control</span></p>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background=
-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norm=
al;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">There is a similar effect =
in 0-RTT. The client writes the ClientHello and early data. The server resp=
onds with ServerHello..Finished. Depending on I/O strategy, implementations=
 may hit a similar deadlock if the client won=E2=80=99t read the ServerHell=
o flight until it has written its early data, but the server won=E2=80=99t =
read early data until it has written the ServerHello flight.</span></p><br>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background=
-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norm=
al;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Some factors make this dea=
dlock less of a concern than NewSessionTicket:</span></p><br><ul style=3D"m=
argin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type:d=
isc;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tran=
sparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;m=
argin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;background-c=
olor:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal=
;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">0-RTT is new as of TLS 1.3 a=
nd should not be enabled by default. 0-RTT clients are already expected to =
handle extra cases such as 0-RTT rejects and replayability. That means libr=
aries can impose extra requirements or introduce APIs for these I/O pattern=
s.</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type:disc;font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-va=
riant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline=
;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;m=
argin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;background-color:transparen=
t;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align=
:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">The ServerHello flight does not contain a c=
ertificate. It is more likely to fit in transport buffers and has more-or-l=
ess fixed size.</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type:dis=
c;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transp=
arent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-a=
lign:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;background-col=
or:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;v=
ertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">For HTTP, RFC8470 only sends G=
ETs over early data by default, which are smaller than POSTs and more likel=
y to fit in transport buffers. But this is another invisible cliff in the s=
ystem.</span></p></li></ul><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Ar=
ial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-va=
riant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline=
;white-space:pre-wrap">Recommendation:</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-varian=
t-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;whi=
te-space:pre-wrap"> 0-RTT clients should eagerly read from the connection, =
even if the application isn=E2=80=99t expecting data yet. This avoids this =
deadlock and opportunistically confirms the handshake sooner, so more data =
is sent over 1-RTT. Note this must be done at a layer which can drive trans=
port I/O itself.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Ar=
ial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-vari=
ant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;w=
hite-space:pre-wrap">Client certificate errors and TCP resets</span></p><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-co=
lor:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;=
vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">If a server rejects a client =
certificate, it should end an alert, so the client can react accordingly. T=
he client may display an error to the user, clear a cache of certificate de=
cisions, or prompt the user to select a different certificate.</span></p><b=
r><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt=
"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgrou=
nd-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:no=
rmal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">TLS 1.2 has a two round-=
trip handshake:</span></p><font face=3D"monospace"><br></font><p dir=3D"ltr=
" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-varia=
nt-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;wh=
ite-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0ClientHello=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 --------&gt;</font></span></p>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent=
;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:=
baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0ServerHello</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:=
10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:nor=
mal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-=
wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Certifica=
te*</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0p=
t;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgro=
und-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:n=
ormal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace=
">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
ServerKeyExchange*</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.3=
8;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb=
(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-varia=
nt-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font fa=
ce=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0CertificateRequest*</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-=
height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;=
font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap=
"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0&lt;--------=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ServerHelloDone=
</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;m=
argin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background=
-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norm=
al;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Certificate*</font></span></p><p dir=3D=
"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-var=
iant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;=
white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0ClientKeyExchange</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-he=
ight:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;fo=
nt-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=
<font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0CertificateVer=
ify*</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgr=
ound-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:=
normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospac=
e">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0[ChangeCipherSpec]</font></span></p>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent=
;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:=
baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Finished =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 --------&gt;<=
/font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;ma=
rgin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-=
color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norma=
l;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0[Ch=
angeCipherSpec]</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;m=
argin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,=
0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-=
east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=
=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0&lt;-------- =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Finis=
hed</font></span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-to=
p:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;fon=
t-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">T=
he server has a handshake flight </span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-=
family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-style:itali=
c;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align=
:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">after</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;f=
ont-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant=
-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;whit=
e-space:pre-wrap"> the client certificate. If it rejects the certificate, t=
he TLS implementation will write an alert and then report failure, at which=
 point the caller will close the socket and discard the connection. From th=
e client=E2=80=99s perspective, this alert comes instead of ChangeCipherSpe=
c/Finished, during the handshake. It processes the alert and cleanly fails =
the handshake, before any application data flows.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"l=
tr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tran=
sparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">TLS 1.3 reduces the handshake to one =
round-trip:</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-t=
op:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);ba=
ckground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-as=
ian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"mono=
space">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0ClientHello =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 --------&gt;</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.=
38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rg=
b(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-vari=
ant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font f=
ace=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0ServerHello</font>=
</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-b=
ottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:=
transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vert=
ical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{EncryptedExtensions}</font=
></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-=
bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color=
:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ver=
tical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{CertificateRequest*}</font=
></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-=
bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color=
:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ver=
tical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{Certificate*}</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line=
-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10p=
t;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal=
;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{CertificateVerify*}</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-=
size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeri=
c:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space=
:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0{Finished}</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0=
,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant=
-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=
=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0&lt;--------=C2=A0 [Application Data*]</font></span></p><p d=
ir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;fon=
t-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:base=
line;white-space:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{Certificate*}</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-=
size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeri=
c:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space=
:pre-wrap"><font face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0{CertificateVerify*}</font></span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-heigh=
t:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-=
variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><fo=
nt face=3D"monospace">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0{Finished}=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 --------&gt;</font></span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr=
" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tran=
sparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">There is no server flight after the c=
lient certificate. If the server rejects it, it will again write an alert a=
nd report failure. However, now the client receives it instead of the first=
 application data record. This is a behavior change to callers, who now mus=
t handle client certificate errors out of read as well as connect.</span></=
p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom=
:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);back=
ground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asia=
n:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Moreover, in a clien=
t-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes </span><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font=
-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ve=
rtical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">after</span><span style=3D"font=
-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;=
font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:b=
aseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> the client has already sent its request. Thi=
s is not only a behavior change but makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:=
</span></p><br><ol style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"list-style-type:decimal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:=
rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-va=
riant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"=
ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:11pt;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:norma=
l;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wr=
ap">Client: write(ClientHello);</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"lis=
t-style-type:decimal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);back=
ground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asia=
n:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:=
11pt;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-=
east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Server: rea=
d(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr=
" style=3D"list-style-type:decimal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-var=
iant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"l=
tr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal=
;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p">Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);</span=
></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type:decimal;font-size:11pt;f=
ont-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant=
-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;whit=
e-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin=
-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;background-color:transparent;fon=
t-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:base=
line;white-space:pre-wrap">Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_c=
ertificate); close();</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-ty=
pe:decimal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-col=
or:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;v=
ertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height=
:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;backg=
round-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian=
:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Client: write(=E2=80=
=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(???);</span></p></li></ol><br><p dir=3D"ltr" s=
tyle=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpare=
nt;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-alig=
n:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideal=
ly ??? would be a bad_certificate alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=
=E2=80=99m not a TCP expert, but I believe this is because the client write=
s data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D) the server never consumes. If it arriv=
es at the server TCP stack before close(), the socket is closed with unread=
 data. If it arrives after close(), the socket receives data after close().=
 TCP appears to consider either condition an application protocol error and=
 triggers a reset shortly after sending the alert. </span><span style=3D"ba=
ckground-color:transparent;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Arial;font-size:11p=
t;white-space:pre-wrap">If the client consumes the alert before its TCP sta=
ck sees the reset, the alert gets through. Otherwise, TCP will not reliably=
 deliver the alert. Receive buffers may be cleared, data isn=E2=80=99t retr=
ansmitted, etc. This is particularly pronounced on loopback.</span></p><br>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background=
-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norm=
al;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Note, if TCP did not reset=
, we=E2=80=99d deadlock other scenarios. Suppose the client request did not=
 fit in transport buffers. The client would not read until that is flushed,=
 but the server will never ACK it. The client would then never progress to =
the alert and get stuck. By resetting, TCP interrupts large client writes w=
ith </span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
;background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal=
;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p">some</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0=
,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-e=
ast-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> error, albe=
it the wrong one.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;ma=
rgin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:A=
rial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-v=
ariant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap">Recommendation</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-varian=
t-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;whi=
te-space:pre-wrap">: We do not have a good answer here. The deadlock scenar=
io means we cannot hope to reliably deliver alerts unless the client eagerl=
y reads as above. But servers cannot rely on clients to do this, and this i=
s not sufficient because of the TCP reset.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" sty=
le=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent=
;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:=
baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">It seems the only fix is for the server to k=
eep the connection alive for some time after the failure, maybe draining so=
me bytes from the application, with some limit before giving up and resetti=
ng if the client seems to be writing a lot of data without ever reading. Th=
is would need to be quite up the stack. We have not implemented this.</span=
></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:=
0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backg=
round-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian=
:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"background-color:transparent;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Arial;fo=
nt-size:11pt;white-space:pre-wrap">TLS False Start (RFC7918) exposes much o=
f the same issues, but, in TLS 1.3, this flow is not optional. Clients cann=
ot even choose to pay a round-trip to restore the TLS 1.2 flow because, in =
the successful case, there is nothing to wait for. One could imagine an ext=
ension that adds an optional server flight, but a round-trip to fix an erro=
r condition is an unsatisfying trade-off.</span><br></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" =
style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"=
font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpar=
ent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Clients could also consider TCP resets to=
 be potential client certificate errors. This is also unsatisfying as TCP r=
esets are unauthenticated and may have other causes.</span></p><br><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color=
:transparent;font-weight:700;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-=
asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Client-write-onl=
y protocols</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color=
:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-v=
ariant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Edge=
 cases may have other unexpected writes. Consider a protocol where the serv=
er never writes, and thus the client never reads. TLS 1.3 introduces server=
 NewSessionTicket messages, so we again trigger the deadlock above. If the =
client further shuts down the read half of the connection, the NewSessionTi=
cket message will also trigger the TCP reset behavior above.</span></p><br>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background=
-color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-varia=
nt-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Recommen=
dation:</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0=
,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-e=
ast-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> Don=E2=80=
=99t do this. If you must, either the client must read anyway to pick up th=
e ticket, or the server must not send tickets. A TLS server library probabl=
y should default to deferring tickets to application write, which would do =
the latter. Note this means such protocols don=E2=80=99t get resumption.</s=
pan></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-=
bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0=
);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-variant-numeric:normal;=
font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap=
">Half-RTT data</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-t=
op:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;fo=
nt-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=
We haven=E2=80=99t done much with half-RTT data outside of 0-RTT connection=
s, but half-RTT may risk similar issues. Half-RTT data in a client certific=
ate connection is sent before the server learns the client identity. That m=
eans the connection is writable before all its properties are established, =
which is an awkward API.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:=
1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-f=
amily:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-nume=
ric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-spa=
ce:pre-wrap">One might think to avoid this state by configuring half-RTT da=
ta ahead of time for the library to write during the handshake, immediately=
 after ServerHello..Finished. A half-RTT HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame doesn=E2=80=
=99t need a streaming API, and this avoids exposing the incomplete state to=
 the caller.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-=
top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;=
color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;f=
ont-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"=
>However, this also risks flow control issues, depending on sizes and I/O p=
atterns. If both half-RTT data and client Certificate..Finished are too lar=
ge, this design has another flow control deadlock: the server will not read=
 client Certificate..Finished until writing half-RTT data, and the client w=
ill not read half-RTT data until it has written its flight.</span></p><br><=
p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><=
span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-=
color:transparent;font-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-varian=
t-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Recommend=
ation:</span><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,=
0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-ea=
st-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> Sadly, it se=
ems half-RTT APIs need to be more complicated than this.</span></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color=
:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ver=
tical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></p><p style=3D"line-=
height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt=
;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-varia=
nt-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;wh=
ite-space:pre-wrap">Hopefully this is helpful to folks.</span></p><br><p di=
r=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-colo=
r:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ve=
rtical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">David</span></p></span></div>

--00000000000044c29505a6cfbb83--


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Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 22:36:42 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:
> Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes after the
> client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior change but
> makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:
> 
> 
>    1.
> 
>    Client: write(ClientHello);
>    2.
> 
>    Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);
>    3.
> 
>    Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);
>    4.
> 
>    Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificate); close();

Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)

>    5.
> 
>    Client: write(“GET / ...”); read(???);
> 
> 
> Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a bad_certificate
> alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I’m not a TCP expert, but I believe
> this is because the client writes data (“GET / ...”) the server never
> consumes.

... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the
server is free to continue to read from the socket.

 If it arrives at the server TCP stack before close(), the socket
> is closed with unread data. If it arrives after close(), the socket
> receives data after close(). TCP appears to consider either condition an
> application protocol error and triggers a reset shortly after sending the
> alert.

-- 
Cheers,
  Jeremy


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 17:52:43 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:36 PM Jeremy Harris <jgh@wizmail.org> wrote:

> On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes after
> the
> > client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior change
> but
> > makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:
> >
> >
> >    1.
> >
> >    Client: write(ClientHello);
> >    2.
> >
> >    Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);
> >    3.
> >
> >    Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);
> >    4.
> >
> >    Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificate); close()=
;
>
> Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)
>
> >    5.
> >
> >    Client: write(=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(???);
> >
> >
> > Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a
> bad_certificate
> > alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=E2=80=99m not a TCP expert, b=
ut I
> believe
> > this is because the client writes data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D) th=
e server never
> > consumes.
>
> ... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the
> server is free to continue to read from the socket.
>

The server's application logic has no reason to continue to read from the
socket. This behavior typically comes from layers above the stack. From the
server's perspective, the TLS library just said the handshake failed. It
required a valid client certificate during the handshake, and the client
did not produce one. This is fatal to the connection, so the server has no
reason to keep it around and no application data to read or write.

The issue is that we've tweaked the I/O patterns in TLS 1.3 such that the
resulting overall behavior interacts badly with TCP. The server could
shutdown(SHUT_WR) and intentionally hold on to the socket and drain data,
in order to get the alert through. That's one of the options I described:

> It seems the only fix is for the server to keep the connection alive for
some time after the failure, maybe draining some bytes from the
application, with some limit before giving up and resetting if the client
seems to be writing a lot of data without ever reading. This would need to
be quite up the stack. We have not implemented this.

This, however, has DoS implications for the server and is a very different
API shape from many current TLS libraries.

David

--00000000000000a4bd05a6d078a9
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:36 PM Jeremy Ha=
rris &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jgh@wizmail.org">jgh@wizmail.org</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes after=
 the<br>
&gt; client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior chang=
e but<br>
&gt; makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 1.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: write(ClientHello);<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);<=
br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 3.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..F=
inished);<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 4.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificat=
e); close();<br>
<br>
Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 5.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: write(=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(???);<br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a bad_certif=
icate<br>
&gt; alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=E2=80=99m not a TCP expert, =
but I believe<br>
&gt; this is because the client writes data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D) t=
he server never<br>
&gt; consumes.<br>
<br>
... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the<br>
server is free to continue to read from the socket.<br></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>The server&#39;s application logic has no reason to continue t=
o read from the socket.  This behavior typically comes from layers above th=
e stack. From the server&#39;s perspective, the TLS library just said the h=
andshake failed. It required a valid client certificate during the handshak=
e, and the client did not produce one.=C2=A0This is fatal to the connection=
, so the server has no reason to keep it around and no application data to =
read or write.</div><div><br></div><div>The issue is that we&#39;ve tweaked=
 the I/O patterns in TLS 1.3 such that the resulting overall behavior inter=
acts badly with TCP. The server could shutdown(SHUT_WR) and intentionally h=
old on to the socket and drain data, in order to get the alert through. Tha=
t&#39;s one of the options I described:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; It se=
ems the only fix is for the server to keep the connection alive for some ti=
me after the failure, maybe draining some bytes from the application, with =
some limit before giving up and resetting if the client seems to be writing=
 a lot of data without ever reading. This would need to be quite up the sta=
ck. We have not implemented this.</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div=
>This, however, has DoS implications for the server and is a very different=
 API shape from many current TLS libraries.<br><div><br></div><div>David=C2=
=A0</div></div></div>

--00000000000000a4bd05a6d078a9--


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 18:35:58 -0400
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:01 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrot=
e:
>
> Hi all,
>
>
> As we=E2=80=99ve been using TLS 1.3 in more scenarios, we=E2=80=99ve enco=
untered some interesting interactions with TCP. We thought we=E2=80=99d doc=
ument these and send a note here. In general, we've found that TLS implemen=
tations need to be wary of post-handshake messages and =E2=80=9Cunexpected=
=E2=80=9D transport writes. This unfortunately also includes some server ha=
ndshake alerts.
>
>
> TLS APIs
>
> First, some background on APIs for TLS libraries. TLS is often deployed =
=E2=80=9Ctransparently=E2=80=9D underneath a TCP-based protocol. HTTPS sand=
wiches TLS between HTTP and TCP, etc. By and large, reads and writes over T=
LS are one-to-one with reads and writes over TCP.
>
>
> TLS APIs and callers can subtly rely on this. Some libraries expose an in=
terface like the POSIX sockets API, including non-blocking behavior. If the=
 transport is blocked on I/O, this is surfaced as an error for the caller t=
o retry later. Importantly, the library cannot drive transport I/O on its o=
wn. The caller must drive the operation to completion. Other APIs transform=
 bytes and leave I/O to the application.. Any TCP writes triggered by TLS r=
eads and vice versa are even more directly part of the API surface. In cont=
rast, sometimes the TLS library can drive I/O itself. For example, a Go TLS=
 implementation can do background work in a goroutine.

In my experience the issues are thorniest when dealing with blocking
sockets. Libraries using nonblocking sockets have to signal to the
application that they want IO to happen during the handshake, and can
use that same mechanism at later times, particularly for rekeying.
Libraries with blocking behavior are unfortunately in a difficult
position if they imitate a POSIX API and have no means to drive I/O.

One possible dirty trick is to set nonblocking on an owned socket and
translate the blocking call into a select or poll based loop that
issues both writes and reads until enough is read or written. Note
that the real corner case is unanticipated needs to read from the
socket: the library has control when it needs to write.


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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 06:35:58PM -0400, Watson Ladd wrote:
> In my experience the issues are thorniest when dealing with blocking
> sockets. Libraries using nonblocking sockets have to signal to the
> application that they want IO to happen during the handshake, and can
> use that same mechanism at later times, particularly for rekeying.
> Libraries with blocking behavior are unfortunately in a difficult
> position if they imitate a POSIX API and have no means to drive I/O.
> 
> One possible dirty trick is to set nonblocking on an owned socket and
> translate the blocking call into a select or poll based loop that
> issues both writes and reads until enough is read or written. Note
> that the real corner case is unanticipated needs to read from the
> socket: the library has control when it needs to write.

Indeed.

Another is to start a worker thread to do all (async) I/O on the
connection and use inter-thread communications primitives on the
blocking I/O API side.  Because the worker thread needs to do async I/O
anyways, it might as well service multiple connections to reduce the
amount of resources needed for the whole thing.

Nico
-- 


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Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 01:06:23 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On 29/05/2020 22:52, David Benjamin wrote:
> On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:36 PM Jeremy Harris <jgh@wizmail.org> wrote:
> 
>> On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:
>>> Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes after
>> the
>>> client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior change
>> but
>>> makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:
>>>
>>>
>>>    1.
>>>
>>>    Client: write(ClientHello);
>>>    2.
>>>
>>>    Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);
>>>    3.
>>>
>>>    Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);
>>>    4.
>>>
>>>    Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificate); close();
>>
>> Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)
>>
>>>    5.
>>>
>>>    Client: write(“GET / ...”); read(???);
>>>
>>>
>>> Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a
>> bad_certificate
>>> alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I’m not a TCP expert, but I
>> believe
>>> this is because the client writes data (“GET / ...”) the server never
>>> consumes.
>>
>> ... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the
>> server is free to continue to read from the socket.
>>
> 
> The server's application logic has no reason to continue to read from the
> socket.

Perhaps not, though I suggest it is valuable to it for debug and
development to be able to see the client's reaction to the shutdown.

However, you ignored the value of the shutdown() action not resulting
in a RST.  That means that the client view becomes deterministic;
your "read(???)" in the close/RST scenario becomes
"read(error, ALERT:bad cert)".
-- 
Cheers,
  Jeremy


-- 
Cheers,
  Jeremy


From nobody Fri May 29 18:12:52 2020
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Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 21:12:48 -0400
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 10:36:42PM +0100, Jeremy Harris wrote:

> > Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a bad_certificate
> > alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I’m not a TCP expert, but I believe
> > this is because the client writes data (“GET / ...”) the server never
> > consumes.

Fortunately, at least for SMTP, the issues David raises are not likely
to be seen because:

    - The protocol is not unidirectional, client and server take turns.

    - The server sends the first AppData (220 greeting), so the
      NewTicket message is read by the client, or any complaints
      about the client certificate...

However, if the server has something to send during the data transfer
phase (e.g. attempts to rekey the connection), then the client could
perhaps not be polling the server socket for incoming traffic, and
a deadlock may be possible.

Such mid-transfer traffic from the server is rather unlikely in
practice, so I don't think there are immediate concerns for Exim or
Postfix, but keeping an eye on the server socket for incoming data may
be prudent.  If a zero-length SSL_read() when the socket appears
readable takes care of any unexpected non-application-data, then
it should be fairly easy to incorporate into the I/O loop.

    - If the remote socket is readable, but you're trying to write
      and don't yet expect to read, do a zero-byte read, but since
      this may not drain the read queue of unexpected app-data,
      don't poll for read again unless the write side has made
      some progress.

    - If you have something to write, and the socket is writable, write it.

    - If you are expecting to read something, read a chunk of data,
      paying attention also to SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE.

At least in Postfix, the socket is non-blocking once TLS is enabled and
we're relying on SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE to provide
appropriate retry signals, and then wait for the corresponding
condition.

Handling out-of-turn app-data (mid-data-transfer server errors) requires
a bit more care, but the server is supposed to wait until the client
sends '.'.  Early SMTP error responses are unreliable even without TLS.

-- 
    Viktor.


From nobody Sat May 30 00:41:16 2020
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Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 10:41:04 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 04:59:57PM -0400, David Benjamin wrote:
>
> Half-RTT data
> 
> We haven’t done much with half-RTT data outside of 0-RTT connections, but
> half-RTT may risk similar issues. Half-RTT data in a client certificate
> connection is sent before the server learns the client identity. That means
> the connection is writable before all its properties are established, which
> is an awkward API.
> 
> One might think to avoid this state by configuring half-RTT data ahead of
> time for the library to write during the handshake, immediately after
> ServerHello..Finished. A half-RTT HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame doesn’t need a
> streaming API, and this avoids exposing the incomplete state to the caller.

There are other issues with half-RTT HTTP/2 SETTINGS as well. I had a
HTTP/2 implementation that used to send HTTP/2 SETTINGS as half-RTT if
there was no client certificate[1]. I later changed it to not use
half-RTT for HTTP/2 because some TLS clients puked with
unexpected_message alert if one sent SETTINGS in half-RTT[2]. I do not
know which clients did that[3].


[1] Not doing that with client certificate was caused by API issues
with the handoff. The TLS library native API would have allowed sending
data in half-RTT even with client certificate pending (unlike say false
start, which is the TLS implementation just prohibits).

[2] The unexpected_message actually came after the handshake
completed (the client did send correct Finished MAC). 

(Fixing the issue was quite nasty shotgun debugging, and it took
long time to verify issue was fixed, as normally there would only be
one or two failures per day.)

[3] Some terse user reports I heard reported things like the site
not working in Firefox on Windows host, but working in Firefox on
Linux VM on that host and site not working in Chrome (or Chromium?)
but working in Firefox on the same system.

(I did get one user report that the problem was fixed about a
week after I did the change that fixed it.)


-Ilari


From nobody Sat May 30 07:59:14 2020
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 10:58:54 -0400
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To: Jeremy Harris <jgh@wizmail.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 8:06 PM Jeremy Harris <jgh@wizmail.org> wrote:

> On 29/05/2020 22:52, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:36 PM Jeremy Harris <jgh@wizmail.org> wrote:
> >
> >> On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:
> >>> Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now comes afte=
r
> >> the
> >>> client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavior chan=
ge
> >> but
> >>> makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>    1.
> >>>
> >>>    Client: write(ClientHello);
> >>>    2.
> >>>
> >>>    Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Finished);
> >>>    3.
> >>>
> >>>    Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certificate..Finished);
> >>>    4.
> >>>
> >>>    Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_certificate);
> close();
> >>
> >> Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)
> >>
> >>>    5.
> >>>
> >>>    Client: write(=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(???);
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a
> >> bad_certificate
> >>> alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=E2=80=99m not a TCP expert,=
 but I
> >> believe
> >>> this is because the client writes data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D) =
the server never
> >>> consumes.
> >>
> >> ... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the
> >> server is free to continue to read from the socket.
> >>
> >
> > The server's application logic has no reason to continue to read from t=
he
> > socket.
>
> Perhaps not, though I suggest it is valuable to it for debug and
> development to be able to see the client's reaction to the shutdown.\
>

I have never seen a production server do this.


> However, you ignored the value of the shutdown() action not resulting
> in a RST.  That means that the client view becomes deterministic;
> your "read(???)" in the close/RST scenario becomes
> "read(error, ALERT:bad cert)".
>

Yes, I said exactly this twice now. :-P Except the shutdown() isn't the
deciding factor. It's the lack of close(). shutdown(SHUT_WR) doesn't hurt,
but the alert already signals to the client that the connection is done.

> It seems the only fix is for the server to keep the connection alive for
some time after the failure, maybe draining some bytes from the
application, with some limit before giving up and resetting if the client
seems to be writing a lot of data without ever reading. This would need to
be quite up the stack. We have not implemented this.

However, there are two problems here. First, the server needs to call
close() eventually to release resources. This is a failed connection. The
natural thing to do is to tear down the connection state which, ultimately,
will destroy the socket in the natural implementation. In
particular, connection management is often outside the low-level TLS
library. The HTTP server is simply doing something like:

   if (tls_server_handshake(connection->tls) !=3D TLS_HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS) {
      // Release all resources associated with connection. It's not needed
anymore.
      // This, among other work, needs to call close(connection->fd). The
caller here
      // is not a TLS expert and reasonably assumes that the TLS library
has sent
      // any data it needs to send. But the TLS library doesn't own the fd
and can't
      // prevent the close.
      delete_connection(connection);
  }

If the HTTP server software is aware of this mess, it can certainly get the
right behavior by leaving the socket open for longer, releasing it later
after a timeout or so. This is not obvious, hence the note here, so folks
would be aware of this interaction. Moreover, simply closing the socket on
error worked just fine in TLS 1.2, so most existing HTTP server software
are not going to keep their connections alive after error for the sake of
it.

Additionally, as noted in the original email, leaving the socket open is
insufficient if the client's first write exceeds the transport buffers.
Either the client needs to eagerly read (not an obvious expectation, nor
something that all clients do, hence the email), or the server must drain
the socket (an *especially* non-obvious expectation).

David

--000000000000da853b05a6decd19
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 8:06 PM Jeremy Ha=
rris &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jgh@wizmail.org">jgh@wizmail.org</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">On 29/05/2020 22:52, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 5:36 PM Jeremy Harris &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jg=
h@wizmail.org" target=3D"_blank">jgh@wizmail.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On 29/05/2020 21:59, David Benjamin wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Moreover, in a client-speaks-first protocol, the error now com=
es after<br>
&gt;&gt; the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; client has already sent its request. This is not only a behavi=
or change<br>
&gt;&gt; but<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; makes it unreliable over TCP. TCP sees:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 1.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: write(ClientHello);<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 2.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Server: read(ClientHello); write(ServerHello..Fin=
ished);<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 3.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: read(ServerHello..Finished); write(Certif=
icate..Finished);<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 4.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Server: read(Certificate..Finished); write(bad_ce=
rtificate); close();<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Rather than close(), the server should shutdown(SHUT_WR)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 5.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Client: write(=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=80=9D); read(=
???);<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Note (4) and (5) happen in parallel. Ideally ??? would be a<br=
>
&gt;&gt; bad_certificate<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; alert, but it is sometimes a TCP reset. I=E2=80=99m not a TCP =
expert, but I<br>
&gt;&gt; believe<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; this is because the client writes data (=E2=80=9CGET / ...=E2=
=80=9D) the server never<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; consumes.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ... because, having solely notified that it will send no more, the=
<br>
&gt;&gt; server is free to continue to read from the socket.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The server&#39;s application logic has no reason to continue to read f=
rom the<br>
&gt; socket.<br>
<br>
Perhaps not, though I suggest it is valuable to it for debug and<br>
development to be able to see the client&#39;s reaction to the shutdown.\<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I have never seen a production server do=
 this.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">
However, you ignored the value of the shutdown() action not resulting<br>
in a RST.=C2=A0 That means that the client view becomes deterministic;<br>
your &quot;read(???)&quot; in the close/RST scenario becomes<br>
&quot;read(error, ALERT:bad cert)&quot;.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>Yes, I said exactly this twice now. :-P Except the shutdown() isn&#39;t t=
he deciding factor. It&#39;s the lack of close().=C2=A0shutdown(SHUT_WR) do=
esn&#39;t hurt, but the alert already signals to the client that the connec=
tion is done. </div><div><br></div><div>&gt; It seems the only fix is for t=
he server to keep the connection alive for some time after the failure, may=
be draining some bytes from the application, with some limit before giving =
up and resetting if the client seems to be writing a lot of data without ev=
er reading. This would need to be quite up the stack. We have not implement=
ed this.<br></div><div><br></div><div>However, there are two problems here.=
 First, the server needs to call close() eventually to release resources. T=
his is a failed connection. The natural thing to do is to tear down the con=
nection state which, ultimately, will destroy the socket in the natural imp=
lementation. In particular,=C2=A0connection management is often outside the=
 low-level TLS library. The HTTP server is simply doing something like:<br>=
<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0if (tls_server_handshake(connection-&gt;tls) !=3D TLS_HAND=
SHAKE_SUCCESS) {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // Release all resources as=
sociated with connection. It&#39;s not needed anymore.<br></div><div>=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // This, among other work, needs to call close(connection-&g=
t;fd). The caller here</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // is not a TLS exper=
t and reasonably assumes that the TLS library has sent</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 //  any data it needs to send. But the TLS library doesn&#39;t o=
wn the fd and can&#39;t</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 // prevent the close=
.</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 delete_connection(connection);<br>=C2=A0 }=
</div><div><br></div><div>If the HTTP server software is aware of this mess=
, it can certainly get the right behavior by leaving the socket open for lo=
nger,=C2=A0releasing it later after a timeout or so. This is not obvious, h=
ence the note here, so folks would be aware of this interaction. Moreover, =
simply closing the socket on error worked just fine in TLS 1.2, so most exi=
sting HTTP server software are not going to keep their connections alive af=
ter error for the sake of it.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Additionally, as=
 noted in the original email, leaving the socket open is insufficient if th=
e client&#39;s first write exceeds the transport buffers. Either the client=
 needs to eagerly read=C2=A0(not an obvious expectation, nor something that=
 all clients do, hence the email), or the server must=C2=A0drain the socket=
 (an <i>especially</i>=C2=A0non-obvious expectation).</div><div><br></div><=
div>David</div></div></div>

--000000000000da853b05a6decd19--


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 11:27:28 -0400
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 7:28 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 06:35:58PM -0400, Watson Ladd wrote:
> > In my experience the issues are thorniest when dealing with blocking
> > sockets. Libraries using nonblocking sockets have to signal to the
> > application that they want IO to happen during the handshake, and can
> > use that same mechanism at later times, particularly for rekeying.
> > Libraries with blocking behavior are unfortunately in a difficult
> > position if they imitate a POSIX API and have no means to drive I/O.
> >
> > One possible dirty trick is to set nonblocking on an owned socket and
> > translate the blocking call into a select or poll based loop that
> > issues both writes and reads until enough is read or written. Note
> > that the real corner case is unanticipated needs to read from the
> > socket: the library has control when it needs to write.
>

The signaling for nonblocking sockets is somewhat interesting. I don't
think it's as straightforward as that because these non-blocking APIs and
how callers use them becomes sequential anyway. Consider the
NewSessionTicket deadlock issue and a TLS implementation which wishes to
send it immediately after the handshake, rather than deferring to the
first write. Signaling to the application that I/O needs to happen during
handshake, read, and write may look something like...

enum tls_io_result {
    tls_io_success,
    tls_io_error,
    tls_io_want_read,
    tls_io_want_write,
};

tls_io_result tls_handshake(...);
tls_io_result tls_read(...)
tls_io_result tls_write(...)

An HTTP/1.1 server may then:

1. tls_handshake(). On tls_io_want_*, pop back to the select() loop and
retry until tls_io_success.
2. tls_read("GET HTTP/1.1 ..."). On tls_io_want_*, pop back to the select()
loop and retry until tls_io_success.
3. tls_write("HTTP/1.1 200 OK ...")). On tls_io_want_*, pop back to the
select() loop and retry until tls_io_success.

Conversely, an HTTP/1.1 client may tls_handshake(), tls_write(), and
tls_read(), in that order. It likewise would only advance to the next
TLS-level function when the previous one succeeded. You generally do
not read or write before the connection is established, and HTTP/1.1,
unlike HTTP/2, never reads and writes concurrently.

Now the TLS library implements TLS 1.3 and wishes the server to send
NewSessionTicket as soon as possible. It may think to send it right at the
end of tls_handshake(). That gets it out independent of the caller's I/O
patterns. If NewSessionTicket hits EWOULDBLOCK, it then returns
tls_io_want_write out of tls_handshake(). But now we have our deadlock.
This HTTP server will not proceed to tls_read() and thus not consume the
(potentially large) HTTP request until *after* NewSessionTicket is written.
Conversely, this client will not consume the NewSessionTicket via
tls_read() until *after* it has finished writing the HTTP request.

Deferring to the first write makes it all work out, but that is because it
removes the "out-of-turn" write altogether.


> Indeed.
>
> Another is to start a worker thread to do all (async) I/O on the
> connection and use inter-thread communications primitives on the
> blocking I/O API side.  Because the worker thread needs to do async I/O
> anyways, it might as well service multiple connections to reduce the
> amount of resources needed for the whole thing.
>

Right, what is happening here, blocking or non-blocking, is that a
non-deferred NewSessionTicket must not be in sequence with the handshake or
TLS read. A deferred one can be in sequence with TLS write since you're
"naturally" blocking on transport write anyway.

If your core TLS protocol implementation is at the same layer as the
component that can drive new sequences, that all works fine. If not, you
need the upper layer to drive that background work, which means this is
part of the TLS protocol implementation's API contract. (Often the layers
above have only a basic understanding of the TLS protocol, since the point
of the TLS library is to abstract that.)

Or, in the case of NewSessionTicket, just defer them to TLS writes because
it's so much simpler. :-)

David

--0000000000000d1cb805a6df3474
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 7:28 PM Nico Will=
iams &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nico@cryptonector.com" target=3D"_blank">nico@cr=
yptonector.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 06:35:58PM=
 -0400, Watson Ladd wrote:<br>
&gt; In my experience the issues are thorniest when dealing with blocking<b=
r>
&gt; sockets. Libraries using nonblocking sockets have to signal to the<br>
&gt; application that they want IO to happen during the handshake, and can<=
br>
&gt; use that same mechanism at later times, particularly for rekeying.<br>
&gt; Libraries with blocking behavior are unfortunately in a difficult<br>
&gt; position if they imitate a POSIX API and have no means to drive I/O.<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt; One possible dirty trick is to set nonblocking on an owned socket and<=
br>
&gt; translate the blocking call into a select or poll based loop that<br>
&gt; issues both writes and reads until enough is read or written. Note<br>
&gt; that the real corner case is unanticipated needs to read from the<br>
&gt; socket: the library has control when it needs to write.<br></blockquot=
e><div><br></div><div><div>The signaling for nonblocking sockets is somewha=
t interesting. I don&#39;t think it&#39;s as straightforward as that becaus=
e these non-blocking APIs and how callers use them becomes sequential anywa=
y. Consider the NewSessionTicket deadlock issue and a TLS implementation wh=
ich wishes to send it immediately after=C2=A0the handshake, rather than def=
erring to the first=C2=A0write. Signaling to the application that I/O needs=
 to happen during handshake, read, and write may look something like...</di=
v><div><br></div><div>enum tls_io_result {</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls_io_s=
uccess,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls_io_error,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls_i=
o_want_read,</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls_io_want_write,<br></div><div>};</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>tls_io_result tls_handshake(...);</div><div>tls_io_r=
esult tls_read(...)</div><div>tls_io_result tls_write(...)<br></div><div><b=
r></div><div>An HTTP/1.1 server may then:</div><div><br></div><div>1. tls_h=
andshake(). On tls_io_want_*, pop back to the select() loop and retry until=
 tls_io_success.</div><div>2. tls_read(&quot;GET HTTP/1.1 ...&quot;). On tl=
s_io_want_*, pop back to the select() loop and retry until tls_io_success.<=
/div><div>3. tls_write(&quot;HTTP/1.1 200 OK ...&quot;)). On tls_io_want_*,=
 pop back to the select() loop and retry until tls_io_success.<br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>Conversely, an HTTP/1.1 client may tls_handshake(), tls_wr=
ite(), and tls_read(), in that order. It likewise would only advance to the=
 next TLS-level function when the previous one succeeded. You generally do =
not=C2=A0read or write before the connection is established, and HTTP/1.1, =
unlike HTTP/2, never reads and writes concurrently.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>Now the TLS library implements TLS 1.3 and wishes the server to send NewS=
essionTicket as soon as possible. It may think to send it right at the end =
of tls_handshake(). That gets it out independent of the caller&#39;s I/O pa=
tterns. If NewSessionTicket hits EWOULDBLOCK, it then returns tls_io_want_w=
rite out of tls_handshake(). But now we have our deadlock. This HTTP server=
 will not proceed to tls_read() and thus not consume the (potentially large=
) HTTP request until <i>after</i>=C2=A0NewSessionTicket is written. Convers=
ely, this client will not consume the NewSessionTicket via tls_read() until=
 <i>after</i>=C2=A0it has finished writing the HTTP request.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>Deferring to the first write makes it all work out, but that is =
because it removes the &quot;out-of-turn&quot; write altogether.</div></div=
><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Indeed.<br>
<br>
Another is to start a worker thread to do all (async) I/O on the<br>
connection and use inter-thread communications primitives on the<br>
blocking I/O API side.=C2=A0 Because the worker thread needs to do async I/=
O<br>
anyways, it might as well service multiple connections to reduce the<br>
amount of resources needed for the whole thing.<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Right, what is happening here, blocking or non-blocking, is that a=
 non-deferred NewSessionTicket must=C2=A0not be in sequence with the handsh=
ake or TLS read. A deferred one can be in sequence with TLS write since you=
&#39;re &quot;naturally&quot; blocking on transport write anyway.</div><div=
><br></div><div>If your core TLS protocol implementation is at the same lay=
er as the component that can drive new sequences, that all works fine. If n=
ot, you need the upper layer to drive that background work, which means thi=
s is part of the TLS protocol implementation&#39;s=C2=A0API contract. (Ofte=
n the layers above have only a basic understanding of the TLS protocol, sin=
ce the point of the TLS library is to abstract that.)</div><div><br></div><=
div>Or, in the case of NewSessionTicket, just defer them to TLS writes beca=
use it&#39;s so much simpler. :-)</div><div><br></div><div>David</div></div=
></div>

--0000000000000d1cb805a6df3474--


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Consider codepoint for KEMTLS (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh/issues/9=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC6)
  1 issues created:
  - Consider strict ECH mode (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/240=20

  4 issues received 6 new comments:
  - #240 Consider strict ECH mode (1 by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/240=20
  - #237 Remove 1.3 from the title (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/237=20
  - #177 GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones (1 =
by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/177=20
  - #139 Associate the ESNI record with the client-facing server IP (3 by c=
hris-wood, jb-wisemo)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/139 [help wanted]=20

  4 issues closed:
  - two type codes needed for interop https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-t=
ls-esni/issues/220=20
  - Associate the ESNI record with the client-facing server IP https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/139 [help wanted]=20
  - GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones https://=
github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/177=20
  - Remove 1.3 from the title https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/=
issues/237=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  1 issues received 1 new comments:
  - #144 Should we require CIDs on all packets (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/144=20

  2 issues closed:
  - Linkability via epoch https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/150=20
  - Should we require CIDs on all packets https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-s=
pec/issues/144=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  3 pull requests submitted:
  - Remove stale TODOs. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/241=20
  - Specify encrypted_client_hello and outer_extension codepoints. (by chri=
s-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/239=20
  - Remove TLS 1.3 from the title, and re-categorize as a ST document. (by =
chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/238=20

  3 pull requests merged:
  - Remove stale TODOs.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/241=20
  - Specify encrypted_client_hello and outer_extension codepoints.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/239=20
  - Remove TLS 1.3 from the title, and re-categorize as a ST document.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/238=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC2)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Add a note about epoch linkability. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151=20

  2 pull requests received 2 new comments:
  - #151 Add a note about epoch linkability. (1 by ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151=20
  - #143 Explicitly provide integrity for the CID (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/143=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - Add a note about epoch linkability.
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151=20
  - Ban implicit CIDs
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<h1>Sunday May 31, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#9 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh/i=
ssues/9">Consider codepoint for KEMTLS</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC6)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#240 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
40">Consider strict ECH mode</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 issues received 6 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#240 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
40">Consider strict ECH mode</a> (1 by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#237 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
37">Remove 1.3 from the title</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#177 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
77">GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones</a> (1 b=
y chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#139 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
39">Associate the ESNI record with the client-facing server IP</a> (3 by ch=
ris-wood, jb-wisemo) <span class=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #0086=
72; color: #ffffff">help wanted</span> </li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#220 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
20">two type codes needed for interop</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#139 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
39">Associate the ESNI record with the client-facing server IP</a> <span cl=
ass=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #008672; color: #ffffff">help want=
ed</span> </li>
 =20
  <li>#177 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
77">GREASE ESNI extensions are easily distinguished from real ones</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#237 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
37">Remove 1.3 from the title</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>

  <p>1 issues received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#144 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/144">Shou=
ld we require CIDs on all packets</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#150 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/150">Link=
ability via epoch</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#144 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/144">Shou=
ld we require CIDs on all packets</a> </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-3/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">3 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#241 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/241=
">Remove stale TODOs.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#239 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/239=
">Specify encrypted_client_hello and outer_extension codepoints.</a> (by ch=
ris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#238 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/238=
">Remove TLS 1.3 from the title, and re-categorize as a ST document.</a> (b=
y chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>


  <p>3 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#241 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/241=
">Remove stale TODOs.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#239 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/239=
">Specify encrypted_client_hello and outer_extension codepoints.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#238 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/238=
">Remove TLS 1.3 from the title, and re-categorize as a ST document.</a> </=
li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC2)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#151 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151">Add a =
note about epoch linkability.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 2 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#151 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151">Add a =
note about epoch linkability.</a> (1 by ekr) </li>
 =20
  <li>#143 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/143">Explic=
itly provide integrity for the CID</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#151 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/151">Add a =
note about epoch linkability.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#148 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/148">Ban im=
plicit CIDs</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============4687350094262507721==--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and TCP interactions
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I wonder if an extension could be used to signal the client's and
server's ability to handle unexpected alerts.

So, for example, if a client TLS implementation and the application
using it can't handle new tickets, then don't send them.

Of course, implementors should get advice about these problems.

Nico
-- 


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Date: Sun, 31 May 2020 21:52:53 -0700
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--000000000000f2c26105a6fe9124
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Reminder: the last call expires this week.

On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 12:56 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:

> This is the Working Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for TLS"
> available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/.
> Please review the document and respond to the list with any comments by
> June 2, 2020.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Chris, Joe & Sean
>

--000000000000f2c26105a6fe9124
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Reminder: the last call expires=C2=A0this week.=C2=A0=
</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">=
On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 12:56 PM Joseph Salowey &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:joe@s=
alowey.net">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,=
204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">This is the Working Group Last =
Call for &quot;Delegated Credentials for TLS&quot; available at=C2=A0<a hre=
f=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/" target=3D"_=
blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/</a>.=C2=A0=
 Please review the document and respond to the list with any comments by Ju=
ne 2, 2020. =C2=A0<br><br><div>Cheers,<br><br>Chris, Joe &amp; Sean</div></=
div>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000f2c26105a6fe9124--


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Date: Mon, 01 Jun 2020 15:57:19 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/XWPdbaYsQrC8JGoZNXTwdgHePio>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07
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I've reviewed it, it's mostly fine.

I wonder how much more needs to be said about expiration dates and allowance for clock skew.  We haven't had any trouble with the mechanism proposed here (to my knowledge), but we've had plenty of trouble with ESNI deployment.  Maybe the design here is sufficiently superior that it is less susceptible to problems, but it's not clear that this is indeed the case.

Our implementation follows the spec when it comes to the validity period, but we can't really prevent skew from causing credentials to be rejected.  What this does is that it creates a fixed notBefore equivalent for the DC that is relative to the notAfter.  This effectively means that servers need to set valid_time values that aren't too far in the future based on their tolerance for client clock skew.  For a 7-day credential, you might get 5 good days of use.

A little bit of a nod in this direction might go a long way to avoiding deployment problems.

The security considerations don't cover the potential for misissuance creating a credential that is as long-lived as the certificate, but they probably should.

Nits:
The authors seem to use title case and sentence case interchangeably for titles.

On Mon, Jun 1, 2020, at 14:52, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Reminder: the last call expires this week. 
> 
> On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 12:56 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
> > This is the Working Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for TLS" available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/. Please review the document and respond to the list with any comments by June 2, 2020. 
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > Chris, Joe & Sean
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

