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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Yiannis Yiakoumis" <yiannis@selfienetworks.com>, network-tokens@ietf.org, "\<tls\@ietf.org\>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Network-tokens]  Network Tokens I-D and TLS / ESNI
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--=-=-=
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Yiannis Yiakoumis <yiannis@selfienetworks.com> wrote:
    > operators, ii) there are no good APIs to expose L3 socket APIs to the
    > app developers who would eventually acquire and insert tokens, and iii)
    > it doesn't work with IPv4.

(ii) is solvable: I don't want applications to bring along their own TLS
        libraries, i want them provided by OSes.  So there is no difference
        anymore between doing in "libssl" and in the kernel.

(iii) is a feature, frankly.  Please stop trying to patch 40yr old technology.

6man had a presentation yesterday about how far extensions headers get, and
the news is probably better than people feared, if I understood correctly.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Common supported KEM (by FredericJacobs)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/251=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH. (by orrc)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=20

  1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
  - #250 Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH. (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=20

  1 pull requests merged:
  - Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=20

* tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Updates from AD review (by kaduk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

--===============8336868716696181599==
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<body>
<h1>Sunday August 02, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#251 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
51">Common supported KEM</a> (by FredericJacobs) </li>
  </ul>





<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#250 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=
">Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH.</a> (by orrc) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#250 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=
">Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH.</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#250 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/250=
">Fix typo caused by rename from ECHO to ECH.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#3 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3">=
Updates from AD review</a> (by kaduk) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============8336868716696181599==--


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Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2020 11:16:46 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Cc: "TLS Chairs" <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/1zeN1gizX3vFyO2KW9Hy9mUFY0g>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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The official minutes are now up:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-108-tls/

Best,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, at 9:29 AM, Christopher Wood wrote:
> Hi folks,
> 
> Draft minutes for today's TLS meeting at IETF 108 are now available:
> 
>    https://github.com/tlswg/wg-materials/blob/master/ietf108/minutes.md
> 
> Thanks to Carrick and others for taking notes! Please send any 
> corrections or updates to the list or as pull requests to the 
> repository.
> 
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>


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From: tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
CC: TLS Chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VLIHPSafXa9ohWn0hSYRz2N1LXo>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Christopher Wood <caw@heaping=
bits.net>=0A=
Sent: 04 August 2020 19:16=0A=
=0A=
The official minutes are now up:=0A=
=0A=
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-108-tls/=0A=
=0A=
<tp>=0A=
What is Benjamin talking about at the end?=0A=
=0A=
It looks as if you are proposing action on all or some RFC that have TLS 1.=
0 or 1.1 as MTI, related to oldversions-deprecate but that is a guess from =
reading between the lines and that topic is a live one for me so I would ap=
preciate clarity.=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
Best,=0A=
Chris, on behalf of the chairs=0A=
=0A=
On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, at 9:29 AM, Christopher Wood wrote:=0A=
> Hi folks,=0A=
>=0A=
> Draft minutes for today's TLS meeting at IETF 108 are now available:=0A=
>=0A=
>    https://github.com/tlswg/wg-materials/blob/master/ietf108/minutes.md=
=0A=
>=0A=
> Thanks to Carrick and others for taking notes! Please send any=0A=
> corrections or updates to the list or as pull requests to the=0A=
> repository.=0A=
>=0A=
> Thanks,=0A=
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs=0A=
>=0A=
=0A=
_______________________________________________=0A=
TLS mailing list=0A=
TLS@ietf.org=0A=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=0A=


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 03:45:48PM +0000, onoketa wrote:
> The Great Firewall of China may have identified and blocked
> Cloudflare's ESNI implementation.
> 
> I have found that when using a TLS client hello with ESNI extension to
> connect to servers behind Cloudflare's CDN, the connection will be cut
> off after the whole TLS handshake is done. And then that IP address
> will be blocked at the TCP level for several minutes.

There is now a detailed written report on the new phenomenon of ESNI
blocking in China. It was produced by a collaboration of researchers
from Geneva (https://censorship.ai/), GFW Report (https://gfw.report/),
and iYouPort (https://www.iyouport.org/).

https://geneva.cs.umd.edu/posts/china-censors-esni/esni/    (English)
https://geneva.cs.umd.edu/zh/posts/china-censors-esni/esni/ (Chinese)

Here are some of the points most likely to be of interest to this group:
 * The detector is not merely matching on the lack of plaintext SNI; it
   is specifically looking for the ESNI extension 0xffce.
 * The ESNI detector only matches the ESNI encrypted_server_name
   extension 0xffce (draft-ietf-tls-esni-00 through -06), not the ECH
   extensions encrypted_client_hello 0xff02, ech_nonce 0xff03,
   outer_extension 0xff04 (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07).
 * The encrypted_server_name extension has to be syntactically correct;
   the detector is not just looking for the byte patter ff cc.
 * Once an ESNI-containing ClientHello is detected, the firewall drops
   packets in the client→server direction for 120 or 180 seconds.
 * The detector runs on all TCP ports, not just 443.

This short payload is sufficient to trigger blocking:
	160303003b0100003703035b72616e646f6d72616e646f6d72616e646f6d7261
	6e646f6d72616e646f6d5d0000000100000effce000a53754772000000000000
Python code to generate this payload is appended to this message.

Most of the functions of the Great Firewall work bidirectionally, and
the ESNI detection and blocking are no exception. Sending an
ESNI-containing ClientHello from *outside* of China to a server
*inside* results in temporary blocking, just the same as sending one
from the inside to the outside. This makes it easy to experiment with,
even if you don't control a host in China.

To experience ESNI blocking for yourself, choose a responsive TCP port
in China (doesn't have to be port 443), for example
www.tsinghua.edu.cn:80. Begin a TCP ping to the port, for example using
one of these commands:
	hping3 -S www.tsinghua.edu.cn -p 80
	nping -4 -c 0 --tcp-connect www.tsinghua.edu.cn -p 80
Then send the trigger payload:
	printf '\x16\x03\x03\x00\x3b\x01\x00\x00\x37\x03\x03[randomrandomrandomrandomrandom]\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x0e\xff\xce\x00\nSuGr\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' | nc -4 -v www.tsinghua.edu.cn 80
The TCP pings will stop receiving replies for 120 or 180 seconds, then
will start back up again.

----

#!/usr/bin/env python3

# Generates a small TLS ClientHello that trigger's the GFW's ESNI detector.
# Writes output to the file minimal.bin.

import struct

from scapy.all import *
load_layer("tls")
from scapy.layers.tls.all import *

# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-3.4
def var(ceiling, data):
    if ceiling < 256:
        fmt = ">B"
    elif ceiling < 65536:
        fmt = ">H"
    else:
        raise ValueError(ceiling)
    return struct.pack(fmt, len(data)) + data

# https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-01#section-5
def encrypted_server_name(suite, group, key_exchange, record_digest, encrypted_sni):
    return struct.pack(">HH", suite, group) \
        + var(65535, key_exchange) \
        + var(65535, record_digest) \
        + var(65535, encrypted_sni)

clienthello = TLS(
    msg = TLSClientHello(
        gmt_unix_time = 0x5b72616e, # "[ran"
        random_bytes = b"domrandomrandomrandomrandom]",
        ciphers = [],
        ext = [
            # The GFW detector requires a syntactically valid
            # server_name_extension, but the actual values it contains may be
            # nonsense. Here we use a CipherSuite of 0x5375 ("Su"), a NamedGroup
            # of 0x4772 ("Gr"), and zero-length key_exchange, record_digest, and
            # encrypted_sni.
            TLS_Ext_Unknown(type=0xffce, val=encrypted_server_name(0x5375, 0x4772, b"", b"", b"")),
        ],
    )
)

TLS(bytes(clienthello)).show()
print(bytes(clienthello))

FILENAME = "minimal.bin"
open(FILENAME, "wb").write(bytes(clienthello))
print("output written to {}".format(FILENAME))


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  2 issues created:
  - Nonce rationale clarity (by bemasc)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/253=20
  - Avoid padding cliff (by bemasc)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/252=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Lint the document (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/254=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<h1>Sunday August 09, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#253 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
53">Nonce rationale clarity</a> (by bemasc) </li>
 =20
  <li>#252 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
52">Avoid padding cliff</a> (by bemasc) </li>
  </ul>





<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#254 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/254=
">Lint the document</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============4624428481307673021==--


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On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:16:50AM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> Thanks for the report. I think this relates to our ambivalence about the
> requirement for ESNI to not "stick out". That requirement is hard to
> meet, and designs have drifted towards an acceptation that it is OK to
> stick out as long as a sufficiently large share of the traffic does it.
> If that share is large, goes the reasoning, it would be too costly for
> censors to just "drop everything that looks like ESNI". Well, given
> actors like the Great Firewall, one wonders.

There's nothing wrong with that reasoning, in my opinion. To blend in
with a crowd, you can change yourself to match the crowd; or you can
change the crowd to match yourself. My feeling is that ESNI is currently
easy to block (or to put it in terms I like, *inexpensive* to block)
because very few TLS connections use it--nothing valuable depends on it
yet. Whereas if encrypted SNI were somehow deployed suddenly and
massively such that it became a normal feature of TLS connections both
essential and inessential, it would be more difficult (read: expensive)
to block.

After all, even the GFW is not all-powerful. Surely it would prefer to
abolish TLS altogether, but it's too late for that. At this point,
blocking TLS would cost too much--not in terms of implementing firewall
rules, but in how much essential communication it would damage. Put
another way, the GFW itself, and the people who operate/manage it, would
feel some of the pain of blocking.

I don't mean to imply that coordinated deployment is the only path to
success, just saying that if SNI encryption were already widespread,
even an obvious tag like 0xffce would not be a useful distinguisher. And
though I find it useful to think of these things in terms of the costs
of overblocking, it's not an infallible guide. A large organization like
the GFW is made up of many conflicting motivations, and it is as prone
as any other to making bad decisions and enacting policies that are
evidently against its own interests. For that reason I believe it's
possible to reduce the risk surrounding the deployment of encrypted SNI,
but not eliminate it completely.


From nobody Sun Aug  9 10:14:42 2020
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2020 17:09:49 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2020 23:00:27 +0300
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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I just want to remind you about my FakeSNI draft

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-02

The idea behind it was cheating the solutions less sophisticated than GFW.
Yes, in real life it will require deep cooperation between DNS and hosting
and yes, the resource still can be blocked by IP (with all collateral
damage).

On Sun, Aug 9, 2020 at 8:15 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> I=E2=80=99m pretty sure your reasoning is wrong. In the ideal world, if
> *everybody* enabled ESNI - then *maybe* the GFW would relent.
>
> The way things are - is not smart pretending reality is not what it is.
>
> Using your terminology - better blend with the crowd, because you aren=E2=
=80=99t
> likely to live long enough to see the crowd change to match you.
>
> There are a lot of technical details why the whole crowd won=E2=80=99t ch=
ange
> regardless of your wishes - e.g., who controls TLS implementations in
> various devices - but I won=E2=80=99t go there.
>
> Regards,
> Uri
>
> > On Aug 9, 2020, at 11:36, David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com> wrote:
> >
> > =EF=BB=BFOn Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:16:50AM -0700, Christian Huitema wr=
ote:
> >> Thanks for the report. I think this relates to our ambivalence about t=
he
> >> requirement for ESNI to not "stick out". That requirement is hard to
> >> meet, and designs have drifted towards an acceptation that it is OK to
> >> stick out as long as a sufficiently large share of the traffic does it=
.
> >> If that share is large, goes the reasoning, it would be too costly for
> >> censors to just "drop everything that looks like ESNI". Well, given
> >> actors like the Great Firewall, one wonders.
> >
> > There's nothing wrong with that reasoning, in my opinion. To blend in
> > with a crowd, you can change yourself to match the crowd; or you can
> > change the crowd to match yourself. My feeling is that ESNI is currentl=
y
> > easy to block (or to put it in terms I like, *inexpensive* to block)
> > because very few TLS connections use it--nothing valuable depends on it
> > yet. Whereas if encrypted SNI were somehow deployed suddenly and
> > massively such that it became a normal feature of TLS connections both
> > essential and inessential, it would be more difficult (read: expensive)
> > to block.
> >
> > After all, even the GFW is not all-powerful. Surely it would prefer to
> > abolish TLS altogether, but it's too late for that. At this point,
> > blocking TLS would cost too much--not in terms of implementing firewall
> > rules, but in how much essential communication it would damage. Put
> > another way, the GFW itself, and the people who operate/manage it, woul=
d
> > feel some of the pain of blocking.
> >
> > I don't mean to imply that coordinated deployment is the only path to
> > success, just saying that if SNI encryption were already widespread,
> > even an obvious tag like 0xffce would not be a useful distinguisher. An=
d
> > though I find it useful to think of these things in terms of the costs
> > of overblocking, it's not an infallible guide. A large organization lik=
e
> > the GFW is made up of many conflicting motivations, and it is as prone
> > as any other to making bad decisions and enacting policies that are
> > evidently against its own interests. For that reason I believe it's
> > possible to reduce the risk surrounding the deployment of encrypted SNI=
,
> > but not eliminate it completely.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


--=20
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--000000000000b77f2705ac774acc
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I just want to remind you about my FakeSNI draft<div><br><=
/div><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-0=
2">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-02</a><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>The idea behind=C2=A0it was cheating the solutions less so=
phisticated=C2=A0than GFW.=C2=A0</div><div>Yes, in real life it will requir=
e deep cooperation between DNS and hosting and yes, the resource still can =
be blocked by IP (with all collateral damage).</div></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Aug 9, 2020 at =
8:15 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu=
">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">I=E2=80=99m pretty sure your reasoning is wrong. In the ide=
al world, if *everybody* enabled ESNI - then *maybe* the GFW would relent. =
<br>
<br>
The way things are - is not smart pretending reality is not what it is. <br=
>
<br>
Using your terminology - better blend with the crowd, because you aren=E2=
=80=99t likely to live long enough to see the crowd change to match you. <b=
r>
<br>
There are a lot of technical details why the whole crowd won=E2=80=99t chan=
ge regardless of your wishes - e.g., who controls TLS implementations in va=
rious devices - but I won=E2=80=99t go there. <br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Uri<br>
<br>
&gt; On Aug 9, 2020, at 11:36, David Fifield &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david@ba=
msoftware.com" target=3D"_blank">david@bamsoftware.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; =EF=BB=BFOn Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:16:50AM -0700, Christian Huitema w=
rote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Thanks for the report. I think this relates to our ambivalence abo=
ut the<br>
&gt;&gt; requirement for ESNI to not &quot;stick out&quot;. That requiremen=
t is hard to<br>
&gt;&gt; meet, and designs have drifted towards an acceptation that it is O=
K to<br>
&gt;&gt; stick out as long as a sufficiently large share of the traffic doe=
s it.<br>
&gt;&gt; If that share is large, goes the reasoning, it would be too costly=
 for<br>
&gt;&gt; censors to just &quot;drop everything that looks like ESNI&quot;. =
Well, given<br>
&gt;&gt; actors like the Great Firewall, one wonders.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; There&#39;s nothing wrong with that reasoning, in my opinion. To blend=
 in<br>
&gt; with a crowd, you can change yourself to match the crowd; or you can<b=
r>
&gt; change the crowd to match yourself. My feeling is that ESNI is current=
ly<br>
&gt; easy to block (or to put it in terms I like, *inexpensive* to block)<b=
r>
&gt; because very few TLS connections use it--nothing valuable depends on i=
t<br>
&gt; yet. Whereas if encrypted SNI were somehow deployed suddenly and<br>
&gt; massively such that it became a normal feature of TLS connections both=
<br>
&gt; essential and inessential, it would be more difficult (read: expensive=
)<br>
&gt; to block.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; After all, even the GFW is not all-powerful. Surely it would prefer to=
<br>
&gt; abolish TLS altogether, but it&#39;s too late for that. At this point,=
<br>
&gt; blocking TLS would cost too much--not in terms of implementing firewal=
l<br>
&gt; rules, but in how much essential communication it would damage. Put<br=
>
&gt; another way, the GFW itself, and the people who operate/manage it, wou=
ld<br>
&gt; feel some of the pain of blocking.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don&#39;t mean to imply that coordinated deployment is the only path=
 to<br>
&gt; success, just saying that if SNI encryption were already widespread,<b=
r>
&gt; even an obvious tag like 0xffce would not be a useful distinguisher. A=
nd<br>
&gt; though I find it useful to think of these things in terms of the costs=
<br>
&gt; of overblocking, it&#39;s not an infallible guide. A large organizatio=
n like<br>
&gt; the GFW is made up of many conflicting motivations, and it is as prone=
<br>
&gt; as any other to making bad decisions and enacting policies that are<br=
>
&gt; evidently against its own interests. For that reason I believe it&#39;=
s<br>
&gt; possible to reduce the risk surrounding the deployment of encrypted SN=
I,<br>
&gt; but not eliminate it completely.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature">SY, Dmitry Belyavsky</div>

--000000000000b77f2705ac774acc--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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>From the writeups I've seen, what they're blocking is TLS 1.3, not ESNI.=0A=
Since ESNI can be de-anonymised with a high degree of success (see various=
=0Aconference papers on this) and in any case doesn't matter for the most=
=0Afrequently-blocked sites like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc, it may =
not=0Aeven be on the GFW's radar.  My guess is that the GFW doesn't have a =
fast-path=0Amechanism for TLS 1.3 so as 1.3 use grows it's being overwhelme=
d, therefore=0Athey're blocking it until they can upgrade their hardware.  =
The fact that ESNI=0Ais also affected is just a coincidence of the blocking=
 of 1.3.=0A=0APeter.=0A


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On 8/9/2020 8:31 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> >From the writeups I've seen, what they're blocking is TLS 1.3, not ESNI.
> Since ESNI can be de-anonymised with a high degree of success (see various
> conference papers on this) and in any case doesn't matter for the most
> frequently-blocked sites like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc, it may not
> even be on the GFW's radar.  My guess is that the GFW doesn't have a fast-path
> mechanism for TLS 1.3 so as 1.3 use grows it's being overwhelmed, therefore
> they're blocking it until they can upgrade their hardware.  The fact that ESNI
> is also affected is just a coincidence of the blocking of 1.3.

Please check David Fitfield's message above in the thread. The research
that he quoted is quite specific, "The ESNI detector only matches the
ESNI encrypted_server_name extension 0xffce (draft-ietf-tls-esni-00
through -06), not the ECH extensions encrypted_client_hello 0xff02,
ech_nonce 0xff03, outer_extension 0xff04 (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07)."

-- Christian Huitema


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Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 07:45:25 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Sun, Aug 9, 2020, at 8:31 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> >From the writeups I've seen, what they're blocking is TLS 1.3, not ESNI.
> Since ESNI can be de-anonymised with a high degree of success (see various
> conference papers on this) 

For the benefit of the list, would you mind sharing these references?

Thanks,
Chris

> and in any case doesn't matter for the most
> frequently-blocked sites like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc, it may not
> even be on the GFW's radar.  My guess is that the GFW doesn't have a fast-path
> mechanism for TLS 1.3 so as 1.3 use grows it's being overwhelmed, therefore
> they're blocking it until they can upgrade their hardware.  The fact that ESNI
> is also affected is just a coincidence of the blocking of 1.3.
> 
> Peter.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 10:19:32 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Sun, Aug 09, 2020 at 11:15:25PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> 
> On 8/9/2020 8:31 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > >From the writeups I've seen, what they're blocking is TLS 1.3, not ESNI.
> 
> Please check David Fitfield's message above in the thread. The research
> that he quoted is quite specific, "The ESNI detector only matches the
> ESNI encrypted_server_name extension 0xffce (draft-ietf-tls-esni-00
> through -06), not the ECH extensions encrypted_client_hello 0xff02,
> ech_nonce 0xff03, outer_extension 0xff04 (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07)."

That's right. The block is specifically against ESNI, not all TLS 1.3.
There is still a minor open question on the issue of ECH extensions
specifically (0xff02, 0xff03, 0xff04). When we tested ECH, we did not
try syntactically well-formed extension values, which proved to be
necessary in the case of ESNI, since the GFW's detector has at least a
rudimentary TLS parser. This leaves open the possibility that a
ClientHello with well-formed ECH extensions would also trigger a block:
https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/43#issuecomment-670794117

TLS 1.3 without SNI, ESNI, ECH	not blocked
TLS 1.3 with SNI only		not blocked
TLS 1.3 with ESNI only		blocked
TLS 1.3 with ECH only		still uncertain

The vast majority, I'm sure, of today's TLS 1.3 connections are
unaffected by the GFW's new block, because they do not use ESNI.
(Personally, I argue that it is *because* ESNI is not yet widely used
that it can be effectively blocked now.)

The bidirectional nature of the GFW makes it easy to test blocking
hypotheses, following the instructions at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Dae-cukKMqfzmTT4Ksh1Bzlx7ws/.
One can try the 64-byte payload given there, or modify it to remove the
0xffce marker. To capture your own genuine ESNI ClientHello, use
Firefox 68 or later and change these settings in about:config:
	network.security.esni.enabled=true
	network.trr.mode=3
	network.trr.uri=https://mozilla.cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query
	network.trr.bootstrapAddress=104.16.249.249
Then visit an ESNI-capable web site. A convenient choice is
https://www.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/trace because it has a
"sni=encrypted" or "sni=plaintext" diagnostic.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Jen Linkova <furry13@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 12:01:48 +1000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kGZQmzGmNy8hg0OOc2Y-v2wHAP8>
Subject: [TLS] Conclusion of the Adoption Call for draft-wang-opsec-tls-proxy-bp
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The call for adoption for draft-wang-opsec-tls-proxy-bp has ended.

The chairs believe that there is insufficient support and no consensus
to adopt this document as a OpSec WG document.

During the adoption call there were a number of comments on the
document scope and technical details the document describes.

Overall, we think these issues need to be addressed before the working
group can consider adopting this document.

Thanks to everyone who has reviewed the document and provided the feedback.

-- 
SY, Jen Linkova aka Furry


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> writes:=0A=0A>For the benefit of the=
 list, would you mind sharing these references?=0A=0AI handwaved this one b=
ecause I don't catalogue these things and didn't want to=0Atry and re-locat=
e every preprint, paper, and report that's drifted across my=0Adesk in the =
last 6-12 months to try and find the relevant stuff... a recent=0Aone that =
I remember because it was published just a few days ago at Usenix=0ASecurit=
y after existing as an arXiv preprint for over a year, that's not ESNI=0Abu=
t eDNS so almost the same thing, was "Padding Ain't Enough: Assessing the=
=0APrivacy Guarantees of Encrypted DNS" which reports, and references other=
=0Apapers which report, an 80-90% success rate in de-anonymising encrypted =
DNS.=0AThe ESNI de-anonymisation is the standard web-site fingerprinting th=
at's been=0Aused in the past to e.g. find people's incomes based on their e=
ncrypted=0Atraffic to tax filing sites.  In other words it doesn't care whe=
ther ESNI is=0Aused or not since it doesn't use it.=0A=0APeter.=0A


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On 8/10/2020 9:26 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> writes:
>
>> For the benefit of the list, would you mind sharing these references?
> I handwaved this one because I don't catalogue these things and didn't want to
> try and re-locate every preprint, paper, and report that's drifted across my
> desk in the last 6-12 months to try and find the relevant stuff... a recent
> one that I remember because it was published just a few days ago at Usenix
> Security after existing as an arXiv preprint for over a year, that's not ESNI
> but eDNS so almost the same thing, was "Padding Ain't Enough: Assessing the
> Privacy Guarantees of Encrypted DNS" which reports, and references other
> papers which report, an 80-90% success rate in de-anonymising encrypted DNS.
> The ESNI de-anonymisation is the standard web-site fingerprinting that's been
> used in the past to e.g. find people's incomes based on their encrypted
> traffic to tax filing sites.  In other words it doesn't care whether ESNI is
> used or not since it doesn't use it.

Fingerprinting is a real issue but from the reports, this is not what is
happening here. The researcher's experiments isolate a simple pattern
matching technique applied to the first client flight.

-- Christian Huitema


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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  <body>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/10/2020 9:26 PM, Peter Gutmann
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1597119980162.55300@cs.auckland.ac.nz">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Christopher Wood <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:caw@heapingbits.net" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;caw@heapingbits.net&gt;</a> writes:

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite" style="color: #000000;">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">For the benefit of the list, would you mind sharing these references?
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">I handwaved this one because I don't catalogue these things and didn't want to
try and re-locate every preprint, paper, and report that's drifted across my
desk in the last 6-12 months to try and find the relevant stuff... a recent
one that I remember because it was published just a few days ago at Usenix
Security after existing as an arXiv preprint for over a year, that's not ESNI
but eDNS so almost the same thing, was "Padding Ain't Enough: Assessing the
Privacy Guarantees of Encrypted DNS" which reports, and references other
papers which report, an 80-90% success rate in de-anonymising encrypted DNS.
The ESNI de-anonymisation is the standard web-site fingerprinting that's been
used in the past to e.g. find people's incomes based on their encrypted
traffic to tax filing sites.  In other words it doesn't care whether ESNI is
used or not since it doesn't use it.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p>Fingerprinting is a real issue but from the reports, this is not
      what is happening here. The researcher's experiments isolate a
      simple pattern matching technique applied to the first client
      flight.</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

--------------33926FB7F81E9219F91C9CC7--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> writes:=0A=0A>Fingerprinting is a r=
eal issue but from the reports, this is not what is=0A>happening here.=0A=
=0ASure, I was just pointing out that they're using the brute-force approac=
h now=0Abut presumably at some point will stop blocking when they've implem=
ented a way=0Ato bypass it.  My guess is that since the GFW uses blocklisti=
ng (of known=0Asites/pages) all they'll need to do is fingerprint the sites=
 they want to=0Ablock and take it from there.  Stuff like the ConceptDopple=
r work=0A("ConceptDoppler: A Weather Tracker for Internet Censorship" out o=
f UC Davis -=0Athat was one paper I do remember :-) showed that they don't =
try and block=0Aeverything but just enough to let you know it's happening a=
nd they're watching=0Ayou, which the fingerprinting approach is fine for.=
=0A=0APeter.=0A=0A=0A


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On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:33 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> writes:
>
> >Fingerprinting is a real issue but from the reports, this is not what is
> >happening here.
>
> Sure, I was just pointing out that they're using the brute-force approach
> now
> but presumably at some point will stop blocking when they've implemented a
> way
> to bypass it.  My guess is that since the GFW uses blocklisting (of known
> sites/pages) all they'll need to do is fingerprint the sites they want to
> block and take it from there.
>

Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH design, if
the client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?

Another technique to use here: deploy servers that refuse unencrypted
ClientHello messages.

thanks,
Rob

--000000000000c0810805ac938788
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:33 PM Peter Gu=
tmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.=
ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Christian Huitema &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hu=
itema@huitema.net" target=3D"_blank">huitema@huitema.net</a>&gt; writes:<br=
>
<br>
&gt;Fingerprinting is a real issue but from the reports, this is not what i=
s<br>
&gt;happening here.<br>
<br>
Sure, I was just pointing out that they&#39;re using the brute-force approa=
ch now<br>
but presumably at some point will stop blocking when they&#39;ve implemente=
d a way<br>
to bypass it.=C2=A0 My guess is that since the GFW uses blocklisting (of kn=
own<br>
sites/pages) all they&#39;ll need to do is fingerprint the sites they want =
to<br>
block and take it from there.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Do you th=
ink this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH design, if the client =
can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?</div><div><br></div><di=
v>Another technique to use here: deploy servers that refuse unencrypted Cli=
entHello messages.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div=
><br></div></div></div>

--000000000000c0810805ac938788--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
CC: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> writes:=0A=0A>Do you think this fingerprinting=
 will work with the newer ECH design, if the=0A>client can add arbitrary co=
ntent to the encrypted payload?=0A=0AECH doesn't have any effect on web sit=
e fingerprinting so unless I've=0Amisunderstood your question the answer wo=
uld be "N/A".=0A=0APeter.


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH design, if
> the
> >client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?
>
> ECH doesn't have any effect on web site fingerprinting so unless I've
> misunderstood your question the answer would be "N/A".
>

Assuming the definition here:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00

it does seem like ECH would make this more difficult, at least for pages in
a large anonymity set. (agree that it won't matter much for Twitter,
Google, et al)

thanks,
Rob

--000000000000f29c9305ac93faf8
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gu=
tmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.=
ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Rob Sayre &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sayrer@gma=
il.com" target=3D"_blank">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH design, i=
f the<br>
&gt;client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?<br>
<br>
ECH doesn&#39;t have any effect on web site fingerprinting so unless I&#39;=
ve<br>
misunderstood your question the answer would be &quot;N/A&quot;.<br></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>Assuming the definition here:</div><div><a href=
=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00"=
>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00</a>=
</div><div><br></div><div>it does seem like ECH would make this more diffic=
ult, at least for pages in a large anonymity set. (agree that it won&#39;t =
matter much for Twitter, Google, et al)</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</d=
iv><div>Rob</div></div></div>

--000000000000f29c9305ac93faf8--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On 8/10/2020 11:14 PM, Rob Sayre wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gutmann
> <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
>
>     Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com <mailto:sayrer@gmail.com>> writes:
>
>     >Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH
>     design, if the
>     >client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?
>
>     ECH doesn't have any effect on web site fingerprinting so unless I've
>     misunderstood your question the answer would be "N/A".
>
>
> Assuming the definition here:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00
>
> it does seem like ECH would make this more difficult, at least for
> pages in a large anonymity set. (agree that it won't matter much for
> Twitter, Google, et al)


Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in the past,
as in "make me look like Skype" or "make me look like wikipedia". The
idea is to build a target model, then inject enough noise and padding in
your traffic to match the target model. But that way easier to say than
to do!

-- Christian Huitema


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<html>
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  <body>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/10/2020 11:14 PM, Rob Sayre wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAChr6SxLAJyweEDHL48-hT3X=d5E6jNrWZheOt+fSydpS=HhQw@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr">On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gutmann &lt;<a
          href="mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" moz-do-not-send="true">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Rob
          Sayre &lt;<a href="mailto:sayrer@gmail.com" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
          <br>
          &gt;Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer
          ECH design, if the<br>
          &gt;client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?<br>
          <br>
          ECH doesn't have any effect on web site fingerprinting so
          unless I've<br>
          misunderstood your question the answer would be "N/A".<br>
        </blockquote>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Assuming the definition here:</div>
        <div><a
href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00"
            moz-do-not-send="true">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00</a></div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>it does seem like ECH would make this more difficult, at
          least for pages in a large anonymity set. (agree that it won't
          matter much for Twitter, Google, et al)</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in the
      past, as in "make me look like Skype" or "make me look like
      wikipedia". The idea is to build a target model, then inject
      enough noise and padding in your traffic to match the target
      model. But that way easier to say than to do!</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 00:06:54 -0700
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 11:49 PM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
wrote:

> Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in the past, as
> in "make me look like Skype" or "make me look like wikipedia". The idea is
> to build a target model, then inject enough noise and padding in your
> traffic to match the target model. But that way easier to say than to do!
>
Some of the techniques do attempt something like that. For example:

"Wright et al. [wright2009traffic] developed traffic morphing, which pads
packets in such a way so as to make the sequence from one page have
characteristics of another (non-monitored or benign) page. This technique
requires application-specific knowledge about benign pages and is therefore
best implemented outside of the transport layer."

What I couldn't figure out is how much the cited training mechanisms rely
on the ClientHello message. I haven't found a source that mentioned this
outside of "packet size and timing", but I haven't read them all.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 11:49 PM Christia=
n Huitema &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:huitema@huitema.net">huitema@huitema.net</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>
    <p>Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in the
      past, as in &quot;make me look like Skype&quot; or &quot;make me look=
 like
      wikipedia&quot;. The idea is to build a target model, then inject
      enough noise and padding in your traffic to match the target
      model. But that way easier to say than to do!</p></div></blockquote><=
div>Some of the techniques do attempt something like that. For example:</di=
v><div><br></div><div>&quot;Wright et al. [wright2009traffic] developed tra=
ffic morphing, which pads packets in such a way so as to make the sequence =
from one page have characteristics of another (non-monitored or benign) pag=
e. This technique requires application-specific knowledge about benign page=
s and is therefore best implemented outside of the transport layer.&quot;</=
div><div><br></div><div>What I couldn&#39;t figure out is how much the cite=
d training mechanisms rely on the ClientHello message. I haven&#39;t found =
a source that mentioned this outside of &quot;packet size and timing&quot;,=
 but I haven&#39;t read them all.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><di=
v>Rob</div><div><br></div></div></div>

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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On 8/10/2020 11:49 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:

> On 8/10/2020 11:14 PM, Rob Sayre wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gutmann
>> <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
>>
>>     Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com <mailto:sayrer@gmail.com>> writes:
>>
>>     >Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the newer ECH
>>     design, if the
>>     >client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted payload?
>>
>>     ECH doesn't have any effect on web site fingerprinting so unless I=
've
>>     misunderstood your question the answer would be "N/A".
>>
>>
>> Assuming the definition here:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00=

>>
>> it does seem like ECH would make this more difficult, at least for
>> pages in a large anonymity set. (agree that it won't matter much for
>> Twitter, Google, et al)
>
>
> Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in the
> past, as in "make me look like Skype" or "make me look like
> wikipedia". The idea is to build a target model, then inject enough
> noise and padding in your traffic to match the target model. But that
> way easier to say than to do!
>

There is also the question of what the anonymity set is. I just did a
little experiment of resolving 25000 domain names and looking at how
many resolved to the same IP address
(https://huitema.wordpress.com/2020/08/09/can-internet-services-hide-in-c=
rowds/).
And then I redid the stats with 50000 domain names. Did not find a lot
of crowds. 75% of domain names in my sample resolve to their very own
address, not shared with anybody. Only 8% resolved by addresses shared
by 10 sites or more, and 1.3% resolved to addresses shared by 100 sites
or more.=C2=A0 Of course, 1% of the Internet is already something big. Bu=
t
still, not quite the whole world...

-- Christian Huitema


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<html>
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  <body>
    <p>On 8/10/2020 11:49 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:<br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:c7e033d9-aa39-1293-2233-4ebb8d1502dc@huitema.net">
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/10/2020 11:14 PM, Rob Sayre
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAChr6SxLAJyweEDHL48-hT3X=d5E6jNrWZheOt+fSydpS=HhQw@mail.gmail.com">
        <div dir="ltr">On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:58 PM Peter Gutmann
          &lt;<a href="mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz"
            moz-do-not-send="true">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <div class="gmail_quote">
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
            0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
            rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Rob Sayre &lt;<a
              href="mailto:sayrer@gmail.com" target="_blank"
              moz-do-not-send="true">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
            <br>
            &gt;Do you think this fingerprinting will work with the
            newer ECH design, if the<br>
            &gt;client can add arbitrary content to the encrypted
            payload?<br>
            <br>
            ECH doesn't have any effect on web site fingerprinting so
            unless I've<br>
            misunderstood your question the answer would be "N/A".<br>
          </blockquote>
          <div><br>
          </div>
          <div>Assuming the definition here:</div>
          <div><a
href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00"
              moz-do-not-send="true">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00</a></div>
          <div><br>
          </div>
          <div>it does seem like ECH would make this more difficult, at
            least for pages in a large anonymity set. (agree that it
            won't matter much for Twitter, Google, et al)</div>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <p><br>
      </p>
      <p>Defeating fingerprinting is really hard. It has been tried in
        the past, as in "make me look like Skype" or "make me look like
        wikipedia". The idea is to build a target model, then inject
        enough noise and padding in your traffic to match the target
        model. But that way easier to say than to do!</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>There is also the question of what the anonymity set is. I just
      did a little experiment of resolving 25000 domain names and
      looking at how many resolved to the same IP address
(<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://huitema.wordpress.com/2020/08/09/can-internet-services-hide-in-crowds/">https://huitema.wordpress.com/2020/08/09/can-internet-services-hide-in-crowds/</a>).
      And then I redid the stats with 50000 domain names. Did not find a
      lot of crowds. 75% of domain names in my sample resolve to their
      very own address, not shared with anybody. Only 8% resolved by
      addresses shared by 10 sites or more, and 1.3% resolved to
      addresses shared by 100 sites or more.  Of course, 1% of the
      Internet is already something big. But still, not quite the whole
      world...</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
CC: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> writes:=0A=20=0A>Defeating fingerpr=
inting is really hard. It has been tried in the past, as in=0A>"make me loo=
k like Skype" or "make me look like wikipedia". The idea is to=0A>build a t=
arget model, then inject enough noise and padding in your traffic to=0A>mat=
ch the target model. But that way easier to say than to do!=0A=0AAs Yuri To=
trov, a.k.a the shadow director of personnel at the CIA, showed:=0A=0Ahttps=
://mindmatters.ai/2018/11/how-the-kgb-found-cia-agents/=0A=0Athe only way t=
o hide A as B is if you become B.=A0 Which means you can't be A=0Aany more.=
=A0 There was a paper that looked a traffic morphing published a year=0Aor =
two ago that came to the same conclusion, to look like you're Skype or a=0A=
SIP VoIP call you need to actually be Skype or a SIP VoIP call.=0A=0APeter.=
=0A


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 01:38:50 -0700
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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--000000000000c1921605ac9600ca
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:14 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

>
> As Yuri Totrov, a.k.a the shadow director of personnel at the CIA, showed:
>
> https://mindmatters.ai/2018/11/how-the-kgb-found-cia-agents/
>
> the only way to hide A as B is if you become B.  Which means you can't be A
> any more.


I'm confused. That seems to be a bunch of boilerplate surrounding a Salon
article from 2015:

https://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifying_cia_agents_in_the_field/

It also contains references to supplementary material, like whether
Intelligent Design can be linked to information theory:

https://mindmatters.ai/2018/10/does-information-theory-support-design-in-nature/

I am not sure this issue is on topic for this list.


> There was a paper that looked a traffic morphing published a year
> or two ago that came to the same conclusion, to look like you're Skype or a
> SIP VoIP call you need to actually be Skype or a SIP VoIP call.
>

You could link it, perhaps.

thanks,
Rob

--000000000000c1921605ac9600ca
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:14 AM Peter Gu=
tmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.=
ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
As Yuri Totrov, a.k.a the shadow director of personnel at the CIA, showed:<=
br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://mindmatters.ai/2018/11/how-the-kgb-found-cia-agents/" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mindmatters.ai/2018/11/how-the-k=
gb-found-cia-agents/</a><br>
<br>
the only way to hide A as B is if you become B.=C2=A0 Which means you can&#=
39;t be A<br>
any more.=C2=A0 </blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m confused. That see=
ms to be a bunch of boilerplate surrounding a Salon article from 2015:</div=
><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_exp=
lain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifying_cia_agents_in_the_field/">https:/=
/www.salon.com/2015/09/26/how_to_explain_the_kgbs_amazing_success_identifyi=
ng_cia_agents_in_the_field/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>It also contai=
ns references to supplementary material, like whether Intelligent Design ca=
n be linked to information theory:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http=
s://mindmatters.ai/2018/10/does-information-theory-support-design-in-nature=
/">https://mindmatters.ai/2018/10/does-information-theory-support-design-in=
-nature/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>I am not sure this issue is on to=
pic for this list.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">There was a paper that looked a traffic morphing published =
a year<br>
or two ago that came to the same conclusion, to look like you&#39;re Skype =
or a<br>
SIP VoIP call you need to actually be Skype or a SIP VoIP call.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>You could link it, perhaps.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>thanks,</div><div>Rob=C2=A0</div></div></div>

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Hey,

I would like to request a label for OpenVPN to use with the RFC5705
Keying Material Exporters to generate keying material for its data
channel encryption.

I hope this the right place to discuss this topic.

The requirements of requesting a label seem to be to have specification
for the protocol. Unfortunately the OpenVPN protocol does not have a
full written specification. We have some documentation for the key
exchange process
(https://github.com/schwabe/openvpn/blob/tls_key_export/doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h)
and some other parts documented as well but no full specification of the
protocol.

Nevertheless, I would like to be able to use RFC 5705 API as this seems
a much cleaner approach compared to OpenVPN's custom TLS 1.0 inspired
PRF function and I am wondering what the best approach here to choose a
label is.

In my current implementation I used EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys as label
as the currently defined seems to follow no particular pattern, so I was
not sure what a "good" label would be.



https://github.com/schwabe/openvpn/commits/tls_key_export

Arne


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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Document Update
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--00000000000053d94105ac9c5062
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi folks,

I've just posted draft-rescorla-tls-rfc8446-bis-00.

This document does two things:

1. It rolls up all the various errata that have been filed for
   RFC 8446. Some of these have created some reader confusion
   and so hopefully this will help.

2. It renames the "master" secrets to "main" secrets in service
   of more inclusive language [0]


My intention here is not to make technical changes but just to produce
a document that's easier to work with.  If there are other pieces of
text that you think need to be fixed, now would be a good time to flag
them.  I am working on this document at
https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec

Thanks to David Benjamin for suggesting this and talking over the
mechanics.

-Ekr

[0] Note that I was not totally unable to remove "master" because the
key schedule labels include it. However, I have removed it from the
text and I think we should probably change the labels to hex to
obscure it.

--00000000000053d94105ac9c5062
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<br><br>I&#39;ve just posted draft-rescorla-tls-r=
fc8446-bis-00.<br><br>This document does two things:<br><br>1. It rolls up =
all the various errata that have been filed for<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC 8446. S=
ome of these have created some reader confusion<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0and so hope=
fully this will help.<br><br>2. It renames the &quot;master&quot; secrets t=
o &quot;main&quot; secrets in service<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0of more inclusive lan=
guage [0]<br><br><br>My intention here is not to make technical changes but=
 just to produce<br>a document that&#39;s easier to work with.=C2=A0 If the=
re are other pieces of<br>text that you think need to be fixed, now would b=
e a good time to flag<br>them.=C2=A0 I am working on this document at<br><a=
 href=3D"https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec">https://github.com/ekr/tls13-sp=
ec</a><br><br>Thanks to David Benjamin for suggesting this and talking over=
 the<br>mechanics.<br><br>-Ekr<br><br>[0] Note that I was not totally unabl=
e to remove &quot;master&quot; because the<br>key schedule labels include i=
t. However, I have removed it from the<br>text and I think we should probab=
ly change the labels to hex to<br>obscure it.<br><br><br><br><br></div>

--00000000000053d94105ac9c5062--


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Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 10:06:01 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
To: tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com>
Cc: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>, TLS Chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:30:39AM +0000, tom petch wrote:
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> Sent: 04 August 2020 19:16
> 
> The official minutes are now up:
> 
>    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_minutes-2D108-2Dtls_&d=DwICAg&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=bJwecPEDnXCm7Huw2ovjHwHyzCjhyu2kGMG-qijduH0&s=ksaUzUpfyd4LFplcfnjfXdGBN-jTrMiqS2Z1vk_Iftw&e= 
> 
> <tp>
> What is Benjamin talking about at the end?
> 
> It looks as if you are proposing action on all or some RFC that have TLS 1.0 or 1.1 as MTI, related to oldversions-deprecate but that is a guess from reading between the lines and that topic is a live one for me so I would appreciate clarity.

oldversions-deprecate is already taking action on all RFCs that have TLS 1.0 or
1.1 as MTI (there are some 80-odd documents in the Updates: header).  The
particular itesm I was mentioning in the meeting relate to various subsets of
those documents that may need some additional handling on top of the basic
"don't use TLS 1.0/1.1; use 1.2 and 1.3 instead" that is currently the content
of the updates.  Details are at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K9_uA6m0dD_oQCw-5kAbha-Kq5M/
So:

- RFC 5469 defines DES and IDEA ciphers that are not in TLS 1.2; the
  document as a whole should be historic

- The downgrade-detection SCSV of RFC 7507 is probably in a similar boat

- We should be more clear about "if the document being updated says you
  MUST use TLS 1.0/1.1, that part is removed"

- No change proposed w.r.t. MTI ciphers (even though the old MTI ciphers
  are no longer considered very good)

Were there additional specific items you were unsure about?

-Ben


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To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 20:10:19 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/erqlhtDSC-t7KnKoICsswZbVll8>
Subject: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
 (#258)
References: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com>

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I count 32 messages like this, relating to the ESNI draft,
as github discussion, in the last 24 hours.

Some of those do not need to be reflected to the TLS WG
list, but I suspect others do, and before discussion
resolves into an unchangeable outcome on github.

Note: when I say "suspect" I don't mean anyone's being
tricky, I just don't keep open browser tabs for all this
stuff because I prefer to handle substantive discussion
via email on the list.

Are the chairs actively checking that issue-discussion on
github is being properly brought to the mailing list as and
when needed?

Am I alone in being concerned that the efficiency of github
for some is leading to others with different workflows
being left out of discussion?

Ta,
S.


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
(#258)
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 06:54:08 -0700
From: Christopher Wood <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
<reply+ABJ5QF3JX35U33SRZMT3VNV5H2CABEVBNHHCQWFCDU@reply.github.com>
To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni <draft-ietf-tls-esni@noreply.github.com>
CC: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>

Thanks, @bemasc, for raising this! You can view, comment on, or merge
this pull request online at:

  https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258

-- Commit Summary --

  * Fix superfluous padding edge cases.

-- File Changes --

    M draft-ietf-tls-esni.md (6)

-- Patch Links --

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.patch
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.diff

--=20
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 12:33:09 -0700
Message-ID: <CAG2Zi20bzOxa8T6uYo+rSn+pJAscwW1=w0fO29-JFHjust4S0A@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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HI all,

    Am I alone in being concerned that the efficiency of github
>     for some is leading to others with different workflows
>     being left out of discussion?
>

This is probably my fault, I apologize. I've been working with Chris Wood
on editorial changes to the draft. These are intended to be purely
presentational-- I figured it was OK to proceed off-list, since we haven't
changed the spec at all. Does anyone object to us proceeding?

Thanks,
Chris Patton

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>HI all,</div><div><br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Am I alon=
e in being concerned that the efficiency of github<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 for some is leading to others with different workflows<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 being left out of discussion?<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</di=
v><div>This is probably my fault, I apologize. I&#39;ve been working with C=
hris Wood on editorial changes to the draft. These are intended to be purel=
y presentational-- I figured it was OK to proceed off-list, since we haven&=
#39;t changed the spec at all. Does anyone object to us proceeding?</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Chris Patton<br></div></div></div>

--000000000000c6b7c105ac9f249e--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 12:37:33 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:10 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> I count 32 messages like this, relating to the ESNI draft,
> as github discussion, in the last 24 hours.
>
> Some of those do not need to be reflected to the TLS WG
> list, but I suspect others do, and before discussion
> resolves into an unchangeable outcome on github.
>
> Note: when I say "suspect" I don't mean anyone's being
> tricky, I just don't keep open browser tabs for all this
> stuff because I prefer to handle substantive discussion
> via email on the list.
>

I note that draft-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on the
issues, with confirmation on-list:


https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-git-using-github-06#section-5.3

We have found this to be quite efficient in QUIC. While the conventions in
TLS predate the approval of this document, I think this would be good to
adopt here

As far as browser tabs, GitHub allows you to watch the repository and be
notified by email of any discussion. You can also reply by email

-Ekr


> Are the chairs actively checking that issue-discussion on
> github is being properly brought to the mailing list as and
> when needed?
>
> Am I alone in being concerned that the efficiency of github
> for some is leading to others with different workflows
> being left out of discussion?
>
> Ta,
> S.
>
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
> (#258)
> Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 06:54:08 -0700
> From: Christopher Wood <notifications@github.com>
> Reply-To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
> <reply+ABJ5QF3JX35U33SRZMT3VNV5H2CABEVBNHHCQWFCDU@reply.github.com>
> To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni <draft-ietf-tls-esni@noreply.github.com>
> CC: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
>
> Thanks, @bemasc, for raising this! You can view, comment on, or merge
> this pull request online at:
>
>   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258
>
> -- Commit Summary --
>
>   * Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
>
> -- File Changes --
>
>     M draft-ietf-tls-esni.md (6)
>
> -- Patch Links --
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.patch
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.diff
>
> --
> You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
> Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:10 PM Step=
hen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_bla=
nk">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
I count 32 messages like this, relating to the ESNI draft,<br>
as github discussion, in the last 24 hours.<br>
<br>
Some of those do not need to be reflected to the TLS WG<br>
list, but I suspect others do, and before discussion<br>
resolves into an unchangeable outcome on github.<br>
<br>
Note: when I say &quot;suspect&quot; I don&#39;t mean anyone&#39;s being<br=
>
tricky, I just don&#39;t keep open browser tabs for all this<br>
stuff because I prefer to handle substantive discussion<br>
via email on the list.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I note that draf=
t-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on the issues, with confirm=
ation on-list:</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://dat=
atracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-git-using-github-06#section-5.3" targ=
et=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-git-using-gi=
thub-06#section-5.3</a></div><div><br></div><div>We have found this to be q=
uite efficient in QUIC. While the conventions in TLS predate the approval o=
f this document, I think this would be good to adopt here</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>As far as browser tabs, GitHub allows you to watch the repository a=
nd be notified by email of any discussion. You can also reply by email<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Are the chairs actively checking that issue-discussion on<br>
github is being properly brought to the mailing list as and<br>
when needed?<br>
<br>
Am I alone in being concerned that the efficiency of github<br>
for some is leading to others with different workflows<br>
being left out of discussion?<br>
<br>
Ta,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
<br>
-------- Forwarded Message --------<br>
Subject: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases.<br=
>
(#258)<br>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 06:54:08 -0700<br>
From: Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:notifications@github.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">notifications@github.com</a>&gt;<br>
Reply-To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:reply%2BABJ5QF3JX35U33SRZMT3VNV5H2CABEVBNHHCQWFCDU@re=
ply.github.com" target=3D"_blank">reply+ABJ5QF3JX35U33SRZMT3VNV5H2CABEVBNHH=
CQWFCDU@reply.github.com</a>&gt;<br>
To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-tls-esni@nor=
eply.github.com" target=3D"_blank">draft-ietf-tls-esni@noreply.github.com</=
a>&gt;<br>
CC: Subscribed &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:subscribed@noreply.github.com" target=
=3D"_blank">subscribed@noreply.github.com</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
Thanks, @bemasc, for raising this! You can view, comment on, or merge<br>
this pull request online at:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-=
esni/pull/258</a><br>
<br>
-- Commit Summary --<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 * Fix superfluous padding edge cases.<br>
<br>
-- File Changes --<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 M draft-ietf-tls-esni.md (6)<br>
<br>
-- Patch Links --<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.patch" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-e=
sni/pull/258.patch</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.diff" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-e=
sni/pull/258.diff</a><br>
<br>
-- <br>
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.<br>
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pu=
ll/258</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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References: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com> <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 13:00:09 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/c9Um48rMnb0Z2XryTuQv7a7e26s>
Subject: Re: [TLS]  =?utf-8?q?Fwd=3A_=5Btlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=5D_Fix_super?= =?utf-8?q?fluous_padding_edge_cases=2E_=28=23258=29?=
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020, at 12:10 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> I count 32 messages like this, relating to the ESNI draft,
> as github discussion, in the last 24 hours.
> 
> Some of those do not need to be reflected to the TLS WG
> list, but I suspect others do, and before discussion
> resolves into an unchangeable outcome on github.
> 
> Note: when I say "suspect" I don't mean anyone's being
> tricky, I just don't keep open browser tabs for all this
> stuff because I prefer to handle substantive discussion
> via email on the list.

For what it's worth, we did plan to email the list for wider discussion before fixing this issue. 

Best,
Chris (no hat)

> Are the chairs actively checking that issue-discussion on
> github is being properly brought to the mailing list as and
> when needed?
> 
> Am I alone in being concerned that the efficiency of github
> for some is leading to others with different workflows
> being left out of discussion?
> 
> Ta,
> S.
> 
> 
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
> (#258)
> Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 06:54:08 -0700
> From: Christopher Wood <notifications@github.com>
> Reply-To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
> <reply+ABJ5QF3JX35U33SRZMT3VNV5H2CABEVBNHHCQWFCDU@reply.github.com>
> To: tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni <draft-ietf-tls-esni@noreply.github.com>
> CC: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
> 
> Thanks, @bemasc, for raising this! You can view, comment on, or merge
> this pull request online at:
> 
>   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258
> 
> -- Commit Summary --
> 
>   * Fix superfluous padding edge cases.
> 
> -- File Changes --
> 
>     M draft-ietf-tls-esni.md (6)
> 
> -- Patch Links --
> 
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.patch
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258.diff
> 
> -- 
> You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
> Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> Attachments:
> * 0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc
> * signature.asc


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References: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com> <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBMOCP4yDTo1HTt3APH0Mv8r3-oBUyLi9ypQY4CkNdYgUw@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding
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Hi,

On 11/08/2020 20:33, Christopher Patton wrote:
> This is probably my fault, I apologize.

No need! It looks like a lot of the editorial/lint
stuff wouldn't need to be brought to the list but
that one looked like it might. And since Chris says
they're gonna mail the list anyway, that'll be fine
then.

The volume is still a bit of a concern though tbh.
Between this and the draft formerly known as httpssvc
there's an awful lot of hopefully non-substantive
changes happening offlist that affect ESNI and more.
I do worry about that "hopefully."

On 11/08/2020 20:37, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I note that draft-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on the
> issues,=20

Well, sure. I know that some people like that, and
it does have benefits. But also downsides that I'm
sure will be discussed when/if that draft goes to
IETF LC.

> with confirmation on-list:
>=20
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-git-using-github-06#se=
ction-5.3
>=20
> We have found this to be quite efficient in QUIC. While the conventions=
 in
> TLS predate the approval of this document, I think this would be good t=
o
> adopt here
>=20
> As far as browser tabs, GitHub allows you to watch the repository and b=
e
> notified by email of any discussion. You can also reply by email

I do. The mails often have URLs and no substantive body
so it's often not possible to actually take part in a
real discussion that way. And the visibility of the
overall context is very different. In the end github
issues and list discussion are just different, both
with pros and cons. And the latter, as of now, is how
we formally do business. But that's for another place
and time - if the chairs are doing the extra work of
ensuring github-based discussions do get confirmed on
the list in a timely fashion then we'll be ok.

Cheers,
S.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Arne Schwabe <arne@openvpn.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 13:44:34 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 1:24 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

> On 11/08/2020 20:37, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I note that draft-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on the
> > issues,
>
> Well, sure. I know that some people like that, and
> it does have benefits. But also downsides that I'm
> sure will be discussed when/if that draft goes to
> IETF LC.
>

Huh? It's been approved by the IESG and is in AUTH48.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-git-using-github/

-Ekr

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 1:24 PM Steph=
en Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">On 11/08/2020 20:37, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; I note that draft-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on the=
<br>
&gt; issues, <br>
<br>
Well, sure. I know that some people like that, and<br>
it does have benefits. But also downsides that I&#39;m<br>
sure will be discussed when/if that draft goes to<br>
IETF LC.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Huh? It&#39;s been approved by=
 the IESG and is in AUTH48.</div><div><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/draft-ietf-git-using-github/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft=
-ietf-git-using-github/</a></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div></div></div>

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References: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com> <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBMOCP4yDTo1HTt3APH0Mv8r3-oBUyLi9ypQY4CkNdYgUw@mail.gmail.com> <8d21256f-2381-1c48-09b1-1aa0fc89aefa@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBP4zXaZo1Kp9v_gYDmcbim1prETOCQ7zvUSud1mXriXYA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Message-ID: <1bed159a-8d1e-ae0a-30cd-cfe5721f4b85@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 21:56:44 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/A5G-fdKdVr-aRRQXRvgQH8os5cU>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (#258)
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <1bed159a-8d1e-ae0a-30cd-cfe5721f4b85@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: [tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni] Fix superfluous padding
 edge cases. (#258)
References: <tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258@github.com>
 <d8a62a74-224e-36a3-844b-2a590541e1a8@cs.tcd.ie>
 <CABcZeBMOCP4yDTo1HTt3APH0Mv8r3-oBUyLi9ypQY4CkNdYgUw@mail.gmail.com>
 <8d21256f-2381-1c48-09b1-1aa0fc89aefa@cs.tcd.ie>
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On 11/08/2020 21:44, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 1:24 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd=
=2Eie>
> wrote:
>=20
>> On 11/08/2020 20:37, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>> I note that draft-ietf-git-github explicitly permits discussion on th=
e
>>> issues,
>>
>> Well, sure. I know that some people like that, and
>> it does have benefits. But also downsides that I'm
>> sure will be discussed when/if that draft goes to
>> IETF LC.
>>
>=20
> Huh? It's been approved by the IESG and is in AUTH48.
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-git-using-github/

Shows how much I keep up to speed with github:-)

S.

>=20
> -Ekr
>=20

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From nobody Tue Aug 11 14:31:34 2020
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Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 15:31:26 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:08:11AM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> There is also the question of what the anonymity set is. I just did a little
> experiment of resolving 25000 domain names and looking at how many resolved to
> the same IP address (https://huitema.wordpress.com/2020/08/09/
> can-internet-services-hide-in-crowds/). And then I redid the stats with 50000
> domain names. Did not find a lot of crowds. 75% of domain names in my sample
> resolve to their very own address, not shared with anybody. Only 8% resolved by
> addresses shared by 10 sites or more, and 1.3% resolved to addresses shared by
> 100 sites or more.  Of course, 1% of the Internet is already something big. But
> still, not quite the whole world...

Here is a related experiment done last year.

"On the Importance of Encrypted-SNI (ESNI) to Censorship Circumvention"
https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Chai2019a
https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci19/presentation/chai
My capsule summary: https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/10

The authors tested an Alexa top 1 million list for blocking from China,
under three different modalities: DNS poisoning, SNI filtering, and IP
address blocking. (The GFW blocked different web sites in different
ways; ESNI is effective against DNS poisoning and SNI filtering but not
IP address blocking.) Of 24,210 domains blocked by either DNS poisoning
or SNI filtering, 16,928 (70%) were additionally blocked by IP address,
so ESNI would not help to unblock them if they remained at their current
hosting. The other 30% of domains would have been unblocked by ESNI.
This analysis, of course, assumes a static situation; if ESNI were
deployed and found to be effective, then blocked sites might choose to
move to shared co-hosting, or the GFW might increase the scope of its IP
address blocking to include addresses with small anonymity sets.

I'll add that it's not just the size of the anonymity set that matters.
The domains that make up the anonymity set, and the cost of blocking
them, matters as well. An anonymity set of 100,000 could still be
blockable if none of the 100,000 is disruptive or costly to block.
(Measure cost however you like: effect on the local economy, for
example.) An anonymity set of size 10 might be hard to block, if just
one of those 10 is one that the would-be blocker greatly cares to
preserve.


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From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 15:40:21 -0700
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: onoketa <onoketa@iyouport.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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It's important to note that the Firefox Nightly client does not implement
GREASE of any form, so only the connections to sites that are known to
support the ESNI could be blocked by this method. These connections
stick out like a sore thumb among connections from this browser since ESNI
is supported by a minority of sites.

If ECH is deployed in a client with GREASE enabled, then every client hello
from the supporting client will contain the ECH extension whether the site
supports ECH or not. The traffic from the supporting user agent would stick
out, but simple filters that check for the presence of specific extensions,
would not be able to differentiate between connections to sites with ECH
enabled and to those without ECH.

On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:18 AM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
wrote:

>
> On 7/30/2020 8:45 AM, onoketa wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > The Great Firewall of China may have identified and blocked
> > Cloudflare's ESNI implementation.
> >
> > I have found that when using a TLS client hello with ESNI extension to
> > connect to servers behind Cloudflare's CDN, the connection will be cut
> > off after the whole TLS handshake is done. And then that IP address
> > will be blocked at the TCP level for several minutes.
>
>
> Thanks for the report. I think this relates to our ambivalence about the
> requirement for ESNI to not "stick out". That requirement is hard to
> meet, and designs have drifted towards an acceptation that it is OK to
> stick out as long as a sufficiently large share of the traffic does it.
> If that share is large, goes the reasoning, it would be too costly for
> censors to just "drop everything that looks like ESNI". Well, given
> actors like the Great Firewall, one wonders.
>
> -- Christian Huitema
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000a418fb05aca1c2c3
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>It&#39;s important to note that the Firefox Nightly c=
lient does not implement GREASE of any form, so only the connections to sit=
es that are known to support the ESNI could be blocked by this method. Thes=
e connections stick=C2=A0out like a sore thumb among connections from this =
browser since ESNI is supported by a minority of sites.</div><div><br></div=
><div>If ECH is deployed in a client with GREASE enabled, then every client=
 hello from the supporting client will contain the ECH extension whether th=
e site supports ECH or not. The traffic from the supporting user agent woul=
d stick out, but simple filters that check for the presence of specific ext=
ensions, would not be able to differentiate between connections to sites wi=
th ECH enabled and to those without ECH.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:18=
 AM Christian Huitema &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:huitema@huitema.net">huitema@hu=
itema.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
On 7/30/2020 8:45 AM, onoketa wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The Great Firewall of China may have identified and blocked<br>
&gt; Cloudflare&#39;s ESNI implementation.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I have found that when using a TLS client hello with ESNI extension to=
<br>
&gt; connect to servers behind Cloudflare&#39;s CDN, the connection will be=
 cut<br>
&gt; off after the whole TLS handshake is done. And then that IP address<br=
>
&gt; will be blocked at the TCP level for several minutes.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks for the report. I think this relates to our ambivalence about the<br=
>
requirement for ESNI to not &quot;stick out&quot;. That requirement is hard=
 to<br>
meet, and designs have drifted towards an acceptation that it is OK to<br>
stick out as long as a sufficiently large share of the traffic does it.<br>
If that share is large, goes the reasoning, it would be too costly for<br>
censors to just &quot;drop everything that looks like ESNI&quot;. Well, giv=
en<br>
actors like the Great Firewall, one wonders.<br>
<br>
-- Christian Huitema<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From nobody Tue Aug 11 15:42:16 2020
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Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 16:42:03 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 01:38:50AM -0700, Rob Sayre wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 12:14 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> 
>     There was a paper that looked a traffic morphing published a year
>     or two ago that came to the same conclusion, to look like you're Skype or a
>     SIP VoIP call you need to actually be Skype or a SIP VoIP call.
> 
> You could link it, perhaps.

Peter is surely referring to the influential "The Parrot is Dead" paper
from 2013, which found discrepancies in so-called "parrot" systems that
superficially imitate some other cover protocol. The authors recommend
not mere imitation, but tunnelling through a real implementation of the
cover protocol (Section XI).
	"The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications"
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Houmansadr2013b
A point of clarification: "The Parrot is Dead" is not about "traffic
morphing" in the restricted sense of Wright et al.
(https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#morphing09), which is solely about
shaping packets' sizes, not their contents nor the interpacket timing.

"The Parrot is Dead" is rightly well-regarded, but one should not cite
it without also mentioning some follow-on work, like "Seeing through
Network-Protocol Obfuscation," which found many of the dead-parrot
attacks impractical due to high false-positive rates or easy
remediation. The authors proposed new detection attacks, optimizing for
low false-positive rates and low cost of deployment, in terms of state
and computation.
	"Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation"
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wang2015a

It is worth noting that, despite these papers' claims of easy detection
of covert protocols, classification attacks of the type they propose are
not really observed in practice. Available evidence indicates that
network intermediaries, when they block, prefer to block using methods
that are simpler and more robust, generally preferring a large number of
false negatives to a small number of false positives. The following
paper takes a contrarian view and proposes more realistic threat models
based on the observed behavior of blockers: see the three "disconnects"
between research and practice in Section I.
	"Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism"
	https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Tschantz2016a
As an example, "Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation" was
published in 2015, but none of its proposed attacks (Figure 1) have come
to pass, despite their ≈1.0 true-positive rates and ≈0.0 false-positive
rates. obfs3 was defeated by active probing
(https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Ensafi2015b); even in China obfs4 is
attacked by enumeration at the proxy distributor, not passive detection;
and meek kept working until it was shut down by the CDNs, not the
network blockers it was intended against. (FTE did not have enough users
to make any strong statements about, I think.)

Attempts to infer information about the contents of an encrypted network
stream based on packet size and timing are usually filed under the term
"website fingerprinting." You'll find many papers with that term in the
title at https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/. I am not as familiar with
that field, but I understand that a common criticism of website
fingerprinting research is that it may use unrealistic data or
assumptions, such that it's not clear that the results generalize or can
be effectively deployed. (There are echoes of this in Table 8 of "Seeing
through Network-Protocol Obfuscation," which reports a large loss in
accuracy when training and testing across corpora.) For a critical look
at research earlier than 2014, see:
	"A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks"
	https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ccs2014-critical

With that said about website fingerprinting, on the topic of inference
using packet sizes, timing, and other metadata, I have been impressed
with this series of articles on inference against TLS and HTTPS, which I
think avoid common missteps:
	"Enhanced telemetry for encrypted threat analytics"
	http://gen.lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=10.1109%2FICNP.2016.7785325

	"Deciphering Malware's use of TLS (without Decryption)"
	https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01639

	"Identifying Encrypted Malware Traffic with Contextual Flow Data"
	http://gen.lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=10.1145%2F2996758.2996768

	"Limitless HTTP in an HTTPS World: Inferring the Semantics of
	the HTTPS Protocol without Decryption"
	http://gen.lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=10.1145%2F3292006.3300025
	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pBVu9GEfE1I&t=80


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 16:24:15 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 3:42 PM David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com> wrote:

> With that said about website fingerprinting, on the topic of inference
> using packet sizes, timing, and other metadata, I have been impressed
> with this series of articles on inference against TLS and HTTPS, which I
> think avoid common missteps:
>         "Enhanced telemetry for encrypted threat analytics"
>         http://gen.lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=10.1109%2FICNP.2016.7785325


Thanks for the links.

This 2016 paper is interesting. Understandably, it doesn't mention a bunch
of newer developments.

Its conclusion ends with:

"We identified features of a flow that can be easily collected, analyzed,
and stored such as
the sequence of packet lengths and times, the byte distribution, and the
TLS handshake
metadata. We showed how these data features can be combined with intuitive
machine
learning models to accurately classify malicious, encrypted network flows."

It seems to me that a lot of these papers studied more predictable packet
sizes than they might get under ECH, and would have less cleartext metadata
available under ECH. Additionally, many of these papers probably used TLS
1.2 or earlier.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 3:42 PM David Fif=
ield &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david@bamsoftware.com">david@bamsoftware.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">
With that said about website fingerprinting, on the topic of inference<br>
using packet sizes, timing, and other metadata, I have been impressed<br>
with this series of articles on inference against TLS and HTTPS, which I<br=
>
think avoid common missteps:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Enhanced telemetry for encrypted threat a=
nalytics&quot;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"http://gen.lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=3D10=
.1109%2FICNP.2016.7785325" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://gen.=
lib.rus.ec/scimag/?q=3D10.1109%2FICNP.2016.7785325</a></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>Thanks for the links.</div><div><br></div><div>This 2016 paper =
is interesting. Understandably, it doesn&#39;t mention a bunch of newer dev=
elopments.</div><div><br></div><div>Its conclusion ends with:</div><div><br=
></div><div>&quot;We identified features of a flow that can be easily colle=
cted, analyzed, and stored such as=C2=A0</div><div>the sequence of packet l=
engths and times, the byte distribution, and the TLS handshake</div><div>me=
tadata. We showed how these data features can be combined with intuitive ma=
chine=C2=A0</div><div>learning models to accurately classify malicious, enc=
rypted network flows.&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>It seems to me that a =
lot of these papers studied more predictable packet sizes than they might g=
et under ECH, and would have less cleartext metadata available under ECH. A=
dditionally, many of these papers probably used TLS 1.2 or earlier.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div></div>

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
CC: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> writes:=0A=0A>I'm confused. That seems to be a=
 bunch of boilerplate surrounding a Salon=0A>article from 2015:=0A=0AI just=
 took the first Google result that seems to cover the material...=0A=0A>It =
also contains references to supplementary material, like whether=0A>Intelli=
gent Design can be linked to information theory:=0A>=0A>I am not sure this =
issue is on topic for this list.=0A=0AAnd Salon, which you linked to, has p=
ublished articles on how vaccines cause=0Aautism.=A0 I'm sure readers will =
be able to tell the difference between a=0Adiscussion of KGB decloaking of =
CIA assets and anti-vaxxer stories.=0A=0A>You could link it, perhaps.=0A=0A=
See my comments in an earlier post, I don't catalogue every paper and prepr=
int=0Aand draft that comes across my desk...=0A=0APeter.


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 11:09 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >I'm confused. That seems to be a bunch of boilerplate surrounding a Salon
> >article from 2015:
>
> I just took the first Google result that seems to cover the material...
>

OK.


> >It also contains references to supplementary material, like whether
> >Intelligent Design can be linked to information theory:
> >
> >I am not sure this issue is on topic for this list.
>
> And Salon, which you linked to, has published articles on how vaccines
> cause
> autism.


You linked to it. As I wrote, the Salon article constitutes the substance
of whatever that other site's article is. There is a large blockquote in
the middle.


> I'm sure readers will be able to tell the difference between a
> discussion of KGB decloaking of CIA assets and anti-vaxxer stories.
>

I am not sure why you linked to this article. Maybe it is a strained
metaphor?


> >You could link it, perhaps.
>
> See my comments in an earlier post, I don't catalogue every paper and
> preprint
> and draft that comes across my desk...
>

I don't either... but I try to remember them if I can, and also try to
avoid making vague references.

I've read many of your messages before (I particularly liked "A mighty
fortress is our PKI"), but this traffic does not seem helpful.

thanks,
Rob

--0000000000008262d805aca8955a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 11:09 PM Peter Gu=
tmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pg=
ut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Rob Sayre &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:sayrer@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:=
<br>
<br>
&gt;I&#39;m confused. That seems to be a bunch of boilerplate surrounding a=
 Salon<br>
&gt;article from 2015:<br>
<br>
I just took the first Google result that seems to cover the material...<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>OK.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt;It also contains references to supplementary material, like whether<br>
&gt;Intelligent Design can be linked to information theory:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;I am not sure this issue is on topic for this list.<br>
<br>
And Salon, which you linked to, has published articles on how vaccines caus=
e<br>
autism.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>You linked to it. As I wrote, the S=
alon article constitutes=C2=A0the substance of whatever that other site&#39=
;s article is. There is a large blockquote in the middle.</div><div>=C2=A0<=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I&#39;m sure readers=
 will be able to tell the difference between a<br>
discussion of KGB decloaking of CIA assets and anti-vaxxer stories.<br></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>I am not sure why you linked to this article. =
Maybe it is a strained metaphor?</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt;You could link it, perhaps.<br>
<br>
See my comments in an earlier post, I don&#39;t catalogue every paper and p=
reprint<br>
and draft that comes across my desk...<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
I don&#39;t either... but I try to remember them if I can, and also try to =
avoid making vague references.</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve read many =
of your messages before (I particularly liked &quot;A mighty fortress is ou=
r PKI&quot;), but this traffic does not seem helpful.</div><div><br></div><=
div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div><br></div></div></div>

--0000000000008262d805aca8955a--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com> writes:=0A=0A>Peter is surely referri=
ng to the influential "The Parrot is Dead" paper from=0A>2013=0A=0AYep, tha=
t was it, thanks (at least one person catalogues their reading by the=0Aloo=
ks of it :-).  Thanks for the ref to the followup, can't remember seeing=0A=
that, but doesn't that just reinforce the Parrot paper?=0A=0AThe "Grounding=
 Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism" paper is an important=0Aone too, y=
ou need to look at what the attackers are doing otherwise you'll end=0Aup t=
hrowing a ton of crypto at something that makes no difference.  In=0Apartic=
ular in reference to a question someone else asked about ECH and TLS=0A1.3,=
 since it's not defending against anything the censors are doing I can't=0A=
see what its presence or absence would do.  Something like ECH seems like=
=0Aclassic inside-out design, "here is our cool piece of crypto trickery, a=
nd=0Awhatever it happens to defend against is the threat".=0A=0APeter.=0A


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References: <67d52e25-71ed-4584-b2c3-6a71a6bdd346@www.fastmail.com> <1597119980162.55300@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <b32110f8-c9ba-e8db-f136-7cc60eba54e4@huitema.net> <1597123970590.77611@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAChr6SzzuyB7sxXJQ4gNJwa3iaQcC5jGPE3-sgfY_EkB7DoykA@mail.gmail.com> <1597125488037.97447@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAChr6SxLAJyweEDHL48-hT3X=d5E6jNrWZheOt+fSydpS=HhQw@mail.gmail.com> <c7e033d9-aa39-1293-2233-4ebb8d1502dc@huitema.net> <1597130085200.4129@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAChr6SypqD+J0LjJWxOQNQhXAvR7R4oLZQCKq_0PPbs+xjiSwg@mail.gmail.com> <20200811224203.qysncdptgiwfrvlu@bamsoftware.com> <1597215113998.32406@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <1597215113998.32406@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2020 00:03:41 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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--0000000000005cb2db05aca8ca93
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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 11:52 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> ... in reference to a question someone else asked about ECH and TLS
> 1.3, since it's not defending against anything the censors are doing I
> can't
> see what its presence or absence would do.  Something like ECH seems like
> classic inside-out design, "here is our cool piece of crypto trickery, and
> whatever it happens to defend against is the threat".
>

Censors do use the unencrypted SNI. See:
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-pearg-censorship-03.html#sni

That doesn't mean an encrypted ClientHello will solve all of the problems
we've discussed, of course.

That said, most of the linked papers I've read could be possibly-overfit ML
models that study older TLS versions without ECH.

Their underlying point could be correct, but the data is old, and usually
not public or reproducible.

thanks,
Rob

--0000000000005cb2db05aca8ca93
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 11:52 PM Peter Gu=
tmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.=
ac.nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">... in reference to a question someone els=
e asked about ECH and TLS<br>
1.3, since it&#39;s not defending against anything the censors are doing I =
can&#39;t<br>
see what its presence or absence would do.=C2=A0 Something like ECH seems l=
ike<br>
classic inside-out design, &quot;here is our cool piece of crypto trickery,=
 and<br>
whatever it happens to defend against is the threat&quot;.<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>Censors do use the unencrypted SNI. See:</div><div><a h=
ref=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-pearg-censorship-03.html#sni">h=
ttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-pearg-censorship-03.html#sni</a></div><=
div><br></div><div>That doesn&#39;t mean an encrypted ClientHello will solv=
e all of the problems we&#39;ve discussed, of course.</div><div><br></div><=
div>That said, most of the linked papers I&#39;ve read could be possibly-ov=
erfit ML models that study older TLS versions without ECH.</div><div><br></=
div><div>Their underlying point could be correct, but the data is old, and =
usually not public or reproducible.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><=
div>Rob=C2=A0</div></div></div>

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--000000000000e4d0eb05acaff8a2
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Hi Ekr, this is great! I just wanted to suggest that, instead of obscuring
the word "master", we add a (foot)note to the text explaining its
persistence in the spec and give some historical context.

Best,
Chris P.

On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 9:11 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> Hi folks,
>
> I've just posted draft-rescorla-tls-rfc8446-bis-00.
>
> This document does two things:
>
> 1. It rolls up all the various errata that have been filed for
>    RFC 8446. Some of these have created some reader confusion
>    and so hopefully this will help.
>
> 2. It renames the "master" secrets to "main" secrets in service
>    of more inclusive language [0]
>
>
> My intention here is not to make technical changes but just to produce
> a document that's easier to work with.  If there are other pieces of
> text that you think need to be fixed, now would be a good time to flag
> them.  I am working on this document at
> https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec
>
> Thanks to David Benjamin for suggesting this and talking over the
> mechanics.
>
> -Ekr
>
> [0] Note that I was not totally unable to remove "master" because the
> key schedule labels include it. However, I have removed it from the
> text and I think we should probably change the labels to hex to
> obscure it.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000e4d0eb05acaff8a2
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Ekr, this is great! I just wanted to suggest that,=
 instead of obscuring the word &quot;master&quot;, we add a (foot)note to t=
he text explaining its persistence in the spec and give some historical con=
text.</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Chris P.<br></div></div><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Au=
g 11, 2020 at 9:11 AM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr=
@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi folks,<br><br>I&#39;ve just posted draft-res=
corla-tls-rfc8446-bis-00.<br><br>This document does two things:<br><br>1. I=
t rolls up all the various errata that have been filed for<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
RFC 8446. Some of these have created some reader confusion<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
and so hopefully this will help.<br><br>2. It renames the &quot;master&quot=
; secrets to &quot;main&quot; secrets in service<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0of more in=
clusive language [0]<br><br><br>My intention here is not to make technical =
changes but just to produce<br>a document that&#39;s easier to work with.=
=C2=A0 If there are other pieces of<br>text that you think need to be fixed=
, now would be a good time to flag<br>them.=C2=A0 I am working on this docu=
ment at<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec" target=3D"_blank">=
https://github.com/ekr/tls13-spec</a><br><br>Thanks to David Benjamin for s=
uggesting this and talking over the<br>mechanics.<br><br>-Ekr<br><br>[0] No=
te that I was not totally unable to remove &quot;master&quot; because the<b=
r>key schedule labels include it. However, I have removed it from the<br>te=
xt and I think we should probably change the labels to hex to<br>obscure it=
.<br><br><br><br><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2020 10:11:35 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 06:51:48AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com> writes:
> 
> >Peter is surely referring to the influential "The Parrot is Dead" paper from
> >2013
> 
> Yep, that was it, thanks (at least one person catalogues their reading by the
> looks of it :-).  Thanks for the ref to the followup, can't remember seeing
> that, but doesn't that just reinforce the Parrot paper?

Both papers are about detection, but I would not call one a
reinforcement of the other. Section 4 of "Seeing through
Network-Protocol Obfuscation", "Semantics-based attacks," finds problems
in the attacks proposed by "The Parrot is Dead". The authors design new
styles of attack (Section 5, "Entropy-based attacks", and Section 6,
"ML-based attacks") and apply them to deployed covert communications
systems. But of these systems, only one (FTE) is a "parrot" or mimicry
system (see the trichotomy of categories under "Network protocol
obfuscation" in Section 2). obfs3 and obfs4 are randomizing protocols,
not designed to resemble any particular cover protocol, and meek uses
exactly the tunnelling approach advocated in "The Parrot is Dead,"
sending its requests via a headless Firefox for the sake of a proper TLS
fingerprint (Section 5.1 of https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Fifield2015a).
The results do not really support the thesis that tunnelling is
essential or necessarily more resistant to blocking, though it remains a
good rule of thumb. Both tunnelling-based and non-tunnelling-based
systems are widely used today, with success in practice.

> The "Grounding Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism" paper is an important
> one too, you need to look at what the attackers are doing otherwise you'll end
> up throwing a ton of crypto at something that makes no difference.  In
> particular in reference to a question someone else asked about ECH and TLS
> 1.3, since it's not defending against anything the censors are doing I can't
> see what its presence or absence would do.  Something like ECH seems like
> classic inside-out design, "here is our cool piece of crypto trickery, and
> whatever it happens to defend against is the threat".

Rob is correct. Blocking on the basis of plaintext SNI is common and
extensively empirically documented. It would be unusual, these days, for
a firewall to support DNS, IP address, and HTTP keyword blocking,
without also supporting SNI blocking. A few examples:
https://ooni.org/post/2020-tls-blocking-india/
	We recorded SNI-based blocking on both Bharti Airtel and
	Reliance Jio.
https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/
	To evaluate this methodology, we ran experiments in Iran because
	we know that Iran implements SNI based blocking.
https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Chai2019a Section 4.2
	We detect that 21,446 sites are under SNI filtering in China.
	One interesting observation is that only 70 websites are
	exclusively censored by SNI filtering. In other words, SNI
	filtering is almost always used in a combination with other
	censorship techniques.
https://ooni.org/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/
	This is quite a strong indication of the presence of some form
	of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology that is aware of TLS
	and which is most likely fingerprinting the SNI field of the TLS
	handshake.
https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#VanderSloot2018a Section 6.4
	Unfortunately, SNI places the domain name in clear-text in the
	first message sent by the client to the server, making it easy
	to detect when a client is connecting to a particular site from
	only the first message in a TLS handshake. We find that networks
	do interfere based on this first message alone.

But you don't have to take anyone's word for it, at least in the case of
the Great Firewall; this is another aspect that's easy to test from
outside. Start a packet capture on port 443 and send a ClientHello,
containing an SNI field known to be blocked, to a responsive HTTPS host
in China. You will immediately receive three RST packets, which are not
sent by the remote server but are injected by the firewall.

$ openssl s_client -connect www.tsinghua.edu.cn:443 -servername www.facebook.com

10:03:30.857872 IP localhost.60084 > www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https: Flags [S], seq 864764526, win 64240, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 2739496015 ecr 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
10:03:31.188496 IP www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https > localhost.60084: Flags [S.], seq 4063746934, ack 864764527, win 2105, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 2,sackOK,TS val 202217658 ecr 2739496015], length 0
10:03:31.188555 IP localhost.60084 > www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https: Flags [.], ack 1, win 502, options [nop,nop,TS val 2739496346 ecr 202217658], length 0
10:03:31.189003 IP localhost.60084 > www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https: Flags [P.], seq 1:319, ack 1, win 502, options [nop,nop,TS val 2739496346 ecr 202217658], length 318
10:03:31.508859 IP www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https > localhost.60084: Flags [R.], seq 1, ack 319, win 995, length 0
10:03:31.508907 IP www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https > localhost.60084: Flags [R.], seq 1, ack 319, win 995, length 0
10:03:31.510050 IP www.tsinghua.edu.cn.https > localhost.60084: Flags [R.], seq 1, ack 319, win 995, length 0


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Hi Ben,

Thanks for your review.  Some initial responses are inline.

On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> Thanks for putting together the -06 based on my preliminary comments, and
> my apologies for taking so long to get back to it.  It turns out that going
> through the 80-odd documents we update takes a while!
>
>
> I have a bunch of suggestions that are basically editorial, that I'll
> make a pull request for (along with suggested changes for several of the
> following comments).  It's up at:
> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3


Thanks for that!

>
>
> We mention in the Abstract (but not Introduction!) that this document
> moves 2246 and 4346 (but not 6347!) to the historic state.
> Unfortunately, this is slightly problematic from a process perspective,
> since the current way to make things Historic
> (
> https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/designating-rfcs-historic-2014-07-20
> )
> requires a separate "status change document" that gets its own IETF LC,
> to effectuate the status change.  Most references to the status change
> document can be replaced by this RFC after it's published, but formally
> the move to historic is *not* done by this document.  I've pulled into
> my pull request the language used in RFC 8429 to describe moves to
> Historic; please make sure to reproduce that language in the
> Introduction as well as the Abstract.
>

Do you need us to submit a draft to request that status change?

>
> I found three documents (3656, 4540, 7562) in the list of update targets
> that are on the ISE (not IETF) stream.  I had talked to Adrian during my
> preliminary review, and in principle it is permissible to make those
> updates as part of this document, but we will need specific ISE approval
> to do so.  I am supposed to sync up with him during IETF LC, but the
> document needs to be updated to clarify that the updates of ISE
> documents are/will be done with permission of the ISE.  (Please also try
> to double-check that the list is complete; I didn't find an
> authoritative list of "all documents on the ISE stream" to grep against,
> and I didn't try to have something parse rfc-index.xml to output such a
> list.
>

OK, so you'd like a list added and that's not in your pull request, is that
right?  We'll figure it out. Thanks in advance with the coordination with
Adrian.


>
> I note that in addition to our BCP 195 update (called out in Section 6),
> we also update 3552, which is BCP 72.  This update is quite incidental
> (compared to our BCP 195 update), so it seems clear that having this
> document be part of BCP 195 is correct.
>

Are you asking here to include an update to RFC3552?   Thanks.

>
> Section 1.1
>
> I went through all 83 of the references in the big list, that are
> supposed to be ones that "normatively reference TLS 1.0/1.1 or DTLS 1.0,
> as well as the shorter list of already-obsoleted documents.
>
> I won't bore you with my full notes, but there are some particular
> things that stood out from the review:
>
> - We have a separate list of updates for documents that are already
>   obsolete (but don't say much about why we're going go the extra
>   bother).  However, three of the documents in our main list of updates
>   (4743, 4744, and 6460) are already Historic, and presumably should be
>   treated more like the already-obsolete ones.
>

Obsolete does not mean the same thing as deprecate though.  TLSv1.2 has
been obsoleted by TLSv1.3, but not deprecated.  The deprecation goes the
extra step to say not to use it and it triggers many to begin phase out
plans.  Am I misunderstanding the question?


>
> - Several documents (e.g., 8261, 5023) specifically have MUST-level
>   requirements for 1.0 (or 1.1) that disappear or become internally
>   inconsistent with our current update, so we might want to fill that
>   void.
>

I'm not sure what you mean here.  This draft will update the ones listed.
RFC8261 just has the following:
"The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347>] and SHOULD

   support the most recently published version of DTLS, which was DTLS

   1.2 [RFC6347 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>] when this RFC was
published. "

This deprecates DTLS1.0.  Are you asking for us to add a MUST support
DTLS1.2?

For RFC5023, there's the following text:
"At a minimum, client and server

   implementations MUST be capable of being configured to use HTTP Basic
   Authentication [RFC2617 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617>] in
conjunction with a connection made with
   TLS 1.0 [RFC2246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246>] or a
subsequent standards-track version of TLS
   (such as [RFC4346 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346>]),
supporting the conventions for using HTTP over

   TLS described in [RFC2818 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818>]."

This requires a lot of updates, but in terms of the text for TLS as it
pertains to this draft, there's already text that says "or a subsequent
standards-track version".  With the document being updated to deprecate the
older versions, I think we're okay.  If you have something specific in mind
or seeing something that I am not seeing, please advise.


> - A few documents (6749, 6750, 6739) make an interesting claim about TLS
>   1.0 being the "most widely deployed version" and providing the
>   "broadest interoperability".
>

OK, so that was from a point in time and I think readers will understand
that.  Are you asking for -bis updates?  I think deprecating is fine, we've
worked with the community to see the numbers.  If it's a -bis that will
help, let's separate that out.  If you'd like specific updates, please
advise.  Thanks.


> - Many documents note specific MTI ciphers (largely just the MTI ciphers
>   from the respective TLS version).  Since all ciphers defined for
>   1.0/1.1 also work in 1.2 (with the exception of the IDEA and DES
>   ciphers from RFC 5469, that it claims "have been removed from TLS
>   version 1.2"), these requirements in theory are still in effect, even
>   though those particular ciphers are not great and the badness of those
>   ciphers is a lot of the justification for deprecating the old protocol
>   versions.  I don't really think that a piecemeal effort to identify
>   and update each specific MTI cipher mention is worth the effort,
>   though it may be worth noting that TLS 1.2 has
>   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as MTI and that it is preferred over the
>   older MTI ciphers.  (Actually, it looks like a few of the specific MTI
>   mentions in the documents we're updating are already
>   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, hooray.)
>

RFC7525 helps as well and the -bis of that to set TLSv1.2 best practices.
Are you asking for any changes here? Thanks.


> - As implied by the previous bullet point, the IDEA and DES ciphers
>   specified by RFC 5469 are now entirely obsolete, which means that that
>   entire document is also obsolete (or maybe historic?).  It seems like
>   the right thing to do to effectuate that change via this document.
>

Yes, good catch.  It does make sense to deprecate RFC5469 with this draft
after looking at the introduction and purpose of the document.


>
> - Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC 7507
>   seems to be entirely obsolete.  Any implementation that is compliant
>   with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.  If it only
>   supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also supports
>   1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS 1.3
>   applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., obsolete).
>   We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.
>

Has this been addressed in RFC8446?  If not, the specific downgrade
examples are just listed as examples.  If a gap is left, then the full
document should not be deprecated and made obsolete.  The text infers other
versions in my read.  I have not looked to see if this was addressed in
RFC8446 yet though.

Thanks.

>
> - We list RFC 8465 as being updated, but it doesn't seem to say anything
>   at all about TLS or reference the relevant RFCs.
>

OK, I played with the numbers and RFC 8645 does mention TLS, but is
specific to present versions.  I think it's safe to remove this from the
list.  Thanks for catching that.


>
>
>    [RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 although only makes an
>    informative reference to [RFC4346].
>
>From the text, I think it's still important to deprecate the use of TLSv1.1
in this document.  If you take a look at the connection establishment
section (2.3)

   2.  after completing the TCP handshake, immediately negotiate TLS
       sessions according to [RFC5246
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>] or its predecessor TLS 1.1.
The
       following restrictions apply:

       *  Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346>] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
          [RFC5246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>]) is
REQUIRED.  To prevent known attacks on TLS
          versions prior to 1.1, implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS

                      versions prior to 1.1.

I think it's important to have the updates and not miss the opportunity.
Do you want specific text for this text as well?


> The text in question seems to be:
>
> %     *  Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
> %        [RFC5246]) is REQUIRED.  [...]
>
> And RFC 5246 is a normative reference for it.  So we may want to say
> "has a requirement for TLSv1.1 or later, although only makes an
> informative reference to [RFC4346].  This requirement is updated to be
> for TLSv1.2 or later."
>

Would you like specific text to update section 2.3 as well?
I think just dropping the first clause and removing the full sentence of
the second reference in 2.3 would work.


>
>    This document updates DTLS [RFC6347].
>
> I note that in the thread from my preliminary review there was some
> support for the sentiment that these changes do not formally Update
> 6347, in that what 6347 says about version negotiation is still true; we
> just tell you not to do it.
> (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/YUySQbMVJPv31Fwv68rEpcmBMsM/)
> But, if we do keep the Updates: relationship, I think we want to say
> slightly more, e.g., noting that the interoperation with DTLS 1.0 that
> it describes is now forbidden.
>

That's fine with me.


>
> Section 2
>
>    Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as
>    their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC
>    7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs.  Although the attacks have
>
> Are the "other referenced RFCs" referenced from 7457 or from this
> document.  This document references ... quite a few RFCs, so either way
> we should probably clarify.
>

That text was from before the search to find the many RFCs that reference
the deprecated versions.  Let's just drop "and other referenced RFCs" as
those are good references.
 Thanks for catching that.


>
>    been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for
>    these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be
>    mitigated in older library releases.
>
> [The wording here is kind of convoluted; I've suggested an alternative
> in the aforementioned pull request.]
>

OK, thanks.


>
>    NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with
>    permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History
>    of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting).


> (The version of SP800-52r2 that we reference has been withdrawn.  We
> should probably check that the quotation in question has not changed if
> we update to reference a current version of the NIST document.)
>

OK, here is the current and published version link:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf

The text appears in section 1.1 of the same name and it looks like it's
just altered slightly towards the end.  Here's the text in the published
version:

"TLS 1.1, specified in RFC 4346 [24], was developed to address weaknesses
discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of initialization vector
selection and padding error processing. Initialization vectors were made
explicit^4 to prevent a certain class of attacks on the Cipher

4 The initialization vector (IV) must be sent; it cannot be derived from a
state known by both parties, such as the previous message.

Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation used by TLS. The handling of padding
errors was altered to treat a padding error as a bad message authentication
code rather than a decryption failure. In addition, the TLS 1.1 RFC
acknowledges attacks on CBC mode that rely on the time to compute the
message authentication code (MAC). The TLS 1.1 specification states that to
defend against such attacks, an implementation must process records in the
same manner regardless of whether padding errors exist. Further
implementation considerations for CBC modes (which were not included in RFC
4346 [24]) are discussed in Section 3.3.2.

TLS 1.2, specified in RFC 5246 [25], made several cryptographic
enhancements, particularly in the area of hash functions, with the ability
to use or specify the SHA-2 family of algorithms for hash, MAC, and
Pseudorandom Function (PRF) computations. TLS 1.2 also adds authenticated
encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher suites.

TLS 1.3, specified in RFC 8446 [57], represents a significant change to TLS
that aims to address threats that have arisen over the years. Among the
changes are a new handshake protocol, a new key derivation process that
uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [37],
and the removal of cipher suites that use RSA key transport or static
DiffieHellman (DH) key exchanges, the CBC mode of operation, or SHA-1. Many
extensions defined for use with TLS 1.2 and previous versions cannot be
used with TLS 1.3. "


> Section 3
>
>    The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
>    hash of the exchanged messages.  This makes it possible to perform a
>    downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
>    operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
>
> The 2^77 number seems to be the pre-shattered.io number.
>
>    Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
>    made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and
>    SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it
>    is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.
>
> Having reviewed the WGLC thread and the papers linked therefrom, I'm
> suggesting that we change this to "not appreciably stronger" (along with
> adding the missing article to "using SHA-1 hash").  In particular,
> https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf
> suggests that MD5 is particularly weak, and that attacking SHA-1 will
> continue to be the bulk of the work even as attacks on SHA-1 become more
> efficient than O(2^58), so that the difference is mostly just the factor
> of 64 for the Joux multicollision.
>

There's a separate draft on SHA-1 and MD5, how would you like to see this
handled?


>
> Section 4
>
>    TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used.  Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of
>    TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
>
> (editorial) I'm not sure how much precedent there is for a construction
> that talks about negotiating one version of TLS "from" some other
> version of TLS.  In my head the negotiation is something that's done by
> or from an implementation, rather than a version.  I don't want to
> insist on anything here, but I probably would have written something
> more like "negotiation of TLSv1.0 by any implementation of TLS MUST NOT
> be permitted".  (And similarly for the following section.)
>

The current text was written that was as it's common to see downgrade
negotiation details in specs.  There's a subtle difference in what's there
versus what's been proposed as a change.  The current text is stating that
downgrades to these deprecated versions is not permitted.  I read your
proposed text as stating the same thing as what is said in the first
sentence.


>
>    Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.0.  TLSv1.0 can be
>    configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
>    available is preferable.
>
> This second sentence seems almost like it's undercutting the premise of
> MUST NOT use.  Would it be better to say something like "While TLSv1.0
> can be configured to prevent some types of interception, using the
> highest version available is preferred"?  (Similarly for the following
> section.)
>

I'm not seeing a big difference in this nit.  I think this may be a
difference only in the author's preference and regional preferences.


>
>    Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
>    layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
>    sending ClientHello.  Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
>    TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
>    though no definitive value is identified as ideal.  That guidance is
>    still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
>    {03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
>    ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.
>
> This "MUST accept any value" seems redundant with Appendix D.2 of RFC
> 8446, which is also giving guidance in this space (but we don't
> currently link to).  (Similarly for the following section.)
>

Yes, this text is  purposefully similar.  I don't see why we'd link to
RFC8446.  Am I missing something?


> Section 5
>
> Should we also wrap the DTLSv1.0 bits in here?  (Or have a dedicated
> section?)  We don't currently have specific statements like "DTLSv1.0
> MUST NOT be used", "MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
> ClientHello.client_version set to {254,255}", etc.
>

I thought there was a reason, but will defer to Stephen on this.  I  think
I had added the prior section and perhaps it was just because DTLS had not
been added to this document yet, but I think there may have been more to it?

Stephen, do you have anything to add/change?

Thanks for the careful review to improve the document, Ben.

Best regards,
Kathleen

>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>


-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen

--00000000000034877305acb40fdb
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Ben,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for you=
r review.=C2=A0 Some initial responses are inline.</div></div><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Jul 26, 202=
0 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.=
edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">Thanks for putting together the -06 based on my preliminary comments, an=
d<br>
my apologies for taking so long to get back to it.=C2=A0 It turns out that =
going<br>
through the 80-odd documents we update takes a while!<br>
<br>
<br>
I have a bunch of suggestions that are basically editorial, that I&#39;ll<b=
r>
make a pull request for (along with suggested changes for several of the<br=
>
following comments).=C2=A0 It&#39;s up at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/=
pull/3</a></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks for that!=C2=A0</div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
We mention in the Abstract (but not Introduction!) that this document<br>
moves 2246 and 4346 (but not 6347!) to the historic state.<br>
Unfortunately, this is slightly problematic from a process perspective,<br>
since the current way to make things Historic<br>
(<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/designating-r=
fcs-historic-2014-07-20" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.i=
etf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/designating-rfcs-historic-2014-07-20</=
a>)<br>
requires a separate &quot;status change document&quot; that gets its own IE=
TF LC,<br>
to effectuate the status change.=C2=A0 Most references to the status change=
<br>
document can be replaced by this RFC after it&#39;s published, but formally=
<br>
the move to historic is *not* done by this document.=C2=A0 I&#39;ve pulled =
into<br>
my pull request the language used in RFC 8429 to describe moves to<br>
Historic; please make sure to reproduce that language in the<br>
Introduction as well as the Abstract.<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><div=
>Do you need us to submit a draft to request that status change?=C2=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I found three documents (3656, 4540, 7562) in the list of update targets<br=
>
that are on the ISE (not IETF) stream.=C2=A0 I had talked to Adrian during =
my<br>
preliminary review, and in principle it is permissible to make those<br>
updates as part of this document, but we will need specific ISE approval<br=
>
to do so.=C2=A0 I am supposed to sync up with him during IETF LC, but the<b=
r>
document needs to be updated to clarify that the updates of ISE<br>
documents are/will be done with permission of the ISE.=C2=A0 (Please also t=
ry<br>
to double-check that the list is complete; I didn&#39;t find an<br>
authoritative list of &quot;all documents on the ISE stream&quot; to grep a=
gainst,<br>
and I didn&#39;t try to have something parse rfc-index.xml to output such a=
<br>
list.<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><div>OK, so you&#39;d like a list ad=
ded and that&#39;s not in your pull request, is that right?=C2=A0 We&#39;ll=
 figure it out. Thanks in advance with the coordination with Adrian.<br>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I note that in addition to our BCP 195 update (called out in Section 6),<br=
>
we also update 3552, which is BCP 72.=C2=A0 This update is quite incidental=
<br>
(compared to our BCP 195 update), so it seems clear that having this<br>
document be part of BCP 195 is correct.<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><d=
iv>Are you asking here to include an update to RFC3552?=C2=A0 =C2=A0Thanks.=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 1.1<br>
<br>
I went through all 83 of the references in the big list, that are<br>
supposed to be ones that &quot;normatively reference TLS 1.0/1.1 or DTLS 1.=
0,<br>
as well as the shorter list of already-obsoleted documents.<br>
<br>
I won&#39;t bore you with my full notes, but there are some particular<br>
things that stood out from the review:<br>
<br>
- We have a separate list of updates for documents that are already<br>
=C2=A0 obsolete (but don&#39;t say much about why we&#39;re going go the ex=
tra<br>
=C2=A0 bother).=C2=A0 However, three of the documents in our main list of u=
pdates<br>
=C2=A0 (4743, 4744, and 6460) are already Historic, and presumably should b=
e<br>
=C2=A0 treated more like the already-obsolete ones.<br></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>Obsolete does not mean the same thing as deprecate though.=C2=
=A0 TLSv1.2 has been obsoleted by TLSv1.3, but not deprecated.=C2=A0 The de=
precation goes the extra step to say not to use it and it triggers many to =
begin phase out plans.=C2=A0 Am I misunderstanding the question?</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- Several documents (e.g., 8261, 5023) specifically have MUST-level<br>
=C2=A0 requirements for 1.0 (or 1.1) that disappear or become internally<br=
>
=C2=A0 inconsistent with our current update, so we might want to fill that<=
br>
=C2=A0 void.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not sure what you =
mean here.=C2=A0 This draft will update the ones listed.=C2=A0 RFC8261 just=
 has the following:</div><div>&quot;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-si=
ze:13.3333px">The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [</span><a href=
=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347" title=3D"&quot;Datagram Transport =
Layer Security&quot;" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px">RFC4347</a><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">] and SHOULD</span></div><pre cla=
ss=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bot=
tom:0px;break-before:page;color:rgb(0,0,0)">   support the most recently pu=
blished version of DTLS, which was DTLS=C2=A0</pre><div><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">=C2=A0 =C2=A01.2 [</span><a href=3D"https=
://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347" title=3D"&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Sec=
urity Version 1.2&quot;" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px">RFC6347</a><span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">] when this RFC was published.=
=C2=A0</span>&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>This deprecates DTLS1.0.=C2=A0=
 Are you asking for us to add a MUST support DTLS1.2?</div><div><br></div><=
div>For RFC5023, there&#39;s the following text:</div><div>&quot;<span styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">At a minimum, client and server<=
/span></div><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margi=
n-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;break-before:page;color:rgb(0,0,0)">   implemen=
tations MUST be capable of being configured to use HTTP Basic
   Authentication [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617" title=3D=
"&quot;HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication&quot;">R=
FC2617</a>] in conjunction with a connection made with
   TLS 1.0 [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246" title=3D"&quot;=
The TLS Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC2246</a>] or a subsequent standards-=
track version of TLS
   (such as [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346" title=3D"&quot=
;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1&quot;">RFC4346</a>=
]), supporting the conventions for using HTTP over=C2=A0</pre><div><span st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS described in =
[</span><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818" title=3D"&quot;HTTP=
 Over TLS&quot;" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px">RFC2818</a><span style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">].</span>&quot;</div><div><br></div><di=
v>This requires a lot of updates, but in terms of the text for TLS as it pe=
rtains to this draft, there&#39;s already text that says &quot;or a subsequ=
ent standards-track version&quot;.=C2=A0 With the document being updated to=
 deprecate the older versions, I think we&#39;re okay.=C2=A0 If you have so=
mething specific in mind or seeing something that I am not seeing, please a=
dvise.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">
<br>
- A few documents (6749, 6750, 6739) make an interesting claim about TLS<br=
>
=C2=A0 1.0 being the &quot;most widely deployed version&quot; and providing=
 the<br>
=C2=A0 &quot;broadest interoperability&quot;.<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>OK, so that was from a point in time and I think readers will unders=
tand that.=C2=A0 Are you asking for -bis updates?=C2=A0 I think deprecating=
 is fine, we&#39;ve worked with the community to see the numbers.=C2=A0 If =
it&#39;s a -bis that will help, let&#39;s separate that out.=C2=A0 If you&#=
39;d like specific updates, please advise.=C2=A0 Thanks.=C2=A0</div><div><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- Many documents note specific MTI ciphers (largely just the MTI ciphers<br=
>
=C2=A0 from the respective TLS version).=C2=A0 Since all ciphers defined fo=
r<br>
=C2=A0 1.0/1.1 also work in 1.2 (with the exception of the IDEA and DES<br>
=C2=A0 ciphers from RFC 5469, that it claims &quot;have been removed from T=
LS<br>
=C2=A0 version 1.2&quot;), these requirements in theory are still in effect=
, even<br>
=C2=A0 though those particular ciphers are not great and the badness of tho=
se<br>
=C2=A0 ciphers is a lot of the justification for deprecating the old protoc=
ol<br>
=C2=A0 versions.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t really think that a piecemeal effort to =
identify<br>
=C2=A0 and update each specific MTI cipher mention is worth the effort,<br>
=C2=A0 though it may be worth noting that TLS 1.2 has<br>
=C2=A0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as MTI and that it is preferred over th=
e<br>
=C2=A0 older MTI ciphers.=C2=A0 (Actually, it looks like a few of the speci=
fic MTI<br>
=C2=A0 mentions in the documents we&#39;re updating are already<br>
=C2=A0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, hooray.)<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</=
div><div>RFC7525 helps as well and the -bis of that to set TLSv1.2 best pra=
ctices.=C2=A0 Are you asking for any changes here? Thanks.</div><div><br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- As implied by the previous bullet point, the IDEA and DES ciphers<br>
=C2=A0 specified by RFC 5469 are now entirely obsolete, which means that th=
at<br>
=C2=A0 entire document is also obsolete (or maybe historic?).=C2=A0 It seem=
s like<br>
=C2=A0 the right thing to do to effectuate that change via this document.<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, good catch.=C2=A0 It does make sens=
e to deprecate RFC5469 with this draft after looking at the introduction an=
d purpose of the document.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC 7507<br>
=C2=A0 seems to be entirely obsolete.=C2=A0 Any implementation that is comp=
liant<br>
=C2=A0 with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.=C2=A0 If it only=
<br>
=C2=A0 supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also supports<=
br>
=C2=A0 1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS 1=
.3<br>
=C2=A0 applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., obsolete=
).<br>
=C2=A0 We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Has this been addressed in RFC8446?=C2=A0 =
If not, the specific downgrade examples are just listed as examples.=C2=A0 =
If a gap is left, then the full document should not be deprecated and made =
obsolete.=C2=A0 The text infers other versions in my read.=C2=A0 I have not=
 looked to see if this was addressed in RFC8446 yet though.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Thanks.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">
<br>
- We list RFC 8465 as being updated, but it doesn&#39;t seem to say anythin=
g<br>
=C2=A0 at all about TLS or reference the relevant RFCs.<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>OK, I played with the numbers and RFC 8645 does mention TL=
S, but is specific to present versions.=C2=A0 I think it&#39;s safe to remo=
ve this from the list.=C2=A0 Thanks for catching that.</div><div>=C2=A0</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 although only makes an=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0informative reference to [RFC4346].<br></blockquote><div>From =
the text, I think it&#39;s still important to deprecate the use of TLSv1.1 =
in this document.=C2=A0 If you take a look at the connection establishment =
section (2.3)</div><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333p=
x;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;break-before:page;color:rgb(0,0,0)">   2=
.  after completing the TCP handshake, immediately negotiate TLS
       sessions according to [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc524=
6" title=3D"&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&q=
uot;">RFC5246</a>] or its predecessor TLS 1.1.  The
       following restrictions apply:

       *  Support for TLS v1.1 [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4=
346" title=3D"&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1=
&quot;">RFC4346</a>] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
          [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246" title=3D"&quot;T=
he Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>])=
 is REQUIRED.  To prevent known attacks on TLS
          versions prior to 1.1, implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS=C2=
=A0</pre><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:13.3333px">=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 versi=
ons prior to 1.1.</span></div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>I think it&#39;s import=
ant to have the updates and not miss the opportunity.=C2=A0 Do you want spe=
cific text for this text as well?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The text in question seems to be:<br>
<br>
%=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0*=C2=A0 Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346] or later (e.g.,=
 TLS 1.2<br>
%=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 [RFC5246]) is REQUIRED.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
And RFC 5246 is a normative reference for it.=C2=A0 So we may want to say<b=
r>
&quot;has a requirement for TLSv1.1 or later, although only makes an<br>
informative reference to [RFC4346].=C2=A0 This requirement is updated to be=
<br>
for TLSv1.2 or later.&quot;<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Would you l=
ike specific text to update section 2.3 as well?</div><div>I think just dro=
pping the first clause and removing the full sentence of the second referen=
ce in 2.3 would work.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204)=
;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document updates DTLS [RFC6347].<br>
<br>
I note that in the thread from my preliminary review there was some<br>
support for the sentiment that these changes do not formally Update<br>
6347, in that what 6347 says about version negotiation is still true; we<br=
>
just tell you not to do it.<br>
(<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/YUySQbMVJPv31Fwv68rEp=
cmBMsM/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/=
arch/msg/tls/YUySQbMVJPv31Fwv68rEpcmBMsM/</a>)<br>
But, if we do keep the Updates: relationship, I think we want to say<br>
slightly more, e.g., noting that the interoperation with DTLS 1.0 that<br>
it describes is now forbidden.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That&#39=
;s fine with me.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as wel=
l as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r=
2], RFC<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A07457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs.=C2=A0 Although the a=
ttacks have<br>
<br>
Are the &quot;other referenced RFCs&quot; referenced from 7457 or from this=
<br>
document.=C2=A0 This document references ... quite a few RFCs, so either wa=
y<br>
we should probably clarify.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That text w=
as from before the search to find the many RFCs that reference the deprecat=
ed versions.=C2=A0 Let&#39;s just drop &quot;and other referenced RFCs&quot=
; as those are good references.</div><div>=C2=A0Thanks for catching that.</=
div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library relea=
ses for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward wil=
l be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigated in older library releases.<br>
<br>
[The wording here is kind of convoluted; I&#39;ve suggested an alternative<=
br>
in the aforementioned pull request.]<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>OK=
, thanks.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied=
 with<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 &q=
uot;History<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0of TLS&quot; (with references changed for RFC formatting).=C2=
=A0</blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
(The version of SP800-52r2 that we reference has been withdrawn.=C2=A0 We<b=
r>
should probably check that the quotation in question has not changed if<br>
we update to reference a current version of the NIST document.)<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>OK, here is the current and published version link=
:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIS=
T.SP.800-52r2.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NI=
ST.SP.800-52r2.pdf</a></div><div><br></div><div>The text appears in section=
 1.1 of the same name and it looks like it&#39;s just altered slightly towa=
rds the end.=C2=A0 Here&#39;s the text in the published version:<br><br>&qu=
ot;TLS 1.1, specified in RFC 4346 [24], was developed to address weaknesses=
 discovered in TLS
1.0, primarily in the areas of initialization vector selection and padding =
error processing.
Initialization vectors were made explicit^4 to prevent a certain class of a=
ttacks on the Cipher=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>4 The initialization ve=
ctor (IV) must be sent; it cannot be derived from a state known by both par=
ties, such as the previous
message.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operat=
ion used by TLS. The handling of padding errors was
altered to treat a padding error as a bad message authentication code rathe=
r than a decryption
failure. In addition, the TLS 1.1 RFC acknowledges attacks on CBC mode that=
 rely on the time
to compute the message authentication code (MAC). The TLS 1.1 specification=
 states that to
defend against such attacks, an implementation must process records in the =
same manner
regardless of whether padding errors exist. Further implementation consider=
ations for CBC
modes (which were not included in RFC 4346 [24]) are discussed in Section 3=
.3.2.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>TLS 1.2, specified in RFC 5246 [25], m=
ade several cryptographic enhancements, particularly in
the area of hash functions, with the ability to use or specify the SHA-2 fa=
mily of algorithms for
hash, MAC, and Pseudorandom Function (PRF) computations. TLS 1.2 also adds =
authenticated
encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher suites.=C2=A0</div><div><br><=
/div><div>TLS 1.3, specified in RFC 8446 [57], represents a significant cha=
nge to TLS that aims to address
threats that have arisen over the years. Among the changes are a new handsh=
ake protocol, a new
key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Deri=
vation Function
(HKDF) [37], and the removal of cipher suites that use RSA key transport or=
 static DiffieHellman (DH) key exchanges, the CBC mode of operation, or SHA=
-1. Many extensions defined
for use with TLS 1.2 and previous versions cannot be used with TLS 1.3. &qu=
ot;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex">
<br>
Section 3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running=
 SHA-1<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0hash of the exchanged messages.=C2=A0 This makes it possible t=
o perform a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perfo=
rm 2^77<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.<=
br>
<br>
The 2^77 number seems to be the <a href=3D"http://pre-shattered.io" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">pre-shattered.io</a> number.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on sign=
atures<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 =
and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server wh=
en it<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.<br>
<br>
Having reviewed the WGLC thread and the papers linked therefrom, I&#39;m<br=
>
suggesting that we change this to &quot;not appreciably stronger&quot; (alo=
ng with<br>
adding the missing article to &quot;using SHA-1 hash&quot;).=C2=A0 In parti=
cular,<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacry=
pt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf</a><br>
suggests that MD5 is particularly weak, and that attacking SHA-1 will<br>
continue to be the bulk of the work even as attacks on SHA-1 become more<br=
>
efficient than O(2^58), so that the difference is mostly just the factor<br=
>
of 64 for the Joux multicollision.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ther=
e&#39;s a separate draft on SHA-1 and MD5, how would you like to see this h=
andled?</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex">
<br>
Section 4<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used.=C2=A0 Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from an=
y version of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS MUST NOT be permitted.<br>
<br>
(editorial) I&#39;m not sure how much precedent there is for a construction=
<br>
that talks about negotiating one version of TLS &quot;from&quot; some other=
<br>
version of TLS.=C2=A0 In my head the negotiation is something that&#39;s do=
ne by<br>
or from an implementation, rather than a version.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t want to=
<br>
insist on anything here, but I probably would have written something<br>
more like &quot;negotiation of TLSv1.0 by any implementation of TLS MUST NO=
T<br>
be permitted&quot;.=C2=A0 (And similarly for the following section.)<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>The current text was written that was as it&#=
39;s common to see downgrade negotiation details in specs.=C2=A0 There&#39;=
s a subtle difference in what&#39;s there versus what&#39;s been proposed a=
s a change.=C2=A0 The current text is stating that downgrades to these depr=
ecated versions is not permitted.=C2=A0 I read your proposed=C2=A0text as s=
tating the same thing as what is said in the first sentence.</div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.0.=C2=A0 TL=
Sv1.0 can be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0configured to prevent interception, though using the highest v=
ersion<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0available is preferable.<br>
<br>
This second sentence seems almost like it&#39;s undercutting the premise of=
<br>
MUST NOT use.=C2=A0 Would it be better to say something like &quot;While TL=
Sv1.0<br>
can be configured to prevent some types of interception, using the<br>
highest version available is preferred&quot;?=C2=A0 (Similarly for the foll=
owing<br>
section.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not seeing a big diff=
erence in this nit.=C2=A0 I think this may be a difference only in the auth=
or&#39;s preference and regional preferences.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the re=
cord<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0sending ClientHello.=C2=A0 Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperab=
ility,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0though no definitive value is identified as ideal.=C2=A0 That =
guidance is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number=
 for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.<br>
<br>
This &quot;MUST accept any value&quot; seems redundant with Appendix D.2 of=
 RFC<br>
8446, which is also giving guidance in this space (but we don&#39;t<br>
currently link to).=C2=A0 (Similarly for the following section.)<br></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>Yes, this text is=C2=A0 purposefully similar.=C2=
=A0 I don&#39;t see why we&#39;d=C2=A0link to RFC8446.=C2=A0 Am I missing s=
omething?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex">
<br>
Section 5<br>
<br>
Should we also wrap the DTLSv1.0 bits in here?=C2=A0 (Or have a dedicated<b=
r>
section?)=C2=A0 We don&#39;t currently have specific statements like &quot;=
DTLSv1.0<br>
MUST NOT be used&quot;, &quot;MUST NOT send a ClientHello with<br>
ClientHello.client_version set to {254,255}&quot;, etc.<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>I thought there was a reason, but will defer to Stephen on=
 this.=C2=A0 I=C2=A0 think I had added the prior section and perhaps it was=
 just because DTLS had not been added to this document yet, but I think the=
re may have been more to it?</div><div><br></div><div>Stephen, do you have =
anything to add/change?</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for the careful rev=
iew to improve the document, Ben.</div><div><br></div><div>Best regards,</d=
iv><div>Kathleen=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Ben<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div>Best regards,</div><di=
v>Kathleen</div></div></div></div>

--00000000000034877305acb40fdb--


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Dear, list,

Sorry for sending this past the last call.

Few comments on the draft, which are:

- On Section 1:

"For clarity, we will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a
"certificate", or "delegation certificate", and the one issued by the
operator as a "delegated credential" or "DC"."

I think this sentence can be their own paragraph, so it does not get
lost with the rest of the text. It will be good to clarify as well the
usage of 'credential', 'delegation', 'delegator' terms used through out
the document. It will be really nice to clarify the term 'credential' as
it sometimes seems to be used to refer to 'delegated credential', and
sometimes to the 'Credential' struct.

- On section 7.3

"Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early
revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated
credential would revoke the credential. Revocation of the long term
private key that signs the delegated credential also implicitly
revokes the delegated credential."

Not sure how the implicit revocation will work. It is my understanding
that the sole way to check that a DC is revoked is by verifying its
valid time, and this is the way that renders it 'invalid'.
Maybe, the DC is valid until it expires regardless if the long-term
private key is revoked, as I don't see a way to mark the DC invalid when
the long-term private key revokes. But perhaps, I'm understanding this
incorrectly.

In that case, how the DC signed by a revoked key will be treated? Should
it wait until they expire to render them completely explicitly invalid?


I have other minor editorial changes that I'll send as a PR.

Thanks!





-- 
Sofía Celi
@claucece
http://claucece.github.io/
Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at
Cloudflare
FAB9 3EDC 7CDD 1198 DCFD  4558 91BB 6B45 6F44 2D02


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From: tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
CC: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>, TLS Chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/pxCMTUIiOkkMIbWS6ej_eEe939Y>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>=0A=
Sent: 11 August 2020 18:06=0A=
=0A=
On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:30:39AM +0000, tom petch wrote:=0A=
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Christopher Wood <caw@heapi=
ngbits.net>=0A=
> Sent: 04 August 2020 19:16=0A=
>=0A=
> The official minutes are now up:=0A=
>=0A=
>    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.iet=
f.org_doc_minutes-2D108-2Dtls_&d=3DDwICAg&c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3Dss=
sDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=3DbJwecPEDnXCm7Huw2ovjHwHyzCjhy=
u2kGMG-qijduH0&s=3DksaUzUpfyd4LFplcfnjfXdGBN-jTrMiqS2Z1vk_Iftw&e=3D=0A=
>=0A=
> <tp>=0A=
> What is Benjamin talking about at the end?=0A=
>=0A=
> It looks as if you are proposing action on all or some RFC that have TLS =
1.0 or 1.1 as MTI, related to oldversions-deprecate but that is a guess fro=
m reading between the lines and that topic is a live one for me so I would =
appreciate clarity.=0A=
=0A=
oldversions-deprecate is already taking action on all RFCs that have TLS 1.=
0 or=0A=
1.1 as MTI (there are some 80-odd documents in the Updates: header).  The=
=0A=
particular itesm I was mentioning in the meeting relate to various subsets =
of=0A=
those documents that may need some additional handling on top of the basic=
=0A=
"don't use TLS 1.0/1.1; use 1.2 and 1.3 instead" that is currently the cont=
ent=0A=
of the updates.  Details are at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K=
9_uA6m0dD_oQCw-5kAbha-Kq5M/=0A=
So:=0A=
=0A=
- RFC 5469 defines DES and IDEA ciphers that are not in TLS 1.2; the=0A=
  document as a whole should be historic=0A=
=0A=
- The downgrade-detection SCSV of RFC 7507 is probably in a similar boat=0A=
=0A=
- We should be more clear about "if the document being updated says you=0A=
  MUST use TLS 1.0/1.1, that part is removed"=0A=
<tp>=0A=
Benjamin=0A=
=0A=
This is the bit I could not guess; the rest of the minutes I could guess bu=
t your explanation is much easier to understand.  I have been tracking 'die=
diedie', including the AD review, since it first appeared and more a commen=
t on that for Kathleen and Stephen is that RFC5953 does not get a mention a=
lthough since it is Obsoleted and the Normative Reference is to RFC4347 the=
n that is a category that does not seem to fit in any of the paragraphs of =
the I-D;  Obsolete and TLS1.0 yes, Obsolete and DTLS1.0 no. =0A=
=0A=
RFC6353 I did expect to find; Internet Standard, STD0078, Normative Referen=
ce to RFC4347; the Security Considerations of that RFC say 'MUST NOT negoti=
ate SSL 2.0' which might not be considered sufficiently strong for 2020 but=
 how do you update a Standard?=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
=0A=
- No change proposed w.r.t. MTI ciphers (even though the old MTI ciphers=0A=
  are no longer considered very good)=0A=
=0A=
Were there additional specific items you were unsure about?=0A=
=0A=
-Ben=0A=


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From: tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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Subject: [TLS] Fw:  Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108
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Kathleen=0A=
=0A=
I have some thoughts below on RFC5953 and RFC6353 which I cannot find in de=
precate but thought that I would.=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
________________________________________=0A=
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.co=
m>=0A=
Sent: 13 August 2020 12:33=0A=
To: Benjamin Kaduk=0A=
Cc: TLS Chairs; TLS@ietf.org=0A=
Subject: Re: [TLS] Draft minutes for TLS at IETF 108=0A=
=0A=
From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>=0A=
Sent: 11 August 2020 18:06=0A=
=0A=
On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:30:39AM +0000, tom petch wrote:=0A=
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Christopher Wood <caw@heapi=
ngbits.net>=0A=
> Sent: 04 August 2020 19:16=0A=
>=0A=
> The official minutes are now up:=0A=
>=0A=
>    https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.iet=
f.org_doc_minutes-2D108-2Dtls_&d=3DDwICAg&c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3Dss=
sDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=3DbJwecPEDnXCm7Huw2ovjHwHyzCjhy=
u2kGMG-qijduH0&s=3DksaUzUpfyd4LFplcfnjfXdGBN-jTrMiqS2Z1vk_Iftw&e=3D=0A=
>=0A=
> <tp>=0A=
> What is Benjamin talking about at the end?=0A=
>=0A=
> It looks as if you are proposing action on all or some RFC that have TLS =
1.0 or 1.1 as MTI, related to oldversions-deprecate but that is a guess fro=
m reading between the lines and that topic is a live one for me so I would =
appreciate clarity.=0A=
=0A=
oldversions-deprecate is already taking action on all RFCs that have TLS 1.=
0 or=0A=
1.1 as MTI (there are some 80-odd documents in the Updates: header).  The=
=0A=
particular itesm I was mentioning in the meeting relate to various subsets =
of=0A=
those documents that may need some additional handling on top of the basic=
=0A=
"don't use TLS 1.0/1.1; use 1.2 and 1.3 instead" that is currently the cont=
ent=0A=
of the updates.  Details are at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K=
9_uA6m0dD_oQCw-5kAbha-Kq5M/=0A=
So:=0A=
=0A=
- RFC 5469 defines DES and IDEA ciphers that are not in TLS 1.2; the=0A=
  document as a whole should be historic=0A=
=0A=
- The downgrade-detection SCSV of RFC 7507 is probably in a similar boat=0A=
=0A=
- We should be more clear about "if the document being updated says you=0A=
  MUST use TLS 1.0/1.1, that part is removed"=0A=
<tp>=0A=
Benjamin=0A=
=0A=
This is the bit I could not guess; the rest of the minutes I could guess bu=
t your explanation is much easier to understand.  I have been tracking 'die=
diedie', including the AD review, since it first appeared and more a commen=
t on that for Kathleen and Stephen is that RFC5953 does not get a mention a=
lthough since it is Obsoleted and the Normative Reference is to RFC4347 the=
n that is a category that does not seem to fit in any of the paragraphs of =
the I-D;  Obsolete and TLS1.0 yes, Obsolete and DTLS1.0 no.=0A=
=0A=
RFC6353 I did expect to find; Internet Standard, STD0078, Normative Referen=
ce to RFC4347; the Security Considerations of that RFC say 'MUST NOT negoti=
ate SSL 2.0' which might not be considered sufficiently strong for 2020 but=
 how do you update a Standard?=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
=0A=
- No change proposed w.r.t. MTI ciphers (even though the old MTI ciphers=0A=
  are no longer considered very good)=0A=
=0A=
Were there additional specific items you were unsure about?=0A=
=0A=
-Ben=0A=
=0A=
_______________________________________________=0A=
TLS mailing list=0A=
TLS@ietf.org=0A=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=0A=


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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 11:30:02 -0600
From: David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Fri, Aug 07, 2020 at 05:56:30PM -0600, David Fifield wrote:
> Most of the functions of the Great Firewall work bidirectionally, and
> the ESNI detection and blocking are no exception. Sending an
> ESNI-containing ClientHello from *outside* of China to a server
> *inside* results in temporary blocking, just the same as sending one
> from the inside to the outside. This makes it easy to experiment with,
> even if you don't control a host in China.

Triggering blocking from the outside no longer works. ESNI connections
that originate inside the firewall are still blocked. This was first
observed by GFW report, who were able to isolate the change from
bidirectionality to unidirectional to a five-minute window: between
06:27 and 06:32 UTC on 2020-08-13. I tried it myself, and I confirm that
I am not now able to trigger ESNI blocking from outside the firewall.
https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/43#issuecomment-673322409


From nobody Thu Aug 13 10:54:24 2020
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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 10:54:13 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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Hi Kathleen,

Also inline.

On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> Thanks for your review.  Some initial responses are inline.
> 
> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> > Thanks for putting together the -06 based on my preliminary comments, and
> > my apologies for taking so long to get back to it.  It turns out that going
> > through the 80-odd documents we update takes a while!
> >
> >
> > I have a bunch of suggestions that are basically editorial, that I'll
> > make a pull request for (along with suggested changes for several of the
> > following comments).  It's up at:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3
> 
> 
> Thanks for that!
> 
> >
> >
> > We mention in the Abstract (but not Introduction!) that this document
> > moves 2246 and 4346 (but not 6347!) to the historic state.
> > Unfortunately, this is slightly problematic from a process perspective,
> > since the current way to make things Historic
> > (
> > https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/designating-rfcs-historic-2014-07-20
> > )
> > requires a separate "status change document" that gets its own IETF LC,
> > to effectuate the status change.  Most references to the status change
> > document can be replaced by this RFC after it's published, but formally
> > the move to historic is *not* done by this document.  I've pulled into
> > my pull request the language used in RFC 8429 to describe moves to
> > Historic; please make sure to reproduce that language in the
> > Introduction as well as the Abstract.
> >
> 
> Do you need us to submit a draft to request that status change?

No -- it's done purely in the datatracker without an I-D, so I will plan to
do that.  (Unfortunately, it has to be one status-change document per
status-change, so it'll be a lot of clicking for me, but that's life.)

> >
> > I found three documents (3656, 4540, 7562) in the list of update targets
> > that are on the ISE (not IETF) stream.  I had talked to Adrian during my
> > preliminary review, and in principle it is permissible to make those
> > updates as part of this document, but we will need specific ISE approval
> > to do so.  I am supposed to sync up with him during IETF LC, but the
> > document needs to be updated to clarify that the updates of ISE
> > documents are/will be done with permission of the ISE.  (Please also try
> > to double-check that the list is complete; I didn't find an
> > authoritative list of "all documents on the ISE stream" to grep against,
> > and I didn't try to have something parse rfc-index.xml to output such a
> > list.
> >
> 
> OK, so you'd like a list added and that's not in your pull request, is that
> right?  We'll figure it out. Thanks in advance with the coordination with
> Adrian.

That's correct, this is not in my pull request (not least because that list
of three documents is incomplete -- I sent a more-likely-complete list of 6
documents in an off-list follow-up.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?stream_name=Independent&page=All
will get a (presumably authoritative) list of ISE-stream documents, FWIW.

> 
> >
> > I note that in addition to our BCP 195 update (called out in Section 6),
> > we also update 3552, which is BCP 72.  This update is quite incidental
> > (compared to our BCP 195 update), so it seems clear that having this
> > document be part of BCP 195 is correct.
> >
> 
> Are you asking here to include an update to RFC3552?   Thanks.

No change needed here, I think -- just noting that we already list RFC 3552
as being updated, but that we don't need to be part of BCP 72, since the
update in question is largely incidental.

> >
> > Section 1.1
> >
> > I went through all 83 of the references in the big list, that are
> > supposed to be ones that "normatively reference TLS 1.0/1.1 or DTLS 1.0,
> > as well as the shorter list of already-obsoleted documents.
> >
> > I won't bore you with my full notes, but there are some particular
> > things that stood out from the review:
> >
> > - We have a separate list of updates for documents that are already
> >   obsolete (but don't say much about why we're going go the extra
> >   bother).  However, three of the documents in our main list of updates
> >   (4743, 4744, and 6460) are already Historic, and presumably should be
> >   treated more like the already-obsolete ones.
> >
> 
> Obsolete does not mean the same thing as deprecate though.  TLSv1.2 has
> been obsoleted by TLSv1.3, but not deprecated.  The deprecation goes the
> extra step to say not to use it and it triggers many to begin phase out
> plans.  Am I misunderstanding the question?

I think you're misunderstanding the question, yes, sorry.

I think we want the documents that are Historic to be listed separately
from the other ("regular") updates, in a manner akin to what is already
done for the documents that are currently obsolete.  Or, perhaps, to say
that there is no point in deprecating something that is already historic,
and not bother updating those three documents, but it seems okay to keep
the current status with a comprehensive list of updates.

> 
> >
> > - Several documents (e.g., 8261, 5023) specifically have MUST-level
> >   requirements for 1.0 (or 1.1) that disappear or become internally
> >   inconsistent with our current update, so we might want to fill that
> >   void.
> >
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean here.  This draft will update the ones listed.
> RFC8261 just has the following:
> "The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347>] and SHOULD
> 
>    support the most recently published version of DTLS, which was DTLS
> 
>    1.2 [RFC6347 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>] when this RFC was
> published. "
> 
> This deprecates DTLS1.0.  Are you asking for us to add a MUST support
> DTLS1.2?

It's not clear that there's need to put in a MUST-level requirement. I was
envisioning something more like "some of the documents being updated in
this manner had specific requirements to support, implement, and/or use a
specific (D)TLS version; it is expected that implementations adopting the
updates made by this document will cause (D)TLS 1.2 to fulril that role
instead".  Or maybe that goes without saying, and there's no need to add
more text; I don't have a strong opinion.

> For RFC5023, there's the following text:
> "At a minimum, client and server
> 
>    implementations MUST be capable of being configured to use HTTP Basic
>    Authentication [RFC2617 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617>] in
> conjunction with a connection made with
>    TLS 1.0 [RFC2246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246>] or a
> subsequent standards-track version of TLS
>    (such as [RFC4346 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346>]),
> supporting the conventions for using HTTP over
> 
>    TLS described in [RFC2818 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818>]."
> 
> This requires a lot of updates, but in terms of the text for TLS as it
> pertains to this draft, there's already text that says "or a subsequent
> standards-track version".  With the document being updated to deprecate the
> older versions, I think we're okay.  If you have something specific in mind
> or seeing something that I am not seeing, please advise.

I am definitely *not* proposing to add specific per-document updates to
each document in this category!  So we're looking at something generic like
my suggestion above, or nothing at all, I think.
> 
> > - A few documents (6749, 6750, 6739) make an interesting claim about TLS
> >   1.0 being the "most widely deployed version" and providing the
> >   "broadest interoperability".
> >
> 
> OK, so that was from a point in time and I think readers will understand
> that.  Are you asking for -bis updates?  I think deprecating is fine, we've
> worked with the community to see the numbers.  If it's a -bis that will
> help, let's separate that out.  If you'd like specific updates, please
> advise.  Thanks.

I don't have specific updates/text changes in mind here, it just seemed
notable as a particular mention of the now-obsolete TLS versions.

> 
> > - Many documents note specific MTI ciphers (largely just the MTI ciphers
> >   from the respective TLS version).  Since all ciphers defined for
> >   1.0/1.1 also work in 1.2 (with the exception of the IDEA and DES
> >   ciphers from RFC 5469, that it claims "have been removed from TLS
> >   version 1.2"), these requirements in theory are still in effect, even
> >   though those particular ciphers are not great and the badness of those
> >   ciphers is a lot of the justification for deprecating the old protocol
> >   versions.  I don't really think that a piecemeal effort to identify
> >   and update each specific MTI cipher mention is worth the effort,
> >   though it may be worth noting that TLS 1.2 has
> >   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as MTI and that it is preferred over the
> >   older MTI ciphers.  (Actually, it looks like a few of the specific MTI
> >   mentions in the documents we're updating are already
> >   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, hooray.)
> >
> 
> RFC7525 helps as well and the -bis of that to set TLSv1.2 best practices.
> Are you asking for any changes here? Thanks.

My take is no changes here, but leaving an opportunity for other opinions
to appear (if they exist).

> 
> > - As implied by the previous bullet point, the IDEA and DES ciphers
> >   specified by RFC 5469 are now entirely obsolete, which means that that
> >   entire document is also obsolete (or maybe historic?).  It seems like
> >   the right thing to do to effectuate that change via this document.
> >
> 
> Yes, good catch.  It does make sense to deprecate RFC5469 with this draft
> after looking at the introduction and purpose of the document.

In light of
https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/designating-rfcs-historic-2014-07-20/
I'm inclined to say we should run the "move to historic" procedure for this
one.

> 
> >
> > - Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC 7507
> >   seems to be entirely obsolete.  Any implementation that is compliant
> >   with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.  If it only
> >   supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also supports
> >   1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS 1.3
> >   applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., obsolete).
> >   We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.
> >
> 
> Has this been addressed in RFC8446?  If not, the specific downgrade
> examples are just listed as examples.  If a gap is left, then the full
> document should not be deprecated and made obsolete.  The text infers other
> versions in my read.  I have not looked to see if this was addressed in
> RFC8446 yet though.

I'd really like to get a few more people to weigh in on this one -- IIRC
David Benjamin and Martin Thomson had mentioned some thoughts in the chat
during the session at 108, and Ekr as author of 8446 would be expected to
have a good sense of what it does.  

The specific RFC 8446 mechanism here is described at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3 : "TLS 1.3 has a
downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's random value.
[...]"

While the RFC 8446 mechanism has the client do the actual detection of
downgrade, there's a MUST-level requirement on clients to make the check,
so from a specification point of view the check can be treated as reliable.
The RFC 7507 mechanism has the server do the detection, but I think the end
result is still the same: in an "downgraded" exchange between two honest
participants, the handshake fails and the downgrade is detected.

Since the functionality is still useful, just superseded, this one seems
like a better fit for "obsoletes" (vs. "historic).

> Thanks.
> 
> >
> > - We list RFC 8465 as being updated, but it doesn't seem to say anything
> >   at all about TLS or reference the relevant RFCs.
> >
> 
> OK, I played with the numbers and RFC 8645 does mention TLS, but is
> specific to present versions.  I think it's safe to remove this from the
> list.  Thanks for catching that.

Okay, thanks for checking.

> 
> >
> >
> >    [RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 although only makes an
> >    informative reference to [RFC4346].
> >
> From the text, I think it's still important to deprecate the use of TLSv1.1
> in this document.  If you take a look at the connection establishment
> section (2.3)
> 
>    2.  after completing the TCP handshake, immediately negotiate TLS
>        sessions according to [RFC5246
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>] or its predecessor TLS 1.1.
> The
>        following restrictions apply:
> 
>        *  Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346>] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
>           [RFC5246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>]) is
> REQUIRED.  To prevent known attacks on TLS
>           versions prior to 1.1, implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS
> 
>                       versions prior to 1.1.
> 
> I think it's important to have the updates and not miss the opportunity.
> Do you want specific text for this text as well?

[Er, this part was just me quoting a snippet from the draft so that I could
comment on it, below]

> 
> > The text in question seems to be:
> >
> > %     *  Support for TLS v1.1 [RFC4346] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
> > %        [RFC5246]) is REQUIRED.  [...]
> >
> > And RFC 5246 is a normative reference for it.  So we may want to say
> > "has a requirement for TLSv1.1 or later, although only makes an
> > informative reference to [RFC4346].  This requirement is updated to be
> > for TLSv1.2 or later."
> >
> 
> Would you like specific text to update section 2.3 as well?
> I think just dropping the first clause and removing the full sentence of
> the second reference in 2.3 would work.

That would be okay with me, though my proposal was more limited in scope --
just noting that since we already have a sentence specific to RFC 6614's
updates, we could add a few more words to explain the apparent oddity,
e.g.,

OLD:
   [RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 although only makes an
   informative reference to [RFC4346].

NEW:
   [RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 or later, although only makes an
   informative reference to [RFC4346].

or possibly:
   [RFC6614] has a requirement for TLSv1.1 or later, although only makes an
   informative reference to [RFC4346], since [RFC5246] was the current
   version of TLS when RFC 6614 was published.


> 
> >
> >    This document updates DTLS [RFC6347].
> >
> > I note that in the thread from my preliminary review there was some
> > support for the sentiment that these changes do not formally Update
> > 6347, in that what 6347 says about version negotiation is still true; we
> > just tell you not to do it.
> > (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/YUySQbMVJPv31Fwv68rEpcmBMsM/)
> > But, if we do keep the Updates: relationship, I think we want to say
> > slightly more, e.g., noting that the interoperation with DTLS 1.0 that
> > it describes is now forbidden.
> >
> 
> That's fine with me.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 2
> >
> >    Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as
> >    their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC
> >    7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs.  Although the attacks have
> >
> > Are the "other referenced RFCs" referenced from 7457 or from this
> > document.  This document references ... quite a few RFCs, so either way
> > we should probably clarify.
> >
> 
> That text was from before the search to find the many RFCs that reference
> the deprecated versions.  Let's just drop "and other referenced RFCs" as
> those are good references.
>  Thanks for catching that.

That works for me; thanks for the background.

> 
> >
> >    been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for
> >    these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be
> >    mitigated in older library releases.
> >
> > [The wording here is kind of convoluted; I've suggested an alternative
> > in the aforementioned pull request.]
> >
> 
> OK, thanks.
> 
> 
> >
> >    NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with
> >    permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History
> >    of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting).
> 
> 
> > (The version of SP800-52r2 that we reference has been withdrawn.  We
> > should probably check that the quotation in question has not changed if
> > we update to reference a current version of the NIST document.)
> >
> 
> OK, here is the current and published version link:
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf
> 
> The text appears in section 1.1 of the same name and it looks like it's
> just altered slightly towards the end.  Here's the text in the published
> version:
> 
> "TLS 1.1, specified in RFC 4346 [24], was developed to address weaknesses
> discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of initialization vector
> selection and padding error processing. Initialization vectors were made
> explicit^4 to prevent a certain class of attacks on the Cipher
> 
> 4 The initialization vector (IV) must be sent; it cannot be derived from a
> state known by both parties, such as the previous message.
> 
> Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation used by TLS. The handling of padding
> errors was altered to treat a padding error as a bad message authentication
> code rather than a decryption failure. In addition, the TLS 1.1 RFC
> acknowledges attacks on CBC mode that rely on the time to compute the
> message authentication code (MAC). The TLS 1.1 specification states that to
> defend against such attacks, an implementation must process records in the
> same manner regardless of whether padding errors exist. Further
> implementation considerations for CBC modes (which were not included in RFC
> 4346 [24]) are discussed in Section 3.3.2.
> 
> TLS 1.2, specified in RFC 5246 [25], made several cryptographic
> enhancements, particularly in the area of hash functions, with the ability
> to use or specify the SHA-2 family of algorithms for hash, MAC, and
> Pseudorandom Function (PRF) computations. TLS 1.2 also adds authenticated
> encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher suites.
> 
> TLS 1.3, specified in RFC 8446 [57], represents a significant change to TLS
> that aims to address threats that have arisen over the years. Among the
> changes are a new handshake protocol, a new key derivation process that
> uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [37],
> and the removal of cipher suites that use RSA key transport or static
> DiffieHellman (DH) key exchanges, the CBC mode of operation, or SHA-1. Many
> extensions defined for use with TLS 1.2 and previous versions cannot be
> used with TLS 1.3. "

Seems like it should be safe to update the reference and quoted text
(though maybe not leave the footnote inline).

> 
> > Section 3
> >
> >    The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
> >    hash of the exchanged messages.  This makes it possible to perform a
> >    downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
> >    operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
> >
> > The 2^77 number seems to be the pre-shattered.io number.
> >
> >    Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
> >    made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and
> >    SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it
> >    is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.
> >
> > Having reviewed the WGLC thread and the papers linked therefrom, I'm
> > suggesting that we change this to "not appreciably stronger" (along with
> > adding the missing article to "using SHA-1 hash").  In particular,
> > https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf
> > suggests that MD5 is particularly weak, and that attacking SHA-1 will
> > continue to be the bulk of the work even as attacks on SHA-1 become more
> > efficient than O(2^58), so that the difference is mostly just the factor
> > of 64 for the Joux multicollision.
> >
> 
> There's a separate draft on SHA-1 and MD5, how would you like to see this
> handled?

My proposals here are pretty minor -- change 2^77 to 2^65, and "not
stronger" to "not appreciably stronger".

> 
> >
> > Section 4
> >
> >    TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used.  Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of
> >    TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
> >
> > (editorial) I'm not sure how much precedent there is for a construction
> > that talks about negotiating one version of TLS "from" some other
> > version of TLS.  In my head the negotiation is something that's done by
> > or from an implementation, rather than a version.  I don't want to
> > insist on anything here, but I probably would have written something
> > more like "negotiation of TLSv1.0 by any implementation of TLS MUST NOT
> > be permitted".  (And similarly for the following section.)
> >
> 
> The current text was written that was as it's common to see downgrade
> negotiation details in specs.  There's a subtle difference in what's there
> versus what's been proposed as a change.  The current text is stating that
> downgrades to these deprecated versions is not permitted.  I read your
> proposed text as stating the same thing as what is said in the first
> sentence.

Okay, feel free to ignore this comment, then.

> 
> >
> >    Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.0.  TLSv1.0 can be
> >    configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
> >    available is preferable.
> >
> > This second sentence seems almost like it's undercutting the premise of
> > MUST NOT use.  Would it be better to say something like "While TLSv1.0
> > can be configured to prevent some types of interception, using the
> > highest version available is preferred"?  (Similarly for the following
> > section.)
> >
> 
> I'm not seeing a big difference in this nit.  I think this may be a
> difference only in the author's preference and regional preferences.

I'm happy to leave this alone for now.

> 
> >
> >    Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
> >    layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
> >    sending ClientHello.  Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
> >    TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
> >    though no definitive value is identified as ideal.  That guidance is
> >    still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
> >    {03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
> >    ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.
> >
> > This "MUST accept any value" seems redundant with Appendix D.2 of RFC
> > 8446, which is also giving guidance in this space (but we don't
> > currently link to).  (Similarly for the following section.)
> >
> 
> Yes, this text is  purposefully similar.  I don't see why we'd link to
> RFC8446.  Am I missing something?

There's no particular need to reference it; I was just noting that we had
the option of replacing most of this with "appendix D.2 of RFC 8446
requires that a server ignore the TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version, which
includes {03,00}" if we wanted to avoid redundant requirements text.

> 
> > Section 5
> >
> > Should we also wrap the DTLSv1.0 bits in here?  (Or have a dedicated
> > section?)  We don't currently have specific statements like "DTLSv1.0
> > MUST NOT be used", "MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
> > ClientHello.client_version set to {254,255}", etc.
> >
> 
> I thought there was a reason, but will defer to Stephen on this.  I  think
> I had added the prior section and perhaps it was just because DTLS had not
> been added to this document yet, but I think there may have been more to it?
> 
> Stephen, do you have anything to add/change?
> 
> Thanks for the careful review to improve the document, Ben.

And thank you for the updates!

-Ben


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Subject: [TLS] Handshake-level vs record-level padding in TLS ECH
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Hi all,

In discussing ECH (draft-ietf-tls-esni) with some QUIC folks, we identified
some places where the extension would not easily apply to QUIC unmodified.
One of them is ECH=E2=80=99s integration of handshake information (anonymit=
y set of
certificates, etc.) with TLS record-level padding. Since QUIC both replaces
the record layer and runs over UDP, that means this padding crosses
TLS/QUIC public APIs and must be integrated into QUIC retransmission logic.

I wrote some notes up in the GitHub issue here:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264

I wanted to find out both WGs=E2=80=99 thoughts on how to handle padding he=
re, as
it seems we have a mismatch between the interfaces TLS assumes and QUIC
provides. The HTTP/3 draft briefly mentions a similar issue and has its own
stream-level padding story alongside the transport-level one.
https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-http.html#name-padding-and-t=
raffic-analysi

We could match that in ECH, which would remove the need for TLS and QUIC to
coordinate here but adds another padding mechanism. Or we could leave
things as-is, which means ECH will require folks to add a parameter to
their TLS/QUIC APIs and then implement more complex retransmission logic
before usefully deploying ECH. (Something that should probably be reflected
in the QUIC spec.)

David

--0000000000001f29ef05acc623cd
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi all,<br><br>In discussing ECH (draft-ietf-tls-esni) wit=
h some QUIC folks, we identified some places where the extension would not =
easily apply to QUIC unmodified. One of them is ECH=E2=80=99s integration o=
f handshake information (anonymity set of certificates, etc.) with TLS reco=
rd-level padding. Since QUIC both replaces the record layer and runs over U=
DP, that means this padding crosses TLS/QUIC public APIs and must be integr=
ated into QUIC retransmission logic.<br><br>I wrote some notes up in the Gi=
tHub issue here:<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=
/issues/264">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264</a><br=
><br>I wanted to find out both WGs=E2=80=99 thoughts on how to handle paddi=
ng here, as it seems we have a mismatch between the interfaces TLS assumes =
and QUIC provides. The HTTP/3 draft briefly mentions a similar issue and ha=
s its own stream-level padding story alongside the transport-level one.<br>=
<a href=3D"https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-http.html#name-pa=
dding-and-traffic-analysi">https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-h=
ttp.html#name-padding-and-traffic-analysi</a><br><br>We could match that in=
 ECH, which would remove the need for TLS and QUIC to coordinate here but a=
dds another padding mechanism. Or we could leave things as-is, which means =
ECH will require folks to add a parameter to their TLS/QUIC APIs and then i=
mplement more complex retransmission logic before usefully deploying ECH. (=
Something that should probably be reflected in the QUIC spec.)<br><br>David=
<br></div>

--0000000000001f29ef05acc623cd--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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Weird. Thanks for the update. How are you confirming that it's blocked =
from inside-out?



> On Aug 13, 2020, at 10:30 AM, David Fifield <david@bamsoftware.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Fri, Aug 07, 2020 at 05:56:30PM -0600, David Fifield wrote:
>> Most of the functions of the Great Firewall work bidirectionally, and
>> the ESNI detection and blocking are no exception. Sending an
>> ESNI-containing ClientHello from *outside* of China to a server
>> *inside* results in temporary blocking, just the same as sending one
>> from the inside to the outside. This makes it easy to experiment =
with,
>> even if you don't control a host in China.
>=20
> Triggering blocking from the outside no longer works. ESNI connections
> that originate inside the firewall are still blocked. This was first
> observed by GFW report, who were able to isolate the change from
> bidirectionality to unidirectional to a five-minute window: between
> 06:27 and 06:32 UTC on 2020-08-13. I tried it myself, and I confirm =
that
> I am not now able to trigger ESNI blocking from outside the firewall.
> https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/43#issuecomment-673322409
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Possible blocking of Encrypted SNI extension in China
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On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 01:04:48PM -0700, Carrick Bartle wrote:
> Weird. Thanks for the update. How are you confirming that it's blocked from inside-out?

I couldn't test it myself, so I am relying on the reports of colleagues
in China. GFW Report is able to test directly from China.

Measurement vantage points in China are tricky to get ahold of. A
possible alternative is to use a reflected measurement system in the
style of Quack, which uses infrastructural echo servers:
https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#VanderSloot2018a
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/vandersloot
https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/2
Censored Planet does regular Quack measurements, but I don't think they
are testing ESNI yet: https://censoredplanet.org/data/raw


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Hi list,

Some of you might have noticed a barrage of issues filed recently against
draft-ietf-tls-esni on GitHub. These are all relatively minor, but
resolving some of them may require changes for the next draft, so I wanted
to summarize them here. These were flagged while Chris Wood and I were
working through some editorial changes.

Links to the issues are given below, including a brief description. We'd
welcome any feedback you might have on these.

Thanks,
Chris P.


https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261: The spec assumes
that HPKE uses an HKDF cipher suite.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262: Possible bug in
"outer_extensions" extension logic.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/263: Role of the hash
in "outer_extensions" is unclear.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265: Question about
"outer_extensions" usage guidance.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266: Security
considerations around SNI leakage.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/267: "ech_accept" is
undefined.

--0000000000003b5e6105acc92ced
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi list,</div><div><br></div><div>Some of you might h=
ave noticed a barrage of issues filed recently against draft-ietf-tls-esni =
on GitHub. These are all relatively minor, but resolving some of them may r=
equire changes for the next draft, so I wanted to summarize them here. Thes=
e were flagged while Chris Wood and I were working through some editorial c=
hanges.</div><div><br></div><div>Links to the issues are given below, inclu=
ding a brief description. We&#39;d welcome any feedback you might have on t=
hese.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Chris P.<br></div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-t=
ls-esni/issues/261">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261=
</a>: The spec assumes that HPKE uses an HKDF cipher suite.</div><div><br><=
/div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/26=
2">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262</a>: Possible bu=
g in &quot;outer_extensions&quot; extension logic.<br></div><div><br></div>=
<div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/263">ht=
tps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/263</a>: Role of the hash=
 in &quot;outer_extensions&quot; is unclear.<br></div><div><br></div><div><=
a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265">https://=
github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265</a>: Question about &quot;o=
uter_extensions&quot; usage guidance.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"h=
ttps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266">https://github.com/=
tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266</a>: Security considerations around SN=
I leakage.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dra=
ft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/267">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/i=
ssues/267</a>: &quot;ech_accept&quot; is undefined.</div><div><br></div></d=
iv>

--0000000000003b5e6105acc92ced--


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Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 09:45:39 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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Thank you for the review, Sof=C3=ADa. I'm looking forward to the PR. Once t=
hat
lands we'll submit a version of the doc with WGLC#2 comments incorporated.

Nick

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 12:35 AM Sof=C3=ADa Celi <cherenkov@riseup.net> wro=
te:

> Dear, list,
>
> Sorry for sending this past the last call.
>
> Few comments on the draft, which are:
>
> - On Section 1:
>
> "For clarity, we will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a
> "certificate", or "delegation certificate", and the one issued by the
> operator as a "delegated credential" or "DC"."
>
> I think this sentence can be their own paragraph, so it does not get
> lost with the rest of the text. It will be good to clarify as well the
> usage of 'credential', 'delegation', 'delegator' terms used through out
> the document. It will be really nice to clarify the term 'credential' as
> it sometimes seems to be used to refer to 'delegated credential', and
> sometimes to the 'Credential' struct.
>
> - On section 7.3
>
> "Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early
> revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated
> credential would revoke the credential. Revocation of the long term
> private key that signs the delegated credential also implicitly
> revokes the delegated credential."
>
> Not sure how the implicit revocation will work. It is my understanding
> that the sole way to check that a DC is revoked is by verifying its
> valid time, and this is the way that renders it 'invalid'.
> Maybe, the DC is valid until it expires regardless if the long-term
> private key is revoked, as I don't see a way to mark the DC invalid when
> the long-term private key revokes. But perhaps, I'm understanding this
> incorrectly.
>
> In that case, how the DC signed by a revoked key will be treated? Should
> it wait until they expire to render them completely explicitly invalid?
>
>
> I have other minor editorial changes that I'll send as a PR.
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Sof=C3=ADa Celi
> @claucece
> http://claucece.github.io/
> Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at
> Cloudflare
> FAB9 3EDC 7CDD 1198 DCFD  4558 91BB 6B45 6F44 2D02
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--00000000000099225005acd92710
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thank you for the review, Sof=C3=ADa. I&#39;m looking forw=
ard to the PR. Once that lands we&#39;ll submit a version of the doc with W=
GLC#2 comments incorporated.<div><br></div><div>Nick</div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 13, 2=
020 at 12:35 AM Sof=C3=ADa Celi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cherenkov@riseup.net"=
>cherenkov@riseup.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">Dear, list,<br>
<br>
Sorry for sending this past the last call.<br>
<br>
Few comments on the draft, which are:<br>
<br>
- On Section 1:<br>
<br>
&quot;For clarity, we will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a<b=
r>
&quot;certificate&quot;, or &quot;delegation certificate&quot;, and the one=
 issued by the<br>
operator as a &quot;delegated credential&quot; or &quot;DC&quot;.&quot;<br>
<br>
I think this sentence can be their own paragraph, so it does not get<br>
lost with the rest of the text. It will be good to clarify as well the<br>
usage of &#39;credential&#39;, &#39;delegation&#39;, &#39;delegator&#39; te=
rms used through out<br>
the document. It will be really nice to clarify the term &#39;credential&#3=
9; as<br>
it sometimes seems to be used to refer to &#39;delegated credential&#39;, a=
nd<br>
sometimes to the &#39;Credential&#39; struct.<br>
<br>
- On section 7.3<br>
<br>
&quot;Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early<br>
revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated<br>
credential would revoke the credential. Revocation of the long term<br>
private key that signs the delegated credential also implicitly<br>
revokes the delegated credential.&quot;<br>
<br>
Not sure how the implicit revocation will work. It is my understanding<br>
that the sole way to check that a DC is revoked is by verifying its<br>
valid time, and this is the way that renders it &#39;invalid&#39;.<br>
Maybe, the DC is valid until it expires regardless if the long-term<br>
private key is revoked, as I don&#39;t see a way to mark the DC invalid whe=
n<br>
the long-term private key revokes. But perhaps, I&#39;m understanding this<=
br>
incorrectly.<br>
<br>
In that case, how the DC signed by a revoked key will be treated? Should<br=
>
it wait until they expire to render them completely explicitly invalid?<br>
<br>
<br>
I have other minor editorial changes that I&#39;ll send as a PR.<br>
<br>
Thanks!<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Sof=C3=ADa Celi<br>
@claucece<br>
<a href=3D"http://claucece.github.io/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>http://claucece.github.io/</a><br>
Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at<br>
Cloudflare<br>
FAB9=C2=A03EDC=C2=A07CDD=C2=A01198=C2=A0DCFD=C2=A0=C2=A04558=C2=A091BB=C2=
=A06B45=C2=A06F44=C2=A02D02<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000099225005acd92710--


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I have two comments:

1) The OID assignment for the ASN.1 module was assigned already by IANA. =
 Please fill it in.

2) I think it would be very helpful to have an example of the extension =
in an Appendix.  There was discussion on the list about it, and an error =
was found in the proposed example, which proves the need for an example.

Russ


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+8/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC35)
  8 issues created:
  - "ech_accept" response type undefined. (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/267=20
  - Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266=20
  - "outer_extensions": Guidance on what to compress (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265=20
  - Handshake-level vs record-level padding (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264=20
  - "outer_extensions": What's the purpose of the hash? (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/263=20
  - "outer_extensions" mechanism is lossy compression (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262=20
  - Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261=20
  - Add a high-level description of the security goal and threat model to t=
he intro (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/260=20

  5 issues received 35 new comments:
  - #266 Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors (1 by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266=20
  - #264 Handshake-level vs record-level padding (5 by chris-wood, davidben=
, kazuho, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264=20
  - #262 "outer_extensions" mechanism is lossy compression (12 by chris-woo=
d, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262=20
  - #261 Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF (4 by chris-wood, cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261=20
  - #253 Nonce rationale clarity (13 by bemasc, chris-wood, cjpatton, david=
ben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/253=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Address WGLC #2 comments (by grittygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/78=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC6)
  6 pull requests submitted:
  - Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/268=20
  - WIP:  (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=20
  - Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258=20
  - Adopt QUIC linter, and fix some issues flagged. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/257=20
  - s/cleartext/plaintext/g (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/256=20
  - Lint (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=20

  3 pull requests received 6 new comments:
  - #259 WIP: Editorial changes (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=20
  - #258 Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (3 by bemasc, chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258=20
  - #255 Lint (2 by chris-wood, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=20

  4 pull requests merged:
  - WIP: Editorial changes
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=20
  - Adopt QUIC linter, and fix some issues flagged.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/257=20
  - Editorial
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/256=20
  - Lint
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<h1>Sunday August 16, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+8/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC35)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">8 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#267 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
67">&quot;ech_accept&quot; response type undefined.</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#266 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
66">Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#265 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
65">&quot;outer_extensions&quot;: Guidance on what to compress</a> (by cjpa=
tton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#264 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
64">Handshake-level vs record-level padding</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#263 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
63">&quot;outer_extensions&quot;: What&#x27;s the purpose of the hash?</a> =
(by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#262 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
62">&quot;outer_extensions&quot; mechanism is lossy compression</a> (by cjp=
atton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#261 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
61">Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#260 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
60">Add a high-level description of the security goal and threat model to t=
he intro</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>5 issues received 35 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#266 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
66">Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors</a> (1 by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#264 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
64">Handshake-level vs record-level padding</a> (5 by chris-wood, davidben,=
 kazuho, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#262 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
62">&quot;outer_extensions&quot; mechanism is lossy compression</a> (12 by =
chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#261 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
61">Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF</a> (4 by chris-wood, cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#253 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
53">Nonce rationale clarity</a> (13 by bemasc, chris-wood, cjpatton, davidb=
en) </li>
  </ul>


<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#78 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/issues/78">Addre=
ss WGLC #2 comments</a> (by grittygrease) </li>
  </ul>





<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC6)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">6 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#268 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/268=
">Fix superfluous padding edge cases.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#259 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=
">WIP: </a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#258 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258=
">Fix superfluous padding edge cases.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#257 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/257=
">Adopt QUIC linter, and fix some issues flagged.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#256 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/256=
">s/cleartext/plaintext/g</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#255 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=
">Lint</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests received 6 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#259 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=
">WIP: Editorial changes</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#258 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/258=
">Fix superfluous padding edge cases.</a> (3 by bemasc, chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#255 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=
">Lint</a> (2 by chris-wood, martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#259 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/259=
">WIP: Editorial changes</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#257 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/257=
">Adopt QUIC linter, and fix some issues flagged.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#256 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/256=
">Editorial</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#255 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/255=
">Lint</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============7750504318488318262==--


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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 16:39:38 +0100
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From: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>
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Subject: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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I am not very familiar with IETF working group practices, however it
strikes me as surely unusual to have a document enter Last Call
(supposedly believed by its owners to be ready for publication) and yet
immediately then be revised showing it was in fact not ready at all.

However this seems to be what happened to draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact.
The below comments concern draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact-02, the newer
document.

Section 4.1 Perfect Forward Secrecy ends:

> TLS session data.ss

I think this is a typographical error and the trailing "ss" should be
removed from the document. If not it should be explained.



Section 4.2 Encrypted Server Certificate describes a practice which is
inherently unsound. Passive inspection of the Certificate message from
TLS 1.2 or earlier isn't a reliable source of information because a
passive eavesdropper isn't able to discern whether the X.509 document
presented corresponds to this server or not. The Client can confirm
this using the TLS protocol but an eavesdropper can't. So the change in
TLS 1.3 does not impact the practical security policy available, only an
appearance is altered.

Passive systems described throughout Section 5.1 fall to this same
error, using the phrase "reduced effectiveness" which the document
defines as not being "as effective on TLS 1.3 traffic" but in fact
since this practice didn't work, it will remain exactly as effective
(not at all) as before.

A related consequence passes into Section 5.2. Since the Certificate
message is only reliable for a Client, it has in fact always been
necessary to fully proxy the TLS session in order to rely on this data,
so this is not in fact an impact from TLS 1.3 but (if it wasn't done
previously for all versions) a vulnerability in such products.


As it stands then, this document is misleading.

Nick.


From nobody Mon Aug 17 10:32:22 2020
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--000000000000965ac905ad1626b5
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

The chairs would like to have an interim to resolve the remaining open
issues for ECH.  Since we need 2 weeks notice we are targeting the week of
September first.   Please fill out the following with your available times
if you are interested in attending:

https://doodle.com/poll/wa4633uafmvdr9hv

We might make this a recurring meeting until we can resolve all the
issues.  Please respond by the evening of Tuesday August 18.

Thanks,

Joe and Sean

--000000000000965ac905ad1626b5
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">The chairs would like to have an interim to resolve the re=
maining open issues for ECH.=C2=A0 Since we need 2 weeks notice we are targ=
eting the week of September first.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Please fill out the followin=
g with your available times if you are interested in attending:<div><br></d=
iv><div><a href=3D"https://doodle.com/poll/wa4633uafmvdr9hv">https://doodle=
.com/poll/wa4633uafmvdr9hv</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>We might make t=
his a recurring meeting until we can resolve all the issues.=C2=A0 Please r=
espond by the evening of Tuesday August 18.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks=
,</div><div><br></div><div>Joe and Sean</div></div>

--000000000000965ac905ad1626b5--


From nobody Mon Aug 17 13:55:06 2020
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Subject: [TLS] ECH usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption?
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--000000000000f9b34a05ad18fb6f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi list,

In the current ECH specification (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07), the server
provides no indication of whether the inner or outer ClientHello (CH) was
used. This means the client must do trial decryption to make this
determination, which creates implementation complexity and potentially
raises security concerns. I was hoping to get your thoughts on a couple
alternatives, which strike different balances between implementation
complexity and other design considerations for ECH. Follow along here:

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274

Thanks,
Chris P.

--000000000000f9b34a05ad18fb6f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi list,</div><div><br></div><div>In the current ECH =
specification (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07), the server provides no indication o=
f whether the=20
inner or outer ClientHello (CH) was used. This means the client must do=20
trial decryption to make this determination, which creates implementation c=
omplexity and potentially raises security concerns. I was hoping to get you=
r thoughts on a couple alternatives, which strike different balances betwee=
n implementation complexity and other design considerations for ECH. Follow=
 along here:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/d=
raft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=
/issues/274</a></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Chris P.<br></di=
v><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>

--000000000000f9b34a05ad18fb6f--


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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 14:09:51 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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HPKE recently removed the Hash() interface from the KDF, which means we need to either (a) change how the config_digest (formerly record_digest) is computed, or (b) constrain ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites. This PR takes approach (b):

   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271

Please have a look and provide feedback. 

Thanks,
Chris


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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 14:11:04 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: [TLS] ECH padding edge cases
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Ben Schwartz found some problems and edge cases with the current ECH padding policy text [1]. This PR proposes a fix:

   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/268

Please have a look and provide feedback. 

Thanks,
Chris

[1] https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/252


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:21:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption?
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Thanks for writing this up! We've been pondering this subject as well, as
part of identifying places where ECH and QUIC interact interestingly. (The
other being the padding issue in
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264.)

As with the padding issue, QUIC replaces the record layer, so all the
handshake/record-layer coordination here must cross the TLS/QUIC public
API. TLS must configure two different keys for QUIC, then QUIC must trial
decrypt and report back to TLS which keys were used. In contrast, something
that lives entirely in the handshake should apply to QUIC without
modifications.

I think in essence we=E2=80=99re running into QUIC sandwiching itself betwe=
en the
TLS handshake and records layer, despite that =E2=80=9Cinterface=E2=80=9D n=
ot being quite
fully understood yet.

(I'm not sure what's IETF email etiquette for joining related WGs to an
existing thread, so I'll forward this separately to the QUICWG, so they can
join the discussion.)

David

On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 4:55 PM Christopher Patton <cpatton=3D
40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi list,
>
> In the current ECH specification (draft-ietf-tls-esni-07), the server
> provides no indication of whether the inner or outer ClientHello (CH) was
> used. This means the client must do trial decryption to make this
> determination, which creates implementation complexity and potentially
> raises security concerns. I was hoping to get your thoughts on a couple
> alternatives, which strike different balances between implementation
> complexity and other design considerations for ECH. Follow along here:
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274
>
> Thanks,
> Chris P.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000007529a405ad195aff
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thanks for writing this up! We&#39;ve been pondering =
this subject as well, as part of identifying places where ECH and QUIC inte=
ract interestingly. (The other being the padding issue in=C2=A0<a href=3D"h=
ttps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264</a>.)</div><div><br>=
</div><div>As with the padding issue, QUIC replaces the record layer, so al=
l the handshake/record-layer coordination here must cross the TLS/QUIC publ=
ic API. TLS must configure two different keys for QUIC, then QUIC must tria=
l decrypt and report back to TLS which keys were used. In contrast, somethi=
ng that lives entirely in the handshake should apply to QUIC without modifi=
cations.</div><div><br></div><div>I think in essence we=E2=80=99re running =
into QUIC sandwiching itself between the TLS handshake and records layer, d=
espite that =E2=80=9Cinterface=E2=80=9D not being quite fully understood ye=
t.<br></div><div><br></div><div>(I&#39;m not sure what&#39;s IETF email eti=
quette for joining related WGs to an existing thread, so I&#39;ll=C2=A0forw=
ard this separately to the QUICWG, so they can join the discussion.)</div><=
div><br></div><div>David</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 4:55 PM Christopher Patton =
&lt;cpatton=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"=
_blank">40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi list,</div>=
<div><br></div><div>In the current ECH specification (draft-ietf-tls-esni-0=
7), the server provides no indication of whether the=20
inner or outer ClientHello (CH) was used. This means the client must do=20
trial decryption to make this determination, which creates implementation c=
omplexity and potentially raises security concerns. I was hoping to get you=
r thoughts on a couple alternatives, which strike different balances betwee=
n implementation complexity and other design considerations for ECH. Follow=
 along here:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/d=
raft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/d=
raft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274</a></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><di=
v>Chris P.<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 07:42:09 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 07:09, Christopher Wood wrote:
> HPKE recently removed the Hash() interface from the KDF, which means we 
> need to either (a) change how the config_digest (formerly 
> record_digest) is computed, or (b) constrain ECH to HKDF-based HPKE 
> ciphersuites. This PR takes approach (b):
> 
>    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271
> 
> Please have a look and provide feedback. 

Was there discussion about just defining a set of hash function identifiers and adding those to the config?

Or maybe just running the HPKE KDF with a fixed input.  Unless I've missed something critical, you don't need any sort of preimage resistance for this, it's only for identification purposes.


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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 14:55:37 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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Hi Martin,


> Or maybe just running the HPKE KDF with a fixed input.

Do you mean something like this? Let `config_digest = KDF.extract("some
salt", "some label", config)`, where `config` is the ECH configuration?

Unless I've missed something critical, you don't need any sort of preimage
> resistance for this, it's only for identification purposes.
>
The manner in which `config_digest` is computed could be significant to
"don't stick out", depending on how you define this property. For example,
one requirement for the hash function might be that it is one-way.

Chris P.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Martin, <br></div>=C2=A0<div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Or maybe just running the HPKE KDF with a fixed input.</blockquote><div>Do =
you mean something like this? Let `config_digest =3D KDF.extract(&quot;some=
 salt&quot;, &quot;some label&quot;, config)`, where `config` is the ECH co=
nfiguration?<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex"> Unless I&#39;ve missed something critical, you don&#39;t need =
any sort of preimage resistance for this, it&#39;s only for identification =
purposes.<br></blockquote><div>The manner in which `config_digest` is compu=
ted could be significant to &quot;don&#39;t stick out&quot;, depending on h=
ow you define this property. For example, one requirement for the hash func=
tion might be that it is one-way.</div><div><br></div><div>Chris P.<br></di=
v><div><br></div><br></div></div>

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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 08:30:18 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Christopher Patton" <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 07:55, Christopher Patton wrote:
> Hi Martin, 
>  
> > Or maybe just running the HPKE KDF with a fixed input.
> Do you mean something like this? Let `config_digest = KDF.extract("some 
> salt", "some label", config)`, where `config` is the ECH configuration?

Sure.  I would probably use all of HKDF though, see below.

> > Unless I've missed something critical, you don't need any sort of 
> preimage resistance for this, it's only for identification purposes.
> The manner in which `config_digest` is computed could be significant to 
> "don't stick out", depending on how you define this property. For 
> example, one requirement for the hash function might be that it is 
> one-way.

So the current system has the property that anyone in possession of the original config can confirm that this is the config in use.  And we have assumed that the config does not contain secrets.

Being unable to recover one input seems to be a KDF property.  We could feed config to that input (for the full HKDF, that would be IKM, I think).  See definition 7 in https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf, which supports the theory that a KDF is a PRF with respect to at least one input (\sigma in the same).

I think that the only case where being able to compute the inverse becomes interesting is if the config contains a secret.  Let's say that you use a config that includes a PSK.  The answer there could just be "don't do that then".  Or we could work something out (for example, a nonce of sufficient length might ensure that a secret could not be reconstructed even if everything else were predictable).


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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 16:04:10 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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Just to be clear, you're proposing something like this? Referring to the
KDF API called for in draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05:

config_digest = Expand(PRK=Extract("some_salt", "some_label", IKM=config),
"some_info", 16)
It's maybe more hashing than necessary, but I'd be good with this.

Chris P.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Just to be clear, you&#39;re proposing something like=
 this? Referring to the KDF API called for in draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05:<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>config_digest =3D Expand(PRK=3DExtract(&quot;some_=
salt&quot;, &quot;some_label&quot;, IKM=3Dconfig), &quot;some_info&quot;, 1=
6)<br></div><div></div><div>It&#39;s maybe more hashing than necessary, but=
 I&#39;d be good with this.</div><div><br></div><div>Chris P.<br></div></di=
v>

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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 16:05:40 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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On Mon, Aug 17, 2020, at 3:30 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 07:55, Christopher Patton wrote:
> > Hi Martin, 
> >  
> > > Or maybe just running the HPKE KDF with a fixed input.
> > Do you mean something like this? Let `config_digest = KDF.extract("some 
> > salt", "some label", config)`, where `config` is the ECH configuration?
> 
> Sure.  I would probably use all of HKDF though, see below.

If we're going to use all of HKDF (extract + expand), then let's just use the HPKE's Extract+Expand functions in sequence. 

Best,
Chris


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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 09:27:39 +1000
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: "Christopher Patton" <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 09:04, Christopher Patton wrote:
> Just to be clear, you're proposing something like this? Referring to 
> the KDF API called for in draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05:
> 
> config_digest = Expand(PRK=Extract("some_salt", "some_label", 
> IKM=config), "some_info", 16)
> It's maybe more hashing than necessary, but I'd be good with this.

Something like that yeah.  And yes, that's a lot of hashing.  But that's a lower-order concern.  Maybe if we try to find a KDF that doesn't cost so much to operate we won't feel so bad about this.


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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 16:57:36 -0700
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Constraining ECH to HKDF-based HPKE ciphersuites
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--00000000000090d4af05ad1b89df
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

I worked out this suggestion into a PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276

Please have a look!
Chris P.

On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 4:28 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 09:04, Christopher Patton wrote:
> > Just to be clear, you're proposing something like this? Referring to
> > the KDF API called for in draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05:
> >
> > config_digest = Expand(PRK=Extract("some_salt", "some_label",
> > IKM=config), "some_info", 16)
> > It's maybe more hashing than necessary, but I'd be good with this.
>
> Something like that yeah.  And yes, that's a lot of hashing.  But that's a
> lower-order concern.  Maybe if we try to find a KDF that doesn't cost so
> much to operate we won't feel so bad about this.
>

--00000000000090d4af05ad1b89df
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I worked out this suggestion into a PR:</div><div><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276</a></div><div><br></div><div>Plea=
se have a look!</div><div>Chris P.<br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 4:28 PM=
 Martin Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mt@lowentropy.net">mt@lowentropy.net<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><=
br>
<br>
On Tue, Aug 18, 2020, at 09:04, Christopher Patton wrote:<br>
&gt; Just to be clear, you&#39;re proposing something like this? Referring =
to <br>
&gt; the KDF API called for in draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; config_digest =3D Expand(PRK=3DExtract(&quot;some_salt&quot;, &quot;so=
me_label&quot;, <br>
&gt; IKM=3Dconfig), &quot;some_info&quot;, 16)<br>
&gt; It&#39;s maybe more hashing than necessary, but I&#39;d be good with t=
his.<br>
<br>
Something like that yeah.=C2=A0 And yes, that&#39;s a lot of hashing.=C2=A0=
 But that&#39;s a lower-order concern.=C2=A0 Maybe if we try to find a KDF =
that doesn&#39;t cost so much to operate we won&#39;t feel so bad about thi=
s.<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000090d4af05ad1b89df--


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To: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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Dear Nick and list,

The PR is here now: https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79
Looking forward to been submitted to WGLC#2.

Thanks!

-- 
Sofía Celi
@claucece
http://claucece.github.io/
Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at
Cloudflare
FAB9 3EDC 7CDD 1198 DCFD  4558 91BB 6B45 6F44 2D02


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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 08:26:41 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
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Hi Carrick,

Sorry for the delay. Please see inline below!

On Thu, Jul 9, 2020, at 10:09 PM, Carrick Bartle wrote:
> Isn=E2=80=99t the rerouting attack described in Section 4 not possible=
 if "A"=20
> uses the SNI extension and "C" aborts the connection on mismatch? If=20=

> so, it might be worth mentioning that as a potential mitigation (as th=
e=20
> Selfie paper does).

Indeed. That seems like a fine thing to mention.

> > "C" has completed the handshake, ostensibly with "A".
> "C" did in fact complete the handshake with "A." (Without mistaking it=
=20
> for some other endpoint or something.)

+1, I'm fine with dropping that bit.

> > Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if a PAKE is=20=

> used with TLS.
> Maybe cite a document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs=20=

> with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?

I'd rather not cite one (now), especially since that document is expired=
. Perhaps we can file an issue to add a citation later on?

> >  Applications should take precautions when using external PSKs to mi=
tigate these risks.
> What sort of precautions should they take?

Filed: https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36

> > Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are=20
> explicitly designed to support mutual authentication.
> Isn't mutual authentication, in general, orthogonal to linkability?=20=

> Certificates, for example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be=20=

> linked across connections.

This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the network. An=
y sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be linkable, b=
e it an external PSK ID or a certificate.=20

> > Below, we list some example use-cases where pair-wise external PSKs=20=

> with TLS have been used for authentication.
> I assume "pair-wise" here means a PSK is shared between only one serve=
r=20
> and one client, but this the term "pair-wise" hasn't been associated=20=

> with that concept in this document, it's not completely clear. Since=20=

> "pair-wise" is used twice in the document, maybe define it when the=20=

> concept is first introduced.

Yep, I agree.

> > primarily for the purposes of supporting TLS connections with fast=20=

> open (0-RTT data)
> I've only ever heard "fast open" used in the context of TFO, which is=20=

> distinct from (albeit similar to) 0-RTT. Using "fast open" to refer to=
=20
> 0-RTT sounds like it's conflating terms. Shouldn't "early data" be use=
d=20
> here instead of "fast open"?

I think the two phrases are basically equivalent, but if using "early da=
ta" is more clear, let's go with that.=20

> > In this use-case, resource-constrained IoT devices act as TLS client=
s=20
> and share the same PSK.  The devices use this PSK for quickly=20
> establishing connections with a central server.  Such a scheme ensures=
=20
> that the client IoT devices are legitimate members of the system.
> If the IoT devices only talk to a central server and not each other,=20=

> why do they all need the same PSK?
>=20
> > To perform rare system specific operations that require a higher=20
> security level, the central server can request resource-intensive=20
> client authentication with the usage of a certificate after=20
> successfully establishing the connection with a PSK.
> If you're going to authenticate with a cert, why bother preceding that=
=20
> with an authentication with a PSK?

Good question. I'll let Mohit answer this, but my impression was that, u=
nlike the PSKs, each node has its own private key, which seemingly allow=
s the server to authenticate a specific client.

> > 6.1.  Provisioning Examples
> This section contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly=20
> without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? Are=
=20
> there any pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?

It's meant to be informational without any comment on the pros and cons =
of each.=20

> > Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user passwords.
> Isn't that precisely the point of this draft? Seems unnecessary to=20
> mention. (Or it might be better to move this point to the intro as a=20=

> motivating factor of this document.)

Great suggestion!

> > PSK provisioning systems are often constrained in application-specif=
ic ways.  For example, although one goal of provisioning is to ensure th=
at each pair of nodes has a unique key pair, some systems do not want to=
 distribute pair-wise shared keys to achieve this.
> Why not? What application-specific constraint would warrant that?

Pointing again to Mohit for the IoT case. :-)

(We might just replace "do not want to" with "might not want to", and le=
ave it at that.)
=20
> > some systems require the provisioning process to embed=20
> application-specific information in either PSKs or their identities.
> Is it really a good idea to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that no=
t=20
> diminish the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that=20=

> sort of information in the identity?

It is probably desirable to use the identity for this purpose since, wel=
l, its application-specific identifying information. This is just commen=
ting on the state of affairs, I think.=20

> > Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently under=20=

> discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.
> What does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, EAP-TLS-PSK=20=

> needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's referring to.

It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK use =
case better than I do, though, so I'll let him answer.=20

> > Applications MUST use external PSKs that adhere to the following=20
> requirements:
> I think you mean "If an application uses external PSKs, the PSKs MUST=20=

> adhere to the following requirements." Otherwise it sounds like you're=
=20
> saying every application must use an external PSK.

Yep, that would be more clear.

> > Each PSK SHOULD be derived from at least 128 bits of entropy
> Recommend a particular method for doing that?

I don't think that's necessary. Any suitable method will suffice.

> > Note that these mechanisms do not necessarily follow the same=20
> architecture as the ordinary process for incorporating EPSKs described=
=20
> in this draft.
> Where was the ordinary process for incorporating EPSKs described? Is=20=

> "incorporating" a PSK the same as "provisioning" one? If so, several=20=

> ways were described. What's the problem with these mechanisms (e.g.=20=

> PAKE) having a different architecture from these ordinary processes?=20=

> Are they not compatible?

I'm not seeing this text in the editor's copy, so I'm not sure what the =
context is.

> >    3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers [I-D.ietf-tls-externa=
l-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of TLS client and serve=
r.
> Why?

Because that interface exists to enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and be=
yond.=20

> > OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external PSK=
s=20
> via distinct ciphersuites.
> This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph goes=
=20
> on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to OpenSSL fo=
r=20
> TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support=20=

> in BoringSSL.

We didn't want to go into version-specific details here, but yes, that's=
 right.=20

> > PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix for roaming and federat=
ion.
> What do roaming and federation mean here? Is there a source that discu=
sses this?

Hmm, probably? Mohit, can you please drop in a reference?

> > Deployments should take care that the length of the PSK identity is =
sufficient to avoid obvious collisions.
> What's the difference between a "collision" and an "obvious collision"=
?

Nothing. We can drop "obivous."

> > This means that if a PSK identity collision occurs, the application =
will be given precedence over how to handle the PSK.
> How should the application handle the collision?

That's an application-specific decision, so we don't specify it.=20

> I'm happy to make the suggested changes in a PR if they look ok.

Yes, please!

Best,
Chris


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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:45:38 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance
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Hi Watson,

Apologies for the delay. I filed this issue to track your feedback: 

   https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/41

I think the issues and editorial suggestions you make are sound. I'll propose some text soon.

Best,
Chris 

On Mon, Jul 6, 2020, at 12:47 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear WG,
> 
> I've taken a look at the draft and I think while its discussion of the
> properties and limitations of the external PSKs are good, I think the
> recommendations in section 7 could use some minor editorial work.
> 
> In particular  "SHOULD be combined with a DH exchange for forward
> secrecy." I would like to see rephrased to make clear that this is
> about the TLS PSK Key Exchange Mode. It wasn't immediately clear to me
> on first read, especially given the next sentence is (maybe) about key
> establishment outside of TLS.
> 
> "If only low-entropy keys are available, then key establishment
> mechanisms such as Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) that
> mitigate the risk of offline dictionary attacks SHOULD be employed".
> I have some questions about the meaning of this sentence. If it's
> about potential future additions to TLS ciphersuites, then it should
> be more clear that this doesn't currently exist and will in the
> future.  If it's about designing an ad-hoc key distribution mechanism
> to be run one time ahead of PSK TLS, then I think we should say so
> more clearly and provide guidance on how to do this and think through
> the implications.
> 
> Section 7.1.1. While it's a good idea to compare byte by byte, humans
> entering PSK identifiers may run into trouble due to all the ways
> visually identical strings may not actually be identical. It might be
> worth calling this out as a consideration.
> 
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
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References: <045601d64fea$e0d7f800$a287e800$@augustcellars.com> <ab10fa75-f30e-d0e2-2c29-6ec0f51bb4da@ericsson.com> <006401d653af$7b029f80$7107de80$@augustcellars.com> <4f52e8f0-eb0b-d6c6-e8bd-3f6fc0b3541e@ericsson.com> <010201d65536$6554f5b0$2ffee110$@augustcellars.com> <c3d2ff8c-762a-399b-40c2-59ddbfe387ae@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 07:28:16 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
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On Thu, Jul 9, 2020, at 3:08 AM, Mohit Sethi M wrote:
> Top posting so that others on the list can chime in.=20
>=20
> While discussing the privacy implications of external PSK identities,=20=

> Jim Schaad in his email below recommends that we could describe=20
> techniques for importing external PSK identities (that may be typed in=
=20
> by the user). He suggests that we could consider using a construct=20
> based on one way hash functions so that the typed-in external PSK=20
> identity (presumably with not so good privacy properties) are never=20=

> sent on the wire.=20

This is being discussed here:

   https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36

I think we ought to omit any particular recommendation, especially in th=
e absence of analysis. What do others think?

Thanks,
Chris

>=20
> --Mohit
>=20
> On 7/8/20 5:45 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > =20
>=20
> > =20
>=20
> > *From:* Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>=20
> > *Sent:* Wednesday, July 8, 2020 1:03 AM
> > *To:* Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.se=
thi@ericsson.com>; draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance@ietf.org
> > *Cc:* tls@ietf.org
> > *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-=
00
>=20
> > =20
>=20
> > Hi Jim,
>=20
> > On 7/6/20 7:06 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
>=20
> >>   -----Original Message----- From: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@eri=
csson.com> Sent: Monday, July 6, 2020 3:10 AM To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augus=
tcellars.com>; draft-ietf-tls-external-psk- guidance@ietf.org Cc: tls@ie=
tf.org Subject: Re: Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00  H=
i Jim,  Thanks for the review. A clarifying question in-line.  On 7/2/20=
 12:02 AM, Jim Schaad wrote: * In section 4 there is a statement that sw=
itching the roles of servers which use PSKs will lead to weakening of se=
curity properties. As this is a common scenario today in situations wher=
e you are doing server-to-server communication, it would be useful to di=
scuss just how and how much this weakening occurs.  This was a complete =
surprise to me and I don't know if it was supposed to be one.  Are there=
 mitigations that can be made?  * In section 7, The first sentence does =
not read, also It seems a bit difficult to have a MUST in there when mos=
t of the items below are SHOULDs. That seems to be a dissonance.  * Sect=
ion 7.1.1 - The idea of having domain name suffixes on PSKs seems to me =
to be a bad idea as this would seem to lower privacy levels.  I think yo=
u are referring to the PSK identity and not to the PSK.  As you know, th=
e Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) used in EAP typically need the domai=
n name suffix for roaming, federation, etc.  This is true, it is also tr=
ue that EAP is very strong on saying that if you have a choice, always s=
end an anonymous version of the NAI if you have to do it in the clear.  =
This means that the domain can be used for correlation, but you do not h=
ave the full identity for that purpose.  I think that the EMU group is g=
oing to need to look at what level of privacy protection it is going to =
desire when using a PSK, but in that case there is no need for having  a=
 domain suffix as that information is provided elsewhere.   This might r=
equire keeping the TLS tunneling as an option to deal with passive attac=
ks.=20
> > You are absolutely right about the preference for using anonymous id=
entities. draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13 currently says the following about re=
sumption:=20
>=20
> >>    It is RECOMMENDED to use a NAIs with the same realm in the resum=
ption    and the original full authentication.  This requirement allows =
EAP    packets to be routable to the same destination as the original fu=
ll    authentication.  If this recommendation is not followed, resumptio=
n    is likely to be impossible.  When NAI reuse can be done without    =
privacy implications, it is RECOMMENDED to use the same anonymous NAI   =
 in the resumption, as was used in the original full authentication.    =
E.g. the NAI @realm can safely be reused, while the NAI    ZmxleG8=3D@re=
alm cannot.=20
> > This document and the ensuing discussion pertains only to external P=
SKs and external PSK identities. I think I incorrectly used the word "is=
sue" in my previous email as a more correct choice would have been "agre=
e/establish" (i.e. the server and client agree on an external PSK and an=
 external PSK identity). RFC 8446 doesn't place any restrictions on exte=
rnal PSK identities (other than the fact that they are at least 1 byte).=
 If we are going to discourage the use of domain names in external PSK i=
dentities, would that be sufficient? What prevents me from using an exte=
rnal PSK identity of the type: my_strong_secret_psk_with_amazon_server?=20=

>=20
> > I am not sure if we should recommend randomized external PSK identit=
ies of a certain minimum length. Perhaps it might be better to add a dis=
claimer about the privacy loss from carelessly chosen external PSK ident=
ities?=20
>=20
> > [JLS] There are going to be three different cases for external PSK i=
dentities: The identity if factory provisioned and carried in a file to =
the server,  the identity is factory provisioned and read by the user fr=
om the device, and it is hand chosen.  The first two cases can definitel=
y be randomized.  I don=E2=80=99t know that having a minimum length make=
s any difference.  This is not exactly a cryptographic property.  Anothe=
r thing that might be done would be analogous to the PSK importer docume=
nt and apply a one way hash from the typed in value to the value that is=
 sent over the wire so on the wire it is just a random set of bytes.
>=20
> > Jim
>=20
> > =20
>=20
> > --Mohit
>=20
> >>     I would like to understand the nature of the resulting privacy =
loss. Is it that a passive attacker can now easily determine the server =
which issued the PSK identity (and the server where it will eventually b=
e used)?  While it I true that at least some of the privacy information =
has already been leaked in the PSK case, you know the address that is be=
ing talked to and the PSK identity that is passed.  If you look at using=
 thigs like ESNI, doing this would appear to potentially give away the v=
ery information that is being hidden in that case.   The other problem w=
ith having domain based KIDs is that you could easily get some amount of=
 correlation between the KIDs that are assigned in different domains.  Y=
ou could end up with mohit.ietf and mohit.amazon and it would be quite r=
easonable to assume that both of those identities are going to be for th=
e same entity, just in different domains.  Jim    --Mohit   * Section 7.=
1.2 - There seem to me to be three different places where collisions wil=
l occur.  The importer function could get a collision, there could be co=
llisions with pre-TLS 1.2 external identifiers and there could be collis=
ion with resumption keys.  There has been a huge discussion about this i=
n the EMU group and I don't find the text here to be sensible in term of=
 whether this is or is not a problem.  * Section 7.1.2 - One of the thin=
gs that I kept meaning to get to and just haven't done so yet, is dealin=
g with the question of can the TLS Key binders in the handshake to disti=
nguish between multiple keys that happen to have the same identity.  Per=
haps you should look to see if this does work and if it is safe.  Jim   =
 _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ie=
tf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls=20
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From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
To: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
CC: "opsec@ietf.org" <opsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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From: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>
To: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 18:45:44 +0000
Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com> wrote:  
>     Section 4.2 Encrypted Server Certificate describes a practice
> which is inherently unsound. Passive inspection of the Certificate
> message from TLS 1.2 or earlier isn't a reliable source of
> information because a passive eavesdropper isn't able to discern
> whether the X.509 document presented corresponds to this server or
> not. The Client can confirm this using the TLS protocol but an
> eavesdropper can't. So the change in TLS 1.3 does not impact the
> practical security policy available, only an appearance is altered.
> [NCW] The document describes what is in practice today with TLS 1.2
> and 1.1 whether we believe it is unsound or otherwise, it is what is
> done today.

It's not a problem for the document to describe today's practices but
it's a mistake to label them "effective" if we know they are not.

>     Passive systems described throughout Section 5.1 fall to this same
>     error, using the phrase "reduced effectiveness" which the document
>     defines as not being "as effective on TLS 1.3 traffic" but in fact
>     since this practice didn't work, it will remain exactly as
> effective (not at all) as before.
> [NCW] Again, the document is describing what is in practice today.

Describing something as "effective" when it is not effective isn't a
matter of today's practice but of a misunderstanding of what's
possible at all.

>     A related consequence passes into Section 5.2. Since the
> Certificate message is only reliable for a Client, it has in fact
> always been necessary to fully proxy the TLS session in order to rely
> on this data, so this is not in fact an impact from TLS 1.3 but (if
> it wasn't done previously for all versions) a vulnerability in such
> products. [NCW] With TLS 1.2 the observer can see the handshake thru
> completion with the Finished message before affecting a policy
> decision.

The passive eavesdropper can indeed see the handshake in TLS 1.2, but
since they were not a participant they don't actually know what it
means even though it wasn't encrypted.

For example, suppose an RSA certificate is sent and the handshake seems
to agree RSA key exchange and Client sends an EncryptedPreMasterSecret.
The passive eavesdropper has no idea if that's actually encrypted to the
RSA public key from the certificate, it's just an opaque blob.


Thus it's easily possible for an eavesdropper to witness a handshake in
which the eavesdropper believes what happened is:

Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret to the local hospital
both agreed this all worked fine and continue encrypted

The eavesdropper's "Don't eavesdrop on people's medical stuff" policy
kicks in and it allows the connection unmolested. Unfortunately what
really happened is:

Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret for the GRU data exfiltration
server ignoring the bogus certificate
$5Bn of stolen commercial documents are uploaded to the server


Nick.


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From: Jen Linkova <furry13@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 09:42:43 +1000
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To: opsec WG <opsec@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact.authors@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Conclusion of the OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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The WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact ended on Aug 18th.

During the WGLC serious technical objections were raised and some
statements the document made were questioned.

The chairs believe that there is insufficient support and no consensus
to advance the document.

The chairs would like to thank both OpSec and TLS working groups for
reviewing the document.

-- 
SY, Jen Linkova aka Furry on behalf of the OpSec WG chairs.


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Thanks for the feedback! I've posted a bunch of PRs and issues, as =
you've seen. Here are my remaining comments:

>>> Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if a PAKE is=20=

>> used with TLS.
>> Maybe cite a document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs=20=

>> with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?
>=20
> I'd rather not cite one (now), especially since that document is =
expired. Perhaps we can file an issue to add a citation later on?

Looks like Mohit already added a more up-to-date citation.

> Filed: https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36

Thanks, Mohit! :)

>>> Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are =
explicitly designed to support mutual authentication.
>> Isn't mutual authentication, in general, orthogonal to linkability?=20=

>> Certificates, for example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be=20=

>> linked across connections.
>=20
> This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the network. =
Any sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be linkable, =
be it an external PSK ID or a certificate.=20


Right, I get that. What I'm saying is that since there are solutions =
that can prevent that type of linkability (for instance, if a third =
party deals the PSKs to the server and clients, and those PSKs are never =
used more than once), the fact that PSKs are designed to support mutual =
authentication is irrelevant. (I.e., mutual authentication for one =
connection doesn't necessarily imply that the server knows it's talking =
to the same client on every connection that client makes.)

>>> 6.1.  Provisioning Examples
>> This section contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly=20
>> without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? =
Are=20
>> there any pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?
>=20
> It's meant to be informational without any comment on the pros and =
cons of each.=20


But the title is "Guidance for External PSK Usage." What is guidance if =
not a collection of recommendations?

>>> Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently under=20=

>> discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.
>> What does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, EAP-TLS-PSK=20=

>> needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's referring to.
>=20
> It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK =
use case better than I do, though, so I'll let him answer.=20

Looks like Mohit added a citation for that.

>>>   3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers =
[I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of =
TLS client and server.
>> Why?
>=20
> Because that interface exists to enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and =
beyond.=20


My understanding is that that interface doesn't enable external PSKs for =
1.3, but that it just to makes it easier and less error-prone because =
the interface generates several PSKs--one for each hash function. Is =
that the case? If so, why not mention that as the rationale as to why =
nodes SHOULD use the importer?

>>> OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external =
PSKs=20
>> via distinct ciphersuites.
>> This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph =
goes=20
>> on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to OpenSSL =
for=20
>> TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support=20=

>> in BoringSSL.
>=20
> We didn't want to go into version-specific details here, but yes, =
that's right.=20


Might be better to mention this particular version-specific detail here =
since otherwise this statement is misleading.

>>> some systems require the provisioning process to embed=20
>> application-specific information in either PSKs or their identities.
>> Is it really a good idea to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that =
not=20
>> diminish the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that=20=

>> sort of information in the identity?
>=20
> It is probably desirable to use the identity for this purpose since, =
well, its application-specific identifying information. This is just =
commenting on the state of affairs, I think.

Okay, but if this document is guidance and not just a description, =
shouldn't it also comment on whether this state of affairs is a good =
idea?

Carrick





> On Aug 18, 2020, at 8:26 AM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi Carrick,
>=20
> Sorry for the delay. Please see inline below!
>=20
> On Thu, Jul 9, 2020, at 10:09 PM, Carrick Bartle wrote:
>> Isn=E2=80=99t the rerouting attack described in Section 4 not =
possible if "A"=20
>> uses the SNI extension and "C" aborts the connection on mismatch? If=20=

>> so, it might be worth mentioning that as a potential mitigation (as =
the=20
>> Selfie paper does).
>=20
> Indeed. That seems like a fine thing to mention.
>=20
>>> "C" has completed the handshake, ostensibly with "A".
>> "C" did in fact complete the handshake with "A." (Without mistaking =
it=20
>> for some other endpoint or something.)
>=20
> +1, I'm fine with dropping that bit.
>=20
>>> Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if a PAKE is=20=

>> used with TLS.
>> Maybe cite a document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs=20=

>> with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?
>=20
> I'd rather not cite one (now), especially since that document is =
expired. Perhaps we can file an issue to add a citation later on?
>=20
>>> Applications should take precautions when using external PSKs to =
mitigate these risks.
>> What sort of precautions should they take?
>=20
> Filed: https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36
>=20
>>> Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are=20
>> explicitly designed to support mutual authentication.
>> Isn't mutual authentication, in general, orthogonal to linkability?=20=

>> Certificates, for example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be=20=

>> linked across connections.
>=20
> This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the network. =
Any sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be linkable, =
be it an external PSK ID or a certificate.=20
>=20
>>> Below, we list some example use-cases where pair-wise external PSKs=20=

>> with TLS have been used for authentication.
>> I assume "pair-wise" here means a PSK is shared between only one =
server=20
>> and one client, but this the term "pair-wise" hasn't been associated=20=

>> with that concept in this document, it's not completely clear. Since=20=

>> "pair-wise" is used twice in the document, maybe define it when the=20=

>> concept is first introduced.
>=20
> Yep, I agree.
>=20
>>> primarily for the purposes of supporting TLS connections with fast=20=

>> open (0-RTT data)
>> I've only ever heard "fast open" used in the context of TFO, which is=20=

>> distinct from (albeit similar to) 0-RTT. Using "fast open" to refer =
to=20
>> 0-RTT sounds like it's conflating terms. Shouldn't "early data" be =
used=20
>> here instead of "fast open"?
>=20
> I think the two phrases are basically equivalent, but if using "early =
data" is more clear, let's go with that.=20
>=20
>>> In this use-case, resource-constrained IoT devices act as TLS =
clients=20
>> and share the same PSK.  The devices use this PSK for quickly=20
>> establishing connections with a central server.  Such a scheme =
ensures=20
>> that the client IoT devices are legitimate members of the system.
>> If the IoT devices only talk to a central server and not each other,=20=

>> why do they all need the same PSK?
>>=20
>>> To perform rare system specific operations that require a higher=20
>> security level, the central server can request resource-intensive=20
>> client authentication with the usage of a certificate after=20
>> successfully establishing the connection with a PSK.
>> If you're going to authenticate with a cert, why bother preceding =
that=20
>> with an authentication with a PSK?
>=20
> Good question. I'll let Mohit answer this, but my impression was that, =
unlike the PSKs, each node has its own private key, which seemingly =
allows the server to authenticate a specific client.
>=20
>>> 6.1.  Provisioning Examples
>> This section contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly=20
>> without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? =
Are=20
>> there any pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?
>=20
> It's meant to be informational without any comment on the pros and =
cons of each.=20
>=20
>>> Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user passwords.
>> Isn't that precisely the point of this draft? Seems unnecessary to=20
>> mention. (Or it might be better to move this point to the intro as a=20=

>> motivating factor of this document.)
>=20
> Great suggestion!
>=20
>>> PSK provisioning systems are often constrained in =
application-specific ways.  For example, although one goal of =
provisioning is to ensure that each pair of nodes has a unique key pair, =
some systems do not want to distribute pair-wise shared keys to achieve =
this.
>> Why not? What application-specific constraint would warrant that?
>=20
> Pointing again to Mohit for the IoT case. :-)
>=20
> (We might just replace "do not want to" with "might not want to", and =
leave it at that.)
>=20
>>> some systems require the provisioning process to embed=20
>> application-specific information in either PSKs or their identities.
>> Is it really a good idea to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that =
not=20
>> diminish the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that=20=

>> sort of information in the identity?
>=20
> It is probably desirable to use the identity for this purpose since, =
well, its application-specific identifying information. This is just =
commenting on the state of affairs, I think.=20
>=20
>>> Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently under=20=

>> discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.
>> What does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, EAP-TLS-PSK=20=

>> needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's referring to.
>=20
> It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK =
use case better than I do, though, so I'll let him answer.=20
>=20
>>> Applications MUST use external PSKs that adhere to the following=20
>> requirements:
>> I think you mean "If an application uses external PSKs, the PSKs MUST=20=

>> adhere to the following requirements." Otherwise it sounds like =
you're=20
>> saying every application must use an external PSK.
>=20
> Yep, that would be more clear.
>=20
>>> Each PSK SHOULD be derived from at least 128 bits of entropy
>> Recommend a particular method for doing that?
>=20
> I don't think that's necessary. Any suitable method will suffice.
>=20
>>> Note that these mechanisms do not necessarily follow the same=20
>> architecture as the ordinary process for incorporating EPSKs =
described=20
>> in this draft.
>> Where was the ordinary process for incorporating EPSKs described? Is=20=

>> "incorporating" a PSK the same as "provisioning" one? If so, several=20=

>> ways were described. What's the problem with these mechanisms (e.g.=20=

>> PAKE) having a different architecture from these ordinary processes?=20=

>> Are they not compatible?
>=20
> I'm not seeing this text in the editor's copy, so I'm not sure what =
the context is.
>=20
>>>   3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers =
[I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of =
TLS client and server.
>> Why?
>=20
> Because that interface exists to enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and =
beyond.=20
>=20
>>> OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external =
PSKs=20
>> via distinct ciphersuites.
>> This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph =
goes=20
>> on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to OpenSSL =
for=20
>> TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support=20=

>> in BoringSSL.
>=20
> We didn't want to go into version-specific details here, but yes, =
that's right.=20
>=20
>>> PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix for roaming and =
federation.
>> What do roaming and federation mean here? Is there a source that =
discusses this?
>=20
> Hmm, probably? Mohit, can you please drop in a reference?
>=20
>>> Deployments should take care that the length of the PSK identity is =
sufficient to avoid obvious collisions.
>> What's the difference between a "collision" and an "obvious =
collision"?
>=20
> Nothing. We can drop "obivous."
>=20
>>> This means that if a PSK identity collision occurs, the application =
will be given precedence over how to handle the PSK.
>> How should the application handle the collision?
>=20
> That's an application-specific decision, so we don't specify it.=20
>=20
>> I'm happy to make the suggested changes in a PR if they look ok.
>=20
> Yes, please!
>=20
> Best,
> Chris
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


--Apple-Mail=_C7192DD3-ACE4-415F-BD7B-8A1D81C85C29
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"auto" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div dir=3D"auto" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;" class=3D"">Thanks for the feedback! I've posted a =
bunch of PRs and issues, as you've seen. Here are my remaining =
comments:</div><div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Low entropy keys are =
only secure against active attack if a PAKE is&nbsp;<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>used with TLS.<br class=3D"">Maybe cite a =
document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I'd rather not cite one (now), =
especially since that document is expired. Perhaps we can file an issue =
to add a citation later on?</blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>Looks like Mohit already added a more up-to-date =
citation.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Filed: <a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36</a>=
</blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Thanks, Mohit! =
:)</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs =
are explicitly designed to support mutual =
authentication.</blockquote>Isn't mutual authentication, in general, =
orthogonal to linkability?&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Certificates, for =
example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">linked across connections.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the =
network. Any sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be =
linkable, be it an external PSK ID or a =
certificate.&nbsp;</blockquote></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Right,=
 I get that. What I'm saying is that since there are solutions that can =
prevent that type of linkability (for instance, if a third party deals =
the PSKs to the server and clients, and those PSKs are never used more =
than once), the fact that PSKs are designed to support mutual =
authentication is irrelevant. (I.e., mutual authentication for one =
connection doesn't necessarily imply that the server knows it's talking =
to the same client on every connection that client makes.)</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">6.1. =
&nbsp;Provisioning Examples<br class=3D""></blockquote>This section =
contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? =
Bad? Are&nbsp;<br class=3D"">there any pitfalls? If so, how can one =
guard against them?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">It's meant =
to be informational without any comment on the pros and cons of =
each.&nbsp;</blockquote></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>But the =
title is "<b class=3D"">Guidance</b>&nbsp;for External PSK Usage." What =
is guidance if not a collection of recommendations?</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Identities =
may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently under&nbsp;<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.<br class=3D"">What =
does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, =
EAP-TLS-PSK&nbsp;<br class=3D"">needs a citation link. I'm not sure =
which document it's referring to.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the =
EAP-TLS-PSK use case better than I do, though, so I'll let him =
answer.&nbsp;</blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>Looks like Mohit =
added a citation for that.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D"">&nbsp; 3. &nbsp;Nodes SHOULD use external PSK =
importers [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for =
a pair of TLS client and server.<br class=3D""></blockquote>Why?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Because that interface exists to =
enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and =
beyond.&nbsp;</blockquote></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>My =
understanding is that that interface doesn't <i class=3D"">enable</i> =
external PSKs for 1.3, but that it just to makes it easier and less =
error-prone because the interface generates several PSKs--one for each =
hash function. Is that the case? If so, why not mention that as the =
rationale as to why nodes SHOULD use the importer?</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">OpenSSL =
and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external PSKs&nbsp;<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>via distinct ciphersuites.<br class=3D"">This is =
not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph goes&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to =
OpenSSL for&nbsp;<br class=3D"">TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this =
doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support&nbsp;<br class=3D"">in BoringSSL.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">We didn't want to go into =
version-specific details here, but yes, that's =
right.&nbsp;</blockquote></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Might be =
better to mention this particular version-specific detail here since =
otherwise this statement is misleading.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">some =
systems require the provisioning process to embed&nbsp;<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>application-specific information in either PSKs =
or their identities.<br class=3D"">Is it really a good idea to embed =
data in the PSK itself? Does that not&nbsp;<br class=3D"">diminish the =
entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">sort of information in the identity?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">It is probably desirable to use =
the identity for this purpose since, well, its application-specific =
identifying information. This is just commenting on the state of =
affairs, I think.</blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div>Okay, but if =
this document is guidance and not just a description, shouldn't it also =
comment on whether this state of affairs is a good idea?</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Carrick</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Aug 18, 2020, at 8:26 AM, Christopher Wood =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net" =
class=3D"">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi =
Carrick,<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Sorry for the delay. Please see =
inline below!<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">On Thu, Jul 9, 2020, at 10:09 =
PM, Carrick Bartle wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Isn=E2=80=99t the rerouting attack described in Section 4 not =
possible if "A" <br class=3D"">uses the SNI extension and "C" aborts the =
connection on mismatch? If <br class=3D"">so, it might be worth =
mentioning that as a potential mitigation (as the <br class=3D"">Selfie =
paper does).<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Indeed. That =
seems like a fine thing to mention.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">"C" has completed the handshake, ostensibly with "A".<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>"C" did in fact complete the handshake with "A." =
(Without mistaking it <br class=3D"">for some other endpoint or =
something.)<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">+1, I'm fine with =
dropping that bit.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Low entropy keys are =
only secure against active attack if a PAKE is <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>used with TLS.<br class=3D"">Maybe cite a =
document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs <br =
class=3D"">with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I'd rather not cite one (now), =
especially since that document is expired. Perhaps we can file an issue =
to add a citation later on?<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""> =
Applications should take precautions when using external PSKs to =
mitigate these risks.<br class=3D""></blockquote>What sort of =
precautions should they take?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">Filed: <a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36</a>=
<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Preventing this type of =
linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>explicitly designed to support mutual =
authentication.<br class=3D"">Isn't mutual authentication, in general, =
orthogonal to linkability? <br class=3D"">Certificates, for example, are =
encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be <br class=3D"">linked across =
connections.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">This section =
speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the network. Any sort of =
identifier that's reused across connections can be linkable, be it an =
external PSK ID or a certificate. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Below, we list some example use-cases where pair-wise =
external PSKs <br class=3D""></blockquote>with TLS have been used for =
authentication.<br class=3D"">I assume "pair-wise" here means a PSK is =
shared between only one server <br class=3D"">and one client, but this =
the term "pair-wise" hasn't been associated <br class=3D"">with that =
concept in this document, it's not completely clear. Since <br =
class=3D"">"pair-wise" is used twice in the document, maybe define it =
when the <br class=3D"">concept is first introduced.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Yep, I agree.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">primarily for the purposes of supporting TLS connections with =
fast <br class=3D""></blockquote>open (0-RTT data)<br class=3D"">I've =
only ever heard "fast open" used in the context of TFO, which is <br =
class=3D"">distinct from (albeit similar to) 0-RTT. Using "fast open" to =
refer to <br class=3D"">0-RTT sounds like it's conflating terms. =
Shouldn't "early data" be used <br class=3D"">here instead of "fast =
open"?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I think the two phrases =
are basically equivalent, but if using "early data" is more clear, let's =
go with that. <br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">In this use-case, =
resource-constrained IoT devices act as TLS clients <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>and share the same PSK. &nbsp;The devices use =
this PSK for quickly <br class=3D"">establishing connections with a =
central server. &nbsp;Such a scheme ensures <br class=3D"">that the =
client IoT devices are legitimate members of the system.<br class=3D"">If =
the IoT devices only talk to a central server and not each other, <br =
class=3D"">why do they all need the same PSK?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">To perform rare system =
specific operations that require a higher <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>security level, the central server can request =
resource-intensive <br class=3D"">client authentication with the usage =
of a certificate after <br class=3D"">successfully establishing the =
connection with a PSK.<br class=3D"">If you're going to authenticate =
with a cert, why bother preceding that <br class=3D"">with an =
authentication with a PSK?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Good =
question. I'll let Mohit answer this, but my impression was that, unlike =
the PSKs, each node has its own private key, which seemingly allows the =
server to authenticate a specific client.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">6.1. &nbsp;Provisioning Examples<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>This section contains a list of ways to =
provision PSKs, but mostly <br class=3D"">without any commentary or =
discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? Are <br class=3D"">there any =
pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">It's meant to be informational =
without any comment on the pros and cons of each. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user =
passwords.<br class=3D""></blockquote>Isn't that precisely the point of =
this draft? Seems unnecessary to <br class=3D"">mention. (Or it might be =
better to move this point to the intro as a <br class=3D"">motivating =
factor of this document.)<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Great =
suggestion!<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">PSK provisioning systems =
are often constrained in application-specific ways. &nbsp;For example, =
although one goal of provisioning is to ensure that each pair of nodes =
has a unique key pair, some systems do not want to distribute pair-wise =
shared keys to achieve this.<br class=3D""></blockquote>Why not? What =
application-specific constraint would warrant that?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Pointing again to Mohit for the =
IoT case. :-)<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(We might just replace "do =
not want to" with "might not want to", and leave it at that.)<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D"">some systems require the provisioning process =
to embed <br class=3D""></blockquote>application-specific information in =
either PSKs or their identities.<br class=3D"">Is it really a good idea =
to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that not <br class=3D"">diminish =
the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that <br =
class=3D"">sort of information in the identity?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">It is probably desirable to use =
the identity for this purpose since, well, its application-specific =
identifying information. This is just commenting on the state of =
affairs, I think. <br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Identities may sometimes =
need to be routable, as is currently under <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.<br class=3D"">What =
does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, EAP-TLS-PSK <br =
class=3D"">needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's =
referring to.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">It might be, for =
example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK use case better than =
I do, though, so I'll let him answer. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">Applications MUST use external PSKs that adhere to the =
following <br class=3D""></blockquote>requirements:<br class=3D"">I =
think you mean "If an application uses external PSKs, the PSKs MUST <br =
class=3D"">adhere to the following requirements." Otherwise it sounds =
like you're <br class=3D"">saying every application must use an external =
PSK.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Yep, that would be more =
clear.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Each PSK SHOULD be =
derived from at least 128 bits of entropy<br =
class=3D""></blockquote>Recommend a particular method for doing that?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I don't think that's necessary. =
Any suitable method will suffice.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Note that =
these mechanisms do not necessarily follow the same <br =
class=3D""></blockquote>architecture as the ordinary process for =
incorporating EPSKs described <br class=3D"">in this draft.<br =
class=3D"">Where was the ordinary process for incorporating EPSKs =
described? Is <br class=3D"">"incorporating" a PSK the same as =
"provisioning" one? If so, several <br class=3D"">ways were described. =
What's the problem with these mechanisms (e.g. <br class=3D"">PAKE) =
having a different architecture from these ordinary processes? <br =
class=3D"">Are they not compatible?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">I'm not seeing this text in the editor's copy, so I'm not =
sure what the context is.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;3. &nbsp;Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers =
[I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of =
TLS client and server.<br class=3D""></blockquote>Why?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Because that interface exists to =
enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and beyond. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for =
external PSKs <br class=3D""></blockquote>via distinct ciphersuites.<br =
class=3D"">This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the =
paragraph goes <br class=3D"">on to mention "new callback functions =
added specifically to OpenSSL for <br class=3D"">TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK =
support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support <br class=3D"">in =
BoringSSL.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">We didn't want to =
go into version-specific details here, but yes, that's right. <br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D"">PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix =
for roaming and federation.<br class=3D""></blockquote>What do roaming =
and federation mean here? Is there a source that discusses this?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Hmm, probably? Mohit, can you =
please drop in a reference?<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Deployments =
should take care that the length of the PSK identity is sufficient to =
avoid obvious collisions.<br class=3D""></blockquote>What's the =
difference between a "collision" and an "obvious collision"?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Nothing. We can drop =
"obivous."<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">This means that if a PSK =
identity collision occurs, the application will be given precedence over =
how to handle the PSK.<br class=3D""></blockquote>How should the =
application handle the collision?<br class=3D""></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">That's an application-specific decision, so we don't specify =
it. <br class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">I'm=
 happy to make the suggested changes in a PR if they look ok.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Yes, please!<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Best,<br class=3D"">Chris<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">TLS mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></div>
</div>
</body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [TLS] 2nd WGLC for Delegated Credentials for TLS
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Daniel,

Thank you for your thorough review. We've attempted to address these
comments in the latest version on Github and are preparing to submit a -10.
Answers inline below for these comments.

Hannes, thank you for your comment as well.

The changes are tracked here:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80

On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 5:48 PM Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=3D
40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> The draft has a number of nits and errors. Among others:
>
> The related work section mentions KEYLESS and subcert being complementary
> that is KEYLESS can perform the operations associated to the DC and/or
> those associated to the cert key. I do not think that is correct. KEYLESS
> does not support TLS 1.3 while DC only works with TLS 1.3. The LURK
> extension for TLS 1.3 [draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] should be mentioned instead=
.
> As LURK was mentioned during the adoption period and until version 05 tha=
t
> should not cause any issues.
>
> Technologies only available for TLS 1.2 may be mentioned in the related
> work section.  [draft-mglt-lurk-tls12] should be mentioned similarly to
> KEYLESS as it addresses the security concerns of KEYLESS.
>
> There are other places where the extensions is mentioned together with TL=
S
> 1.2 that needs to be updated.
>
> I also think that test vectors would be good as well as a link to a forma=
l
> verification publication (if available).
>
> Please see all my comments inline, I hope they help.
>
> Yours,
> Daniel
>
> ----
>
>                      Delegated Credentials for TLS
>                        draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09
>
> [...]
>
> 1.  Introduction
>
>    Typically, a TLS server uses a certificate provided by some entity
>    other than the operator of the server (a "Certification Authority" or
>    CA) [RFC8446] [RFC5280].  This organizational separation makes the
>    TLS server operator dependent on the CA for some aspects of its
>    operations, for example:
>
>    *  Whenever the server operator wants to deploy a new certificate, it
>       has to interact with the CA..
>
>    *  The server operator can only use TLS signature schemes for which
>       the CA will issue credentials.
>
>    These dependencies cause problems in practice.  Server operators
>    often deploy TLS termination services in locations such as remote
>    data centers or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) where it may be
>    difficult to detect key compromises..  Short-lived certificates may be
>    used to limit the exposure of keys in these cases.
>
> <mglt>
> I believe it would be clearer to
> summarize the problem and link it to the
> use case. I would propose something
> around:
>
> These dependencies cause problems in
> practice, the management of key exposure
> necessarily requires an interaction with
> the CA.
>
> Typically server operators....
> </mglt>
>

I tried to move the sentences around but wasn't able to get something more
satisfactory. It's currently structured as:

Reality of deployment
Problem: dependencies
Flaws in existing solutions
Proposed solution (this)


>
>    However, short-lived certificates need to be renewed more frequently
>    than long-lived certificates.  If an external CA is unable to issue a
>    certificate in time to replace a deployed certificate, the server
>    would no longer be able to present a valid certificate to clients.
>    With short-lived certificates, there is a smaller window of time to
>    renew a certificates and therefore a higher risk that an outage at a
>    CA will negatively affect the uptime of the service.
>
>    To reduce the dependency on external CAs, this document proposes a
>    limited delegation mechanism that allows a TLS peer to issue its own
>    credentials within the scope of a certificate issued by an external
>    CA.  These credentials only enable the recipient of the delegation to
>    speak for names that the CA has authorized.  For clarity, we will
>    refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a "certificate", or
>    "delegation certificate", and the one issued by the operator as a
>    "delegated credential" or "DC".
>
> <mglt>
> From the text it is unclear why the
> signature scheme appears to be a
> constraint as well how it does not opens
> to some sort of downgrade attacks if
> left to the operator.
> </mglt>
>

The second bullet was left unaddressed, so I added some text here.
Downgrades are not a current concern in TLS 1.3 since weak signature
algorithms have been removed and clients advertise signature algorithm
support and can remove weak algorithms should they arise.

>
>
> 3.  Solution Overview
>
> [...]
>
> 3.1.  Rationale
>
>    Delegated credentials present a better alternative than other
>    delegation mechanisms like proxy certificates [RFC3820] for several
>    reasons:
>
>    *  There is no change needed to certificate validation at the PKI
>       layer.
>
>    *  X.509 semantics are very rich.  This can cause unintended
>       consequences if a service owner creates a proxy certificate where
>       the properties differ from the leaf certificate.  For this reason,
>       delegated credentials have very restricted semantics that should
>       not conflict with X.509 semantics.
>
>    *  Proxy certificates rely on the certificate path building process
>       to establish a binding between the proxy certificate and the
>       server certificate.  Since the certificate path building process
>       is not cryptographically protected, it is possible that a proxy
>       certificate could be bound to another certificate with the same
>       public key, with different X.509 parameters.  Delegated
>       credentials, which rely on a cryptographic binding between the
>       entire certificate and the delegated credential, cannot.
>
>    *  Each delegated credential is bound to a specific signature
>       algorithm that may be used to sign the TLS handshake ([RFC8446]
>
>
>
>
> Barnes, et al.          Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 6]
>
> Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            June 2020
>
>
>       section 4.2.3).  This prevents them from being used with other,
>       perhaps unintended signature algorithms.
>
> <mglt>
> It is not clear to me why there is a
> "may be used". I suppose it concerns the
> use of the DC not the algorithm but that
> was confusing.
>
> I also believe that the specific
> signature algorithm to sign the
> delegated credential could be part of
> the rational.
> </mglt>
>

The sentence was re-structured a bit. I don't understand the second
comment, since the signature algorithm to sign the DC is constricted by the
EE cert's key type. The only ambiguity there is for RSA, which we addressed
by allowing only PSS.

>
> 3.2.  Related Work
>
>    Many of the use cases for delegated credentials can also be addressed
>    using purely server-side mechanisms that do not require changes to
>    client behavior (e.g., a PKCS#11 interface or a remote signing
>    mechanism [KEYLESS]).  These mechanisms, however, incur per-
>    transaction latency, since the front-end server has to interact with
>    a back-end server that holds a private key.  The mechanism proposed
>    in this document allows the delegation to be done off-line, with no
>    per-transaction latency.  The figure below compares the message flows
>    for these two mechanisms with TLS 1..3 [RFC8446].
>
>    Remote key signing:
>
>    Client            Front-End            Back-End
>      |----ClientHello--->|                    |
>      |<---ServerHello----|                    |
>      |<---Certificate----|                    |
>      |                   |<---remote sign---->|
>      |<---CertVerify-----|                    |
>      |        ...        |                    |
>
>
>    Delegated credentials:
>
>    Client            Front-End            Back-End
>      |                   |<--DC distribution->|
>      |----ClientHello--->|                    |
>      |<---ServerHello----|                    |
>      |<---Certificate----|                    |
>      |<---CertVerify-----|                    |
>      |        ...        |                    |
>
>    These two mechanisms can be complementary.  A server could use
>    credentials for clients that support them, while using [KEYLESS] to
>    support legacy clients.
>
> <mglt>
> I believe that this sentence does not
> show any complementary as subcert and
> KEYLESS are targeting different version
> of TLS, so they can hardly be
> complementary.  However (and luckily)
> LURK provides an extension for TLS 1.3
> [draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] which enable a
> complementary use of these mechanisms
> these mechanisms. I believe that would
> be good to indicate the reason they
> complement each other which is that LURK
> protects the credentials for its
> operations. These operations could be
> performed in the scope of subcert or TLS
> 1.3.
>
> Note also that in a related section it
> also worth mentioning that credentials
> may be managed in different ways and
> KEYLESS represents an valuable way to
> protect and manage these credentials in
> TLS 1.2. However, KEYLESS is known to
> presents some vulnerabilities (PFS,
> signing oracle) so the protection
> remains limited while the LURK extension
> for TLS 1.2 [draft-mglt-lurk-tls12]
> addressed these issues and as a result
> should provide a better protection.
> </mglt>
>

Joe had some comments on this as well. This section is meant to
illustrate that it is possible to create a fallback with a remote oracle so
a reference to a paper seemed more apt than an active draft (which would be
challenging to reference in an RFC). Implementations can differ here, this
section is not meant to be instructive.

>
> The private key for a delegated credential
>    can be used in place of a certificate private key, so it is important
>    that the Front-End and Back-End are parties that have a trusted
>    relationship.
>
>
>    Use of short-lived certificates with automated certificate issuance,
>    e.g., with Automated Certificate Managment Environment (ACME)
> <mglt>
> Management
> </mglt>
>

Fixed, thanks!


>    [RFC8555], reduces the risk of key compromise, but has several
>    limitations.  Specifically, it introduces an operationally-critical
>    dependency on an external party.  It also limits the types of
>
>
>
> Barnes, et al.          Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 7]
>
> Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            June 2020
>
>
>    algorithms supported for TLS authentication to those the CA is
>    willing to issue a certificate for.  Nonetheless, existing automated
>    issuance APIs like ACME may be useful for provisioning delegated
>    credentials.
>
> 4.  Delegated Credentials
>
>    While X.509 forbids end-entity certificates from being used as
>    issuers for other certificates, it is valid to use them to issue
>    other signed objects as long as the certificate contains the
>    digitalSignature KeyUsage ([RFC5280] section 4.2.1.3).  We define a
>    new signed object format that would encode only the semantics that
>    are needed for this application.  The credential has the following
>    structure:
>
>       struct {
>         uint32 valid_time;
>         SignatureScheme expected_cert_verify_algorithm;
>         opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
>       } Credential;
>
>    valid_time:  Time in seconds relative to the beginning of the
>       delegation certificate's notBefore value after which the delegated
>       credential is no longer valid.  This MUST NOT exceed 7 days.
> <mglt>
> I believe the behavior of the "verifying
> peer" should also be specified maybe
> with a reference.
>
> </mglt>
>

This is valid and echoes Hannes's comment later in this thread. I've
updated the text here to refer directly to the relying peer's behavior. The
issuance requirement of 7 days is defined in section 3 and the behavior is
now defined in 4.1.3.


>
>    expected_cert_verify_algorithm:  The signature algorithm of the
>       credential key pair, where the type SignatureScheme is as defined
>       in [RFC8446].  This is expected to be the same as
>       CertificateVerify.algorithm sent by the server.  Only signature
>       algorithms allowed for use in CertificateVerify messages are
>       allowed.  When using RSA, the public key MUST NOT use the
>       rsaEncryption OID, as a result, the following algorithms are not
>       allowed for use with delegated credentials: rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
>       rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, rsa_pss_rsae_sha512.
>
> <mglt>
> It is unclear whether the
> expected_cert_verify_algorithm and
> CertificateVerify.algorithm needs to be
> checked and what needs to be done in
> case of mismatch (with the RSA caveat).
> I believe that should be clarified.
>
> </mglt>
>

This bullet 3 in section 4.1.3.


>
>    ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo:  The credential's public key, a DER-
>       encoded [X.690] SubjectPublicKeyInfo as defined in [RFC5280].
>
>    The delegated credential has the following structure:
>
>       struct {
>         Credential cred;
>         SignatureScheme algorithm;
>         opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
>       } DelegatedCredential;
>
>    algorithm:  The signature algorithm used to verify
>       DelegatedCredential.signature.
>
> <mglt>
> I am wondering if any checks should be
> performed with the
> CertificateVerify.algorithm or if any
> algorithm would be acceptable. Unless I
> am missing something it seems a weak
> algorithm can be used - assuming the
> registry contains such weak algorithms.
> </mglt>
>

Echoing my answer above, only signature algorithms listed
in SignatureSchemeList are permitted, so the peer is able to disable weak
algorithms at will.

>
> Barnes, et al.          Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 8]
>
> Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            June 2020
>
>
>    signature:  The delegation, a signature that binds the credential to
>       the end-entity certificate's public key as specified below.  The
>       signature scheme is specified by DelegatedCredential.algorithm.
>
> [...]
>
> 4.1.1.  Server Authentication
>
>    A client which supports this specification SHALL send a
>    "delegated_credential" extension in its ClientHello.  The body of the
>    extension consists of a SignatureSchemeList:
>
>
>
>
>
> Barnes, et al.          Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 9]
>
> Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            June 2020
>
>
>       struct {
>         SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithm<2..2^16-2>;
>       } SignatureSchemeList;
>
>    If the client receives a delegated credential without indicating
>    support, then the client MUST abort with an "unexpected_message"
>    alert.
>
>    If the extension is present, the server MAY send a delegated
>    credential; if the extension is not present, the server MUST NOT send
>    a delegated credential.  The server MUST ignore the extension unless
>    TLS 1.3 or a later version is negotiated.
>
>
>    The server MUST send the delegated credential as an extension in the
>    CertificateEntry of its end-entity certificate; the client SHOULD
>    ignore delegated credentials sent as extensions to any other
>    certificate.
>
>    The expected_cert_verify_algorithm field MUST be of a type advertised
>    by the client in the SignatureSchemeList and is considered invalid
>    otherwise.  Clients that receive invalid delegated credentials MUST
>    terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
>
> <mglt>
> I am wondering what would prevent any
> downgrade attacks if the
> SignatureSchemeList and
> signature_algorithms have two different
> sets of lists. My current understanding
> is that these extensions are handled
> independently, but I might be missing
> something.
>
> I am wondering if that would be
> appropriated to specify the signature of
> the CertificateVerify depending on the
> presence of the delegated credential - I
> mean the key used to generate it.
>
> </mglt>
>

The signature_algorithms SignatureSchemeList is used to match the signature
by the certificate, the delegated_credential SignatureSchemeList is used to
match the expected_cert_verify_algorithm. Given both a certificate and all
possible DCs, the peer could select the weakest signature of the union of
both sets (if they're different). However, this doesn't permit a downgrade
attack if the validating peer doesn't advertise a weak algorithm.


>
> [...]
>
> 4.1.3.  Validating a Delegated Credential
>
>    On receiving a delegated credential and a certificate chain, the peer
>    validates the certificate chain and matches the end-entity
>    certificate to the peer's expected identity.  It also takes the
>    following steps:
>
>    1.  Verify that the current time is within the validity interval of
>        the credential.  This is done by asserting that the current time
>        is no more than the delegation certificate's notBefore value plus
>        DelegatedCredential.cred.valid_time.
>
>    2.  Verify that the credential's remaining validity time is no more
>        than the maximum validity period.  This is done by asserting that
>        the current time is no more than the delegation certificate's
>        notBefore value plus DelegatedCredential.cred.valid_time plus the
>        maximum validity period.
>
>    3.  Verify that expected_cert_verify_algorithm matches the scheme
>        indicated in the peer's CertificateVerify message and that the
>        algorithm is allowed for use with delegated credentials.
>
> <mglt>
> I am wondering if a reference to specify
> what allowed would not be needed unless
> it means advertised in the extension.
>
> </mglt>
>
>    4.  Verify that the end-entity certificate satisfies the conditions
>        in Section 4.2.
>
>    5.  Use the public key in the peer's end-entity certificate to verify
>        the signature of the credential using the algorithm indicated by
>        DelegatedCredential.algorithm.
>
>    If one or more of these checks fail, then the delegated credential is
>    deemed invalid.  Clients and servers that receive invalid delegated
>    credentials MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter"
>    alert.  If successful, the participant receiving the Certificate
>    message uses the public key in the credential to verify the signature
>    in the peer's CertificateVerify message.
>
> [...]
>
> 7.  Security Considerations
>
> [...]
>
> 7.6.  The Impact of Signature Forgery Attacks
>
>    When TLS 1.2 servers support RSA key exchange, they may be vulnerable
>    to attacks that allow forging an RSA signature over an arbitrary
>    message [BLEI].  TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] (Section 7.4.7.1.) describes a
>    mitigation strategy requiring careful implementation of timing
>    resistant countermeasures for preventing these attacks.  Experience
>    shows that in practice, server implementations may fail to fully stop
>    these attacks due to the complexity of this mitigation [ROBOT].  For
>    TLS 1.2 servers that support RSA key exchange using a DC-enabled end-
>    entity certificate, a hypothetical signature forgery attack would
>    allow forging a signature over a delegated credential.  The forged
>    credential could then be used by the attacker as the equivalent of a
>    man-in-the-middle certificate, valid for 7 days.
>
> <mglt>
> I do not see the relevance to TLS 1.3.
> </mglt>
>

In a key reuse scenario (same key, multiple servers) where one of the
servers permits a signing oracle, TLS 1.3 signatures can be actively
forged.

>
>    Server operators should therefore minimize the risk of using DC-
>    enabled end-entity certificates where a signature forgery oracle may
>    be present.  If possible, server operators may choose to use DC-
>    enabled certificates only for signing credentials, and not for
>    serving non-DC TLS traffic.  Furthermore, server operators may use
>    elliptic curve certificates for DC-enabled traffic, while using RSA
>    certificates without the DelegationUsage certificate extension for
>    non-DC traffic; this completely prevents such attacks.
>
>    Note that if a signature can be forged over an arbitrary credential,
>    the attacker can choose any value for the valid_time field.  Repeated
>    signature forgeries therefore allow the attacker to create multiple
>    delegated credentials that can cover the entire validity period of
>    the certificate.  Temporary exposure of the key or a signing oracle
>    may allow the attacker to impersonate a server for the lifetime of
>    the certificate.
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D
> 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 29, 2020 12:00 PM
> *To:* Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] 2nd WGLC for Delegated Credentials for TLS
>
>
> I=E2=80=99d still like to see test vectors.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel,</div><div><br></div><div>Thank you for your t=
horough review. We&#39;ve attempted to address these comments in the latest=
=C2=A0version on Github and are preparing to submit a -10. Answers inline=
=C2=A0below for these comments.</div><div><br></div><div>Hannes, thank you =
for your comment as well.</div><div><br></div><div>The changes are tracked =
here:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80">h=
ttps://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80</a></div><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 5:4=
8 PM Daniel Migault &lt;daniel.migault=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40ericsson.com@d=
marc.ietf.org">40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex">




<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt=
;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif">
<span style=3D"margin:0px">Hi,=C2=A0</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif">
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">The draft has a number of nits and errors. Among =
others:<span>=C2=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">The related work section mentions KEYLESS and sub=
cert being complementary that is KEYLESS can perform the operations associa=
ted to the DC and/or those associated to the cert key. I do not think that =
is correct. KEYLESS does not support
 TLS 1.3 while DC only works with TLS 1.3. The LURK extension for TLS 1.3 [=
draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] should be mentioned instead. As LURK was mentioned d=
uring the adoption period and until version 05 that should not cause any is=
sues.=C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Technologies only available for TLS 1.2 may be me=
ntioned in the related work section.=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-family:Calibr=
i,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);display:inli=
ne!important"><span>=C2=A0</span>[draft-mglt-lurk-tls12]<span>=C2=A0should
 be mentioned=C2=A0</span></span>similarly to KEYLESS as it addresses the s=
ecurity concerns of KEYLESS.=C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">There are other places where the extensions is me=
ntioned together with TLS 1.2 that needs to be updated. =C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I also think that test vectors would be good as w=
ell as a link to a formal verification publication (if available).</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Please see all my comments inline, I hope they he=
lp.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Yours,<span>=C2=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Daniel<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">----<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegated Credentials for TLS<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">1.=C2=A0 Introduction<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Typically, a TLS server uses a certi=
ficate provided by some entity<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0other than the operator of the serve=
r (a &quot;Certification Authority&quot; or<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0CA) [RFC8446] [RFC5280].=C2=A0 This =
organizational separation makes the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS server operator dependent on the=
 CA for some aspects of its<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0operations, for example:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0Whenever the server operator=
 wants to deploy a new certificate, it<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 has to interact with the CA.=
.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0The server operator can only=
 use TLS signature schemes for which<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the CA will issue credential=
s.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0These dependencies cause problems in=
 practice.=C2=A0 Server operators<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0often deploy TLS termination service=
s in locations such as remote<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0data centers or Content Delivery Net=
works (CDNs) where it may be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0difficult to detect key compromises.=
.=C2=A0 Short-lived certificates may be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0used to limit the exposure of keys i=
n these cases.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I believe it would be clearer to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">summarize the problem and link it to the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">use case. I would propose something<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">around:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">These dependencies cause problems in<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">practice, the management of key exposure<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">necessarily requires an interaction with<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">the CA.<span>=C2=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Typically server operators....<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>I tried to move the sentences around but wasn&#39;=
t able to get something more satisfactory. It&#39;s currently structured as=
:</div><div><br></div><div>Reality of deployment</div><div>Problem: depende=
ncies</div><div>Flaws in existing solutions</div><div>Proposed solution (th=
is)=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size=
:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family=
:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0However, short-lived certificates ne=
ed to be renewed more frequently<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0than long-lived certificates.=C2=A0 =
If an external CA is unable to issue a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate in time to replace a dep=
loyed certificate, the server<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0would no longer be able to present a=
 valid certificate to clients.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0With short-lived certificates, there=
 is a smaller window of time to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0renew a certificates and therefore a=
 higher risk that an outage at a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0CA will negatively affect the uptime=
 of the service.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0To reduce the dependency on external=
 CAs, this document proposes a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0limited delegation mechanism that al=
lows a TLS peer to issue its own<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials within the scope of a ce=
rtificate issued by an external<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0CA.=C2=A0 These credentials only ena=
ble the recipient of the delegation to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0speak for names that the CA has auth=
orized.=C2=A0 For clarity, we will<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0refer to the certificate issued by t=
he CA as a &quot;certificate&quot;, or<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;delegation certificate&quot;, =
and the one issued by the operator as a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;delegated credential&quot; or =
&quot;DC&quot;.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">From the text it is unclear why the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">signature scheme appears to be a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">constraint as well how it does not opens<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">to some sort of downgrade attacks if<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">left to the operator. =C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>The second bullet was left unaddressed, so I added=
 some text here. Downgrades are not a current concern in TLS 1.3 since weak=
 signature algorithms have been removed and clients advertise signature alg=
orithm support and can remove weak algorithms should they arise.=C2=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:=
Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div st=
yle=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif"><div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">3.=C2=A0 Solution Overview<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">3.1.=C2=A0 Rationale<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegated credentials present a bett=
er alternative than other<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0delegation mechanisms like proxy cer=
tificates [RFC3820] for several<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0reasons:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0There is no change needed to=
 certificate validation at the PKI<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 layer.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0X.509 semantics are very ric=
h.=C2=A0 This can cause unintended<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 consequences if a service ow=
ner creates a proxy certificate where<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the properties differ from t=
he leaf certificate.=C2=A0 For this reason,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 delegated credentials have v=
ery restricted semantics that should<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 not conflict with X.509 sema=
ntics.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0Proxy certificates rely on t=
he certificate path building process<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 to establish a binding betwe=
en the proxy certificate and the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 server certificate.=C2=A0 Si=
nce the certificate path building process<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 is not cryptographically pro=
tected, it is possible that a proxy<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificate could be bound t=
o another certificate with the same<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 public key, with different X=
.509 parameters.=C2=A0 Delegated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 credentials, which rely on a=
 cryptographic binding between the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 entire certificate and the d=
elegated credential, cannot.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0* =C2=A0Each delegated credential is=
 bound to a specific signature<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm that may be used t=
o sign the TLS handshake ([RFC8446]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Barnes, et al. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
Expires 28 December 2020 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0[Page 6]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Internet-Draft =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegat=
ed Credentials for TLS =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0June 2020<b=
r>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 section 4.2.3).=C2=A0 This p=
revents them from being used with other,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 perhaps unintended signature=
 algorithms.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">It is not clear to me why there is a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&quot;may be used&quot;. I suppose it concerns th=
e<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">use of the DC not the algorithm but that<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">was confusing.<span>=C2=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I also believe that the specific<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">signature algorithm to sign the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">delegated credential could be part of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">the rational. =C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>The sentence was re-structured a bit. I don&#39;t =
understand the second comment, since the signature algorithm to sign the DC=
 is constricted by the EE cert&#39;s key type. The only ambiguity there is =
for RSA, which we addressed by allowing only PSS.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,A=
rial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><di=
v style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">3.2.=C2=A0 Related Work<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Many of the use cases for delegated =
credentials can also be addressed<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0using purely server-side mechanisms =
that do not require changes to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0client behavior (e.g., a PKCS#11 int=
erface or a remote signing<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0mechanism [KEYLESS]).=C2=A0 These me=
chanisms, however, incur per-<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0transaction latency, since the front=
-end server has to interact with<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0a back-end server that holds a priva=
te key.=C2=A0 The mechanism proposed<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0in this document allows the delegati=
on to be done off-line, with no<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0per-transaction latency.=C2=A0 The f=
igure below compares the message flows<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0for these two mechanisms with TLS 1.=
.3 [RFC8446].<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Remote key signing:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Client =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Front-End =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Back-End<br=
>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|----ClientHello---&gt;| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---ServerHello----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---Certificate----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |&lt;---remote sign----&gt;|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---CertVerify-----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
... =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegated credentials:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Client =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Front-End =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Back-End<br=
>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |&lt;--DC distribution-&gt;|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|----ClientHello---&gt;| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---ServerHello----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---Certificate----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|&lt;---CertVerify-----| =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
... =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0These two mechanisms can be compleme=
ntary.=C2=A0 A server could use<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials for clients that support=
 them, while using [KEYLESS] to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0support legacy clients.<span>=C2=A0<=
/span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I believe that this sentence does not<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">show any complementary as subcert and<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">KEYLESS are targeting different version<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">of TLS, so they can hardly be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">complementary.=C2=A0 However (and luckily)<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">LURK provides an extension for TLS 1.3<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] which enable a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">complementary use of these mechanisms<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">these mechanisms. I believe that would<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">be good to indicate the reason they<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">complement each other which is that LURK<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">protects the credentials for its<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">operations. These operations could be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">performed in the scope of subcert or TLS<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">1.3.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Note also that in a related section it<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">also worth mentioning that credentials<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">may be managed in different ways and<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">KEYLESS represents an valuable way to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">protect and manage these credentials in<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">TLS 1.2. However, KEYLESS is known to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">presents some vulnerabilities (PFS,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">signing oracle) so the protection<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">remains limited while the LURK extension<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">for TLS 1.2 [draft-mglt-lurk-tls12]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">addressed these issues and as a result<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">should provide a better protection.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Joe had some comments on this as well. This sectio=
n is meant to illustrate=C2=A0that it is possible to create a fallback with=
 a remote oracle so a reference to a paper seemed more apt than an active d=
raft (which would be challenging to reference in an RFC). Implementations c=
an differ here, this section is not meant to be instructive.</div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc so=
lid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Ar=
ial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"mar=
gin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div=
 style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">The private key for a delegated credential<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0can be used in place of a certificat=
e private key, so it is important<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0that the Front-End and Back-End are =
parties that have a trusted<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0relationship.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Use of short-lived certificates with=
 automated certificate issuance,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0e.g., with Automated Certificate Man=
agment Environment (ACME)<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Management<span>=C2=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Fixed, thanks!</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,=
Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"margin:=
0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div sty=
le=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC8555], reduces the risk of key c=
ompromise, but has several<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0limitations.=C2=A0 Specifically, it =
introduces an operationally-critical<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0dependency on an external party.=C2=
=A0 It also limits the types of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Barnes, et al. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
Expires 28 December 2020 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0[Page 7]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Internet-Draft =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegat=
ed Credentials for TLS =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0June 2020<b=
r>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithms supported for TLS authent=
ication to those the CA is<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0willing to issue a certificate for.=
=C2=A0 Nonetheless, existing automated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0issuance APIs like ACME may be usefu=
l for provisioning delegated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">4.=C2=A0 Delegated Credentials<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0While X.509 forbids end-entity certi=
ficates from being used as<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0issuers for other certificates, it i=
s valid to use them to issue<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0other signed objects as long as the =
certificate contains the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0digitalSignature KeyUsage ([RFC5280]=
 section 4.2.1.3).=C2=A0 We define a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0new signed object format that would =
encode only the semantics that<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0are needed for this application.=C2=
=A0 The credential has the following<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0structure:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uint32 valid_time;<br=
>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SignatureScheme expec=
ted_cert_verify_algorithm;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque ASN1_subjectPu=
blicKeyInfo&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } Credential;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0valid_time: =C2=A0Time in seconds re=
lative to the beginning of the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 delegation certificate&#39;s=
 notBefore value after which the delegated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 credential is no longer vali=
d.=C2=A0 This MUST NOT exceed 7 days.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I believe the behavior of the &quot;verifying<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">peer&quot; should also be specified maybe<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">with a reference.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>This is valid and echoes Hannes&#39;s comment late=
r in this thread. I&#39;ve updated the text here to refer directly to the r=
elying peer&#39;s behavior. The issuance requirement of 7 days is defined i=
n section 3 and the behavior is now defined in 4.1.3.</div><div>=C2=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:=
Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div st=
yle=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif"><div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0expected_cert_verify_algorithm: =C2=
=A0The signature algorithm of the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 credential key pair, where t=
he type SignatureScheme is as defined<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 in [RFC8446].=C2=A0 This is =
expected to be the same as<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 CertificateVerify.algorithm =
sent by the server.=C2=A0 Only signature<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithms allowed for use i=
n CertificateVerify messages are<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 allowed.=C2=A0 When using RS=
A, the public key MUST NOT use the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsaEncryption OID, as a resu=
lt, the following algorithms are not<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 allowed for use with delegat=
ed credentials: rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, rsa_pss=
_rsae_sha512.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">It is unclear whether the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">expected_cert_verify_algorithm and<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">CertificateVerify.algorithm needs to be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">checked and what needs to be done in<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">case of mismatch (with the RSA caveat).<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I believe that should be clarified.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>This bullet 3 in section 4.1.3.</div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-fami=
ly:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div=
 style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif"><div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo: =C2=A0The=
 credential&#39;s public key, a DER-<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 encoded [X.690] SubjectPubli=
cKeyInfo as defined in [RFC5280].<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0The delegated credential has the fol=
lowing structure:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Credential cred;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SignatureScheme algor=
ithm;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque signature&lt;0=
..2^16-1&gt;;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } DelegatedCredential;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm: =C2=A0The signature algor=
ithm used to verify<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DelegatedCredential.signatur=
e.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I am wondering if any checks should be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">performed with the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">CertificateVerify.algorithm or if any<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">algorithm would be acceptable. Unless I<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">am missing something it seems a weak<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">algorithm can be used - assuming the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">registry contains such weak algorithms.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Echoing my answer above, only signature algorithms=
 listed in=C2=A0SignatureSchemeList are permitted, so the peer is able to d=
isable weak algorithms at will.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font=
-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-f=
amily:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Barnes, et al. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
Expires 28 December 2020 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0[Page 8]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Internet-Draft =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegat=
ed Credentials for TLS =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0June 2020<b=
r>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0signature: =C2=A0The delegation, a s=
ignature that binds the credential to<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the end-entity certificate&#=
39;s public key as specified below.=C2=A0 The<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 signature scheme is specifie=
d by DelegatedCredential.algorithm.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">4.1.1.=C2=A0 Server Authentication<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0A client which supports this specifi=
cation SHALL send a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;delegated_credential&quot; ext=
ension in its ClientHello.=C2=A0 The body of the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0extension consists of a SignatureSch=
emeList:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Barnes, et al. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
Expires 28 December 2020 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0[Page 9]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">Internet-Draft =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Delegat=
ed Credentials for TLS =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0June 2020<b=
r>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SignatureScheme suppo=
rted_signature_algorithm&lt;2..2^16-2&gt;;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } SignatureSchemeList;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the client receives a delegated c=
redential without indicating<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0support, then the client MUST abort =
with an &quot;unexpected_message&quot;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0alert.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the extension is present, the ser=
ver MAY send a delegated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credential; if the extension is not =
present, the server MUST NOT send<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0a delegated credential.=C2=A0 The se=
rver MUST ignore the extension unless<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.3 or a later version is negoti=
ated.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0The server MUST send the delegated c=
redential as an extension in the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0CertificateEntry of its end-entity c=
ertificate; the client SHOULD<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0ignore delegated credentials sent as=
 extensions to any other<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0The expected_cert_verify_algorithm f=
ield MUST be of a type advertised<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0by the client in the SignatureScheme=
List and is considered invalid<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0otherwise.=C2=A0 Clients that receiv=
e invalid delegated credentials MUST<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0terminate the connection with an &qu=
ot;illegal_parameter&quot; alert.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I am wondering what would prevent any<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">downgrade attacks if the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">SignatureSchemeList and<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">signature_algorithms have two different<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">sets of lists. My current understanding<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">is that these extensions are handled<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">independently, but I might be missing<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">something.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I am wondering if that would be<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">appropriated to specify the signature of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">the CertificateVerify depending on the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">presence of the delegated credential - I<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">mean the key used to generate it.<span>=C2=A0</sp=
an><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>The signature_algorithms=C2=A0SignatureSchemeList =
is used to match the signature by the certificate, the delegated_credential=
=C2=A0SignatureSchemeList is used to match the=C2=A0expected_cert_verify_al=
gorithm. Given both a certificate and all possible DCs, the peer could sele=
ct the weakest signature of the union of both sets (if they&#39;re differen=
t). However, this doesn&#39;t permit a downgrade attack if the validating p=
eer doesn&#39;t advertise a weak algorithm.</div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibr=
i,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D=
"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">=
<div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">4.1.3.=C2=A0 Validating a Delegated Credential<br=
>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0On receiving a delegated credential =
and a certificate chain, the peer<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0validates the certificate chain and =
matches the end-entity<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate to the peer&#39;s expect=
ed identity.=C2=A0 It also takes the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0following steps:<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A01.=C2=A0 Verify that the current tim=
e is within the validity interval of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the credential.=C2=A0 =
This is done by asserting that the current time<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is no more than the de=
legation certificate&#39;s notBefore value plus<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0DelegatedCredential.cr=
ed.valid_time.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A02.=C2=A0 Verify that the credential&=
#39;s remaining validity time is no more<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0than the maximum valid=
ity period.=C2=A0 This is done by asserting that<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the current time is no=
 more than the delegation certificate&#39;s<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0notBefore value plus D=
elegatedCredential.cred.valid_time plus the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0maximum validity perio=
d.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A03.=C2=A0 Verify that expected_cert_v=
erify_algorithm matches the scheme<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0indicated in the peer&=
#39;s CertificateVerify message and that the<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm is allowed f=
or use with delegated credentials.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I am wondering if a reference to specify<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">what allowed would not be needed unless<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">it means advertised in the extension. =C2=A0<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A04.=C2=A0 Verify that the end-entity =
certificate satisfies the conditions<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0in Section 4.2.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A05.=C2=A0 Use the public key in the p=
eer&#39;s end-entity certificate to verify<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the signature of the c=
redential using the algorithm indicated by<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0DelegatedCredential.al=
gorithm.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0If one or more of these checks fail,=
 then the delegated credential is<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0deemed invalid.=C2=A0 Clients and se=
rvers that receive invalid delegated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credentials MUST terminate the conne=
ction with an &quot;illegal_parameter&quot;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0alert.=C2=A0 If successful, the part=
icipant receiving the Certificate<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0message uses the public key in the c=
redential to verify the signature<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0in the peer&#39;s CertificateVerify =
message.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">7.=C2=A0 Security Considerations<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">[...]<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">7.6.=C2=A0 The Impact of Signature Forgery Attack=
s<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0When TLS 1.2 servers support RSA key=
 exchange, they may be vulnerable<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0to attacks that allow forging an RSA=
 signature over an arbitrary<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0message [BLEI].=C2=A0 TLS 1.2 [RFC52=
46] (Section 7.4.7.1.) describes a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigation strategy requiring carefu=
l implementation of timing<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0resistant countermeasures for preven=
ting these attacks.=C2=A0 Experience<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0shows that in practice, server imple=
mentations may fail to fully stop<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0these attacks due to the complexity =
of this mitigation [ROBOT].=C2=A0 For<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.2 servers that support RSA key=
 exchange using a DC-enabled end-<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0entity certificate, a hypothetical s=
ignature forgery attack would<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0allow forging a signature over a del=
egated credential.=C2=A0 The forged<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0credential could then be used by the=
 attacker as the equivalent of a<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0man-in-the-middle certificate, valid=
 for 7 days.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">I do not see the relevance to TLS 1.3.<span>=C2=
=A0</span><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>In a key reuse scenario (same key, multiple server=
s) where one of the servers permits a signing oracle, TLS 1.3 signatures ca=
n be actively forged.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><div style=3D"margin:0px;font-size:12pt;font-famil=
y:Calibri,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div style=3D"margin:0px">
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Server operators should therefore mi=
nimize the risk of using DC-<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0enabled end-entity certificates wher=
e a signature forgery oracle may<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0be present.=C2=A0 If possible, serve=
r operators may choose to use DC-<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0enabled certificates only for signin=
g credentials, and not for<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0serving non-DC TLS traffic.=C2=A0 Fu=
rthermore, server operators may use<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0elliptic curve certificates for DC-e=
nabled traffic, while using RSA<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificates without the DelegationU=
sage certificate extension for<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0non-DC traffic; this completely prev=
ents such attacks.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that if a signature can be forg=
ed over an arbitrary credential,<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0the attacker can choose any value fo=
r the valid_time field.=C2=A0 Repeated<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0signature forgeries therefore allow =
the attacker to create multiple<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0delegated credentials that can cover=
 the entire validity period of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0the certificate.=C2=A0 Temporary exp=
osure of the key or a signing oracle<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0may allow the attacker to impersonat=
e a server for the lifetime of<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px">=C2=A0 =C2=A0the certificate.<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin:0px"><br style=3D"font-size:16px;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255)">
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<div id=3D"m_2604014426712549088appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%">
<div id=3D"m_2604014426712549088divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Ca=
libri, sans-serif" style=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> =
TLS &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tls-bounc=
es@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Salz, Rich &lt;rsalz=3D<a href=3D"mailto:4=
0akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org</=
a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, June 29, 2020 12:00 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Joseph Salowey &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:joe@salowey.net" target=3D"=
_blank">joe@salowey.net</a>&gt;; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tls@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">tls@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [TLS] 2nd WGLC for Delegated Credentials for TLS</font>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
</div>

<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p>I=E2=80=99d still like to see test vectors.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 19:32:21 -0700
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Thank you Russ and Rich for your comments,

I've attempted to address the comments here:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80, save for the one about the
example extension.

Russ, which format do you think would be most useful for the extension? I'm
having a hard time finding another extension to model this after.

On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 10:00 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> I have two comments:
>
> 1) The OID assignment for the ASN.1 module was assigned already by IANA.
> Please fill it in.
>
> 2) I think it would be very helpful to have an example of the extension in
> an Appendix.  There was discussion on the list about it, and an error was
> found in the proposed example, which proves the need for an example.
>
> Russ
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Thank you Russ and Rich for your=C2=A0com=
ments,<div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve attempted to address the comments here:=
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80">https://git=
hub.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80</a>, save for the one about the example =
extension.</div><div><br></div><div>Russ, which format do you think would b=
e most useful for the extension? I&#39;m having a hard time finding another=
 extension to model this after.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 10:00 AM Russ =
Housley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I h=
ave two comments:<br>
<br>
1) The OID assignment for the ASN.1 module was assigned already by IANA.=C2=
=A0 Please fill it in.<br>
<br>
2) I think it would be very helpful to have an example of the extension in =
an Appendix.=C2=A0 There was discussion on the list about it, and an error =
was found in the proposed example, which proves the need for an example.<br=
>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
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Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 06:10:19 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "Carrick Bartle" <cbartle891@icloud.com>
Cc: "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
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On Wed, Aug 19, 2020, at 6:42 PM, Carrick Bartle wrote:
> Thanks for the feedback! I've posted a bunch of PRs and issues, as 
> you've seen. Here are my remaining comments:
> 
> >>> Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if a PAKE is 
> >> used with TLS.
> >> Maybe cite a document that contains a recommended way of using PAKEs 
> >> with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?
> > 
> > I'd rather not cite one (now), especially since that document is expired. Perhaps we can file an issue to add a citation later on?
> 
> Looks like Mohit already added a more up-to-date citation.
> 
> > Filed: https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36
> 
> Thanks, Mohit! :)
> 
> >>> Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are explicitly designed to support mutual authentication.Isn't mutual authentication, in general, orthogonal to linkability? 
> >> Certificates, for example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot be 
> >> linked across connections.
> > 
> > This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the network. Any sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be linkable, be it an external PSK ID or a certificate. 
> 
> Right, I get that. What I'm saying is that since there are solutions 
> that can prevent that type of linkability (for instance, if a third 
> party deals the PSKs to the server and clients, and those PSKs are 
> never used more than once), the fact that PSKs are designed to support 
> mutual authentication is irrelevant. (I.e., mutual authentication for 
> one connection doesn't necessarily imply that the server knows it's 
> talking to the same client on every connection that client makes.)

I think the preceding sentence provides the missing context:

"Specifically, servers can link successive connections that use the same external PSK together. Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are explicitly designed to support mutual authentication."

That said, I see what you're saying. We can just drop "as PSKs are explicitly designed to support mutual authentication." 

> >>> 6.1.  Provisioning Examples
> >> This section contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly 
> >> without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? Are 
> >> there any pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?
> > 
> > It's meant to be informational without any comment on the pros and cons of each. 
> 
> But the title is "*Guidance* for External PSK Usage." What is guidance 
> if not a collection of recommendations?

This particular bit of the document describes use cases which informed the guidance (recommendations) for PSK usage described elsewhere.

> >>> Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently under 
> >> discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.
> >> What does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, EAP-TLS-PSK 
> >> needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's referring to.
> > 
> > It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK use case better than I do, though, so I'll let him answer. 
> Looks like Mohit added a citation for that.
> 
> >>>   3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of TLS client and server.
> >> Why?
> > 
> > Because that interface exists to enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 and beyond. 
> 
> My understanding is that that interface doesn't *enable* external PSKs 
> for 1.3, but that it just to makes it easier and less error-prone 
> because the interface generates several PSKs--one for each hash 
> function. Is that the case? If so, why not mention that as the 
> rationale as to why nodes SHOULD use the importer?

That seems like a fine clarification. Do you want to propose some text?

> >>> OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external PSKs 
> >> via distinct ciphersuites.
> >> This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph goes 
> >> on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to OpenSSL for 
> >> TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK support 
> >> in BoringSSL.
> > 
> > We didn't want to go into version-specific details here, but yes, that's right. 
> 
> Might be better to mention this particular version-specific detail here 
> since otherwise this statement is misleading.

That sounds reasonable. Can you please propose text?

> >>> some systems require the provisioning process to embed 
> >> application-specific information in either PSKs or their identities.
> >> Is it really a good idea to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that not 
> >> diminish the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put that 
> >> sort of information in the identity?
> > 
> > It is probably desirable to use the identity for this purpose since, 
> well, its application-specific identifying information. This is just 
> commenting on the state of affairs, I think.
> Okay, but if this document is guidance and not just a description, 
> shouldn't it also comment on whether this state of affairs is a good 
> idea?

As above, this section is more about documenting the situations and use cases which informed the recommendations. I don't think commenting on the pros and cons of the solution beyond that is needed.

Thanks again!

Best,
Chris


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As co-author I am not a proponent of passive TLS inspection - not least =
because of the ossification implications.  It cannot be labeled as =
ineffective though (see further comments below), even if the document =
strongly hints at not using passive TLS inspection in a post-TLS-1.2 =
world.

> On Aug 19, 2020, at 6:43 PM, Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> wrote:
>=20
> The passive eavesdropper can indeed see the handshake in TLS 1.2, but
> since they were not a participant they don't actually know what it
> means even though it wasn't encrypted.
>=20
> For example, suppose an RSA certificate is sent and the handshake =
seems
> to agree RSA key exchange and Client sends an =
EncryptedPreMasterSecret.
> The passive eavesdropper has no idea if that's actually encrypted to =
the
> RSA public key from the certificate, it's just an opaque blob.
>=20
>=20
> Thus it's easily possible for an eavesdropper to witness a handshake =
in
> which the eavesdropper believes what happened is:
>=20
> Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
> Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
> Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret to the local hospital
> both agreed this all worked fine and continue encrypted
>=20
> The eavesdropper's "Don't eavesdrop on people's medical stuff" policy
> kicks in and it allows the connection unmolested. Unfortunately what
> really happened is:
>=20
> Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
> Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
> Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret for the GRU data exfiltration
> server ignoring the bogus certificate
> $5Bn of stolen commercial documents are uploaded to the server


Advanced passive TLS inspection devices use a combination of techniques =
to defend against those attacks for TLS 1.2 (and below):
1. Policy-based control over the use of RSA key exchange.  It should not =
be allowed.
2. Checking the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message when (EC)DHE =
key exchange is used.
3. Not trusting the destination IP address.  The hostname from the SNI =
is resolved and compared.

None of those techniques are perfect given an advanced adversary that =
controls the client + DNS in the enterprise + the flow of traffic on the =
server side of the TLS inspection device.
(Side note: If I=E2=80=99m an attacker that has control over DNS then I =
would not bother with TLS-based attacks for data exfiltration).
In other words, nation state attacks might succeed but it does not mean =
that passive TLS inspection devices are not effective against other =
attacks.

=E2=80=94Roelof=


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--Apple-Mail=_E48E77CC-EB56-431C-970B-CC5168929B04
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	charset=us-ascii

There are many RFCs that use the PEM encoding to provide example =
certificates:
     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
     -----END CERTIFICATE-----

Others use the output of dumpasn1 from Peter Gutmann.

Either one would be fine with me.

Russ

> On Aug 19, 2020, at 10:32 PM, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Thank you Russ and Rich for your comments,
>=20
> I've attempted to address the comments here: =
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80 =
<https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80>, save for the one about =
the example extension.
>=20
> Russ, which format do you think would be most useful for the =
extension? I'm having a hard time finding another extension to model =
this after.
>=20
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 10:00 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com =
<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
> I have two comments:
>=20
> 1) The OID assignment for the ASN.1 module was assigned already by =
IANA.  Please fill it in.
>=20
> 2) I think it would be very helpful to have an example of the =
extension in an Appendix.  There was discussion on the list about it, =
and an error was found in the proposed example, which proves the need =
for an example.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>


--Apple-Mail=_E48E77CC-EB56-431C-970B-CC5168929B04
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">There=
 are many RFCs that use the PEM encoding to provide example =
certificates:<div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: =
normal; font-size: 11px; line-height: normal; font-family: Menlo;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;-----BEGIN =
CERTIFICATE-----</span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: =
normal; font-size: 11px; line-height: normal; font-family: Menlo;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; -----END =
CERTIFICATE-----</span></div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Others use =
the output of dumpasn1 from Peter Gutmann.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Either one would be fine with me.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Russ</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Aug 19, 2020, at 10:32 PM, =
Nick Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nick@cloudflare.com" =
class=3D"">nick@cloudflare.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Thank you Russ and Rich for =
your&nbsp;comments,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I've attempted to address the comments here:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80</a>, save for =
the one about the example extension.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ, which format do you think would =
be most useful for the extension? I'm having a hard time finding another =
extension to model this after.</div></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug =
14, 2020 at 10:00 AM Russ Housley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" =
class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I =
have two comments:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
1) The OID assignment for the ASN.1 module was assigned already by =
IANA.&nbsp; Please fill it in.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
2) I think it would be very helpful to have an example of the extension =
in an Appendix.&nbsp; There was discussion on the list about it, and an =
error was found in the proposed example, which proves the need for an =
example.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Russ<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
TLS mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">TLS@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_E48E77CC-EB56-431C-970B-CC5168929B04--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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From nobody Thu Aug 20 09:10:41 2020
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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Yes, my first comment was addressed.

Russ

> On Aug 20, 2020, at 9:19 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>=20
> I've attempted to address the comments here: =
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80 =
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__github.com_tlswg_t=
ls-2Dsubcerts_pull_80&d=3DDwMFaQ&c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9=
Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3DHixf15djhWIija9QJkTI4w7whANztt9hjISFuzRGo2Q&s=3D6RyMUabBp=
LVBxZFPpTn7au08k57raGHF3yKohxFtwq4&e=3D>, save for the one about the =
example extension.
> =20
> Thanks for responding; looks good.


--Apple-Mail=_F6C2C6AD-F78A-4766-8BC1-6EE22D868873
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Yes, =
my first comment was addressed.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Aug 20, 2020, at 9:19 AM, =
Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" =
class=3D"">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: =
0in;" class=3D""><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin: 0in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">I've attempted to =
address the comments here:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__github.com_=
tlswg_tls-2Dsubcerts_pull_80&amp;d=3DDwMFaQ&amp;c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg=
&amp;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&amp;m=3DHixf15djhWIija9QJkTI4w7whANztt9hjI=
SFuzRGo2Q&amp;s=3D6RyMUabBpLVBxZFPpTn7au08k57raGHF3yKohxFtwq4&amp;e=3D" =
style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80</a>, save for =
the one about the example extension.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></li></ul><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D"">Thanks for responding; looks =
good.</div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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References: <A2E098AE-6ACE-4999-ADF2-5C1211E70CCB@akamai.com> <FC3B9E6E-7F14-4585-97F0-845A049AD001@vigilsec.com> <CAFDDyk8xNp7YbSJSNhNuxcbf7r8XFt_Lds8XnW7X63pqEVNgyA@mail.gmail.com> <EC4F759B-715F-4C98-B15D-BA6FCED70DDC@vigilsec.com> <10571E25-ECED-4C9D-A2FB-B43FAB8AD17D@akamai.com>
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From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 09:18:48 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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--000000000000c594c605ad517a83
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

For some reason, I misinterpreted this request as putting a representation
of the TLS extension into the document. An ASN.1 representation of the OID
in the certificate is forthcoming.

Nick

On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 9:04 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>
>
>    - There are many RFCs that use the PEM encoding to provide example
>    certificates:
>
>      -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
>
>      -----END CERTIFICATE-----
>
>
>
>    - Others use the output of dumpasn1 from Peter Gutmann.
>
>
>
> If you ask I prefer PEM style, but can live with either.
>

--000000000000c594c605ad517a83
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<div dir=3D"ltr">For some reason, I misinterpreted this request as putting =
a representation of the TLS extension into the document. An ASN.1 represent=
ation of the OID in the certificate is forthcoming.<div><div><br></div><div=
>Nick</div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 9:04 AM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_5566148487929021201WordSection1">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_5566148487929021201MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0in">There are many RFCs that use the PEM encoding to provide example c=
ertificates:
<u></u><u></u></li></ul>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:8.5pt;font-family:Menlo">=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:8.5pt;font-family:Menlo">=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -----END CERTIFICATE-----<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_5566148487929021201MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0in">Others use the output of dumpasn1 from Peter Gutmann.<u></u><u></u=
></li></ul>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If you ask I prefer PEM style, but can live with eit=
her.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--000000000000c594c605ad517a83--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 12:13:45 -0700
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To: Roelof DuToit <r@nerd.ninja>
Cc: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, "opsec@ietf.org" <opsec@ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 7:01 AM Roelof DuToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:

> As co-author I am not a proponent of passive TLS inspection - not least
> because of the ossification implications.  It cannot be labeled as
> ineffective though (see further comments below), even if the document
> strongly hints at not using passive TLS inspection in a post-TLS-1.2 worl=
d.
>
> > On Aug 19, 2020, at 6:43 PM, Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> wrote:
> >
> > The passive eavesdropper can indeed see the handshake in TLS 1.2, but
> > since they were not a participant they don't actually know what it
> > means even though it wasn't encrypted.
> >
> > For example, suppose an RSA certificate is sent and the handshake seems
> > to agree RSA key exchange and Client sends an EncryptedPreMasterSecret.
> > The passive eavesdropper has no idea if that's actually encrypted to th=
e
> > RSA public key from the certificate, it's just an opaque blob.
> >
> >
> > Thus it's easily possible for an eavesdropper to witness a handshake in
> > which the eavesdropper believes what happened is:
> >
> > Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
> > Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
> > Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret to the local hospital
> > both agreed this all worked fine and continue encrypted
> >
> > The eavesdropper's "Don't eavesdrop on people's medical stuff" policy
> > kicks in and it allows the connection unmolested. Unfortunately what
> > really happened is:
> >
> > Client proposed to do RSA key exchange
> > Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example
> > Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret for the GRU data exfiltration
> > server ignoring the bogus certificate
> > $5Bn of stolen commercial documents are uploaded to the server
>
>
> Advanced passive TLS inspection devices use a combination of techniques t=
o
> defend against those attacks for TLS 1.2 (and below):
> 1. Policy-based control over the use of RSA key exchange.  It should not
> be allowed.
> 2. Checking the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message when (EC)DHE
> key exchange is used.
> 3. Not trusting the destination IP address.  The hostname from the SNI is
> resolved and compared.
>
> None of those techniques are perfect given an advanced adversary that
> controls the client + DNS in the enterprise + the flow of traffic on the
> server side of the TLS inspection device.
> (Side note: If I=E2=80=99m an attacker that has control over DNS then I w=
ould not
> bother with TLS-based attacks for data exfiltration).
> In other words, nation state attacks might succeed but it does not mean
> that passive TLS inspection devices are not effective against other attac=
ks.
>

It seems to me that the conditions under which this kind of inspection
works and does not work are quite subtle. If you want to proceed with this
document, it would probably be good to document them,

-Ekr

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 7:01 AM Roelo=
f DuToit &lt;r@nerd.ninja&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">As co-author I am not a proponent of passive TLS inspe=
ction - not least because of the ossification implications.=C2=A0 It cannot=
 be labeled as ineffective though (see further comments below), even if the=
 document strongly hints at not using passive TLS inspection in a post-TLS-=
1.2 world.<br>
<br>
&gt; On Aug 19, 2020, at 6:43 PM, Nick Lamb &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:njl@tlrmx=
.org" target=3D"_blank">njl@tlrmx.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The passive eavesdropper can indeed see the handshake in TLS 1.2, but<=
br>
&gt; since they were not a participant they don&#39;t actually know what it=
<br>
&gt; means even though it wasn&#39;t encrypted.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For example, suppose an RSA certificate is sent and the handshake seem=
s<br>
&gt; to agree RSA key exchange and Client sends an EncryptedPreMasterSecret=
.<br>
&gt; The passive eavesdropper has no idea if that&#39;s actually encrypted =
to the<br>
&gt; RSA public key from the certificate, it&#39;s just an opaque blob.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thus it&#39;s easily possible for an eavesdropper to witness a handsha=
ke in<br>
&gt; which the eavesdropper believes what happened is:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Client proposed to do RSA key exchange<br>
&gt; Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example<br>
&gt; Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret to the local hospital<br>
&gt; both agreed this all worked fine and continue encrypted<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The eavesdropper&#39;s &quot;Don&#39;t eavesdrop on people&#39;s medic=
al stuff&quot; policy<br>
&gt; kicks in and it allows the connection unmolested. Unfortunately what<b=
r>
&gt; really happened is:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Client proposed to do RSA key exchange<br>
&gt; Server showed a certificate for www.local-hospital.example<br>
&gt; Client sent an EncryptedPreMasterSecret for the GRU data exfiltration<=
br>
&gt; server ignoring the bogus certificate<br>
&gt; $5Bn of stolen commercial documents are uploaded to the server<br>
<br>
<br>
Advanced passive TLS inspection devices use a combination of techniques to =
defend against those attacks for TLS 1.2 (and below):<br>
1. Policy-based control over the use of RSA key exchange.=C2=A0 It should n=
ot be allowed.<br>
2. Checking the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message when (EC)DHE key=
 exchange is used.<br>
3. Not trusting the destination IP address.=C2=A0 The hostname from the SNI=
 is resolved and compared.<br>
<br>
None of those techniques are perfect given an advanced adversary that contr=
ols the client + DNS in the enterprise + the flow of traffic on the server =
side of the TLS inspection device.<br>
(Side note: If I=E2=80=99m an attacker that has control over DNS then I wou=
ld not bother with TLS-based attacks for data exfiltration).<br>
In other words, nation state attacks might succeed but it does not mean tha=
t passive TLS inspection devices are not effective against other attacks.<b=
r></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It seems to me that the conditions under=
 which this kind of inspection works and does not work are quite subtle. If=
 you want to proceed with this document, it would probably be good to docum=
ent them,<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div></div=
>

--00000000000088c47705ad53ed92--


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--0000000000003e46c305ad5422fb
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Thursday, September 3rd, 17:00 - 18:00 UTC

This was the best time from the Doodle poll.  It was not possible to
accommodate everyone's schedules.  We will schedule a follow-up meeting in
case we need to have additional discussion on issues.

Webex details:

Meeting link:https: //
ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=m03f90210684f8e73e98a1fa737884d37
Meeting number: 171 257 5368
Password: 3MJbiVqYZ34
Agenda: ECH Issue Discussion
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues

Cheers,

Joe and Sean

--0000000000003e46c305ad5422fb
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thursday, September=C2=A03rd, 17:00 - 18:00 UTC<br></=
div><div><br></div><div>This was the best time from the Doodle poll.=C2=A0 =
It was not possible to accommodate=C2=A0everyone&#39;s schedules.=C2=A0 We =
will schedule a follow-up meeting in case we need to have additional discus=
sion on issues.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><br>Webex details:<br><br>Meeting link:htt=
ps: //<a href=3D"http://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=3Dm03f90210684f8e73e=
98a1fa737884d37">ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=3Dm03f90210684f8e73e98a1fa7=
37884d37</a><div>Meeting number: 171 257 5368</div><div>Password: 3MJbiVqYZ=
34</div><div>Agenda:=C2=A0ECH Issue Discussion</div><div><a href=3D"https:/=
/github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues">https://github.com/tlswg/draf=
t-ietf-tls-esni/issues</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><=
br></div><div>Joe and Sean</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>

--0000000000003e46c305ad5422fb--


From nobody Thu Aug 20 14:48:21 2020
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The Transport Layer Security (tls) WG will hold
a virtual interim meeting on 2020-09-03 from 10:00 to 11:00 America/Los_Angeles (17:00 to 18:00 UTC).

Agenda:
ECH Issue Discussion 
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues

Information about remote participation:
https://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=m03f90210684f8e73e98a1fa737884d37


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On Thu, 20 Aug 2020 09:58:58 -0400
Roelof DuToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:

> As co-author I am not a proponent of passive TLS inspection - not
> least because of the ossification implications.  It cannot be labeled
> as ineffective though (see further comments below), even if the
> document strongly hints at not using passive TLS inspection in a
> post-TLS-1.2 world.

Mostly I endorse Ekr's comment that a document like this should
actually spell out any convolutions and conditions necessary to the
effective use of passive inspection. I would try to find time to
examine a revised document that did this.

But I do want to address one such in particular now:

> 1. Policy-based control over the use of RSA key exchange.  It should
> not be allowed.

Qualys estimates that when TLS 1.3 was finalised RSA was required for
about 5.7% of web sites (it had been larger previously). That's a
pretty huge caveat.

The same document we're discussing, draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact-02
actually several times relies upon RSA key exchange (in section 5.3) for
methods it says will now be impacted by TLS 1.3 because that doesn't
allow RSA key exchange.

As written there's no problem, but it seems to me that if you add a
condition saying to disallow RSA key exchange in section 5.1, this has
the effect of implicitly rebuking this approach from section 5.3.

That would be a little bit silly in a single document but it's even
sillier when you recall that actually products in this space straddle
both categories.

Nick.


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From: Carrick Bartle <cbartle891@icloud.com>
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
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Cool, I'll propose some text in the cases you mentioned.


> On Aug 20, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Wed, Aug 19, 2020, at 6:42 PM, Carrick Bartle wrote:
>> Thanks for the feedback! I've posted a bunch of PRs and issues, as=20
>> you've seen. Here are my remaining comments:
>>=20
>>>>> Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if a PAKE =
is=20
>>>> used with TLS.
>>>> Maybe cite a document that contains a recommended way of using =
PAKEs=20
>>>> with TLS (e.g. draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00)?
>>>=20
>>> I'd rather not cite one (now), especially since that document is =
expired. Perhaps we can file an issue to add a citation later on?
>>=20
>> Looks like Mohit already added a more up-to-date citation.
>>=20
>>> Filed: https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team/issues/36
>>=20
>> Thanks, Mohit! :)
>>=20
>>>>> Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope, as PSKs are =
explicitly designed to support mutual authentication.Isn't mutual =
authentication, in general, orthogonal to linkability?=20
>>>> Certificates, for example, are encrypted in TLS 1.3, and so cannot =
be=20
>>>> linked across connections.
>>>=20
>>> This section speaks of linkability by the endpoints, not the =
network. Any sort of identifier that's reused across connections can be =
linkable, be it an external PSK ID or a certificate.=20
>>=20
>> Right, I get that. What I'm saying is that since there are solutions=20=

>> that can prevent that type of linkability (for instance, if a third=20=

>> party deals the PSKs to the server and clients, and those PSKs are=20
>> never used more than once), the fact that PSKs are designed to =
support=20
>> mutual authentication is irrelevant. (I.e., mutual authentication for=20=

>> one connection doesn't necessarily imply that the server knows it's=20=

>> talking to the same client on every connection that client makes.)
>=20
> I think the preceding sentence provides the missing context:
>=20
> "Specifically, servers can link successive connections that use the =
same external PSK together. Preventing this type of linkability is out =
of scope, as PSKs are explicitly designed to support mutual =
authentication."
>=20
> That said, I see what you're saying. We can just drop "as PSKs are =
explicitly designed to support mutual authentication."=20
>=20
>>>>> 6.1.  Provisioning Examples
>>>> This section contains a list of ways to provision PSKs, but mostly=20=

>>>> without any commentary or discussion. Are these methods good? Bad? =
Are=20
>>>> there any pitfalls? If so, how can one guard against them?
>>>=20
>>> It's meant to be informational without any comment on the pros and =
cons of each.=20
>>=20
>> But the title is "*Guidance* for External PSK Usage." What is =
guidance=20
>> if not a collection of recommendations?
>=20
> This particular bit of the document describes use cases which informed =
the guidance (recommendations) for PSK usage described elsewhere.
>=20
>>>>> Identities may sometimes need to be routable, as is currently =
under=20
>>>> discussion for EAP-TLS-PSK.
>>>> What does it mean for an identity to be "routable"? Also, =
EAP-TLS-PSK=20
>>>> needs a citation link. I'm not sure which document it's referring =
to.
>>>=20
>>> It might be, for example, a FQDN. Mohit understands the EAP-TLS-PSK =
use case better than I do, though, so I'll let him answer.=20
>> Looks like Mohit added a citation for that.
>>=20
>>>>>  3.  Nodes SHOULD use external PSK importers =
[I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a pair of =
TLS client and server.
>>>> Why?
>>>=20
>>> Because that interface exists to enable external PSKs for TLS 1.3 =
and beyond.=20
>>=20
>> My understanding is that that interface doesn't *enable* external =
PSKs=20
>> for 1.3, but that it just to makes it easier and less error-prone=20
>> because the interface generates several PSKs--one for each hash=20
>> function. Is that the case? If so, why not mention that as the=20
>> rationale as to why nodes SHOULD use the importer?
>=20
> That seems like a fine clarification. Do you want to propose some =
text?
>=20
>>>>> OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications specify support for external =
PSKs=20
>>>> via distinct ciphersuites.
>>>> This is not true of BoringSSL for TLS 1.3. Although the paragraph =
goes=20
>>>> on to mention "new callback functions added specifically to OpenSSL =
for=20
>>>> TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support," this doesn't preclude 1.3 PSK =
support=20
>>>> in BoringSSL.
>>>=20
>>> We didn't want to go into version-specific details here, but yes, =
that's right.=20
>>=20
>> Might be better to mention this particular version-specific detail =
here=20
>> since otherwise this statement is misleading.
>=20
> That sounds reasonable. Can you please propose text?
>=20
>>>>> some systems require the provisioning process to embed=20
>>>> application-specific information in either PSKs or their =
identities.
>>>> Is it really a good idea to embed data in the PSK itself? Does that =
not=20
>>>> diminish the entropy of the PSK? Why is it not sufficient to put =
that=20
>>>> sort of information in the identity?
>>>=20
>>> It is probably desirable to use the identity for this purpose since,=20=

>> well, its application-specific identifying information. This is just=20=

>> commenting on the state of affairs, I think.
>> Okay, but if this document is guidance and not just a description,=20
>> shouldn't it also comment on whether this state of affairs is a good=20=

>> idea?
>=20
> As above, this section is more about documenting the situations and =
use cases which informed the recommendations. I don't think commenting =
on the pros and cons of the solution beyond that is needed.
>=20
> Thanks again!
>=20
> Best,
> Chris


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+5/-5/=F0=9F=92=AC76)
  5 issues created:
  - ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys (by kjacobs-moz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/281=20
  - When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values. (by kjacobs-=
moz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/280=20
  - Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF? (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/278=20
  - s/Hkpe/Hpke/? (by cbartle891)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/275=20
  - Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274=20

  10 issues received 76 new comments:
  - #281 ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys (2 by chris-wood, =
davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/281=20
  - #280 When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values. (3 by c=
hris-wood, davidben, kjacobs-moz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/280=20
  - #278 Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF? (15 by chris-wood, cjpa=
tton, davidben, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/278=20
  - #275 s/Hkpe/Hpke/? (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/275=20
  - #274 Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption (45 by MikeBish=
op, bemasc, chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben, ekr, grittygrease, kazuho, mart=
inthomson, richsalz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274=20
  - #266 Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors (2 by cjpatton, david=
ben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266=20
  - #265 "outer_extensions": Guidance on what to compress (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265=20
  - #264 Handshake-level vs record-level padding (2 by richsalz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264=20
  - #261 Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF (4 by cjpatton, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261=20
  - #253 Nonce rationale clarity (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/253=20

  5 issues closed:
  - ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/281=20
  - "outer_extensions": Guidance on what to compress https://github.com/tls=
wg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/265=20
  - When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values. https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/280=20
  - Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors https://github.com/tlswg/d=
raft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/266=20
  - s/Hkpe/Hpke/? https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/275=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+10/-6/=F0=9F=92=AC23)
  10 pull requests submitted:
  - Ech confirmation (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=20
  - Fix leftover references to 'retry_keys' (by kjacobs-moz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/282=20
  - Fix typo CllientHelloInner (by thomwiggers)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/279=20
  - Nit: fix typo: change 'Hkpe' to 'Hpke'. (by cbartle891)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/277=20
  - Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=20
  - Update a few citations to RFCs. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/273=20
  - Remove "outer_extension" compression guidance (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/272=20
  - Require the KDF to be HKDF-based (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271=20
  - Adjust and generalize cached_info guidance. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/270=20
  - Proposal: Retry-only ECHConfig (by bemasc)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/269=20

  5 pull requests received 23 new comments:
  - #283 Add "ech_confirm" extension (10 by MikeBishop, bemasc, cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=20
  - #276 Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API (4 by chris-wood, cjpatt=
on)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=20
  - #271 Require the KDF to be HKDF-based (4 by chris-wood, cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271=20
  - #269 Proposal: Retry-only ECHConfig (3 by bemasc, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/269=20
  - #268 Fix superfluous padding edge cases. (2 by chris-wood, ekr)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/268=20

  6 pull requests merged:
  - Remove "outer_extension" compression guidance
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/272=20
  - Fix leftover references to 'retry_keys'
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/282=20
  - Fix typo CllientHelloInner
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/279=20
  - Nit: fix typo: change 'Hkpe' to 'Hpke'.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/277=20
  - Adjust and generalize cached_info guidance.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/270=20
  - Update a few citations to RFCs.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/273=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+2/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Address Daniel Migault, Russ Housley and Rich Salz's comments. (by grit=
tygrease)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80=20
  - Add clarifications (by claucece)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79=20

  1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
  - #79 Add clarifications (1 by claucece)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - Address Daniel Migault, Russ Housley and Rich Salz's comments.
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80=20
  - Add clarifications
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<h1>Sunday August 23, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+5/-5/=F0=9F=92=AC76)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">5 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#281 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
81">ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys</a> (by kjacobs-moz) </=
li>
 =20
  <li>#280 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
80">When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values.</a> (by kjac=
obs-moz) </li>
 =20
  <li>#278 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
78">Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF?</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#275 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
75">s/Hkpe/Hpke/?</a> (by cbartle891) </li>
 =20
  <li>#274 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
74">Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption</a> (by cjpatton) </=
li>
  </ul>

  <p>10 issues received 76 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#281 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
81">ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys</a> (2 by chris-wood, d=
avidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#280 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
80">When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values.</a> (3 by ch=
ris-wood, davidben, kjacobs-moz) </li>
 =20
  <li>#278 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
78">Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF?</a> (15 by chris-wood, cjpat=
ton, davidben, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#275 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
75">s/Hkpe/Hpke/?</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#274 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
74">Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption</a> (45 by MikeBisho=
p, bemasc, chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben, ekr, grittygrease, kazuho, marti=
nthomson, richsalz) </li>
 =20
  <li>#266 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
66">Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors</a> (2 by cjpatton, davidb=
en) </li>
 =20
  <li>#265 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
65">&quot;outer_extensions&quot;: Guidance on what to compress</a> (1 by cj=
patton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#264 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
64">Handshake-level vs record-level padding</a> (2 by richsalz) </li>
 =20
  <li>#261 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
61">Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF</a> (4 by cjpatton, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#253 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
53">Nonce rationale clarity</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>5 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#281 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
81">ServerEncryptedCH: retry_configs vs. retry_keys</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#265 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
65">&quot;outer_extensions&quot;: Guidance on what to compress</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#280 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
80">When computing config_digest, use I2OSP on integer values.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#266 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
66">Security considerations: SNI leakage vectors</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#275 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
75">s/Hkpe/Hpke/?</a> </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+10/-6/=F0=9F=92=AC23)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">10 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#283 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=
">Ech confirmation</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#282 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/282=
">Fix leftover references to &#x27;retry_keys&#x27;</a> (by kjacobs-moz) </=
li>
 =20
  <li>#279 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/279=
">Fix typo CllientHelloInner</a> (by thomwiggers) </li>
 =20
  <li>#277 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/277=
">Nit: fix typo: change &#x27;Hkpe&#x27; to &#x27;Hpke&#x27;.</a> (by cbart=
le891) </li>
 =20
  <li>#276 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=
">Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#273 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/273=
">Update a few citations to RFCs.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#272 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/272=
">Remove &quot;outer_extension&quot; compression guidance</a> (by cjpatton)=
 </li>
 =20
  <li>#271 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271=
">Require the KDF to be HKDF-based</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#270 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/270=
">Adjust and generalize cached_info guidance.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#269 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/269=
">Proposal: Retry-only ECHConfig</a> (by bemasc) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>5 pull requests received 23 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#283 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=
">Add &quot;ech_confirm&quot; extension</a> (10 by MikeBishop, bemasc, cjpa=
tton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#276 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=
">Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API</a> (4 by chris-wood, cjpatton)=
 </li>
 =20
  <li>#271 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/271=
">Require the KDF to be HKDF-based</a> (4 by chris-wood, cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#269 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/269=
">Proposal: Retry-only ECHConfig</a> (3 by bemasc, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#268 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/268=
">Fix superfluous padding edge cases.</a> (2 by chris-wood, ekr) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#272 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/272=
">Remove &quot;outer_extension&quot; compression guidance</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#282 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/282=
">Fix leftover references to &#x27;retry_keys&#x27;</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#279 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/279=
">Fix typo CllientHelloInner</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#277 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/277=
">Nit: fix typo: change &#x27;Hkpe&#x27; to &#x27;Hpke&#x27;.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#270 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/270=
">Adjust and generalize cached_info guidance.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#273 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/273=
">Update a few citations to RFCs.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+2/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#80 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80">Address=
 Daniel Migault, Russ Housley and Rich Salz&#x27;s comments.</a> (by gritty=
grease) </li>
 =20
  <li>#79 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79">Add cla=
rifications</a> (by claucece) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#79 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79">Add cla=
rifications</a> (1 by claucece) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#80 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/80">Address=
 Daniel Migault, Russ Housley and Rich Salz&#x27;s comments.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#79 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/79">Add cla=
rifications</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Editorial suggestion for tls-subcert document
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Subject: [TLS] Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)
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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+5/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC36)
  5 issues created:
  - What to do on ECH decryption failure? (by Lekensteyn)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/290=20
  - Rejecting ECH for unrecognized backend servers (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/289=20
  - config_digest doesn't need to be 2^16-1 bytes long (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/288=20
  - Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption? (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/285=20
  - Section number levels (by MikeBishop)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/284=20

  7 issues received 36 new comments:
  - #290 What to do on ECH decryption failure? (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/290=20
  - #289 Rejecting ECH for unrecognized backend servers (3 by Lekensteyn, c=
jpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/289=20
  - #288 config_digest doesn't need to be 2^16-1 bytes long (8 by cjpatton,=
 martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/288=20
  - #285 Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption? (4 by ch=
ris-wood, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/285=20
  - #278 Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF? (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/278=20
  - #274 Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption (18 by bemasc, =
chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben, ekr, grittygrease, richsalz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/274=20
  - #261 Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/261=20

  1 issues closed:
  - Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esn=
i/issues/261=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC7)
  2 pull requests submitted:
  - Add ECH confirmation (option (3), but use SH.random) (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/287=20
  - Add ECH confirmation (option (3), can fall back to (2)) (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/286=20

  1 pull requests received 7 new comments:
  - #283 Add ECH confirmation (option (3)) (7 by cjpatton, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=20

  1 pull requests merged:
  - Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<title>Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)</title>
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<body>
<h1>Sunday August 30, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+5/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC36)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">5 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#290 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
90">What to do on ECH decryption failure?</a> (by Lekensteyn) </li>
 =20
  <li>#289 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
89">Rejecting ECH for unrecognized backend servers</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#288 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
88">config_digest doesn&#x27;t need to be 2^16-1 bytes long</a> (by chris-w=
ood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#285 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
85">Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption?</a> (by david=
ben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#284 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
84">Section number levels</a> (by MikeBishop) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>7 issues received 36 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#290 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
90">What to do on ECH decryption failure?</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#289 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
89">Rejecting ECH for unrecognized backend servers</a> (3 by Lekensteyn, cj=
patton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#288 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
88">config_digest doesn&#x27;t need to be 2^16-1 bytes long</a> (8 by cjpat=
ton, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#285 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
85">Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption?</a> (4 by chr=
is-wood, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#278 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
78">Computation of `config_digest`: which KDF?</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#274 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
74">Usage indication: alternatives to trial decryption</a> (18 by bemasc, c=
hris-wood, cjpatton, davidben, ekr, grittygrease, richsalz) </li>
 =20
  <li>#261 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
61">Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#261 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
61">Spec assumes HPKE uses HKDF</a> </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC7)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#287 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/287=
">Add ECH confirmation (option (3), but use SH.random)</a> (by cjpatton) </=
li>
 =20
  <li>#286 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/286=
">Add ECH confirmation (option (3), can fall back to (2))</a> (by cjpatton)=
 </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests received 7 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#283 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/283=
">Add ECH confirmation (option (3))</a> (7 by cjpatton, martinthomson) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#276 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/276=
">Resolve mismatch between ECH and HPKE API</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
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