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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS]  Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 11:09:50 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:02:37 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS]  =?utf-8?q?Is_stateless_HelloRetryRequest_worthwhile=3F_=28?= =?utf-8?q?was_Re=3A_TLS_1=2E3_Problem=3F=29?=
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> I am having a difficult time understanding the tradeoffs you're facing.

This is the first time I'm reading the TLS 1.3 RFC.  I have
implemented SSLv3, TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2.  You may have
used my test server at https www dot mikestoolbox dot
org or dot net to test your own code.  It's kind of old now
since it doesn't do ECC and the DHE_RSA key exchange
I focused on has been disabled by most clients so you
end up getting a regular RSA handshake now.

I have gotten caught by the stateless HelloRetryRequest
and can't get past it.  You can't possibly implement it the
way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie
extension.  If it can be done at all, the stateless server
should probably just put the ClientHello1 and HRR (minus
the cookie) into the cookie extension.  If this is how it
should be done, then the spec should say so -- exactly
how to do it so everyone does it the same (correct) way
and not just hand-wave it and say figure it out yourself.

Getting the cookie right isn't enough because of the
potential for resending an old cookie by a mischievous
client.  Nico suggests that replay caches are hard to
get right even when your distributed servers are all
talking to each other.

Mike


From nobody Thu Oct  1 13:22:25 2020
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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 20:22:16 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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Hi!

I've assumed the role of responsible AD on this document.  As such, I perfo=
rmed an AD review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05.  All in all, =
it is in good shape.  My feedback is primarily around clarifying the conten=
t of the new KDF registry and a few of editorial suggestions.  Given that, =
I'm going to advance this document to IETF LC and the feedback below can be=
 discussed/addressed concurrently.

** Section 1.  Editorial.  Expand acronym on first use:
-- s/TLS 1.2 PRF/TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function (PRF)/
-- s/KDF/Key Derivation Function (KDF)/

** Section 1. Editorial.  Since the text says "... this document specifies =
a PSK Importer interface ... for use in D(TLS 1.3)" perhaps the this scopin=
g should also be upfront in the first sentence too:
s/TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] supports/(D)TLS 1.3 [RFC8446][ID-DTLS]/

** Section 4.1.  Editorial.  Per "The list of 'target_kdf' ...", other part=
s of this text refer to elements of struct ImportIdentity with the notation=
 "ImportedIdentity.*".  Consider s/The list of "target_kdf" values/The list=
 of ImportedIdentity.target_kdf values/

** Section 4.1.
If the EPSK is a key derived from some other protocol or
   sequence of protocols, ImportedIdentity.context MUST include a
   channel binding for the deriving protocols [RFC5056].

To the end of this normative guidance, I'd recommend adding something to th=
e effect of: "The details of this binding will be protocol specific and out=
 of scope in this document".

** Section 4.1.  Per "If no hash function is specified, SHA-256 MUST be use=
d"

-- Please provide a reference for SHA-256 (per "... If no hash function is =
specified, SHA-256 MUST be used").  =20

-- It is likely worth saying that this is the equivalent of HKDF_SHA256 (i.=
e., 0x0001)

** Section 4.1.  Per "EPSKs may be imported before the started of the conne=
ction ..." and "EPSKs may also be imported for early data use ..." should b=
e these be a normative MAYs?

** Section 4.1.  Per "Minimally, that means ALPN, QUIC ... must be provisio=
ned alongside these EPSK"
-- Please expand ALPN

-- should this be a normative MUST?

** Section 9.  Per the columns in the registry:
-- Is there a reason why there isn't a Reference column in the registry to =
capture which specification describes the particular KDF?  I think it needs=
 one to eliminate guesswork from the label in "KDF Description" to an algor=
ithm. =20

-- Was a Recommended column (and the associated processed for populating it=
 like a few of the other TLS registries) discussed/considered?

** Section 9.  While it is implied by the label, the text doesn't explicitl=
y say what HKDF_SHA256 and _SHA384 are (per previous comment about needing =
a reference).

Regards,
Roman


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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 14:08:55 -0700
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To: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 7:05 AM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> > I am having a difficult time understanding the tradeoffs you're facing.
>
> This is the first time I'm reading the TLS 1.3 RFC.  I have
> implemented SSLv3, TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2.  You may have
> used my test server at https www dot mikestoolbox dot
> org or dot net to test your own code.  It's kind of old now
> since it doesn't do ECC and the DHE_RSA key exchange
> I focused on has been disabled by most clients so you
> end up getting a regular RSA handshake now.
>
> I have gotten caught by the stateless HelloRetryRequest
> and can't get past it.  You can't possibly implement it the
> way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie
> extension.


The only thing the server needs to know is the hash of the ClientHello (so
it can restore the transcript hash) and that the server has already sent a
HelloRetryRequest (which it can detect by presence of the cookie). The only
argument I've seen made for what the spec suggests not working is being
able to verify which fields changed between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2.
I see no language in RFC 8446 that the server MUST enforce that the
ClientHello2 is conformant with respect to ClientHello1. Thus, I think what
the spec suggests should work.


> If it can be done at all, the stateless server
> should probably just put the ClientHello1 and HRR (minus
> the cookie) into the cookie extension.  If this is how it
> should be done, then the spec should say so -- exactly
> how to do it so everyone does it the same (correct) way
> and not just hand-wave it and say figure it out yourself.
>
> Getting the cookie right isn't enough because of the
> potential for resending an old cookie by a mischievous
> client.


The cookie serves as an alternative way for the server to remember the
ClientHello1 sent by the server. If the client is trying to perform some
sort of attack on the server by re-sending an old cookie, I assume that a
prerequisite for this attack is that the TLS handshake succeeds. For the
handshake to succeed, the client needs to know the ClientHello1 that
corresponds to the cookie so that it can compute the transcript hash
correctly. Regardless of the source of that client hello, the client can
equivalently send that ClientHello, get a real HelloRetryRequest from the
server, and send its ClientHello2, or it can send a ClientHello with the
cookie, bypassing the step of waiting for the HRR. A client attempting to
do something malicious with an HRR cookie is equivalent to behavior that
does not depend on a cookie.

>
> Mike
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 7:05 AM Michae=
l D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com">mike-list@pobox.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">&gt; I am having a difficult time understanding the tradeoffs you&#39;re =
facing.<br>
<br>
This is the first time I&#39;m reading the TLS 1.3 RFC.=C2=A0 I have<br>
implemented SSLv3, TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2.=C2=A0 You may have<br>
used my test server at https www dot mikestoolbox dot<br>
org or dot net to test your own code.=C2=A0 It&#39;s kind of old now<br>
since it doesn&#39;t do ECC and the DHE_RSA key exchange<br>
I focused on has been disabled by most clients so you<br>
end up getting a regular RSA handshake now.<br>
<br>
I have gotten caught by the stateless HelloRetryRequest<br>
and can&#39;t get past it.=C2=A0 You can&#39;t possibly implement it the<br=
>
way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie<br>
extension.=C2=A0</blockquote><div><br></div><div>The only thing the server =
needs to know is the hash of the ClientHello (so it can restore the transcr=
ipt hash) and that the server has already sent a HelloRetryRequest (which i=
t can detect by presence of the cookie). The only argument I&#39;ve seen ma=
de for what the spec suggests not working is being able to verify which fie=
lds changed between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2. I see no language in RFC=
 8446 that the server MUST enforce that the ClientHello2 is conformant with=
 respect to ClientHello1. Thus, I think what the spec suggests should work.=
</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0p=
x 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> I=
f it can be done at all, the stateless server<br>
should probably just put the ClientHello1 and HRR (minus<br>
the cookie) into the cookie extension.=C2=A0 If this is how it<br>
should be done, then the spec should say so -- exactly<br>
how to do it so everyone does it the same (correct) way<br>
and not just hand-wave it and say figure it out yourself.<br>
<br>
Getting the cookie right isn&#39;t enough because of the<br>
potential for resending an old cookie by a mischievous<br>
client.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>The cookie serves as an alternative=
 way for the server to remember the ClientHello1 sent by the server. If the=
 client is trying to perform some sort of attack on the server by re-sendin=
g an old cookie, I assume that a prerequisite for this attack is that the T=
LS handshake succeeds. For the handshake to succeed, the client needs to kn=
ow the ClientHello1 that corresponds to the cookie so that it can compute t=
he transcript hash correctly. Regardless of the source of that client hello=
, the client can equivalently send that ClientHello, get a real HelloRetryR=
equest from the server, and send its ClientHello2, or it can send a ClientH=
ello with the cookie, bypassing the step of waiting for the HRR. A client a=
ttempting to do something malicious with an HRR cookie is equivalent to beh=
avior that does not depend on a cookie.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05.txt> (Importing External PSKs for TLS) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
consider the following document: - 'Importing External PSKs for TLS'
  <draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-15. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document describes an interface for importing external Pre-
   Shared Keys (PSKs) into TLS 1.3.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.






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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
Thread-Index: AdaY21G9H9pWbGwkTCiEpqCBTCyDiQ==
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 16:50:02 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
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Hi!

I've assumed the role of responsible AD on this document.  As such, I perfo=
rmed an AD review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13.  This docume=
nt has seen a few WG LCs and reviews.  Thanks for working out the details f=
or this feedback.    I have a few questions and suggestions for process and=
 editorial clarity described below.  Given that, I'm going to advance this =
document to IETF LC and the feedback below can be discussed/addressed concu=
rrently.

** Section 1.  Editorial. Provide a reference to TLS 1.3 when it is first m=
entioned.

OLD
Post-handshake authentication is defined in TLS 1.3

NEW
Post-handshake authentication is defined in Section 4.6.2 of TLS 1.3 [TLS13=
]

** Section 1.  Editorial. Provide references to for (D)TLS 1.2

OLD
TLS (or DTLS) version 1.2 or later are REQUIRED

NEW
TLS (or DTLS) version 1.2 [RFC5246][RFC6347] or later are REQUIRED.

** Section 5. =20
   The
   application layer protocol used to send the authenticator SHOULD use
   TLS or a protocol with comparable security properties as its
   underlying transport

I saw the additional text added here after the LC on -09 (and the discussio=
n that this can't be MUST-use-TLS because of use cases like QUIC).  However=
, what is the envisioned flexibility by using SHOULD (instead of MUST) give=
n the addition of the "or a protocol with comparable security properties"? =
 When would I want to use a protocol with reduced security properties?

** Section 5.1.  Editorial.

These values are derived
   using an exporter as described in [RFC5705] (for TLS 1.2) or Sec. 7.5
   of [TLS13] (for TLS 1.3).

-- Please provide the relevant section in RFC5705 (just like was done for [=
TLS13])

-- s/Sec. 7.5/Section 7.5/

** Section 5.2.2.  Editorial. Per "The definition for TLS 1.3 is:" begs the=
 question of what that format might be for TLS 1.2.  Can you please make it=
 clearer that the format is the same.

** Section 5.2.2. =20

Otherwise, the signature algorithm used
   should be chosen from the "signature_algorithms" sent by the peer in
   the ClientHello of the TLS handshake. =20

-- Editorial.  For clarity, s/ Otherwise, the signature algorithm used .../=
Otherwise, with spontaneous server authentication, the signature algorithm =
used .../

-- Would it make sense to make this "should" and normative "SHOULD"?

** Section 5.2.4.
   When validating an
   authenticator, a constant-time comparison SHOULD be used.

What's the concern here?  IMO, this guidance seems better in Section 7.4

** Section 7.*.  As Section 7 states that 7.* is informative:
-- Section 7.3. Downgrade the single normative "RECOMMENDED" to be "recomme=
nded".

-- Section 7.4. Downgrade the single normative "SHOULD" to be "should"

** Section 8.1.  Why shouldn't this document also be added to the "Referenc=
e" column to explain the addition of "CR" to the "TLS 1.3" column?

** Section 8.2.  With these additions to "Exporter Labels" registry, please=
 describe the values of the other fields:
-- How should the "DTLS-OK" and "Recommended" columns be set?

-- The obvious text that this document should be the "Reference"

Regards,
Roman


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Subject: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13.txt> (Exported Authenticators in TLS) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
consider the following document: - 'Exported Authenticators in TLS'
  <draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-16. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   for peers to provide a proof of ownership of an identity, such as an
   X.509 certificate.  This proof can be exported by one peer,
   transmitted out-of-band to the other peer, and verified by the
   receiving peer.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.






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A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Christopher A. Wood, a Chair of the tls working group.


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: Transport Layer Security
Area Name: Security Area
Session Requester: Christopher Wood


Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  1 Hour
Number of Attendees: 120
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 Chair Conflict: pearg mls emu masque
 Technology Overlap: cfrg dprive dnsop lake
 Key Participant Conflict: quic httpbis taps secdispatch saag





People who must be present:
  Eric Rescorla
  Rich Salz
  Sean Turner
  Joseph A. Salowey
  Yoav Nir
  Benjamin Kaduk
  Christopher A. Wood
  Nick Sullivan

Resources Requested:

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------



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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Obsolete SCSV!? (was Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06)
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> On Sep 23, 2020, at 08:43, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi! this issue was buried in the Ben=E2=80=99s review, but I think it =
is worth getting some attention on.
>=20
>> On Aug 13, 2020, at 13:54, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> =
wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> - Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC =
7507
>>>> seems to be entirely obsolete.  Any implementation that is =
compliant
>>>> with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.  If it only
>>>> supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also supports
>>>> 1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS =
1.3
>>>> applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., =
obsolete).
>>>> We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Has this been addressed in RFC8446?  If not, the specific downgrade
>>> examples are just listed as examples.  If a gap is left, then the =
full
>>> document should not be deprecated and made obsolete.  The text =
infers other
>>> versions in my read.  I have not looked to see if this was addressed =
in
>>> RFC8446 yet though.
>>=20
>> I'd really like to get a few more people to weigh in on this one -- =
IIRC
>> David Benjamin and Martin Thomson had mentioned some thoughts in the =
chat
>> during the session at 108, and Ekr as author of 8446 would be =
expected to
>> have a good sense of what it does. =20
>>=20
>> The specific RFC 8446 mechanism here is described at
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3 : "TLS 1.3 has a
>> downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's random value.
>> [...]"
>>=20
>> While the RFC 8446 mechanism has the client do the actual detection =
of
>> downgrade, there's a MUST-level requirement on clients to make the =
check,
>> so from a specification point of view the check can be treated as =
reliable.
>> The RFC 7507 mechanism has the server do the detection, but I think =
the end
>> result is still the same: in an "downgraded" exchange between two =
honest
>> participants, the handshake fails and the downgrade is detected.
>>=20
>> Since the functionality is still useful, just superseded, this one =
seems
>> like a better fit for "obsoletes" (vs. "historic).
>>=20
>=20
> Right now, we have a list of RFCs draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate =
will update. RFC 7507 "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) =
for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks" =
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7507/) is in this list. If you =
agree with Ben=E2=80=99s logic then we would be move 7507 out of the =
list of =E2=80=9Cupdates=E2=80=9D and adding an obsoletes header, i.e., =
=E2=80=9CObsoletes: 7507 (if approved)=E2=80=9D, and moving 7507 down in =
s1.1 to the obsoletes paragraph. While this might seem like a minor =
point, this is the kind of the IESG loves to sink its teeth into so have =
a WG opinion on this matter can make overcoming later hurdles easier for =
the AD and doc shepherd.
>=20
> Thanks for the your time,
>=20
> spt (doc shepherd)

All I have gone ahead and submitted a PR to address the point raised by =
Ben:
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4

spt=


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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 22:11:06 +0400
Message-ID: <CAOp4FwRdP2VVXMSoJAyE9cmEvwdQ2TKgVC=e16rMW_Z2eWbWNg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/I-VGDx3hG0he92Dyuy849-nTGko>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Obsolete SCSV!? (was Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06)
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Please go ahead. I remembered a discussion (outside of the ietf) where
not everybody agreed
with it but reluctantly implemented it.

On Fri, Oct 2, 2020 at 9:44 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Sep 23, 2020, at 08:43, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi! this issue was buried in the Ben=E2=80=99s review, but I think it i=
s worth getting some attention on.
> >
> >> On Aug 13, 2020, at 13:54, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> - Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC 75=
07
> >>>> seems to be entirely obsolete.  Any implementation that is compliant
> >>>> with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.  If it only
> >>>> supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also supports
> >>>> 1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS 1=
.3
> >>>> applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., obsolete=
).
> >>>> We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Has this been addressed in RFC8446?  If not, the specific downgrade
> >>> examples are just listed as examples.  If a gap is left, then the ful=
l
> >>> document should not be deprecated and made obsolete.  The text infers=
 other
> >>> versions in my read.  I have not looked to see if this was addressed =
in
> >>> RFC8446 yet though.
> >>
> >> I'd really like to get a few more people to weigh in on this one -- II=
RC
> >> David Benjamin and Martin Thomson had mentioned some thoughts in the c=
hat
> >> during the session at 108, and Ekr as author of 8446 would be expected=
 to
> >> have a good sense of what it does.
> >>
> >> The specific RFC 8446 mechanism here is described at
> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3 : "TLS 1.3 has a
> >> downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's random value.
> >> [...]"
> >>
> >> While the RFC 8446 mechanism has the client do the actual detection of
> >> downgrade, there's a MUST-level requirement on clients to make the che=
ck,
> >> so from a specification point of view the check can be treated as reli=
able.
> >> The RFC 7507 mechanism has the server do the detection, but I think th=
e end
> >> result is still the same: in an "downgraded" exchange between two hone=
st
> >> participants, the handshake fails and the downgrade is detected.
> >>
> >> Since the functionality is still useful, just superseded, this one see=
ms
> >> like a better fit for "obsoletes" (vs. "historic).
> >>
> >
> > Right now, we have a list of RFCs draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate =
will update. RFC 7507 "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for=
 Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/r=
fc7507/) is in this list. If you agree with Ben=E2=80=99s logic then we wou=
ld be move 7507 out of the list of =E2=80=9Cupdates=E2=80=9D and adding an =
obsoletes header, i.e., =E2=80=9CObsoletes: 7507 (if approved)=E2=80=9D, an=
d moving 7507 down in s1.1 to the obsoletes paragraph. While this might see=
m like a minor point, this is the kind of the IESG loves to sink its teeth =
into so have a WG opinion on this matter can make overcoming later hurdles =
easier for the AD and doc shepherd.
> >
> > Thanks for the your time,
> >
> > spt (doc shepherd)
>
> All I have gone ahead and submitted a PR to address the point raised by B=
en:
> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4
>
> spt
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 22:15:28 +0400
Message-ID: <CAOp4FwTgOk7B0pDxK2yc4_vPVYJm-gn5wj2TvXjwhvXubNka2g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/geka1EqTon1K_0kL8rVcwDe7gN4>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Obsolete SCSV!? (was Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06)
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On Fri, Oct 2, 2020 at 10:11 PM Loganaden Velvindron
<loganaden@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Please go ahead. I remembered a discussion (outside of the ietf) where
> not everybody agreed
> with it but reluctantly implemented it.
>

Found the commit message in LibreSSL:

"

Reluctantly add server-side support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

   This allows for clients that willingly choose to perform a downgrade and
   attempt to establish a second connection at a lower protocol after the
   previous attempt unexpectedly failed, to be notified and have the second
   connection aborted, if the server does in fact support a higher protocol=
.

   TLS has perfectly good version negotiation and client-side fallback is
   dangerous. Despite this, in order to maintain maximum compatability with
   broken web servers, most mainstream browsers implement this.

"
> On Fri, Oct 2, 2020 at 9:44 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Sep 23, 2020, at 08:43, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi! this issue was buried in the Ben=E2=80=99s review, but I think it=
 is worth getting some attention on.
> > >
> > >> On Aug 13, 2020, at 13:54, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrot=
e:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> - Similarly, the downgrade protection provided by the SCSV of RFC =
7507
> > >>>> seems to be entirely obsolete.  Any implementation that is complia=
nt
> > >>>> with this document will support only 1.2 or higher.  If it only
> > >>>> supports one version, no downgrade is possible; if it also support=
s
> > >>>> 1.3 or newer, the new downgrade-detection mechanism defined by TLS=
 1.3
> > >>>> applies, so the SCSV mechanism is entirely redundant (i.e., obsole=
te).
> > >>>> We could effectuate that status change in this document as well.
> > >>>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Has this been addressed in RFC8446?  If not, the specific downgrade
> > >>> examples are just listed as examples.  If a gap is left, then the f=
ull
> > >>> document should not be deprecated and made obsolete.  The text infe=
rs other
> > >>> versions in my read.  I have not looked to see if this was addresse=
d in
> > >>> RFC8446 yet though.
> > >>
> > >> I'd really like to get a few more people to weigh in on this one -- =
IIRC
> > >> David Benjamin and Martin Thomson had mentioned some thoughts in the=
 chat
> > >> during the session at 108, and Ekr as author of 8446 would be expect=
ed to
> > >> have a good sense of what it does.
> > >>
> > >> The specific RFC 8446 mechanism here is described at
> > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.3 : "TLS 1.3 has a
> > >> downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's random value=
.
> > >> [...]"
> > >>
> > >> While the RFC 8446 mechanism has the client do the actual detection =
of
> > >> downgrade, there's a MUST-level requirement on clients to make the c=
heck,
> > >> so from a specification point of view the check can be treated as re=
liable.
> > >> The RFC 7507 mechanism has the server do the detection, but I think =
the end
> > >> result is still the same: in an "downgraded" exchange between two ho=
nest
> > >> participants, the handshake fails and the downgrade is detected.
> > >>
> > >> Since the functionality is still useful, just superseded, this one s=
eems
> > >> like a better fit for "obsoletes" (vs. "historic).
> > >>
> > >
> > > Right now, we have a list of RFCs draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecat=
e will update. RFC 7507 "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) f=
or Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc=
/rfc7507/) is in this list. If you agree with Ben=E2=80=99s logic then we w=
ould be move 7507 out of the list of =E2=80=9Cupdates=E2=80=9D and adding a=
n obsoletes header, i.e., =E2=80=9CObsoletes: 7507 (if approved)=E2=80=9D, =
and moving 7507 down in s1.1 to the obsoletes paragraph. While this might s=
eem like a minor point, this is the kind of the IESG loves to sink its teet=
h into so have a WG opinion on this matter can make overcoming later hurdle=
s easier for the AD and doc shepherd.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the your time,
> > >
> > > spt (doc shepherd)
> >
> > All I have gone ahead and submitted a PR to address the point raised by=
 Ben:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4
> >
> > spt
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 14:15:48 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Ag0N7aPvqxQYo2zBGvjrK2UwlCI>
Subject: Re: [TLS]  =?utf-8?q?Is_stateless_HelloRetryRequest_worthwhile=3F_=28?= =?utf-8?q?was_Re=3A_TLS_1=2E3_Problem=3F=29?=
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> > You can't possibly implement [stateless HelloRetryRequest] the
> > way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie extension. 
> 
> The only thing the server needs to know is the hash of the ClientHello 
> (so it can restore the transcript hash) and that the server has already 
> sent a HelloRetryRequest (which it can detect by presence of the 
> cookie). The only argument I've seen made for what the spec suggests 
> not working is being able to verify which fields changed between 
> ClientHello1 and ClientHello2.

The server also needs to know the entire HelloRetryRequest message
since this goes into the Transcript Hash calculation:

  Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) =
      Hash(message_hash ||        /* Handshake type */
           00 00 Hash.length  ||  /* Handshake message length (bytes) */
           Hash(ClientHello1) ||  /* Hash of ClientHello1 */
           HelloRetryRequest  || ... || Mn)

Many of the fields in HelloRetryRequest are fixed or predictable, but
the legacy_session_id_echo is not, for example.  Also, relying on the
client to remind you what the hash of ClientHello1 is seems extremely
"optimistic" (in my opinion).

> I see no language in RFC 8446 that the server MUST enforce that
> the ClientHello2 is conformant with respect to  ClientHello1.

It doesn't, and you could probably argue that the HelloRetryRequest
can be just a "do over" and let the client try again however it wants.

But if the server doesn't do 100% validation of the second ClientHello
as if it never received the first one, then there is room for mischief by
a "curious" client.

Mike


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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 14:46:55 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] =?utf-8?q?Client_attacks_on_stateless_HRR=3F_=28was_Re=3A_?= =?utf-8?q?_Is_stateless_HelloRetryRequest_worthwhile=3F=29?=
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> If the client is trying to perform 
> some sort of attack on the server by re-sending an old cookie, I assume 
> that a prerequisite for this attack is that the TLS handshake succeeds.

Maybe you don't need the handshake to succeed?  As a non-cryptographer
I can't say what the implications might be (as I said to Watson in private
email) but some of you are crypto people.  If you can create N parallel
sessions using the same cookie (send the same ClientHello1 with the
same Random value (?), or maybe trick a poorly-written server by sending
an initial ClientHello1 containing a cookie extension, or use DTLS (?)), what
could you do as a malicious client?  I don't know the answer, I'm asking.

Mike


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Hi!

I've assumed the role of responsible AD on this document.  As such, I perfo=
rmed an AD review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03. =20

Thanks for writing this document to address an important crypto maintenance=
 tasks in TLS v1.2.  I have a few clarifying and pro forma editorial items =
of feedback. =20

** Please address the following IDNits:

-- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section.  (See Section
     2.2 of https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle the ca=
se
     when there are no actions for IANA.)

-- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the
     abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should.

-- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the
     abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should.

** Section 1.  Editorial.=20
-- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/

-- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/

-- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/

** Section 1.  Editorial.  For symmetry with the rest of the text:

OLD
RFC 6151 [RFC6151]
   details the security considerations, including collision attacks for
   MD5, published in 2011. =20

NEW
In 2011, [RFC6151]  detailed the security considerations, including collisi=
on attacks for MD5. =20

** Section 1.  Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al".  Is there a re=
ference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack"

** Section 6.  Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/

** Section 6.  Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revi=
sed from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so t=
hat the OLD vs. NEW is  a clear cut-and-paste.

** Section 7.  Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/

** Section 7.  SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525.  Recommend:

OLD
The prior text did not explicitly include
   MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been
   deprecated.

NEW
The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds =
guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated.

** Section 7.  Editorial.  Grammar.

OLD
In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED,
   SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used

NEW
In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-=
1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used

** Section 10.2  Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.

Regards,
Roman


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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2020 17:21:00 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Review of two ECH issues and PRs
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Hi folks,

Below are two issues we can probably resolve before publishing -08 of ECH. Proposed resolutions in the form of a PR accompany each issue. Please have a look and let us know if you support the proposed resolutions, and, if not, please indicate what you think should be done differently. Hopefully we can converge on these quickly!

Trial decryption after HelloRetryRequest
- Issue: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/233
- PR: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316

Simplifying session resumption text (related to "do not stick out")
- Issue: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/285
- PR: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/285

Thanks,
Chris


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On 10/2/20 14:15, I wrote:
> The server also needs to know the entire HelloRetryRequest message
> since this goes into the Transcript Hash calculation:
>
>    Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) =
>        Hash(message_hash ||        /* Handshake type */
>             00 00 Hash.length  ||  /* Handshake message length (bytes) */
>             Hash(ClientHello1) ||  /* Hash of ClientHello1 */
>             HelloRetryRequest  || ... || Mn)

Please don't tell me all the current TLS 1.3 implementations
forgot to include the HelloRetryRequest in the transcript hash.

Mike


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On 10/2/20 22:13, I wrote:
> Please don't tell me all the current TLS 1.3 implementations
> forgot to include the HelloRetryRequest in the transcript hash.

Is this the reason why Microsoft ditched Edge and rebuilt on
top of Chrome?=C2=A0 There must have been a bug bounty for this.
Are there still bug bounties?=C2=A0 I've been sidelined for a while....

Mike


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From: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On Fri, 02 Oct 2020 14:15:48 -0400
"Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> > > You can't possibly implement [stateless HelloRetryRequest] the
> > > way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie extension.

Lots of people have and it works just fine, so it seems to me that "You
can't possibly" here means something closer to "I still don't
understand how to" and as such would be more appropriate to some sort
of programming Q&A site like Stack Overflow than an IETF working group.

> Many of the fields in HelloRetryRequest are fixed or predictable, but
> the legacy_session_id_echo is not, for example.  Also, relying on the
> client to remind you what the hash of ClientHello1 is seems extremely
> "optimistic" (in my opinion).

The client MUST use the same value for legacy_session_id in its retried
ClientHello. As a result this value will be available alongside the
cookie.

Section 4.4.2 is clear that a hash used this way in the cookie should be
"protected with some suitable integrity protection algorithm". For
example some implementations use an HMAC construction, but you could do
other things here successfully. So in fact this is not especially
optimistic.

Nick.


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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On 10/3/20 16:12, Nick Lamb wrote:
>>>> You can't possibly implement [stateless HelloRetryRequest] the
>>>> way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie extension.
> Lots of people have and it works just fine, so it seems to me that "You
> can't possibly" here means something closer to "I still don't
> understand how to" and as such would be more appropriate to some sort
> of programming Q&A site like Stack Overflow than an IETF working group.

StackOverflow has only one result if you search for HelloRetryRequest
and it is about jdk.disabledAlgorithms.

When you say it "works just fine" I think you are saying that the
handshake will complete.=C2=A0 But is it secure?=C2=A0 This is the import=
ant
parts of "works" and I'm not sure it's possible to do it correctly
without a lot of work, and am certain that a hash is not enough
information even if it's integrity-protected.

> The client MUST use the same value for legacy_session_id in its retried
> ClientHello. As a result this value will be available alongside the
> cookie.
>
> Section 4.4.2 is clear that a hash used this way in the cookie should b=
e
> "protected with some suitable integrity protection algorithm". For
> example some implementations use an HMAC construction, but you could do
> other things here successfully. So in fact this is not especially
> optimistic.

All the integrity protection bytes tell you is that the server did in fac=
t
generate the cookie at some point in the past.=C2=A0 You don't even know
how old the cookie is if it just contains a hash, unless you are
frequently changing the key (and keeping the previous key around for
a bit to cover the case that the key rollover happened within the life-
time of an old cookie).=C2=A0 A client could possibly exploit this by mak=
ing
many connections and sending a second ClientHello on each one with
the same legacy_session_id_echo and cookie.=C2=A0 A stateless server migh=
t
not be keeping track of whether a cookie is being reused, and why
would it if it's actually stateless?=C2=A0 If it's going to go through th=
e=20
trouble
of keeping track of previously-used cookies, possibly across several
distributed machines, why not just be not-stateless and avoid all of
the hassle?

And, yes, it is optimistic to trust a client to do the right thing. It's=20
also
dangerous.=C2=A0 I used the word optimistic to downplay the significance.

Rebuilding the beginning of the transcript hash based solely on what
the client sends in its second ClientHello message is fraught with peril.

Mike


From nobody Sun Oct  4 00:33:13 2020
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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC28)
  3 issues created:
  - Tidy up all codepoints before -08 (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/322=20
  - legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/310=20
  - Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/309=20

  5 issues received 28 new comments:
  - #310 legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer (1 by chris=
-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/310=20
  - #309 Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted (10 by chris-wood, cjpat=
ton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/309=20
  - #295 Greasing to supporting servers (2 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/295=20
  - #264 Handshake-level vs record-level padding (12 by chris-wood, cjpatto=
n, davidben, richsalz)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/264 [needs WG discu=
ssion]=20
  - #233 Trial decryption after HelloRetryRequest (3 by cjpatton, ocheron)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/233=20

  2 issues closed:
  - Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted https://github.com/tlswg/draf=
t-ietf-tls-esni/issues/309=20
  - legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer https://github.c=
om/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/310=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+11/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC20)
  11 pull requests submitted:
  - Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=20
  - Fix ECH and version negotiation order. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=20
  - Clarify client-facing server GREASE behavior (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/319=20
  - Clarify our lack of concern around 2^{-64} acceptance signal collision =
probabilities (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/318=20
  - Simplify session resumption logic. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=20
  - Require HRR-sensitive parameters match in ClientHello(Outer|Inner). (by=
 chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316=20
  - Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE changes. =
(by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=20
  - Fix a line break (and make CI happy) (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/314=20
  - Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313=20
  - Match legacy_session_id values. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=20
  - Fix bug in HRR behavior (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=20

  6 pull requests received 20 new comments:
  - #321 Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE. (4 by chris-woo=
d, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=20
  - #320 Fix ECH and version negotiation order. (2 by cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=20
  - #319 Clarify client-facing server GREASE behavior (5 by cjpatton, david=
ben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/319=20
  - #315 Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE chan=
ges. (2 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=20
  - #312 Match legacy_session_id values. (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=20
  - #311 Clarify HRR behavior (6 by chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=20

  4 pull requests merged:
  - Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=20
  - Fix a line break (and make CI happy)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/314=20
  - Clarify HRR behavior
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=20
  - Match legacy_session_id values.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=20

* tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - obsolete 7507 (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<body>
<h1>Sunday October 04, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC28)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">3 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#322 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
22">Tidy up all codepoints before -08</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#310 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
10">legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer</a> (by davidben=
) </li>
 =20
  <li>#309 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
09">Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>5 issues received 28 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#310 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
10">legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer</a> (1 by chris-=
wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#309 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
09">Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted</a> (10 by chris-wood, cjpatt=
on, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#295 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
95">Greasing to supporting servers</a> (2 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#264 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
64">Handshake-level vs record-level padding</a> (12 by chris-wood, cjpatton=
, davidben, richsalz) <span class=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #c5d=
ef5; color: #000000">needs WG discussion</span> </li>
 =20
  <li>#233 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
33">Trial decryption after HelloRetryRequest</a> (3 by cjpatton, ocheron) <=
/li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#309 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
09">Ensuring 1.3 is used when ECH is accepted</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#310 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
10">legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer</a> </li>
  </ul>



<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+11/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC20)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">11 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#321 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=
">Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#320 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=
">Fix ECH and version negotiation order.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#319 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/319=
">Clarify client-facing server GREASE behavior</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#318 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/318=
">Clarify our lack of concern around 2^{-64} acceptance signal collision pr=
obabilities</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#317 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=
">Simplify session resumption logic.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#316 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316=
">Require HRR-sensitive parameters match in ClientHello(Outer|Inner).</a> (=
by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#315 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=
">Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE changes.</a=
> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#314 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/314=
">Fix a line break (and make CI happy)</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#313 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313=
">Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding</a> (by cjpatto=
n) </li>
 =20
  <li>#312 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=
">Match legacy_session_id values.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#311 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=
">Fix bug in HRR behavior</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 pull requests received 20 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#321 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=
">Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE.</a> (4 by chris-wood, =
cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#320 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=
">Fix ECH and version negotiation order.</a> (2 by cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#319 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/319=
">Clarify client-facing server GREASE behavior</a> (5 by cjpatton, davidben=
) </li>
 =20
  <li>#315 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=
">Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE changes.</a=
> (2 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#312 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=
">Match legacy_session_id values.</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#311 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=
">Clarify HRR behavior</a> (6 by chris-wood, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#321 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/321=
">Clarify client handling of retry keys with GREASE.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#314 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/314=
">Fix a line break (and make CI happy)</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#311 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/311=
">Clarify HRR behavior</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#312 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/312=
">Match legacy_session_id values.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#4 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4">=
obsolete 7507</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============6467246565497418759==--


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Subject: [TLS] Fwd: Re:  AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

any progress on the cid-length / calculate MAC topic?

As I wrote, though the cid-length itself is not "on the wire" (it's only
the cid), I can't see, that the cid-length could be injected.
Do I oversee soemthing?

best regrads
Achim Kraus

=2D------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------
Betreff: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
Datum: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 08:31:19 +0200
Von: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
An: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Kopie (CC): draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org

Hi Ben,

...

>>>
>>> The TLS 1.2 notation is "seq_num" for the implicit sequence number, bu=
t
>>> DTLS 1.2 says that the MAC input is the concatenation of the DTLS epoc=
h
>>> and the DTLS (explicit) sequence number.  I do not see this
>>> concatenation given the name "seq_num" anywhere, so I think we need to
>>> reformulate this expression.
>>>
>>>              cid +
>>>              cid_length +
>>>
>>> Does this construction preserve injectivity?  It seems easier to reaso=
n
>>> about when the length of an element is always before or always after t=
he
>>> element itself, but we put the length first for some of the other
>>> fields (that appear after these) so there seems to be some malleabilit=
y.
>>
>> That order was also discussed a lot.
>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
>> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!
>
> Thanks for the pointer!
> I am not sure that the specific question about injectivity was raised
> there, though.  (The topic of whether "seq_num" includes epoch was raise=
d
> but I did not see a clear resolution on my first reading, just
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246152379)
>
> Specifically, the question of "injectivity" is referring to a scenario
> where I can use different actual values for (cid, cid_length,
> length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext, etc.) but have a collision in the construc=
ted
>
> cid + cid_length + length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + ...
>
> (Hmm, we should probably say that length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext is a 2-by=
te
> field...)
>
> Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
>
> 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
>
> could be cid_length=3D1, cid=3D0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x02=
02,
> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
> cid_length=3D2, cis=3D0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0201,
> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D <513 bytes>.  The possibility of such a
> collision weakens the cryptographic protection and should be avoided.
>

If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble with
their deployments!

The cid length is not on the wire, so on the wire is (cid 01 01)

> 01 01 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>

Therefore I don't understand, WHO will inject something, which is not on
the wire. For me that would only be the peer's implementation, which
extracts it's "own" CID wrong, or a "spoofed CID" (maybe that's the time
to read my proposal about a CID Authentication Code, issue #74.). But
with the wrong CID, the wrong keys would be selected and the MAC will
fail anyway. So, I can't see that collision.

best regards
Achim

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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BTW, if anybody is hoping I'll update my test server
to support TLS 1.3, I am not going to be doing that.
Version 1.3 is broken and I don't think anybody should
use it.

Mike


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To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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Hi,

I'm pretty sure TLS 1.3 is completely broken.  Can we
please stop deprecating things that TLS 1.2 uses and
make them all Recommended again?

Mike


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From: Luke Curley <kixelated@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2020 13:35:00 -0700
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To: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
Cc: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Is stateless HelloRetryRequest worthwhile? (was Re: TLS 1.3 Problem?)
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Mike,

The server receives a ClientHello from a prospective client. In the case of
DTLS and QUIC, this path has not yet been validated, so the server may want
to verify the remote address prior to continuing the handshake. This is
incredibly important as generating key_shares and signing the transcript
are not trivial operations and make for a very easy DDoS attack.

The server hashes the ClientHello message and generates a random cookie. In
a connection-oriented setup, the cookie is just a random challenge. In a
semi-stateful environment, there's a lookup table from the cookie to the
ClientHello hash and no other state is stored. In a stateless environment,
the cookie might be an encrypted payload, containing the ClientHello hash
plus any additional information.

This is primarily designed with load balancers in mind. The connection is
validated by front-line load balancers that mitigate DDoS attacks and
distribute "safe" connections to backend servers. These load balancers deal
with an enormous amount of traffic and must be simple: 1) reply to
ClientHello messages with a HelloRetryRequest and 2) assign and forward
valid ClientHello retries to a backend server.

The original ClientHello does not need to be stored, as the HRR contains
the information required to continue the handshake. The backend service can
use the cookie to either lookup the CH hash in a shared database, or even
better decrypt the cookie using a shared secret to get the CH hash. Now the
handshake can be completed like normal.

I definitely agree that the benefits of HRR are not made obvious in the RFC
and I thought it was weird too. I wouldn't have hashed the hash of the
ClientHello, but it makes sense given most languages don't allow storing
the state of a hash. The design decisions make sense for services at scale
and require minimal effort for hobby TLS 1.3 implementations (including
mine).

On Sat, Oct 3, 2020 at 2:05 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> On 10/3/20 16:12, Nick Lamb wrote:
> >>>> You can't possibly implement [stateless HelloRetryRequest] the
> >>>> way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie extension.
> > Lots of people have and it works just fine, so it seems to me that "You
> > can't possibly" here means something closer to "I still don't
> > understand how to" and as such would be more appropriate to some sort
> > of programming Q&A site like Stack Overflow than an IETF working group.
>
> StackOverflow has only one result if you search for HelloRetryRequest
> and it is about jdk.disabledAlgorithms.
>
> When you say it "works just fine" I think you are saying that the
> handshake will complete.  But is it secure?  This is the important
> parts of "works" and I'm not sure it's possible to do it correctly
> without a lot of work, and am certain that a hash is not enough
> information even if it's integrity-protected.
>
> > The client MUST use the same value for legacy_session_id in its retried
> > ClientHello. As a result this value will be available alongside the
> > cookie.
> >
> > Section 4.4.2 is clear that a hash used this way in the cookie should be
> > "protected with some suitable integrity protection algorithm". For
> > example some implementations use an HMAC construction, but you could do
> > other things here successfully. So in fact this is not especially
> > optimistic.
>
> All the integrity protection bytes tell you is that the server did in fact
> generate the cookie at some point in the past.  You don't even know
> how old the cookie is if it just contains a hash, unless you are
> frequently changing the key (and keeping the previous key around for
> a bit to cover the case that the key rollover happened within the life-
> time of an old cookie).  A client could possibly exploit this by making
> many connections and sending a second ClientHello on each one with
> the same legacy_session_id_echo and cookie.  A stateless server might
> not be keeping track of whether a cookie is being reused, and why
> would it if it's actually stateless?  If it's going to go through the
> trouble
> of keeping track of previously-used cookies, possibly across several
> distributed machines, why not just be not-stateless and avoid all of
> the hassle?
>
> And, yes, it is optimistic to trust a client to do the right thing. It's
> also
> dangerous.  I used the word optimistic to downplay the significance.
>
> Rebuilding the beginning of the transcript hash based solely on what
> the client sends in its second ClientHello message is fraught with peril.
>
> Mike
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000006a98d005b0de4de4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Mike,<div><br></div><div>The server receives a ClientHello=
 from a prospective client. In the case of DTLS and QUIC, this path has not=
 yet been validated, so the server may want to verify the remote address pr=
ior to=C2=A0continuing the handshake. This is incredibly important as gener=
ating key_shares and signing the transcript are not trivial operations and =
make for a very easy DDoS attack.</div><div><br></div><div>The server hashe=
s the ClientHello message and generates a random cookie. In a connection-or=
iented setup, the cookie is just a random challenge. In a semi-stateful env=
ironment, there&#39;s a lookup table from the cookie to the ClientHello has=
h and no other state is stored. In a stateless environment, the cookie migh=
t be an=C2=A0encrypted payload, containing the ClientHello hash plus any ad=
ditional information.</div><div><br></div><div>This is primarily designed w=
ith load balancers in mind. The connection is validated by front-line load =
balancers that mitigate DDoS attacks and distribute &quot;safe&quot; connec=
tions to backend servers. These load balancers deal with an enormous amount=
 of traffic and must be simple: 1) reply to ClientHello messages with a Hel=
loRetryRequest and 2) assign and forward valid ClientHello retries to a bac=
kend server.</div><div><br></div><div>The original ClientHello does not nee=
d to be stored,=C2=A0as the HRR contains the information required to contin=
ue the handshake. The backend service can use the cookie to either lookup t=
he CH hash in a shared database, or even better decrypt the=C2=A0cookie usi=
ng a shared secret to get the CH hash. Now the handshake can be completed l=
ike normal.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I definitely agree that the bene=
fits of HRR are not made obvious in the RFC and I thought it was weird too.=
 I wouldn&#39;t have hashed the hash of the ClientHello, but it makes sense=
 given most languages don&#39;t allow storing the state of a hash. The desi=
gn decisions make sense for services at scale and require minimal effort fo=
r hobby TLS 1.3 implementations (including mine).</div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Oct 3, 2020 =
at 2:05 PM Michael D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com">=
mike-list@pobox.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204)=
;padding-left:1ex">On 10/3/20 16:12, Nick Lamb wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; You can&#39;t possibly implement [stateless HelloRetryRequ=
est] the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; way the spec suggests with just a hash in a HRR cookie ext=
ension.<br>
&gt; Lots of people have and it works just fine, so it seems to me that &qu=
ot;You<br>
&gt; can&#39;t possibly&quot; here means something closer to &quot;I still =
don&#39;t<br>
&gt; understand how to&quot; and as such would be more appropriate to some =
sort<br>
&gt; of programming Q&amp;A site like Stack Overflow than an IETF working g=
roup.<br>
<br>
StackOverflow has only one result if you search for HelloRetryRequest<br>
and it is about jdk.disabledAlgorithms.<br>
<br>
When you say it &quot;works just fine&quot; I think you are saying that the=
<br>
handshake will complete.=C2=A0 But is it secure?=C2=A0 This is the importan=
t<br>
parts of &quot;works&quot; and I&#39;m not sure it&#39;s possible to do it =
correctly<br>
without a lot of work, and am certain that a hash is not enough<br>
information even if it&#39;s integrity-protected.<br>
<br>
&gt; The client MUST use the same value for legacy_session_id in its retrie=
d<br>
&gt; ClientHello. As a result this value will be available alongside the<br=
>
&gt; cookie.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Section 4.4.2 is clear that a hash used this way in the cookie should =
be<br>
&gt; &quot;protected with some suitable integrity protection algorithm&quot=
;. For<br>
&gt; example some implementations use an HMAC construction, but you could d=
o<br>
&gt; other things here successfully. So in fact this is not especially<br>
&gt; optimistic.<br>
<br>
All the integrity protection bytes tell you is that the server did in fact<=
br>
generate the cookie at some point in the past.=C2=A0 You don&#39;t even kno=
w<br>
how old the cookie is if it just contains a hash, unless you are<br>
frequently changing the key (and keeping the previous key around for<br>
a bit to cover the case that the key rollover happened within the life-<br>
time of an old cookie).=C2=A0 A client could possibly exploit this by makin=
g<br>
many connections and sending a second ClientHello on each one with<br>
the same legacy_session_id_echo and cookie.=C2=A0 A stateless server might<=
br>
not be keeping track of whether a cookie is being reused, and why<br>
would it if it&#39;s actually stateless?=C2=A0 If it&#39;s going to go thro=
ugh the <br>
trouble<br>
of keeping track of previously-used cookies, possibly across several<br>
distributed machines, why not just be not-stateless and avoid all of<br>
the hassle?<br>
<br>
And, yes, it is optimistic to trust a client to do the right thing. It&#39;=
s <br>
also<br>
dangerous.=C2=A0 I used the word optimistic to downplay the significance.<b=
r>
<br>
Rebuilding the beginning of the transcript hash based solely on what<br>
the client sends in its second ClientHello message is fraught with peril.<b=
r>
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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--0000000000005e213205b0ed331e
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A couple pointers for getting started:

   1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a month or so
   ago, it's the most recent proof of security of the full handshake (also
   includes PSK modes): https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
   2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the body of papers
   that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the myriad attacks against
   TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a more proactive design approach for 1.3:
   https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7

If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appears in a
slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.

No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to
1.0-1.2.

Best,
Chris P.

--0000000000005e213205b0ed331e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A couple pointers for getting starte=
d:</div><div><ol><li>Check out Dowling et al.&#39;s recent analysis. Publis=
hed a month or so ago, it&#39;s the most recent proof of security of the fu=
ll handshake (also includes PSK modes): <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/=
2020/1044">https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044</a></li><li>Check out Paterson=
 and van der Merwe&#39;s survey of the body of papers that helped to shape =
TLS 1.3. It also overviews the myriad attacks against TLS 1.2 and below tha=
t catalyzed a more proactive design approach for 1.3: <a href=3D"https://li=
nk.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7">https://link.springer.=
com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7</a> <br></li></ol></div><div>If you=
&#39;re unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appears in a sli=
ghtly different form in van der Merwe&#39;s PhD thesis.</div><div><br></div=
><div>No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to=
 1.0-1.2.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Chris P.</div></div>=
</div>

--0000000000005e213205b0ed331e--


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03
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Roman,

Thanks for your review. Some comments inline.

spt

> On Oct 2, 2020, at 19:42, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:
>=20
> Hi!
>=20
> I've assumed the role of responsible AD on this document.  As such, I =
performed an AD review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03. =20
>=20
> Thanks for writing this document to address an important crypto =
maintenance tasks in TLS v1.2.  I have a few clarifying and pro forma =
editorial items of feedback. =20
>=20
> ** Please address the following IDNits:
>=20
> -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section.  (See =
Section
>     2.2 of https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle =
the case
>     when there are no actions for IANA.)

Addressed via:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/7

Comments about one below, but the remaining are addressed via:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/8

> -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but =
the
>     abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should.
>=20
> -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but =
the
>     abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should.
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Editorial.=20
> -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/
>=20
> -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/
>=20
> -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Editorial.  For symmetry with the rest of the text:
>=20
> OLD
> RFC 6151 [RFC6151]
>   details the security considerations, including collision attacks for
>   MD5, published in 2011. =20
>=20
> NEW
> In 2011, [RFC6151]  detailed the security considerations, including =
collision attacks for MD5. =20
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al".  Is there =
a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack"

For the Wang attack we used the following reference when updating the =
SHA-0 and SHA-1 considerations. I put it where the collisions are first =
noted. I am unsure if it=E2=80=99s the latest and greatest:

Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu., "Finding Collisions in
                 the Full SHA-1", Crypto 2005.

<rant: I am not entirely sure I did the XML right for the reference.>

I am not sure there is a reference for the brute force potential attack, =
but somebody correct me if I am wrong. The way I see it if you know the =
collision space is much smaller well you might launch said attack.

In s1.1, I also updated the paragraph to use the new paragraph and fixed =
the references.

> ** Section 6.  Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/
>=20
> ** Section 6.  Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be =
revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro =
paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is  a clear cut-and-paste.
>=20
> ** Section 7.  Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/
>=20
> ** Section 7.  SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525.  Recommend:
>=20
> OLD
> The prior text did not explicitly include
>   MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been
>   deprecated.
>=20
> NEW
> The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text =
adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated.
>=20
> ** Section 7.  Editorial.  Grammar.
>=20
> OLD
> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED,
>   SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used
>=20
> NEW
> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and =
SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used
>=20
> ** Section 10.2  Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.
>=20
> Regards,
> Roman
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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I submitted these as an Issue in the repo:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/issues/37

spt

> On Oct 1, 2020, at 16:22, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Editorial.  Expand acronym on first use:
> -- s/TLS 1.2 PRF/TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function (PRF)/
> -- s/KDF/Key Derivation Function (KDF)/
>=20
> ** Section 1. Editorial.  Since the text says "... this document =
specifies a PSK Importer interface ... for use in D(TLS 1.3)" perhaps =
the this scoping should also be upfront in the first sentence too:
> s/TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] supports/(D)TLS 1.3 [RFC8446][ID-DTLS]/
>=20
> ** Section 4.1.  Editorial.  Per "The list of 'target_kdf' ...", other =
parts of this text refer to elements of struct ImportIdentity with the =
notation "ImportedIdentity.*".  Consider s/The list of "target_kdf" =
values/The list of ImportedIdentity.target_kdf values/
>=20
> ** Section 4.1.
> If the EPSK is a key derived from some other protocol or
>   sequence of protocols, ImportedIdentity.context MUST include a
>   channel binding for the deriving protocols [RFC5056].
>=20
> To the end of this normative guidance, I'd recommend adding something =
to the effect of: "The details of this binding will be protocol specific =
and out of scope in this document".
>=20
> ** Section 4.1.  Per "If no hash function is specified, SHA-256 MUST =
be used"
>=20
> -- Please provide a reference for SHA-256 (per "... If no hash =
function is specified, SHA-256 MUST be used"). =20
>=20
> -- It is likely worth saying that this is the equivalent of =
HKDF_SHA256 (i.e., 0x0001)
>=20
> ** Section 4.1.  Per "EPSKs may be imported before the started of the =
connection ..." and "EPSKs may also be imported for early data use ..." =
should be these be a normative MAYs?
>=20
> ** Section 4.1.  Per "Minimally, that means ALPN, QUIC ... must be =
provisioned alongside these EPSK"
> -- Please expand ALPN
>=20
> -- should this be a normative MUST?
>=20
> ** Section 9.  Per the columns in the registry:
> -- Is there a reason why there isn't a Reference column in the =
registry to capture which specification describes the particular KDF?  I =
think it needs one to eliminate guesswork from the label in "KDF =
Description" to an algorithm. =20
>=20
> -- Was a Recommended column (and the associated processed for =
populating it like a few of the other TLS registries) =
discussed/considered?
>=20
> ** Section 9.  While it is implied by the label, the text doesn't =
explicitly say what HKDF_SHA256 and _SHA384 are (per previous comment =
about needing a reference).


From nobody Mon Oct  5 08:51:28 2020
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
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I have entered these as an issue in the repo:
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/issues/66

spt

> On Oct 2, 2020, at 12:50, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:
>=20
> Hi!
>=20
> I've assumed the role of responsible AD on this document.  As such, I =
performed an AD review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13.  =
This document has seen a few WG LCs and reviews.  Thanks for working out =
the details for this feedback.    I have a few questions and suggestions =
for process and editorial clarity described below.  Given that, I'm =
going to advance this document to IETF LC and the feedback below can be =
discussed/addressed concurrently.
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Editorial. Provide a reference to TLS 1.3 when it is =
first mentioned.
>=20
> OLD
> Post-handshake authentication is defined in TLS 1.3
>=20
> NEW
> Post-handshake authentication is defined in Section 4.6.2 of TLS 1.3 =
[TLS13]
>=20
> ** Section 1.  Editorial. Provide references to for (D)TLS 1.2
>=20
> OLD
> TLS (or DTLS) version 1.2 or later are REQUIRED
>=20
> NEW
> TLS (or DTLS) version 1.2 [RFC5246][RFC6347] or later are REQUIRED.
>=20
> ** Section 5. =20
>   The
>   application layer protocol used to send the authenticator SHOULD use
>   TLS or a protocol with comparable security properties as its
>   underlying transport
>=20
> I saw the additional text added here after the LC on -09 (and the =
discussion that this can't be MUST-use-TLS because of use cases like =
QUIC).  However, what is the envisioned flexibility by using SHOULD =
(instead of MUST) given the addition of the "or a protocol with =
comparable security properties"?  When would I want to use a protocol =
with reduced security properties?
>=20
> ** Section 5.1.  Editorial.
>=20
> These values are derived
>   using an exporter as described in [RFC5705] (for TLS 1.2) or Sec. =
7.5
>   of [TLS13] (for TLS 1.3).
>=20
> -- Please provide the relevant section in RFC5705 (just like was done =
for [TLS13])
>=20
> -- s/Sec. 7.5/Section 7.5/
>=20
> ** Section 5.2.2.  Editorial. Per "The definition for TLS 1.3 is:" =
begs the question of what that format might be for TLS 1.2.  Can you =
please make it clearer that the format is the same.
>=20
> ** Section 5.2.2. =20
>=20
> Otherwise, the signature algorithm used
>   should be chosen from the "signature_algorithms" sent by the peer in
>   the ClientHello of the TLS handshake. =20
>=20
> -- Editorial.  For clarity, s/ Otherwise, the signature algorithm used =
.../Otherwise, with spontaneous server authentication, the signature =
algorithm used .../
>=20
> -- Would it make sense to make this "should" and normative "SHOULD"?
>=20
> ** Section 5.2.4.
>   When validating an
>   authenticator, a constant-time comparison SHOULD be used.
>=20
> What's the concern here?  IMO, this guidance seems better in Section =
7.4
>=20
> ** Section 7.*.  As Section 7 states that 7.* is informative:
> -- Section 7.3. Downgrade the single normative "RECOMMENDED" to be =
"recommended".
>=20
> -- Section 7.4. Downgrade the single normative "SHOULD" to be "should"
>=20
> ** Section 8.1.  Why shouldn't this document also be added to the =
"Reference" column to explain the addition of "CR" to the "TLS 1.3" =
column?
>=20
> ** Section 8.2.  With these additions to "Exporter Labels" registry, =
please describe the values of the other fields:
> -- How should the "DTLS-OK" and "Recommended" columns be set?
>=20
> -- The obvious text that this document should be the "Reference"
>=20
> Regards,
> Roman
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
> A couple pointers for getting started:

Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I'm going through
the first one now and will note that it does not even
mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So while I am
confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryRequest
-> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.

I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "stateless"
server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or
HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the
second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data centers seem to
do this based on some of the discussion I've had this
week.

The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by
replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you're
supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in
its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny is happening,
how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?=C2=A0 Where
does it get this value from if it's not also somehow in
the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the server
of hash-of-ClientHello1)?

And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into
the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of
the HelloRetryRequest?

Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write to do
this correctly makes my head spin:

 =C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I don't do lots of
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing without knowing there's a rout=
able
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address associated with the client]

 =C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1

 =C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryRequest message without cookie

 =C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-minus-
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a data structure, encrypt + MAC to
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie

 =C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 remembering to update the length of the e=
xtensions

 =C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to client

 =C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what just happened!!!

 =C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2

 =C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie extension (well I should
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least remember the fact that I already=
 sent a
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest and not be completely statel=
ess,
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=A0 Otherwise the client may be =
able to send
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN's without a cookie)

 =C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie and if it's valid, decrypt
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to determine the contents of ClientHel=
lo1 and
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest (without cookie) me=
ssages

 =C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was received in ClientHello1 (RFC 8446 ha=
s a list
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things a client is allowed to do; I wo=
uld want
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check all of them, so a hash of Client=
Hello1
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequate in my opinion).=C2=A0 This =
seems to be a
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary thing to do even for stateful s=
ervers.

 =C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was sent to the client by putting th=
e cookie
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-minus-cookie (in the same place =
within
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list of extensions as was already don=
e in step
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but since we threw it away, do it agai=
n)

 =C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript-Hash along with the HelloRetry=
Request
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message

And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.........

Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) please take a
few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which
doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello's
without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 Or a server that
doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can
not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of
allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to maybe "guess" the
content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it
just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=C2=A0 And if it
guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different
from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate
(denial of service to legitimate clients).

Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message
into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and threw
it in the bin along with ClientHello1?

Mike


>  1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a month or
>     so ago, it's the most recent proof of security of the full
>     handshake (also includes PSK modes): https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1=
044
>  2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the body of
>     papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the myriad
>     attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a more proactive
>     design approach for 1.3:
>     https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7
>
> If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appears=20
> in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.
>
> No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to=20
> 1.0-1.2.
>
> Best,
> Chris P.


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
        Author          : Eric Rescorla
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-00.txt
	Pages           : 152
	Date            : 2020-10-05

Abstract:
   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

   This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066 and obsoletes RFCs 5077,
   5246, and 6961.  This document also specifies new requirements for
   TLS 1.2 implementations.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-00.html


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Hi folks,

cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I propose
adopting their varint format.

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28

Any objections?
-Ekr

--0000000000005c6edb05b0f5c4ee
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>cTLS uses a bespok=
e varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I propose adopting their var=
int format.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dr=
aft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pul=
l/28</a></div><div><br></div><div>Any objections?</div><div>-Ekr</div><div>=
<br></div></div>

--0000000000005c6edb05b0f5c4ee--


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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 08:31:17 +0700
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One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant format=
 is that there
are multiple ways to encode a number. This has led to some complications in
the specification (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the minimal encoding for
frame types, but allows all encodings everywhere else).
It would be nice to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> Hi folks,
>
> cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I propos=
e
> adopting their varint format.
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28
>
> Any objections?
> -Ekr
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"auto">One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=
=99s variant format is that there are multiple ways to encode a number. Thi=
s has led to some complications in the specification (e.g. QUIC requires yo=
u to use the minimal encoding for frame types, but allows all encodings eve=
rywhere else).</div><div dir=3D"auto">It would be nice to have an unambiguo=
us way to encode a number.</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(=
204,204,204)"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>cTLS=
 uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I propose adop=
ting their varint format.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://githu=
b.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28" target=3D"_blank">https://github.c=
om/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28</a></div><div><br></div><div>Any objec=
tions?</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 12:38:04 +1100
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Oh, I consider that to be a feature.  One that I exploit.  It's sometime=
s awkward to build a structure then prepend a length that has a variable=
-length encoding.  If you know the maximum length, the varint encoding a=
llows you to avoid having to move memory.

That said, cTLS won't authenticate both the value and the specific encod=
ing of numeric values as the varint encoding is erased.  I don't conside=
r that to be a serious problem, but it means that cTLS transcripts can't=
 be directly compared.  I would note that in the draft: people shouldn't=
 be processing cTLS messages that way, but they might be surprised to le=
arn of this.

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020, at 12:31, Marten Seemann wrote:
> One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant f=
ormat is that=20
> there are multiple ways to encode a number. This has led to some=20
> complications in the specification (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the=20=

> minimal encoding for frame types, but allows all encodings everywhere=20=

> else).
> It would be nice to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.
>=20
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > Hi folks,
> >=20
> > cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I p=
ropose adopting their varint format.
> >=20
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28
> >=20
> > Any objections?
> > -Ekr
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 18:38:08 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Yeah, I'm certainly sympathetic to this. TBH, from an aesthetic perspective
I prefer what's in cTLS now (though it had the same property) but I figured
that some consistency was nice.

-Ekr



On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 6:31 PM Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
wrote:

> One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant form=
at is that there
> are multiple ways to encode a number. This has led to some complications =
in
> the specification (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the minimal encoding for
> frame types, but allows all encodings everywhere else).
> It would be nice to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.
>
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi folks,
>>
>> cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I
>> propose adopting their varint format.
>>
>> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28
>>
>> Any objections?
>> -Ekr
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

--000000000000d1f0fe05b0f6a808
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Yeah, I&#39;m certainly sympathetic to this. TBH, fro=
m an aesthetic perspective I prefer what&#39;s in cTLS now (though it had t=
he same property) but I figured that some consistency was nice.<br></div><d=
iv><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 20=
20 at 6:31 PM Marten Seemann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martenseemann@gmail.com"=
>martenseemann@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit an=
noying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant format is that there are multiple ways =
to encode a number. This has led to some complications in the specification=
 (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the minimal encoding for frame types, but a=
llows all encodings everywhere else).</div><div dir=3D"auto">It would be ni=
ce to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.</div><div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 =
at 07:35 Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank=
">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi folks,</div><div><br></div><div>cTLS=
 uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I propose adop=
ting their varint format.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://githu=
b.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28" target=3D"_blank">https://github.c=
om/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28</a></div><div><br></div><div>Any objec=
tions?</div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 18:41:44 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 6:38 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> Oh, I consider that to be a feature.  One that I exploit.  It's sometimes
> awkward to build a structure then prepend a length that has a
> variable-length encoding.  If you know the maximum length, the varint
> encoding allows you to avoid having to move memory.
>
> That said, cTLS won't authenticate both the value and the specific
> encoding of numeric values as the varint encoding is erased.  I don't
> consider that to be a serious problem, but it means that cTLS transcripts
> can't be directly compared.  I would note that in the draft: people
> shouldn't be processing cTLS messages that way, but they might be surpris=
ed
> to learn of this.
>

You could fix this by requiring the minimal encoding, right?

-Ekr


> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020, at 12:31, Marten Seemann wrote:
> > One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant fo=
rmat is that
> > there are multiple ways to encode a number. This has led to some
> > complications in the specification (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the
> > minimal encoding for frame types, but allows all encodings everywhere
> > else).
> > It would be nice to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > > Hi folks,
> > >
> > > cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, I
> propose adopting their varint format.
> > >
> > > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28
> > >
> > > Any objections?
> > > -Ekr
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > TLS mailing list
> > > TLS@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 6:38 PM Martin=
 Thomson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mt@lowentropy.net">mt@lowentropy.net</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Oh, I co=
nsider that to be a feature.=C2=A0 One that I exploit.=C2=A0 It&#39;s somet=
imes awkward to build a structure then prepend a length that has a variable=
-length encoding.=C2=A0 If you know the maximum length, the varint encoding=
 allows you to avoid having to move memory.<br>
<br>
That said, cTLS won&#39;t authenticate both the value and the specific enco=
ding of numeric values as the varint encoding is erased.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t =
consider that to be a serious problem, but it means that cTLS transcripts c=
an&#39;t be directly compared.=C2=A0 I would note that in the draft: people=
 shouldn&#39;t be processing cTLS messages that way, but they might be surp=
rised to learn of this.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You could fix t=
his by requiring the minimal encoding, right?</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr=
</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
On Tue, Oct 6, 2020, at 12:31, Marten Seemann wrote:<br>
&gt; One thing that=E2=80=99s a bit annoying about QUIC=E2=80=99s variant f=
ormat is that <br>
&gt; there are multiple ways to encode a number. This has led to some <br>
&gt; complications in the specification (e.g. QUIC requires you to use the =
<br>
&gt; minimal encoding for frame types, but allows all encodings everywhere =
<br>
&gt; else).<br>
&gt; It would be nice to have an unambiguous way to encode a number.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 07:35 Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@r=
tfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; Hi folks,<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; cTLS uses a bespoke varint format. Now that QUIC is nearly done, =
I propose adopting their varint format.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/pull/28" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tl=
s-ctls/pull/28</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Any objections?<br>
&gt; &gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a=
><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 19:00:45 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't really
see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code path leads to
an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?

I don't think this is likely. One way to think about this problem is as
follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path, can you
efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version of the protocol
without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is "yes", and if we
assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR code path implemented (as
asserted by a proof of security, say), it must be case that the protocol is
also secure *with* the HRR code path implemented.

Although I haven't studied this problem specifically ---  Dowling et al.
appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my intuition is that
the answer is "yes". The reason, loosely, is that the HRR code path doesn't
appear to depend on any ephemeral or long-term secret key material used by
the server for the core handshake. In particular, it doesn't depend on the
server's key share or signing key. This means that the adversary can
"simulate" any computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without
interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the
reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if you
study any one of the high quality implementations that exist (openSSL,
boringSSL, NSS, Go's crypto/tls just to name a few), it won't be hard to
convince yourself that the HRR code path doesn't depend on secrets used in
the core handshake.


Chris P.

[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
> > A couple pointers for getting started:
>
> Thank you for providing these links!  I'm going through
> the first one now and will note that it does not even
> mention the HelloRetryRequest message.  So while I am
> confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
> ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
> have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryRequest
> -> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.
>
> I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "stateless"
> server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or
> HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the
> second ClientHello.  Load-balanced data centers seem to
> do this based on some of the discussion I've had this
> week.
>
> The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by
> replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you're
> supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in
> its ClientHello2.  Even if nothing funny is happening,
> how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
> HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?  Where
> does it get this value from if it's not also somehow in
> the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the server
> of hash-of-ClientHello1)?
>
> And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into
> the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of
> the HelloRetryRequest?
>
> Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write to do
> this correctly makes my head spin:
>
>    0)  [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I don't do lots of
>        processing without knowing there's a routable
>        address associated with the client]
>
>    1)  receive ClientHello1
>
>    2)  generate HelloRetryRequest message without cookie
>
>    3)  package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-minus-
>        cookie into a data structure, encrypt + MAC to
>        create a cookie
>
>    4)  insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,
>        remembering to update the length of the extensions
>
>    5)  send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to client
>
>    6)  erase all memory of what just happened!!!
>
>    7)  receive ClientHello2
>
>    8)  ensure it has a cookie extension (well I should
>        at least remember the fact that I already sent a
>        HelloRetryRequest and not be completely stateless,
>        right?  Otherwise the client may be able to send
>        many ClientHelloN's without a cookie)
>
>    9)  check MAC on the cookie and if it's valid, decrypt
>        it to determine the contents of ClientHello1 and
>        the HelloRetryRequest (without cookie) messages
>
>    10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what
>        was received in ClientHello1 (RFC 8446 has a list
>        of things a client is allowed to do; I would want
>        to check all of them, so a hash of ClientHello1
>        is inadequate in my opinion).  This seems to be a
>        necessary thing to do even for stateful servers.
>
>    11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message
>        that was sent to the client by putting the cookie
>        into HRR-minus-cookie (in the same place within
>        the list of extensions as was already done in step
>        4, but since we threw it away, do it again)
>
>    12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the
>        Transcript-Hash along with the HelloRetryRequest
>        message
>
> And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.........
>
> Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) please take a
> few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which
> doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello's
> without a cookie on the same connection?  Or a server that
> doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can
> not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of
> allowed changes?  Or a server that has to maybe "guess" the
> content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it
> just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?  And if it
> guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different
> from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate
> (denial of service to legitimate clients).
>
> Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message
> into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and threw
> it in the bin along with ClientHello1?
>
> Mike
>
>
> >  1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a month or
> >     so ago, it's the most recent proof of security of the full
> >     handshake (also includes PSK modes):
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
> >  2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the body of
> >     papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the myriad
> >     attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a more proactive
> >     design approach for 1.3:
> >     https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7
> >
> > If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appears
> > in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.
> >
> > No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to
> > 1.0-1.2.
> >
> > Best,
> > Chris P.
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason abou=
t, but I don&#39;t really see an attack here. Is it your contention that th=
e HRR code path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think this is likely. One way to think a=
bout this problem is as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HR=
R code path, can you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a vers=
ion of the protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is=
 &quot;yes&quot;, and if we assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR=
 code path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it must b=
e case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path implemente=
d.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Although I haven&#39;t studied this problem=
 specifically ---=C2=A0 Dowling et al. appear to address this problem, if o=
nly implicitly --- my intuition is that the answer is &quot;yes&quot;. The =
reason, loosely, is that the HRR code path doesn&#39;t appear to depend on =
any ephemeral or long-term secret key material used by the server for the c=
ore handshake. In particular, it doesn&#39;t depend on the server&#39;s key=
 share or signing key. This means that the adversary can &quot;simulate&quo=
t; any computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without interac=
ting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the reduction I de=
scribed above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if you study any one of =
the high quality implementations that exist (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go&#3=
9;s crypto/tls just to name a few), it won&#39;t be hard to convince yourse=
lf that the HRR code path doesn&#39;t depend on secrets used in the core ha=
ndshake.</div><div><br></div><div></div><div><br></div><div>Chris P.<br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div>[1] <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573">htt=
ps://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573</a></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Micha=
el D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com">mike-list@pobox.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:<br>
&gt; A couple pointers for getting started:<br>
<br>
Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I&#39;m going through<br>
the first one now and will note that it does not even<br>
mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So while I am<br>
confident there has been quite a bit of study of a<br>
ClientHello -&gt; ServerHello handshake, there may not<br>
have been much study of ClientHello1 -&gt; HelloRetryRequest<br>
-&gt; ClientHello2 -&gt; ServerHello handshakes.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m especially concerned about the fact that a &quot;stateless&quot;<br=
>
server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or<br>
HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the<br>
second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data centers seem to<br>
do this based on some of the discussion I&#39;ve had this<br>
week.<br>
<br>
The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by<br>
replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you&#39;re<br>
supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in<br>
its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny is happening,<br>
how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the<br>
HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?=C2=A0 Where<br>
does it get this value from if it&#39;s not also somehow in<br>
the &quot;cookie&quot; (which is how the client reminds the server<br>
of hash-of-ClientHello1)?<br>
<br>
And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into<br>
the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of<br>
the HelloRetryRequest?<br>
<br>
Just trying to imagine the code I&#39;d have to write to do<br>
this correctly makes my head spin:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable &quot;TCP Fast Open&quot; so I don&#39;t do =
lots of<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing without knowing there&#39;s=
 a routable<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address associated with the client]<br=
>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryRequest message without cookie<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-minus-<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a data structure, encrypt + MAC=
 to<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 remembering to update the length of th=
e extensions<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to client<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what just happened!!!<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie extension (well I should<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least remember the fact that I alre=
ady sent a<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest and not be completely sta=
teless,<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=A0 Otherwise the client may =
be able to send<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN&#39;s without a cookie)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie and if it&#39;s valid, decryp=
t<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to determine the contents of Client=
Hello1 and<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest (without cookie)=
 messages<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was received in ClientHello1 (RFC 8446=
 has a list<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things a client is allowed to do; I=
 would want<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check all of them, so a hash of Cli=
entHello1<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequate in my opinion).=C2=A0 Th=
is seems to be a<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary thing to do even for statefu=
l servers.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was sent to the client by putting=
 the cookie<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-minus-cookie (in the same pla=
ce within<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list of extensions as was already =
done in step<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but since we threw it away, do it a=
gain)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript-Hash along with the HelloRe=
tryRequest<br>
=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message<br>
<br>
And I didn&#39;t even handle the possibility of replay.........<br>
<br>
Can a cryptographer (I don&#39;t claim to be one) please take a<br>
few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which<br>
doesn&#39;t implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello&#39;s<br>
without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 Or a server that<br>
doesn&#39;t put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can<br>
not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of<br>
allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to maybe &quot;guess&quot; the<=
br>
content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it<br>
just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=C2=A0 And if it<br>
guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different<br>
from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate<br>
(denial of service to legitimate clients).<br>
<br>
Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message<br>
into the Transcript-Hash if you are &quot;stateless&quot; and threw<br>
it in the bin along with ClientHello1?<br>
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 1. Check out Dowling et al.&#39;s recent analysis. Published a m=
onth or<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0so ago, it&#39;s the most recent proof of security =
of the full<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake (also includes PSK modes): <a href=3D"htt=
ps://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe&#39;s survey of the body=
 of<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overvi=
ews the myriad<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a =
more proactive<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0design approach for 1.3:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.100=
7/978-3-319-49100-4_7" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://link.sp=
ringer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If you&#39;re unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appea=
rs <br>
&gt; in a slightly different form in van der Merwe&#39;s PhD thesis.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to =
<br>
&gt; 1.0-1.2.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Best,<br>
&gt; Chris P.<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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From: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 09:31:43 +0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would just put the burden
on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.
Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's encoding, such that the
2-byte encoding doesn't encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numbers
from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimum possible length=
=E2=80=9D?
>

--000000000000f7b6a205b0f7663a
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>In that case, why use QUIC&#39;s encoding at all? It =
would just put the burden on the receiver to check that the minimal encodin=
g was used.</div><div>Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC&#39;s=
 encoding, such that the 2-byte encoding doesn&#39;t encode the numbers fro=
m 0 to 16383, but the numbers from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for=
 4 and 8-byte encodings?<br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_-2934754279755651575WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the min=
imum possible length=E2=80=9D?<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--000000000000f7b6a205b0f7663a--


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 20:08:54 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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I don't have a strong opinion on whether to require a minimal encoding, but
if we're not going to use QUIC's encoding as-is, then I would rather stick
with the existing scheme, which has twice as large a range for the 1 byte
encoding and is thus more compact for a range of common cases.

-Ekr


On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
wrote:

> In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would just put the burde=
n
> on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.
> Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's encoding, such that the
> 2-byte encoding doesn't encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numbe=
rs
> from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?
>
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimum possible length=
=E2=80=9D?
>>
>

--00000000000075feac05b0f7edfe
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I don&#39;t have a strong opinion on whether to requi=
re a minimal encoding, but if we&#39;re not going to use QUIC&#39;s encodin=
g as-is, then I would rather stick with the existing scheme, which has twic=
e as large a range for the 1 byte encoding and is thus more compact for a r=
ange of common cases.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div=
></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr"=
>On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:marten=
seemann@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martenseemann@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div>In that case, why use QUIC&#39;s encoding at all? It would just put =
the burden on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.</di=
v><div>Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC&#39;s encoding, such=
 that the 2-byte encoding doesn&#39;t encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, b=
ut the numbers from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte e=
ncodings?<br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the min=
imum possible length=E2=80=9D?<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000075feac05b0f7edfe--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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1994 called. It wanted to talk about distinguished encoding rules.

On 10/5/2020 8:08 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I don't have a strong opinion on whether to require a minimal
> encoding, but if we're not going to use QUIC's encoding as-is, then I
> would rather stick with the existing scheme, which has twice as large
> a range for the 1 byte encoding and is thus more compact for a range
> of common cases.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com
> <mailto:martenseemann@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would just put
>     the burden on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was
>     used.
>     Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's encoding, such
>     that the 2-byte encoding doesn't encode the numbers from 0 to
>     16383, but the numbers from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently
>     for 4 and 8-byte encodings?
>
>     On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com
>     <mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
>
>         Can you just say “QUIC rules but use the minimum possible length”?
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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    <p>1994 called. It wanted to talk about distinguished encoding
      rules.<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/5/2020 8:08 PM, Eric Rescorla
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CABcZeBNQ3tk-rGpdJ88q0oaUXXq4B7NQWKp8P8uQOyxA7Lwstg@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>I don't have a strong opinion on whether to require a
          minimal encoding, but if we're not going to use QUIC's
          encoding as-is, then I would rather stick with the existing
          scheme, which has twice as large a range for the 1 byte
          encoding and is thus more compact for a range of common cases.<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>-Ekr</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM
          Marten Seemann &lt;<a href="mailto:martenseemann@gmail.com"
            target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">martenseemann@gmail.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir="ltr">
            <div>In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would
              just put the burden on the receiver to check that the
              minimal encoding was used.</div>
            <div>Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's
              encoding, such that the 2-byte encoding doesn't encode the
              numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numbers from 64 to (16383
              + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?<br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at
              9:22 AM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href="mailto:rsalz@akamai.com"
                target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div lang="EN-US">
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal">Can you just say “QUIC rules but
                    use the minimum possible length”?</p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:TLS@ietf.org">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 22:11:26 -0700
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>, "TLS@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 9:59 PM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
wrote:

> 1994 called. It wanted to talk about distinguished encoding rules.
>

Could you expand on this idea?

I am not sure what you mean, because most things from circa 1994 are pretty
naive, to my eye.

thanks,
Rob




> On 10/5/2020 8:08 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> I don't have a strong opinion on whether to require a minimal encoding,
> but if we're not going to use QUIC's encoding as-is, then I would rather
> stick with the existing scheme, which has twice as large a range for the =
1
> byte encoding and is thus more compact for a range of common cases.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would just put the
>> burden on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.
>> Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's encoding, such that th=
e
>> 2-byte encoding doesn't encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numb=
ers
>> from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimum possible lengt=
h=E2=80=9D?
>>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing listTLS@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 9:59 PM Christian =
Huitema &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:huitema@huitema.net">huitema@huitema.net</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <p>1994 called. It wanted to talk about distinguished encoding
      rules.<br></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Could you expand=
 on this idea?</div><div><br></div><div>I am not sure what you mean, becaus=
e most things from circa 1994 are pretty naive, to my eye.</div><div><br></=
div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><p>
    </p>
    <div>On 10/5/2020 8:08 PM, Eric Rescorla
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div>I don&#39;t have a strong opinion on whether to require a
          minimal encoding, but if we&#39;re not going to use QUIC&#39;s
          encoding as-is, then I would rather stick with the existing
          scheme, which has twice as large a range for the 1 byte
          encoding and is thus more compact for a range of common cases.<br=
>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>-Ekr</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 P=
M
          Marten Seemann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martenseemann@gmail.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">martenseemann@gmail.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div dir=3D"ltr">
            <div>In that case, why use QUIC&#39;s encoding at all? It would
              just put the burden on the receiver to check that the
              minimal encoding was used.</div>
            <div>Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC&#39;s
              encoding, such that the 2-byte encoding doesn&#39;t encode th=
e
              numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numbers from 64 to (16383
              + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?<br>
            </div>
          </div>
          <br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
            <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at
              9:22 AM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
              <div lang=3D"EN-US">
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rul=
es but
                    use the minimum possible length=E2=80=9D?</p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ZrUKiotpT0HRIY0Xj7CAskckZhg>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 17:52:15 +1100
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/l-OI0_s7Q8y4S-0facBvX-gvb3o>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Tue, Oct 6, 2020, at 17:36, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> In the work on QUIC did you discuss the ability to make the encoding 
> such that there are no ways to express a number in two different ways, 
> as shown in your example with the single byte 25 decoding to 37 and the 
> two byte sequence 40 25? 

For QUIC, where the performance impact of serialization and parsing was considered important, the additional cost involved was a little higher than I think some people wanted.  It also makes the encoding more complex.

A "distinguished" or canonical encoding wasn't critical there.  It's probably not critical here either.


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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> 1994 called. It wanted to talk about distinguished encoding rules.
>

Yes, DER vs. BER.=C2=A0 ASN.1 is actually pretty
cool (bits on the wire in X.690, not X.680).

The encoding also reminds me of UTF-8 which is
a variable length:

 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 0xxxxxxx
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 110xxxxx 10yyyyyy
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 1110xxxx 10yyyyyy 10zzzzzz
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 11110xxx 10yyyyyy 10zzzzzz 10wwwwww

UTF-8 requires using the fewest number of bytes
to represent a Unicode code point.

Mike


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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I would prefer the minimum encoding length.

=20

From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=3D40akamai.=
com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Monday, October 5, 2020 at 22:23
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints

=20

Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimum possible length=E2=80=9D?


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04/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=3DC=
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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D'wo=
rd-wrap:break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I would prefe=
r the minimum encoding length.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0p=
t 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;=
color:black'>TLS &lt;tls-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of &quot;Salz, Rich&=
quot; &lt;rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Monday, Octo=
ber 5, 2020 at 22:23<br><b>To: </b>Eric Rescorla &lt;ekr@rtfm.com&gt;, Marte=
n Seemann &lt;martenseemann@gmail.com&gt;<br><b>Cc: </b>&quot;&lt;tls@ietf.o=
rg&gt;&quot; &lt;tls@ietf.org&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [TLS] PR#28: Conver=
ting cTLS to QUIC-style varints<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimu=
m possible length=E2=80=9D?<o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>

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--B_3684825942_687168505--


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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> I would prefer the minimum encoding length.
>

But if the spec says MUST be minimum length,
I would feel compelled to check every one.

Please don't require minimum length unless
security would be weaker without it.

Mike


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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>>     But if the spec says MUST be minimum length,
>      I would feel compelled to check every one.
>
> "Be liberal in what you accept" no?

A requirement of MUST in a security protocol usually
means (or at least should mean) that there's a good
reason for the thing, whatever it is, so if you are
not checking it, then bad things can happen.=C2=A0 I try
to heed Postel's advice though, and can sometimes be
more liberal than the spec says if I really know
what the trade-offs are.=C2=A0 With crypto though, I don't
pretend to be expert in it, I'm kind of afraid of it,
and I'm not sure how anyone can claim to understand
it well enough to say, for example, that ECC is so
much better than everything else.=C2=A0 What if it's all
broken?=C2=A0 We're getting rid of everything else that
we know works....

>>     Please don't require minimum length unless
>      security would be weaker without it.
>
> If the fields are used in digests/hashing/signatures, then it matters. =
 (The DER/BER comment upthread)

It matters in X.509 certificates because the basic
encoding rules (BER) allow you to specify the same
thing in different ways.=C2=A0 With DER, there is only
one way to encode every element, so everybody will
come up with the same string of bytes and hashes of
those strings will be the same, signatures will
verify, etc.

I haven't read whatever spec cTLS is, but know that
if I decided to implement it someday and there's a
"varints MUST be minimum length" requirement, I'd
assume that it's important and would check for it.
If this is a waste of CPU cycles, then please don't
make it a requirement.

Mike


From nobody Tue Oct  6 10:07:25 2020
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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> Okay, we disagree about things.  Not sure it's worth proceeding.
>
>>     I haven't read whatever spec cTLS is
> Got it.

My advice is universally applicable, to whatever
spec you are working on.=C2=A0 cTLS, QUIC, whatever-TF.

Mike


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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On 10/6/2020 10:00 AM, Michael D'Errico wrote:

> It matters in X.509 certificates because the basic
> encoding rules (BER) allow you to specify the same
> thing in different ways.=C2=A0 With DER, there is only
> one way to encode every element, so everybody will
> come up with the same string of bytes and hashes of
> those strings will be the same, signatures will
> verify, etc.=20


Well, we have learned a few things since 1994. The DER rules are defined
to allow a "re-encoding" workflow:

* Sender side: prepare the message, encode with DER, sign the result

* Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder,
process the message using the "parsed" representation, re-encode with
DER, check the signature.

Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the
parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature
will fail.=C2=A0 One may argue that these changes are due to implementati=
on
bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.
Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:

* Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
and check the signature.

If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in the
transcript.

-- Christian Huitema




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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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I think we are in agreement.

On 10/6/20 13:12, Christian Huitema wrote:
> * Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder=
,
> process the message using the "parsed" representation, re-encode with
> DER, check the signature.

I recall that at least one root certificate had a
SEQUENCE encoded using BER-but-not-DER (?)=C2=A0 Yeah if
your software re-encoded that, it would no longer
be the same sequence of bytes.

> Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the
> parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature
> will fail.=C2=A0 One may argue that these changes are due to implementa=
tion
> bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.
> Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:
>
> * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
> when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
> and check the signature.

This is how I did X.509 verification, though I was
late to the game and the advice was already there
to accept a BER-encoded certificate.=C2=A0 Not sure if
I would have done the DER re-encoding bit if that
was the current advice at the time since it seems
like the wrong thing to do, but maybe I would have.

> If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
> encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
> extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in the
> transcript.

I was disappointed to see that the TLS 1.3 spec now
has a requirement to put one of the ClientHello
extensions in a specific place (last in the list).

We discussed this at length during the development
of either TLS 1.2 or one of the extensions (maybe
renegotiation-info?) and we ultimately came to what
I believe was the correct decision never to require
any ordering of the extensions.=C2=A0 Sad to see the
group capitulated to whomever said it would make
their software easier to write (which I doubt).

Mike


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:
> I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't=20
> really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code=20
> path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?

I have a concern that yes, there may be a way to
attack a TLS server via the HRR code path that
may not be possible without using HRR.=C2=A0 I am
hopeful that I'm wrong about this, but as a non-
cryptographer it would be difficult to come up
with any kind of proof.

Specifically, I am thinking that a client can
trick a server to use its ECC private key to do
an operation using the wrong curve, the wrong
point, or maybe something else.=C2=A0 See the pseudo
code I wrote below.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Step 10 is where the server
should be checking that the second ClientHello is
valid based on what it originally sent in the
first ClientHello.

RFC 8446 implies that you should check ClientHello2
vs. ClientHello1 because if this wasn't necessary
then why is there a list of allowed modifications?

But then it also says you can throw away CH1 and
just send the client a hash of it, rely on the
client to send it back (once), and not check
whether the second ClientHello is properly similar
to the first one (since the server doesn't even
retain it).

Can a malicious client send in its second Client-
Hello an invalid combination of EC point, curve,
cipher suite, etc. (that a server maybe doesn't
even check because there's a cookie extension in
there as well) and then use the result to discern
the key?=C2=A0 How many handshakes does the client need
to make to get the private key if I'm right?=C2=A0 One?

I've avoided spelling this out because it seems
potentially serious, and there was the weekend,
but it's Tuesday now, and I have been hopeful that
I haven't been just ignored and everyone has been
disabling TLS 1.3 and/or fixing their code, etc.

Please just tell me why I'm wrong and I'll feel
better since we won't have to malign another cute
furry animal.

Mike


> I don't think this is likely. One way to think about this problem is=20
> as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path, can=20
> you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version of the=20
> protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is=20
> "yes", and if we assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR code=20
> path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it must be=20
> case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path=20
> implemented.
>
> Although I haven't studied this problem specifically --- Dowling et=20
> al. appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my=20
> intuition is that the answer is "yes". The reason, loosely, is that=20
> the HRR code path doesn't appear to depend on any ephemeral or=20
> long-term secret key material used by the server for the core=20
> handshake. In particular, it doesn't depend on the server's key share=20
> or signing key. This means that the adversary can "simulate" any=20
> computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without=20
> interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the=20
> reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if=20
> you study any one of the high quality implementations that exist=20
> (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go's crypto/tls just to name a few), it=20
> won't be hard to convince yourself that the HRR code path doesn't=20
> depend on secrets used in the core handshake.
>
>
> Chris P.
>
> [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com=20
> <mailto:mike-list@pobox.com>> wrote:
>
>     On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
>     > A couple pointers for getting started:
>
>     Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I'm going through
>     the first one now and will note that it does not even
>     mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So while I am
>     confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
>     ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
>     have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryRequest
>     -> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.
>
>     I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "stateless"
>     server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or
>     HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the
>     second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data centers seem to
>     do this based on some of the discussion I've had this
>     week.
>
>     The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by
>     replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you're
>     supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in
>     its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny is happening,
>     how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
>     HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?=C2=A0 Where
>     does it get this value from if it's not also somehow in
>     the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the server
>     of hash-of-ClientHello1)?
>
>     And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into
>     the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of
>     the HelloRetryRequest?
>
>     Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write to do
>     this correctly makes my head spin:
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I don't do lots o=
f
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing without knowing the=
re's a routable
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address associated with the cl=
ient]
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryRequest message without co=
okie
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-mi=
nus-
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a data structure, encry=
pt + MAC to
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 remembering to update the leng=
th of the extensions
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to clien=
t
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what just happened!!!
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie extension (well I shou=
ld
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least remember the fact tha=
t I already sent a
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest and not be comple=
tely stateless,
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=A0 Otherwise the cli=
ent may be able to send
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN's without a cookie)
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie and if it's valid, de=
crypt
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to determine the contents o=
f ClientHello1 and
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest (without=
 cookie) messages
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was received in ClientHello1 (=
RFC 8446 has a list
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things a client is allowed =
to do; I would want
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check all of them, so a has=
h of ClientHello1
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequate in my opinion).=C2=
=A0 This seems to be a
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary thing to do even for=
 stateful servers.
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was sent to the client by=
 putting the cookie
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-minus-cookie (in the =
same place within
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list of extensions as was =
already done in step
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but since we threw it away,=
 do it again)
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript-Hash along with the=
 HelloRetryRequest
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message
>
>     And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.........
>
>     Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) please take a
>     few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which
>     doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello's
>     without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 Or a server that
>     doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can
>     not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of
>     allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to maybe "guess" the
>     content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it
>     just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=C2=A0 And if it
>     guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different
>     from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate
>     (denial of service to legitimate clients).
>
>     Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message
>     into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and threw
>     it in the bin along with ClientHello1?
>
>     Mike
>
>
>     >=C2=A0 1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a =
month or
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0so ago, it's the most recent proof of security=
 of the full
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake (also includes PSK modes):
>     https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
>     >=C2=A0 2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the bod=
y of
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also o=
verviews the
>     myriad
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyz=
ed a more
>     proactive
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0design approach for 1.3:
>     > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7
>     >
>     > If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper
>     appears
>     > in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.
>     >
>     > No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far
>     superior to
>     > 1.0-1.2.
>     >
>     > Best,
>     > Chris P.
>


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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[Resending this with a better Subject line. --Mike]

On 10/6/20 16:11, I wrote:
> On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:
>> I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't=20
>> really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code=20
>> path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?
>
> I have a concern that yes, there may be a way to
> attack a TLS server via the HRR code path that
> may not be possible without using HRR.=C2=A0 I am
> hopeful that I'm wrong about this, but as a non-
> cryptographer it would be difficult to come up
> with any kind of proof.
>
> Specifically, I am thinking that a client can
> trick a server to use its ECC private key to do
> an operation using the wrong curve, the wrong
> point, or maybe something else.=C2=A0 See the pseudo
> code I wrote below.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Step 10 is where the server
> should be checking that the second ClientHello is
> valid based on what it originally sent in the
> first ClientHello.
>
> RFC 8446 implies that you should check ClientHello2
> vs. ClientHello1 because if this wasn't necessary
> then why is there a list of allowed modifications?
>
> But then it also says you can throw away CH1 and
> just send the client a hash of it, rely on the
> client to send it back (once), and not check
> whether the second ClientHello is properly similar
> to the first one (since the server doesn't even
> retain it).
>
> Can a malicious client send in its second Client-
> Hello an invalid combination of EC point, curve,
> cipher suite, etc. (that a server maybe doesn't
> even check because there's a cookie extension in
> there as well) and then use the result to discern
> the key?=C2=A0 How many handshakes does the client need
> to make to get the private key if I'm right?=C2=A0 One?
>
> I've avoided spelling this out because it seems
> potentially serious, and there was the weekend,
> but it's Tuesday now, and I have been hopeful that
> I haven't been just ignored and everyone has been
> disabling TLS 1.3 and/or fixing their code, etc.
>
> Please just tell me why I'm wrong and I'll feel
> better since we won't have to malign another cute
> furry animal.
>
> Mike
>
>
>> I don't think this is likely. One way to think about this problem is=20
>> as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path,=20
>> can you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version of=20
>> the protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is=20
>> "yes", and if we assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR code=20
>> path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it must=20
>> be case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path=20
>> implemented.
>>
>> Although I haven't studied this problem specifically --- Dowling et=20
>> al. appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my=20
>> intuition is that the answer is "yes". The reason, loosely, is that=20
>> the HRR code path doesn't appear to depend on any ephemeral or=20
>> long-term secret key material used by the server for the core=20
>> handshake. In particular, it doesn't depend on the server's key share=20
>> or signing key. This means that the adversary can "simulate" any=20
>> computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without=20
>> interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the=20
>> reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if=20
>> you study any one of the high quality implementations that exist=20
>> (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go's crypto/tls just to name a few), it=20
>> won't be hard to convince yourself that the HRR code path doesn't=20
>> depend on secrets used in the core handshake.
>>
>>
>> Chris P.
>>
>> [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com=20
>> <mailto:mike-list@pobox.com>> wrote:
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > A couple pointers for getting started:
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I'm goin=
g through
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the first one now and will note that it does not ev=
en
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So whi=
le I am
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryR=
equest
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "sta=
teless"
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 server does not even remember what the ClientHello1=
 or
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives th=
e
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data center=
s seem to
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 do this based on some of the discussion I've had th=
is
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 week.
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 messa=
ge by
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then yo=
u're
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 supposed to rely on the client to tell you this val=
ue in
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny is ha=
ppening,
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?=C2=
=A0 Where
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 does it get this value from if it's not also someho=
w in
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the s=
erver
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of hash-of-ClientHello1)?
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message=
 into
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a pa=
rt of
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest?
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write t=
o do
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 this correctly makes my head spin:
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I=
 don't do lots of
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing wit=
hout knowing there's a routable
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address associ=
ated with the client]
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryRequest me=
ssage without cookie
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and Hell=
oRetryRequest-minus-
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a data =
structure, encrypt + MAC to
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into the He=
lloRetryRequest,
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 remembering to=
 update the length of the extensions
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (with =
cookie) to client
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what just=
 happened!!!
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie extens=
ion (well I should
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least remem=
ber the fact that I already sent a
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest a=
nd not be completely stateless,
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=A0 O=
therwise the client may be able to send
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN's with=
out a cookie)
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie and i=
f it's valid, decrypt
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to determin=
e the contents of ClientHello1 and
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetry=
Request (without cookie) messages
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid ac=
cording to what
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was received i=
n ClientHello1 (RFC 8446 has a list
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things a cl=
ient is allowed to do; I would want
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check all o=
f them, so a hash of ClientHello1
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequate =
in my opinion).=C2=A0 This seems to be a
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary thin=
g to do even for stateful servers.
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequ=
est message
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was sent =
to the client by putting the cookie
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-minus=
-cookie (in the same place within
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list of ex=
tensions as was already done in step
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but since w=
e threw it away, do it again)
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this=
 hash to the
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript-Has=
h along with the HelloRetryRequest
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.=
........
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) pleas=
e take a
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 few moments to look at the possibilities for a serv=
er which
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple Client=
Hello's
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 Or a=
 server that
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie=
 and can
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the=
 list of
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to mayb=
e "guess" the
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 =
since it
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=C2=A0=
 And if it
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up diffe=
rent
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 from the client, the peers will not be able to comm=
unicate
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (denial of service to legitimate clients).
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest =
message
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and=
 threw
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it in the bin along with ClientHello1?
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Mike
>>
>>
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analys=
is. Published a=20
>> month or
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0so ago, it's the most recent p=
roof of security of the full
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake (also includes PSK m=
odes):
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's s=
urvey of the body of
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0papers that helped to shape TL=
S 1.3. It also overviews the
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 myriad
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks against TLS 1.2 and be=
low that catalyzed a more
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 proactive
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0design approach for 1.3:
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-3=
19-49100-4_7
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > If you're unable to download the second (2.), the=
 same paper
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 appears
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's P=
hD thesis.
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears t=
o be far
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 superior to
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > 1.0-1.2.
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 >
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > Best,
>> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 > Chris P.
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 16:11:28 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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> > Please just tell me why I'm wrong and I'll feel
> > better since we won't have to malign another cute
> > furry animal.
>

I've told you already why I believe you're wrong here. At this point, it
won't do much good to continue posting about this list on the list. My
suggestion to you is to study the problem offline, and If you find an
attack and can demonstrate the works, then bring it back to the list. It
would also be helpful to look at implementations in order to understand how
others have interpreted the HRR code path. I bet this would clear up many
of your questions.

Chris P.

--000000000000a9eea505b108b85a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; Please just tell me why I&#39;m wrong and I&#39;ll feel<br>
&gt; better since we won&#39;t have to malign another cute<br>
&gt; furry animal.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div></div><div>I&#3=
9;ve told you already why I believe you&#39;re wrong here. At this point, i=
t won&#39;t do much good to continue posting about this list on the list. M=
y suggestion to you is to study the problem offline, and If you find an att=
ack and can demonstrate the works, then bring it back to the list. It would=
 also be helpful to look at implementations in order to understand how othe=
rs have interpreted the HRR code path. I bet this would clear up many of yo=
ur questions.</div><div><br></div><div>Chris P.<br></div></div><br></div></=
div>

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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 16:11:54 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:52 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:

> [Resending this with a better Subject line. --Mike]
>
> On 10/6/20 16:11, I wrote:
> > On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:
> >> I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't
> >> really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code
> >> path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?
> >
> > I have a concern that yes, there may be a way to
> > attack a TLS server via the HRR code path that
> > may not be possible without using HRR.  I am
> > hopeful that I'm wrong about this, but as a non-
> > cryptographer it would be difficult to come up
> > with any kind of proof.
> >
> > Specifically, I am thinking that a client can
> > trick a server to use its ECC private key to do
> > an operation using the wrong curve, the wrong
> > point, or maybe something else.  See the pseudo
> > code I wrote below.   Step 10 is where the server
> > should be checking that the second ClientHello is
> > valid based on what it originally sent in the
> > first ClientHello.
>

A server is going to do its EC private key operation on a key_share value K
from the client. It should be a value from ClientHello2, but let's assume
that it comes from any ClientHello. I posit that if a client causes a
server to use K as the client's public value in an ECDHE computation on a
handshake that involves HRR, the client could also cause the server to use
K in the ECDHE computation without using HRR. From this, I conclude that if
this leads to some vulnerability, this implies the ECDHE algorithm (or its
implementation), not the TLS handshake, is flawed.

Suppose a server sends ClientHello2 with a cookie to a server, and the
server deduces from ClientHello2 that the client supports groups G_1, G_2,
... G_n for (EC)DHE and the client has provided key shares K_1, K_2, ...
K_m that the client might wish to use with one of those supported groups.
Suppose the server picks supported group G_i and key share K_j and performs
an ECDHE operation with that combination (even though it might not be a
valid pairing, e.g. the group G_i is Ed25519 and the key share K_j is for
P256). The client could have just as easily had the server perform this
operation by sending a single ClientHello (i.e. on a fresh connection, with
no cookie) containing a supported groups list with only G_i and a key share
list with only K_j. If the key share doesn't match the group, the client
can lie in the KeyShareEntry and say that it does.

>
> > RFC 8446 implies that you should check ClientHello2
> > vs. ClientHello1 because if this wasn't necessary
> > then why is there a list of allowed modifications?
>

I am not aiming to provide a complete explanation to this question. Some
modifications to the ClientHello can't be allowed. For example, the cipher
suite can't be changed between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2 because that
could mean a different PRF for the transcript hash, which needs to be
computed starting with ClientHello1. Other modifications must be allowed,
because the client needs to be able to send a key_share in ClientHello2
that wasn't present in ClientHello1. It's possible that some future TLS
extension might affect cipher suite selection, so for future compatibility
it seems like a good idea to require other extensions to stay the same
between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2. Because some modifications are
needed and some can't be allowed, a good spec should list what is and isn't
allowed. The list of allowed modifications makes sense as it's limited to
things affected by HRR and nothing else (unless a future extension present
in the HRR allows more modifications).

> >
> > But then it also says you can throw away CH1 and
> > just send the client a hash of it, rely on the
> > client to send it back (once), and not check
> > whether the second ClientHello is properly similar
> > to the first one (since the server doesn't even
> > retain it).
> >
> > Can a malicious client send in its second Client-
> > Hello an invalid combination of EC point, curve,
> > cipher suite, etc. (that a server maybe doesn't
> > even check because there's a cookie extension in
> > there as well) and then use the result to discern
> > the key?  How many handshakes does the client need
> > to make to get the private key if I'm right?  One?
> >
> > I've avoided spelling this out because it seems
> > potentially serious, and there was the weekend,
> > but it's Tuesday now, and I have been hopeful that
> > I haven't been just ignored and everyone has been
> > disabling TLS 1.3 and/or fixing their code, etc.
> >
> > Please just tell me why I'm wrong and I'll feel
> > better since we won't have to malign another cute
> > furry animal.
> >
> > Mike
> >
> >
> >> I don't think this is likely. One way to think about this problem is
> >> as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path,
> >> can you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version of
> >> the protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is
> >> "yes", and if we assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR code
> >> path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it must
> >> be case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path
> >> implemented.
> >>
> >> Although I haven't studied this problem specifically --- Dowling et
> >> al. appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my
> >> intuition is that the answer is "yes". The reason, loosely, is that
> >> the HRR code path doesn't appear to depend on any ephemeral or
> >> long-term secret key material used by the server for the core
> >> handshake. In particular, it doesn't depend on the server's key share
> >> or signing key. This means that the adversary can "simulate" any
> >> computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without
> >> interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the
> >> reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if
> >> you study any one of the high quality implementations that exist
> >> (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go's crypto/tls just to name a few), it
> >> won't be hard to convince yourself that the HRR code path doesn't
> >> depend on secrets used in the core handshake.
> >>
> >>
> >> Chris P.
> >>
> >> [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573
> >>
> >> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com
> >> <mailto:mike-list@pobox.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
> >>     > A couple pointers for getting started:
> >>
> >>     Thank you for providing these links!  I'm going through
> >>     the first one now and will note that it does not even
> >>     mention the HelloRetryRequest message.  So while I am
> >>     confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
> >>     ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
> >>     have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryRequest
> >>     -> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.
> >>
> >>     I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "stateless"
> >>     server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or
> >>     HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the
> >>     second ClientHello.  Load-balanced data centers seem to
> >>     do this based on some of the discussion I've had this
> >>     week.
> >>
> >>     The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by
> >>     replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you're
> >>     supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in
> >>     its ClientHello2.  Even if nothing funny is happening,
> >>     how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
> >>     HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?  Where
> >>     does it get this value from if it's not also somehow in
> >>     the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the server
> >>     of hash-of-ClientHello1)?
> >>
> >>     And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into
> >>     the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of
> >>     the HelloRetryRequest?
> >>
> >>     Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write to do
> >>     this correctly makes my head spin:
> >>
> >>        0)  [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I don't do lots of
> >>            processing without knowing there's a routable
> >>            address associated with the client]
> >>
> >>        1)  receive ClientHello1
> >>
> >>        2)  generate HelloRetryRequest message without cookie
> >>
> >>        3)  package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-minus-
> >>            cookie into a data structure, encrypt + MAC to
> >>            create a cookie
> >>
> >>        4)  insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,
> >>            remembering to update the length of the extensions
> >>
> >>        5)  send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to client
> >>
> >>        6)  erase all memory of what just happened!!!
> >>
> >>        7)  receive ClientHello2
> >>
> >>        8)  ensure it has a cookie extension (well I should
> >>            at least remember the fact that I already sent a
> >>            HelloRetryRequest and not be completely stateless,
> >>            right?  Otherwise the client may be able to send
> >>            many ClientHelloN's without a cookie)
> >>
> >>        9)  check MAC on the cookie and if it's valid, decrypt
> >>            it to determine the contents of ClientHello1 and
> >>            the HelloRetryRequest (without cookie) messages
> >>
> >>        10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what
> >>            was received in ClientHello1 (RFC 8446 has a list
> >>            of things a client is allowed to do; I would want
> >>            to check all of them, so a hash of ClientHello1
> >>            is inadequate in my opinion).  This seems to be a
> >>            necessary thing to do even for stateful servers.
> >>
> >>        11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message
> >>            that was sent to the client by putting the cookie
> >>            into HRR-minus-cookie (in the same place within
> >>            the list of extensions as was already done in step
> >>            4, but since we threw it away, do it again)
> >>
> >>        12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the
> >>            Transcript-Hash along with the HelloRetryRequest
> >>            message
> >>
> >>     And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.........
> >>
> >>     Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) please take a
> >>     few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which
> >>     doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello's
> >>     without a cookie on the same connection?  Or a server that
> >>     doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can
> >>     not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of
> >>     allowed changes?  Or a server that has to maybe "guess" the
> >>     content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it
> >>     just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?  And if it
> >>     guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different
> >>     from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate
> >>     (denial of service to legitimate clients).
> >>
> >>     Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message
> >>     into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and threw
> >>     it in the bin along with ClientHello1?
> >>
> >>     Mike
> >>
> >>
> >>     >  1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a
> >> month or
> >>     >     so ago, it's the most recent proof of security of the full
> >>     >     handshake (also includes PSK modes):
> >>     https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
> >>     >  2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the body of
> >>     >     papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the
> >>     myriad
> >>     >     attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a more
> >>     proactive
> >>     >     design approach for 1.3:
> >>     > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7
> >>     >
> >>     > If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper
> >>     appears
> >>     > in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.
> >>     >
> >>     > No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far
> >>     superior to
> >>     > 1.0-1.2.
> >>     >
> >>     > Best,
> >>     > Chris P.
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:52 PM Michae=
l D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com">mike-list@pobox.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">[Resending this with a better Subject line. --Mike]<br>
<br>
On 10/6/20 16:11, I wrote:<br>
&gt; On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don&=
#39;t <br>
&gt;&gt; really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code=
 <br>
&gt;&gt; path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I have a concern that yes, there may be a way to<br>
&gt; attack a TLS server via the HRR code path that<br>
&gt; may not be possible without using HRR.=C2=A0 I am<br>
&gt; hopeful that I&#39;m wrong about this, but as a non-<br>
&gt; cryptographer it would be difficult to come up<br>
&gt; with any kind of proof.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Specifically, I am thinking that a client can<br>
&gt; trick a server to use its ECC private key to do<br>
&gt; an operation using the wrong curve, the wrong<br>
&gt; point, or maybe something else.=C2=A0 See the pseudo<br>
&gt; code I wrote below.=C2=A0=C2=A0 Step 10 is where the server<br>
&gt; should be checking that the second ClientHello is<br>
&gt; valid based on what it originally sent in the<br>
&gt; first ClientHello.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A server is goi=
ng to do its EC private key operation on a key_share value K from the clien=
t. It should be a value from ClientHello2, but let&#39;s assume that it com=
es from any ClientHello. I posit that if a client causes a server to use K =
as the client&#39;s public value in an ECDHE computation on a handshake tha=
t involves HRR, the client could also cause the server to use K in the ECDH=
E computation without using HRR. From this, I conclude that if this leads t=
o some vulnerability, this implies the ECDHE algorithm (or its implementati=
on), not the TLS handshake, is flawed.</div><div><br></div><div>Suppose a s=
erver sends ClientHello2 with a cookie to a server, and the server deduces =
from ClientHello2 that the client supports groups G_1, G_2, ... G_n for (EC=
)DHE and the client has provided key shares K_1, K_2, ... K_m that the clie=
nt might wish to use with one of those supported groups. Suppose the server=
 picks supported group G_i and key share K_j and performs an ECDHE operatio=
n with that combination (even though it might not be a valid pairing, e.g. =
the group G_i is Ed25519 and the key share K_j is for P256). The client cou=
ld have just as easily had the server perform this operation by sending a s=
ingle ClientHello (i.e. on a fresh connection, with no cookie) containing a=
 supported groups list with only G_i and a key share list with only K_j. If=
 the key share doesn&#39;t match the group, the client can lie in the KeySh=
areEntry and say that it does.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt;<br>
&gt; RFC 8446 implies that you should check ClientHello2<br>
&gt; vs. ClientHello1 because if this wasn&#39;t necessary<br>
&gt; then why is there a list of allowed modifications?<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>I am not aiming to provide a complete explanation to this =
question. Some modifications to the ClientHello can&#39;t be allowed. For e=
xample, the cipher suite can&#39;t be changed between ClientHello1 and Clie=
ntHello2 because that could mean a different PRF for the transcript hash, w=
hich needs to be computed starting with ClientHello1. Other modifications m=
ust be allowed, because the client needs to be able to send a key_share in =
ClientHello2 that wasn&#39;t present in ClientHello1. It&#39;s possible tha=
t some future TLS extension might affect cipher suite selection, so for fut=
ure compatibility it seems like a good idea to require other extensions to =
stay the same between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2. Because some modificat=
ions are needed and some can&#39;t be allowed, a good spec should list what=
 is and isn&#39;t allowed. The list of allowed modifications makes sense as=
 it&#39;s limited to things affected by HRR and nothing else (unless a futu=
re extension present in the HRR allows more modifications).=C2=A0</div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt;<br>
&gt; But then it also says you can throw away CH1 and<br>
&gt; just send the client a hash of it, rely on the<br>
&gt; client to send it back (once), and not check<br>
&gt; whether the second ClientHello is properly similar<br>
&gt; to the first one (since the server doesn&#39;t even<br>
&gt; retain it).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Can a malicious client send in its second Client-<br>
&gt; Hello an invalid combination of EC point, curve,<br>
&gt; cipher suite, etc. (that a server maybe doesn&#39;t<br>
&gt; even check because there&#39;s a cookie extension in<br>
&gt; there as well) and then use the result to discern<br>
&gt; the key?=C2=A0 How many handshakes does the client need<br>
&gt; to make to get the private key if I&#39;m right?=C2=A0 One?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve avoided spelling this out because it seems<br>
&gt; potentially serious, and there was the weekend,<br>
&gt; but it&#39;s Tuesday now, and I have been hopeful that<br>
&gt; I haven&#39;t been just ignored and everyone has been<br>
&gt; disabling TLS 1.3 and/or fixing their code, etc.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Please just tell me why I&#39;m wrong and I&#39;ll feel<br>
&gt; better since we won&#39;t have to malign another cute<br>
&gt; furry animal.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Mike<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I don&#39;t think this is likely. One way to think about this prob=
lem is <br>
&gt;&gt; as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path,=
 <br>
&gt;&gt; can you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version =
of <br>
&gt;&gt; the protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer =
is <br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;yes&quot;, and if we assume the protocol is secure *without*=
 the HRR code <br>
&gt;&gt; path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it mus=
t <br>
&gt;&gt; be case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path =
<br>
&gt;&gt; implemented.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Although I haven&#39;t studied this problem specifically --- Dowli=
ng et <br>
&gt;&gt; al. appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my <br>
&gt;&gt; intuition is that the answer is &quot;yes&quot;. The reason, loose=
ly, is that <br>
&gt;&gt; the HRR code path doesn&#39;t appear to depend on any ephemeral or=
 <br>
&gt;&gt; long-term secret key material used by the server for the core <br>
&gt;&gt; handshake. In particular, it doesn&#39;t depend on the server&#39;=
s key share <br>
&gt;&gt; or signing key. This means that the adversary can &quot;simulate&q=
uot; any <br>
&gt;&gt; computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without <br>
&gt;&gt; interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield th=
e <br>
&gt;&gt; reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but i=
f <br>
&gt;&gt; you study any one of the high quality implementations that exist <=
br>
&gt;&gt; (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go&#39;s crypto/tls just to name a few),=
 it <br>
&gt;&gt; won&#39;t be hard to convince yourself that the HRR code path does=
n&#39;t <br>
&gt;&gt; depend on secrets used in the core handshake.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Chris P.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; [1] <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com" target=3D"_blank">mike-list@pobox.com</a> <br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com" target=3D"_blank=
">mike-list@pobox.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; A couple pointers for getting started:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I&#3=
9;m going through<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the first one now and will note that it does no=
t even<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So=
 while I am<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 confident there has been quite a bit of study o=
f a<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ClientHello -&gt; ServerHello handshake, there =
may not<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 have been much study of ClientHello1 -&gt; Hell=
oRetryRequest<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -&gt; ClientHello2 -&gt; ServerHello handshakes=
.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 I&#39;m especially concerned about the fact tha=
t a &quot;stateless&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 server does not even remember what the ClientHe=
llo1 or<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receive=
s the<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data ce=
nters seem to<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 do this based on some of the discussion I&#39;v=
e had this<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 week.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 m=
essage by<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but the=
n you&#39;re<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 supposed to rely on the client to tell you this=
 value in<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny i=
s happening,<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 how is the (stateless) server supposed to put t=
he<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Has=
h?=C2=A0 Where<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 does it get this value from if it&#39;s not als=
o somehow in<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the &quot;cookie&quot; (which is how the client=
 reminds the server<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of hash-of-ClientHello1)?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest mes=
sage into<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the cookie extension when the cookie itself is =
a part of<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Just trying to imagine the code I&#39;d have to=
 write to do<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 this correctly makes my head spin:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable &quot;TCP Fast O=
pen&quot; so I don&#39;t do lots of<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing=
 without knowing there&#39;s a routable<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address as=
sociated with the client]<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryReques=
t message without cookie<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and =
HelloRetryRequest-minus-<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a d=
ata structure, encrypt + MAC to<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into th=
e HelloRetryRequest,<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 rememberin=
g to update the length of the extensions<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (w=
ith cookie) to client<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what =
just happened!!!<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie ex=
tension (well I should<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least r=
emember the fact that I already sent a<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryReque=
st and not be completely stateless,<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=
=A0 Otherwise the client may be able to send<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN&#3=
9;s without a cookie)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie a=
nd if it&#39;s valid, decrypt<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to dete=
rmine the contents of ClientHello1 and<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloR=
etryRequest (without cookie) messages<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is vali=
d according to what<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was receiv=
ed in ClientHello1 (RFC 8446 has a list<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things =
a client is allowed to do; I would want<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check a=
ll of them, so a hash of ClientHello1<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequ=
ate in my opinion).=C2=A0 This seems to be a<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary =
thing to do even for stateful servers.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetry=
Request message<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was s=
ent to the client by putting the cookie<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-m=
inus-cookie (in the same place within<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list o=
f extensions as was already done in step<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but sin=
ce we threw it away, do it again)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add =
this hash to the<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript=
-Hash along with the HelloRetryRequest<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 And I didn&#39;t even handle the possibility of=
 replay.........<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Can a cryptographer (I don&#39;t claim to be on=
e) please take a<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 few moments to look at the possibilities for a =
server which<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 doesn&#39;t implement step 8 and allows multipl=
e ClientHello&#39;s<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 =
Or a server that<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 doesn&#39;t put the entire ClientHello1 into th=
e cookie and can<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to=
 the list of<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to =
maybe &quot;guess&quot; the<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHel=
lo2 since it<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=
=C2=A0 And if it<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up d=
ifferent<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 from the client, the peers will not be able to =
communicate<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (denial of service to legitimate clients).<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequ=
est message<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into the Transcript-Hash if you are &quot;state=
less&quot; and threw<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it in the bin along with ClientHello1?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Mike<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 1. Check out Dowling et al.&#39;s re=
cent analysis. Published a <br>
&gt;&gt; month or<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0so ago, it&#39;s the mo=
st recent proof of security of the full<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake (also include=
s PSK modes):<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044</a><b=
r>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 2. Check out Paterson and van der Me=
rwe&#39;s survey of the body of<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0papers that helped to s=
hape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 myriad<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks against TLS 1.2=
 and below that catalyzed a more<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 proactive<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0design approach for 1.3=
:<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; <a href=3D"https://link.springer.com/chapt=
er/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7</a><br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; If you&#39;re unable to download the secon=
d (2.), the same paper<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 appears<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; in a slightly different form in van der Me=
rwe&#39;s PhD thesis.<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 ap=
pears to be far<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 superior to<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; 1.0-1.2.<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; Best,<br>
&gt;&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 &gt; Chris P.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 16:18:39 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 11:37 AM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
wrote:

> I think we are in agreement.
>
> On 10/6/20 13:12, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > * Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder,
> > process the message using the "parsed" representation, re-encode with
> > DER, check the signature.
>
> I recall that at least one root certificate had a
> SEQUENCE encoded using BER-but-not-DER (?)  Yeah if
> your software re-encoded that, it would no longer
> be the same sequence of bytes.
>
> > Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the
> > parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature
> > will fail.  One may argue that these changes are due to implementation
> > bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.
> > Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:
> >
> > * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
> > when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
> > and check the signature.
>
> This is how I did X.509 verification, though I was
> late to the game and the advice was already there
> to accept a BER-encoded certificate.  Not sure if
> I would have done the DER re-encoding bit if that
> was the current advice at the time since it seems
> like the wrong thing to do, but maybe I would have.
>
> > If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
> > encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
> > extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in the
> > transcript.
>
> I was disappointed to see that the TLS 1.3 spec now
> has a requirement to put one of the ClientHello
> extensions in a specific place (last in the list).
>
> We discussed this at length during the development
> of either TLS 1.2 or one of the extensions (maybe
> renegotiation-info?) and we ultimately came to what
> I believe was the correct decision never to require
> any ordering of the extensions.  Sad to see the
> group capitulated to whomever said it would make
> their software easier to write (which I doubt).
>

Hopefully https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11.2 makes it
clear why the pre_shared_key extension must be at the end of the list.

>
> Mike
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000005e572c05b108d20f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 11:37 AM Micha=
el D&#39;Errico &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike-list@pobox.com">mike-list@pobox.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">I think we are in agreement.<br>
<br>
On 10/6/20 13:12, Christian Huitema wrote:<br>
&gt; * Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decode=
r,<br>
&gt; process the message using the &quot;parsed&quot; representation, re-en=
code with<br>
&gt; DER, check the signature.<br>
<br>
I recall that at least one root certificate had a<br>
SEQUENCE encoded using BER-but-not-DER (?)=C2=A0 Yeah if<br>
your software re-encoded that, it would no longer<br>
be the same sequence of bytes.<br>
<br>
&gt; Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the<=
br>
&gt; parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature<=
br>
&gt; will fail.=C2=A0 One may argue that these changes are due to implement=
ation<br>
&gt; bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.<br=
>
&gt; Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and<=
br>
&gt; when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original messag=
e<br>
&gt; and check the signature.<br>
<br>
This is how I did X.509 verification, though I was<br>
late to the game and the advice was already there<br>
to accept a BER-encoded certificate.=C2=A0 Not sure if<br>
I would have done the DER re-encoding bit if that<br>
was the current advice at the time since it seems<br>
like the wrong thing to do, but maybe I would have.<br>
<br>
&gt; If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length<br>
&gt; encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder<br=
>
&gt; extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in th=
e<br>
&gt; transcript.<br>
<br>
I was disappointed to see that the TLS 1.3 spec now<br>
has a requirement to put one of the ClientHello<br>
extensions in a specific place (last in the list).<br>
<br>
We discussed this at length during the development<br>
of either TLS 1.2 or one of the extensions (maybe<br>
renegotiation-info?) and we ultimately came to what<br>
I believe was the correct decision never to require<br>
any ordering of the extensions.=C2=A0 Sad to see the<br>
group capitulated to whomever said it would make<br>
their software easier to write (which I doubt).<br></blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Hopefully=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#sect=
ion-4.2.11.2">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11.2</a> make=
s it clear why the pre_shared_key extension must be at the end of the list.=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000005e572c05b108d20f--


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Date: Wed, 07 Oct 2020 11:23:48 +1100
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Wed, Oct 7, 2020, at 04:12, Christian Huitema wrote:
> * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
> when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
> and check the signature.

I think that you mean:

receive the message, check the signature, then parse and process if that passes

> If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
> encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
> extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in the
> transcript.

This I agree with.  But cTLS doesn't work that way because the signature - such as it is - applies at the next layer, which appears after the encoding is erased.  And that is important here.  The encoding we're talking about is a compression function only.  Not having a canonical form means adding an inefficiency, but it has little bearing on the process you describe, which would be modified to:

receive the message, decompress the message, check the signature, then parse and process if that passes

In TLS we don't follow that ordering either because we all routinely process tons of stuff before we get to the Finished/CertificateVerify.  Having those at the end makes a ton of sense, for a variety of reasons, but it does mean that we build a protocol on credit.  And we have plenty of experience, I hope, in dealing with bad credit in TLS.


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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 17:33:32 -0700
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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I have no strong opinion on how this is formatted. I'd base my decision on
what the maximum value cTLS needs to encode: If 2^22-1 is sufficient, let's
keep it as is, otherwise let's change it to the QUIC format (or some other
change to increase the max value). I do like that the existing scheme,
compared to QUIC varints, is more efficient for values 64-127 and just as
efficient for the rest.

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 8:09 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> I don't have a strong opinion on whether to require a minimal encoding,
> but if we're not going to use QUIC's encoding as-is, then I would rather
> stick with the existing scheme, which has twice as large a range for the =
1
> byte encoding and is thus more compact for a range of common cases.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> In that case, why use QUIC's encoding at all? It would just put the
>> burden on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.
>> Would it instead make more sense to modify QUIC's encoding, such that th=
e
>> 2-byte encoding doesn't encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, but the numb=
ers
>> from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings?
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the minimum possible lengt=
h=E2=80=9D?
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000002080ce05b109def7
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I have no strong opinion on how this is formatted. I&#39;d=
 base my decision on what the maximum value cTLS needs to encode: If 2^22-1=
 is sufficient, let&#39;s keep it as is, otherwise let&#39;s change it to t=
he QUIC format (or some other change to increase the max value). I do like =
that the existing scheme, compared to QUIC varints, is more efficient for v=
alues 64-127 and just as efficient for the rest.</div><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 8:09=
 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div>I don&#39;t have a strong opinion on whether to require a min=
imal encoding, but if we&#39;re not going to use QUIC&#39;s encoding as-is,=
 then I would rather stick with the existing scheme, which has twice as lar=
ge a range for the 1 byte encoding and is thus more compact for a range of =
common cases.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon,=
 Oct 5, 2020 at 7:31 PM Marten Seemann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martenseemann@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martenseemann@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I=
n that case, why use QUIC&#39;s encoding at all? It would just put the burd=
en on the receiver to check that the minimal encoding was used.</div><div>W=
ould it instead make more sense to modify QUIC&#39;s encoding, such that th=
e 2-byte encoding doesn&#39;t encode the numbers from 0 to 16383, but the n=
umbers from 64 to (16383 + 64), and equivalently for 4 and 8-byte encodings=
?<br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"g=
mail_attr">On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 9:22 AM Salz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Can you just say =E2=80=9CQUIC rules but use the min=
imum possible length=E2=80=9D?<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000002080ce05b109def7--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On 10/6/2020 5:23 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 7, 2020, at 04:12, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
>> when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original messag=
e
>> and check the signature.
> I think that you mean:
>
> receive the message, check the signature, then parse and process if tha=
t passes
You would think that, but the X.509 design meant that the application
would received all its data in parsed form, and then re-serialize the
parts that it needed to check, such as for example certificates. And if
you do that, you must absolutely guarantee that parse and serialize are
bijections between the application representation and the byte
sequences. Which leads to requiring "distinguished encoding rules",
including not just the coding of integers but also ordering of elements
in sets or representations of character strings. And yes, this turned
out to be a really bad idea.
>> If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
>> encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
>> extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in th=
e
>> transcript.
> This I agree with.  But cTLS doesn't work that way because the signatur=
e - such as it is - applies at the next layer, which appears after the en=
coding is erased.  And that is important here.  The encoding we're talkin=
g about is a compression function only.  Not having a canonical form mean=
s adding an inefficiency, but it has little bearing on the process you de=
scribe, which would be modified to:
>
> receive the message, decompress the message, check the signature, then =
parse and process if that passes
>
> In TLS we don't follow that ordering either because we all routinely pr=
ocess tons of stuff before we get to the Finished/CertificateVerify.  Hav=
ing those at the end makes a ton of sense, for a variety of reasons, but =
it does mean that we build a protocol on credit.  And we have plenty of e=
xperience, I hope, in dealing with bad credit in TLS.

Yes. And I do also agree with your statement that *not* requiring
minimal length encoding makes some of the code paths much simpler. I use
that for example to encode the length field of Quic packets.

-- Christian Huitema


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    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/6/2020 5:23 PM, Martin Thomson
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:4227b57b-8d9e-4b20-b17d-4d03730ef0bf@www.fastmail.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">On Wed, Oct 7, 2020, at 04:12, Christian Huitema wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite" style="color: #000000;">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">* Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
and check the signature.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">I think that you mean:

receive the message, check the signature, then parse and process if that passes</pre>
    </blockquote>
    You would think that, but the X.509 design meant that the
    application would received all its data in parsed form, and then
    re-serialize the parts that it needed to check, such as for example
    certificates. And if you do that, you must absolutely guarantee that
    parse and serialize are bijections between the application
    representation and the byte sequences. Which leads to requiring
    "distinguished encoding rules", including not just the coding of
    integers but also ordering of elements in sets or representations of
    character strings. And yes, this turned out to be a really bad idea.
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:4227b57b-8d9e-4b20-b17d-4d03730ef0bf@www.fastmail.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite" style="color: #000000;">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">If we do that, then there is no reason to mandate minimal length
encoding. And TLS already does that. For example, we do not reorder
extensions according to some canonical rules before placing them in the
transcript.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">This I agree with.  But cTLS doesn't work that way because the signature - such as it is - applies at the next layer, which appears after the encoding is erased.  And that is important here.  The encoding we're talking about is a compression function only.  Not having a canonical form means adding an inefficiency, but it has little bearing on the process you describe, which would be modified to:

receive the message, decompress the message, check the signature, then parse and process if that passes

In TLS we don't follow that ordering either because we all routinely process tons of stuff before we get to the Finished/CertificateVerify.  Having those at the end makes a ton of sense, for a variety of reasons, but it does mean that we build a protocol on credit.  And we have plenty of experience, I hope, in dealing with bad credit in TLS.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <p>Yes. And I do also agree with your statement that *not* requiring
      minimal length encoding makes some of the code paths much simpler.
      I use that for example to encode the length field of Quic packets.</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> writes:=0A=0A>Receiver side: receiv=
e the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder,=0A>process the message us=
ing the "parsed" representation, re-encode with DER,=0A>check the signature=
.=0A=0AExcept that no true Scots... uhh, sane person ever even tried that. =
 I've=0Aheard that there was one implementation, done in Europe, but have n=
ever seen=0Ait.  Everyone else just treated what arrived as a blob and went=
 with that.=0AThat's why, years ago, on the PKIX list I said "there is only=
 one encoding=0Arule and that is memcpy()".=0A=0A>Well, we have learned a f=
ew things since 1994.=0A=0AExcept for the people who did secure XML, who no=
t only ignored what we've=0Alearned so far but made it worse by making it a=
ctive content rather than flat=0Abyte strings.=0A=0ABut that seems to be th=
e rule for XML design in any case.=0A=0APeter.=0A


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:
> I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't=20
> really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code=20
> path leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?

I know that it may lead to denial-of-service
for a legitimate client.=C2=A0 That's a big deal, but
I was more worried that there might be a bigger
problem with ECC, and I'm glad to hear that you
and Nick Harper say it's just fine (or at least
that we're no worse off than we are by trusting
ECC in version 1.2).

I'm still very concerned that everything 1.2- and
non-ECC is being thrown in the trash.

To see what I mean about denial of service, a
"stateless" server implemented according to the
way RFC 8446 describes is not going to have the
actual HelloRetryRequest message it sent to the
client.=C2=A0 I don't know what is done to solve this
problem, but apparently a lot of people have
implemented stateless-HRR so they must have done
something to either guess this value, or maybe
their code is not actually stateless.=C2=A0 If they
are guessing the value of HRR based on the 2nd
ClientHello received, and they guess wrong, and
the client puts a different value of HRR in its
own Transcript-Hash, then the handshake will
fail and a legitimate client will be denied
service.

Note that the pseudo code I wrote in the quoted
message below (steps 0 thru 12) does a lot more
than what RFC 8446 implies you should do so that
the server does have access to both the original
ClientHello1 message and the HelloRetryRequest
message.=C2=A0 It seems like a lot of wasted effort
for very little gain (if any, maybe it's worse
in every respect - memory use, processing time,
latency, bandwidth...).

Even then, it's not going to work as well as just
making a "stateful" (non-stateless?) server.

A data center with load-balancing can probably use
their distributed database like this to do a non-
stateless HRR transaction:

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - [disable "TCP Fast Open" so your database
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 doesn't fill up with a bunch of crap]

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - receive ClientHello1

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - ask database for a (long-enough) randomish
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 unpredictable value to be used for a cookie

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - create a HelloRetryRequest message with the
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 cookie and commit ClientHello1 & HelloRetry-
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Request messages to the database using the
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 cookie as the key

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - reply to the client with HelloRetryRequest
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 after the database has finished storing
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the messages and the process can terminate

later....

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - if a new ClientHello arrives containing a
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 cookie, ask the database for ClientHello1
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 and HelloRetryRequest messages which
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 correspond to the cookie key, using an
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 atomic retrieve-and-delete function so the
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 cookie can only be used once

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - if the key isn't in the database, then
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the cookie was fake, or it was already
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 retrieved by another database client (replay
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 prevented), or maybe it was too old and got
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 expunged, so generate an error and close the
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 connection

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 - if the database does return the messages,
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 then you can continue the handshake, make
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 any comparisons between the two ClientHello
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 messages you decide are important, and you
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 also have the actual HelloRetryRequest
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 message that the server sent to the client
 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 which you can put into the Transcript-Hash

[Note: the pseudo code above and in the original
quoted message below may not be complete!]

> I don't think this is likely. One way to think about this problem is=20
> as follows [1]. Given an attacker that exploits the HRR code path, can=20
> you efficiently construct an attacker that exploits a version of the=20
> protocol without the HRR code path implemented? If the answer is=20
> "yes", and if we assume the protocol is secure *without* the HRR code=20
> path implemented (as asserted by a proof of security, say), it must be=20
> case that the protocol is also secure *with* the HRR code path=20
> implemented.

I'm not quite sure I understand this reasoning.
Proof by contradiction?=C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest is a
new message flow not present in any version of
TLS before 1.3.=C2=A0 Sorry if I'm missing something.

I appreciate all of the time you and everybody
else are putting into these issues!

Mike


> Although I haven't studied this problem specifically --- Dowling et=20
> al. appear to address this problem, if only implicitly --- my=20
> intuition is that the answer is "yes". The reason, loosely, is that=20
> the HRR code path doesn't appear to depend on any ephemeral or=20
> long-term secret key material used by the server for the core=20
> handshake. In particular, it doesn't depend on the server's key share=20
> or signing key. This means that the adversary can "simulate" any=20
> computation involving the HRR code path in its head, without=20
> interacting with a real server. This observation ought to yield the=20
> reduction I described above. Perhaps the spec is vague here, but if=20
> you study any one of the high quality implementations that exist=20
> (openSSL, boringSSL, NSS, Go's crypto/tls just to name a few), it=20
> won't be hard to convince yourself that the HRR code path doesn't=20
> depend on secrets used in the core handshake.
>
>
> Chris P.
>
> [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/573
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:47 PM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com=20
> <mailto:mike-list@pobox.com>> wrote:
>
>     On 10/5/20 10:21, Christopher Patton wrote:
>     > A couple pointers for getting started:
>
>     Thank you for providing these links!=C2=A0 I'm going through
>     the first one now and will note that it does not even
>     mention the HelloRetryRequest message.=C2=A0 So while I am
>     confident there has been quite a bit of study of a
>     ClientHello -> ServerHello handshake, there may not
>     have been much study of ClientHello1 -> HelloRetryRequest
>     -> ClientHello2 -> ServerHello handshakes.
>
>     I'm especially concerned about the fact that a "stateless"
>     server does not even remember what the ClientHello1 or
>     HelloRetryRequest messages were when it receives the
>     second ClientHello.=C2=A0 Load-balanced data centers seem to
>     do this based on some of the discussion I've had this
>     week.
>
>     The protocol handles the missing ClientHello1 message by
>     replacing it with hash-of-ClientHello1, but then you're
>     supposed to rely on the client to tell you this value in
>     its ClientHello2.=C2=A0 Even if nothing funny is happening,
>     how is the (stateless) server supposed to put the
>     HelloRetryRequest message in the Transcript-Hash?=C2=A0 Where
>     does it get this value from if it's not also somehow in
>     the "cookie" (which is how the client reminds the server
>     of hash-of-ClientHello1)?
>
>     And how would you put the HelloRetryRequest message into
>     the cookie extension when the cookie itself is a part of
>     the HelloRetryRequest?
>
>     Just trying to imagine the code I'd have to write to do
>     this correctly makes my head spin:
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 0)=C2=A0 [disable "TCP Fast Open" so I don't do lots o=
f
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 processing without knowing the=
re's a routable
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 address associated with the cl=
ient]
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 1)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello1
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 2)=C2=A0 generate HelloRetryRequest message without co=
okie
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 3)=C2=A0 package ClientHello1 and HelloRetryRequest-mi=
nus-
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 cookie into a data structure, encry=
pt + MAC to
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 create a cookie
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 4)=C2=A0 insert the cookie into the HelloRetryRequest,
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 remembering to update the leng=
th of the extensions
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 5)=C2=A0 send HelloRetryRequest (with cookie) to clien=
t
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 6)=C2=A0 erase all memory of what just happened!!!
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 7)=C2=A0 receive ClientHello2
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 8)=C2=A0 ensure it has a cookie extension (well I shou=
ld
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 at least remember the fact tha=
t I already sent a
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 HelloRetryRequest and not be comple=
tely stateless,
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 right?=C2=A0 Otherwise the cli=
ent may be able to send
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 many ClientHelloN's without a cookie)
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 9)=C2=A0 check MAC on the cookie and if it's valid, de=
crypt
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 it to determine the contents o=
f ClientHello1 and
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the HelloRetryRequest (without=
 cookie) messages
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 10) MAKE SURE ClientHello2 is valid according to what
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 was received in ClientHello1 (=
RFC 8446 has a list
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 of things a client is allowed =
to do; I would want
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 to check all of them, so a has=
h of ClientHello1
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is inadequate in my opinion).=C2=
=A0 This seems to be a
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 necessary thing to do even for=
 stateful servers.
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 11) Recreate the actual HelloRetryRequest message
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 that was sent to the client by=
 putting the cookie
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 into HRR-minus-cookie (in the =
same place within
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the list of extensions as was =
already done in step
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 4, but since we threw it away,=
 do it again)
>
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 12) Hash the ClientHello1 and add this hash to the
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Transcript-Hash along with the=
 HelloRetryRequest
>     =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 message
>
>     And I didn't even handle the possibility of replay.........
>
>     Can a cryptographer (I don't claim to be one) please take a
>     few moments to look at the possibilities for a server which
>     doesn't implement step 8 and allows multiple ClientHello's
>     without a cookie on the same connection?=C2=A0 Or a server that
>     doesn't put the entire ClientHello1 into the cookie and can
>     not check whether ClientHello2 is conformant to the list of
>     allowed changes?=C2=A0 Or a server that has to maybe "guess" the
>     content of HelloRetryRequest based on ClientHello2 since it
>     just sent hash-of-ClientHello1 in the cookie?=C2=A0 And if it
>     guesses wrong and the Transcript-Hash ends up different
>     from the client, the peers will not be able to communicate
>     (denial of service to legitimate clients).
>
>     Implementers -- how do you put a HelloRetryRequest message
>     into the Transcript-Hash if you are "stateless" and threw
>     it in the bin along with ClientHello1?
>
>     Mike
>
>
>     >=C2=A0 1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a =
month or
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0so ago, it's the most recent proof of security=
 of the full
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake (also includes PSK modes):
>     https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
>     >=C2=A0 2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the bod=
y of
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0papers that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also o=
verviews the
>     myriad
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks against TLS 1.2 and below that catalyz=
ed a more
>     proactive
>     >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0design approach for 1.3:
>     > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7
>     >
>     > If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper
>     appears
>     > in a slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.
>     >
>     > No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far
>     superior to
>     > 1.0-1.2.
>     >
>     > Best,
>     > Chris P.
>


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Subject: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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Reviewer: Brian Carpenter
Review result: Ready with Issues

Gen-ART Last Call review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
Reviewer: Brian Carpenter
Review Date: 2020-10-07
IETF LC End Date: 2020-10-15
IESG Telechat date:  

Summary: Ready with issues
--------

Issues:
-------

>1.  Introduction
>
>    Applications SHOULD provision separate PSKs for TLS 1.3 and prior
>    versions when possible.

I think that "when possible" could easily be used as a loophole by a
lazy implementer. ("Impossible, because I'd have to refactor my code.")
Since presumably this rule is to avoid all risk of a "related output"
cryptanalytic vulnerability, why weaken the RFC2119 definition of SHOULD?
The formal definition of SHOULD is stronger, with "the full implications
must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different
course." So I suggest simply deleting "when possible".

>6.  Incremental Deployment
>
>   Recall that TLS 1.2 permits computing the TLS PRF with any hash
>   algorithm and PSK.  Thus, an EPSK may be used with the same KDF (and
>   underlying HMAC hash algorithm) as TLS 1.3 with importers.  However,
>   critically, the derived PSK will not be the same since the importer
>   differentiates the PSK via the identity and target KDF and protocol.
>   Thus, PSKs imported for TLS 1.3 are distinct from those used in TLS
>   1.2, and thereby avoid cross-protocol collisions.  Note that this
>   does not preclude endpoints from using non-imported PSKs for TLS 1.2.
>   Indeed, this is necessary for incremental deployment.

I read this three times and I have to ask whether "TLS 1.2" is
really what you want in the penultimate line.

Nits:
-----

>4.1.  External PSK Diversification
...
>   ImportedIdentity.target_protocol MUST be the (D)TLS protocol version
>   for which the PSK is being imported.  For example, TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]
>   and QUICv1 [QUIC] use 0x0304. 

As far as I can tell, [QUIC] doesn't specify this, but draft-ietf-quic-tls
does specify that QUICv1 uses TLS1.3. So the phrasing is a bit misleading.
Maybe:

  For example, TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] uses 0x0304, which will therefore also be
  used by QUICv1 [QUIC-TLS]. 

Are all the RFC2119 terms capitalised when required? For example, there
are lower case 'may' and 'must' in the last paragraph of section 4.1
(External PSK Diversification). I couldn't determine whether they were
intended to be normative.





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To: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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On 10/6/20 19:11, Nick Harper wrote:
> I conclude that if this leads to some vulnerability, this implies the 
> ECDHE algorithm (or its implementation), not the TLS handshake, is flawed.

Thank you for the analysis!

Mike


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Just want to clarify what I meant by "It" below
where I said, "It seems like a lot of wasted effort
for very little gain"

"It" refers to "stateless HRR", not the pseudo
code I wrote.=C2=A0 Even though I proof read the whole
message several times I missed this...

Mike


On 10/6/20 22:13, I wrote:
> [....]
>
> Note that the pseudo code I wrote in the quoted
> message below (steps 0 thru 12) does a lot more
> than what RFC 8446 implies you should do so that
> the server does have access to both the original
> ClientHello1 message and the HelloRetryRequest
> message.=C2=A0 It seems like a lot of wasted effort
> for very little gain (if any, maybe it's worse
> in every respect - memory use, processing time,
> latency, bandwidth...).


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 21:30:43 -0700
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 10:13 AM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
>
> On 10/6/2020 10:00 AM, Michael D'Errico wrote:
>
> > It matters in X.509 certificates because the basic
> > encoding rules (BER) allow you to specify the same
> > thing in different ways.  With DER, there is only
> > one way to encode every element, so everybody will
> > come up with the same string of bytes and hashes of
> > those strings will be the same, signatures will
> > verify, etc.
>
>
> Well, we have learned a few things since 1994. The DER rules are defined
> to allow a "re-encoding" workflow:
>
> * Sender side: prepare the message, encode with DER, sign the result
>
> * Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder,
> process the message using the "parsed" representation, re-encode with
> DER, check the signature.
>
> Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the
> parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature
> will fail.  One may argue that these changes are due to implementation
> bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.
> Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:
>
> * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
> when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
> and check the signature.

Examining signed data ahead of verification, particularly to determine
what should have signed it, is fraught with issues. In particular
parser errors that would only be exploitable by trusted parties become
exploitable by anyone. Furthermore, you should know the expected
signer ahead of time. That this isn't possible in X509 due to
inordinate flexibility is one of many pitfalls for implementors. This
sort of issue periodically leads to authentication bypasses and other
such fun.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd



--
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim


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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On 10/6/20 10:28, I wrote:
> ASN.1 is actually pretty cool ....

My favorite sentence in any RFC is:

 =C2=A0=C2=A0 In ASN.1, EXPLICIT tagging is implicit
 =C2=A0=C2=A0 unless IMPLICIT is explicitly specified.

(Not brown-nosing....)

Mike


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From: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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To: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 21:14:33 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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On 2020-10-07 19:47, Mohit Sethi M wrote:
> A strong +1 on the security issues of decode -> extract -> re-encode ->
> verify signature flow. The lack of canonical encoding can also mean that
> the resulting bytes can be different in different encoder/decoder
> implementations.
> 
> It would have been nice to have canonical JSON. Some implementations
> support it with flags such as "JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER"
> (https://jansson.readthedocs.io/en/2.8/apiref.html). Some specs try to
> specify things like keys should be in alphabetical order but fail to
> realize the complication with nested structures.

Hi Mohit,

Since a few months back there is an RFC (8785) which specifies a
scheme for canonicalizing JSON, albeit limited to the JSON subset
supported by ECMAScript and browsers.

It can be tested in an on-line application where it is combined with
JWS: https://mobilepki.org/jws-jcs/home

Anders

> 
> CBOR has thankfully specified canonical representation (called as
> deterministic encoding in 7049bis). Some CBOR libraries have added
> support: https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/issues/6.
> 
> --Mohit
> 
> On 10/7/20 7:30 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 10:13 AM Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
>>> On 10/6/2020 10:00 AM, Michael D'Errico wrote:
>>>
>>>> It matters in X.509 certificates because the basic
>>>> encoding rules (BER) allow you to specify the same
>>>> thing in different ways.  With DER, there is only
>>>> one way to encode every element, so everybody will
>>>> come up with the same string of bytes and hashes of
>>>> those strings will be the same, signatures will
>>>> verify, etc.
>>>
>>> Well, we have learned a few things since 1994. The DER rules are defined
>>> to allow a "re-encoding" workflow:
>>>
>>> * Sender side: prepare the message, encode with DER, sign the result
>>>
>>> * Receiver side: receive the message, parser with generic ASN.1 decoder,
>>> process the message using the "parsed" representation, re-encode with
>>> DER, check the signature.
>>>
>>> Experience showed that this workflow is very problematic, because the
>>> parse/reencode process may introduce subtle changes and the signature
>>> will fail.  One may argue that these changes are due to implementation
>>> bugs, but fact it that this is a rich environment for growing bugs.
>>> Based on experience, the receiver side is better done as:
>>>
>>> * Receiver side: receive the message, save it, parse and process, and
>>> when it is time to verify the signature go back to the original message
>>> and check the signature.
>> Examining signed data ahead of verification, particularly to determine
>> what should have signed it, is fraught with issues. In particular
>> parser errors that would only be exploitable by trusted parties become
>> exploitable by anyone. Furthermore, you should know the expected
>> signer ahead of time. That this isn't possible in X509 due to
>> inordinate flexibility is one of many pitfalls for implementors. This
>> sort of issue periodically leads to authentication bypasses and other
>> such fun.
> A strong +1 to this.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> Watson Ladd
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 


From nobody Wed Oct  7 12:20:32 2020
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Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 22:20:24 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 10:13:19PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> On 10/5/20 22:00, Christopher Patton wrote:
> > I agree that the HRR code path is hard to reason about, but I don't
> > really see an attack here. Is it your contention that the HRR code path
> > leads to an attack not accounted for by existing proofs?
> 
> I know that it may lead to denial-of-service
> for a legitimate client.  That's a big deal, but
> I was more worried that there might be a bigger
> problem with ECC, and I'm glad to hear that you
> and Nick Harper say it's just fine (or at least
> that we're no worse off than we are by trusting
> ECC in version 1.2).

If implemented properly, it will never lead to denying a legimate
client.
 
> I'm still very concerned that everything 1.2- and
> non-ECC is being thrown in the trash.

Because actually proving security of any practical cryptography is far
beyond current capabilities of open cryptography, the way security of
crypto is judged today is from attempts to break it.

ECC has been subject to this for ~35 years, and natural prime curves
(which include P-256, P-384, P-521, Curve25519 and Curve448) are second
to none in how well those have fared.

RSA and finite-field discete-logs have fared MUCH worse in ~45 years.

And there is no tradeoff between security and performance: Using ECC
instead of RSA/DH gives massive performance improvement.

This is not to say there will not be major challenges in future: If
large quantum computers can be built, ECC is toast (along with lots
of other stuff), and one needs new crypto, which is a necressarily a lot
less secure.


And regarding TLS 1.2, it is a mess:

- There is an extension to prevent attacks from having server confuse
  initial handshake and renegotiation.
- There is an extension to prevent attacks from failing to include
  exchange keys into master secret.
- Diffie-Hellman group negotiation is completely broken. To prevent
  attacks, clients must either disable DHE or tolerate handshakes with
  some servers failing.
- Signatures fail to include handshake type. The endpoints can disagree
  about handshake type, leading to attacks.
- Session ticket mechanism is pretty totally insecure.
- Static RSA uses insecure encryption (and is not forward-secure).
- Blockmodes use mac-then-pad, leading to timing attacks. There is
  extension to fix this, but pretty much nobody implements it.
- The MTI ciphersuite is insecure.
- You think EXPORT and single-DES have gone the way of dodo, >20
  years after being proven completely insecure? Unfortunately no.
- Limited extensibilty due to middlebox threat.
- Adding post-quantum cryptography is not feasible.

It is in practice impossible to implement TLS 1.2 securely. The best
one can do is some approximation with multiple unimplemented features
that is approximately secure.

Then there are non-security issues with TLS 1.2. Like ciphersuite
negotiation being petty much impossible to implement correctly due
to coupling between encryption and certificates.

> To see what I mean about denial of service, a
> "stateless" server implemented according to the
> way RFC 8446 describes is not going to have the
> actual HelloRetryRequest message it sent to the
> client.  I don't know what is done to solve this
> problem, but apparently a lot of people have
> implemented stateless-HRR so they must have done
> something to either guess this value, or maybe
> their code is not actually stateless.  If they
> are guessing the value of HRR based on the 2nd
> ClientHello received, and they guess wrong, and
> the client puts a different value of HRR in its
> own Transcript-Hash, then the handshake will
> fail and a legitimate client will be denied
> service.

Have function cookie_to_hrr(c,cs,grp) that turns a cookie c into
HRR message, and is pure function of the cookie.

Then:

Without cookie:

1) Receive ClientHello without cookie.

2) Figure out ciphersuite cs and group grp to use.

3) Compute invariant partial hash of Client Hello.

4) Serialize state, including full client hello hash, cs and grp in
   cookie (no need to include the invariant hash).

5) Use MAC to authenticate the cookie, including the invariant hash.
   
   OR

   Use MRAE to encrypt and authenticate cookie, including the invariant
   hash in associated data.

6) Use cookie_to_hrr(c,cs,grp), send result to client and abort.


With cookie:

1) Receive ClientHello with cookie.

2) Compute invariant partial hash of Client Hello.

3) Authenticate the cookie, and decrypt it if it is encrypted. If
   authentication fails, abort. Important: There is an attack if
   this is not done!

4) Read full client hello hash, cs and grp from cookie.

5) Inject client hello hash to transcript.

6) Use cookie_to_hrr(c,cs,grp), and inject result to transcript.

7) Add inject second client hello to transcript.

8) Figure out other connection parameters besides ciphersuite and
   group, and continue handshake.


This can be proven to always work.


-Ilari


From nobody Wed Oct  7 12:57:29 2020
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From: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>
To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman with a generator
of 2 is probably not the best choice.  Unfortunately
all of the published primes (RFCs 2409, 3526, and
7919) use 2 for the generator.  Any other generator
would likely be (not sure how much?) more secure.

The problem is that 2^X consists of a single bit of
value 1 followed by a huge string of zeros.  When
you then reduce this modulo a large prime number,
there will be a pattern in the bits which may help
an attacker discern the value of X.  This is further
helped by the fact that all of the published primes
have 64 bits of 1 in the topmost and bottom-most bits.
In addition, the larger published primes are very
similar to the shorter ones, the shorter ones closely
matching truncated versions of the larger primes.

If you were to manually perform the modulo-P operation
yourself, you would add enough zeros to the end of P
until the topmost bit is just to the right of the 1
bit from 2^X, and then you'd subtract.  This bit
pattern will always be the same, no matter the value
of X.  In particular, the top 64 bits disappear since
they're all one.  Continuing the mod-P operation, you
adjust the number of zeros after the prime P and then
subtract again, reducing the size of the operand.  The
pattern of bits again will be the same, regardless of
the value of X, the only difference being the number
of trailing zeros.

I have not looked at the cyclic patterns which happen
as you do this, but I wouldn't be surprised to find
that the "new" primes based on e (RFC 7919) have
easier-to-spot bit patterns than those based on pi.

This is speculation of course.

Should we define some new DH parameters which use a
different generator?  Maybe the primes are fine....

Mike


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Michael D'Errico
> Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2020 1:54 PM
> To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
>=20
> Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman with a generator of 2 is probably not t=
he best
> choice.  Unfortunately all of the published primes (RFCs 2409, 3526, and
> 7919) use 2 for the generator.  Any other generator would likely be (not =
sure
> how much?) more secure.

No, that is known to be not true.

In particular, if you can compute discrete logs to the base 2, you can comp=
ute discrete logs to any base (except in the cases where 2 generates an ano=
malously small subgroup, which is not the case in the above groups).

Here's how it works; suppose you were given the problem of solving the disc=
rete log problem g^x =3D h, for some g, h.  Then, if you can solve discrete=
 logs to base 2, you would solve these two problems:

2^y =3D g
2^z =3D h

Once you have solved those two problems, then you have x =3D y z^-1 mod p-1=
.

It's a little more complex if g, h is not in the subgroup that 2 generates,=
 but not that much more (unless, as above, the size of that subgroup is far=
 smaller than p-1).

>=20
> The problem is that 2^X consists of a single bit of value 1 followed by a=
 huge
> string of zeros.  When you then reduce this modulo a large prime number,
> there will be a pattern in the bits which may help an attacker discern th=
e
> value of X.  This is further helped by the fact that all of the published=
 primes
> have 64 bits of 1 in the topmost and bottom-most bits.
> In addition, the larger published primes are very similar to the shorter =
ones,
> the shorter ones closely matching truncated versions of the larger primes=
.
>=20
> If you were to manually perform the modulo-P operation yourself, you
> would add enough zeros to the end of P until the topmost bit is just to t=
he
> right of the 1 bit from 2^X, and then you'd subtract.  This bit pattern w=
ill
> always be the same, no matter the value of X.  In particular, the top 64 =
bits
> disappear since they're all one.  Continuing the mod-P operation, you adj=
ust
> the number of zeros after the prime P and then subtract again, reducing t=
he
> size of the operand.  The pattern of bits again will be the same, regardl=
ess of
> the value of X, the only difference being the number of trailing zeros.

Actually, for these group, the value of 2^x mod p can take on (p-1)/2 diffe=
rent values; there is no chance that the bit pattern will be trapped in som=
e cul-de-sac, as you appear to be suggesting...

>=20
> I have not looked at the cyclic patterns which happen as you do this, but=
 I
> wouldn't be surprised to find that the "new" primes based on e (RFC 7919)
> have easier-to-spot bit patterns than those based on pi.

I would be surprised; do you have some reason that would suggest why bits d=
erived from the binary expansion of 'e' would be somehow qualitatively diff=
erent from bits derived from the binary expansion of 'pi'?

>=20
> This is speculation of course.

Might I suggest you learn a bit of number theory to go along with your spec=
ulation?

>=20
> Should we define some new DH parameters which use a different
> generator?  Maybe the primes are fine....

If the prime is fine, so is the generator...


From nobody Thu Oct  8 16:35:06 2020
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Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 16:34:54 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Hi Achim,

Sorry for the long silence on this front; my attention had cycled elsewhere
and I was just overall operating slowly for a couple weeks (sick, maybe,
but no clear symptoms).

My primary concern is not actually about a specific situation where
injection occurs, but rather for cryptographic hygiene -- whenever we
assemble an input for a cryptographic operation (especially MAC or signing)
it is important to ensure that the sequence of bits used as input to the
cryptographic operation can only be produced by a single combination of
logical inputs to the protocol-level operation or message that we are
applying cryptographic protection to.  This property is known as
"injectivity", because the map from protocol-level values to bitstrings
(themselves used as input for cryptographic operations) is an injective
mapping in the mathematical sense.  I believe that I have demonstrated that
the current MAC construction does not use an injective mapping and is thus
not consistent with best practices.

However, in particular...

On Sun, Oct 04, 2020 at 04:35:49PM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> any progress on the cid-length / calculate MAC topic?
> 
> As I wrote, though the cid-length itself is not "on the wire" (it's only
> the cid), I can't see, that the cid-length could be injected.
> Do I oversee soemthing?
> 
> best regrads
> Achim Kraus
> 
> -------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------
> Betreff: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
> Datum: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 08:31:19 +0200
> Von: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
> An: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Kopie (CC): draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
> 
> Hi Ben,
> 
> ...
> 
> >>>
> >>> The TLS 1.2 notation is "seq_num" for the implicit sequence number, but
> >>> DTLS 1.2 says that the MAC input is the concatenation of the DTLS epoch
> >>> and the DTLS (explicit) sequence number.  I do not see this
> >>> concatenation given the name "seq_num" anywhere, so I think we need to
> >>> reformulate this expression.
> >>>
> >>>              cid +
> >>>              cid_length +
> >>>
> >>> Does this construction preserve injectivity?  It seems easier to reason
> >>> about when the length of an element is always before or always after the
> >>> element itself, but we put the length first for some of the other
> >>> fields (that appear after these) so there seems to be some malleability.
> >>
> >> That order was also discussed a lot.
> >> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
> >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!
> >
> > Thanks for the pointer!
> > I am not sure that the specific question about injectivity was raised
> > there, though.  (The topic of whether "seq_num" includes epoch was raised
> > but I did not see a clear resolution on my first reading, just
> > https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246152379)
> >
> > Specifically, the question of "injectivity" is referring to a scenario
> > where I can use different actual values for (cid, cid_length,
> > length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext, etc.) but have a collision in the constructed
> >
> > cid + cid_length + length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + ...
> >
> > (Hmm, we should probably say that length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext is a 2-byte
> > field...)
> >
> > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
> >
> > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> >
> > could be cid_length=1, cid=0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0202,
> > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
> > cid_length=2, cis=0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0201,
> > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = <513 bytes>.  The possibility of such a
> > collision weakens the cryptographic protection and should be avoided.
> >
> 
> If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble with
> their deployments!

I'm not sure I follow.  Are you saying that if there is a theoretical
problem with the construction it would have been exposed by implementation
testing?

> The cid length is not on the wire, so on the wire is (cid 01 01)
> 
> > 01 01 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> 
> Therefore I don't understand, WHO will inject something, which is not on
> the wire. For me that would only be the peer's implementation, which
> extracts it's "own" CID wrong, or a "spoofed CID" (maybe that's the time
> to read my proposal about a CID Authentication Code, issue #74.). But
> with the wrong CID, the wrong keys would be selected and the MAC will
> fail anyway. So, I can't see that collision.

Consider the MAC-then-Encrypt case.  We *know* that there are devices in
the field that get TLS encryption but not MAC keys for use in monitoring
situations (e.g., enterprises subject to particular compliance regimes).
So it is perfectly reasonable to consider a case where a third party has
encryption keys but not MAC keys, and is not expected to have the
capability to modify the plaintext of the stream.  However, having stripped
the encryption by using the keys that they already possess, it is possible
to move a byte (or in general, multiple bytes) between the cid field in the
outer portion of the record and the inner plaintext, without modifying the
MAC value.  Encryption can be reapplied, again using the already-known
keys, and the stream as received by the other TLS peer is modified,
breaking the principle that the party not knowing the MAC key should not be
able to modify the plaintext.

(I am not entirely convinced that encrypt-then-mac is intrinsically immune,
though a successful attack would seem to require knowledge of the
underlying structure of the plaintext even if the specific content is not
known.)

-Ben


From nobody Thu Oct  8 16:41:20 2020
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Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 16:41:10 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Achim,

Sorry again for the delayed response.  (Inline.)

On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 09:59:55AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> 
> Am 16.09.20 um 08:31 schrieb Achim Kraus:
> > Hi Ben,
> >
> >>>
> >>> If I did't get it, it may be easier to discus this as issue in the
> >>> github repo.
> >>
> >> I think you got it; I am just failing to remember where the "MUST anyway
> >> use new handshakes" requirement comes in from.  And I guess that also
> >> raises the question of what the expected behavior is when a server
> >> expects
> >> CID-ful traffic on a given 5-tuple and receives an (unencrypted)
> >> ClientHello on that 5-tuple.
> >>
> >
> > "when a server expects CID-ful traffic on a given 5-tuple"
> >
> > I'm not sure, why that should happen. If CID is used, the server should
> > not expect a given 5-tuple (at least not longer than a few seconds).
> > If a new CLIENT_HELLO arrives, it's first challenge it with a
> > HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST. If that verification succeeds and a "old 5-tuple
> > of a previous CID message" is hit, then just mark/remove the 5-tuple of
> > that CID association. That mainly means, you will not be able to reach
> > the CID peer with that 5-tuple. That's anyway extremely common to lose
> > the ip-route to such CID peers, otherwise CID would not be required.
> >
> 
> Let me add:
> 
> - If the scenario uses "dynamic 5-tuples, with CID or without" and
> "static 5-tuples without CID",
> - then an attack, with the spoofed 5-tuple (out of that static-5-tuple"
> pool) and CID (described in
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/64), may disrupt the
> communication to such a static-5-tuple without CID.

Yes, I think this is the disruption I was pondering.

> Even then, that "static-5-tuple" peers must be anyway aware, that
> sometimes new handshakes are required. So that scenario may also depend
> more on the volume of such attacks, than just on the pure possibility.

It does seem like a pretty rare/difficult attack, unlikely to be worth the
trouble.  But perhaps it is still worht documenting as a property of the
protocol ...

> In my experience, such "static-5-tuples" are rare and I would guess,
> they will benefit from different handling also for other reasons.
> Therefore I would just spend them an separate endpoint to separate their
> traffic.

... especially when we can give this recommendation as a workaround.
(Actually, is it generally a good idea to try to steer CID-ful and CID-less
traffic to different endpoints?)

Thanks,

Ben


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Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2020 22:20:03 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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> This is speculation of course.

I retract this part of my message due to
the fact that the format of the primes in
the recent spec is the same as the format
going back to the original MODP primes.

Mike


From nobody Thu Oct  8 22:56:14 2020
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <0da9b525-ec78-bef5-6ceb-5f377019ade4@gmx.net> <4ca7c2f9-1e9d-0d16-0089-649f013b4565@gmx.net> <20201008233454.GF89563@kduck.mit.edu>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 07:56:00 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

 >> If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble wi=
th
 >> their deployments!
 >
 > I'm not sure I follow.  Are you saying that if there is a theoretical
 > problem with the construction it would have been exposed by
implementation
 > testing?

No, I don't say that.
"Early adopters" means, there people using
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 in real world systems with that
current definiton of the MAC. If that MAC calculation is changed, then
they need to adapt their deployments in the field, which is not too easy
(and potential dangerous). Sure, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 is
still only a draft and could be changed. But not without trouble for
those "early adopters".

 > My primary concern is not actually about a specific situation where
 > injection occurs, but rather for cryptographic hygiene -- whenever we
 > assemble an input for a cryptographic operation (especially MAC or
signing)
 > it is important to ensure that the sequence of bits used as input to th=
e
 > cryptographic operation can only be produced by a single combination of
 > logical inputs to the protocol-level operation or message that we are
 > applying cryptographic protection to.  This property is known as
 > "injectivity", because the map from protocol-level values to bitstrings
 > (themselves used as input for cryptographic operations) is an injective
 > mapping in the mathematical sense.  I believe that I have
demonstrated that
 > the current MAC construction does not use an injective mapping and is
thus
 > not consistent with best practices.

*** protocol-level operation or message ***

I understood your example in your previous mail.
I tried to explain, that the data of your example, especially the
cid-length, is not in the message. Please, find the time to check that
current record defintion! There the CID is encoded in the protocols
tls-cid-records without the explicit CID length.

With that, I can't see the posssiblity to inject the cid-length.
It's simply not "in" and so can't be "injected".

best regards
Achim Kraus

Am 09.10.20 um 01:34 schrieb Benjamin Kaduk:
> Hi Achim,
>
> Sorry for the long silence on this front; my attention had cycled elsewh=
ere
> and I was just overall operating slowly for a couple weeks (sick, maybe,
> but no clear symptoms).
>
> My primary concern is not actually about a specific situation where
> injection occurs, but rather for cryptographic hygiene -- whenever we
> assemble an input for a cryptographic operation (especially MAC or signi=
ng)
> it is important to ensure that the sequence of bits used as input to the
> cryptographic operation can only be produced by a single combination of
> logical inputs to the protocol-level operation or message that we are
> applying cryptographic protection to.  This property is known as
> "injectivity", because the map from protocol-level values to bitstrings
> (themselves used as input for cryptographic operations) is an injective
> mapping in the mathematical sense.  I believe that I have demonstrated t=
hat
> the current MAC construction does not use an injective mapping and is th=
us
> not consistent with best practices.
>
> However, in particular...
>
> On Sun, Oct 04, 2020 at 04:35:49PM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
>> Hi Ben,
>>
>> any progress on the cid-length / calculate MAC topic?
>>
>> As I wrote, though the cid-length itself is not "on the wire" (it's onl=
y
>> the cid), I can't see, that the cid-length could be injected.
>> Do I oversee soemthing?
>>
>> best regrads
>> Achim Kraus
>>
>> -------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------
>> Betreff: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
>> Datum: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 08:31:19 +0200
>> Von: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
>> An: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
>> Kopie (CC): draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
>>
>> Hi Ben,
>>
>> ...
>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The TLS 1.2 notation is "seq_num" for the implicit sequence number, =
but
>>>>> DTLS 1.2 says that the MAC input is the concatenation of the DTLS ep=
och
>>>>> and the DTLS (explicit) sequence number.  I do not see this
>>>>> concatenation given the name "seq_num" anywhere, so I think we need =
to
>>>>> reformulate this expression.
>>>>>
>>>>>               cid +
>>>>>               cid_length +
>>>>>
>>>>> Does this construction preserve injectivity?  It seems easier to rea=
son
>>>>> about when the length of an element is always before or always after=
 the
>>>>> element itself, but we put the length first for some of the other
>>>>> fields (that appear after these) so there seems to be some malleabil=
ity.
>>>>
>>>> That order was also discussed a lot.
>>>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
>>>> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments=
!
>>>
>>> Thanks for the pointer!
>>> I am not sure that the specific question about injectivity was raised
>>> there, though.  (The topic of whether "seq_num" includes epoch was rai=
sed
>>> but I did not see a clear resolution on my first reading, just
>>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246152379)
>>>
>>> Specifically, the question of "injectivity" is referring to a scenario
>>> where I can use different actual values for (cid, cid_length,
>>> length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext, etc.) but have a collision in the constr=
ucted
>>>
>>> cid + cid_length + length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + ...
>>>
>>> (Hmm, we should probably say that length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext is a 2-=
byte
>>> field...)
>>>
>>> Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
>>>
>>> 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
>>>
>>> could be cid_length=3D1, cid=3D0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x=
0202,
>>> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
>>> cid_length=3D2, cis=3D0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0201,
>>> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D <513 bytes>.  The possibility of such a
>>> collision weakens the cryptographic protection and should be avoided.
>>>
>>
>> If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble wit=
h
>> their deployments!
>
> I'm not sure I follow.  Are you saying that if there is a theoretical
> problem with the construction it would have been exposed by implementati=
on
> testing?
>
>> The cid length is not on the wire, so on the wire is (cid 01 01)
>>
>>> 01 01 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
>>
>> Therefore I don't understand, WHO will inject something, which is not o=
n
>> the wire. For me that would only be the peer's implementation, which
>> extracts it's "own" CID wrong, or a "spoofed CID" (maybe that's the tim=
e
>> to read my proposal about a CID Authentication Code, issue #74.). But
>> with the wrong CID, the wrong keys would be selected and the MAC will
>> fail anyway. So, I can't see that collision.
>
> Consider the MAC-then-Encrypt case.  We *know* that there are devices in
> the field that get TLS encryption but not MAC keys for use in monitoring
> situations (e.g., enterprises subject to particular compliance regimes).
> So it is perfectly reasonable to consider a case where a third party has
> encryption keys but not MAC keys, and is not expected to have the
> capability to modify the plaintext of the stream.  However, having strip=
ped
> the encryption by using the keys that they already possess, it is possib=
le
> to move a byte (or in general, multiple bytes) between the cid field in =
the
> outer portion of the record and the inner plaintext, without modifying t=
he
> MAC value.  Encryption can be reapplied, again using the already-known
> keys, and the stream as received by the other TLS peer is modified,
> breaking the principle that the party not knowing the MAC key should not=
 be
> able to modify the plaintext.
>
> (I am not entirely convinced that encrypt-then-mac is intrinsically immu=
ne,
> though a successful attack would seem to require knowledge of the
> underlying structure of the plaintext even if the specific content is no=
t
> known.)
>
> -Ben
>


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
References: <20200903230228.GQ16914@kduck.mit.edu> <0723ab09-7c47-400b-6e93-1b0ae34242fd@gmx.net> <20200915192644.GV89563@kduck.mit.edu> <0da9b525-ec78-bef5-6ceb-5f377019ade4@gmx.net> <06e2f9db-7c7c-f594-b236-e307d52bc07b@gmx.net> <20201008234110.GG89563@kduck.mit.edu>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 08:19:11 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

>> Let me add:
>>
>> - If the scenario uses "dynamic 5-tuples, with CID or without" and
>> "static 5-tuples without CID",
>> - then an attack, with the spoofed 5-tuple (out of that static-5-tuple"
>> pool) and CID (described in
>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/64), may disrupt the
>> communication to such a static-5-tuple without CID.
>
> Yes, I think this is the disruption I was pondering.
>
>> Even then, that "static-5-tuple" peers must be anyway aware, that
>> sometimes new handshakes are required. So that scenario may also depend
>> more on the volume of such attacks, than just on the pure possibility.
>
> It does seem like a pretty rare/difficult attack, unlikely to be worth t=
he
> trouble.  But perhaps it is still worht documenting as a property of the
> protocol ...
>

The point from my side was, that anyway, with or without that attack,
even clients with static-5-tuples must take care of their "encryption
association". If the client expects responses but didn't get them, then
a new handshake may be required. So, I'm not sure, if explicitly mention
that, really changes the game.

>> In my experience, such "static-5-tuples" are rare and I would guess,
>> they will benefit from different handling also for other reasons.
>> Therefore I would just spend them an separate endpoint to separate thei=
r
>> traffic.
>
> ... especially when we can give this recommendation as a workaround.
> (Actually, is it generally a good idea to try to steer CID-ful and CID-l=
ess
> traffic to different endpoints?)
>

If it's possible to use different endpoints, I think so.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2020 08:35:45 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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I have not written any code, but have just been thinking
about what is going on and I am pretty sure that the
bottom 64 bits of 2^X mod P tell you information which
can help you determine X.  The top bits are also suspect
but I haven't worried about those yet.  My original
message below explains which primes I'm talking about.

They all have a solid block of 64 bits with value one in
both the uppermost and bottom-most bit positions.
This construction seems to make the primes a very bad
choice for use with a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

If you think about how a modulo operation takes place
(the long way, one bit position at a time), you compare
the operand to (a shifted version of) P and if it's bigger
you subtract P and shift P one bit to the right.  If the
operand is not bigger than P, you just shift P one bit to
the right without doing a subtraction.

Due to the construction of all of the primes in the RFCs
cited below, you will get a trace of this in the bottom
64 bits.  There will be a one whenever a subtraction
occurred and a zero otherwise.  This is because if you
calculate the two's complement of the prime (followed
by a bunch of zeros), there will be a lone 1 preceded by
at least 63 zeros.  Instead of subtracting, you can add
this two's complement number, so a 1 will be placed
wherever a subtraction happened or a 0 if there was
no subtraction.

I've not worked out how to use these 64 bits to then
reconstruct X, but this seems like it was purposeful
so I'm fairly certain it reduces the complexity of
determining X from 2^X mod P.  (In fact, there may
be a use for more than just 64 of the bottom bits.)

A private discussion I had seems to indicate that these
particular primes would be bad even with a different
generator (because number theory).  I am hopeful
that it's possible to construct better primes which are
more secure than these (even using a generator of 2)
for use with Diffie-Hellman.

Mike


On Thu, Oct 8, 2020, at 13:54, I wrote:
> Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman with a generator
> of 2 is probably not the best choice.  Unfortunately
> all of the published primes (RFCs 2409, 3526, and
> 7919) use 2 for the generator.  Any other generator
> would likely be (not sure how much?) more secure.
> 
> The problem is that 2^X consists of a single bit of
> value 1 followed by a huge string of zeros.  When
> you then reduce this modulo a large prime number,
> there will be a pattern in the bits which may help
> an attacker discern the value of X.  This is further
> helped by the fact that all of the published primes
> have 64 bits of 1 in the topmost and bottom-most bits.
> In addition, the larger published primes are very
> similar to the shorter ones, the shorter ones closely
> matching truncated versions of the larger primes.
> 
> If you were to manually perform the modulo-P operation
> yourself, you would add enough zeros to the end of P
> until the topmost bit is just to the right of the 1
> bit from 2^X, and then you'd subtract.  This bit
> pattern will always be the same, no matter the value
> of X.  In particular, the top 64 bits disappear since
> they're all one.  Continuing the mod-P operation, you
> adjust the number of zeros after the prime P and then
> subtract again, reducing the size of the operand.  The
> pattern of bits again will be the same, regardless of
> the value of X, the only difference being the number
> of trailing zeros.
> 
> I have not looked at the cyclic patterns which happen
> as you do this, but I wouldn't be surprised to find
> that the "new" primes based on e (RFC 7919) have
> easier-to-spot bit patterns than those based on pi.
> 
> This is speculation of course.
> 
> Should we define some new DH parameters which use a
> different generator?  Maybe the primes are fine....
> 
> Mike


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
                          Stephen Farrell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2020-10-09

Abstract:
   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346).
   Accordingly, those documents (will be moved|have been moved) to
   Historic status.  These versions lack support for current and
   recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various
   government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now
   mandate avoiding these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the
   recommended version for IETF protocols since 2008, providing
   sufficient time to transition away from older versions.  Removing
   support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack
   surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines
   library and product maintenance.

   This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0
   (RFC6347), but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version
   1.1.

   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLSv1.0 or
   TLSv1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates the best
   practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525 and hence is part of BCP195.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07.txt
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Ben,

This version incorporates the PR you submitted to address you AD =
comments as well as a PR to address moving RFC 7507 to obsolete. I =
believe/hope this version is ready for IETF LC.

spt

> On Oct 9, 2020, at 09:44, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the =
IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
>        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
>                          Stephen Farrell
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07.txt
> 	Pages           : 22
> 	Date            : 2020-10-09
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
>   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346).
>   Accordingly, those documents (will be moved|have been moved) to
>   Historic status.  These versions lack support for current and
>   recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various
>   government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now
>   mandate avoiding these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the
>   recommended version for IETF protocols since 2008, providing
>   sufficient time to transition away from older versions.  Removing
>   support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack
>   surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines
>   library and product maintenance.
>=20
>   This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0
>   (RFC6347), but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version
>   1.1.
>=20
>   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLSv1.0 or
>   TLSv1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates the best
>   practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525 and hence is part of BCP195.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/
>=20
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-07
> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate=
-07
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-0=
7
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 07:44:01 -0700
Message-ID: <CACsn0ckwoMmq9ioBe4D9fPVCWai_4w2UfZWS1m1qi5xfh0h2zQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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On Fri, Oct 9, 2020 at 5:36 AM Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:
>
> I have not written any code, but have just been thinking
> about what is going on and I am pretty sure that the
> bottom 64 bits of 2^X mod P tell you information which
> can help you determine X.  The top bits are also suspect
> but I haven't worried about those yet.  My original
> message below explains which primes I'm talking about.

POC || GTFO

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Fri Oct  9 08:06:35 2020
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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> POC || GTFO

I showed how to do it just by using your brain.=C2=A0 If
I'm wrong please explain.

And, no, you don't get to decide who belongs here.

Also I tried reading your thesis.=C2=A0 It's waaay over
my head, but I think I learned that quaternions are
two-by-two matrices, really ----ing cool.

Mike


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Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2020 08:17:51 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
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This is a reminder to keep discourse here courteous and respectful. We want this mailing list to be maximally useful for all readers. Dismissive or otherwise disrespectful replies are counter to that goal. Please check out the official Code of Conduct [1] for more information.

Michael, since your question is more related to the cryptographic primitives used by TLS than the protocol itself, the chairs encourage you to continue this discussion on the CFRG mailing list [2]. 

Thanks,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

[1] https://ietf.org/about/administration/policies-procedures/code-of-conduct/
[2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/


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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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Dear Michael,

Your concern that special primes in Diffie--Hellman might be weaker has some
truth: the famous and ingenious special number field sieve (SNFS) works
against primes with special structure.  See 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/961 
for a recent application (which, as an extra wrinkle, is also able to hide
the special structure). 

Therefore, applied cryptography like TLS already uses vetted primes in
Diffie--Hellman, with careful guidance from cryptographers such as those in
CFRG, which specialize in such fundamentals.  (Full disclosure: I proposed
some primes for DH to the CFRG list (for reductionist security), but never
followed through with an I-D.)

Scott explains below very well, as one'd expect, why the generator choice
should generally not matter (random self-reducibility).

Best regards,

Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
> Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2020 3:09 PM
> To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>; TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Michael D'Errico
> > Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2020 1:54 PM
> > To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
> > Subject: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
> >
> > Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman with a generator of 2 is probably
> > not the best choice.  Unfortunately all of the published primes (RFCs
> > 2409, 3526, and
> > 7919) use 2 for the generator.  Any other generator would likely be
> > (not sure how much?) more secure.
> 
> No, that is known to be not true.
> 
> In particular, if you can compute discrete logs to the base 2, you can
compute
> discrete logs to any base (except in the cases where 2 generates an
> anomalously small subgroup, which is not the case in the above groups).
> 
> Here's how it works; suppose you were given the problem of solving the
> discrete log problem g^x = h, for some g, h.  Then, if you can solve
discrete logs
> to base 2, you would solve these two problems:
> 
> 2^y = g
> 2^z = h
> 
> Once you have solved those two problems, then you have x = y z^-1 mod p-1.
> 
> It's a little more complex if g, h is not in the subgroup that 2
generates, but not
> that much more (unless, as above, the size of that subgroup is far smaller
than
> p-1).
> 
> >
> > The problem is that 2^X consists of a single bit of value 1 followed
> > by a huge string of zeros.  When you then reduce this modulo a large
> > prime number, there will be a pattern in the bits which may help an
> > attacker discern the value of X.  This is further helped by the fact
> > that all of the published primes have 64 bits of 1 in the topmost and
bottom-
> most bits.
> > In addition, the larger published primes are very similar to the
> > shorter ones, the shorter ones closely matching truncated versions of
the
> larger primes.
> >
> > If you were to manually perform the modulo-P operation yourself, you
> > would add enough zeros to the end of P until the topmost bit is just
> > to the right of the 1 bit from 2^X, and then you'd subtract.  This bit
> > pattern will always be the same, no matter the value of X.  In
> > particular, the top 64 bits disappear since they're all one.
> > Continuing the mod-P operation, you adjust the number of zeros after
> > the prime P and then subtract again, reducing the size of the operand.
> > The pattern of bits again will be the same, regardless of the value of
X, the
> only difference being the number of trailing zeros.
> 
> Actually, for these group, the value of 2^x mod p can take on (p-1)/2
different
> values; there is no chance that the bit pattern will be trapped in some
cul-de-
> sac, as you appear to be suggesting...
> 
> >
> > I have not looked at the cyclic patterns which happen as you do this,
> > but I wouldn't be surprised to find that the "new" primes based on e
> > (RFC 7919) have easier-to-spot bit patterns than those based on pi.
> 
> I would be surprised; do you have some reason that would suggest why bits
> derived from the binary expansion of 'e' would be somehow qualitatively
> different from bits derived from the binary expansion of 'pi'?
> 
> >
> > This is speculation of course.
> 
> Might I suggest you learn a bit of number theory to go along with your
> speculation?
> 
> >
> > Should we define some new DH parameters which use a different
> > generator?  Maybe the primes are fine....
> 
> If the prime is fine, so is the generator...

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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
        Authors         : Loganaden Velvindron
                          Kathleen Moriarty
                          Alessandro Ghedini
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2020-10-09

Abstract:
   The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening in
   strength and their deprecation process should begin for their use in
   TLS 1.2 digital signatures.  However, this document does not
   deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.  This document updates
   RFC 5246 and RFC 7525.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2020 15:15:05 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DH generator 2 problem?
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> This is a reminder to keep discourse here courteous and respectful.

I am hoping this comment was not directed at me.
I find myself biting my tongue frequently, but will
try to do a better job of it going forward in any
case.

> We want this mailing list to be maximally useful for all readers. 
> Dismissive or otherwise disrespectful replies are counter to that goal. 
> Please check out the official Code of Conduct [1] for more information.
> 
> Michael, since your question is more related to the cryptographic 
> primitives used by TLS than the protocol itself, the chairs encourage 
> you to continue this discussion on the CFRG mailing list [2]. 

I am not really interested in pursuing this further.
If the cryptographers want to run with it, that's
fine.  I'm more of a protocol implementer person
and will refocus my attention there, or not, haven't
decided.

Mike


> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
> 
> [1] https://ietf.org/about/administration/policies-procedures/code-of-conduct/
> [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/


From nobody Fri Oct  9 14:22:50 2020
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Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 14:22:40 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Achim,

On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 07:56:00AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
>  >> If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble with
>  >> their deployments!
>  >
>  > I'm not sure I follow.  Are you saying that if there is a theoretical
>  > problem with the construction it would have been exposed by
> implementation
>  > testing?
> 
> No, I don't say that.
> "Early adopters" means, there people using
> draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 in real world systems with that
> current definiton of the MAC. If that MAC calculation is changed, then
> they need to adapt their deployments in the field, which is not too easy
> (and potential dangerous). Sure, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 is
> still only a draft and could be changed. But not without trouble for
> those "early adopters".

Ah, I see what you mean now.

If we are concerned about changing the behavior, we can (and, arguably,
should) allocate a new TLS extension codepoint to indicate the new
behavior.  That would leave existing implementations able to function with
the old semantics until they age out/are upgraded/etc.

>  > My primary concern is not actually about a specific situation where
>  > injection occurs, but rather for cryptographic hygiene -- whenever we
>  > assemble an input for a cryptographic operation (especially MAC or
> signing)
>  > it is important to ensure that the sequence of bits used as input to the
>  > cryptographic operation can only be produced by a single combination of
>  > logical inputs to the protocol-level operation or message that we are
>  > applying cryptographic protection to.  This property is known as
>  > "injectivity", because the map from protocol-level values to bitstrings
>  > (themselves used as input for cryptographic operations) is an injective
>  > mapping in the mathematical sense.  I believe that I have
> demonstrated that
>  > the current MAC construction does not use an injective mapping and is
> thus
>  > not consistent with best practices.
> 
> *** protocol-level operation or message ***
> 
> I understood your example in your previous mail.
> I tried to explain, that the data of your example, especially the
> cid-length, is not in the message. Please, find the time to check that
> current record defintion! There the CID is encoded in the protocols
> tls-cid-records without the explicit CID length.

I understood your previous message, as well -- yes, the CID length is not
encoded in the message on the wire, and is implicit based on what the
entity allocating it has advertised.  I am asserting that the cryptographic
construction we are using is flawed, which is independent of what is
actually on the wire.

To be frank, I'm actually surprised that this is even seen as a matter for
discussion.  We've been doing quite well recently (e.g., for TLS 1.3) at
using rigorous and veriviable cryptographic constructions that are provably
secure at the smallest modular level.  This scheme is a regression in that
regard -- it relies not only on the cryptography for secure operation, but
also on some specific behavior of the application that is external to the
cryptographic processing (relating to how the application extracts the CID
and looks up the DTLS association/key material).  The behavior we should
demand from our cryptographic constructions is that the cryptography itself
correctly returns "valid" or "invalid" based on the input message, provided
that the application inputs the correct key material.  (It should also
return "invalid" if incorrect key material is supplied, of course.)  The
ability to produce two different messages for which the cryptography
returns "valid" violates this principle; even if we do not see an obvious
path by which a reasonable application might supply those inputs to the
cryptographic code, it is still a flawed construction.

-Ben

> With that, I can't see the posssiblity to inject the cid-length.
> It's simply not "in" and so can't be "injected".
> 
> best regards
> Achim Kraus
> 
> Am 09.10.20 um 01:34 schrieb Benjamin Kaduk:
> > Hi Achim,
> >
> > Sorry for the long silence on this front; my attention had cycled elsewhere
> > and I was just overall operating slowly for a couple weeks (sick, maybe,
> > but no clear symptoms).
> >
> > My primary concern is not actually about a specific situation where
> > injection occurs, but rather for cryptographic hygiene -- whenever we
> > assemble an input for a cryptographic operation (especially MAC or signing)
> > it is important to ensure that the sequence of bits used as input to the
> > cryptographic operation can only be produced by a single combination of
> > logical inputs to the protocol-level operation or message that we are
> > applying cryptographic protection to.  This property is known as
> > "injectivity", because the map from protocol-level values to bitstrings
> > (themselves used as input for cryptographic operations) is an injective
> > mapping in the mathematical sense.  I believe that I have demonstrated that
> > the current MAC construction does not use an injective mapping and is thus
> > not consistent with best practices.
> >
> > However, in particular...
> >
> > On Sun, Oct 04, 2020 at 04:35:49PM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> >> Hi Ben,
> >>
> >> any progress on the cid-length / calculate MAC topic?
> >>
> >> As I wrote, though the cid-length itself is not "on the wire" (it's only
> >> the cid), I can't see, that the cid-length could be injected.
> >> Do I oversee soemthing?
> >>
> >> best regrads
> >> Achim Kraus
> >>
> >> -------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------
> >> Betreff: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
> >> Datum: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 08:31:19 +0200
> >> Von: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
> >> An: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> >> Kopie (CC): draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
> >>
> >> Hi Ben,
> >>
> >> ...
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The TLS 1.2 notation is "seq_num" for the implicit sequence number, but
> >>>>> DTLS 1.2 says that the MAC input is the concatenation of the DTLS epoch
> >>>>> and the DTLS (explicit) sequence number.  I do not see this
> >>>>> concatenation given the name "seq_num" anywhere, so I think we need to
> >>>>> reformulate this expression.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>               cid +
> >>>>>               cid_length +
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Does this construction preserve injectivity?  It seems easier to reason
> >>>>> about when the length of an element is always before or always after the
> >>>>> element itself, but we put the length first for some of the other
> >>>>> fields (that appear after these) so there seems to be some malleability.
> >>>>
> >>>> That order was also discussed a lot.
> >>>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
> >>>> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the pointer!
> >>> I am not sure that the specific question about injectivity was raised
> >>> there, though.  (The topic of whether "seq_num" includes epoch was raised
> >>> but I did not see a clear resolution on my first reading, just
> >>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246152379)
> >>>
> >>> Specifically, the question of "injectivity" is referring to a scenario
> >>> where I can use different actual values for (cid, cid_length,
> >>> length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext, etc.) but have a collision in the constructed
> >>>
> >>> cid + cid_length + length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + ...
> >>>
> >>> (Hmm, we should probably say that length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext is a 2-byte
> >>> field...)
> >>>
> >>> Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
> >>>
> >>> 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> >>>
> >>> could be cid_length=1, cid=0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0202,
> >>> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
> >>> cid_length=2, cis=0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0201,
> >>> DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = <513 bytes>.  The possibility of such a
> >>> collision weakens the cryptographic protection and should be avoided.
> >>>
> >>
> >> If that is going to be changed, the early adopters run into trouble with
> >> their deployments!
> >
> > I'm not sure I follow.  Are you saying that if there is a theoretical
> > problem with the construction it would have been exposed by implementation
> > testing?
> >
> >> The cid length is not on the wire, so on the wire is (cid 01 01)
> >>
> >>> 01 01 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> >>
> >> Therefore I don't understand, WHO will inject something, which is not on
> >> the wire. For me that would only be the peer's implementation, which
> >> extracts it's "own" CID wrong, or a "spoofed CID" (maybe that's the time
> >> to read my proposal about a CID Authentication Code, issue #74.). But
> >> with the wrong CID, the wrong keys would be selected and the MAC will
> >> fail anyway. So, I can't see that collision.
> >
> > Consider the MAC-then-Encrypt case.  We *know* that there are devices in
> > the field that get TLS encryption but not MAC keys for use in monitoring
> > situations (e.g., enterprises subject to particular compliance regimes).
> > So it is perfectly reasonable to consider a case where a third party has
> > encryption keys but not MAC keys, and is not expected to have the
> > capability to modify the plaintext of the stream.  However, having stripped
> > the encryption by using the keys that they already possess, it is possible
> > to move a byte (or in general, multiple bytes) between the cid field in the
> > outer portion of the record and the inner plaintext, without modifying the
> > MAC value.  Encryption can be reapplied, again using the already-known
> > keys, and the stream as received by the other TLS peer is modified,
> > breaking the principle that the party not knowing the MAC key should not be
> > able to modify the plaintext.
> >
> > (I am not entirely convinced that encrypt-then-mac is intrinsically immune,
> > though a successful attack would seem to require knowledge of the
> > underlying structure of the plaintext even if the specific content is not
> > known.)
> >
> > -Ben
> >
> 


From nobody Sat Oct 10 00:14:03 2020
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 09:13:51 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

>
> To be frank, I'm actually surprised that this is even seen as a matter f=
or
> discussion.

As developer, I'm surprised, that this discussion now spans a couple of
years, starting on summer 2018 with:

https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8

There are many (proposed) changes since then. I already tried to point
to that with my e-mail answer from 4. September

 >> That order was also discussed a lot.
 >> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
 >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!

For me, "cryptographic hygiene", which breaks the API, are not strong
arguments. Sure, that's only my personal opinion. I'm not sure, if a new
code-point helps, nor that a new one is emitted for changing a draft (I
would not recommend to do so, draft is a draft).

So let me try to find a end:
As developer, I see it's very important to come to a stable definition
of the MAC. If now the order of the cid/cid-length is changing the MAC
(again), and in half a year the next "cryptographic hygiene" campaign
removes the cid-length (because it's not on the header and some
(including me) don't see the benefit), then FMPOV this "process" just
demonstrates more weakness, than I appreciate.

So:
If there is a guideline for constructing MACs, is that guideline
documented somewhere?
If the guideline is changing over the time, are these changes documented?

And I would really welcome, also based on the experience with the long
history of this discussion, if more can give their feedback about
changing the MAC again. Please, this year, not next :-).

best regards
Achim Kraus


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Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 13:29:13 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "Benjamin Kaduk" <kaduk@mit.edu>, "Achim Kraus" <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Fri, Oct 9, 2020, at 17:22, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> [...]  The behavior we should demand from our cryptographic
> constructions is that the cryptography itself correctly returns
> "valid" or "invalid" based on the input message, provided that
> the application inputs the correct key material.  (It should also
> return "invalid" if incorrect key material is supplied, of course.)
> The ability to produce two different messages for which the
> cryptography returns "valid" violates this principle; even if we
> do not see an obvious path by which a reasonable application
> might supply those inputs to the cryptographic code, it is still
> a flawed construction.

Hi,

I'd like clarification about this point, where the cryptography
should return values of "valid" or "invalid".  This is a general
question, not specifically about this draft.  (Please read at
least the next 2 paragraphs.)

I remember a long time ago, it may have been the renegotiation
info extension, where there was a lot of calculation being done,
there were two complicated values each side had to compute.
If they were equal, then everything was fine and the handshake
could proceed.  If not, there was an insecure renegotiation
happening.  (Or maybe it was the downgrade protection RFC,
I can't remember now.)  But if the values were not equal, then
something bad was happening and the handshake should not
proceed.

The problem both Martin Rex and I discovered at nearly the
same time (posts to the mailing list within minutes of each
other) was that both sides could go through all the motions
faithfully calculating all of the values, correctly, and then
forget to compare them to see if the values were actually
the same.  I noticed this because I wrote the code, and it
seemed like an easy thing to overlook.

I remember suggesting that we somehow incorporate the
calculated values into the derivation of the record layer keys
so the MAC would fail, or maybe into the Finished message
calculation so (if you remember to check that?) a failure is
noticed later.  This suggestion was shot down by the author
unilaterally for what I perceived at the time to be petty
reasons.

I still believe that (D)TLS security should not rely on the
implementer to check whether two values are equal.  This
is too easy to forget to do.  Or you could do this in C:

    if (complex_value_a = complex_value_b) {
        // we're in trouble....
    }

I have not looked at the TLS 1.3 draft beyond the hour or so
I've put in so far to see whether this reliance on checking is
in there too.  I've also not checked whether the security
proof I was referred to has any games where the implementer
forgot to compare values.  Or a game where everybody made
the same error and nobody noticed (forgetting to put the
HelloRetryRequest into the Tramscript-Hash for example).

Mike


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To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <0da9b525-ec78-bef5-6ceb-5f377019ade4@gmx.net> <4ca7c2f9-1e9d-0d16-0089-649f013b4565@gmx.net> <20201008233454.GF89563@kduck.mit.edu> <6185242d-8ba8-2d2f-5938-afad46c2e854@gmx.net> <20201009212240.GK89563@kduck.mit.edu> <401a965c-69ee-455a-8c09-12a37f3b89dc@www.fastmail.com>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 20:27:20 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Mike,

 > in C:
 >
 >      if (complex_value_a =3D complex_value_b) {
 >          // we're in trouble....
 >      }

That's a pitfall of C ('=3D' is not '=3D=3D'). You will be almost in troub=
le,
if the complex value is not 0.

But the discussion here is more about how often somethings should be
adapted again and again. The point from Ben are all very valid, but they
should have been raised at least 1 year ago. Now, the point is, if
"cryptographic hygiene" without "actual threat" (at least, this was not
explained) should modify the MAC again. If so, the question may be, when
this changes will end.

best regards
Achim Kraus

Am 10.10.20 um 19:29 schrieb Michael D'Errico:
> On Fri, Oct 9, 2020, at 17:22, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> [...]  The behavior we should demand from our cryptographic
>> constructions is that the cryptography itself correctly returns
>> "valid" or "invalid" based on the input message, provided that
>> the application inputs the correct key material.  (It should also
>> return "invalid" if incorrect key material is supplied, of course.)
>> The ability to produce two different messages for which the
>> cryptography returns "valid" violates this principle; even if we
>> do not see an obvious path by which a reasonable application
>> might supply those inputs to the cryptographic code, it is still
>> a flawed construction.
>
> Hi,
>
> I'd like clarification about this point, where the cryptography
> should return values of "valid" or "invalid".  This is a general
> question, not specifically about this draft.  (Please read at
> least the next 2 paragraphs.)
>
> I remember a long time ago, it may have been the renegotiation
> info extension, where there was a lot of calculation being done,
> there were two complicated values each side had to compute.
> If they were equal, then everything was fine and the handshake
> could proceed.  If not, there was an insecure renegotiation
> happening.  (Or maybe it was the downgrade protection RFC,
> I can't remember now.)  But if the values were not equal, then
> something bad was happening and the handshake should not
> proceed.
>
> The problem both Martin Rex and I discovered at nearly the
> same time (posts to the mailing list within minutes of each
> other) was that both sides could go through all the motions
> faithfully calculating all of the values, correctly, and then
> forget to compare them to see if the values were actually
> the same.  I noticed this because I wrote the code, and it
> seemed like an easy thing to overlook.
>
> I remember suggesting that we somehow incorporate the
> calculated values into the derivation of the record layer keys
> so the MAC would fail, or maybe into the Finished message
> calculation so (if you remember to check that?) a failure is
> noticed later.  This suggestion was shot down by the author
> unilaterally for what I perceived at the time to be petty
> reasons.
>
> I still believe that (D)TLS security should not rely on the
> implementer to check whether two values are equal.  This
> is too easy to forget to do.  Or you could do this in C:
>
>      if (complex_value_a =3D complex_value_b) {
>          // we're in trouble....
>      }
>
> I have not looked at the TLS 1.3 draft beyond the hour or so
> I've put in so far to see whether this reliance on checking is
> in there too.  I've also not checked whether the security
> proof I was referred to has any games where the implementer
> forgot to compare values.  Or a game where everybody made
> the same error and nobody noticed (forgetting to put the
> HelloRetryRequest into the Tramscript-Hash for example).
>
> Mike
>


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Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 14:41:11 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "Nick Harper" <nharper@google.com>
Cc: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#28: Converting cTLS to QUIC-style varints
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> Hopefully https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11.2
> makes it clear why the pre_shared_key extension must be at
> the end of the list. 

I see what was done, but it still makes me a bit
sad that whatever security property was desired
couldn't have been done differently to avoid this
requirement.  Hopefully we never discover a new
extension that should be "last" ....

Mike


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To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 12:14 AM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi Ben,
>
> >
> > To be frank, I'm actually surprised that this is even seen as a matter
> for
> > discussion.
>
> As developer, I'm surprised, that this discussion now spans a couple of
> years, starting on summer 2018 with:
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8
>
> There are many (proposed) changes since then. I already tried to point
> to that with my e-mail answer from 4. September
>
>  >> That order was also discussed a lot.
>  >> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
>  >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!
>
> For me, "cryptographic hygiene", which breaks the API, are not strong
> arguments. Sure, that's only my personal opinion. I'm not sure, if a new
> code-point helps, nor that a new one is emitted for changing a draft (I
> would not recommend to do so, draft is a draft).
>
> So let me try to find a end:
> As developer, I see it's very important to come to a stable definition
> of the MAC. If now the order of the cid/cid-length is changing the MAC
> (again), and in half a year the next "cryptographic hygiene" campaign
> removes the cid-length (because it's not on the header and some
> (including me) don't see the benefit), then FMPOV this "process" just
> demonstrates more weakness, than I appreciate.
>
> So:
> If there is a guideline for constructing MACs, is that guideline
> documented somewhere?
> If the guideline is changing over the time, are these changes documented?
>
> And I would really welcome, also based on the experience with the long
> history of this discussion, if more can give their feedback about
> changing the MAC again. Please, this year, not next :-).
>
>
[Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change at the
end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has taken a long path
to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, even in a corner
case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo and website and we
will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's better to fix now rather
than later.   In this case, I don't have a way to exploit this issue, but
unless someone has a way to demonstrate that this is not going to be an
issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it now.

Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?



> best regards
> Achim Kraus
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--000000000000d5118705b1588f16
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 12:14 AM Achi=
m Kraus &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:achimkraus@gmx.net">achimkraus@gmx.net</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Ben,=
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; To be frank, I&#39;m actually surprised that this is even seen as a ma=
tter for<br>
&gt; discussion.<br>
<br>
As developer, I&#39;m surprised, that this discussion now spans a couple of=
<br>
years, starting on summer 2018 with:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8</a><br>
<br>
There are many (proposed) changes since then. I already tried to point<br>
to that with my e-mail answer from 4. September<br>
<br>
=C2=A0&gt;&gt; That order was also discussed a lot.<br>
=C2=A0&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pu=
ll/29</a><br>
=C2=A0&gt;&gt; I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong =
arguments!<br>
<br>
For me, &quot;cryptographic hygiene&quot;, which breaks the API, are not st=
rong<br>
arguments. Sure, that&#39;s only my personal opinion. I&#39;m not sure, if =
a new<br>
code-point helps, nor that a new one is emitted for changing a draft (I<br>
would not recommend to do so, draft is a draft).<br>
<br>
So let me try to find a end:<br>
As developer, I see it&#39;s very important to come to a stable definition<=
br>
of the MAC. If now the order of the cid/cid-length is changing the MAC<br>
(again), and in half a year the next &quot;cryptographic hygiene&quot; camp=
aign<br>
removes the cid-length (because it&#39;s not on the header and some<br>
(including me) don&#39;t see the benefit), then FMPOV this &quot;process&qu=
ot; just<br>
demonstrates more weakness, than I appreciate.<br>
<br>
So:<br>
If there is a guideline for constructing MACs, is that guideline<br>
documented somewhere?<br>
If the guideline is changing over the time, are these changes documented?<b=
r>
<br>
And I would really welcome, also based on the experience with the long<br>
history of this discussion, if more can give their feedback about<br>
changing the MAC again. Please, this year, not next :-).<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>[Joe]=C2=A0 It&#39;s unfortunate to fi=
nd issues that require breaking change at the end of the review cycle, espe=
cially for a draft that has taken a long path to get here.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If t=
here is an issue that is exploitable, even in a corner case, someone will d=
evelop an attack, clever name, logo and website and we will all have to scr=
amble to deploy a fix.=C2=A0 =C2=A0It&#39;s better to fix now rather than l=
ater.=C2=A0 =C2=A0In this case, I don&#39;t have a way to exploit this issu=
e, but unless someone has a way to demonstrate that this is not going to be=
 an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it now.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div>Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204)=
;padding-left:1ex">
best regards<br>
Achim Kraus<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000d5118705b1588f16--


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Subject: [TLS] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05
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Reviewer: Al Morton
Review result: Has Nits

OPS-DIR Review of:
Importing External PSKs for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-05

Note that Brian Carpenter provided a useful review for GEN-ART, far beyond
general questions. Brian's comments on Section 6, Incremental Deployment, are
relevant to operational considerations, which are the focus of this review.

The draft provides a useful capability and considers possible issues stemming
from interaction with (D)TLS 1.2. There are some implementations and other
parties are interested.

Nits:

Intro:not expanded on first use
PRF
KDF

3.1 Terminology: one-too-many "and" in:
...
   *  Imported PSK (IPSK): A PSK derived from an EPSK, External
      Identity, optional context string, and target protocol and KDF.






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To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Joe,

 > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change at
 > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has taken a
 > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, even
 > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo and
 > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's better
 > to fix now rather than later.

Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:

 >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong
 >> arguments!

 > In this case, I don't have a way to
 > exploit this issue, but unless someone has a way to demonstrate that
 > this is not going to be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it
 > now.
 >

In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured to
use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's finish".
I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so for
something more the "cryptographic hygiene".

So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be
discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
I asked this already in January 2019

https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915

The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no
one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about
injection, why not remove it at all?

 > Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?

That may also be something to help, not to change still again and again.

best regards
Achim Kraus

Am 11.10.20 um 00:26 schrieb Joseph Salowey:
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 12:14 AM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net
> <mailto:achimkraus@gmx.net>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Ben,
>
>      >
>      > To be frank, I'm actually surprised that this is even seen as a
>     matter for
>      > discussion.
>
>     As developer, I'm surprised, that this discussion now spans a couple=
 of
>     years, starting on summer 2018 with:
>
>     https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8
>
>     There are many (proposed) changes since then. I already tried to poi=
nt
>     to that with my e-mail answer from 4. September
>
>      =C2=A0>> That order was also discussed a lot.
>      =C2=A0>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
>      =C2=A0>> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without stron=
g
>     arguments!
>
>     For me, "cryptographic hygiene", which breaks the API, are not stron=
g
>     arguments. Sure, that's only my personal opinion. I'm not sure, if a=
 new
>     code-point helps, nor that a new one is emitted for changing a draft=
 (I
>     would not recommend to do so, draft is a draft).
>
>     So let me try to find a end:
>     As developer, I see it's very important to come to a stable definiti=
on
>     of the MAC. If now the order of the cid/cid-length is changing the M=
AC
>     (again), and in half a year the next "cryptographic hygiene" campaig=
n
>     removes the cid-length (because it's not on the header and some
>     (including me) don't see the benefit), then FMPOV this "process" jus=
t
>     demonstrates more weakness, than I appreciate.
>
>     So:
>     If there is a guideline for constructing MACs, is that guideline
>     documented somewhere?
>     If the guideline is changing over the time, are these changes
>     documented?
>
>     And I would really welcome, also based on the experience with the lo=
ng
>     history of this discussion, if more can give their feedback about
>     changing the MAC again. Please, this year, not next :-).
>
>
> [Joe]=C2=A0 It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change=
 at
> the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has taken a
> long path to get here.=C2=A0 =C2=A0If there is an issue that is exploita=
ble, even
> in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo and
> website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.=C2=A0 =C2=A0It=
's better
> to fix now rather than later.=C2=A0 =C2=A0In this case, I don't have a w=
ay to
> exploit this issue, but unless someone has a way to demonstrate that
> this is not going to be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it
> now.
>
> Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?
>
>     best regards
>     Achim Kraus
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     TLS mailing list
>     TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 23:49:36 -0700
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To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 11:27 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Joe,
>
>  > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change at
>  > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has taken a
>  > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, even
>  > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo and
>  > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's better
>  > to fix now rather than later.
>
> Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:
>
>  >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong
>  >> arguments!
>
>  > In this case, I don't have a way to
>  > exploit this issue, but unless someone has a way to demonstrate that
>  > this is not going to be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it
>  > now.
>  >
>
> In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured to
> use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's finish".
> I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so for
> something more the "cryptographic hygiene".
>
> So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be
> discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
> I asked this already in January 2019
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915
>
> The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no
> one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about
> injection, why not remove it at all?

The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every
value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be
injective. Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the
encoding could end up the same. In fact I think in the MAC setting
there almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is
right after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up
with a cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.

I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient
when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but
perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record
layer of the draft.

>
>  > Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?
>
> That may also be something to help, not to change still again and again.

I don't think the formal models of TLS reach the wire encoding.


-- 
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+2/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  2 issues created:
  - Update KM's address (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/issues/10=20
  - Address Roman's AD comments (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/issues/9=20

  1 issues received 1 new comments:
  - #10 Update KM's address (1 by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/issues/10=20

  1 issues closed:
  - Update KM's address https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-de=
precate/issues/10=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC23)
  6 issues created:
  - Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/331=20
  - ClientHello construction order is inconsistent (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/329=20
  - No encryption AD specified (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/326=20
  - Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s) (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/325=20
  - Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/324=20
  - Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes) (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/323=20

  6 issues received 23 new comments:
  - #331 Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous (2 by cjp=
atton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/331=20
  - #326 No encryption AD specified (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/326=20
  - #325 Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s) (5 by cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/325=20
  - #324 Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents (2 by chris-wood, cjpatt=
on)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/324=20
  - #323 Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes) (12 by chri=
s-wood, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/323=20
  - #295 Greasing to supporting servers (1 by wbl)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/295=20

  4 issues closed:
  - Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption? https://githu=
b.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/285=20
  - Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents https://github.com/tlswg/draf=
t-ietf-tls-esni/issues/324=20
  - Add note on network/transport failure probability and ECH confirmation =
collision https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/307=20
  - Greasing to supporting servers https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-=
esni/issues/295=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Address Roman's AD comments (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/issues/37=
=20

* tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - DTLS 1.3 header format (by awcunning)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/153=20

* tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  1 issues created:
  - Update KM's address (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issues/5=20

  1 issues received 1 new comments:
  - #5 Update KM's address (1 by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issues/5=20

  1 issues closed:
  - Update KM's address https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issu=
es/5=20

* tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  1 issues created:
  - Address Roman's AD Comments (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/issues/66=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC4)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - AD Review Comments (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/8=20

  2 pull requests received 4 new comments:
  - #8 AD Review Comments (3 by KME, seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/8=20
  - #7 added IANA considerations (1 by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/7=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - AD Review Comments
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/8=20
  - added IANA considerations
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/pull/7=20

* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+4/-6/=F0=9F=92=AC10)
  4 pull requests submitted:
  - Note -05 of HPKE for this version of ECH. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/332=20
  - Consistently construct ClientHelloInner before ClientHelloOuter. (by da=
vidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/330=20
  - Define error-handling for missing outer extension (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/328=20
  - Rewrite "Resumption PSK Oracle Mitigation". (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/327=20

  3 pull requests received 10 new comments:
  - #317 Simplify session resumption logic. (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=20
  - #313 Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding (4 by ch=
ris-wood, davidben, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313=20
  - #293 Revise "outer_extension" (postponed until after -08) (5 by cjpatto=
n, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/293=20

  6 pull requests merged:
  - Note -05 of HPKE for this version of ECH.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/332=20
  - Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE changes.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=20
  - Rewrite "Resumption PSK Oracle Mitigation".
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/327=20
  - Simplify session resumption logic.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=20
  - Clarify our lack of concern around 2^{-64} acceptance signal collision =
probabilities
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/318=20
  - Fix ECH and version negotiation order.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=20

* tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  1 pull requests submitted:
  - Oid fix (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81=20

  1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
  - #81 Oid fix (1 by siyengar)
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81=20

  1 pull requests merged:
  - Oid fix
    https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81=20

* tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)
  2 pull requests merged:
  - Updates from AD review
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3=20
  - obsolete 7507
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<body>
<h1>Sunday October 11, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+2/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#10 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-depre=
cate/issues/10">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> (by seanturner) </li>
 =20
  <li>#9 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/issues/9">Address Roman&#x27;s AD comments</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#10 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-depre=
cate/issues/10">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> (1 by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#10 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-depre=
cate/issues/10">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+6/-4/=F0=9F=92=AC23)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">6 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#331 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
31">Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous</a> (by davidb=
en) </li>
 =20
  <li>#329 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
29">ClientHello construction order is inconsistent</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#326 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
26">No encryption AD specified</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#325 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
25">Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s)</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#324 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
24">Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#323 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
23">Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes)</a> (by davidben=
) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 issues received 23 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#331 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
31">Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous</a> (2 by cjpa=
tton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#326 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
26">No encryption AD specified</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#325 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
25">Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s)</a> (5 by cjpatton, davidben) <=
/li>
 =20
  <li>#324 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
24">Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents</a> (2 by chris-wood, cjpatto=
n) </li>
 =20
  <li>#323 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
23">Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes)</a> (12 by chris=
-wood, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#295 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
95">Greasing to supporting servers</a> (1 by wbl) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>4 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#285 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
85">Possible to simplify interaction with session resumption?</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#324 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
24">Clarify that CHInner ECH payload contents</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#307 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
07">Add note on network/transport failure probability and ECH confirmation =
collision</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#295 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
95">Greasing to supporting servers</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#37 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-i=
mporter/issues/37">Address Roman&#x27;s AD comments</a> (by seanturner) </l=
i>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/dtls13-spec (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#153 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/issues/153">DTLS=
 1.3 header format</a> (by awcunning) </li>
  </ul>



<h3>tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#5 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issues/5=
">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#5 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issues/5=
">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> (1 by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#5 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/issues/5=
">Update KM&#x27;s address</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#66 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator/is=
sues/66">Address Roman&#x27;s AD Comments</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>





<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate (+1/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC4)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#8 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/8">AD Review Comments</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 4 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#8 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/8">AD Review Comments</a> (3 by KME, seanturner) </li>
 =20
  <li>#7 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/7">added IANA considerations</a> (1 by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#8 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/8">AD Review Comments</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#7 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprec=
ate/pull/7">added IANA considerations</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+4/-6/=F0=9F=92=AC10)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">4 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#332 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/332=
">Note -05 of HPKE for this version of ECH.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#330 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/330=
">Consistently construct ClientHelloInner before ClientHelloOuter.</a> (by =
davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#328 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/328=
">Define error-handling for missing outer extension</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#327 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/327=
">Rewrite &quot;Resumption PSK Oracle Mitigation&quot;.</a> (by davidben) <=
/li>
  </ul>

  <p>3 pull requests received 10 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#317 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=
">Simplify session resumption logic.</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#313 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313=
">Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding</a> (4 by chris=
-wood, davidben, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#293 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/293=
">Revise &quot;outer_extension&quot; (postponed until after -08)</a> (5 by =
cjpatton, davidben) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#332 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/332=
">Note -05 of HPKE for this version of ECH.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#315 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/315=
">Bump ech_hrr_key length to 32 bytes to align with latest HPKE changes.</a=
> </li>
 =20
  <li>#327 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/327=
">Rewrite &quot;Resumption PSK Oracle Mitigation&quot;.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#317 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/317=
">Simplify session resumption logic.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#318 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/318=
">Clarify our lack of concern around 2^{-64} acceptance signal collision pr=
obabilities</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#320 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/320=
">Fix ECH and version negotiation order.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/tls-subcerts (+1/-1/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#81 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81">Oid fix=
</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#81 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81">Oid fix=
</a> (1 by siyengar) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#81 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts/pull/81">Oid fix=
</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+0/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC0)</h3>


  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#3 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/3">=
Updates from AD review</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#4 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/4">=
obsolete 7507</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============6849689619656271130==--


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On Sun, Oct 11, 2020 at 08:26:47AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Joe,
> 
> > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change at
> > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has taken a
> > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, even
> > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo and
> > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's better
> > to fix now rather than later.
> 
> Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:
> 
> >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong
> >> arguments!
> 
> > In this case, I don't have a way to
> > exploit this issue, but unless someone has a way to demonstrate that
> > this is not going to be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it
> > now.
> >
> 
> In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured to
> use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's finish".
> I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so for
> something more the "cryptographic hygiene".
> 
> So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be
> discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
> I asked this already in January 2019
> 
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915
> 
> The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no
> one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about
> injection, why not remove it at all?

The problem is the follows:

Take the following input to the MAC (MtE case):

<seqnum> 19 FE FD 63 01 00 05 04 00 02 FF 17

There is no way to tell from that input if it is:

- Application record on CID 63 containing 04 00 02 FF, or
- Application record on CID 63 01 00 05 containing FF.

The overall MAC length will not catch this, because the overall length
is the same in both cases.

And even if it seems that the data lengths after depad should be
different, it is unsafe to rely on depad length.


Stripping the CID length will not solve the issue. Heck, if cid length
is removed, the very above example is still ambiguous, now for:

- Application record on CID 63 01 containing 04 00 02 FF, or
- Application record on CID 63 01 00 05 containing FF.


For EtM construction, it is even worse. There is no way to check for
consistency, because CBC mode leaves end of message intact even if
IV or length are bogus, meaning all the depad and content-type checks
will pass.

The AEAD construction is not affected. Even if the design is pretty
bad, the CID is the only variable-length field in AD, so its length
can be inferred from AD length.


Swapping order of CID and its length will solve it:

<seqnum> 19 FE FD 01 63 00 05 04 00 02 FF 17

- Application record on CID 63 containing 04 00 02 FF.

<seqnum> 19 FE FD 04 63 01 00 05 00 02 FF 17

- Application record on CID 63 01 00 05 containing FF.

Tricks altering CID length are not possible, because those will
alter a byte at fixed position. And one can not alter CID without
changing its length either, as those will alter bytes at fixed
position as well.



-Ilari


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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Wadson,

> The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every
> value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be
> injective.

I hope, this is just a "typo" or "mistake".

Prepending the length is the change, Ben want to use to protect against
injection. You now say, this will be "obviously injective".

> Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the
> encoding could end up the same.

Though the MAC definition starts with "MAC_write_key", I'm pretty sure,
all examples so far are just incomplete. They must declare, if the
"different/ambiguous" CIDs are refer to the same "MAC_write_key" or not.

"different MAC_write_key" =3D> obviously "end up" different.
"same MAC_write_key" =3D> the decoding of the records gets ambiguous

> In fact I think in the MAC setting
> there almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is
> right after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up
> with a cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
> Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.
>
> I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient
> when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but
> perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record
> layer of the draft.

That's just a theroretical numbers game. No one os far made any really
useful example from start to end. FMPOV, "CID with dynamic length" MUST
use a unique/deterministic encoding. If that encoding ambiguous, as
others imply/assume in their "numbers game", the whole record gets
ambiguous.

Just as forecast:
Without agreement, that the CIDs must be encoded using deterministic
interpretation, which in my opinion obsoletes these "number games",
next Summer either Raccoon or Kenny will write up their next
"time side channel attack" on this.
(The ambiguity will end up in try out the MAC for both "different
MAC_write_key" and so create a time signal. Or with "same MAC_write_key"
the receiver will not know by the failing MAC, which interpretation is
the right. I guess, this will end up in decrypt twice, also obvious time
signal.)

best regards
Achim Kraus


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Might as well publish a new revision of the I-D in the datatracker, too, since
the current one is approaching its expiry.

-Ben

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 10:16:01AM -0400, Douglas Stebila wrote:
> Thanks!  I've merged it in.
> 
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 4:48 AM Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Thanks!
> > The PR is here, happy to hear comments and corrections:
> > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_dstebila_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Dhybrid-2Ddesign_pull_1&d=DwICAg&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=scN8KVeFpWVHjq0xefZ-MgaFkz3Dur3X0b6_ev41lZE&s=uEgApPwG25neG5tcewrPfJxk6KO-9aot8ZysgPeA-Bw&e= 
> >
> > best,
> > Nimrod
> >
> >
> > On Fri, 18 Sep 2020 at 12:04, Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Sounds good to me.
> >> I'm happy to send a PR making these changes, but couldn't find the repository for the document.
> >> Could you please point me to it?


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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ilari,

> The problem is the follows:
>
> Take the following input to the MAC (MtE case):
>
> <seqnum> 19 FE FD 63 01 00 05 04 00 02 FF 17
>
> There is no way to tell from that input if it is:
>
> - Application record on CID 63 containing 04 00 02 FF, or
> - Application record on CID 63 01 00 05 containing FF.
>

Maybe you check your example?

Does the 1. assume cid-length :=3D 1?
And the 2. cid-length :=3D 4?


The dtls-record will then contain:

(remove cid-length 01, cid-length is NOT encoded in the dtls-record!)

19 FE FD <seqnum> 63 00 05 04 00 02 FF 17

or

(remove cid-length 04)

19 FE FD <seqnum> 63 01 00 05 00 02 FF 17

For me this seems to be different input to the MAC, if the cid-length is
left out. My feeling is, your example proves my opinion, that it's
better to remove the cid-length from the MAC.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi,

> I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient
> when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but
> perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record
> layer of the draft.
>

I created an issue on github to discus the requirements for encoding
variable length CIDs.

https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76

best regards
Achim Kraus


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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Wadson,

my bad, I mislead in understanding "injective".
It's not related to "injection".

best regards
Achim Kraus


> Hi Wadson,
>
>> The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every
>> value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be
>> injective.
>
> I hope, this is just a "typo" or "mistake".
>
> Prepending the length is the change, Ben want to use to protect against
> injection. You now say, this will be "obviously injective".
>
>> Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the
>> encoding could end up the same.
>
> Though the MAC definition starts with "MAC_write_key", I'm pretty sure,
> all examples so far are just incomplete. They must declare, if the
> "different/ambiguous" CIDs are refer to the same "MAC_write_key" or not.
>
> "different MAC_write_key" =3D> obviously "end up" different.
> "same MAC_write_key" =3D> the decoding of the records gets ambiguous
>
>> In fact I think in the MAC setting
>> there almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is
>> right after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up
>> with a cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
>> Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.
>>
>> I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient
>> when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but
>> perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record
>> layer of the draft.
>
> That's just a theroretical numbers game. No one os far made any really
> useful example from start to end. FMPOV, "CID with dynamic length" MUST
> use a unique/deterministic encoding. If that encoding ambiguous, as
> others imply/assume in their "numbers game", the whole record gets
> ambiguous.
>
> Just as forecast:
> Without agreement, that the CIDs must be encoded using deterministic
> interpretation, which in my opinion obsoletes these "number games",
> next Summer either Raccoon or Kenny will write up their next
> "time side channel attack" on this.
> (The ambiguity will end up in try out the MAC for both "different
> MAC_write_key" and so create a time signal. Or with "same MAC_write_key"
> the receiver will not know by the failing MAC, which interpretation is
> the right. I guess, this will end up in decrypt twice, also obvious time
> signal.)
>
> best regards
> Achim Kraus
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>
To: "'Watson Ladd'" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "'Achim Kraus'" <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: <draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org>, <tls@ietf.org>, "'Benjamin Kaduk'" <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Dear Watson,

I object to your comment about formal models of TLS not capturing wire =
encoding issues. miTLS does in fact formally specify the format of all =
messages on the wire to the bit.
In fact this is complex enough that we have a full paper just about the =
subject that will tell you more or less everything that was said in this =
thread
http://antoine.delignat-lavaud.fr/doc/usenix19.pdf - =
https://github.com/project-everest/mitls-fstar/blob/dev/src/parsers/Parse=
rs.rfc is the formal TLS message format specification including the =
demonstrably unsafe constructions (implicit tags on server key exchange =
in 1.2 and CertificateEntry in TLS 1.3).=20

In the specific context of connection ID, QUIC up to draft 16 did suffer =
from an attack caused by the lack of encoding of the CID length. The =
attack is caused by the concatenation of two variable length fields in =
the network format (the CID and the packet number) that can both be =
tampered by an active attacker. The boundary of the concatenation is =
made ambiguous to the crypto authentication (AAD of packet content =
encryption) by QUIC header protection, which is applied before =
decryption. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/114.pdf (Section III.D) for =
a description of the attack. See =
https://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/master/src/QUIC.S=
pec.VarInt.fsti and =
https://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/master/src/QUIC.S=
pec.VarInt.fst  for the formal proof that the QUIC varint encoding with =
minimal length representation satisfies the strong prefix property.

Antoine

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
Sent: dimanche 11 octobre 2020 08:50
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org; Benjamin =
Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of =
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07

On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 11:27 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Joe,
>
>  > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change =

> at  > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has =
taken a
>  > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, =
even
>  > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo =
and
>  > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's =
better
>  > to fix now rather than later.
>
> Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:
>
>  >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong  >>=20
> arguments!
>
>  > In this case, I don't have a way to  > exploit this issue, but=20
> unless someone has a way to demonstrate that  > this is not going to=20
> be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it  > now.
>  >
>
> In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured=20
> to use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's =
finish".
> I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so=20
> for something more the "cryptographic hygiene".
>
> So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be=20
> discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
> I asked this already in January 2019
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915
>
> The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no =

> one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about=20
> injection, why not remove it at all?

The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every =
value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be =
injective. Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the =
encoding could end up the same. In fact I think in the MAC setting there =
almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is right =
after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up with a =
cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.

I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient =
when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but =
perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record layer =
of the draft.

>
>  > Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?
>
> That may also be something to help, not to change still again and =
again.

I don't think the formal models of TLS reach the wire encoding.


--
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>
To: "'Watson Ladd'" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "'Achim Kraus'" <achimkraus@gmx.net>, <taramana@microsoft.com>
Cc: <draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org>, <tls@ietf.org>, "'Benjamin Kaduk'" <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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P.S. additional comments for the authors of the cTLS draft:

- it is absolutely not acceptable to tolerate two different finish =
values for the same handshake depending on which codec was used to carry =
the handshake messages. This would be an attack against the security =
definition of TLS in virtually every model that was published, symbolic =
or computational.
- it is actually very easy to prove the security of cTLS modularly (i.e. =
without changing anything in the security model of normal TLS). The idea =
is to express cTLS as an injective type cast, as suggested by others in =
the thread.
The argument for the security is based on the parser synthetizer =
combinator, which takes a parser p for type t1 and an injective function =
f:t1->t2 and returns a parser p' for the type p2. It is possible to =
generically prove that the combinator preserves the strong prefix =
property. See =
https://github.com/project-everest/everparse/blob/master/src/lowparse/Low=
Parse.Spec.Combinators.fsti#L487 (and corresponding fst) for the proof.
Writing and proving the injectivity of the f function is probably quite =
easy, as it's a function defined a high-level representations (and it's =
mostly filling missing fields with default values). We don't have time =
to do it now but if someone wants to get familiar with F* and the =
EverParse framework it's probably achievable to a beginner with some =
experience in program verification and functional languages.
- the generic argument only works if both peers know in advance which =
codec they want to use. If some clients and servers may accept both, =
something must be done to ensure that the same codec was used by both =
peers if the security model expects they must use the same codec (unless =
it is an explicit goal to allow an active adversary/"middleboxes" to =
re-encode transparently to the peers).=20
An easy way to do this is to see the codec as a transport layer =
negotiated parameter which is authenticated in the handshake with an =
added extension (similar idea to QUIC TP).
If the CH is shared by both codecs it is possible to negotiate cTLS with =
a normal extension.

Best,
Antoine

-----Original Message-----
From: antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr <antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr>=20
Sent: dimanche 11 octobre 2020 22:54
To: 'Watson Ladd' <watsonbladd@gmail.com>; 'Achim Kraus' =
<achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: 'draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org' =
<draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org>; 'tls@ietf.org' =
<tls@ietf.org>; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of =
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07

Dear Watson,

I object to your comment about formal models of TLS not capturing wire =
encoding issues. miTLS does in fact formally specify the format of all =
messages on the wire to the bit.
In fact this is complex enough that we have a full paper just about the =
subject that will tell you more or less everything that was said in this =
thread http://antoine.delignat-lavaud.fr/doc/usenix19.pdf - =
https://github.com/project-everest/mitls-fstar/blob/dev/src/parsers/Parse=
rs.rfc is the formal TLS message format specification including the =
demonstrably unsafe constructions (implicit tags on server key exchange =
in 1.2 and CertificateEntry in TLS 1.3).=20

In the specific context of connection ID, QUIC up to draft 16 did suffer =
from an attack caused by the lack of encoding of the CID length. The =
attack is caused by the concatenation of two variable length fields in =
the network format (the CID and the packet number) that can both be =
tampered by an active attacker. The boundary of the concatenation is =
made ambiguous to the crypto authentication (AAD of packet content =
encryption) by QUIC header protection, which is applied before =
decryption. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/114.pdf (Section III.D) for =
a description of the attack. See =
https://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/master/src/QUIC.S=
pec.VarInt.fsti and =
https://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/master/src/QUIC.S=
pec.VarInt.fst  for the formal proof that the QUIC varint encoding with =
minimal length representation satisfies the strong prefix property.

Antoine

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
Sent: dimanche 11 octobre 2020 08:50
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org; Benjamin =
Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of =
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07

On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 11:27 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Joe,
>
>  > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change =

> at  > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has =
taken a
>  > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, =
even
>  > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo =
and
>  > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's =
better
>  > to fix now rather than later.
>
> Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:
>
>  >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong  >>=20
> arguments!
>
>  > In this case, I don't have a way to  > exploit this issue, but=20
> unless someone has a way to demonstrate that  > this is not going to=20
> be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it  > now.
>  >
>
> In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured=20
> to use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's =
finish".
> I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so=20
> for something more the "cryptographic hygiene".
>
> So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be=20
> discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
> I asked this already in January 2019
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915
>
> The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no =

> one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about=20
> injection, why not remove it at all?

The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every =
value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be =
injective. Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the =
encoding could end up the same. In fact I think in the MAC setting there =
almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is right =
after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up with a =
cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.

I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient =
when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but =
perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record layer =
of the draft.

>
>  > Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?
>
> That may also be something to help, not to change still again and =
again.

I don't think the formal models of TLS reach the wire encoding.


--
Astra mortemque praestare gradatim

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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> The argument for the security is based on the parser synthetizer combinator, which takes a parser p for type t1 and an injective function f:t1->t2 and returns a parser p' for the type p2.

TLS, I don't even know you anymore....

Mike


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To: antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr, 'Watson Ladd' <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org, 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>
References: <0da9b525-ec78-bef5-6ceb-5f377019ade4@gmx.net> <4ca7c2f9-1e9d-0d16-0089-649f013b4565@gmx.net> <20201008233454.GF89563@kduck.mit.edu> <6185242d-8ba8-2d2f-5938-afad46c2e854@gmx.net> <20201009212240.GK89563@kduck.mit.edu> <fe7eab66-a14a-5f18-46be-7bae471c3b20@gmx.net> <CAOgPGoBWRyqQUNk3JQx2_Cna-7s-A7gENVwW-sh8+tRoJ_=V_Q@mail.gmail.com> <13a821d3-30cc-94b8-842c-22a87d280f09@gmx.net> <CACsn0cn4QcnaoocQeoiUXgGoAvfOs+1+Ei76z1Kuq8MMqNEh3Q@mail.gmail.com> <2ce401d6a010$a267c980$e7375c80$@delignat-lavaud.fr>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/WV1_qyZ4ZqqmgpZEBp_dmSLAbvM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Dear Antoine,

thanks for adding the references.

I tried to understand https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/114.pdf (Section
III.D). But to be frank, as developer, it's extremley hard not to
misunderstand, what is documented there.

For me, this seems like in QUIC, the length of the CID is encoded in the
sent message (so it's on the wire).

For draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07, at least as far as I
understood it, there are two general possiblities:

- a peer chose to emit only CID with the same static length. In that
case, the cid-length will always be the same (cid-length is not on the
wire). It can't be injected, except someone injects the execute programm
code itself.

- a peer chose to emit CIDs with variable length. In the case the other
peer is intended just to add that received CID in the hello extension to
the dtls-records. The emitting peer has to chose a encoding for such CID
with variable length, that the emitting peer is able to decode it. In
this case the cid-length is on the wire, but the encoding is not
specified in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07. In my opinion it's
extremely important, to chose a encoding, which could not be interpreted
in different ways (I guess, that's what Watson ment by "injective").

With these both options, FMPOV, to add explicit someting as the
cid-length to the MAC is not required. It's either the same static
value, or must be already encoded in the CID itself, which is already in
the MAC. But it may be required, to add constraints about such a
encoding for variable length CIDs to the draft.

The confusion may be mainly caused by the idea, to support both, static
length CID and variable length CIDs. That misleads to build examples,
assming that two CID may be used, where one CID is the start of the
other. In my opinion, that's a problem of the encoding of the variable
length CID, but not the MAC.

best regards
Achim Kraus


Am 11.10.20 um 22:53 schrieb antoine@delignat-lavaud.fr:
> Dear Watson,
>
> I object to your comment about formal models of TLS not capturing wire e=
ncoding issues. miTLS does in fact formally specify the format of all mess=
ages on the wire to the bit.
> In fact this is complex enough that we have a full paper just about the =
subject that will tell you more or less everything that was said in this t=
hread
> http://antoine.delignat-lavaud.fr/doc/usenix19.pdf - https://github.com/=
project-everest/mitls-fstar/blob/dev/src/parsers/Parsers.rfc is the formal=
 TLS message format specification including the demonstrably unsafe constr=
uctions (implicit tags on server key exchange in 1.2 and CertificateEntry =
in TLS 1.3).
>
> In the specific context of connection ID, QUIC up to draft 16 did suffer=
 from an attack caused by the lack of encoding of the CID length. The atta=
ck is caused by the concatenation of two variable length fields in the net=
work format (the CID and the packet number) that can both be tampered by a=
n active attacker. The boundary of the concatenation is made ambiguous to =
the crypto authentication (AAD of packet content encryption) by QUIC heade=
r protection, which is applied before decryption. See https://eprint.iacr.=
org/2020/114.pdf (Section III.D) for a description of the attack. See http=
s://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/master/src/QUIC.Spec.V=
arInt.fsti and https://github.com/project-everest/everquic-crypto/blob/mas=
ter/src/QUIC.Spec.VarInt.fst  for the formal proof that the QUIC varint en=
coding with minimal length representation satisfies the strong prefix prop=
erty.
>
> Antoine
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
> Sent: dimanche 11 octobre 2020 08:50
> To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
> Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org; Benjamin K=
aduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-=
id-07
>
> On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 11:27 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Joe,
>>
>>   > [Joe]  It's unfortunate to find issues that require breaking change
>> at  > the end of the review cycle, especially for a draft that has take=
n a
>>   > long path to get here.   If there is an issue that is exploitable, =
even
>>   > in a corner case, someone will develop an attack, clever name, logo=
 and
>>   > website and we will all have to scramble to deploy a fix.   It's be=
tter
>>   > to fix now rather than later.
>>
>> Agreed, therefore I wrote at the begin of the discussion with Ben:
>>
>>   >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong  >>
>> arguments!
>>
>>   > In this case, I don't have a way to  > exploit this issue, but
>> unless someone has a way to demonstrate that  > this is not going to
>> be an issue then I believe it is prudent to fix it  > now.
>>   >
>>
>> In my opinion, ONE change may be possible. A server may be configured
>> to use only the old, only the new, or both by "try on the client's fini=
sh".
>> I'm not happy with such "dirty" work-around. I would prefer to do so
>> for something more the "cryptographic hygiene".
>>
>> So, if the MAC is considered to be adpated again, should it not be
>> discussed, why at all the cid-length should be put in?
>> I asked this already in January 2019
>>
>> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29#discussion_r246654915
>>
>> The MAC contains already a overall length. Even in that discussion, no
>> one mentioned the reason for adding it. So if there a doubts about
>> injection, why not remove it at all?
>
> The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every v=
alue was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be injective.=
 Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the encoding could =
end up the same. In fact I think in the MAC setting there almost certainly=
 is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is right after the cid lengt=
h, and with some cleverness you can come up with a cid and ciphertext that=
 could be interpreted multiple ways.
> Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.
>
> I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient wh=
en the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but perhaps =
I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record layer of the dr=
aft.
>
>>
>>   > Would this issue have been caught by formal verification?
>>
>> That may also be something to help, not to change still again and again=
.
>
> I don't think the formal models of TLS reach the wire encoding.
>
>
> --
> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Hi,

It appears that there may be a need to revert to the
old way of sending Diffie-Hellman parameters that
the server generates.  I see that TLS 1.3 removed
this capability*; is there any way to add it back?

Mike


*From RFC 8446:

- Other cryptographic improvements were made,
  including changing the RSA padding to use the RSA
  Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS), and
  the removal of compression, the Digital Signature
  Algorithm (DSA), and custom Ephemeral Diffie-
  Hellman (DHE) groups.


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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 12:49:39 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Weak Diffie-Hellman Primes (was: DH generator 2 problem?)
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On Fri, Oct 9, 2020, at 11:17, Christopher Wood wrote:
> Michael, since your question is more related to the cryptographic 
> primitives used by TLS than the protocol itself, the chairs encourage 
> you to continue this discussion on the CFRG mailing list [2]. 
> 
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
> 
> [1] ...
> [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/

Hi,

As requested, I sent the message below to the CFRG
mailing list on the 10th.  I did not join the list, but have
been watching via the link [2] above and so far nobody
has said anything.

Mike


------------------------------------------------------------
To: cfrg at irtf dot org

Hi,

I'm not a member of this list, but was encouraged to
start a discussion here about a discovery I made
w.r.t. the published Diffie-Hellman prime numbers in
RFC's 2409, 3526, and 7919.  These primes all have
a very interesting property where you get 64 or more
bits (the least significant bits of 2^X mod P for some
secret X and prime P) detailing how the modulo
operation was done.  These 64 bits probably reduce
the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchanges though
I have not tried to figure out how.

The number 2^X is going to be a single bit with value
1 followed by a lot of zeros.  All of the primes in the
above mentioned RFC's have 64 bits of 1 in the most
and least significant positions.  The 2's complement
of these primes will have a one in the least significant
bit and at least 63 zeros to the left.

When you think about how a modulo operation is done
manually, you compare a shifted version of P against
the current value of the operand (which is initially 2^X)
and if it's larger than the (shifted) P, you subtract P at
that position and shift P to the right, or if the operand
is smaller than (the shifted) P, you just shift P to the
right without subtracting.

Instead of subtracting, you can add the 2's complement
I mentioned above.  Because of the fact that there are
63 zeros followed by a 1 in the lowest position, you will
see a record of when the modulo operation performed
a subtraction (there's a one) and when it didn't (there's
a zero).

You can use the value of the result you were given by
your peer (which is 2^X mod P) and then add back the
various 2^j * P's detailed wherever the lowest 64 bits
had a value of 1 to find the state of the mod  P operation
when it wasn't yet finished.  This intermediate result is
likely going to make it easier to determine X than just a
brute force search.

I don't plan to join this list, though I am flattered to have
been asked to do so.  I'm not a cryptographer.

Mike


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 12:36:06PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> 
> It appears that there may be a need to revert to the
> old way of sending Diffie-Hellman parameters that
> the server generates.  I see that TLS 1.3 removed
> this capability*; is there any way to add it back?

The Diffie-Hellman support in TLS 1.2 is severly broken. There is no
way to use it safely on client side. This has lead to e.g., all the web
browers to remove support for it.

There is no way to ensure that the parameters sent are not totally
broken, e.g.:

- Modulus too small.
- Modulus too large.
- Modulus not prime (has been used as a backdoor!).
- Modulus is weak (possibly backdoored).
- Subgroup order does not have large prime factor.

Even checking the third would require primality test, and primality
tests at relevant sizes are slow. And the fourth and fifth can not be
checked at all in general case.


For ECDHE, TLS 1.2 allowed server to specify custom curve to do the
key exchange with. Rightfully pretty much nobody implemented that.


I think TLS WG should withdraw recommendation (as flawed) on all
TLS_DHE_* ciphersuites.


-Ilari


From nobody Mon Oct 12 10:36:11 2020
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
CC: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/fkUQJuH4m6gzPvz3w_yjAQEU3qA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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--B_3685354518_2031205771
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="UTF-8"
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I suggest that custom parameters should be allowed, and documented as compl=
etely under user/administrator responsibility.

Ensuring that a custom modulus is not "too small" or "too large" (etc.) in =
that case is not your problem or your business.



=EF=BB=BFOn 10/12/20, 13:32, "TLS on behalf of Ilari Liusvaara" <tls-bounces@ietf=
.org on behalf of ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:

    On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 12:36:06PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
    >=20
    > It appears that there may be a need to revert to the
    > old way of sending Diffie-Hellman parameters that
    > the server generates.  I see that TLS 1.3 removed
    > this capability*; is there any way to add it back?

    The Diffie-Hellman support in TLS 1.2 is severly broken. There is no
    way to use it safely on client side. This has lead to e.g., all the web
    browers to remove support for it.

    There is no way to ensure that the parameters sent are not totally
    broken, e.g.:

    - Modulus too small.
    - Modulus too large.
    - Modulus not prime (has been used as a backdoor!).
    - Modulus is weak (possibly backdoored).
    - Subgroup order does not have large prime factor.

    Even checking the third would require primality test, and primality
    tests at relevant sizes are slow. And the fourth and fifth can not be
    checked at all in general case.


    For ECDHE, TLS 1.2 allowed server to specify custom curve to do the
    key exchange with. Rightfully pretty much nobody implemented that.


    I think TLS WG should withdraw recommendation (as flawed) on all
    TLS_DHE_* ciphersuites.


    -Ilari

    _______________________________________________
    TLS mailing list
    TLS@ietf.org
    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

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--B_3685354518_2031205771--


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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 14:06:31 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Would it be possible to define a new dual-DH exchange
where you do one with server-supplied parameters, and
a second one with client-supplied parameters, so if one
is broken or sabotaged the connection is still secure?

Mike


On Mon, Oct 12, 2020, at 13:35, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> I suggest that custom parameters should be allowed, and documented as=20=

> completely under user/administrator responsibility.
>=20
> Ensuring that a custom modulus is not "too small" or "too large" (etc.=
)=20
> in that case is not your problem or your business.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> =EF=BB=BFOn 10/12/20, 13:32, "TLS on behalf of Ilari Liusvaara"=20
> <tls-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>=20
>     On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 12:36:06PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
>     >=20
>     > It appears that there may be a need to revert to the
>     > old way of sending Diffie-Hellman parameters that
>     > the server generates.  I see that TLS 1.3 removed
>     > this capability*; is there any way to add it back?
>=20
>     The Diffie-Hellman support in TLS 1.2 is severly broken. There is =
no
>     way to use it safely on client side. This has lead to e.g., all th=
e web
>     browers to remove support for it.
>=20
>     There is no way to ensure that the parameters sent are not totally=

>     broken, e.g.:
>=20
>     - Modulus too small.
>     - Modulus too large.
>     - Modulus not prime (has been used as a backdoor!).
>     - Modulus is weak (possibly backdoored).
>     - Subgroup order does not have large prime factor.
>=20
>     Even checking the third would require primality test, and primalit=
y
>     tests at relevant sizes are slow. And the fourth and fifth can not=
 be
>     checked at all in general case.
>=20
>=20
>     For ECDHE, TLS 1.2 allowed server to specify custom curve to do th=
e
>     key exchange with. Rightfully pretty much nobody implemented that.=

>=20
>=20
>     I think TLS WG should withdraw recommendation (as flawed) on all
>     TLS_DHE_* ciphersuites.
>=20
>=20
>     -Ilari
>=20
>     _______________________________________________
>     TLS mailing list
>     TLS@ietf.org
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> Attachments:
> * smime.p7s


From nobody Mon Oct 12 12:57:12 2020
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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 12:57:02 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Hi Mike,

On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 01:29:13PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 9, 2020, at 17:22, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > [...]  The behavior we should demand from our cryptographic
> > constructions is that the cryptography itself correctly returns
> > "valid" or "invalid" based on the input message, provided that
> > the application inputs the correct key material.  (It should also
> > return "invalid" if incorrect key material is supplied, of course.)
> > The ability to produce two different messages for which the
> > cryptography returns "valid" violates this principle; even if we
> > do not see an obvious path by which a reasonable application
> > might supply those inputs to the cryptographic code, it is still
> > a flawed construction.
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I'd like clarification about this point, where the cryptography
> should return values of "valid" or "invalid".  This is a general
> question, not specifically about this draft.  (Please read at
> least the next 2 paragraphs.)
> 
> I remember a long time ago, it may have been the renegotiation
> info extension, where there was a lot of calculation being done,
> there were two complicated values each side had to compute.
> If they were equal, then everything was fine and the handshake
> could proceed.  If not, there was an insecure renegotiation
> happening.  (Or maybe it was the downgrade protection RFC,
> I can't remember now.)  But if the values were not equal, then
> something bad was happening and the handshake should not
> proceed.
> 
> The problem both Martin Rex and I discovered at nearly the
> same time (posts to the mailing list within minutes of each
> other) was that both sides could go through all the motions
> faithfully calculating all of the values, correctly, and then
> forget to compare them to see if the values were actually
> the same.  I noticed this because I wrote the code, and it
> seemed like an easy thing to overlook.
> 
> I remember suggesting that we somehow incorporate the
> calculated values into the derivation of the record layer keys
> so the MAC would fail, or maybe into the Finished message
> calculation so (if you remember to check that?) a failure is
> noticed later.  This suggestion was shot down by the author
> unilaterally for what I perceived at the time to be petty
> reasons.
> 
> I still believe that (D)TLS security should not rely on the
> implementer to check whether two values are equal.  This
> is too easy to forget to do.  Or you could do this in C:
> 
>     if (complex_value_a = complex_value_b) {
>         // we're in trouble....
>     }
> 
> I have not looked at the TLS 1.3 draft beyond the hour or so
> I've put in so far to see whether this reliance on checking is
> in there too.  I've also not checked whether the security

The TLS 1.3 handshake transcript is an input to the key schedule; manual
comparison of generated values is not necessary for security.

I would encourage you to continue in your efforts reading RFC 8446 -- in my
opinion we put quite a bit of effort in towards making it readable.  (With,
perhaps, the exception of stateless HelloRetryRequest as you have already
noted, since the main expected use case is in DTLS.)

-Ben


From nobody Mon Oct 12 13:06:06 2020
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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 13:05:48 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Achim,

On Sun, Oct 11, 2020 at 07:43:14PM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Watson,
> 
> > The doubt is because of where it appears not that it appears. If every
> > value was preceded by its length the encoding would obviously be
> > injective.
> 
> I hope, this is just a "typo" or "mistake".
> 
> Prepending the length is the change, Ben want to use to protect against
> injection. You now say, this will be "obviously injective".

Since apparently this was not fully clear, allow me to link the wikipedia
article corresponding to "injective map (in the mathematical sense)" in my
earlier description: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Injective_function

> > Here though it isn't clear if two different inputs to the
> > encoding could end up the same.
> 
> Though the MAC definition starts with "MAC_write_key", I'm pretty sure,
> all examples so far are just incomplete. They must declare, if the
> "different/ambiguous" CIDs are refer to the same "MAC_write_key" or not.
> 
> "different MAC_write_key" => obviously "end up" different.
> "same MAC_write_key" => the decoding of the records gets ambiguous
> 
> > In fact I think in the MAC setting
> > there almost certainly is a problem as the length of the ciphertext is
> > right after the cid length, and with some cleverness you can come up
> > with a cid and ciphertext that could be interpreted multiple ways.
> > Unfortunately I haven't followed the draft's discussions that closely.
> >
> > I do not understand how a CID is supposed to be parsed by a recipient
> > when the length can change and the length field is not encoded, but
> > perhaps I'm misreading the intent of the [] notation in the record
> > layer of the draft.
> 
> That's just a theroretical numbers game. No one os far made any really
> useful example from start to end. FMPOV, "CID with dynamic length" MUST

In my opinion a useful example from start to end is not a prerequisite for
making a change to the spec in the face of a demonstrated local weakness.
Attacks only ever get better, and we should not leave known building blocks
for them in place.

> use a unique/deterministic encoding. If that encoding ambiguous, as
> others imply/assume in their "numbers game", the whole record gets
> ambiguous.

Yes, an entity assigning its own CIDs has to be able to distinguish them on
receipt based on the record bitstream (which does not supply its own
framing for the CID length).  The current text may not be as explicit about
this requirement as it could be (it may only list a requirement that the
values given out have to be recognized, not that there has to be a unique
parsing of all potential CID bytestreams in a received record that rejects
invalid ones?  I didn't check).

> Just as forecast:
> Without agreement, that the CIDs must be encoded using deterministic
> interpretation, which in my opinion obsoletes these "number games",
> next Summer either Raccoon or Kenny will write up their next
> "time side channel attack" on this.
> (The ambiguity will end up in try out the MAC for both "different
> MAC_write_key" and so create a time signal. Or with "same MAC_write_key"
> the receiver will not know by the failing MAC, which interpretation is
> the right. I guess, this will end up in decrypt twice, also obvious time
> signal.)

Just to check my understanding: your forecast of an attack is predicated on
implementations that accept both potential MAC calculations proposed (CID
length before CID and CID length after CID)?  I do not think we should
allow things to progress to a state where accepting both forms is
encouraged, precisely because it leads to this sort of difficulty.   Hence,
my suggestion to assign a different extension codepoint, so an
implementation knows exactly which procedure to use.

-Ben


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From nobody Mon Oct 12 13:45:47 2020
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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 13:45:35 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 09:13:51AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> >
> > To be frank, I'm actually surprised that this is even seen as a matter for
> > discussion.
> 
> As developer, I'm surprised, that this discussion now spans a couple of
> years, starting on summer 2018 with:
> 
> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/8

Well, we are not always happy about it (in fact, usually are unhappy), but
writing protocol specifications does have a reputation for taking a long
time due to repeated experiences.  It's also the case that the spec isn't
done until it's done, and that breaking changes to the spec are possible at
any time before it's done.

> There are many (proposed) changes since then. I already tried to point
> to that with my e-mail answer from 4. September
> 
>  >> That order was also discussed a lot.
>  >> https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/pull/29
>  >> I would prefer, if this is not changed again without strong arguments!
> 
> For me, "cryptographic hygiene", which breaks the API, are not strong
> arguments. Sure, that's only my personal opinion. I'm not sure, if a new
> code-point helps, nor that a new one is emitted for changing a draft (I
> would not recommend to do so, draft is a draft).

A codepoint should have a specific well-defined behavior.  The current
allocation of extension type 53 is explicitly marked as TEMPORARY and
can+will age out if we get a new one for the new semantics; this is normal.

> So let me try to find a end:
> As developer, I see it's very important to come to a stable definition
> of the MAC. If now the order of the cid/cid-length is changing the MAC
> (again), and in half a year the next "cryptographic hygiene" campaign
> removes the cid-length (because it's not on the header and some
> (including me) don't see the benefit), then FMPOV this "process" just
> demonstrates more weakness, than I appreciate.
> 
> So:
> If there is a guideline for constructing MACs, is that guideline
> documented somewhere?
> If the guideline is changing over the time, are these changes documented?

Sure, there's pretty standard common-knowledge guidance, though I'm not
sure it's documented anyplace particularly discoverable:

- include in the MAC as much application/protocol context and protocol
  fields as you can without breaking operation of the procotol
- ensure that the mapping from (set of protocol fields and values derived
  from application context) to (bytes given as input to the MAC function) is
  an injective mapping

In some (many?) cases, there is not any additional contextual information
available, and the protocol header itself has a deterministic/fixed-length
encoding, so both points can be achieved by just using the protocol
header/payload as it appears on the wire as MAC input.  For better or for
worse, the current construction in the -07 diverges significantly from the
actual protocol header, so we have to do a bit of thinking to ensure that
we are compliant to the guidelines (that I just described, so I assume you
did not previously think about them in that formulation).


For what it's worth, I am in a similar position as you in that I don't see
a specific reason that including the CID length explicitly is *required*,
since the CID itself would need to be using a self-delineating encoding in
order for the packet to be parseable (if variable-length CIDs are used at
all; a fixed-length CID is trivially delineated).  I would be pretty okay
with not having the separate length field if our MAC inputs more closely
followed the record header (and, to be honest, I could accept not having it
at all even with the current order of (other) fields in the MAC input, in
the absence of specific reasoning why it's needed), though I prefer to keep
an explicit length if we stay with something resembling the current
formulation (that diverging from the record header as it appears on the
wire), just to make it easier to reason about.  I still, however, object to
the construction in the -07 that puts the CID length after the CID -- there
is no point in having the CID length if you need a self-delineating CID
anyway [1], and its current location gives an aveue of malleability to an
attacker.  Leaving this kind of local malleability of MAC input in place
seems irresponsible and is not in keeping with the quality expectations for
the output of the TLS working group.

(We should also check to make sure that we properly document the
requirements on CID generation and parsing schemes, as you noted
elsewhere.)

> And I would really welcome, also based on the experience with the long
> history of this discussion, if more can give their feedback about
> changing the MAC again. Please, this year, not next :-).

I believe that Joe's response supports my "don't leave areas of local
malleability in place" stance.  I guess maybe the discussion is migrating
to the github issue, though, so I will try to watch there as well.

Thanks,

Ben

[1] "need [...] anyway" here is perhaps most usefully thought of in the
sense of inverting the (injective) map from (protocol parameters and context)
to (input to the MAC function), since this needs to be possible for any
valid MAC input in order for the injective property to hold.


From nobody Mon Oct 12 14:38:41 2020
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 17:38:20 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] draft-vvv-tls-alps-01
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Hi all,

Victor and I recently published draft-vvv-tls-alps-01. It has a couple of
changes that I wanted to get the WG=E2=80=99s thoughts on. The changes are
switching the bespoke ClientApplicationSettings message to a client
EncryptedExtensions message and clarifying the 0-RTT handling.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vvv-tls-alps-01

I think it was EKR who suggested a client EncryptedExtensions message, so
future extensions can more easily add to the client Finished leg. A new
message means picking when it is sent, and a new extensions block means
picking when extensions are allowed. We=E2=80=99ve initially gone with:


   -

   We add a CEE tag to the TLS 1.3 column in the IANA registry.
   -

   The client sends EncryptedExtensions, possibly empty, if and only if the
   server sent at least one CEE-tagged extension in server
   EncryptedExtensions. (No unsolicited server extensions, so the client wi=
ll
   know the status of each extension.)
   -

   The client may send an extension in EncryptedExtensions if the server
   sent the corresponding extension in server EncryptedExtensions. (Whether=
 it
   is mandatory or optional once negotiated is the extension=E2=80=99s busi=
ness.)


Other formulations may also work. We picked this to avoid an optional
message (see half-RTT tickets below), and to try to match the existing
scheme.

For 0-RTT, ALPS aims to align with ALPN where we carry over the ticket
state (like ALPN, ALPS is resolved before any application data) and decline
0-RTT on mismatch. That leaves the question of resending the information
(receiver checks it matches) vs omitting it (receiver implicitly carries it
over). ALPN does the former, but we=E2=80=99ve currently gone with the latt=
er for
ALPS. Both seem comparable implementation-wise, but we picked this for
fewer bytes on the wire, and to avoid breaking half-RTT tickets. We=E2=80=
=99d
particularly like to hear the WG=E2=80=99s thoughts on this last point.

Section 4.6.1 of RFC8446 has the following text:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.6.1

   Note: Although the resumption master secret depends on the client's

   second flight, a server which does not request client authentication

   MAY compute the remainder of the transcript independently and then

   send a NewSessionTicket immediately upon sending its Finished rather

   than waiting for the client Finished.  This might be appropriate in

   cases where the client is expected to open multiple TLS connections

   in parallel and would benefit from the reduced overhead of a

   resumption handshake, for example.

This relies on the server being able to predict the client Finished flight
in 0-RTT handshakes. Two risks here:


   -

   Whether EncryptedExtensions is sent must be deterministic (as in our
   formulation).
   -

   Extension order is not fixed. If we ever have two client encrypted
   extensions sent over 0-RTT, the server cannot predict which will go firs=
t.


We thus punted this in -01 by not sending the redundant extension in 0-RTT
at all. Another option would be locking the client EE extension order. But
I think we should decide whether half-RTT tickets are a constraint we want
to carry going forward.

Half-RTT tickets were originally added for a stateless reject flow in QUIC
that no longer applies. We=E2=80=99ve since found it useful for 0-RTT, to a=
void
some problematic I/O patterns. (See
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hymweZ66b2C8nnYyXF8cwj7qopc, and =
this
comment
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6944#issuecomment-413858136> from
I think an NGINX developer.) We=E2=80=99ve since realized we can avoid the
surprising I/O patterns by deferring NewSessionTicket to the next
application write and have done so in BoringSSL for 1-RTT. For 0-RTT, we
currently still use half-RTT tickets because the cost is connections don=E2=
=80=99t
deliver tickets until the second application round-trip rather than the
first:

ClientHello
GET /request1 HTTP/1.1
                        ServerHello..Finished
                              HTTP/1.1 200 OK
EndOfEarlyData..Finished
GET /request2 HTTP/1.1
                             NewSessionTicket
                              HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Delaying this seems surprising and not ideal. We already see that
post-handshake NST is itself surprising to application developers, since
the client only picks up tickets on the first read. This would *further*
delay it to some late read. It=E2=80=99s also something the RFC explicitly =
says you
can do, and dropping this would contradict that decision. At the same time,
the prediction bits are goofy and constraining.

Thoughts?

David

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"gmail-docs-internal-guid-902c0b2b-7fff-0c9d-67=
8e-731e61ec32f0"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;ma=
rgin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgrou=
nd-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:no=
rmal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Hi all,</span></p><br><p=
 dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><s=
pan style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparen=
t;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align=
:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Victor and I recently published draft-vvv-t=
ls-alps-01. It has a couple of changes that I wanted to get the WG=E2=80=99=
s thoughts on. The changes are switching the bespoke ClientApplicationSetti=
ngs message to a client EncryptedExtensions message and clarifying the 0-RT=
T handling.</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);bac=
kground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asi=
an:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><a href=3D"https://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vvv-tls-alps-01">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draf=
t-vvv-tls-alps-01</a><br></span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height=
:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;fon=
t-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">I=
 think it was EKR who suggested a client EncryptedExtensions message, so fu=
ture extensions can more easily add to the client Finished leg. A new messa=
ge means picking when it is sent, and a new extensions block means picking =
when extensions are allowed. We=E2=80=99ve initially gone with:</span></p><=
br><ul style=3D"margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"=
list-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tr=
ansparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertic=
al-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"background-color:transpar=
ent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">We add a CEE tag to the TLS 1.3 column in=
 the IANA registry.</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type=
:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-=
variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseli=
ne;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt=
;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"background-color:transparent;font-varian=
t-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;whi=
te-space:pre-wrap">The client sends EncryptedExtensions, possibly empty, if=
 and only if the server sent at least one CEE-tagged extension in server En=
cryptedExtensions. (No unsolicited server extensions, so the client will kn=
ow the status of each extension.)</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ist-style-type:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:tra=
nsparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertica=
l-align:baseline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"background-color:transpare=
nt;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-alig=
n:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">The client may send an extension in Encryp=
tedExtensions if the server sent the corresponding extension in server Encr=
yptedExtensions. (Whether it is mandatory or optional once negotiated is th=
e extension=E2=80=99s business.)</span></p></li></ul><br><p dir=3D"ltr" sty=
le=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"fon=
t-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-n=
umeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-=
space:pre-wrap">Other formulations may also work. We picked this to avoid a=
n optional message (see half-RTT tickets below), and to try to match the ex=
isting scheme.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margi=
n-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0=
,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-e=
ast-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">For 0-RTT, A=
LPS aims to align with ALPN where we carry over the ticket state (like ALPN=
, ALPS is resolved before any application data) and decline 0-RTT on mismat=
ch. That leaves the question of resending the information (receiver checks =
it matches) vs omitting it (receiver implicitly carries it over). ALPN does=
 the former, but we=E2=80=99ve currently gone with the latter for ALPS. Bot=
h seem comparable implementation-wise, but we picked this for fewer bytes o=
n the wire, and to avoid breaking half-RTT tickets. We=E2=80=99d particular=
ly like to hear the WG=E2=80=99s thoughts on this last point.</span></p><br=
><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"=
><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpa=
rent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-al=
ign:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Section 4.6.1 of RFC8446 has the followi=
ng text:</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;=
margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4=
.6.1" style=3D"text-decoration-line:none"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;=
background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-=
asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-s=
pace:pre-wrap">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.6.1</span></a>=
</p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bott=
om:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:=
transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vert=
ical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Note: Although =
the resumption master secret depends on the client&#39;s</span></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;fo=
nt-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:bas=
eline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0second flight, a server which=
 does not request client authentication</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:=
normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:p=
re-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0MAY compute the remainder of the transcript inde=
pendently and then</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margi=
n-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0=
,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-e=
ast-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0send a NewSessionTicket immediately upon sending its Finished rather<=
/span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bo=
ttom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-colo=
r:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;ve=
rtical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0than waiting =
for the client Finished.=C2=A0 This might be appropriate in</span></p><p di=
r=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span=
 style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;f=
ont-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:ba=
seline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0cases where the client is ex=
pected to open multiple TLS connections</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:=
normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:p=
re-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0in parallel and would benefit from the reduced o=
verhead of a</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:=
0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);ba=
ckground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-as=
ian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
resumption handshake, for example.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"li=
ne-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family=
:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:n=
ormal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pr=
e-wrap">This relies on the server being able to predict the client Finished=
 flight in 0-RTT handshakes. Two risks here:</span></p><br><ul style=3D"mar=
gin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px"><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-type:dis=
c;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-vari=
ant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;w=
hite-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;mar=
gin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"background-color:transparent;font-variant-nu=
meric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-s=
pace:pre-wrap">Whether EncryptedExtensions is sent must be deterministic (a=
s in our formulation).</span></p></li><li dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"list-style-t=
ype:disc;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;fo=
nt-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:bas=
eline;white-space:pre"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:=
0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"background-color:transparent;font-var=
iant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;=
white-space:pre-wrap">Extension order is not fixed. If we ever have two cli=
ent encrypted extensions sent over 0-RTT, the server cannot predict which w=
ill go first.</span></p></li></ul><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-=
variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">We =
thus punted this in -01 by not sending the redundant extension in 0-RTT at =
all. Another option would be locking the client EE extension order. But I t=
hink we should decide whether half-RTT tickets are a constraint we want to =
carry going forward.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-var=
iant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Half-R=
TT tickets were originally added for a stateless reject flow in QUIC that n=
o longer applies. We=E2=80=99ve since found it useful for 0-RTT, to avoid s=
ome problematic I/O patterns. (See </span><a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/tls/hymweZ66b2C8nnYyXF8cwj7qopc" style=3D"text-decoration-l=
ine:none"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;fon=
t-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-lin=
e:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">https://mailarchi=
ve.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hymweZ66b2C8nnYyXF8cwj7qopc</span></a><span style=
=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-va=
riant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline=
;white-space:pre-wrap">, and </span><a href=3D"https://github.com/openssl/o=
penssl/pull/6944#issuecomment-413858136" style=3D"text-decoration-line:none=
"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;background-color:transparent;font-varian=
t-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-decoration-line:underl=
ine;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">this comment</span></a><s=
pan style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparen=
t;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align=
:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"> from I think an NGINX developer.) We=E2=80=
=99ve since realized we can avoid the surprising I/O patterns by deferring =
NewSessionTicket to the next application write and have done so in BoringSS=
L for 1-RTT. For 0-RTT, we currently still use half-RTT tickets because the=
 cost is connections don=E2=80=99t deliver tickets until the </span><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;fon=
t-style:italic;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;v=
ertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">second</span><span style=3D"fo=
nt-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-variant-=
numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white=
-space:pre-wrap"> application round-trip rather than the first:</span></p><=
br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0p=
t"><font face=3D"monospace">ClientHello<br>GET /request1 HTTP/1.1<br>=C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 ServerHello..Finished<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK=
<br>EndOfEarlyData..Finished<br>GET /request2 HTTP/1.1<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0NewSessionTicket<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 HTTP/1.1 200=
 OK</font><br></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);bac=
kground-color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asi=
an:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Delaying this seems=
 surprising and not ideal. We already see that post-handshake NST is itself=
 surprising to application developers, since the client only picks up ticke=
ts on the first read. This would <i style=3D"">further</i> delay it to some=
 late read. </span><span style=3D"background-color:transparent;color:rgb(0,=
0,0);font-family:Arial;white-space:pre-wrap">It=E2=80=99s also something th=
e RFC explicitly says you can do, and dropping this would contradict that d=
ecision. At the same time, the prediction bits are goofy and constraining.<=
/span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margi=
n-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-=
color:transparent;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:norma=
l;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Thoughts?</span></p><br><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><sp=
an style=3D"font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent=
;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:=
baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">David</span></p></span><br class=3D"gmail-Ap=
ple-interchange-newline"></div>

--000000000000ea50f705b1801e6f--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
CC: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
Thread-Index: AQHWoLX3OjsE/emnlECFuRHL7D1JAamTXvQAgAFBt10=
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 23:41:59 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kTr4G_TalIskPRnEDBfKtXYaqVs>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> writes:=0A=0A>The Diffie-Hellman=
 support in TLS 1.2 is severly broken. There is no way to=0A>use it safely =
on client side. This has lead to e.g., all the web browers to=0A>remove sup=
port for it.=0A=0AIt's actually pretty simple, don't use toy key sizes.  Ma=
ny implementations=0Awere never vulnerable to Logjam et al because they app=
lied the simple measure=0Aof... not using toy key sizes.=0A=0A>There is no =
way to ensure that the parameters sent are not totally broken,=0A>e.g.:=0A=
=0AThis requires that the server that you're connecting to is malicious.  I=
f=0Ayou're connecting to a malicious server then you've got bigger things t=
o worry=0Aabout then what they set g to.=0A=0A>This has lead to e.g., all t=
he web browers to remove support for it.=0A=0ABecause throwing out the baby=
 with the bathwater and jumping on the next shiny=0Athing that comes along =
every time someone points out a problem seems to be a=0Arequirement for cry=
pto protocol implementers.=0A=0APeter.=0A


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

>
>> Just as forecast:
>> Without agreement, that the CIDs must be encoded using deterministic
>> interpretation, which in my opinion obsoletes these "number games",
>> next Summer either Raccoon or Kenny will write up their next
>> "time side channel attack" on this.
>> (The ambiguity will end up in try out the MAC for both "different
>> MAC_write_key" and so create a time signal. Or with "same MAC_write_key=
"
>> the receiver will not know by the failing MAC, which interpretation is
>> the right. I guess, this will end up in decrypt twice, also obvious tim=
e
>> signal.)
>
> Just to check my understanding: your forecast of an attack is predicated=
 on
> implementations that accept both potential MAC calculations proposed (CI=
D
> length before CID and CID length after CID)?  I do not think we should
> allow things to progress to a state where accepting both forms is
> encouraged, precisely because it leads to this sort of difficulty.   Hen=
ce,
> my suggestion to assign a different extension codepoint, so an
> implementation knows exactly which procedure to use.
>

My concerns are based on permit ambiguous CIDs.

 > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)

 > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>

 > could be cid_length=3D1, cid=3D0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0=
202,
 > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
 > cid_length=3D2, cis=3D0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0201,
 > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D <513 bytes>.

That results in my opinion in cid 01 and cid 01 01 being valid for the
same peer and same time.

or

 > - Application record on CID 63 containing 04 00 02 FF, or
 > - Application record on CID 63 01 00 05 containing FF.

being valid for the same peer and same time.

That seems to be the precondition for the threats. Permitting such
ambiguous CIDs may be then the root cause for such a "time side channel".

With the reference from Antoine (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/114.pdf,
Section III.D), I started to consider the encoding of a "variable length
CID" to be the real spot. That points for me to the same direction, it's
that encoding not the position of the cid-lenght.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <0da9b525-ec78-bef5-6ceb-5f377019ade4@gmx.net> <4ca7c2f9-1e9d-0d16-0089-649f013b4565@gmx.net> <20201008233454.GF89563@kduck.mit.edu> <6185242d-8ba8-2d2f-5938-afad46c2e854@gmx.net> <20201009212240.GK89563@kduck.mit.edu> <fe7eab66-a14a-5f18-46be-7bae471c3b20@gmx.net> <20201012204535.GE1212@kduck.mit.edu>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

> Sure, there's pretty standard common-knowledge guidance, though I'm not
> sure it's documented anyplace particularly discoverable:
>
> - include in the MAC as much application/protocol context and protocol
>    fields as you can without breaking operation of the procotol
> - ensure that the mapping from (set of protocol fields and values derive=
d
>    from application context) to (bytes given as input to the MAC functio=
n) is
>    an injective mapping
>
> In some (many?) cases, there is not any additional contextual informatio=
n
> available, and the protocol header itself has a deterministic/fixed-leng=
th
> encoding, so both points can be achieved by just using the protocol
> header/payload as it appears on the wire as MAC input.  For better or fo=
r
> worse, the current construction in the -07 diverges significantly from t=
he
> actual protocol header, so we have to do a bit of thinking to ensure tha=
t
> we are compliant to the guidelines (that I just described, so I assume y=
ou
> did not previously think about them in that formulation).
>

Hope, I'm not again catched by my bad english :-):

If the forumlation refers to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 (and
not my e-mails), I can't say, what was thought or not by the authors. My
role in that discussion quite a year ago, was just to ask, which of the
many variants should then be chosen in order not to change it every year.

That's also the main thing, which drives me to this endless discussion.
If it changes again, try to change it that last time.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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On 2020-10-12 19:28, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 12:36:06PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
>>
>> It appears that there may be a need to revert to the
>> old way of sending Diffie-Hellman parameters that
>> the server generates.  I see that TLS 1.3 removed
>> this capability*; is there any way to add it back?
>=20
> The Diffie-Hellman support in TLS 1.2 is severly broken. There is no
> way to use it safely on client side. This has lead to e.g., all the web=

> browers to remove support for it.

You have to excuse me, but there is a fair amount of noise in this=20
group, and it is sometimes hard to find the information you are looking=20
for, in past discussions held years or even decades ago.

But surely DHE support can't be considered broken at the protocol level, =

because the client can't confirm that the server implementation of DHE=20
parameter generation isn't broken? There are gazillion of ways the=20
server implementation might be broken, that the client has absolutely no =

way to test, regardless of which TLS protocol it supports. I do not=20
think I have to go into details.

If I remember correctly, the problem was rather that some of the most=20
common implementations had made a habit out of using poorly chosen=20
parameters, and the automated security testing tools couldn't easily=20
tell flawed servers, from servers that had fixed this issue. It wasn't=20
really a protocol issue, but purely an implementation issue.

Correct me if I remember incorrectly.


> There is no way to ensure that the parameters sent are not totally
> broken, e.g.:
>=20
> - Modulus too small.
> - Modulus too large.
> - Modulus not prime (has been used as a backdoor!).
> - Modulus is weak (possibly backdoored).
> - Subgroup order does not have large prime factor.
>=20
> Even checking the third would require primality test, and primality
> tests at relevant sizes are slow. And the fourth and fifth can not be
> checked at all in general case.
>=20
>=20
> For ECDHE, TLS 1.2 allowed server to specify custom curve to do the
> key exchange with. Rightfully pretty much nobody implemented that.
>=20
>=20
> I think TLS WG should withdraw recommendation (as flawed) on all
> TLS_DHE_* ciphersuites.
>=20
>=20
> -Ilari
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20



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--------------ms030409020208070403040005--


From nobody Mon Oct 12 23:49:46 2020
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From: Hanno =?iso-8859-1?q?B=F6ck?= <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Hi,

There was a reason custom DH parameters were removed.
Custom DH parameters were the source of plenty of problems.

I suggest reading:
https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/841-Diffie-Hellman-and-TLS-with-nonsense-pa=
rameters.html
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160128.txt

There's also a more general theme I think what we have learned over
time:
Moving parts in crypto protocols are bad, simplicity is good. Fix as
much as you can, avoid negotiating stuff.

This is not talked about that much explicitly, but it is a major change
of how crypto protocols were designed in the past (i.e. TLS 1.2 times)
where it was often considered desirable to add as much flexibility as
possible.

(Also FWIW the relevance of DH is pretty small these days. I think the
largest web clients simply don't support it at all.)

--=20
Hanno B=C3=B6ck
https://hboeck.de/


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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Ben,

Thanks for pointing out I missed a couple. Inline =E2=80=A6

spt

> On Aug 13, 2020, at 13:54, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Kathleen,
>=20
> Also inline.
>=20
> On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
>> Hi Ben,
>>=20
>> Thanks for your review.  Some initial responses are inline.
>>=20
>> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>>=20
>>> I found three documents (3656, 4540, 7562) in the list of update =
targets
>>> that are on the ISE (not IETF) stream.  I had talked to Adrian =
during my
>>> preliminary review, and in principle it is permissible to make those
>>> updates as part of this document, but we will need specific ISE =
approval
>>> to do so.  I am supposed to sync up with him during IETF LC, but the
>>> document needs to be updated to clarify that the updates of ISE
>>> documents are/will be done with permission of the ISE.  (Please also =
try
>>> to double-check that the list is complete; I didn't find an
>>> authoritative list of "all documents on the ISE stream" to grep =
against,
>>> and I didn't try to have something parse rfc-index.xml to output =
such a
>>> list.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> OK, so you'd like a list added and that's not in your pull request, =
is that
>> right?  We'll figure it out. Thanks in advance with the coordination =
with
>> Adrian.
>=20
> That's correct, this is not in my pull request (not least because that =
list
> of three documents is incomplete -- I sent a more-likely-complete list =
of 6
> documents in an off-list follow-up.
> =
https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?stream_name=3DInde=
pendent&page=3DAll
> will get a (presumably authoritative) list of ISE-stream documents, =
FWIW.

After going through the list I found six. Here=E2=80=99s some text that =
addresses the fact that will have permission from the ISE:
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6

>>> Section 1.1
>>>=20
>>> I went through all 83 of the references in the big list, that are
>>> supposed to be ones that "normatively reference TLS 1.0/1.1 or DTLS =
1.0,
>>> as well as the shorter list of already-obsoleted documents.
>>>=20
>>> I won't bore you with my full notes, but there are some particular
>>> things that stood out from the review:
>>>=20
>>> - We have a separate list of updates for documents that are already
>>>  obsolete (but don't say much about why we're going go the extra
>>>  bother).  However, three of the documents in our main list of =
updates
>>>  (4743, 4744, and 6460) are already Historic, and presumably should =
be
>>>  treated more like the already-obsolete ones.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> Obsolete does not mean the same thing as deprecate though.  TLSv1.2 =
has
>> been obsoleted by TLSv1.3, but not deprecated.  The deprecation goes =
the
>> extra step to say not to use it and it triggers many to begin phase =
out
>> plans.  Am I misunderstanding the question?
>=20
> I think you're misunderstanding the question, yes, sorry.
>=20
> I think we want the documents that are Historic to be listed =
separately
> from the other ("regular") updates, in a manner akin to what is =
already
> done for the documents that are currently obsolete.  Or, perhaps, to =
say
> that there is no point in deprecating something that is already =
historic,
> and not bother updating those three documents, but it seems okay to =
keep
> the current status with a comprehensive list of updates.

How about this:
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7

spt



From nobody Tue Oct 13 11:34:34 2020
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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 11:34:20 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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Thanks, Sean, the linked pull requests seem to do the trick.

Skimming through
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/K9_uA6m0dD_oQCw-5kAbha-Kq5M/ once
more, I think I still plan to put out a status-change document to move RFC
5469 (IDEA and DES ciphers) to Historic in parallel with the IETF LC for
this document.  It is probably not critical that we mention such a change
in the document text, though we could if we want to.

I think we still need to check for the latest version of the SP800-52r2
reference, too.

Thanks again,

Ben

On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 01:02:07PM -0400, Sean Turner wrote:
> Ben,
> 
> Thanks for pointing out I missed a couple. Inline …
> 
> spt
> 
> > On Aug 13, 2020, at 13:54, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> > 
> > Hi Kathleen,
> > 
> > Also inline.
> > 
> > On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 04:29:56PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> >> Hi Ben,
> >> 
> >> Thanks for your review.  Some initial responses are inline.
> >> 
> >> On Sun, Jul 26, 2020 at 5:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> >> 
> >>> I found three documents (3656, 4540, 7562) in the list of update targets
> >>> that are on the ISE (not IETF) stream.  I had talked to Adrian during my
> >>> preliminary review, and in principle it is permissible to make those
> >>> updates as part of this document, but we will need specific ISE approval
> >>> to do so.  I am supposed to sync up with him during IETF LC, but the
> >>> document needs to be updated to clarify that the updates of ISE
> >>> documents are/will be done with permission of the ISE.  (Please also try
> >>> to double-check that the list is complete; I didn't find an
> >>> authoritative list of "all documents on the ISE stream" to grep against,
> >>> and I didn't try to have something parse rfc-index.xml to output such a
> >>> list.
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> OK, so you'd like a list added and that's not in your pull request, is that
> >> right?  We'll figure it out. Thanks in advance with the coordination with
> >> Adrian.
> > 
> > That's correct, this is not in my pull request (not least because that list
> > of three documents is incomplete -- I sent a more-likely-complete list of 6
> > documents in an off-list follow-up.
> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?stream_name=Independent&page=All
> > will get a (presumably authoritative) list of ISE-stream documents, FWIW.
> 
> After going through the list I found six. Here’s some text that addresses the fact that will have permission from the ISE:
> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6
> 
> >>> Section 1.1
> >>> 
> >>> I went through all 83 of the references in the big list, that are
> >>> supposed to be ones that "normatively reference TLS 1.0/1.1 or DTLS 1.0,
> >>> as well as the shorter list of already-obsoleted documents.
> >>> 
> >>> I won't bore you with my full notes, but there are some particular
> >>> things that stood out from the review:
> >>> 
> >>> - We have a separate list of updates for documents that are already
> >>>  obsolete (but don't say much about why we're going go the extra
> >>>  bother).  However, three of the documents in our main list of updates
> >>>  (4743, 4744, and 6460) are already Historic, and presumably should be
> >>>  treated more like the already-obsolete ones.
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> Obsolete does not mean the same thing as deprecate though.  TLSv1.2 has
> >> been obsoleted by TLSv1.3, but not deprecated.  The deprecation goes the
> >> extra step to say not to use it and it triggers many to begin phase out
> >> plans.  Am I misunderstanding the question?
> > 
> > I think you're misunderstanding the question, yes, sorry.
> > 
> > I think we want the documents that are Historic to be listed separately
> > from the other ("regular") updates, in a manner akin to what is already
> > done for the documents that are currently obsolete.  Or, perhaps, to say
> > that there is no point in deprecating something that is already historic,
> > and not bother updating those three documents, but it seems okay to keep
> > the current status with a comprehensive list of updates.
> 
> How about this:
> https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7
> 
> spt
> 
> 


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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:09:15 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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I know that saying this will have no effect, but I'd
rather see deprecation of just TLS 1.0 and retain
version 1.1 as not recommended.

Also, we should not abandon RFC 7507 (downgrade
protection SCSV).  What harm is there in keeping it
around?  None.

Mike


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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 12:15:12 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Hi Mike,

On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 03:09:15PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> I know that saying this will have no effect, but I'd
> rather see deprecation of just TLS 1.0 and retain
> version 1.1 as not recommended.

Saying that it's your preference without saying why is likely to have
little effect, yes.  (We endeavor to make decisions based on technical
merit, not voting, after all.)  Why do you want this?  TLS 1.1 seems to
have minimal usage (less even than 1.0) and is much closer to 1.0 than 1.2
(let alone 1.3) in terms of design and safety.

> Also, we should not abandon RFC 7507 (downgrade
> protection SCSV).  What harm is there in keeping it
> around?  None.

I don't expect implementations to abandon SCSV any faster than they abandon
TLS 1.0 or 1.1.  But if the official advice is that 1.0 and 1.1 are
obsolete, then the official advice should also be that SCSV is obsolete --
its function is performed in a different way by the newer versions of TLS.

-Ben


From nobody Tue Oct 13 13:01:41 2020
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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:59:27 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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> Saying that it's your preference without saying why is likely
> to have little effect, yes.  (We endeavor to make decisions
> based on technical merit, not voting, after all.)  Why do you
> want this?

Hi,

I think the advice should be: "If your code currently
only supports TLS 1.0, please spend a week or two
adding support for both TLS 1.1 and the downgrade
protection SCSV."

Since the vast majority of the 1.0 and 1.1 specifications
is the same, someone who takes the advice has a
good chance of succeeding.

(You could then also say which other extensions are
important and why, roughly in order of importance.)

Recommending that people wholesale abandon
their legacy system and implement TLS (1.2 and)
1.3 is asking too much, and will largely be ignored
by the people who would be able to add 1.1 to their
1.0 code.

I understand that we don't vote here.

Mike


On Tue, Oct 13, 2020, at 15:15, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Hi Mike,
> 
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 03:09:15PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> > I know that saying this will have no effect, but I'd
> > rather see deprecation of just TLS 1.0 and retain
> > version 1.1 as not recommended.
> 
> Saying that it's your preference without saying why is likely to have
> little effect, yes.  (We endeavor to make decisions based on technical
> merit, not voting, after all.)  Why do you want this?  TLS 1.1 seems to
> have minimal usage (less even than 1.0) and is much closer to 1.0 than 1.2
> (let alone 1.3) in terms of design and safety.
> 
> > Also, we should not abandon RFC 7507 (downgrade
> > protection SCSV).  What harm is there in keeping it
> > around?  None.
> 
> I don't expect implementations to abandon SCSV any faster than they abandon
> TLS 1.0 or 1.1.  But if the official advice is that 1.0 and 1.1 are
> obsolete, then the official advice should also be that SCSV is obsolete --
> its function is performed in a different way by the newer versions of TLS.
> 
> -Ben
>


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To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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> On Oct 13, 2020, at 14:34, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> I think we still need to check for the latest version of the SP800-52r2
> reference, too.

You are correct - the date should be August 2019:
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/8

spt


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Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 20:24:07 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-06
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Hi Mike,

On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 03:59:27PM -0400, Michael D'Errico wrote:
> > Saying that it's your preference without saying why is likely
> > to have little effect, yes.  (We endeavor to make decisions
> > based on technical merit, not voting, after all.)  Why do you
> > want this?
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I think the advice should be: "If your code currently
> only supports TLS 1.0, please spend a week or two
> adding support for both TLS 1.1 and the downgrade
> protection SCSV."
> 
> Since the vast majority of the 1.0 and 1.1 specifications
> is the same, someone who takes the advice has a
> good chance of succeeding.
> 
> (You could then also say which other extensions are
> important and why, roughly in order of importance.)

I don't see much to object to in that advice, but the precondition is
rather limiting.  Have you considered writing a draft that covers it
(including fleshing out the important extensions)?

> Recommending that people wholesale abandon
> their legacy system and implement TLS (1.2 and)
> 1.3 is asking too much, and will largely be ignored
> by the people who would be able to add 1.1 to their
> 1.0 code.

It may be true that such recommendations will largely be ignored by people
who have 1.0-only implementations (recall that the IETF does not have an
enforcement arm!), but draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate aims to be a
Best Current Practice, and there are not preconditions to that Best.  The
Best thing you can do for TLS involves TLS 1.3, and TLS 1.2 is probably
okay, too.  I don't see anyone arguing that the Best Curent Practice for
TLS, in general, involves TLS 1.0 or 1.1, at this point.

-Ben


From nobody Wed Oct 14 07:56:26 2020
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
        Authors         : Kathleen Moriarty
                          Stephen Farrell
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2020-10-14

Abstract:
   This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346).
   Accordingly, those documents (will be moved|have been moved) to
   Historic status.  These versions lack support for current and
   recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various
   government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now
   mandate avoiding these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the
   recommended version for IETF protocols since 2008, providing
   sufficient time to transition away from older versions.  Removing
   support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack
   surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines
   library and product maintenance.

   This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0
   (RFC6347), but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version
   1.1.

   This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLSv1.0 or
   TLSv1.1 as described herein.  This document also updates the best
   practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525 and hence is part of BCP195.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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From: Douglas Stebila <douglas@stebila.ca>
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 11:24:21 -0400
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 and variable-length secrets
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I've pushed an update with fixed-length public keys here:
https://github.com/dstebila/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/pull/4

I'll wait for any feedback over the next couple of days then publish a
revised ID.

Douglas

On Sun, Oct 11, 2020 at 2:01 PM Benjamin Kaduk
<bkaduk=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Might as well publish a new revision of the I-D in the datatracker, too, =
since
> the current one is approaching its expiry.
>
> -Ben
>
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 10:16:01AM -0400, Douglas Stebila wrote:
> > Thanks!  I've merged it in.
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 4:48 AM Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>=
 wrote:
> > >
> > > Thanks!
> > > The PR is here, happy to hear comments and corrections:
> > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__github.com_dst=
ebila_draft-2Dietf-2Dtls-2Dhybrid-2Ddesign_pull_1&d=3DDwICAg&c=3D96ZbZZcaMF=
4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3DsssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=3DscN8KVeFpW=
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PeA-Bw&e=3D
> > >
> > > best,
> > > Nimrod
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, 18 Sep 2020 at 12:04, Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>=
 wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Sounds good to me.
> > >> I'm happy to send a PR making these changes, but couldn't find the r=
epository for the document.
> > >> Could you please point me to it?
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


From nobody Wed Oct 14 11:40:08 2020
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Subject: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> (Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
consider the following document: - 'Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature
hashes in TLS 1.2'
  <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-28. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening in
   strength and their deprecation process should begin for their use in
   TLS 1.2 digital signatures.  However, this document does not
   deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.  This document updates
   RFC 5246 and RFC 7525.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.






From nobody Wed Oct 14 14:20:21 2020
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Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 14:20:09 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 06:50:52AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> > Sure, there's pretty standard common-knowledge guidance, though I'm not
> > sure it's documented anyplace particularly discoverable:
> >
> > - include in the MAC as much application/protocol context and protocol
> >    fields as you can without breaking operation of the procotol
> > - ensure that the mapping from (set of protocol fields and values derived
> >    from application context) to (bytes given as input to the MAC function) is
> >    an injective mapping
> >
> > In some (many?) cases, there is not any additional contextual information
> > available, and the protocol header itself has a deterministic/fixed-length
> > encoding, so both points can be achieved by just using the protocol
> > header/payload as it appears on the wire as MAC input.  For better or for
> > worse, the current construction in the -07 diverges significantly from the
> > actual protocol header, so we have to do a bit of thinking to ensure that
> > we are compliant to the guidelines (that I just described, so I assume you
> > did not previously think about them in that formulation).
> >
> 
> Hope, I'm not again catched by my bad english :-):

Sorry, my writing became less clear when I attempted to edit it :(

> If the forumlation refers to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 (and
> not my e-mails), I can't say, what was thought or not by the authors. My
> role in that discussion quite a year ago, was just to ask, which of the
> many variants should then be chosen in order not to change it every year.

I was just saying "I only told you the list of two things that are the
standard guidance just now; I don't expect that you used those two things
as part of your thought processes before I told them to you".

-Ben


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Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 14:24:28 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 06:41:50AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> >
> >> Just as forecast:
> >> Without agreement, that the CIDs must be encoded using deterministic
> >> interpretation, which in my opinion obsoletes these "number games",
> >> next Summer either Raccoon or Kenny will write up their next
> >> "time side channel attack" on this.
> >> (The ambiguity will end up in try out the MAC for both "different
> >> MAC_write_key" and so create a time signal. Or with "same MAC_write_key"
> >> the receiver will not know by the failing MAC, which interpretation is
> >> the right. I guess, this will end up in decrypt twice, also obvious time
> >> signal.)
> >
> > Just to check my understanding: your forecast of an attack is predicated on
> > implementations that accept both potential MAC calculations proposed (CID
> > length before CID and CID length after CID)?  I do not think we should
> > allow things to progress to a state where accepting both forms is
> > encouraged, precisely because it leads to this sort of difficulty.   Hence,
> > my suggestion to assign a different extension codepoint, so an
> > implementation knows exactly which procedure to use.
> >
> 
> My concerns are based on permit ambiguous CIDs.

Ah, I think I understand better now (based on this and the rest of your
note).  I do not think we should allow such ambiguous CIDs, since (as you
note) they would require some "trial decryption" processing and the ensuing
time channels.  That said...

>  > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
> 
>  > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> 
>  > could be cid_length=1, cid=0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0202,
>  > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
>  > cid_length=2, cis=0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0201,
>  > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = <513 bytes>.
> 
> That results in my opinion in cid 01 and cid 01 01 being valid for the
> same peer and same time.

The attack does not require that both are valid for the same peer at the
same time -- the attack can still occur when the party producing the MAC is
induced to use the "wrong" (invalid CID) interpretation of the byte stream
but then the version with valid CID is presented to the party verifying the
MAC.  If the internal structure (including length encoding) of the CID is
opaque to the party producing the MAC, that party cannot validate the data
used as input to the MAC.

(Sorry for duplicating this previous paragraph here and on the github
issue.)

-Ben


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--00000000000048e59705b1a9f30a
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Hiya list,

Chris Wood plans to publish the next draft of the ECH extension by the end
of the week (or early next week). As such, I wanted to give you all a brief
run-down on the open issues, some of which won't be resolved until a later
draft. The numbers below refer to GitHub issues:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues

We would like to resolve the following before -08:

#323: Replace "inner_digest" mechanism with authentication of
ClientHelloOuter. In case of ECH acceptance, the only part of the
ClientHelloInner that is authenticated are the outer extensions
incorporated into the ClientHelloInner. David Benjamin contributed a PR
that sets the associated data for AEAD encryption to the ClientHelloOuter
(sans the ECH extension). This was previously not possible because of PSK
binders in the ClientHelloOuter. This is no longer an issue, however, since
we decided at Interim 2 to disallow session resumption in the
ClientHelloOuter. PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336

#325: The server shouldn't change its mind about ECH usage after HRR, since
switching from ClientHelloInner to ClientHelloOuter (or vice versa) could
trigger yet another HRR.
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339

There remain at least two problem areas, which won't be resolved until
after -08.

#233, #333: Our experience with implementing ECH has shown that HRR
behavior still needs to be fleshed out. First,  the client needs to ensure
that HRR-sensitive parameters match in the ClientHelloInner /
ClientHelloOuter. While it's fairly straightforward to get this right,
there are tons of ways in which implementations can get this right. We
would like to provide guidance on this (#233), but saying which parameters
are "HRR-sensitive" and which aren't is not straightforward. Chris Wood has
a PR for this, but we don't yet have consensus on it. Second, the server
needs to ensure that ECH usage doesn't change across the HRR. This is
straightforward for stateful-HRR servers (#325), but we have not yet
specified how stateless-HRR servers should do this. In fact, it's uncertain
how stateless-HRR would work in Split Mode at all (#333). PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316

#264: Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding in order to
resolve API-mismatch issues for QUIC. There's a PR for this, but we don't
yet have consensus on it. PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313

Best,
Chris P.

--00000000000048e59705b1a9f30a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hiya list,</div><div><br></div><div>Chris Wood plans =
to publish the
 next draft of the ECH extension by the end of the week (or early next=20
week). As such, I wanted to give you all a brief run-down on the open=20
issues, some of which won&#39;t be resolved until a later draft. The number=
s
 below refer to GitHub issues:<br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/=
tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues</a></div><div><br></div><div>We would like to =
resolve the following before -08:<br></div><div><br></div><div>#323:
 Replace &quot;inner_digest&quot; mechanism with authentication of=20
ClientHelloOuter. In case of ECH acceptance, the only part of the=20
ClientHelloInner that is authenticated are the outer extensions=20
incorporated into the ClientHelloInner. David Benjamin contributed a PR=20
that sets the associated data for AEAD encryption to the=20
ClientHelloOuter (sans the ECH extension). This was previously not=20
possible because of PSK binders in the ClientHelloOuter. This is no=20
longer an issue, however, since we decided at Interim 2 to disallow=20
session resumption in the ClientHelloOuter. PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https:=
//github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336" target=3D"_blank">https://=
github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336</a></div><div><br></div><div>=
</div><div>#325:
 The server shouldn&#39;t change its mind about ECH usage after HRR, since=
=20
switching from ClientHelloInner to ClientHelloOuter (or vice versa)=20
could trigger yet another HRR.</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/=
draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339</a></div><div><b></b><br></div><div>There rema=
in at least two problem areas, which won&#39;t be resolved until after -08.=
</div><div><br></div><div>#233, #333: Our experience with implementing ECH =
has shown that HRR=20
behavior still needs to be fleshed out. First,=C2=A0 the client needs to=20
ensure that HRR-sensitive parameters match in the ClientHelloInner /=20
ClientHelloOuter. While it&#39;s fairly straightforward to get this right,=
=20
there are tons of ways in which implementations can get this right. We=20
would like to provide guidance on this (#233), but saying which=20
parameters are &quot;HRR-sensitive&quot; and which aren&#39;t is not straig=
htforward.=20
Chris Wood has a PR for this, but we don&#39;t yet have consensus on it.
 Second, the server needs to ensure that ECH usage doesn&#39;t change acros=
s
 the HRR. This is straightforward for stateful-HRR servers (#325), but=20
we have not yet specified how stateless-HRR servers should do this. In=20
fact, it&#39;s uncertain how stateless-HRR would work in Split Mode at all=
=20
(#333). PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-es=
ni/pull/316" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=
/pull/316</a></div><div><br></div><div>#264: Replace record-level padding w=
ith
 handshake-level padding in order to resolve API-mismatch issues for=20
QUIC. There&#39;s a PR for this, but we don&#39;t yet have consensus on it.=
 PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/313" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/3=
13</a></div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Chris P.<br></div></div>

--00000000000048e59705b1a9f30a--


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Subject: [TLS] Outstanding issues for ECH
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Hiya list,

[Re-sending this email with a subject. Apologies for the spam!]

Chris Wood plans to publish the next draft of the ECH extension by the end
of the week (or early next week). As such, I wanted to give you all a brief
run-down on the open issues, some of which won't be resolved until a later
draft. The numbers below refer to GitHub issues:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues

We would like to resolve the following before -08:

#323: Replace "inner_digest" mechanism with authentication of
ClientHelloOuter. In case of ECH acceptance, the only part of the
ClientHelloInner that is authenticated are the outer extensions
incorporated into the ClientHelloInner. David Benjamin contributed a PR
that sets the associated data for AEAD encryption to the ClientHelloOuter
(sans the ECH extension). This was previously not possible because of PSK
binders in the ClientHelloOuter. This is no longer an issue, however, since
we decided at Interim 2 to disallow session resumption in the
ClientHelloOuter. PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336

#325: The server shouldn't change its mind about ECH usage after HRR, since
switching from ClientHelloInner to ClientHelloOuter (or vice versa) could
trigger yet another HRR.
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339

There remain at least two problem areas, which won't be resolved until
after -08.

#233, #333: Our experience with implementing ECH has shown that HRR
behavior still needs to be fleshed out. First,  the client needs to ensure
that HRR-sensitive parameters match in the ClientHelloInner /
ClientHelloOuter. While it's fairly straightforward to get this right,
there are tons of ways in which implementations can get this right. We
would like to provide guidance on this (#233), but saying which parameters
are "HRR-sensitive" and which aren't is not straightforward. Chris Wood has
a PR for this, but we don't yet have consensus on it. Second, the server
needs to ensure that ECH usage doesn't change across the HRR. This is
straightforward for stateful-HRR servers (#325), but we have not yet
specified how stateless-HRR servers should do this. In fact, it's uncertain
how stateless-HRR would work in Split Mode at all (#333). PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316

#264: Replace record-level padding with handshake-level padding in order to
resolve API-mismatch issues for QUIC. There's a PR for this, but we don't
yet have consensus on it. PR:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/313

Best,
Chris P.

--0000000000003dffa605b1aa002e
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hiya list,</div><div><br></div><div>[Re-sending this =
email with a subject. Apologies for the spam!]<br></div><div><br></div><div=
>Chris Wood plans to publish the
 next draft of the ECH extension by the end of the week (or early next=20
week). As such, I wanted to give you all a brief run-down on the open=20
issues, some of which won&#39;t be resolved until a later draft. The number=
s
 below refer to GitHub issues:<br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/=
tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues</a></div><div><br></div><div>We would like to =
resolve the following before -08:<br></div><div><br></div><div>#323:
 Replace &quot;inner_digest&quot; mechanism with authentication of=20
ClientHelloOuter. In case of ECH acceptance, the only part of the=20
ClientHelloInner that is authenticated are the outer extensions=20
incorporated into the ClientHelloInner. David Benjamin contributed a PR=20
that sets the associated data for AEAD encryption to the=20
ClientHelloOuter (sans the ECH extension). This was previously not=20
possible because of PSK binders in the ClientHelloOuter. This is no=20
longer an issue, however, since we decided at Interim 2 to disallow=20
session resumption in the ClientHelloOuter. PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https:=
//github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336" target=3D"_blank">https://=
github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336</a></div><div><br></div><div>=
#325:
 The server shouldn&#39;t change its mind about ECH usage after HRR, since=
=20
switching from ClientHelloInner to ClientHelloOuter (or vice versa)=20
could trigger yet another HRR.</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlsw=
g/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/=
draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339</a></div><div><br></div><div>There remain at l=
east two problem areas, which won&#39;t be resolved until after -08.</div><=
div><br></div><div>#233, #333: Our experience with implementing ECH has sho=
wn that HRR=20
behavior still needs to be fleshed out. First,=C2=A0 the client needs to=20
ensure that HRR-sensitive parameters match in the ClientHelloInner /=20
ClientHelloOuter. While it&#39;s fairly straightforward to get this right,=
=20
there are tons of ways in which implementations can get this right. We=20
would like to provide guidance on this (#233), but saying which=20
parameters are &quot;HRR-sensitive&quot; and which aren&#39;t is not straig=
htforward.=20
Chris Wood has a PR for this, but we don&#39;t yet have consensus on it.
 Second, the server needs to ensure that ECH usage doesn&#39;t change acros=
s
 the HRR. This is straightforward for stateful-HRR servers (#325), but=20
we have not yet specified how stateless-HRR servers should do this. In=20
fact, it&#39;s uncertain how stateless-HRR would work in Split Mode at all=
=20
(#333). PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-es=
ni/pull/316" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=
/pull/316</a></div><div><br></div><div>#264: Replace record-level padding w=
ith
 handshake-level padding in order to resolve API-mismatch issues for=20
QUIC. There&#39;s a PR for this, but we don&#39;t yet have consensus on it.=
 PR:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull=
/313" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/3=
13</a></div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Chris P.</div></div>

--0000000000003dffa605b1aa002e--


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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending Custom DHE Parameters in TLS 1.3
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Hanno B=F6ck <hanno@hboeck.de> writes:=0A=0A>I suggest reading:=0A>https://=
blog.hboeck.de/archives/841-Diffie-Hellman-and-TLS-with-nonsense-parameters=
.html=0A>https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644=0A>https://www.openssl.org/news/s=
ecadv/20160128.txt=0A=0AThis just confirms what I said previously, this is =
an overreaction to a=0Acompletely artificial situation.  The first link is =
to a problem with a badly=0Abroken implementation, the second and third are=
 to the use of maliciously-=0Agenerated parameters.  If your server is deli=
berately serving up malicious=0Aparameters then you have bigger things to w=
orry about than the crypto.=0A=0ATo put this another way, if I show that a =
malicious server can break TLS 1.3,=0Adoes that mean we have to throw it ou=
t and start bikeshedding TLS 1.4?=0A=0APeter.=0A


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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 08:12:14 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

> The attack does not require that both are valid for the same peer at the
> same time -- the attack can still occur when the party producing the MAC=
 is
> induced to use the "wrong" (invalid CID) interpretation of the byte stre=
am
> but then the version with valid CID is presented to the party verifying =
the
> MAC.

Though I consider the CID mainly as lookup-key for the security context,
including the MAC_write_key for Block Ciphers or the write_key /
write_IV for AEAD Ciphers provides in almost all casses the protection,
not the cid in the MAC. The only exclusion would be, if two different
cids point to the same security context. With a injective cid encoding,
that is mitigated.

As far as I understand your description:

1. The (server) peer 1 used cid "abcd" for it's encryption context.

2. An attacker modifies that cid "abcd" into a different cid (any
assumptions about that? Should it be "abcd12"? Or "ef3456"? Or no
special consideration?)

3. Then the other peer 2 uses the modified cid to place it into the
FINISH record and to calculate the MAC for that. The used security
context on peer 2 is NOT defined by that modified CID, it's defined by
peer 1's 5-tupel (according draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07).

4. Now peer 1 will use the modified cid to
4.a. lookup the security context. What is assumed as result here?
4.b. calculated the MAC using the security context and modified cid

In my opinion, the MAC verfication generally fails, if at least one
input is different. So either a different security context or a
different cid will fail the MAC verification.

Though you say, that not both cids need to be valid for peer 1, the
consequence for me is, that peer 1 knows only the unmodified cid, but
not the modified cid. With that, peer 1 doesn't even have a security
context to calculate the MAC with.

It's totally mystic to me, what you assume as attack.

I guess, you adapt now your example. If so, would it be possible, that
you try to follow the above steps and show, where you deviate?

> If the internal structure (including length encoding) of the CID is
> opaque to the party producing the MAC, that party cannot validate the da=
ta
> used as input to the MAC.
>
> (Sorry for duplicating this previous paragraph here and on the github
> issue.)
>

 From the github issue:

 > In short, you asked me to show how having a cid-length (in a different
 > position than currently) will prevent an attack: the attack in
 > question occurs when the client is generating a (its first) MAC, not
 > at the time when the MAC is validated.

I still fail to follow your description, even with that amend.
Would it be possible, to get more information about an attack applied on
the generation of a MAC (above in step 3)? Or does the effect occur in
an other step (maybe 4)? Which effect should be considered?

Maybe, someone else has also an opinion about that attack or the
description.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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To: last-call@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 11:56:05 +0200 (CEST)
CC: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>, rdd@cert.org, tls-chairs@ietf.org,  tls@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate@ietf.org
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Iua3ClOgRdD6mKeNNhixmNGbjc8>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> (Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
> consider the following document: - 'Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature
> hashes in TLS 1.2'
>
>   <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> as Proposed Standard
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-28. Exceptionally, comments may
> be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
> of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.


The new, backwards-incompatible and interop-fatal behaviour proposed in
section 2 of the current draft must be changed to reflect the updated
rationale from section 6 of the very same document, and to promote
safe and secure interoperability instead of a needless total interop failure.

Requesting interop failure where instead safe and secure interop can
be easily obtained, as the current draft does, would be in serious
violation of section 6 of RFC 2119 about where an imperative MUST
is not allowed for the given situation.



Section 6 of the current draft says:

   6.  Updates to RFC5246

   [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
   suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
   their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
   SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.

   In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:

   OLD:

   "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
   supports MD5 and SHA- 1."

   NEW:

   "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
   supports SHA-256."


and therefore the behaviour in section 2 about the "Signature Algorithms"
extension ought to say:

   2.  Signature Algorithms

   Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
   extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
   extension, then the server MUST use (sha256,rsa) for
   digitally_signed on the ServerKeyExchange handshake message for
   TLS cipher suites using RSA authentication, and the server MUST use
   (sha256,ecdsa) for TLS cipher suites using ECDSA authentication.

   The server behaviour ought to be consistent for both, receipt of an
   extension-less SSLv3+ ClientHello handshake message, and for a
   backwards-compatible SSL VERSION 2 CLIENT-HELLO (which can not convey
   any TLS extensions) as described in Appendix-E.2 of rfc5246,
   and as permitted in bullet 2 in section 3 of RFC6176.



As desribed in RFC6151, collision attacks on MD5 were appearing in
publications already in 2004, 2005, 2006 & 2007, the TLSv1.2 spec
rfc5246 should have never *NEWLY* added support for (md5,rsa) in
TLSv1.2 digitally_signed.

Similarily, since the sunset date for SHA1-signatures had been
announced by NIST *before* TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) was published,
TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) should have never *NEWLY* added support for
(sha1,rsa) in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed, but have used (sha256,rsa)
from the beginning.  sha256 has been required for the TLSv1.2 PRF
and for HMAC-SHA256 of several cipher suites anyway, so there
was no excuse for not using sha256 in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed
in the first place.


-Martin


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 08:59:43 -0700
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To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>,  Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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I would like to make several points here:

- In terms of operational practice, in order for a server to
function correctly, the CID must either be fixed-length for all
clients that might need to be demuxed *or*
self-describing. Otherwise, the server will not be able to determine
the correct CID. I believe this is clear in the specification:

   Because each party sends the value in the "connection_id" extension
   it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possible for
   an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connection
   identifiers.  This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup,
   for example by having the length in question be a compile-time
   constant.  Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs,
   are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
   length can be determined on reception.  Such implementations must
   still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties.
   Note that there is no CID length information included in the record
   itself.

This is an important space optimization and in fact was one of the
key points in getting us to variable CIDs in QUIC, so I would not
want to take a regression here.

- I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. It's
been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.

- To the best of my knowledge, the ability to just disclose the
encryption key but not the MAC key has never been part of the
official interface of TLS -- and of course it doesn't really
work with many AEADs. So, anyone who is doing that is off the
fairway and I don't think has any security guarantees (TLS aside,
many application protocols have surprising security properties
in this situation) With that said, we shouldn't break such uses
unnecessarily, and it seems like there might be other negative
side effects of the current construction.


So on balance, I think we should try to fix this. I'm slightly less
enthusiastic about just swapping the length field, because I'd
prefer to MAC the literal bytes (though perhaps we'll just have
to live with that). However, it might be worth bikeshedding that
some. Here's one potential alternative, though I haven't studied

struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint64 seq_num;
  uint8 cid = tls12_cid;               \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version +      |  appears on wire   | non-CID MAC
input
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /                    |
  uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;                      /
}

This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) the
bytes appear
in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length metadata
appears in
the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in the
front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.

-Ekr








On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 11:12 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi Ben,
>
> > The attack does not require that both are valid for the same peer at the
> > same time -- the attack can still occur when the party producing the MAC
> is
> > induced to use the "wrong" (invalid CID) interpretation of the byte
> stream
> > but then the version with valid CID is presented to the party verifying
> the
> > MAC.
>
> Though I consider the CID mainly as lookup-key for the security context,
> including the MAC_write_key for Block Ciphers or the write_key /
> write_IV for AEAD Ciphers provides in almost all casses the protection,
> not the cid in the MAC. The only exclusion would be, if two different
> cids point to the same security context. With a injective cid encoding,
> that is mitigated.
>
> As far as I understand your description:
>
> 1. The (server) peer 1 used cid "abcd" for it's encryption context.
>
> 2. An attacker modifies that cid "abcd" into a different cid (any
> assumptions about that? Should it be "abcd12"? Or "ef3456"? Or no
> special consideration?)
>
> 3. Then the other peer 2 uses the modified cid to place it into the
> FINISH record and to calculate the MAC for that. The used security
> context on peer 2 is NOT defined by that modified CID, it's defined by
> peer 1's 5-tupel (according draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07).
>
> 4. Now peer 1 will use the modified cid to
> 4.a. lookup the security context. What is assumed as result here?
> 4.b. calculated the MAC using the security context and modified cid
>
> In my opinion, the MAC verfication generally fails, if at least one
> input is different. So either a different security context or a
> different cid will fail the MAC verification.
>
> Though you say, that not both cids need to be valid for peer 1, the
> consequence for me is, that peer 1 knows only the unmodified cid, but
> not the modified cid. With that, peer 1 doesn't even have a security
> context to calculate the MAC with.
>
> It's totally mystic to me, what you assume as attack.
>
> I guess, you adapt now your example. If so, would it be possible, that
> you try to follow the above steps and show, where you deviate?
>
> > If the internal structure (including length encoding) of the CID is
> > opaque to the party producing the MAC, that party cannot validate the
> data
> > used as input to the MAC.
> >
> > (Sorry for duplicating this previous paragraph here and on the github
> > issue.)
> >
>
>  From the github issue:
>
>  > In short, you asked me to show how having a cid-length (in a different
>  > position than currently) will prevent an attack: the attack in
>  > question occurs when the client is generating a (its first) MAC, not
>  > at the time when the MAC is validated.
>
> I still fail to follow your description, even with that amend.
> Would it be possible, to get more information about an attack applied on
> the generation of a MAC (above in step 3)? Or does the effect occur in
> an other step (maybe 4)? Which effect should be considered?
>
> Maybe, someone else has also an opinion about that attack or the
> description.
>
> best regards
> Achim Kraus
>

--000000000000bc465005b1b7bea4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I would like to make several points here:<br><br>- In term=
s of operational practice, in order for a server to<br>function correctly, =
the CID must either be fixed-length for all<br>clients that might need to b=
e demuxed *or*<br>self-describing. Otherwise, the server will not be able t=
o determine<br>the correct CID. I believe this is clear in the specificatio=
n:<br><br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Because each party sends the value in the &quot;conn=
ection_id&quot; extension<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0it wants to receive as a CID in e=
ncrypted records, it is possible for<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0an endpoint to use a g=
lobally constant length for such connection<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0identifiers.=C2=
=A0 This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup,<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0fo=
r example by having the length in question be a compile-time<br>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0constant.=C2=A0 Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs,=
<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way tha=
t its<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0length can be determined on reception.=C2=A0 Such imp=
lementations must<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0still be able to send CIDs of different l=
ength to other parties.<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that there is no CID length in=
formation included in the record<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0itself.<br><br>This is an =
important space optimization and in fact was one of the<br>key points in ge=
tting us to variable CIDs in QUIC, so I would not<br>want to take a regress=
ion here.<br><br>- I agree with Ben that the current construction has some =
awkward<br>properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that=
. It&#39;s<br>been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I re=
call the<br>rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than=
 some<br>reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on=
<br>this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.<br><br=
>- To the best of my knowledge, the ability to just disclose the<br>encrypt=
ion key but not the MAC key has never been part of the<br>official interfac=
e of TLS -- and of course it doesn&#39;t really<br>work with many AEADs. So=
, anyone who is doing that is off the<br>fairway and I don&#39;t think has =
any security guarantees (TLS aside,<br>many application protocols have surp=
rising security properties<br>in this situation) With that said, we shouldn=
&#39;t break such uses<br>unnecessarily, and it seems like there might be o=
ther negative<br>side effects of the current construction.<br><br><br>So on=
 balance, I think we should try to fix this. I&#39;m slightly less<br>enthu=
siastic about just swapping the length field, because I&#39;d<br>prefer to =
MAC the literal bytes (though perhaps we&#39;ll just have<br>to live with t=
hat). However, it might be worth bikeshedding that<br>some. Here&#39;s one =
potential alternative, though I haven&#39;t studied<br><br>struct {<br>=C2=
=A0 uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>=C2=A0 uint8 cid_le=
n; =C2=A0 <br>=C2=A0 uint64 seq_num; =C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>=C2=A0 uint8 cid =3D =
tls12_cid; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \<br>=C2=A0 uin=
t16 DTLSCiphertext.version + =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| =C2=A0appears on wire =
=C2=A0 | non-CID MAC input<br>=C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_len]; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 / =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>=C2=A0 uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPl=
aintext; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0/<br>} <br><br>This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the pr=
operties that (1) the bytes appear<br>in the MAC in the order they appear o=
n the wire (2) fixed-length metadata appears in<br>the front (the seq_num a=
lready does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in the<br>front avoids confusion =
with MAC input for other records.<br><br>-Ekr<br>=C2=A0 <br>=C2=A0 <br><br>=
<br><br><br><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 11:12 PM Achim Kraus &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:achimkraus@gmx.net">achimkraus@gmx.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Ben,<br>
<br>
&gt; The attack does not require that both are valid for the same peer at t=
he<br>
&gt; same time -- the attack can still occur when the party producing the M=
AC is<br>
&gt; induced to use the &quot;wrong&quot; (invalid CID) interpretation of t=
he byte stream<br>
&gt; but then the version with valid CID is presented to the party verifyin=
g the<br>
&gt; MAC.<br>
<br>
Though I consider the CID mainly as lookup-key for the security context,<br=
>
including the MAC_write_key for Block Ciphers or the write_key /<br>
write_IV for AEAD Ciphers provides in almost all casses the protection,<br>
not the cid in the MAC. The only exclusion would be, if two different<br>
cids point to the same security context. With a injective cid encoding,<br>
that is mitigated.<br>
<br>
As far as I understand your description:<br>
<br>
1. The (server) peer 1 used cid &quot;abcd&quot; for it&#39;s encryption co=
ntext.<br>
<br>
2. An attacker modifies that cid &quot;abcd&quot; into a different cid (any=
<br>
assumptions about that? Should it be &quot;abcd12&quot;? Or &quot;ef3456&qu=
ot;? Or no<br>
special consideration?)<br>
<br>
3. Then the other peer 2 uses the modified cid to place it into the<br>
FINISH record and to calculate the MAC for that. The used security<br>
context on peer 2 is NOT defined by that modified CID, it&#39;s defined by<=
br>
peer 1&#39;s 5-tupel (according draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07).<br>
<br>
4. Now peer 1 will use the modified cid to<br>
4.a. lookup the security context. What is assumed as result here?<br>
4.b. calculated the MAC using the security context and modified cid<br>
<br>
In my opinion, the MAC verfication generally fails, if at least one<br>
input is different. So either a different security context or a<br>
different cid will fail the MAC verification.<br>
<br>
Though you say, that not both cids need to be valid for peer 1, the<br>
consequence for me is, that peer 1 knows only the unmodified cid, but<br>
not the modified cid. With that, peer 1 doesn&#39;t even have a security<br=
>
context to calculate the MAC with.<br>
<br>
It&#39;s totally mystic to me, what you assume as attack.<br>
<br>
I guess, you adapt now your example. If so, would it be possible, that<br>
you try to follow the above steps and show, where you deviate?<br>
<br>
&gt; If the internal structure (including length encoding) of the CID is<br=
>
&gt; opaque to the party producing the MAC, that party cannot validate the =
data<br>
&gt; used as input to the MAC.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (Sorry for duplicating this previous paragraph here and on the github<=
br>
&gt; issue.)<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0From the github issue:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0&gt; In short, you asked me to show how having a cid-length (in a dif=
ferent<br>
=C2=A0&gt; position than currently) will prevent an attack: the attack in<b=
r>
=C2=A0&gt; question occurs when the client is generating a (its first) MAC,=
 not<br>
=C2=A0&gt; at the time when the MAC is validated.<br>
<br>
I still fail to follow your description, even with that amend.<br>
Would it be possible, to get more information about an attack applied on<br=
>
the generation of a MAC (above in step 3)? Or does the effect occur in<br>
an other step (maybe 4)? Which effect should be considered?<br>
<br>
Maybe, someone else has also an opinion about that attack or the<br>
description.<br>
<br>
best regards<br>
Achim Kraus<br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000bc465005b1b7bea4--


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From: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 16:03:34 -0400
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To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: last-call@ietf.org, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate@ietf.org, tls-chairs@ietf.org,  IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> (Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2) to Proposed Standard
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Hi,

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 5:56 AM Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>
> The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
> > consider the following document: - 'Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature
> > hashes in TLS 1.2'
> >
> >   <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> as Proposed Standard
> >
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
> > comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> > last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-28. Exceptionally, comments may
> > be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
> > of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>
>...
>
> Section 6 of the current draft says:
>
>    6.  Updates to RFC5246
>
>    [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>    suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
>    their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
>    SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
>
>    In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
>
>    OLD:
>
>    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."

It probably should be clarified but I think this text is just trying
to say that with TLS 1.1 you could assume support of MD5 and SHA-1.

>    NEW:
>
>    "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports SHA-256."

How about
    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
    rules, but as a practical matter one could have assumed that the peer
    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
or, to be even more explicit
    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
    rules, but as a practical matter with TLS 1.1 one could have
assumed that the peer
    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."

Thanks,
Donald
===============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 2386 Panoramic Circle, Apopka, FL 32703 USA
 d3e3e3@gmail.com

> and therefore the behaviour in section 2 about the "Signature Algorithms"
> extension ought to say:
>
>    2.  Signature Algorithms
>
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>    extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>    extension, then the server MUST use (sha256,rsa) for
>    digitally_signed on the ServerKeyExchange handshake message for
>    TLS cipher suites using RSA authentication, and the server MUST use
>    (sha256,ecdsa) for TLS cipher suites using ECDSA authentication.
>
>    The server behaviour ought to be consistent for both, receipt of an
>    extension-less SSLv3+ ClientHello handshake message, and for a
>    backwards-compatible SSL VERSION 2 CLIENT-HELLO (which can not convey
>    any TLS extensions) as described in Appendix-E.2 of rfc5246,
>    and as permitted in bullet 2 in section 3 of RFC6176.
>
>
>
> As desribed in RFC6151, collision attacks on MD5 were appearing in
> publications already in 2004, 2005, 2006 & 2007, the TLSv1.2 spec
> rfc5246 should have never *NEWLY* added support for (md5,rsa) in
> TLSv1.2 digitally_signed.
>
> Similarily, since the sunset date for SHA1-signatures had been
> announced by NIST *before* TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) was published,
> TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) should have never *NEWLY* added support for
> (sha1,rsa) in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed, but have used (sha256,rsa)
> from the beginning.  sha256 has been required for the TLSv1.2 PRF
> and for HMAC-SHA256 of several cipher suites anyway, so there
> was no excuse for not using sha256 in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed
> in the first place.
>
>
> -Martin
>
> --
> last-call mailing list
> last-call@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call


From nobody Thu Oct 15 17:36:46 2020
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3
        Authors         : Douglas Stebila
                          Scott Fluhrer
                          Shay Gueron
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-01.txt
	Pages           : 34
	Date            : 2020-10-15

Abstract:
   Hybrid key exchange refers to using multiple key exchange algorithms
   simultaneously and combining the result with the goal of providing
   security even if all but one of the component algorithms is broken.
   It is motivated by transition to post-quantum cryptography.  This
   document provides a construction for hybrid key exchange in the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3.

   Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the TLS IETF
   mailing list tls@ietf.org or on the GitHub repository which contains
   the draft: https://github.com/dstebila/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-01.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> (Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2) to Proposed Standard
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I think that the first sentence could be improved.

'The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening ...' sounds 
as if they are under attack from electrolytic corrosion or the 
death-watch beatle.

I suggest
NEW
'The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are increasingly vulnerable to 
attack and this document deprecates their use in TLS 1.2 digital 
signatures.'

And

/This draft/This document/

Tom Petch

On 14/10/2020 19:40, The IESG wrote:
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
> consider the following document: - 'Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature
> hashes in TLS 1.2'
>    <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> as Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-28. Exceptionally, comments may
> be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
> of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>
> Abstract
>
>
>     The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening in
>     strength and their deprecation process should begin for their use in
>     TLS 1.2 digital signatures.  However, this document does not
>     deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.  This document updates
>     RFC 5246 and RFC 7525.
>
>
>
>
> The file can be obtained via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate/
>
>
>
> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
> .
>


From nobody Fri Oct 16 14:42:01 2020
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Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-esni-08.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : TLS Encrypted Client Hello
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Kazuho Oku
                          Nick Sullivan
                          Christopher A. Wood
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-esni-08.txt
	Pages           : 37
	Date            : 2020-10-16

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   for encrypting a ClientHello message under a server public key.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-08.html

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From nobody Sat Oct 17 16:31:50 2020
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> (Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2) to Proposed Standard
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Hi Martin,

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:56:05AM +0200, Martin Rex wrote:
> The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
> > 
> > The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
> > consider the following document: - 'Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature
> > hashes in TLS 1.2'
> >
> >   <draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt> as Proposed Standard
> > 
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
> > comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> > last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-10-28. Exceptionally, comments may
> > be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
> > of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> 
> 
> The new, backwards-incompatible and interop-fatal behaviour proposed in

"Backwards-incompatible" I can see, but "interop-fatal" seems yet to be
proven...

> section 2 of the current draft must be changed to reflect the updated
> rationale from section 6 of the very same document, and to promote
> safe and secure interoperability instead of a needless total interop failure.
> 
> Requesting interop failure where instead safe and secure interop can
> be easily obtained, as the current draft does, would be in serious
> violation of section 6 of RFC 2119 about where an imperative MUST
> is not allowed for the given situation.
> 
> 
> 
> Section 6 of the current draft says:
> 
>    6.  Updates to RFC5246
> 
>    [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>    suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
>    their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
>    SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
> 
>    In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
> 
>    OLD:
> 
>    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
> 
>    NEW:
> 
>    "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports SHA-256."
> 
> 
> and therefore the behaviour in section 2 about the "Signature Algorithms"
> extension ought to say:
> 
>    2.  Signature Algorithms
> 
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>    extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>    extension, then the server MUST use (sha256,rsa) for
>    digitally_signed on the ServerKeyExchange handshake message for
>    TLS cipher suites using RSA authentication, and the server MUST use
>    (sha256,ecdsa) for TLS cipher suites using ECDSA authentication.

... since your propsal here seems to be resulting in TLS servers
prior-to-this-RFC and TLS servers implementing this RFC using a different
interpretation for what the absence of a "signature_algorithms" extension
means.  That itself, seems like a recipe for interoperability failure,
absent some comprehensive case-by-case analysis showing that it is safe.
I, for one, will not support publication of a document including your
proposed change in the absence of such an analysis.

Furthermore, there is perhaps some awkward interaction between the way this
document refers to the contents of the "signature_algorithms" extensions
and the changes to that extension (and the corresponding IANA registry)
made by RFC 8446.  In the current state of the registry, there is not a
separate 'hash algorithm' field, and instead we must deal with combined
SignatureScheme codepoints.  One might argue that this document should
specifically enumerate the 16-bit SignatureScheme codepoints that are
prohibited.

(The SignatureScheme formulation also allows signature types other than RSA
and ECDSA, of course.)

>    The server behaviour ought to be consistent for both, receipt of an
>    extension-less SSLv3+ ClientHello handshake message, and for a
>    backwards-compatible SSL VERSION 2 CLIENT-HELLO (which can not convey
>    any TLS extensions) as described in Appendix-E.2 of rfc5246,
>    and as permitted in bullet 2 in section 3 of RFC6176.

I note that we prohibited SSLv2-compatible ClientHello for TLS 1.3
implementations.  If we are to assume the current formulation of the draft
where absence of the "signature_algorithms" extension continues to imply
inferred support for SHA-1 and MD5, which are now forbidden, then it is a
natural consequence that the SSLv2-compatible ClientHello cannot
successfully negotiate a handshake, and is de facto forbidden.  I am not
entirely sure why you feel there is a need in the ecosystem to continue to
support the SSLv2-compatible ClientHello; do you, perhaps, know of some
implementation that cannot generate an SSLv3/TLS ClientHello but would
otherwise interoperate (using your formulation where no
"signature_algorithms" means inferred SHA-256 support) with a server that
adheres to this draft's strictures?

> 
> 
> As desribed in RFC6151, collision attacks on MD5 were appearing in
> publications already in 2004, 2005, 2006 & 2007, the TLSv1.2 spec
> rfc5246 should have never *NEWLY* added support for (md5,rsa) in
> TLSv1.2 digitally_signed.
> 
> Similarily, since the sunset date for SHA1-signatures had been
> announced by NIST *before* TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) was published,
> TLSv1.2 (rfc5246) should have never *NEWLY* added support for
> (sha1,rsa) in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed, but have used (sha256,rsa)
> from the beginning.  sha256 has been required for the TLSv1.2 PRF
> and for HMAC-SHA256 of several cipher suites anyway, so there
> was no excuse for not using sha256 in TLSv1.2 digitally_signed
> in the first place.

I've lost count of the number of times that you have mentioned this.
Saying it again is not going to change what RFC 5246 says or help us in
coping with the fallout of what RFC 5246 says.

Thanks,

Ben


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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC17)
  2 issues created:
  - Consider shortening config_id to 8 bytes (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/342=20
  - Stateless HRR and split mode (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/333=20

  6 issues received 17 new comments:
  - #333 Stateless HRR and split mode (2 by cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/333=20
  - #331 Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous (1 by chr=
is-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/331=20
  - #326 No encryption AD specified (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/326=20
  - #325 Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s) (10 by chris-wood, cjpatto=
n, davidben, martinthomson)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/325=20
  - #262 "outer_extensions" mechanism is lossy compression (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262 [needs WG discu=
ssion] [ready-for-text]=20
  - #118 Is there a debug/development server to test client side implementa=
tion (2 by ValZapod, avened)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/118=20

  7 issues closed:
  - Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes) https://github.c=
om/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/323=20
  - Tidy up all codepoints before -08 https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-t=
ls-esni/issues/322=20
  - Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s) https://github.com/tlswg/draft-=
ietf-tls-esni/issues/325=20
  - "outer_extensions" mechanism is lossy compression https://github.com/tl=
swg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/262 [needs WG discussion] [ready-for-text]=20
  - Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous https://github=
.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/331=20
  - No encryption AD specified https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni=
/issues/326=20
  - ClientHello construction order is inconsistent https://github.com/tlswg=
/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/329=20

* tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC16)
  1 issues created:
  - Clarification - variable length CID encoding MUST be deterministic (by =
boaks)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76=20

  1 issues received 16 new comments:
  - #76 Clarification - variable length CID encoding MUST be deterministic =
(16 by ad-l, boaks, jsalowey, kaduk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+11/-12/=F0=9F=92=AC10)
  11 pull requests submitted:
  - Only extract 8 bytes for the config_id (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/345=20
  - Trial decryption and ECHConfig binding fixes (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/344=20
  - Pick from an unassigned range. (by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=20
  - Fix up description of server message forwarding. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/341=20
  - Remove remnant of ECH PSKs and non-ECH PSKs. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/340=20
  - Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=20
  - Add an OPEN ISSUE for stateless HRR and split mode. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/338=20
  - Tweak section titles and comparison against criteria. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/337=20
  - Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=20
  - Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=20
  - Resolve missing outer ClientHello guidance. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/334=20

  6 pull requests received 10 new comments:
  - #345 Only extract 8 bytes for the config_id (1 by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/345=20
  - #343 Pick from an unassigned range. (2 by chris-wood, cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=20
  - #339 Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior (1 by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=20
  - #336 Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD (3 by cjpatton, davi=
dben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=20
  - #335 Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner. (2 by davidbe=
n)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=20
  - #293 Revise "outer_extension" (postponed until after -08) (1 by cjpatto=
n)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/293=20

  12 pull requests merged:
  - Trial decryption and ECHConfig binding fixes
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/344=20
  - Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=20
  - Pick from an unassigned range.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=20
  - Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=20
  - Fix up description of server message forwarding.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/341=20
  - Remove remnant of ECH PSKs and non-ECH PSKs.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/340=20
  - Resolve missing outer ClientHello guidance.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/334=20
  - Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=20
  - Tweak section titles and comparison against criteria.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/337=20
  - Add an OPEN ISSUE for stateless HRR and split mode.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/338=20
  - Define error-handling for missing outer extension
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/328=20
  - Consistently construct ClientHelloInner before ClientHelloOuter.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/330=20

* tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)
  3 pull requests submitted:
  - Ref for 800-52r2 (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/8=20
  - Historic (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7=20
  - Text for ISE RFCs (by seanturner)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6=20

  1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
  - #7 Historic (1 by kaduk)
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - Text for ISE RFCs
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6=20
  - Ref for 800-52r2
    https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/8=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<h1>Sunday October 18, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-7/=F0=9F=92=AC17)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#342 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
42">Consider shortening config_id to 8 bytes</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#333 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
33">Stateless HRR and split mode</a> (by davidben) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 issues received 17 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#333 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
33">Stateless HRR and split mode</a> (2 by cjpatton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#331 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
31">Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous</a> (1 by chri=
s-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#326 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
26">No encryption AD specified</a> (1 by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#325 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
25">Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s)</a> (10 by chris-wood, cjpatton=
, davidben, martinthomson) </li>
 =20
  <li>#262 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
62">&quot;outer_extensions&quot; mechanism is lossy compression</a> (1 by c=
jpatton) <span class=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #c5def5; color: #=
000000">needs WG discussion</span> <span class=3D"label" style=3D"backgroun=
d-color: #f9d0c4; color: #000000">ready-for-text</span> </li>
 =20
  <li>#118 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/1=
18">Is there a debug/development server to test client side implementation<=
/a> (2 by ValZapod, avened) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>7 issues closed:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#323 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
23">Re-re-visit outer ClientHello binding (saves 65 bytes)</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#322 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
22">Tidy up all codepoints before -08</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#325 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
25">Specify cross-HRR key rotation issue(s)</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#262 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/2=
62">&quot;outer_extensions&quot; mechanism is lossy compression</a> <span c=
lass=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #c5def5; color: #000000">needs WG=
 discussion</span> <span class=3D"label" style=3D"background-color: #f9d0c4=
; color: #000000">ready-for-text</span> </li>
 =20
  <li>#331 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
31">Encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner is a little ambiguous</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#326 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
26">No encryption AD specified</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#329 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
29">ClientHello construction order is inconsistent</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/dtls-conn-id (+1/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC16)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">1 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#76 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76">Clari=
fication - variable length CID encoding MUST be deterministic</a> (by boaks=
) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 issues received 16 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#76 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76">Clari=
fication - variable length CID encoding MUST be deterministic</a> (16 by ad=
-l, boaks, jsalowey, kaduk) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+11/-12/=F0=9F=92=AC10)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">11 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#345 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/345=
">Only extract 8 bytes for the config_id</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#344 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/344=
">Trial decryption and ECHConfig binding fixes</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#343 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=
">Pick from an unassigned range.</a> (by chris-wood) </li>
 =20
  <li>#341 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/341=
">Fix up description of server message forwarding.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#340 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/340=
">Remove remnant of ECH PSKs and non-ECH PSKs.</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#339 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=
">Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#338 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/338=
">Add an OPEN ISSUE for stateless HRR and split mode.</a> (by davidben) </l=
i>
 =20
  <li>#337 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/337=
">Tweak section titles and comparison against criteria.</a> (by davidben) <=
/li>
 =20
  <li>#336 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=
">Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#335 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=
">Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner.</a> (by davidben) </=
li>
 =20
  <li>#334 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/334=
">Resolve missing outer ClientHello guidance.</a> (by davidben) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>6 pull requests received 10 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#345 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/345=
">Only extract 8 bytes for the config_id</a> (1 by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#343 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=
">Pick from an unassigned range.</a> (2 by chris-wood, cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#339 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=
">Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior</a> (1 by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#336 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=
">Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD</a> (3 by cjpatton, davidbe=
n) </li>
 =20
  <li>#335 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=
">Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner.</a> (2 by davidben) =
</li>
 =20
  <li>#293 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/293=
">Revise &quot;outer_extension&quot; (postponed until after -08)</a> (1 by =
cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>12 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#344 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/344=
">Trial decryption and ECHConfig binding fixes</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#336 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/336=
">Replace inner_digest with ClientHelloOuterAAD</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#343 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/343=
">Pick from an unassigned range.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#339 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/339=
">Clarify client-facing server HRR behavior</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#341 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/341=
">Fix up description of server message forwarding.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#340 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/340=
">Remove remnant of ECH PSKs and non-ECH PSKs.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#334 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/334=
">Resolve missing outer ClientHello guidance.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#335 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/335=
">Disambiguate the encoded vs actual ClientHelloInner.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#337 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/337=
">Tweak section titles and comparison against criteria.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#338 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/338=
">Add an OPEN ISSUE for stateless HRR and split mode.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#328 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/328=
">Define error-handling for missing outer extension</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#330 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/330=
">Consistently construct ClientHelloInner before ClientHelloOuter.</a> </li>
  </ul>

<h3>tlswg/oldversions-deprecate (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC1)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">3 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#8 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/8">=
Ref for 800-52r2</a> (by seanturner) </li>
 =20
  <li>#7 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7">=
Historic</a> (by seanturner) </li>
 =20
  <li>#6 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6">=
Text for ISE RFCs</a> (by seanturner) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>1 pull requests received 1 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#7 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/7">=
Historic</a> (1 by kaduk) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#6 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/6">=
Text for ISE RFCs</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#8 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate/pull/8">=
Ref for 800-52r2</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
</body>
</html>

--===============5433405636377597087==--


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Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 15:51:02 -0700
From: "Christopher Wood" <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/9RhKruM6Yc-nc4jzHro7f4ErKCk>
Subject: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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RFC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging from the lightweight "document management mode" [1] to more heavyweight "issue discussion mode" [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked on in GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, some interact with GitHub in "issue tracking mode," wherein editors primarily use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with GitHub in a way that resembles "issue discussion mode," wherein substantive issue discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls occur on the list.

This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with respect to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG documents. Moreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF participants adopt GitHub for document development, especially those formed in recent years, we have not made expectations for use of GitHub clear.

To that end, after observing what's been maximally productive for document development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account community engagement, document review support, and editor tools, we propose the following: the TLS WG interact with WG documents in "issue discussion mode," following the approach outlined in [3].

We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4. We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach moving forward at that time.

Thanks,
Chris, on behalf of the chairs

[1] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-management-mode
[2] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes
[3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-mode


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 16:04:27 -0700
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On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

>
> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal.
> Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4.
> We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach
> moving forward at that time.
>

I support this "issue discussion mode" as long as summaries are sent to the
list (as they are now). My github account is too noisy to be useful.

thanks,
Rob

--000000000000429e6005b2365f05
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christoph=
er Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
We&#39;d like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. Pl=
ease chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4. We&=
#39;ll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach movi=
ng forward at that time.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I support this=
 &quot;issue discussion mode&quot; as long as summaries are sent to the lis=
t (as they are now). My github account is too noisy to be useful.=C2=A0</di=
v><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><div><br></div></div></div=
>

--000000000000429e6005b2365f05--


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On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
wrote:

> RFC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging
> from the lightweight "document management mode" [1] to more heavyweight
> "issue discussion mode" [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked on in
> GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, some
> interact with GitHub in "issue tracking mode," wherein editors primarily
> use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with GitHub in a way
> that resembles "issue discussion mode," wherein substantive issue
> discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls occur on the
> list.
>
> This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with respect
> to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG documents.
> Moreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF participants
> adopt GitHub for document development, especially those formed in recent
> years, we have not made expectations for use of GitHub clear.
>
> To that end, after observing what's been maximally productive for document
> development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account community
> engagement, document review support, and editor tools, we propose the
> following: the TLS WG interact with WG documents in "issue discussion
> mode," following the approach outlined in [3].
>
> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal.
> Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4.
> We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach
> moving forward at that time.
>

I am in favor of using "issue discussion mode". When we developed our
current structure, we had less experience with Github and it was reasonable
to be cautious, but I believe that now we have enough experience to support
the use of "issue discussion mode".

-Ekr


> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>
> [1] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-management-mode
> [2] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes
> [3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-mode
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Chris=
topher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:caw@heapingbits.net">caw@heapingbits.net<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">R=
FC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging from =
the lightweight &quot;document management mode&quot; [1] to more heavyweigh=
t &quot;issue discussion mode&quot; [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and =
worked on in GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example=
, some interact with GitHub in &quot;issue tracking mode,&quot; wherein edi=
tors primarily use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with Gi=
tHub in a way that resembles &quot;issue discussion mode,&quot; wherein sub=
stantive issue discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls =
occur on the list.<br>
<br>
This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with respect =
to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG documents. M=
oreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF participants adop=
t GitHub for document development, especially those formed in recent years,=
 we have not made expectations for use of GitHub clear.<br>
<br>
To that end, after observing what&#39;s been maximally productive for docum=
ent development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account community engag=
ement, document review support, and editor tools, we propose the following:=
 the TLS WG interact with WG documents in &quot;issue discussion mode,&quot=
; following the approach outlined in [3].<br>
<br>
We&#39;d like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. Pl=
ease chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4. We&=
#39;ll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach movi=
ng forward at that time.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am in favor =
of using &quot;issue discussion mode&quot;. When we developed our current s=
tructure, we had less experience with Github and it was reasonable to be ca=
utious, but I believe that now we have enough experience to support the use=
 of &quot;issue discussion mode&quot;.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</d=
iv><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, on behalf of the chairs<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-manageme=
nt-mode" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8=
874.html#name-document-management-mode</a><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-sc=
hemes" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc887=
4.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes</a><br>
[3] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-=
mode" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874=
.html#name-issue-discussion-mode</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000003a677505b2366a73--


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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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I support this proposal. GitHub offers a lot more tools for organization =
than emails do, which makes reviewing issues considerably easier.


> On Oct 21, 2020, at 3:51 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> RFC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging =
from the lightweight "document management mode" [1] to more heavyweight =
"issue discussion mode" [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked on =
in GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, some =
interact with GitHub in "issue tracking mode," wherein editors primarily =
use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with GitHub in a =
way that resembles "issue discussion mode," wherein substantive issue =
discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls occur on the =
list.
>=20
> This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with =
respect to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG =
documents. Moreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF =
participants adopt GitHub for document development, especially those =
formed in recent years, we have not made expectations for use of GitHub =
clear.
>=20
> To that end, after observing what's been maximally productive for =
document development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account =
community engagement, document review support, and editor tools, we =
propose the following: the TLS WG interact with WG documents in "issue =
discussion mode," following the approach outlined in [3].
>=20
> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. =
Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November =
4. We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach =
moving forward at that time.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>=20
> [1] =
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-management-mode
> [2] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes
> [3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-mode
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 16:09:15 -0700
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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+1, issue discussion mode with email summaries sounds like the best option

On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 4:08 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
> wrote:
>
>> RFC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging
>> from the lightweight "document management mode" [1] to more heavyweight
>> "issue discussion mode" [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked on in
>> GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, some
>> interact with GitHub in "issue tracking mode," wherein editors primarily
>> use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with GitHub in a way
>> that resembles "issue discussion mode," wherein substantive issue
>> discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls occur on the
>> list.
>>
>> This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with
>> respect to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG
>> documents. Moreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF
>> participants adopt GitHub for document development, especially those formed
>> in recent years, we have not made expectations for use of GitHub clear.
>>
>> To that end, after observing what's been maximally productive for
>> document development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account community
>> engagement, document review support, and editor tools, we propose the
>> following: the TLS WG interact with WG documents in "issue discussion
>> mode," following the approach outlined in [3].
>>
>> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal.
>> Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4.
>> We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach
>> moving forward at that time.
>>
>
> I am in favor of using "issue discussion mode". When we developed our
> current structure, we had less experience with Github and it was reasonable
> to be cautious, but I believe that now we have enough experience to support
> the use of "issue discussion mode".
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>> Thanks,
>> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
>>
>> [1] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-management-mode
>> [2] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes
>> [3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-mode
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--0000000000005be96405b2367089
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1, issue discussion mode with email summaries sounds like=
 the best option<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 4:08 PM Eric Rescorla &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><b=
r></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr=
">On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christopher Wood &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ca=
w@heapingbits.net" target=3D"_blank">caw@heapingbits.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">RFC 8874 describes =
several different methods for using GitHub, ranging from the lightweight &q=
uot;document management mode&quot; [1] to more heavyweight &quot;issue disc=
ussion mode&quot; [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked on in GitHu=
b, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, some interact wi=
th GitHub in &quot;issue tracking mode,&quot; wherein editors primarily use=
 GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with GitHub in a way that=
 resembles &quot;issue discussion mode,&quot; wherein substantive issue dis=
cussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus calls occur on the list.=
<br>
<br>
This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with respect =
to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG documents. M=
oreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF participants adop=
t GitHub for document development, especially those formed in recent years,=
 we have not made expectations for use of GitHub clear.<br>
<br>
To that end, after observing what&#39;s been maximally productive for docum=
ent development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account community engag=
ement, document review support, and editor tools, we propose the following:=
 the TLS WG interact with WG documents in &quot;issue discussion mode,&quot=
; following the approach outlined in [3].<br>
<br>
We&#39;d like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. Pl=
ease chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4. We&=
#39;ll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach movi=
ng forward at that time.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am in favor =
of using &quot;issue discussion mode&quot;. When we developed our current s=
tructure, we had less experience with Github and it was reasonable to be ca=
utious, but I believe that now we have enough experience to support the use=
 of &quot;issue discussion mode&quot;.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</d=
iv><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Chris, on behalf of the chairs<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-manageme=
nt-mode" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8=
874.html#name-document-management-mode</a><br>
[2] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-sc=
hemes" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc887=
4.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes</a><br>
[3] <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-=
mode" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874=
.html#name-issue-discussion-mode</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 14:31:38 +1100
From: "Martin Thomson" <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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On Thu, Oct 22, 2020, at 10:04, Rob Sayre wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 3:51 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> > 
> > We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 4. We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new approach moving forward at that time.

This is a fine plan.

> I support this "issue discussion mode" as long as summaries are sent to 
> the list (as they are now). My github account is too noisy to be 
> useful. 

I think that Rob's request is reasonable.  And I hope that this isn't just the digests, which I find useless.  Either way, even when discussing issues, it's often good to open a thread on the list for important topics.

On this point, I regard the ECH work as being effectively a self-selected design team.  I have been unable to keep tracking the work and lack the context to engage on the topics that do come back to the list for discussion.  Missing 3am meetings can't have helped, but it's mostly about the volume of traffic.


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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 01:10:19 -0400
From: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>
To: "TLS List" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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Hi,

I used to be very active in the development of TLS
specifications (version 1.2) and some of the extensions.  
At the time, all discussion was done on the mailing list.  
I don't know if I'll be active going forward, but the
trend to move everything to GitHub is a mistake, in my 
opinion.

First of all, GitHub is owned by Microsoft, a private 
for-profit company.  I don't think I need to point out 
past actions by the company which were not in the best 
interest of anybody other than their own shareholders 
(and then not even them in actuality).  GitHub is just a 
property to them, and who knows when they'll tire of it 
and shut it down or sell it off.  Bad idea to rely on it.

As an implementer of TLS, it was important to follow all 
of the discussions as they were happening, to understand 
the trade-offs being made, to check whether the result 
was even something you could implement!  (I'll point to 
the stateless HelloRetryRequest debacle which you can not 
implement correctly as an example.  I still owe Ilari a
response, if I go back to reading the spec for 1.3.)

I don't want to have to "Go To GitHub" to work on TLS.  I 
would want all of the messages to arrive in my email, as 
they used to.  The messages all go into a separate folder 
so I can ignore them if I want.  My inbox is not 
cluttered by them.  This is a fine system.

GitHub's issue tracking system is actually pretty nice.  
I took a look.  I'd guess that there's some free software
("free" as in "freedom") which could be run on the IETF
website which would provide the equivalent functionality.
Though I'd prefer to go back to the way it used to be.

Mike


On Wed, Oct 21, 2020, at 18:51, Christopher Wood wrote:
> RFC 8874 describes several different methods for using GitHub, ranging 
> from the lightweight "document management mode" [1] to more heavyweight 
> "issue discussion mode" [2]. Most TLS documents are hosted and worked 
> on in GitHub, though with varying levels of interaction. For example, 
> some interact with GitHub in "issue tracking mode," wherein editors 
> primarily use GitHub for tracking open issues. Others interact with 
> GitHub in a way that resembles "issue discussion mode," wherein 
> substantive issue discussion takes place on GitHub issues and consensus 
> calls occur on the list.
> 
> This discrepancy has caused confusion in the past, especially with 
> respect to how best to stay engaged in the continued development of WG 
> documents. Moreover, with the rising rate at which other WGs and IETF 
> participants adopt GitHub for document development, especially those 
> formed in recent years, we have not made expectations for use of GitHub 
> clear.
> 
> To that end, after observing what's been maximally productive for 
> document development in TLS and related WGs, taking into account 
> community engagement, document review support, and editor tools, we 
> propose the following: the TLS WG interact with WG documents in "issue 
> discussion mode," following the approach outlined in [3].
> 
> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal. 
> Please chime in (on the list!) and share your thoughts before November 
> 4. We'll determine whether there is consensus to adopt this new 
> approach moving forward at that time.
> 
> Thanks,
> Chris, on behalf of the chairs
> 
> [1] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-document-management-mode
> [2] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-labeling-schemes
> [3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8874.html#name-issue-discussion-mode
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


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On Wed, Oct 21, 2020, Christopher Wood wrote:

> We'd like to hear whether folks are support or oppose this proposal.

Opposed.
I want to use my tools to follow a discussion,
not something someone else controls/"designs".

-- 
Address is valid for this mailing list only, please do not reply
to it direcly, but to the list.


From nobody Thu Oct 22 03:46:26 2020
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, tls@ietf.org
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 11:46:15 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, tls@ietf.org
Message-ID: <bb8e8bf4-9d24-6dd3-8b8e-556b8b8012d9@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS WG GitHub interaction
References: <ca1ba518-7195-415a-8729-3ce60724f5ff@www.fastmail.com>
 <CAChr6Sw2p_D=cBYC=kk4tPz05TwvKQ9c5a59AqO763R6RxMbXQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <950d9aea-9758-4964-bd38-5c00e686afd2@www.fastmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <950d9aea-9758-4964-bd38-5c00e686afd2@www.fastmail.com>

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On 22/10/2020 04:31, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On this point, I regard the ECH work as being effectively a
> self-selected design team.  I have been unable to keep tracking the
> work and lack the context to engage on the topics that do come back
> to the list for discussion.
+many - I don't know if the proposed mode will be any
better than the status quo - with that volume, I don't
see how anyone could send a useful summary to the list

Maybe it'd be useful if the chairs or someone could
summarise the last N weeks of githubbery for ECH and
we can see if it has a chance of working?

S

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Reviewer: Rich Salz
Review result: Has Nits

I'm the assigned security directorate reviewer for this draft. This is intended
for use by the Sec ADs, but anyone else who gleans wisdom from this message is
free to use it as they see fit.

The document is READY.  There are some nits, which can be found at
https://www6.ietf.org/tools/idnits?url=https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt
or by clicking on the "nits" tab on the datatracker page.

Don't use MD5 or SHA1 as digests.  If you do, bad people in shadows wearing
hoodies will be able to steal your information, impersonate or break your TLS
or other connections, and so on. This document gives more rationale and updates
some RFC's.

This NITS should be fixed, but this should be published.




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Subject: [TLS] tls - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 109
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Dear Christopher Wood,

The session(s) that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by
the original request. 


    tls Session 1 (1:00 requested)
    Tuesday, 17 November 2020, Session II 1430-1530
    Room Name: Room 6 size: 506
    ---------------------------------------------


iCalendar: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/109/sessions/tls.ics

Request Information:


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: Transport Layer Security
Area Name: Security Area
Session Requester: Christopher Wood


Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  1 Hour
Number of Attendees: 120
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 Chair Conflict: pearg mls emu masque
 Technology Overlap: cfrg dprive dnsop lake
 Key Participant Conflict: quic httpbis taps secdispatch saag





People who must be present:
  Eric Rescorla
  Rich Salz
  Sean Turner
  Joseph A. Salowey
  Yoav Nir
  Benjamin Kaduk
  Christopher A. Wood
  Nick Sullivan

Resources Requested:

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------



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Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 19:13:16 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Hi Ekr,

Thanks for chiming in.

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I would like to make several points here:
> 
> - In terms of operational practice, in order for a server to
> function correctly, the CID must either be fixed-length for all
> clients that might need to be demuxed *or*
> self-describing. Otherwise, the server will not be able to determine
> the correct CID. I believe this is clear in the specification:

I am pretty sure that we all agree on this, yes...

>    Because each party sends the value in the "connection_id" extension
>    it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possible for
>    an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connection
>    identifiers.  This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup,
>    for example by having the length in question be a compile-time
>    constant.  Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs,
>    are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
>    length can be determined on reception.  Such implementations must
>    still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties.
>    Note that there is no CID length information included in the record
>    itself.

...and thanks for the reminder about how we say so in the text already.

> This is an important space optimization and in fact was one of the
> key points in getting us to variable CIDs in QUIC, so I would not
> want to take a regression here.
> 
> - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
> properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. It's
> been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
> rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
> reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
> this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.

I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together in a
rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).

> - To the best of my knowledge, the ability to just disclose the
> encryption key but not the MAC key has never been part of the
> official interface of TLS -- and of course it doesn't really

I agree.

> work with many AEADs. So, anyone who is doing that is off the
> fairway and I don't think has any security guarantees (TLS aside,
> many application protocols have surprising security properties
> in this situation) With that said, we shouldn't break such uses
> unnecessarily, and it seems like there might be other negative
> side effects of the current construction.

To be clear, I'm more concerned about the "other negative side effects";
bringing up this case was just a convenient rhetorical device to attempt to
illustrate that what seems like a local cryptographic annoyance can be
parlayed into something more significant.

> So on balance, I think we should try to fix this. I'm slightly less
> enthusiastic about just swapping the length field, because I'd
> prefer to MAC the literal bytes (though perhaps we'll just have
> to live with that). However, it might be worth bikeshedding that
> some. Here's one potential alternative, though I haven't studied

Seeing you write this has served to finally hammer home for me a point that
Achim has been making for some time.  Sorry for being so dense about this,
Achim!  That is to say, if we're making any change at all, we should change
to what is unambiguously the Right Thing, not just make a fiddling change
on the margins -- there's not much difference in implementation impact, and
we can get it actually right and not have to change it again.

> struct {
>   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
>   uint8 cid_len;
>   uint64 seq_num;
>   uint8 cid = tls12_cid;               \
>   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version +      |  appears on wire   | non-CID MAC input
>   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /                    |
>   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;                      /
> }
> 
> This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) the
> bytes appear
> in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length metadata
> appears in
> the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in the
> front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.

I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little trouble
lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll repeat
here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much:

        struct {
            ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
            ProtocolVersion version;
            uint16 epoch;
            uint48 sequence_number;
            opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
            uint16 length;
            opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
        } DTLSCiphertext;

Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current AEAD
"additional_data" from the -07:

#      additional_data = seq_num +
#                        tls12_cid +
#                        DTLSCipherText.version +
#                        cid +
#                        cid_length +
#                        length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;

If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them), hewing
more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest having us use:

additional_data:
struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire 
  uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
  uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
};

Mac-then-Encrypt:
struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire 
  uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
  uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.content;          \
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type;        |  entirety of DTLSInnerPlaintext
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros;            /
};

Encrypt-then-MAC:
struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire 
  uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
  uint16 iv_length;
  opaque IV[iv_length];
  uint16 enc_content_length;
  opaque enc_content[enc_content_length];
};

(with apologies to Achim for using the 'struct' formulation that cannot
just be copied into the draft)

They all share a commmon prefix: the content-type marker, cid_len, and the
DTLSCiphertext header, and are self-framing (though, of course, the
Mac-then-Encrypt case is mostly "parse from front" except for the "parse
from back" that it inherits from DTLSInnerPlaintext).

Note that for the Encrypt-then-MAC case there are a few more deviations
from the formulation in the -07 -- I put separate length prefixes for IV
and enc_content whereas the -07 has a single "length of (IV +
DTLSCiphertext.enc_content)".  (Also, using DTLSCiphertext.enc_content like
that seems to be self-referential.)  I don't have a strong reasoning for
that offhand, but of course the IV length depends on the cipher in use,
which is a negotiated quantity, and we start using DTLSCiphertext before
both parties' Finished are confirmed, so I erred on the side of paranoia.

Any further thoughts?

Thanks,

Ben

> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 11:12 PM Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Ben,
> >
> > > The attack does not require that both are valid for the same peer at the
> > > same time -- the attack can still occur when the party producing the MAC
> > is
> > > induced to use the "wrong" (invalid CID) interpretation of the byte
> > stream
> > > but then the version with valid CID is presented to the party verifying
> > the
> > > MAC.
> >
> > Though I consider the CID mainly as lookup-key for the security context,
> > including the MAC_write_key for Block Ciphers or the write_key /
> > write_IV for AEAD Ciphers provides in almost all casses the protection,
> > not the cid in the MAC. The only exclusion would be, if two different
> > cids point to the same security context. With a injective cid encoding,
> > that is mitigated.
> >
> > As far as I understand your description:
> >
> > 1. The (server) peer 1 used cid "abcd" for it's encryption context.
> >
> > 2. An attacker modifies that cid "abcd" into a different cid (any
> > assumptions about that? Should it be "abcd12"? Or "ef3456"? Or no
> > special consideration?)
> >
> > 3. Then the other peer 2 uses the modified cid to place it into the
> > FINISH record and to calculate the MAC for that. The used security
> > context on peer 2 is NOT defined by that modified CID, it's defined by
> > peer 1's 5-tupel (according draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07).
> >
> > 4. Now peer 1 will use the modified cid to
> > 4.a. lookup the security context. What is assumed as result here?
> > 4.b. calculated the MAC using the security context and modified cid
> >
> > In my opinion, the MAC verfication generally fails, if at least one
> > input is different. So either a different security context or a
> > different cid will fail the MAC verification.
> >
> > Though you say, that not both cids need to be valid for peer 1, the
> > consequence for me is, that peer 1 knows only the unmodified cid, but
> > not the modified cid. With that, peer 1 doesn't even have a security
> > context to calculate the MAC with.
> >
> > It's totally mystic to me, what you assume as attack.
> >
> > I guess, you adapt now your example. If so, would it be possible, that
> > you try to follow the above steps and show, where you deviate?
> >
> > > If the internal structure (including length encoding) of the CID is
> > > opaque to the party producing the MAC, that party cannot validate the
> > data
> > > used as input to the MAC.
> > >
> > > (Sorry for duplicating this previous paragraph here and on the github
> > > issue.)
> > >
> >
> >  From the github issue:
> >
> >  > In short, you asked me to show how having a cid-length (in a different
> >  > position than currently) will prevent an attack: the attack in
> >  > question occurs when the client is generating a (its first) MAC, not
> >  > at the time when the MAC is validated.
> >
> > I still fail to follow your description, even with that amend.
> > Would it be possible, to get more information about an attack applied on
> > the generation of a MAC (above in step 3)? Or does the effect occur in
> > an other step (maybe 4)? Which effect should be considered?
> >
> > Maybe, someone else has also an opinion about that attack or the
> > description.
> >
> > best regards
> > Achim Kraus
> >


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
References: <fe7eab66-a14a-5f18-46be-7bae471c3b20@gmx.net> <CAOgPGoBWRyqQUNk3JQx2_Cna-7s-A7gENVwW-sh8+tRoJ_=V_Q@mail.gmail.com> <13a821d3-30cc-94b8-842c-22a87d280f09@gmx.net> <CACsn0cn4QcnaoocQeoiUXgGoAvfOs+1+Ei76z1Kuq8MMqNEh3Q@mail.gmail.com> <0327abb0-6317-b848-28d0-1fc50f4bf50e@gmx.net> <20201012200548.GD1212@kduck.mit.edu> <bab402e6-3353-d750-a849-21c91081f94e@gmx.net> <20201014212428.GP50845@kduck.mit.edu> <a7110178-6220-175e-869d-fcc44400f773@gmx.net> <CABcZeBNocUYZO9yxuG-DYh33ss+Dum1EOxHYEdww5OCR=rKFXw@mail.gmail.com> <20201024021316.GN39170@kduck.mit.edu>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <082806e2-5ff2-61d3-e181-31e50daef7f2@gmx.net>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2020 08:56:08 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

>>     Because each party sends the value in the "connection_id" extension
>>     it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possible f=
or
>>     an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connection
>>     identifiers.  This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup,
>>     for example by having the length in question be a compile-time
>>     constant.  Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs,
>>     are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
>>     length can be determined on reception.  Such implementations must
>>     still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties.
>>     Note that there is no CID length information included in the record
>>     itself.
>
> ...and thanks for the reminder about how we say so in the text already.

(your example from a previous e-mail)

 > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)

 > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>

 > could be cid_length=3D1, cid=3D0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0=
202,
 > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
 > cid_length=3D2, cis=3D0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0201,
 > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D <513 bytes>.

I would feel much more comfortable, if you state,
that you consider now either

1. that example was not compliant to the draft,

or

2. the draft is not clear enough about that.

If 1. is true, https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76 could be
closed.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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Subject: [TLS] Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)
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Issues
------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC12)
  2 issues created:
  - Avoid computing a new HPKE contexts on HRR? (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/349=20
  - General server handling of ECH extension is unclear (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/348=20

  2 issues received 12 new comments:
  - #349 Avoid computing a new HPKE contexts on HRR? (6 by chris-wood, cjpa=
tton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/349=20
  - #348 General server handling of ECH extension is unclear (6 by chris-wo=
od, cjpatton, davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/348=20



Pull requests
-------------
* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC2)
  3 pull requests submitted:
  - Clarify client and server roles (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/350=20
  - Fix ServerHello.random behavior in older TLS versions. (by davidben)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/347=20
  - Fix some editorial issues (by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/346=20

  2 pull requests received 2 new comments:
  - #350 Clarify client and server roles (1 by cjpatton)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/350=20
  - #316 Require HRR-sensitive parameters match in ClientHello(Outer|Inner)=
. (1 by chris-wood)
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316=20

  2 pull requests merged:
  - Fix ServerHello.random behavior in older TLS versions.
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/347=20
  - Fix some editorial issues
    https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/346=20


Repositories tracked by this digest:
-----------------------------------
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease

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<title>Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)</title>
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<body>
<h1>Sunday October 25, 2020</h1>


<h2>Issues</h2>

<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+2/-0/=F0=9F=92=AC12)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">2 issues created:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#349 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
49">Avoid computing a new HPKE contexts on HRR?</a> (by davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#348 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
48">General server handling of ECH extension is unclear</a> (by davidben) <=
/li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 issues received 12 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#349 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
49">Avoid computing a new HPKE contexts on HRR?</a> (6 by chris-wood, cjpat=
ton, davidben) </li>
 =20
  <li>#348 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/3=
48">General server handling of ECH extension is unclear</a> (6 by chris-woo=
d, cjpatton, davidben) </li>
  </ul>




<h2>Pull requests</h2>
<h3>tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-2/=F0=9F=92=AC2)</h3>
  <p class=3D"new">3 pull requests submitted:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#350 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/350=
">Clarify client and server roles</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#347 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/347=
">Fix ServerHello.random behavior in older TLS versions.</a> (by davidben) =
</li>
 =20
  <li>#346 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/346=
">Fix some editorial issues</a> (by cjpatton) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests received 2 new comments:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#350 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/350=
">Clarify client and server roles</a> (1 by cjpatton) </li>
 =20
  <li>#316 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/316=
">Require HRR-sensitive parameters match in ClientHello(Outer|Inner).</a> (=
1 by chris-wood) </li>
  </ul>

  <p>2 pull requests merged:</p>
  <ul>
  <li>#347 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/347=
">Fix ServerHello.random behavior in older TLS versions.</a> </li>
 =20
  <li>#346 <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/346=
">Fix some editorial issues</a> </li>
  </ul>


<h2>Repositories tracked by this digest:</h2>
<ul class=3D"repos">
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=
">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://gith=
ub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression">https://=
github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-impor=
ter">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags">https://github.com/tls=
wg/tls-flags</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec">https://github.com/t=
lswg/dtls13-spec</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id">https://github.com/=
tlswg/dtls-conn-id</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts">https://github.com/=
tlswg/tls-subcerts</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption">https://github.com=
/tlswg/sniencryption</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator">https=
://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator</a></li>
  <li><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease">https://gi=
thub.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-grease</a></li>
  </ul>
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From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
To: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>, Roelof DuToit <r@nerd.ninja>
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To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Achim,

On Sat, Oct 24, 2020 at 08:56:08AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> >>     Because each party sends the value in the "connection_id" extension
> >>     it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possible for
> >>     an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connection
> >>     identifiers.  This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup,
> >>     for example by having the length in question be a compile-time
> >>     constant.  Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs,
> >>     are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
> >>     length can be determined on reception.  Such implementations must
> >>     still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties.
> >>     Note that there is no CID length information included in the record
> >>     itself.
> >
> > ...and thanks for the reminder about how we say so in the text already.
> 
> (your example from a previous e-mail)
> 
>  > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
> 
>  > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
> 
>  > could be cid_length=1, cid=0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0202,
>  > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
>  > cid_length=2, cis=0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=0x0201,
>  > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content = <513 bytes>.
> 
> I would feel much more comfortable, if you state,
> that you consider now either
> 
> 1. that example was not compliant to the draft,
> 
> or
> 
> 2. the draft is not clear enough about that.
> 
> If 1. is true, https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76 could be
> closed.

It is neither of those two.

While the party that will be parsing packets that use a given CID value to
identify the connection needs to be able to determine the length from the
byte stream, the other party does not.  Accordingly, when computing the
MAC, there is still malleability in terms of which "interpretation" of the
byte stream was intended by the party computing the MAC.  The party
receiving the packet (and MAC) will only use one interpretation, but the
party generating the MAC could have been deceived into using the other
interpretation.

As I said previously, the CID values are not authenticated until the
handshake completes, so there is a real window where this attack surface is
exposed.  Note that I do not need to present a complete end-to-end attack
that breaks the TLS guarantees in order for us to change the spec -- it is
enough to have shown that the malleability of the cryptographic input
stream is exposed to potential attack.  To leave such behavior in a
published protocol spec would be irresponsible, in effect, publishing an
algorithm with known weaknesses.

Thanks,

Ben


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 20:29:04 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ben,

at least at your point (from the e-mail before)

 > and not have to change it again.

I agree :-).

That will naturally become true, if the RFC gets released.

best regards
Achim



Am 26.10.20 um 17:56 schrieb Benjamin Kaduk:
> Hi Achim,
>
> On Sat, Oct 24, 2020 at 08:56:08AM +0200, Achim Kraus wrote:
>> Hi Ben,
>>
>>>>      Because each party sends the value in the "connection_id" extens=
ion
>>>>      it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possibl=
e for
>>>>      an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connectio=
n
>>>>      identifiers.  This can in turn ease parsing and connection looku=
p,
>>>>      for example by having the length in question be a compile-time
>>>>      constant.  Implementations, which want to use variable-length CI=
Ds,
>>>>      are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
>>>>      length can be determined on reception.  Such implementations mus=
t
>>>>      still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties.
>>>>      Note that there is no CID length information included in the rec=
ord
>>>>      itself.
>>>
>>> ...and thanks for the reminder about how we say so in the text already=
.
>>
>> (your example from a previous e-mail)
>>
>>   > Attempting to construct a trivial example on the fly, (hex)
>>
>>   > 01 01 02 02 01 <513 bytes of plaintext content>
>>
>>   > could be cid_length=3D1, cid=3D0x01, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=
=3D0x0202,
>>   > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D 0x01 <513 bytes>, or it could be
>>   > cid_length=3D2, cis=3D0x0101, length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext=3D0x0201=
,
>>   > DTLSInnerPlaintext.content =3D <513 bytes>.
>>
>> I would feel much more comfortable, if you state,
>> that you consider now either
>>
>> 1. that example was not compliant to the draft,
>>
>> or
>>
>> 2. the draft is not clear enough about that.
>>
>> If 1. is true, https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id/issues/76 could be
>> closed.
>
> It is neither of those two.
>
> While the party that will be parsing packets that use a given CID value =
to
> identify the connection needs to be able to determine the length from th=
e
> byte stream, the other party does not.  Accordingly, when computing the
> MAC, there is still malleability in terms of which "interpretation" of t=
he
> byte stream was intended by the party computing the MAC.  The party
> receiving the packet (and MAC) will only use one interpretation, but the
> party generating the MAC could have been deceived into using the other
> interpretation.
>
> As I said previously, the CID values are not authenticated until the
> handshake completes, so there is a real window where this attack surface=
 is
> exposed.  Note that I do not need to present a complete end-to-end attac=
k
> that breaks the TLS guarantees in order for us to change the spec -- it =
is
> enough to have shown that the malleability of the cryptographic input
> stream is exposed to potential attack.  To leave such behavior in a
> published protocol spec would be irresponsible, in effect, publishing an
> algorithm with known weaknesses.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 17:38:33 -0700
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>,  Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>,  draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> Hi Ekr,
>
> Thanks for chiming in.
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> > - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
> > properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. It's
> > been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
> > rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
> > reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
> > this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.
>
> I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together in a
> rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).
>

Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum.


> >
> > This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) the
> > bytes appear
> > in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length metadata
> > appears in
> > the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in the
> > front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.
>
> I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little trouble
> lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll repeat
> here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much:
>
>         struct {
>             ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
>             ProtocolVersion version;
>             uint16 epoch;
>             uint48 sequence_number;
>             opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
>             uint16 length;
>             opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
>         } DTLSCiphertext;
>
> Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current AEAD
> "additional_data" from the -07:
>
> #      additional_data = seq_num +
> #                        tls12_cid +
> #                        DTLSCipherText.version +
> #                        cid +
> #                        cid_length +
> #                        length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
>
> If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them), hewing
> more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest having us
> use:
>
> additional_data:
> struct {
>   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
>   uint8 cid_len;
>   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
>   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
>   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
>   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
>   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> };
>
>
Mostly.

I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather the
length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with
that? If not, let's discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.

-Ekr

--00000000000064db5605b29c463d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benja=
min Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Ekr,<br>
<br>
Thanks for chiming in.<br>
<br>
On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>&gt; <br>
&gt; - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward<br>
&gt; properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. It&#=
39;s<br>
&gt; been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the<=
br>
&gt; rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some<b=
r>
&gt; reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on<br>
&gt; this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.<br>
<br>
I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together in a<=
br>
rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).<br></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right. I forgot that we also preserved the T=
LS order of the seqnum.</div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex"><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) th=
e<br>
&gt; bytes appear<br>
&gt; in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length metad=
ata<br>
&gt; appears in<br>
&gt; the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in t=
he<br>
&gt; front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.<br>
<br>
I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I&#39;m having a little troub=
le<br>
lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I&#39;ll rep=
eat<br>
here so I&#39;m not flipping back and forth as much:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ContentType special_type =3D tls1=
2_cid;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ProtocolVersion version;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uint16 epoch;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uint48 sequence_number;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_length];=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// New field<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uint16 length;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext=
.length];<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } DTLSCiphertext;<br>
<br>
Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current AEAD<br=
>
&quot;additional_data&quot; from the -07:<br>
<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 additional_data =3D seq_num +<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 tls12_cid +<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 DTLSCipherText.version +<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 cid +<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 cid_length +<br>
#=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;<br>
<br>
If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them), hewing=
<br>
more strictly to the &quot;bits on the wire&quot; philosophy would suggest =
having us use:<br>
<br>
additional_data:<br>
struct {<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid;<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 cid_len;<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 content_type =3D tls12_cid;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 app=
ears on wire <br>
=C2=A0 uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch=C2=A0 =C2=A0 |<br>
=C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_len];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;<br>
};<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Mostly. <br></div><div><br></div><div>=
I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather the =
length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with tha=
t? If not, let&#39;s discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br></div></div>

--00000000000064db5605b29c463d--


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Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 18:00:29 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 05:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Ekr,
> >
> > Thanks for chiming in.
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > >
> > > - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
> > > properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that. It's
> > > been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
> > > rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
> > > reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
> > > this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.
> >
> > I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together in a
> > rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).
> >
> 
> Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum.
> 
> 
> > >
> > > This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1) the
> > > bytes appear
> > > in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length metadata
> > > appears in
> > > the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in the
> > > front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.
> >
> > I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little trouble
> > lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll repeat
> > here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much:
> >
> >         struct {
> >             ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
> >             ProtocolVersion version;
> >             uint16 epoch;
> >             uint48 sequence_number;
> >             opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
> >             uint16 length;
> >             opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
> >         } DTLSCiphertext;
> >
> > Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current AEAD
> > "additional_data" from the -07:
> >
> > #      additional_data = seq_num +
> > #                        tls12_cid +
> > #                        DTLSCipherText.version +
> > #                        cid +
> > #                        cid_length +
> > #                        length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> >
> > If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them), hewing
> > more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest having us
> > use:
> >
> > additional_data:
> > struct {
> >   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
> >   uint8 cid_len;
> >   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
> >   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
> >   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
> >   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
> >   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> > };
> >
> >
> Mostly.
> 
> I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather the
> length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with
> that? If not, let's discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.

Good catch, the length on the wire makes more sense.  (I presume I just
cribbed from the -07 here and didn't think hard enough.)

-Ben


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On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 6:00 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 05:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ekr,
> > >
> > > Thanks for chiming in.
> > >
> > > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > >
> > > > - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
> > > > properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that.
> It's
> > > > been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
> > > > rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
> > > > reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
> > > > this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.
> > >
> > > I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together
> in a
> > > rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).
> > >
> >
> > Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum.
> >
> >
> > > >
> > > > This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1)
> the
> > > > bytes appear
> > > > in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length
> metadata
> > > > appears in
> > > > the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in
> the
> > > > front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.
> > >
> > > I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little
> trouble
> > > lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll
> repeat
> > > here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much:
> > >
> > >         struct {
> > >             ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
> > >             ProtocolVersion version;
> > >             uint16 epoch;
> > >             uint48 sequence_number;
> > >             opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
> > >             uint16 length;
> > >             opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
> > >         } DTLSCiphertext;
> > >
> > > Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current
> AEAD
> > > "additional_data" from the -07:
> > >
> > > #      additional_data = seq_num +
> > > #                        tls12_cid +
> > > #                        DTLSCipherText.version +
> > > #                        cid +
> > > #                        cid_length +
> > > #                        length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> > >
> > > If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them),
> hewing
> > > more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest
> having us
> > > use:
> > >
> > > additional_data:
> > > struct {
> > >   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
> > >   uint8 cid_len;
> > >   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
> > >   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
> > >   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
> > >   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
> > >   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> > > };
> > >
> > >
> > Mostly.
> >
> > I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather
> the
> > length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with
> > that? If not, let's discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.
>
> Good catch, the length on the wire makes more sense.  (I presume I just
> cribbed from the -07 here and didn't think hard enough.
>

So I think that the following is right for MtE.

struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
  uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
  uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.content;          \
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type;        |  entirety of DTLSInnerPlaintext
  DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros;            /
};


As for EtM

Encrypt-then-MAC:
struct {
  uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
  uint8 cid_len;
  uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
  uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
  uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
  opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
  uint16 iv_length;
  opaque IV[iv_length];
  uint16 enc_content_length;
  opaque enc_content[enc_content_length];
};

This seems kind of unfortunate in that the 7366 version is much more
faithful to the wire, so I still have to think about this one some more, I
think...

-Ekr

--00000000000094e5fb05b29cac3e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 6:00 PM Benja=
min Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Oct 26,=
 2020 at 05:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:k=
aduk@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Hi Ekr,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Thanks for chiming in.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br=
>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some aw=
kward<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy =
that. It&#39;s<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I r=
ecall the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather t=
han some<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussi=
ons on<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not id=
eal.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put toge=
ther in a<br>
&gt; &gt; rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more bel=
ow).<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum.<br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties t=
hat (1) the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; bytes appear<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-le=
ngth metadata<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; appears in<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls1=
2_cid in the<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I&#39;m having a li=
ttle trouble<br>
&gt; &gt; lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I&=
#39;ll repeat<br>
&gt; &gt; here so I&#39;m not flipping back and forth as much:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0struct {<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ContentType specia=
l_type =3D tls12_cid;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ProtocolVersion ve=
rsion;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 epoch;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0uint48 sequence_nu=
mber;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque cid[cid_len=
gth];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0// New field<br=
>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 length;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque enc_content=
[DTLSCiphertext.length];<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0} DTLSCiphertext;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the curre=
nt AEAD<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;additional_data&quot; from the -07:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 additional_data =3D seq_num +<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 tls12_cid +<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DTLSCipherText.version +<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 cid +<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 cid_length +<br>
&gt; &gt; #=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand the=
m), hewing<br>
&gt; &gt; more strictly to the &quot;bits on the wire&quot; philosophy woul=
d suggest having us<br>
&gt; &gt; use:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; additional_data:<br>
&gt; &gt; struct {<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint8 cid_len;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint8 content_type =3D tls12_cid;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 \<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0|=C2=A0 appears on wire<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch=C2=A0 =C2=A0 |<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0opaque cid[cid_len];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;<br>
&gt; &gt; };<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; Mostly.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather=
 the<br>
&gt; length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree wit=
h<br>
&gt; that? If not, let&#39;s discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.<=
br>
<br>
Good catch, the length on the wire makes more sense.=C2=A0 (I presume I jus=
t<br>
cribbed from the -07 here and didn&#39;t think hard enough.<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div>So I think that the following is right for MtE.</div><=
div><br></div><div><span class=3D"gmail-im">struct {<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid;<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 cid_len;<br></span>
=C2=A0 uint8 content_type =3D tls12_cid;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 app=
ears on wire <br>
=C2=A0 uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch=C2=A0 =C2=A0 |<span class=3D"gmail=
-im"><br>
=C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_len];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;<br></span>
=C2=A0 DTLSInnerPlaintext.content;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \<br>
=C2=A0 DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 ent=
irety of DTLSInnerPlaintext<br>
=C2=A0 DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 /=
<br>
};<br>
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>As for EtM<br></div><div><br></div=
>Encrypt-then-MAC:<span class=3D"gmail-im"><br>
struct {<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid;<br>
=C2=A0 uint8 cid_len;<br></span>
=C2=A0 uint8 content_type =3D tls12_cid;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 app=
ears on wire <br>
=C2=A0 uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch=C2=A0 =C2=A0 |<br>
=C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_len];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/<br>
=C2=A0 uint16 iv_length;<br>
=C2=A0 opaque IV[iv_length];</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
=C2=A0 uint16 enc_content_length;<br>
=C2=A0 opaque enc_content[enc_content_length];<br>
};</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Thi=
s seems kind of unfortunate in that the 7366 version is much more faithful =
to the wire, so I still have to think about this one some more, I think...<=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">-E=
kr</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br=
></div></div>

--00000000000094e5fb05b29cac3e--


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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 06:07:07PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 6:00 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 05:38:33PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Ekr,
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for chiming in.
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:59:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > - I agree with Ben that the current construction has some awkward
> > > > > properties and that prefixing the length field would remedy that.
> > It's
> > > > > been quite some time since we had this discussion but as I recall the
> > > > > rationale was to protect the bits on the wire as-is rather than some
> > > > > reconstructed version of them (see a number of long discussions on
> > > > > this topic), so just prefixing the CID length is also not ideal.
> > > >
> > > > I think the current scheme is unfortunately using fields put together
> > in a
> > > > rather different order than the actual bits on the wire (more below).
> > > >
> > >
> > > Right. I forgot that we also preserved the TLS order of the seqnum.
> > >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > This is a little goofy but it has (I think) the properties that (1)
> > the
> > > > > bytes appear
> > > > > in the MAC in the order they appear on the wire (2) fixed-length
> > metadata
> > > > > appears in
> > > > > the front (the seq_num already does) (3) the duplicated tls12_cid in
> > the
> > > > > front avoids confusion with MAC input for other records.
> > > >
> > > > I like (1) and (2) and agree with (3), though I'm having a little
> > trouble
> > > > lining up your figure with the DTLSCiphertext structure, which I'll
> > repeat
> > > > here so I'm not flipping back and forth as much:
> > > >
> > > >         struct {
> > > >             ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
> > > >             ProtocolVersion version;
> > > >             uint16 epoch;
> > > >             uint48 sequence_number;
> > > >             opaque cid[cid_length];               // New field
> > > >             uint16 length;
> > > >             opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
> > > >         } DTLSCiphertext;
> > > >
> > > > Ah, your proposal looks more natural if I compare it to the current
> > AEAD
> > > > "additional_data" from the -07:
> > > >
> > > > #      additional_data = seq_num +
> > > > #                        tls12_cid +
> > > > #                        DTLSCipherText.version +
> > > > #                        cid +
> > > > #                        cid_length +
> > > > #                        length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> > > >
> > > > If I could try to synthesize your key points (as I understand them),
> > hewing
> > > > more strictly to the "bits on the wire" philosophy would suggest
> > having us
> > > > use:
> > > >
> > > > additional_data:
> > > > struct {
> > > >   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
> > > >   uint8 cid_len;
> > > >   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
> > > >   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
> > > >   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
> > > >   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
> > > >   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
> > > > };
> > > >
> > > >
> > > Mostly.
> > >
> > > I would expect the length here to not be DTLSInnerPlaintext but rather
> > the
> > > length field that appears on the wire, as in TLS 1.3. Do you agree with
> > > that? If not, let's discuss. If so, we can talk about the others.
> >
> > Good catch, the length on the wire makes more sense.  (I presume I just
> > cribbed from the -07 here and didn't think hard enough.
> >
> 
> So I think that the following is right for MtE.
> 
> struct {
>   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
>   uint8 cid_len;
>   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
>   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
>   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
>   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
>   uint16 length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
>   DTLSInnerPlaintext.content;          \
>   DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type;        |  entirety of DTLSInnerPlaintext
>   DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros;            /
> };

Sounds good.

> 
> As for EtM
> 
> Encrypt-then-MAC:
> struct {
>   uint8 marker = tls12_cid;
>   uint8 cid_len;
>   uint8 content_type = tls12_cid;      \
>   uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;       |  appears on wire
>   uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch    |
>   opaque cid[cid_len];                 /
>   uint16 iv_length;
>   opaque IV[iv_length];
>   uint16 enc_content_length;
>   opaque enc_content[enc_content_length];
> };
> 
> This seems kind of unfortunate in that the 7366 version is much more
> faithful to the wire, so I still have to think about this one some more, I
> think...

Yeah, I was not super happy with that one as I wrote it (hence my comment
about it), but I also wasn't around when 7366 was being written, so I don't
have much else to draw on.

-Ben


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Rich,

THanks for the review. Pretty funny that we forgot the 8446 reference. =
We will get that added.

spt

> On Oct 22, 2020, at 15:22, Rich Salz via Datatracker =
<noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Reviewer: Rich Salz
> Review result: Has Nits
>=20
> I'm the assigned security directorate reviewer for this draft. This is =
intended
> for use by the Sec ADs, but anyone else who gleans wisdom from this =
message is
> free to use it as they see fit.
>=20
> The document is READY.  There are some nits, which can be found at
> =
https://www6.ietf.org/tools/idnits?url=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/archive/id/d=
raft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04.txt
> or by clicking on the "nits" tab on the datatracker page.
>=20
> Don't use MD5 or SHA1 as digests.  If you do, bad people in shadows =
wearing
> hoodies will be able to steal your information, impersonate or break =
your TLS
> or other connections, and so on. This document gives more rationale =
and updates
> some RFC's.
>=20
> This NITS should be fixed, but this should be published.
>=20
>=20
>=20


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Reviewer: Meral Shirazipour
Review result: Ready with Nits

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team
(Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF
Chair.  Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04

Reviewer: Meral Shirazipour
Review Date: 2020-10-26
IETF LC End Date: 2020-10-28
IESG Telechat date: NA

Summary: This draft is ready to be published as Standards Track RFC , no more
comments other than those addressed on the list already.

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:
[Page 4], Section 7, typo : "deprecated.."-->"deprecated."
[Page 4], Section 8, typo :"resgistry"-->"registry"

Best Regards,
Meral



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Reviewer: Daniel Migault
Review result: Ready with Nits

Hi,


I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing effort to
review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were
written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.  Document
authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like
any other IETF Last Call comments.  

Review Results: Ready with Nits

Please find my comments below.

Yours,
Daniel


         Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
                  draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
[...]

1.  Introduction

   The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is
   specified in [RFC5246].  MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be
   insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].  In 2011, [RFC6151]
   detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for
   MD5.  NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011
   [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at
   the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the
   potential for brute-force attack.  In 2016, researchers from INRIA
   identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and
   other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms
   on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].
   Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam
   [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical.
   This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that MD5
   and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.  However, this
   document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.

<mglt>
RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2]. 

Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
already been deprecated but I have not found
this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
is deprecated already.

</mglt>

[...]

2.  Signature Algorithms

   Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
   extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
   extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a
   handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not used
   (for example, when using PSK ciphers).

<mglt>
It seems to me that the server behavior might
be defined as well. In our case this could be
something around the lines the server MUST
ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature
algorithm extension. 

</mglt>

3.  Certificate Request

   Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest
   messages.

<mglt>
It seems to me that the same level of
authentication should be provided for both
peers and that server MUST NOT  include MD5
or SHA-1.

A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a
smooth transition. At that time, collision
for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely
that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are
likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth
path worth being taken. 
</mglt>

4.  Server Key Exchange

   Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages.
   If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyExchange
   message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter
   alert.

<mglt>
As per section 2, the client has clearly
indicated it does not support signature with
MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not
end up with signature with SHA1/MD5. 

"""
If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
   signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that
   extension. 
"""

It also seems to me that the constraint of
including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is
related to the Certificate. I suspect that
some clarification are needed here.  

Since the case where the extension becomes
mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246
might be updated as well, though this does
not appear that necessary.

</mglt>

5.  Certificate Verify

   Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages.
   If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it
   MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or
   insufficient_security alert.


<mglt>

6. Certificate 

Unless I am missing something, it seems to me
that signature may also be found in the
Certificate messages for the chain as well in
the restriction of the signature algorithm.
The end certificate is associated to the peer
while other certificate are related to a CA. 

It seems that client and server behavior may
be specified. The quoted text below may be
helpful to clarify. 

"""
 If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
   certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
   hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.
"""

</mglt>

6.  Updates to RFC5246

   [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
   suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
   their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
   SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.

   In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:

   OLD:

   "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
   supports MD5 and SHA- 1."

   NEW:

   "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
   supports SHA-256."


<mglt>
I am reading the Note as an explanation on
why sha was taken as the default hash
function with the following rules. 

"""
If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
   server MUST do the following:

   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
      DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
      sent the value {sha1,rsa}.

   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
      DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.

   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
      ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
"""

The current document does not update the
default hash function from sha to sha256 to
avoid interoperability issue where one peer
takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.
As a results, these rules and the "Note" may
eventually all together be replaced by your
text of section 2. 

The following text may also be removed:

"""
 If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms
   (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms
   extension.
"""

Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the
removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result
in interoperability issues. At this point,
the issue is due to the obsolescence of the
implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has
started a long time ago. 

It is unclear to me how normative is
interpreted "can assume". Was the support of
MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if
we were willing to maintain interoperability
between software that only implemented
MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and
introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1
kept for interoperability purpose before
being deprecated. I do not think we should
take that path as implementations that
currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely
to be updated and that deprecation of
SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago. 

I would however mention the issue of
interoperability in the  section but not in
the text to update. In the text to update I
would maybe suggest that the support of
SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST
statement. 


</mglt>

Velvindron, et al.       Expires April 12, 2021                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft      draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate       October 2020


7.  Updates to RFC7525

   [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of
   SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum
   recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1
   and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and
   this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been
   deprecated..

   Section 4.3:

   OLD:

   When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
   at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the use
   of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] for
   more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
   SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
   1.2.

   NEW:

   Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a
   2048-bit modulus for the public key.

   In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED;
   and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more
   details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-
   256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
   1.2.

<mglt>
I understand the reason we do specify that
hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This
is fine in the context of this document, but
it seems to me that if we were writing the
updated specification we may have rather
mentioned a minimum level of security hash
function needs to be met - in our case
SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the
appropriated choice.   

</mglt>


8.  IANA Considerations

   The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the
   recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not
   recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].  The following entries are to
   be updated:

       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
       | Value  |  Description   | Recommended |     Reference     |
       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
       | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
       | 0x0203 |   ecdsa_sha1   |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+

   Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.


<mglt>
It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS
hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature
registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature
Scheme. 

I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and
md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should
be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the 
SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest
 may have prevented such deprecation. 

A side effect is these code points for
signature scheme that were assigned for
compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)
signatures must not be used anymore -  if
there are no more valid with TLS 1.2. 
</mglt>





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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 10:32:28 -0400
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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Cc: iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org,  draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate.all@ietf.org, tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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To address the comment below, keeping weak security is likely to weaken
current and future IoT communications, so I do not think there is room for
compromise with performance. Of course this is in a context of TLS.  I
expect protocol to leverage from TLS security, so the impact should be
rather negligible.

"""
As those hash algorithms were 'cheap' for TLS 1.2, I would appreciate a
review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated.
"""
Yours,
Daniel


On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:21 AM Daniel Migault via Datatracker <
noreply@ietf.org> wrote:

> Reviewer: Daniel Migault
> Review result: Ready with Nits
>
> Hi,
>
>
> I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing effort to
> review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were
> written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.  Document
> authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just
> like
> any other IETF Last Call comments.
>
> Review Results: Ready with Nits
>
> Please find my comments below.
>
> Yours,
> Daniel
>
>
>          Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
>                   draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
> [...]
>
> 1.  Introduction
>
>    The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is
>    specified in [RFC5246].  MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be
>    insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].  In 2011, [RFC6151]
>    detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for
>    MD5.  NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011
>    [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at
>    the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the
>    potential for brute-force attack.  In 2016, researchers from INRIA
>    identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and
>    other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms
>    on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].
>    Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam
>    [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical.
>    This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that MD5
>    and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.  However, this
>    document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.
>
> <mglt>
> RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
> not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
> additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2].
>
> Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
> MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
> is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
> the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
> hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
> already been deprecated but I have not found
> this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
> is deprecated already.
>
> </mglt>
>
> [...]
>
> 2.  Signature Algorithms
>
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>    extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>    extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a
>    handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not used
>    (for example, when using PSK ciphers).
>
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the server behavior might
> be defined as well. In our case this could be
> something around the lines the server MUST
> ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature
> algorithm extension.
>
> </mglt>
>
> 3.  Certificate Request
>
>    Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest
>    messages.
>
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the same level of
> authentication should be provided for both
> peers and that server MUST NOT  include MD5
> or SHA-1.
>
> A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a
> smooth transition. At that time, collision
> for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely
> that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are
> likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth
> path worth being taken.
> </mglt>
>
> 4.  Server Key Exchange
>
>    Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages.
>    If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyExchange
>    message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter
>    alert.
>
> <mglt>
> As per section 2, the client has clearly
> indicated it does not support signature with
> MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not
> end up with signature with SHA1/MD5.
>
> """
> If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
>    signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that
>    extension.
> """
>
> It also seems to me that the constraint of
> including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is
> related to the Certificate. I suspect that
> some clarification are needed here.
>
> Since the case where the extension becomes
> mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246
> might be updated as well, though this does
> not appear that necessary.
>
> </mglt>
>
> 5.  Certificate Verify
>
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages.
>    If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it
>    MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or
>    insufficient_security alert.
>
>
> <mglt>
>
> 6. Certificate
>
> Unless I am missing something, it seems to me
> that signature may also be found in the
> Certificate messages for the chain as well in
> the restriction of the signature algorithm.
> The end certificate is associated to the peer
> while other certificate are related to a CA.
>
> It seems that client and server behavior may
> be specified. The quoted text below may be
> helpful to clarify.
>
> """
>  If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
>    certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
>    hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.
> """
>
> </mglt>
>
> 6.  Updates to RFC5246
>
>    [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>    suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
>    their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
>    SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
>
>    In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
>
>    OLD:
>
>    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
>
>    NEW:
>
>    "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports SHA-256."
>
>
> <mglt>
> I am reading the Note as an explanation on
> why sha was taken as the default hash
> function with the following rules.
>
> """
> If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
>    server MUST do the following:
>
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
>       DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
>       sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
>
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
>       DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
>
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
>       ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
> """
>
> The current document does not update the
> default hash function from sha to sha256 to
> avoid interoperability issue where one peer
> takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.
> As a results, these rules and the "Note" may
> eventually all together be replaced by your
> text of section 2.
>
> The following text may also be removed:
>
> """
>  If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms
>    (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms
>    extension.
> """
>
> Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the
> removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result
> in interoperability issues. At this point,
> the issue is due to the obsolescence of the
> implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has
> started a long time ago.
>
> It is unclear to me how normative is
> interpreted "can assume". Was the support of
> MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if
> we were willing to maintain interoperability
> between software that only implemented
> MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and
> introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1
> kept for interoperability purpose before
> being deprecated. I do not think we should
> take that path as implementations that
> currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely
> to be updated and that deprecation of
> SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago.
>
> I would however mention the issue of
> interoperability in the  section but not in
> the text to update. In the text to update I
> would maybe suggest that the support of
> SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST
> statement.
>
>
> </mglt>
>
> Velvindron, et al.       Expires April 12, 2021                 [Page 3]
>
> Internet-Draft      draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate       October 2020
>
>
> 7.  Updates to RFC7525
>
>    [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security
>    (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of
>    SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum
>    recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1
>    and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and
>    this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been
>    deprecated..
>
>    Section 4.3:
>
>    OLD:
>
>    When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
>    at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the use
>    of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] for
>    more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
>    SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>    1.2.
>
>    NEW:
>
>    Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a
>    2048-bit modulus for the public key.
>
>    In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED;
>    and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more
>    details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-
>    256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>    1.2.
>
> <mglt>
> I understand the reason we do specify that
> hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This
> is fine in the context of this document, but
> it seems to me that if we were writing the
> updated specification we may have rather
> mentioned a minimum level of security hash
> function needs to be met - in our case
> SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the
> appropriated choice.
>
> </mglt>
>
>
> 8.  IANA Considerations
>
>    The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the
>    recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not
>    recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].  The following entries are to
>    be updated:
>
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | Value  |  Description   | Recommended |     Reference     |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        | 0x0203 |   ecdsa_sha1   |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>
>    Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.
>
>
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS
> hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature
> registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature
> Scheme.
>
> I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and
> md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should
> be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the
> SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest
>  may have prevented such deprecation.
>
> A side effect is these code points for
> signature scheme that were assigned for
> compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)
> signatures must not be used anymore -  if
> there are no more valid with TLS 1.2.
> </mglt>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--00000000000039bba905b2a7ebb4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">To address the comment below, keeping weak security is lik=
ely to weaken current and future IoT communications, so I do not think ther=
e is room for compromise with performance. Of course this is in a context o=
f TLS.=C2=A0 I expect protocol to leverage from TLS security, so the impact=
 should be rather negligible.=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</=
div><div>As those hash algorithms were &#39;cheap&#39; for TLS 1.2, I would=
 appreciate a review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are depr=
ecated.</div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div>=
<div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:21 AM Daniel Migault via Datatra=
cker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noreply@ietf.org">noreply@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Reviewer: Dani=
el Migault<br>
Review result: Ready with Nits<br>
<br>
Hi,<br>
<br>
<br>
I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate&#39;s ongoing effor=
t to<br>
review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.=C2=A0 These comments=
 were<br>
written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.=C2=A0 Doc=
ument<br>
authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just l=
ike<br>
any other IETF Last Call comments.=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
Review Results: Ready with Nits<br>
<br>
Please find my comments below.<br>
<br>
Yours,<br>
Daniel<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashe=
s in TLS 1.2<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 draft-ietf-t=
ls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04<br>
[...]<br>
<br>
1.=C2=A0 Introduction<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0specified in [RFC5246].=C2=A0 MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven t=
o be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].=C2=A0 In 2011, =
[RFC6151]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0detailed the security considerations, including collision atta=
cks for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0MD5.=C2=A0 NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatu=
res at<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and th=
e<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0potential for brute-force attack.=C2=A0 In 2016, researchers f=
rom INRIA<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS =
(and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algo=
rithms<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practica=
l.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way th=
at MD5<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.=C2=A0 Howev=
er, this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protectio=
n.<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for<br>
not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an<br>
additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2]. <br>
<br>
Reading the text the situation of HMAC with<br>
MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1<br>
is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify<br>
the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I<br>
hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has<br>
already been deprecated but I have not found<br>
this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it<br>
is deprecated already.<br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
[...]<br>
<br>
2.=C2=A0 Signature Algorithms<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algori=
thms<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0extension.=C2=A0 If a client does not send a signature_algorit=
hms<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are no=
t used<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(for example, when using PSK ciphers).<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
It seems to me that the server behavior might<br>
be defined as well. In our case this could be<br>
something around the lines the server MUST<br>
ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature<br>
algorithm extension. <br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
3.=C2=A0 Certificate Request<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0messages.<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
It seems to me that the same level of<br>
authentication should be provided for both<br>
peers and that server MUST NOT=C2=A0 include MD5<br>
or SHA-1.<br>
<br>
A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a<br>
smooth transition. At that time, collision<br>
for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely<br>
that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are<br>
likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth<br>
path worth being taken. <br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
4.=C2=A0 Server Key Exchange<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange me=
ssages.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyEx=
change<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_paramete=
r<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0alert.<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
As per section 2, the client has clearly<br>
indicated it does not support signature with<br>
MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not<br>
end up with signature with SHA1/MD5. <br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
If the client has offered the &quot;signature_algorithms&quot; extension, t=
he<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed i=
n that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0extension. <br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br>
It also seems to me that the constraint of<br>
including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is<br>
related to the Certificate. I suspect that<br>
some clarification are needed here.=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
Since the case where the extension becomes<br>
mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246<br>
might be updated as well, though this does<br>
not appear that necessary.<br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
5.=C2=A0 Certificate Verify<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify me=
ssages.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or S=
HA-1 it<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0insufficient_security alert.<br>
<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
6. Certificate <br>
<br>
Unless I am missing something, it seems to me<br>
that signature may also be found in the<br>
Certificate messages for the chain as well in<br>
the restriction of the signature algorithm.<br>
The end certificate is associated to the peer<br>
while other certificate are related to a CA. <br>
<br>
It seems that client and server behavior may<br>
be specified. The quoted text below may be<br>
helpful to clarify. <br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
=C2=A0If the client provided a &quot;signature_algorithms&quot; extension, =
then all<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.<=
br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
6.=C2=A0 Updates to RFC5246<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version=
 1.2,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and S=
HA-1 by<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0their peer.=C2=A0 This update changes the suggestion to assume=
 support for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0OLD:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no e=
xplicit<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0supports MD5 and SHA- 1.&quot;<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0NEW:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no e=
xplicit<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0supports SHA-256.&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
I am reading the Note as an explanation on<br>
why sha was taken as the default hash<br>
function with the following rules. <br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server MUST do the following:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0-=C2=A0 If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RS=
A, DHE_RSA,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if cl=
ient had<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 sent the value {sha1,rsa}.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0-=C2=A0 If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DH=
E_DSS,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {s=
ha1,dsa}.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0-=C2=A0 If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (EC=
DH_ECDSA,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {=
sha1,ecdsa}.<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br>
The current document does not update the<br>
default hash function from sha to sha256 to<br>
avoid interoperability issue where one peer<br>
takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.<br>
As a results, these rules and the &quot;Note&quot; may<br>
eventually all together be replaced by your<br>
text of section 2. <br>
<br>
The following text may also be removed:<br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
=C2=A0If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0extension.<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br>
Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the<br>
removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result<br>
in interoperability issues. At this point,<br>
the issue is due to the obsolescence of the<br>
implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has<br>
started a long time ago. <br>
<br>
It is unclear to me how normative is<br>
interpreted &quot;can assume&quot;. Was the support of<br>
MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if<br>
we were willing to maintain interoperability<br>
between software that only implemented<br>
MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and<br>
introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1<br>
kept for interoperability purpose before<br>
being deprecated. I do not think we should<br>
take that path as implementations that<br>
currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely<br>
to be updated and that deprecation of<br>
SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago. <br>
<br>
I would however mention the issue of<br>
interoperability in the=C2=A0 section but not in<br>
the text to update. In the text to update I<br>
would maybe suggest that the support of<br>
SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST<br>
statement. <br>
<br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
Velvindron, et al.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Expires April 12, 2021=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[Page 3]<br>
<br>
Internet-Draft=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0October 2020<br>
<br>
<br>
7.=C2=A0 Updates to RFC7525<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer S=
ecurity<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends =
use of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.=C2=A0 This update moves the =
minimum<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of bot=
h SHA-1<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and MD5.=C2=A0 The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 o=
r SHA-1; and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have b=
een<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0deprecated..<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.3:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0OLD:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates=
 with<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.=C2=A0 In addit=
ion, the use<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baselin=
e] for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0more details).=C2=A0 Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that t=
hey request<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHA-256, by using the &quot;Signature Algorithms&quot; extensi=
on defined in TLS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A01.2.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0NEW:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A02048-bit modulus for the public key.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMEN=
DED;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0details).=C2=A0 Clients MUST indicate to servers that they req=
uest SHA-<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0256, by using the &quot;Signature Algorithms&quot; extension d=
efined in TLS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A01.2.<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
I understand the reason we do specify that<br>
hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This<br>
is fine in the context of this document, but<br>
it seems to me that if we were writing the<br>
updated specification we may have rather<br>
mentioned a minimum level of security hash<br>
function needs to be met - in our case<br>
SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the<br>
appropriated choice.=C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>
<br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
8.=C2=A0 IANA Considerations<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The document updates the &quot;TLS SignatureScheme&quot; regis=
try to change the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].=C2=A0 The following entr=
ies are to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0be updated:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+--------+----------------+-------------+-------=
------------+<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| Value=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 Description=C2=A0 =C2=A0| =
Recommended |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Reference=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+--------+----------------+-------------+-------=
------------+<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
N=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| 0x0203 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0ecdsa_sha1=C2=A0 =C2=A0|=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 N=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+--------+----------------+-------------+-------=
------------+<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.<br>
<br>
<br>
&lt;mglt&gt;<br>
It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS<br>
hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature<br>
registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature<br>
Scheme. <br>
<br>
I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and<br>
md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should<br>
be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the <br>
SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest<br>
=C2=A0may have prevented such deprecation. <br>
<br>
A side effect is these code points for<br>
signature scheme that were assigned for<br>
compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)<br>
signatures must not be used anymore -=C2=A0 if<br>
there are no more valid with TLS 1.2. <br>
&lt;/mglt&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><d=
iv>Ericsson</div></div></div>

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Subject: [TLS] ECH test server
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Hi,

I would like to test an ECH-enabled client, but am struggling to find a
public test server with a published ECHconfig in its HTTPS record.

Do any yet exist?

I've looked in all these places, but none are mentioned:
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation-Status
https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md
https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md

Or is everyone just spinning up private servers for now?

Thanks,
Chris

--00000000000057c5a305b2ab582d
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>I would like to test an =
ECH-enabled client, but am struggling to find a public test server with a p=
ublished ECHconfig in its HTTPS record.</div><div><br></div><div>Do any yet=
 exist?<br></div><div></div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve looked in all thes=
e places, but none are mentioned:</div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px">
<a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation=
-Status">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation-S=
tatus</a>

</div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px"> <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/=
tlswg-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md">https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-w=
iki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md</a></div><div style=3D"margin-left:40px"=
><a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md">htt=
ps://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md</a></div><div><br><=
/div><div>Or is everyone just spinning up private servers for now?</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Chris<br></div><div><div></div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div></div></div>

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Hiya,

The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
HPKE for public key encryption."

The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
reasons).

So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated
I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and
a common co-author.

It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in
such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related
specs.

Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and
HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where
there is too much githubbery going on with the result
that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author
end up out of whack despite being issued within a week
of one another.

That and the velocity of discussion and changes on
github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing
ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it
as it has been happening these last months. If that were
the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on
github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be
close to reaching that goal.

Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long
enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?

Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored
just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send
it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like
an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can't
interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might
show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on
github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this
case).

Thanks,
Stephen.


From nobody Tue Oct 27 13:33:32 2020
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH test server
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: "Chris Box (BT)" <chris.box.ietf@gmail.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH test server
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On 27/10/2020 18:37, Chris Box (BT) wrote:
> Hi,
>=20
> I would like to test an ECH-enabled client, but am struggling to find a=

> public test server with a published ECHconfig in its HTTPS record.
>=20
> Do any yet exist?
>=20
> I've looked in all these places, but none are mentioned:
> https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation-Status=

> https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md
> https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md
>=20
> Or is everyone just spinning up private servers for now?

I got as far as draft-05 before falling behind sorry.
Will post when/if I get current.

See my other mail for the related whine:-)

Cheers,
S.

>=20
> Thanks,
> Chris
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 09:28:12 +1100
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Stephen,

I don't think what you're complaining about can be attributed to GitHub. =
Tools are just tools, how they're used is what's relevant (i.e., this =
could just as easily happen over e-mail).

Cheers,


> On 28 Oct 2020, at 7:31 am, Stephen Farrell =
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Hiya,
>=20
> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
> HPKE for public key encryption."
>=20
> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
> reasons).
>=20
> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated
> I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and
> a common co-author.
>=20
> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in
> such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related
> specs.
>=20
> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and
> HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where
> there is too much githubbery going on with the result
> that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author
> end up out of whack despite being issued within a week
> of one another.
>=20
> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on
> github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing
> ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it
> as it has been happening these last months. If that were
> the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on
> github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be
> close to reaching that goal.
>=20
> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long
> enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?
>=20
> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored
> just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send
> it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like
> an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can't
> interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might
> show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on
> github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this
> case).
>=20
> Thanks,
> Stephen.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/


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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Hiya,

On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> Stephen,
>=20
> I don't think what you're complaining about can be attributed to
> GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they're used is what's relevant
> (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).

Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would've happened via
email for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking
topics.

I "watch" the repos for these drafts, and in just the last
month, I've seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157
dns-alt-svc emails. That's too many, is encouraged by the
tools IMO and has to mean a lot not being discussed on the
list that ought be.

So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes,
had someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful
bits of those 683 mails per month to the list, it may have
been that the mismatch would've been avoided.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I neglected to say in my earlier mail that hpke-05 has
an interop bug that we discovered when I was verifying the
test vectors a few months ago. It's not the right basis to
pick if we want esni-08 to be used for interop really. But
more to the point, nor is a moving target.


>=20
> Cheers,
>=20
>=20
>> On 28 Oct 2020, at 7:31 am, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> Hiya,
>>=20
>> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of HPKE
>> for public key encryption."
>>=20
>> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor=20
>> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial reasons).
>>=20
>> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated I-D,
>> despite the one week difference in publishing and a common
>> co-author.
>>=20
>> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in such a lack
>> of co-ordination in two closely related specs.
>>=20
>> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and HPKE-06 but this
>> seems like yet another case where there is too much githubbery
>> going on with the result that two closely linked drafts with a
>> common co-author end up out of whack despite being issued within a
>> week of one another.
>>=20
>> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on github are a
>> major disincentive (for me) for implementing ECH. I simply do not
>> have the cycles to keep up with it as it has been happening these
>> last months. If that were the goal of the authors and those
>> endlessly commenting on github (and I do not believe it is), then
>> they would be close to reaching that goal.
>>=20
>> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long enough to get
>> implementations done and somewhat tested?
>>=20
>> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored just as
>> my previous entreaties were. I decided to send it anyway on the
>> basis that the perhaps what seems like an obvious failure of the
>> current approach (ECH can't interop unless you use an outdated I-D
>> for HPKE) might show that all this apparent high velocity
>> discussion on github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least
>> this case).
>>=20
>> Thanks, Stephen.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
> -- Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>=20

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 16:06:18 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:00 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> > Stephen,
> >
> > I don't think what you're complaining about can be attributed to
> > GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they're used is what's relevant
> > (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).
>
> Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would've happened via
> email for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking
> topics.
>
> I "watch" the repos for these drafts, and in just the last
> month, I've seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157
> dns-alt-svc emails. That's too many, is encouraged by the
> tools IMO and has to mean a lot not being discussed on the
> list that ought be.
>
> So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes,
> had someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful
> bits of those 683 mails per month to the list, it may have
> been that the mismatch would've been avoided.
>

This seems to me like it makes the argument for the tooling. Namely that it
enables low friction participation on details.



> PS: I neglected to say in my earlier mail that hpke-05 has
> an interop bug that we discovered when I was verifying the
> test vectors a few months ago. It's not the right basis to
> pick if we want esni-08 to be used for interop really. But
> more to the point, nor is a moving target.
>

I think this is the key point. ECH is under active development with open
issues. Trying to do interop now is at your own risk.

-Ekr


>
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> >
> >> On 28 Oct 2020, at 7:31 am, Stephen Farrell
> >> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Hiya,
> >>
> >> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of HPKE
> >> for public key encryption."
> >>
> >> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
> >> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial reasons).
> >>
> >> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated I-D,
> >> despite the one week difference in publishing and a common
> >> co-author.
> >>
> >> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in such a lack
> >> of co-ordination in two closely related specs.
> >>
> >> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and HPKE-06 but this
> >> seems like yet another case where there is too much githubbery
> >> going on with the result that two closely linked drafts with a
> >> common co-author end up out of whack despite being issued within a
> >> week of one another.
> >>
> >> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on github are a
> >> major disincentive (for me) for implementing ECH. I simply do not
> >> have the cycles to keep up with it as it has been happening these
> >> last months. If that were the goal of the authors and those
> >> endlessly commenting on github (and I do not believe it is), then
> >> they would be close to reaching that goal.
> >>
> >> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long enough to get
> >> implementations done and somewhat tested?
> >>
> >> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored just as
> >> my previous entreaties were. I decided to send it anyway on the
> >> basis that the perhaps what seems like an obvious failure of the
> >> current approach (ECH can't interop unless you use an outdated I-D
> >> for HPKE) might show that all this apparent high velocity
> >> discussion on github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least
> >> this case).
> >>
> >> Thanks, Stephen.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list
> >> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
> > -- Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
> >
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--00000000000056e55b05b2af1a8d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:00 PM Steph=
en Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:<br>
&gt; Stephen,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don&#39;t think what you&#39;re complaining about can be attributed =
to<br>
&gt; GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they&#39;re used is what&#39;s relev=
ant<br>
&gt; (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).<br>
<br>
Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would&#39;ve happened via<br>
email for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking<br>
topics.<br>
<br>
I &quot;watch&quot; the repos for these drafts, and in just the last<br>
month, I&#39;ve seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157<br>
dns-alt-svc emails. That&#39;s too many, is encouraged by the<br>
tools IMO and has to mean a lot not being discussed on the<br>
list that ought be.<br>
<br>
So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes,<br>
had someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful<br>
bits of those 683 mails per month to the list, it may have<br>
been that the mismatch would&#39;ve been avoided.<br></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>This seems to me like it makes the argument for the tooling. Nam=
ely that it enables low friction participation on details.</div><div><br></=
div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
PS: I neglected to say in my earlier mail that hpke-05 has<br>
an interop bug that we discovered when I was verifying the<br>
test vectors a few months ago. It&#39;s not the right basis to<br>
pick if we want esni-08 to be used for interop really. But<br>
more to the point, nor is a moving target.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>I think this is the key point. ECH is under active development with ope=
n issues. Trying to do interop now is at your own risk.<br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On 28 Oct 2020, at 7:31 am, Stephen Farrell<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank"=
>stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Hiya,<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says &quot;ECH uses draft-05 of H=
PKE<br>
&gt;&gt; for public key encryption.&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor <br>
&gt;&gt; incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial reasons).<br=
>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated I-D,<br>
&gt;&gt; despite the one week difference in publishing and a common<br>
&gt;&gt; co-author.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in such a lack=
<br>
&gt;&gt; of co-ordination in two closely related specs.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and HPKE-06 but this<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; seems like yet another case where there is too much githubbery<br>
&gt;&gt; going on with the result that two closely linked drafts with a<br>
&gt;&gt; common co-author end up out of whack despite being issued within a=
<br>
&gt;&gt; week of one another.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; That and the velocity of discussion and changes on github are a<br=
>
&gt;&gt; major disincentive (for me) for implementing ECH. I simply do not<=
br>
&gt;&gt; have the cycles to keep up with it as it has been happening these<=
br>
&gt;&gt; last months. If that were the goal of the authors and those<br>
&gt;&gt; endlessly commenting on github (and I do not believe it is), then<=
br>
&gt;&gt; they would be close to reaching that goal.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long enough to ge=
t<br>
&gt;&gt; implementations done and somewhat tested?<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored just as<=
br>
&gt;&gt; my previous entreaties were. I decided to send it anyway on the<br=
>
&gt;&gt; basis that the perhaps what seems like an obvious failure of the<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; current approach (ECH can&#39;t interop unless you use an outdated=
 I-D<br>
&gt;&gt; for HPKE) might show that all this apparent high velocity<br>
&gt;&gt; discussion on github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; this case).<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Thanks, Stephen.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list <=
br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a>=
 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -- Mark Nottingham=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.mnot.net/" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.mnot.net/</a><br>
&gt; <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Hiya,

On 27/10/2020 23:06, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:00 PM Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> Hiya,
>>=20
>> On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>>> Stephen,
>>>=20
>>> I don't think what you're complaining about can be attributed to=20
>>> GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they're used is what's
>>> relevant (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).
>>=20
>> Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would've happened via email
>> for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking topics.
>>=20
>> I "watch" the repos for these drafts, and in just the last month,
>> I've seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157 dns-alt-svc
>> emails. That's too many, is encouraged by the tools IMO and has to
>> mean a lot not being discussed on the list that ought be.
>>=20
>> So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes, had
>> someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful bits of those
>> 683 mails per month to the list, it may have been that the mismatch
>> would've been avoided.
>>=20
>=20
> This seems to me like it makes the argument for the tooling. Namely
> that it enables low friction participation on details.

It enables that for *some* whose workflow that matches.
That is not the IETF process (yet). (And "low friction"
is just as much verbiage as it would be had I described
the situation using a term like "verbal diarrhoea":-)

>> PS: I neglected to say in my earlier mail that hpke-05 has an
>> interop bug that we discovered when I was verifying the test
>> vectors a few months ago. It's not the right basis to pick if we
>> want esni-08 to be used for interop really. But more to the point,
>> nor is a moving target.
>>=20
>=20
> I think this is the key point. ECH is under active development with
> open issues.=20

No. The key point is esni-08 unnecessarily and uselessly
depends on -05 which has a known bug. That should have
been avoided. That it was not is a fail. And I think one
party due to the preferred tooling of the set of people
who are extremely active on github wrt these drafts. (It's
not an end of the world thing, but denying it seems a
bit odd to me.)

> Trying to do interop now is at your own risk.

That's a non-answer. I didn't claim any loss so risk isn't
relevant. It's being denied the opportunity to implement by
the continually moving target that is my problem, not a
risk nor financial loss.

Mozilla implemented -02, but not, so far as I recall, later
versions. It's been two years since -02 was published. I don't think=20
we've come that far at all since (there are
modest improvements but not two years worth) and I do
think the tooling is responsible for some of those delays,
certainly this year.

ISTM that a spec that always changes too fast to be
implemented by many will often be inferior to one that is
dealt with in a manner that has more eyeballs looking at
it in considered detail. So by all means use github, but
at least make sure the text has enough stability to be
coded up.

Cheers,
S.

>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Cheers,
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On 28 Oct 2020, at 7:31 am, Stephen Farrell=20
>>>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Hiya,
>>>>=20
>>>> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
>>>> HPKE for public key encryption."
>>>>=20
>>>> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor=20
>>>> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
>>>> reasons).
>>>>=20
>>>> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated I-D,=20
>>>> despite the one week difference in publishing and a common=20
>>>> co-author.
>>>>=20
>>>> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in such a
>>>> lack of co-ordination in two closely related specs.
>>>>=20
>>>> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and HPKE-06 but
>>>> this seems like yet another case where there is too much
>>>> githubbery going on with the result that two closely linked
>>>> drafts with a common co-author end up out of whack despite
>>>> being issued within a week of one another.
>>>>=20
>>>> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on github are
>>>> a major disincentive (for me) for implementing ECH. I simply do
>>>> not have the cycles to keep up with it as it has been happening
>>>> these last months. If that were the goal of the authors and
>>>> those endlessly commenting on github (and I do not believe it
>>>> is), then they would be close to reaching that goal.
>>>>=20
>>>> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long enough to
>>>> get implementations done and somewhat tested?
>>>>=20
>>>> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored just
>>>> as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send it anyway on
>>>> the basis that the perhaps what seems like an obvious failure
>>>> of the current approach (ECH can't interop unless you use an
>>>> outdated I-D for HPKE) might show that all this apparent high
>>>> velocity discussion on github is not as effetcive as claimed
>>>> (in at least this case).
>>>>=20
>>>> Thanks, Stephen.
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing
>>>> list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>=20
>>> -- Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>=20
>=20

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 16:27:46 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:20 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 27/10/2020 23:06, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:00 PM Stephen Farrell
> > <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Hiya,
> >>
> >> On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> >>> Stephen,
> >>>
> >>> I don't think what you're complaining about can be attributed to
> >>> GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they're used is what's
> >>> relevant (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).
> >>
> >> Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would've happened via email
> >> for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking topics.
> >>
> >> I "watch" the repos for these drafts, and in just the last month,
> >> I've seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157 dns-alt-svc
> >> emails. That's too many, is encouraged by the tools IMO and has to
> >> mean a lot not being discussed on the list that ought be.
> >>
> >> So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes, had
> >> someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful bits of those
> >> 683 mails per month to the list, it may have been that the mismatch
> >> would've been avoided.
> >>
> >
> > This seems to me like it makes the argument for the tooling. Namely
> > that it enables low friction participation on details.
>
> It enables that for *some* whose workflow that matches.
> That is not the IETF process (yet).


In fact, it *is* the IETF process, or rather one permitted IETF process,
since RFC 8874. If you think the chairs are not following the IETF process,
I would encourage you to contact the AD rather than arguing with me.


> Trying to do interop now is at your own risk.
>
> That's a non-answer. I didn't claim any loss so risk isn't
> relevant. It's being denied the opportunity to implement by
> the continually moving target that is my problem, not a
> risk nor financial loss.
>

And what I'm saying here is that specifications go through stages where
they are stable enough to implement and other stages where they are in flux
and people should hold off on implementing, or at least trying to get
interop. Currently, we are in the latter period.


Mozilla implemented -02, but not, so far as I recall, later
> versions. It's been two years since -02 was published.


Yes. We've been waiting for the spec to stabilize to the point where it was
worth cutting a new version. We are now working on that.



> I don't think
> we've come that far at all since (there are
> modest improvements but not two years worth) and I do
> think the tooling is responsible for some of those delays,
> certainly this year.
>

Yes, I appreciate that that's your opinion. It's not mine.

-Ekr

--0000000000001646e205b2af6778
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:20 PM Steph=
en Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
Hiya,<br>
<br>
On 27/10/2020 23:06, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 4:00 PM Stephen Farrell<br>
&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">ste=
phen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Hiya,<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; On 27/10/2020 22:28, Mark Nottingham wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Stephen,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I don&#39;t think what you&#39;re complaining about can be att=
ributed to <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; GitHub. Tools are just tools, how they&#39;re used is what&#39=
;s<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; relevant (i.e., this could just as easily happen over e-mail).=
<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Sorta. I doubt the volume of traffic would&#39;ve happened via ema=
il<br>
&gt;&gt; for non-contentious, not-trivial-but-not-earthshaking topics.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I &quot;watch&quot; the repos for these drafts, and in just the la=
st month,<br>
&gt;&gt; I&#39;ve seen 401 esni emails, 127 hpke emails and 157 dns-alt-svc=
<br>
&gt;&gt; emails. That&#39;s too many, is encouraged by the tools IMO and ha=
s to<br>
&gt;&gt; mean a lot not being discussed on the list that ought be.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; So I do think the tooling is really part of this. But yes, had<br>
&gt;&gt; someone taken on the mega-task of bringing the useful bits of thos=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; 683 mails per month to the list, it may have been that the mismatc=
h<br>
&gt;&gt; would&#39;ve been avoided.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This seems to me like it makes the argument for the tooling. Namely<br=
>
&gt; that it enables low friction participation on details.<br>
<br>
It enables that for *some* whose workflow that matches.<br>
That is not the IETF process (yet). </blockquote><div><br></div><div>In fac=
t, it *is* the IETF process, or rather one permitted IETF process, since RF=
C 8874. If you think the chairs are not following the IETF process, I would=
 encourage you to contact the AD rather than arguing with me.</div><div><br=
></div><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; Trying to do interop now is at your own risk.<br>
<br>
That&#39;s a non-answer. I didn&#39;t claim any loss so risk isn&#39;t<br>
relevant. It&#39;s being denied the opportunity to implement by<br>
the continually moving target that is my problem, not a<br>
risk nor financial loss.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>And what I&#39=
;m saying here is that specifications go through stages where they are stab=
le enough to implement and other stages where they are in flux and people s=
hould hold off on implementing, or at least trying to get interop. Currentl=
y, we are in the latter period.<br></div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div><br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Mozilla implemented -02, but not, so far as I recall, later<br>
versions. It&#39;s been two years since -02 was published. </blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>Yes. We&#39;ve been waiting for the spec to stabilize to t=
he point where it was worth cutting a new version. We are now working on th=
at.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">I don&#39;t think <br>
we&#39;ve come that far at all since (there are<br>
modest improvements but not two years worth) and I do<br>
think the tooling is responsible for some of those delays,<br>
certainly this year.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I appreciate =
that that&#39;s your opinion. It&#39;s not mine.</div><div><br></div>-Ekr</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
References: <06eebcd3-1532-1df4-cd4b-c92110bbf010@cs.tcd.ie> <8F6CBA53-967D-49C5-A3DE-B85C486F8DD5@mnot.net> <07735271-7d4e-1f9c-2262-7493fb6122dd@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBMxto+fbCBTKhuqHtDjFqnnwhzO_9MW5rcUR5V37RdzXw@mail.gmail.com> <82d9bd4e-ea37-86cc-4a3b-0b1efe295e7b@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBNOYN=oKx2=aDOX9kh0f404PhJp=dXp+Zy5ons_c2ZwiA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 23:33:02 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <ff8523ce-d01a-e2da-3bdc-ebf4199a0d41@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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On 27/10/2020 23:27, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>=20
> In fact, it*is*  the IETF process, or rather one permitted IETF process=
,
> since RFC 8874.=20

I don't believe the current case matches my recollection of
that, but I've not checked in detail. The lack of list
discussion certainly smells wrong to me.

> If you think the chairs are not following the IETF process,
> I would encourage you to contact the AD rather than arguing with me.

I am not arguing with you. I am discussing an avoidable spec
bug, and how that might've happened, on the TLS WG list.

S.

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From nobody Tue Oct 27 16:44:13 2020
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate.all@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
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<#secure method=3Dpgpmime mode=3Dsign>

Daniel Migault via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
    > RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
    > not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
    > additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2].

    > Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
    > MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
    > is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
    > the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
    > hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
    > already been deprecated but I have not found
    > this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
    > is deprecated already.

My understanding is that despite the flaws in MD5, HMAC-MD5 is still
resistant to second pre-image attacks.
RFC6151 is pretty clear about the state of things, but let me tell you about
the hassle of explaining this to end users.
The two rounds that the HMAC construct uses mean that only way to get past =
it
is with a brute force attack.

I rememeber back in 1995ish, when Hugo insisted with do HMAC.
We hated it because it made hardware.  He clearly knew something!

I agree that this document should probably quote more of RFC6151 when it
comes to HMAC-MD5.

My best advice for why we deprecate HMAC-MD5 (and HMAC-SHA1) is because end
users are confused and/or alarmed if the strings "MD5" or "SHA1" occur in
their logs.

Certainly from an IOT point of view, an algorithm that has no code is more
secure than one with code.

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Stephen,

Given that there appears to be emerging consensus around the "issue =
discussion mode with email summaries sounds" presented in Chris' email =
from just last week can we let that settle?

We can certainly get a summary together - granted there have been =
interim meetings with published minutes [0][1].

We could also adopt an approach similar to the QUIC WG where they would =
declare a particular draft version one that they would run interop on. =
We would need to decide on the process of declaring what that version =
was as well as moving to the next version.

spt

[0] =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02-202009031000/=

[1] =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03-202009210800/=


> On Oct 27, 2020, at 16:31, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Hiya,
>=20
> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
> HPKE for public key encryption."
>=20
> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
> reasons).
>=20
> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated
> I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and
> a common co-author.
>=20
> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in
> such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related
> specs.
>=20
> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and
> HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where
> there is too much githubbery going on with the result
> that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author
> end up out of whack despite being issued within a week
> of one another.
>=20
> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on
> github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing
> ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it
> as it has been happening these last months. If that were
> the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on
> github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be
> close to reaching that goal.
>=20
> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long
> enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?
>=20
> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored
> just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send
> it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like
> an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can't
> interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might
> show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on
> github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this
> case).
>=20
> Thanks,
> Stephen.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


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Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 20:49:22 -0400
Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate.all@ietf.org, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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> On Oct 27, 2020, at 19:44, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> <#secure method=3Dpgpmime mode=3Dsign>
>=20
> Daniel Migault via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>> RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
>> not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
>> additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2].
>=20
>> Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
>> MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
>> is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
>> the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
>> hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
>> already been deprecated but I have not found
>> this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
>> is deprecated already.
>=20
> My understanding is that despite the flaws in MD5, HMAC-MD5 is still
> resistant to second pre-image attacks.
> RFC6151 is pretty clear about the state of things,

Well it was the state of things in 2011. But, I am pretty sure we have =
heard something by now (or this thread will prompt a response from =
somebody who knows more).

> but let me tell you about
> the hassle of explaining this to end users.
> The two rounds that the HMAC construct uses mean that only way to get =
past it
> is with a brute force attack.
>=20
> I rememeber back in 1995ish, when Hugo insisted with do HMAC.
> We hated it because it made hardware.  He clearly knew something!
>=20
> I agree that this document should probably quote more of RFC6151 when =
it
> comes to HMAC-MD5.
>=20
> My best advice for why we deprecate HMAC-MD5 (and HMAC-SHA1) is =
because end
> users are confused and/or alarmed if the strings "MD5" or "SHA1" occur =
in
> their logs.


This was the reason I wrote RFC 7093 (Additional Methods for Generating =
Key Identifiers Values), which ended up going through the ISE stream. I =
wanted to avoid having to explain that key identifiers were generated =
with SHA-1 but that was okay. Better to just avoid the darn algorithm.

spt=


From nobody Tue Oct 27 17:51:56 2020
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Hiya,

On 28/10/2020 00:32, Sean Turner wrote:
> Stephen,
>=20
> Given that there appears to be emerging consensus around the "issue
> discussion mode with email summaries sounds" presented in Chris'
> email from just last week can we let that settle?

My bet is that yes the WG will land on that bad answer.
I contend that it is highly unlikely useful summaries of
the barrage of githubbery can be regularly generated,
unless some of those messaging there decide to send mail
to the list as needed and allow time for responses from
those with other things to do that hour. (That's not a
thing within WG chairs' power to grant of course but it
would be nice.)

I'd be much happier about all that if someone would go
back and do that summarising for e.g. the last month's
traffic. I suspect that poor person would find the task
hard or maybe give up. I encourage anyone to take a look
and see how easy/hard they think that might be.

(Just to be clear: I don't think anyone here is trying to
be a bad actor - I figure it's more a case of understandably
not taking into account that there are more people involved
in the WG's work than are active in a particular way on
github. Still, there is "not taking into account" going
on, so not all's well.)

> We can certainly get a summary together - granted there have been
> interim meetings with published minutes [0][1].

Those are fine. No complaint from me there. (Albeit that
I had to miss some, but that was my problem.)

> We could also adopt an approach similar to the QUIC WG where they
> would declare a particular draft version one that they would run
> interop on. We would need to decide on the process of declaring what
> that version was as well as moving to the next version.

I think that would be good, yes. Just pick some iterations
and get agreement that enough people will implement and do
enough testing to be useful and take enough results into
account in the next iteration. Lotsa judgement needed but not
a showstopper. Way better than the current situation IMO so
yes please try direct us in that direction if you can.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I got another 8 mails wrt the esni draft since I sent
the earlier numbers. One of those had some human readable
content maybe, though it was context-free in that context;-)


>=20
> spt
>=20
> [0]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02-2020090310=
00/
>
>=20
[1]=20
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03-202009210800=
/
>=20
>> On Oct 27, 2020, at 16:31, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> Hiya,
>>=20
>> The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of HPKE
>> for public key encryption."
>>=20
>> The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor=20
>> incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial reasons).
>>=20
>> So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated I-D,
>> despite the one week difference in publishing and a common
>> co-author.
>>=20
>> It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in such a lack
>> of co-ordination in two closely related specs.
>>=20
>> Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and HPKE-06 but this
>> seems like yet another case where there is too much githubbery
>> going on with the result that two closely linked drafts with a
>> common co-author end up out of whack despite being issued within a
>> week of one another.
>>=20
>> That and the velocity of discussion and changes on github are a
>> major disincentive (for me) for implementing ECH. I simply do not
>> have the cycles to keep up with it as it has been happening these
>> last months. If that were the goal of the authors and those
>> endlessly commenting on github (and I do not believe it is), then
>> they would be close to reaching that goal.
>>=20
>> Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long enough to get
>> implementations done and somewhat tested?
>>=20
>> Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored just as
>> my previous entreaties were. I decided to send it anyway on the
>> basis that the perhaps what seems like an obvious failure of the
>> current approach (ECH can't interop unless you use an outdated I-D
>> for HPKE) might show that all this apparent high velocity
>> discussion on github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least
>> this case).
>>=20
>> Thanks, Stephen.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list=20
>> TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20

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From nobody Tue Oct 27 20:32:42 2020
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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Please note the comment about Section 3 suggests changing server =
behavior from SHOULD NOT to a MUST NOT.

> On Oct 27, 2020, at 10:19, Daniel Migault via Datatracker =
<noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Reviewer: Daniel Migault
> Review result: Ready with Nits
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
>=20
> I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing =
effort to
> review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments =
were
> written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.  =
Document
> authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments =
just like
> any other IETF Last Call comments. =20
>=20
> Review Results: Ready with Nits
>=20
> Please find my comments below.
>=20
> Yours,
> Daniel
>=20
>=20
>         Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
>                  draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
> [...]
>=20
> 1.  Introduction
>=20
>   The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is
>   specified in [RFC5246].  MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be
>   insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].  In 2011, [RFC6151]
>   detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks =
for
>   MD5.  NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011
>   [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at
>   the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the
>   potential for brute-force attack.  In 2016, researchers from INRIA
>   identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and
>   other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms
>   on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].
>   Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam
>   [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical.
>   This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that MD5
>   and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.  However, this
>   document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.
>=20
> <mglt>
> RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
> not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
> additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2].=20

Are asking for something like this:

OLD:

  In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations,
  including collision attacks for MD5.

NEW:

  In 2011, [RFC6151] [RFC6194] detailed the security considerations,
  including collision attacks for MD5 and SHA-1, respectively.

> Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
> MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
> is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
> the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
> hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
> already been deprecated but I have not found
> this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
> is deprecated already.
>=20
> </mglt>

Are you asking for something like this:

OLD:

  However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC
  for record protection.

  However, this  document does not deprecate MD-5 or SHA-1 HMAC
  for record protection.

> [...]
>=20
> 2.  Signature Algorithms
>=20
>   Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>   extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>   extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a
>   handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not used
>   (for example, when using PSK ciphers).
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the server behavior might
> be defined as well. In our case this could be
> something around the lines the server MUST
> ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature
> algorithm extension.=20
>=20
> </mglt>

I guess that would be the way to absolutely stamp them out, but don=E2=80=99=
t we get the same result because the client is not sending the values in =
the signaure_algorithms extension?

> 3.  Certificate Request
>=20
>   Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest
>   messages.
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the same level of
> authentication should be provided for both
> peers and that server MUST NOT  include MD5
> or SHA-1.
>=20
> A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a
> smooth transition. At that time, collision
> for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely
> that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are
> likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth
> path worth being taken.=20
> </mglt>

This has been a SHOULD NOT since it was a first published as an =
individual draft and through the WGLC. I would not feel comfortable =
changing it now without further discussion.

I tend to think it is okay to leave as SHOULD NOT because the server =
MUST use values from the now ever present signature_algorithms extension =
and MD5 and SHA1 are not going to be there. If the server is going to go =
nuts and include MD5 and SHA-1 in the CertifiateRequest even though =
it=E2=80=99s not been asked, well, you got bigger problems.

> 4.  Server Key Exchange
>=20
>   Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange =
messages.
>   If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyExchange
>   message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter
>   alert.
>=20
> <mglt>
> As per section 2, the client has clearly
> indicated it does not support signature with
> MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not
> end up with signature with SHA1/MD5.=20
>=20
> """
> If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
>   signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that
>   extension.=20
> """
>=20
> It also seems to me that the constraint of
> including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is
> related to the Certificate. I suspect that
> some clarification are needed here. =20

It=E2=80=99s about the digitally-signed struct for the dhe_dss and =
dhe_rsa cases in ServerKeyExchange.

> Since the case where the extension becomes
> mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246
> might be updated as well, though this does
> not appear that necessary.

So we might do it, but the question is whether implementers are going to =
be confused if we don=E2=80=99t update it.  I tend to think that the =
changes in s2 are clear that the extension will be present (except when =
sigs are not used) if the handshake is to complete.

> </mglt>

Not sure anything needs to be changed in this section based on the =
above.

> 5.  Certificate Verify
>=20
>   Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify =
messages.
>   If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 =
it
>   MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or
>   insufficient_security alert.
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
>=20
> 6. Certificate=20
>=20
> Unless I am missing something, it seems to me
> that signature may also be found in the
> Certificate messages for the chain as well in
> the restriction of the signature algorithm.
> The end certificate is associated to the peer
> while other certificate are related to a CA.=20
>=20
> It seems that client and server behavior may
> be specified. The quoted text below may be
> helpful to clarify.=20
>=20
> """
> If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
>   certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
>   hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.
> """
>=20
> </mglt>

Are you suggesting that a new section be added to address the =
Certificate message?

> 6.  Updates to RFC5246
>=20
>   [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>   suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 =
by
>   their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support =
for
>   SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
>=20
>   In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
>=20
>   OLD:
>=20
>   "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>   supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
>=20
>   NEW:
>=20
>   "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>   rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>   supports SHA-256."
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
> I am reading the Note as an explanation on
> why sha was taken as the default hash
> function with the following rules.=20
>=20
> """
> If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
>   server MUST do the following:
>=20
>   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
>      DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
>      sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
>=20
>   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
>      DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
>=20
>   -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
>      ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value =
{sha1,ecdsa}.
> """
>=20
> The current document does not update the
> default hash function from sha to sha256 to
> avoid interoperability issue where one peer
> takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.

You are right that this section, which is updating TLS1.2 [RFC5246], is =
not changing the default to SHA-256, but the recommendations for =
configuring TLS 1.2, which are provided in RFC 7525/BCP 195, is being =
updated to recommend SHA-256 in the very next section.

> As a results, these rules and the "Note" may
> eventually all together be replaced by your
> text of section 2.=20
>=20
> The following text may also be removed:
>=20
> """
> If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms
>   (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms
>   extension.
> """

So we might do it, but the question is whether implementers are going to =
be confused if we don=E2=80=99t do it. I think because s1 already says =
that client MUST send a signature_algorithms extension that we don=E2=80=99=
t have to indicate that that particular sentence be dropped/removed from =
the draft. I will admit this document mixes the two ways to do a bis =
document, i.e., old/new and describing blanket changes, but I think the =
intent is pretty clear based on the brevity of the draft.

> Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the
> removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result
> in interoperability issues. At this point,
> the issue is due to the obsolescence of the
> implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has
> started a long time ago.=20
>=20
> It is unclear to me how normative is
> interpreted "can assume". Was the support of
> MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if
> we were willing to maintain interoperability
> between software that only implemented
> MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and
> introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1
> kept for interoperability purpose before
> being deprecated. I do not think we should
> take that path as implementations that
> currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely
> to be updated and that deprecation of
> SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago.=20
>=20
> I would however mention the issue of
> interoperability in the  section but not in
> the text to update. In the text to update I
> would maybe suggest that the support of
> SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST
> statement.=20
>=20
>=20
> </mglt>

I think we can accomplish migrating to SHA-256 by updating RFC 7525/BCP =
195.

> Velvindron, et al.       Expires April 12, 2021                 [Page =
3]
>=20
> Internet-Draft      draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate       October =
2020
>=20
>=20
> 7.  Updates to RFC7525
>=20
>   [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer =
Security
>   (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of
>   SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum
>   recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both =
SHA-1
>   and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; =
and
>   this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been
>   deprecated..
>=20
>   Section 4.3:
>=20
>   OLD:
>=20
>   When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
>   at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the =
use
>   of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] for
>   more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
>   SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in =
TLS
>   1.2.
>=20
>   NEW:
>=20
>   Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a
>   2048-bit modulus for the public key.
>=20
>   In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED;
>   and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more
>   details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-
>   256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>   1.2.
>=20
> <mglt>
> I understand the reason we do specify that
> hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This
> is fine in the context of this document, but
> it seems to me that if we were writing the
> updated specification we may have rather
> mentioned a minimum level of security hash
> function needs to be met - in our case
> SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the
> appropriated choice.  =20
>=20
> </mglt>

Can you clarify what you would like changed? I am just confused because =
SHA-256 is RECOMMENDED in the proposed new text.

> 8.  IANA Considerations
>=20
>   The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change =
the
>   recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not
>   recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].  The following entries are to
>   be updated:
>=20
>       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>       | Value  |  Description   | Recommended |     Reference     |
>       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>       | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>       | 0x0203 |   ecdsa_sha1   |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>       +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>=20
>   Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS
> hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature
> registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature
> Scheme.=20
>=20
> I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and
> md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should
> be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the=20
> SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest
> may have prevented such deprecation.=20

The TLS HashAlgorithm and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries do not have =
a Recommended column. Likewise, there=E2=80=99s not a notes column. What =
I think we could do is replace the reference to [RFC5246] with [RFCTBD] =
(so it=E2=80=99s points to this document when it is published).

> A side effect is these code points for
> signature scheme that were assigned for
> compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)
> signatures must not be used anymore -  if
> there are no more valid with TLS 1.2.=20
> </mglt>

This is what changing the Recommended to =E2=80=9CN=E2=80=9D is above so =
I think we=E2=80=99re good here?

spt=


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Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate.all@ietf.org, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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> On Oct 27, 2020, at 10:32, Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> To address the comment below, keeping weak security is likely to =
weaken current and future IoT communications, so I do not think there is =
room for compromise with performance. Of course this is in a context of =
TLS.  I expect protocol to leverage from TLS security, so the impact =
should be rather negligible.=20
>=20
> """
> As those hash algorithms were 'cheap' for TLS 1.2, I would appreciate =
a review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated.
> """

In terms of process, are you suggesting "a review of impacted IoT =
protocols if those algorithms are deprecated=E2=80=9D MUST be completed =
prior to advancing this document to the IESG?

spt

> Yours,=20
> Daniel
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:21 AM Daniel Migault via Datatracker =
<noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
> Reviewer: Daniel Migault
> Review result: Ready with Nits
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
>=20
> I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing =
effort to
> review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments =
were
> written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.  =
Document
> authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments =
just like
> any other IETF Last Call comments. =20
>=20
> Review Results: Ready with Nits
>=20
> Please find my comments below.
>=20
> Yours,
> Daniel
>=20
>=20
>          Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
>                   draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
> [...]
>=20
> 1.  Introduction
>=20
>    The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is
>    specified in [RFC5246].  MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be
>    insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].  In 2011, [RFC6151]
>    detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks =
for
>    MD5.  NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011
>    [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures =
at
>    the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the
>    potential for brute-force attack.  In 2016, researchers from INRIA
>    identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and
>    other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding =
algorithms
>    on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].
>    Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam
>    [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical.
>    This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that =
MD5
>    and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.  However, this
>    document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.
>=20
> <mglt>
> RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
> not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
> additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2].=20
>=20
> Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
> MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
> is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
> the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
> hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
> already been deprecated but I have not found
> this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
> is deprecated already.
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> [...]
>=20
> 2.  Signature Algorithms
>=20
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>    extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>    extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a
>    handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not =
used
>    (for example, when using PSK ciphers).
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the server behavior might
> be defined as well. In our case this could be
> something around the lines the server MUST
> ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature
> algorithm extension.=20
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> 3.  Certificate Request
>=20
>    Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest
>    messages.
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the same level of
> authentication should be provided for both
> peers and that server MUST NOT  include MD5
> or SHA-1.
>=20
> A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a
> smooth transition. At that time, collision
> for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely
> that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are
> likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth
> path worth being taken.=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> 4.  Server Key Exchange
>=20
>    Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange =
messages.
>    If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a =
ServerKeyExchange
>    message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter
>    alert.
>=20
> <mglt>
> As per section 2, the client has clearly
> indicated it does not support signature with
> MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not
> end up with signature with SHA1/MD5.=20
>=20
> """
> If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
>    signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in =
that
>    extension.=20
> """
>=20
> It also seems to me that the constraint of
> including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is
> related to the Certificate. I suspect that
> some clarification are needed here. =20
>=20
> Since the case where the extension becomes
> mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246
> might be updated as well, though this does
> not appear that necessary.
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> 5.  Certificate Verify
>=20
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify =
messages.
>    If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 =
it
>    MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or
>    insufficient_security alert.
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
>=20
> 6. Certificate=20
>=20
> Unless I am missing something, it seems to me
> that signature may also be found in the
> Certificate messages for the chain as well in
> the restriction of the signature algorithm.
> The end certificate is associated to the peer
> while other certificate are related to a CA.=20
>=20
> It seems that client and server behavior may
> be specified. The quoted text below may be
> helpful to clarify.=20
>=20
> """
>  If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
>    certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
>    hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.
> """
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> 6.  Updates to RFC5246
>=20
>    [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>    suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 =
by
>    their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support =
for
>    SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
>=20
>    In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
>=20
>    OLD:
>=20
>    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
>=20
>    NEW:
>=20
>    "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports SHA-256."
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
> I am reading the Note as an explanation on
> why sha was taken as the default hash
> function with the following rules.=20
>=20
> """
> If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
>    server MUST do the following:
>=20
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, =
DHE_RSA,
>       DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
>       sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
>=20
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
>       DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
>=20
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
>       ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value =
{sha1,ecdsa}.
> """
>=20
> The current document does not update the
> default hash function from sha to sha256 to
> avoid interoperability issue where one peer
> takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.
> As a results, these rules and the "Note" may
> eventually all together be replaced by your
> text of section 2.=20
>=20
> The following text may also be removed:
>=20
> """
>  If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms
>    (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms
>    extension.
> """
>=20
> Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the
> removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result
> in interoperability issues. At this point,
> the issue is due to the obsolescence of the
> implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has
> started a long time ago.=20
>=20
> It is unclear to me how normative is
> interpreted "can assume". Was the support of
> MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if
> we were willing to maintain interoperability
> between software that only implemented
> MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and
> introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1
> kept for interoperability purpose before
> being deprecated. I do not think we should
> take that path as implementations that
> currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely
> to be updated and that deprecation of
> SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago.=20
>=20
> I would however mention the issue of
> interoperability in the  section but not in
> the text to update. In the text to update I
> would maybe suggest that the support of
> SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST
> statement.=20
>=20
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
> Velvindron, et al.       Expires April 12, 2021                 [Page =
3]
>=20
> Internet-Draft      draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate       October =
2020
>=20
>=20
> 7.  Updates to RFC7525
>=20
>    [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer =
Security
>    (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use =
of
>    SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum
>    recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both =
SHA-1
>    and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; =
and
>    this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been
>    deprecated..
>=20
>    Section 4.3:
>=20
>    OLD:
>=20
>    When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
>    at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the =
use
>    of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] =
for
>    more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they =
request
>    SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in =
TLS
>    1.2.
>=20
>    NEW:
>=20
>    Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a
>    2048-bit modulus for the public key.
>=20
>    In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED;
>    and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more
>    details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-
>    256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>    1.2.
>=20
> <mglt>
> I understand the reason we do specify that
> hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This
> is fine in the context of this document, but
> it seems to me that if we were writing the
> updated specification we may have rather
> mentioned a minimum level of security hash
> function needs to be met - in our case
> SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the
> appropriated choice.  =20
>=20
> </mglt>
>=20
>=20
> 8.  IANA Considerations
>=20
>    The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change =
the
>    recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not
>    recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].  The following entries are to
>    be updated:
>=20
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | Value  |  Description   | Recommended |     Reference     |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        | 0x0203 |   ecdsa_sha1   |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>=20
>    Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.
>=20
>=20
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS
> hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature
> registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature
> Scheme.=20
>=20
> I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and
> md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should
> be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the=20
> SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest
>  may have prevented such deprecation.=20
>=20
> A side effect is these code points for
> signature scheme that were assigned for
> compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)
> signatures must not be used anymore -  if
> there are no more valid with TLS 1.2.=20
> </mglt>
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Daniel Migault
> Ericsson


From nobody Wed Oct 28 01:29:23 2020
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Subject: [TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
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Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
Review result: Ready

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
Review Date: 2020-10-28
IETF LC End Date: 2020-10-16
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat

Summary: I am happy with the way my comments and issues have been addressed,
and the document is now ready for publication.

Major issues: N/A

Minor issues: N/A

Nits/editorial comments: N/A




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From: "Chris Box (BT)" <chris.box.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 10:39:12 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH test server
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Ok, so in summary (based on the other thread), I think there is no public
test server yet. And there won't be until the recent rate of change is seen
to slow and implementations have had a chance to catch up.

ECH is a useful privacy enhancement but I'm particularly interested in the
way HTTPS RRs are managed, and consumed by clients.

Chris

On Tue, 27 Oct 2020 at 20:33, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 27/10/2020 18:37, Chris Box (BT) wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I would like to test an ECH-enabled client, but am struggling to find a
> > public test server with a published ECHconfig in its HTTPS record.
> >
> > Do any yet exist?
> >
> > I've looked in all these places, but none are mentioned:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation-Status
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md
> >
> > Or is everyone just spinning up private servers for now?
>
> I got as far as draft-05 before falling behind sorry.
> Will post when/if I get current.
>
> See my other mail for the related whine:-)
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Chris
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> >
>

--000000000000d9751305b2b8c6cd
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Ok, so in summary (based on the other thread), I thin=
k there is no public test server yet. And there won&#39;t be until the rece=
nt rate of change is seen to slow and implementations have had a chance to =
catch up.</div><div><br></div><div>ECH is a useful privacy enhancement but =
I&#39;m particularly interested in the way HTTPS RRs are managed, and consu=
med by clients.</div><div><br></div><div>Chris<br></div><div></div></div><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, =
27 Oct 2020 at 20:33, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell=
@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On 27/10/2020 18:37, Chris Box (BT) wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I would like to test an ECH-enabled client, but am struggling to find =
a<br>
&gt; public test server with a published ECHconfig in its HTTPS record.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Do any yet exist?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I&#39;ve looked in all these places, but none are mentioned:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implement=
ation-Status" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg=
/draft-ietf-tls-esni/wiki/Implementation-Status</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTAT=
IONS.md" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tlsw=
g-wiki/blob/master/IMPLEMENTATIONS.md</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/blob/master/TESTING.md"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/tlswg/tlswg-wiki/b=
lob/master/TESTING.md</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Or is everyone just spinning up private servers for now?<br>
<br>
I got as far as draft-05 before falling behind sorry.<br>
Will post when/if I get current.<br>
<br>
See my other mail for the related whine:-)<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Chris<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
&gt; <br>
</blockquote></div>

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Reviewer: Ted Lemon
Review result: Ready with Nits

This document is ready for publication, with one minor nit, which is included
at the end.

Éric additionally made the following request:
  As those hash algorithms were 'cheap' for TLS, I would appreciate a review of
  the impact if those algorithms are deprecated in TLS 1.2.

I am not in a position to do any practical tests, but I will point out several
things. First, deprecating MD5 is not going to cause a performance problem
because it's slower than SHA1, so we really only need to worry about whether
deprecating SHA1 will cause a problem. This document only deprecates SHA1 for
use in digital signatures. It "does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record
protection." Given the way TLS uses digital signatures, this should not be a
serious concern. At worst case, SHA256 is about 24% slower than SHA1. Best case
(shorter text) it is less than 16% slower. It's reasonable to expect that in
common use in TLS, the texts being digested will be shorter, not longer.
Further, the bulk of the computational burden of TLS is not in the generation
of digests for digital signatures. Therefore it seems reasonable to expect that
the performance impact of this change is vastly overshadowed by one of the very
factors that motivates it: the increased speed of hash computation over time. 
Even assuming constant speed legacy hardware, the performance impact is not
sufficient to cause concern when considering it as part of the total system
that would be using TLS 1.2.

Nit:

In the abstract:
   The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are steadily weakening in
   strength and their deprecation process should begin for their use in
   TLS 1.2 digital signatures.

Technically, the strength of these algorithms hasn't changed. What's changed is
that their strength is no longer sufficient to prevent realistic attacks. So it
might be better to say something like "The vulnerability of MD5 and SHA-1
algorithms to practical attacks is steadly increasing and ..."




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Hi all,

Thanks for everyone who contributed to this one; I think we ended up in
a pretty good place with it.  Sorry to have taken so long to get around
to processing it; on the plus side, the only document now in my
publication-requested queue is DTLS 1.3, and that will be entering AD
Evaluation shortly!

I think there's enough here that is reader-unfriendly that we should wait
to start the IETF LC until there's a new revision out, but hopefully the
needed changes will be fairly straightforward.

I made a few editorial suggestions and nit fixes at
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest/pull/21 .

We have some level of duplication between the Introduction text
describing limitations of the stock 8446 mechanism, and the detailed use
cases in Section 2, but I think it's probably acceptable.

We talk about avoiding ticket reuse being a goal (e.g., explicitly so in
the "Parallel HTTP connections" use case), but we don't really say why.
I think the introduction could probably do with a paragraph on this that
references https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#appendix-C.4 for the
default behavior being to attempt to avoid reuse of tickets (without
implying that it is required behavior, of course).

Section 2

   *  Connection priming: In some systems, connections can be primed or
      bootstrapped by a centralized service or daemon for faster
      connection establishment.  Requesting tickets on demand allows
      such services to vend tickets to clients to use for accelerated
      handshakes with early data.  (Note that if early data is not
      needed by these connections, this method SHOULD NOT be used.
      Fresh handshakes SHOULD be performed instead.)

This doesn't seem to paint a very clear picture of the use case.  It
doesn't even seem to be clear about whether the "centralized service or
daemon" is a helper on the TLS client or server side!
I also want to check my understanding here, in that the recommendation
for only doing this when early data is needed is due to the fact that
you need to have an initial handshake with which to negotiate the
ability to use early data in the subsequent handshake, and having the
central service do a bunch of full handshakes just to get a ticket for
use on a subsequent connection that does user early data is a lot of
overhead, whereas if you don't need early data then you only do as many
full handshakes as you need connections (vs 2x that number to get a
ticket and then do early data) and get fully independent keys.  Since
you have this central service the extra latency for a full handshake is
irrelevant because you're priming connections in advance, not on-demand.

   *  Less ticket waste: Currently, TLS servers use application-
      specific, and often implementation-specific, logic to determine
      how many tickets to issue.  By moving the burden of ticket count
      to clients, servers do not generate wasteful tickets.  As an
      example, clients might only request one ticket during resumption.
      Moreover, as ticket generation might involve expensive
      computation, e.g., public key cryptographic operations, avoiding
      waste is desirable.

(I assume we have a particular case in mind that does use public-key
crypto when issuing a ticket, or we wouldn't have mentioned it.)

   When a client presenting a previously obtained ticket finds that the
   server nevertheless negotiates a fresh session, the client SHOULD
   assume that any other tickets associated with the same session as the
   presented ticket are also no longer valid for resumption.  This

Unfortunately, RFC 8446 does not seem to be consistent about "session"
(persists across multiple resumption handshakes) vs "connection" (a
single handshake) terminology.  We may want to consider just discussing
"full handshake" and "initial full handshake" instead of trying to use
the "session" shorthand.

   and the number requested.  Servers MAY send additional tickets, up to
   the same limit, if the tickets that are originally sent are somehow
   invalidated.

(nit) pedantically, the server can send whatever tickets it likes
whenever it likes.  The current "up to the same limit" looks a little
bit like it's trying to restrict the server's behavior, so "typically
using the same limit" might be better.

   Servers MUST NOT send the "ticket_request" extension in ServerHello
   or HelloRetryRequest messages.  A client MUST abort the connection
   with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the "ticket_request" extension
   is present in either of these messages.

I note that we do have other messages (Certificate, CertificateRequest,
NewSessionTicket itself, maybe soon ClientEncryptedExtensions) that can
carry extensions, so in that sense it's strange to only explicitly
prohibit these two.  That said, they are the two that would be most
tempting to (inadvertently) put this extension in, so I don't
particularly mind leaving it this way.

Section 6

I suppose there is perhaps some risk of traffic analysis leaking how
many tickets were issued at the start of the connection (and thus the
value that the client requested), but this is neither terribly
interesting nor terribly novel, so I don't propose that we add text
about it.

   Despite ticket lifetime hints provided by servers, clients SHOULD
   dispose of pooled tickets after some reasonable amount of time that
   mimics the ticket rotation period.

While this is true and good advice, I note that §4.6.1 of RFC 8446
already has "MUST NOT cache tickets for longer than 7 days".  It does
not look like this advice is fully duplicating the 8446 advice, so
perhaps an additional sentence like "As specified in Section 4.6.1 of
[RFC8446], 'clients MUST NOT cache tickets for longer than 7 days'."


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From: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>
To: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OpSec WGLC for draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact
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Hi Nancy

On Mon, 26 Oct 2020 02:55:52 +0000
"Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com> wrote:

> [NCW] The specific conditions are more deployment and vendor specific
> and proprietary so it'd be difficult to enumerate (and enumerate them
> all)...as well as which we believe is out of scope for the document.
> I did add a paragraph to state that as well as we (the authors) are
> not proponents for these techniques but as it had been asked to how
> the deployments 'inspect' we thought it important to document the
> most common known practices.  Please look over the updates and see if
> that clarifies intent.

I see. I focused on the modifications to the document rather than
re-reading the document. Thanks for correcting the typographical error
and I acknowledge that the two new paragraphs reflect the intent
you've described.

> [NCW] Right, our intent was not to prescribe what should or should
> not be done, but rather educate as to what is being done in practice
> today.

Unfortunately words like "effective" and "capability" give the
impression that instead of describing practices which don't work
neutrally so as to educate about what is done, this documents
techniques that actually worked. My previous emails explained some
problems with that back in August.

Your co-author Roelof has argued that they can work under some specific
circumstances, but this revision does not explain what those
circumstances would be in the document itself and my impression from
your reply is that you believe doing so would be "out of scope".

Nick.


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 00:31:09 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ECH & HPKE versions as an example of too much githubbery
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Hi,

I think the concern might center around previous standards.

thanks,
Rob


On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 5:34 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:

> Stephen,
>
> Given that there appears to be emerging consensus around the "issue
> discussion mode with email summaries sounds" presented in Chris' email from
> just last week can we let that settle?
>
> We can certainly get a summary together - granted there have been interim
> meetings with published minutes [0][1].
>
> We could also adopt an approach similar to the QUIC WG where they would
> declare a particular draft version one that they would run interop on. We
> would need to decide on the process of declaring what that version was as
> well as moving to the next version.
>
> spt
>
> [0]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02-202009031000/
> [1]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03-202009210800/
>
> > On Oct 27, 2020, at 16:31, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Hiya,
> >
> > The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says "ECH uses draft-05 of
> > HPKE for public key encryption."
> >
> > The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor
> > incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial
> > reasons).
> >
> > So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated
> > I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and
> > a common co-author.
> >
> > It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in
> > such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related
> > specs.
> >
> > Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and
> > HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where
> > there is too much githubbery going on with the result
> > that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author
> > end up out of whack despite being issued within a week
> > of one another.
> >
> > That and the velocity of discussion and changes on
> > github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing
> > ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it
> > as it has been happening these last months. If that were
> > the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on
> > github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be
> > close to reaching that goal.
> >
> > Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long
> > enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?
> >
> > Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored
> > just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send
> > it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like
> > an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can't
> > interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might
> > show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on
> > github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this
> > case).
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Stephen.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

--00000000000000d5f705b2de62c2
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<div><br></div><div>I think the concern might center ar=
ound previous standards.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</di=
v><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 5:34 PM Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:sean@sn3rd.com">sean@sn3rd.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Stephen,<br>
<br>
Given that there appears to be emerging consensus around the &quot;issue di=
scussion mode with email summaries sounds&quot; presented in Chris&#39; ema=
il from just last week can we let that settle?<br>
<br>
We can certainly get a summary together - granted there have been interim m=
eetings with published minutes [0][1].<br>
<br>
We could also adopt an approach similar to the QUIC WG where they would dec=
lare a particular draft version one that they would run interop on. We woul=
d need to decide on the process of declaring what that version was as well =
as moving to the next version.<br>
<br>
spt<br>
<br>
[0] <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02=
-202009031000/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-02-202009031000/</a><br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03=
-202009210800/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/minutes-interim-2020-tls-03-202009210800/</a><br>
<br>
&gt; On Oct 27, 2020, at 16:31, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:steph=
en.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt; w=
rote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Hiya,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The latest ECH draft from Oct 16 says &quot;ECH uses draft-05 of<br>
&gt; HPKE for public key encryption.&quot;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The latest HPKE draft (-06) from Oct 23 has a few minor<br>
&gt; incompatible changes (for good but relatively trivial<br>
&gt; reasons).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So for interop ECH apparently requires use of an outdated<br>
&gt; I-D, despite the one week difference in publishing and<br>
&gt; a common co-author.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It seems a bit mad that all that githubbery results in<br>
&gt; such a lack of co-ordination in two closely related<br>
&gt; specs.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Anyway, I can manage to handle both HPKE-05 and<br>
&gt; HPKE-06 but this seems like yet another case where<br>
&gt; there is too much githubbery going on with the result<br>
&gt; that two closely linked drafts with a common co-author<br>
&gt; end up out of whack despite being issued within a week<br>
&gt; of one another.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; That and the velocity of discussion and changes on<br>
&gt; github are a major disincentive (for me) for implementing<br>
&gt; ECH. I simply do not have the cycles to keep up with it<br>
&gt; as it has been happening these last months. If that were<br>
&gt; the goal of the authors and those endlessly commenting on<br>
&gt; github (and I do not believe it is), then they would be<br>
&gt; close to reaching that goal.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Can we not please freeze this stuff for at least long<br>
&gt; enough to get implementations done and somewhat tested?<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Frankly, I expect my plea here to be more or less ignored<br>
&gt; just as my previous entreaties were. I decided to send<br>
&gt; it anyway on the basis that the perhaps what seems like<br>
&gt; an obvious failure of the current approach (ECH can&#39;t<br>
&gt; interop unless you use an outdated I-D for HPKE) might<br>
&gt; show that all this apparent high velocity discussion on<br>
&gt; github is not as effetcive as claimed (in at least this<br>
&gt; case).<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; Stephen.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; TLS mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000000d5f705b2de62c2--


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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org
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From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
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Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 13:28:12 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/zN4AyZ02AcH4PcOs5xQ8Z1-xZ-4>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Ekr,

> As for EtM
>
> Encrypt-then-MAC:
> struct {
>  =C2=A0 uint8 marker =3D tls12_cid;
>  =C2=A0 uint8 cid_len;
>  =C2=A0 uint8 content_type =3D tls12_cid;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 \
>  =C2=A0 uint16 DTLSCiphertext.version;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0=
 appears on wire
>  =C2=A0 uint64 seq_num; // includes epoch=C2=A0 =C2=A0 |
>  =C2=A0 opaque cid[cid_len];=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0/
>  =C2=A0 uint16 iv_length;
>  =C2=A0 opaque IV[iv_length];
>  =C2=A0 uint16 enc_content_length;
>  =C2=A0 opaque enc_content[enc_content_length];
> };
>

I failed to understand the reasons behind this proposal.

1. Why should the "marker" be added, if the "content_type" is already in
the MAC, and this special MAC is only applied for tls12_cid records.
What is the intended benefit of that?

2. Why should a "uint16 iv_length" be added?
2.a If it should be added, why as "uint16" instead of "uint8"
2.b If it should be added, why in the middle? It's not on the wire and
so I would assume, if at all, to have that at the begin.

best regards
Achim Kraus


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "Benjamin Kaduk" <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-quGduxsZD-2bx9gaLgOrsb8NvM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> writes:=0A=0A>2. Why should a "uint16 iv_l=
ength" be added?=0A=0ATo make it explicit which of the bits being hashed is=
 the IV.  This is one of=0Athe flaws of things like OAEP, there are a large=
 number of implicitly-sized=0Afields controlled by external, unauthenticate=
d parameters, so you can make the=0Averifier see fields as other, nearby fi=
elds (I'm using OAEP as an example=0Abecause it's particularly bad, there a=
re so many optional values controlled by=0Aexternal unauthenticated data th=
at you can have all sorts of fun with it).=0A=0A>2.b If it should be added,=
 why in the middle? It's not on the wire and so I=0A>would assume, if at al=
l, to have that at the begin.=0A=0AIt precedes the IV, i.e. the field that =
it describes.=0A=0APeter.=0A


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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id@ietf.org>
References: <13a821d3-30cc-94b8-842c-22a87d280f09@gmx.net> <CACsn0cn4QcnaoocQeoiUXgGoAvfOs+1+Ei76z1Kuq8MMqNEh3Q@mail.gmail.com> <0327abb0-6317-b848-28d0-1fc50f4bf50e@gmx.net> <20201012200548.GD1212@kduck.mit.edu> <bab402e6-3353-d750-a849-21c91081f94e@gmx.net> <20201014212428.GP50845@kduck.mit.edu> <a7110178-6220-175e-869d-fcc44400f773@gmx.net> <CABcZeBNocUYZO9yxuG-DYh33ss+Dum1EOxHYEdww5OCR=rKFXw@mail.gmail.com> <20201024021316.GN39170@kduck.mit.edu> <CABcZeBPP_PFWtaNB4Wr+2MoY2+8Mh1Vxt9A-Hp5LaCg9DiLCFw@mail.gmail.com> <20201027010029.GG39170@kduck.mit.edu> <CABcZeBOQxpWMSuJiiXDB0Cf62iNU+hU8Wpd_Pd_1HOgXJYc0Kg@mail.gmail.com> <3e55d1fe-62b2-c62e-a085-032ecb43addb@gmx.net> <1604061544196.52783@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
From: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <2a8e1752-667c-2211-fe84-5e69d0999280@gmx.net>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 13:56:17 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/BbOib9e7CB0qAF7jwSssuIzVO08>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07
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Hi Peter,

thanks!

 > It precedes the IV, i.e. the field that it describes.

In other contributions, it's said, that it is also important to keep the
header bytes as they are. With that, the "iv_length" should be ahead
before the header bytes starts.

And I'm still curious about the "uint16" instead of "uint8".

I'm looking forward, when this will get finished :-).

best regards
Achim Kraus


Am 30.10.20 um 13:39 schrieb Peter Gutmann:
> Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net> writes:
>
>> 2. Why should a "uint16 iv_length" be added?
>
> To make it explicit which of the bits being hashed is the IV.  This is o=
ne of
> the flaws of things like OAEP, there are a large number of implicitly-si=
zed
> fields controlled by external, unauthenticated parameters, so you can ma=
ke the
> verifier see fields as other, nearby fields (I'm using OAEP as an exampl=
e
> because it's particularly bad, there are so many optional values control=
led by
> external unauthenticated data that you can have all sorts of fun with it=
).
>
>> 2.b If it should be added, why in the middle? It's not on the wire and =
so I
>> would assume, if at all, to have that at the begin.
>
> It precedes the IV, i.e. the field that it describes.
>
> Peter.
>
>

