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Subject: Re: [Trans] Clarification regarding SCTs and intermediates.
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Hi Fabrice.  Some comments inline...

On 28/08/14 17:13, Fabrice Gautier wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Per my reading of rfc 6962, it seems that SCT (in that RFC) are only
> produced for Leaf certificates. 6962-bis introduce a possibility that
> intermediates certs are also logged and SCT produced for them.
> (Section 3.2.3. Using a Name-Constrained Intermediate CA)
>
> This raised a couple questions:
>
> - How are SCTs for intermediates provided to TLS clients ? Can they be
> provided through the TLS extension? Through the OCSP response?
> Embedded in the leaf cert ? Or only embedded in the intermediate cert
> ?
>
> - If intermediates SCTs can be provided by the same channel as SCTs
> for leaf certs, how is the TLS client supposed to know which cert
> correspond to a given SCT? Should the TLS client just try all the
> certs in the chain until the signature match ? - afaict, there is no
> data in the SCT that bind it to the cert, beside the signature.

http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/10
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/23

<snip>
> In 6962-bis, section 3.2.3, there is some language about what kind of
> intermediate CA are acceptable to log. It seems that at least some
> logs clients should also check that intermediates CA with SCTs do obey
> those rules. I'm not sure if it's the role of TLS clients, Auditors,
> Monitors or all of them to do so.

Good point.  I've just created 
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/48

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] OCSP and SCTs
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Hi Kyle.  Please review the TRANS charter [1].  The scope for 6962-bis 
is "a standards-track mechanism to apply verifiable logs to HTTP over TLS".

I'm guessing you're thinking of S/MIME certificates, Code Signing 
certificates, etc, which can be logged but which can only be checked via 
OCSP Fetching (not OCSP Stapling).  These are in scope for discussion, 
possible future WG re-chartering and possible future WG work items.


[1] http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/charter/

On 01/09/14 01:57, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> The more you apply your own "best idea" decision tree, the more you
> restrict perfectly valid options that would otherwise be legitimate by
> the spec, in the name of "interoperability". This is why, for example,
> Netscape's insistence on a "trustworthy" (which really devolves to
> "known, without judgment of trustworthiness") certifier managed to
> create a new and completely artificial cottage industry that suffered
> artificial stunted growth patterns... because it insisted on
> ITU-standard authentication before anyone knew what it was really good
> for. It also basically destroyed one of the use-cases explicitly
> permitted by the spec, that of the unauthenticated connection.
>
> Don't insist on a client-protocol stapling. Not everything uses TLS --
> and even though TLS is the intended use case, leaving low hanging fruit
> for other protocols is probably better than binding it so tightly to TLS
> that no one can conceive of a use aside from that binding.
>
> -Kyle H
>
> On August 31, 2014 11:44:10 AM PST, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
> wrote:
>
>     On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 9:05 PM, Fabrice <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>         On Aug 30, 2014, at 15:43, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
>
>             On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 3:22 PM, Fabrice
>             <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>                 On Aug 30, 2014, at 14:16, Brian Smith
>                 <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
>
>                 I understand the issue you describe and how stapling has
>                 less opportunities
>                 for failures and is a MUST for TLS clients, but my
>                 question was really about
>                 what should a TLS client do when it does not get an OCSP
>                 response through
>                 stapling (RFC6066) but get one directly from the OCSP
>                 responder or
>                 potentially other means.
>
>                 To me, it seems logical for the TLS clients to process
>                 SCTs found in those
>                 responses, no matter how it got them.
>
>
>             When the client is enforcing CT, it should reject the
>             certificate due
>             to the missing SCT before it even attempts revocation checking.
>
>             Thus, it would never fetch the OCSP response and so it would
>             never
>             learn the SCT from a fetched response.
>
>
>         I don't see any language in the RFC or draft that suggest there
>         is an
>         ordering between revocation checking and CT validation, or any
>         other parts
>         of the certificate validation. The only related language I found
>         is rather
>         succinct:
>
>         In addition to normal validation of the certificate and its
>         chain, they
>         should validate the SCT (...)
>
>
>     I understand that your question is "If I fetched an OCSP response,
>     should I recognize the SCTs
>     in the fetched response?" I don't have any
>     opinion on that.
>
>     You are right that the spec. doesn't talk about the ordering of doing
>     revocation checking and SCT processing during certificate chain
>     validation. I believe that the best ordering is to process SCTs, and
>     reject certificates without SCTs, before doing revocation checking or
>     path building, especially revocation checking and path building that
>     requires doing any networking (OCSP fetching and/or AIA chasing),
>     because this reduces the risks that are inherent in doing that
>     networking and with doing path building in general. The draft should
>     be changed to say that.
>
>     However, you agree that the current draft allows a client to reject a
>     certificate due to a missing SCT before it attempts any AIA chasing
>     and/or OCSP fetching, right? If so, then the server must provide the
>     SCT in the handshake--in the TLS extension, in the certificate, or in
>     a stapled
>     OCSP response--to interoperate with clients that work that
>     way, regardless of whether some clients process SCTs in fetched OCSP
>     responses.
>
>         If there are good reasons to ignore SCTs in non-stapled OCSP
>         responses, I'd
>         like to know about them, and it probably should be mentioned in
>         the RFC.
>
>
>     A browser needs a reliable mechanism for getting SCTs in order for the
>     browser to be able to make SCTs mandatory. Browsers that make SCT
>     mandatory would ultimately be what would make CT effective. OCSP
>     fetching is not reliable, in theory or on practice, so a client cannot
>     rely on getting SCTs via OCSP fetching. A browser that processed SCTs
>     in fetched OCSP responses would be encouraging websites to avoid the
>     reliable mechanisms of SCT delivery in favor of an unreliable
>     mechanism, causing CT to be
>     unreliable and thus ineffective.
>
>     Cheers,
>     Brian
>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>     Trans mailing list
>     Trans@ietf.org
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
> --
> Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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From nobody Mon Sep  1 04:07:03 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] OCSP and SCTs
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On 31/08/14 19:44, Brian Smith wrote:
<snip>
> You are right that the spec. doesn't talk about the ordering of doing
> revocation checking and SCT processing during certificate chain
> validation. I believe that the best ordering is to process SCTs, and
> reject certificates without SCTs, before doing revocation checking or
> path building, especially revocation checking and path building that
> requires doing any networking (OCSP fetching and/or AIA chasing),
> because this reduces the risks that are inherent in doing that
> networking and with doing path building in general. The draft should
> be changed to say that.

I've just added http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/50

<snip>
>> If there are good reasons to ignore SCTs in non-stapled OCSP responses, I'd
>> like to know about them, and it probably should be mentioned in the RFC.
>
> A browser needs a reliable mechanism for getting SCTs in order for the
> browser to be able to make SCTs mandatory. Browsers that make SCT
> mandatory would ultimately be what would make CT effective. OCSP
> fetching is not reliable, in theory or on practice, so a client cannot
> rely on getting SCTs via OCSP fetching. A browser that processed SCTs
> in fetched OCSP responses would be encouraging websites to avoid the
> reliable mechanisms of SCT delivery in favor of an unreliable
> mechanism, causing CT to be unreliable and thus ineffective.

I've just added http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/49

Thanks Brian!

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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It seems as if we've been talking about precertificate format for
quite some time, without coming to resolution.  Let's try to find
agreement on how to handle it and close issue 26.

The ticket, with description, is here:
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/26

The fundamental problem is that because precertificates are currently
encoded as X.509 structures we have the potential for two certificates
to exist with the same issuer and same serial number.  Because the
precertificate is not usable as a TLS certificate in practice, this
may not be an issue.  However, it's a clear violation of section 4.1.2.2
in 5280 (and to be honest I'm a little fuzzy on its implications for
CRL processing).

So, are you all comfortable with letting the X.509 representation
stand, or do you have an alternative proposal?

Thanks,

Melinda


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Kyle,

I don't disagree with your observation that, in a broader context, other 
client
behavior might be appropriate. But the CT doc we're discussing is 
focused on TLS, and
we should not try to broaden that scope at this time.

In the TLS client context, I agree with Fabrice that the description of 
(TLS) client
behavior is not yet sufficiently precise to yield predictable results. 
If we're going
to claim that CT solves a problem, and thus merits imposing changes on 
how CAs issue
certs and how all clients process them, the doc needs to define client 
behavior with
sufficient precision to substantiate this claim.

Steve
> The more you apply your own "best idea" decision tree, the more you 
> restrict perfectly valid options that would otherwise be legitimate by 
> the spec, in the name of "interoperability". This is why, for example, 
> Netscape's insistence on a "trustworthy" (which really devolves to 
> "known, without judgment of trustworthiness") certifier managed to 
> create a new and completely artificial cottage industry that suffered 
> artificial stunted growth patterns... because it insisted on 
> ITU-standard authentication before anyone knew what it was really good 
> for. It also basically destroyed one of the use-cases explicitly 
> permitted by the spec, that of the unauthenticated connection.
>
> Don't insist on a client-protocol stapling. Not everything uses TLS -- 
> and even though TLS is the intended use case, leaving low hanging 
> fruit for other protocols is probably better than binding it so 
> tightly to TLS that no one can conceive of a use aside from that binding.
>
> -Kyle H


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Melinda,

The problem is bigger than just the choice of format for the SCT response.

The current pre-cert model requires a CA to be able to issue two certs with
the same serial number. This would, in general, be a very bad thing for a CA
to do. So, mandating this behavior is very worrisome. And, as you noted, it
clearly violates 4.1.2.2 of 5280. (Thanks, I should have noted that.)
Thus, I suggest we use a different format. I suggest sticking with ASN.1,
since the data used to compute the SCT will come from a cert, and ASN.1 is
the native cert format description language. DER encoding is also good for
creating a canonical representation for signature generation.

However, Ben has noted that even if we use a different format for the 
pre-cert data,
the data MUST contain the serial number of the cert that is eventually 
issued.
This is almost as much of a problem for CAs, at least in principle. 
Remember that
the DigiNotar breach (which is a major motivation for CT) was especially 
bad because
the attackers were able erase all evidence of the bogus certs that they 
issued.
Countermeasures to such attacks might preclude a CA from knowing what serial
number will appear in a cert until it is issued. (I mentioned one such 
counter-
measure in a FIPS level 3 HSM from long ago, in a prior post.)

I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that 
is being
logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be 
present. Maybe that
will show us how to avoid the concern that I and others have raised. It 
would also
provide us with a starting point for the format of a new data structure 
for the SCT
request, and the set of data that is input to the SCT hash computation.

Steve


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To be honest I'm a bit concerned that this has been kicked around
for as long as it has, without progress.  This was one of the first
topics to be discussed shortly after working group formation (see
thread starting here:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00050.html).

It may be worth taking a look at that thread and seeing if you
("you" working group participants, not Steve specifically)
can find something useful.  I do think it's time to start coming
up with concrete counterproposals.

Melinda


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On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 1:16 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> The current pre-cert model requires a CA to be able to issue two certs with
> the same serial number.

The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the
production CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial
number issues.

Cheers,
Brian


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the Precertif=
icate, and then sign the final certificate with the production CA certifica=
te. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.

Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer nam=
e has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to be th=
at of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the problem.

-Rick


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From: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that is=
 being
> logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be present=
. Maybe that
> will show us how to avoid the concern that I and others have raised. It w=
ould also
> provide us with a starting point for the format of a new data structure f=
or the SCT
> request, and the set of data that is input to the SCT hash computation.

The serial number needs to be part of the logged proof because that is the =
key on which existing revocation mechanisms operate.  Transparently identif=
ying that a certificate has been issued incorrectly is of little utility un=
less that certificate can be revoked.

The alternatives are revoking the issuing CA on any leaf mis-issuance or in=
venting alternate revocation mechanisms.=20

The latter may be less of an obstacle than it appears since the major imple=
menters of CT are also in the process of inventing and deploying their own =
(currently) proprietary revocation systems alongside CT.

Nevertheless, one would need something stable to uniquely identify the cert=
ificate for these purposes, which ends up looking a lot like a serial numbe=
r however you slice it.  (You can't use a cryptograhpic hash of the final c=
ert for this, either, because that would require a preimage in the log.)

-Brad Hill=


From nobody Mon Sep  8 17:27:53 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Hi Stephen,

On Mon, Sep 08, 2014 at 04:16:16PM -0400, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Thus, I suggest we use a different format. I suggest sticking with ASN.1,
> since the data used to compute the SCT will come from a cert, and ASN.1 is
> the native cert format description language. DER encoding is also good for
> creating a canonical representation for signature generation.

I'm in agreement that ASN.1/DER should be used wherever we're dealing with
"certificate-like" data.  I know of the concerns regarding the, uh,
"elevated potential", shall we say, for security bugs in DER-handling code,
but that's got to be weighed against the potential for bugs in whatever code
has to be custom-written to deal with whatever *other* encoding format is
used for the data.

> However, Ben has noted that even if we use a different format for the
> pre-cert data, the data MUST contain the serial number of the cert that is
> eventually issued.  This is almost as much of a problem for CAs, at least
> in principle.  Remember that the DigiNotar breach (which is a major
> motivation for CT) was especially bad because the attackers were able
> erase all evidence of the bogus certs that they issued.  Countermeasures
> to such attacks might preclude a CA from knowing what serial number will
> appear in a cert until it is issued.  (I mentioned one such counter-
> measure in a FIPS level 3 HSM from long ago, in a prior post.)

I don't know all the specifics of the Diginotar breach, but I'm not
conceiving of a situation in which knowing the serial number of a
certificate in advance helps an attacker erase the evidence of a bogus cert
having been issued.  Knowing a serial number in advance, or being able to
specify a serial (rather than having one auto-generated) shouldn't have any
impact on the tamper-proof log of CA operations which I would expect to be a
fundamental part of any CA.  Also, it'll be awfully hard for a future
attacker to erase proof of issuance if the CA is logging all their certs to
a variety of CT servers.

On the other hand, I can certainly empathise with the sentiment that
removing/modifying reasonable safety checks that prevent a given CA from
issuing two certificates with the same serial is a scary proposition. 
The CT spec has a way to avoid that, though, by issuing pre-certs from a
separate CA to that of the CA issuing the eventual certificate.  That avoids
the need for duplicate serials.

> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that is
> being logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be
> present.  Maybe that will show us how to avoid the concern that I and
> others have raised.  It would also provide us with a starting point for
> the format of a new data structure for the SCT request, and the set of
> data that is input to the SCT hash computation.

I can't speak for Ben, Adam, or the others with significant input into the
CT spec, but for myself I would want to see *everything* that goes into the
final certificate.  The goal of CT is to provide a publically available
database of the data which is being attested to by CAs.  I wouldn't want to
limit what the public is capable of auditing because of a lack of
imagination at the time the specification was codified.

- Matt

-- 
New Yankee Workshop isn't a "how to" for home hobbyists, it's "Baywatch" for
powertool fetishists.
		-- Geoff Kinnel, ASR


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Mon, Sep 08, 2014 at 04:24:26PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:
> > The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
> > Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production
> > CA certificate.  Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
> 
> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer
> name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to
> be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the
> problem.

As the Wikipedians say, "Citation Needed".  My understanding is that there
is no restriction on the contents of the issuer certificate of a precert,
other than:

    a special-purpose (CA:true, Extended Key Usage: Certificate
    Transparency, OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) Precertificate Signing
    Certificate.  The Precertificate Signing Certificate MUST be directly
    certified by the (root or intermediate) CA certificate that will
    ultimately sign the end-entity TBSCertificate yielding the end-entity
    certificate

That's from RFC6962 s3.1, and the wording is identical in rfc6962-bis.xml in
the github repo at the time of writing.

Of all the mentions of "issuer" in 6962, the closest relevant mention I can
find is in s3.2, "Structure of the Signed Certificate Timestamp", in the
paragraph discussing what `tbs_certificate` is, which talks (rather densely)
about how precerts differ from regular certs, and how the TBSCertificate
structure's issuer and AKI extension need to be those of the final
certificate issuer, not the precert issuer.

This variation between the issuer listed in the precert and the *actual*
issuer of the precert would potentially be a problem, if the usual chain
verification methods were employed, but it does mention elsewhere in 6962
(s3.1, para 4) that normal X.509 verification rules "may be relaxed" to
accommodate this sort of situation.  This is reasonable because the chain
verification is for spam prevention, rather than for information security.

For my log implementation, I've just made sure that the signature of the
cert was made by the public key in the next cert up the chain.  I'm not
looking at revocation, notBefore/notAfter, issuer/subject matching, or
anything else of that nature

Nobody other than logs need to verify the chain of the precert, either,
because browsers can verify the signature for the precert and then compare
the contents of the precert (from the log) and the presented cert and make
sure those details match.

- Matt


From nobody Tue Sep  9 02:24:16 2014
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References: <540DFA75.2040000@gmail.com> <540E0E90.1070208@bbn.com> <CAFewVt5kZqw0-W7PqtFHe7yJUsR9PqVJ6C74ZShgo0qs19wLjA@mail.gmail.com> <544B0DD62A64C1448B2DA253C011414607D07DC251@TUS1XCHEVSPIN33.SYMC.SYMANTEC.COM> <20140909011451.GW5645@hezmatt.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 10:24:10 +0100
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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
To: Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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I see two issues:
* What should the precertificate contain.
* What should be the format of the precertificate.

First I'd like to point out that there already is a way to issue
precertificates without violating section 4.1.2.2 in 5280:
As Matt correctly pointed out, when a Precertificate  is signed by a
Precertificate Signing Certificate, then the log produces a signature over
a TBSCertificate that _uses the final issuer's identity_, not the one in
the Precertificate Signing Certificate (hence the requirement that the
Precertificate Signing Certificate will be signed directly by the
certificate that will ultimately sign the end-entity certificate the
Precertificate represents).
That is explained in section 3.2 of RFC6962 ("Structure of the Signed
Certificate Timestamp") or in compliant code
<https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/java/src/org/certificatetransparency/ctlog/LogSignatureVerifier.java#L149>.
 We could do a better job of explaining this in RFC6962-bis (I personally
found it confusing when implementing the Java CT API).

On what precertificates should contain:
Seems like there's a consensus that it should be all data in the final
certificate, except for the serial number, for which there's no agreement.
The argument against including the serial number, raised mostly by Stephen,
is that it may be difficult for CAs who use HSMs to determine/generate the
serial number in advance. I don't recall any CA strongly supporting this
position (and, given precertificates from several CAs have already hit CT
Logs, that's definitely not an issue for several CAs).
The argument for including the serial number is its necessity for revoking
a certificate - Somebody has mentioned alternative revocation mechanisms
that do not require it but have not provided any references, and all
current mechanisms I know of require the serial number.
We all realize the requirement for pre-generating the serial number is a
disruptive one for the certificate issuance process - Given the authors of
RFC6962 have tried hard not to introduce disruptive changes, I think this
is a reasonable given the necessity of the serial number.
Melinda, how do you propose we reach a consensus on the issue if serial
number inclusion?

On the format of precertificates:
As far as I understand the main motivation behind exploring alternative
formats is the desire to avoid two (bitwise-different) X.509 certificates
with the same serial number, signed by the same issuer.
Recall that the log requires a signature over the to-be-issued certificate
as an indicator of the CA's intent to issue a certificate, but that format
does not have to be the same as the one that will be signed by the log
itself.

My proposal is that the structure the log signs would remain the
TBSCertificate as RFC6962-bis describes today, but the data structure for
the Precertificate could be something else:
A structure described using ASN.1 notation or a very crude transformation
over the TBSCertificate (like a signature over the base64-encoded DER
representation of the TBSCertificate).
The main concern here is that CAs should be able to sign this structure
(basically, an arbitrary blob) with the issuer's key.
Which encoding / formats are CAs comfortable with?

The reason for distinguishing the data structure the log signs from the one
the CA submits is simplifying client implementation - to make CT easy to
adopt by as many TLS clients as possible, we should avoid as much as
possible introducing additional requirements on clients. The ability to
manipulate X.509 certificates is an ability a TLS client should already
have, which is why I suggest we stick to that format for the data structure
the log signs.


To sum up, I propose:
* Finding out how to reach a consensus regarding the serial number
inclusion.
* Changing only the Precertificates format that is signed by certificate
issuers, keeping the X.509 TBSCertificate as the data structure signed by
logs.
* Soliciting feedback from certificate issuers on what encoding / formats
are they comfortable signing using the final issuer's key.

Eran

On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 2:14 AM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 08, 2014 at 04:24:26PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:
> > > The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
> > > Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production
> > > CA certificate.  Then, there would be no duplicate serial number
> issues.
> >
> > Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer
> > name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to
> > be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the
> > problem.
>
> As the Wikipedians say, "Citation Needed".  My understanding is that there
> is no restriction on the contents of the issuer certificate of a precert,
> other than:
>
>     a special-purpose (CA:true, Extended Key Usage: Certificate
>     Transparency, OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) Precertificate Signing
>     Certificate.  The Precertificate Signing Certificate MUST be directly
>     certified by the (root or intermediate) CA certificate that will
>     ultimately sign the end-entity TBSCertificate yielding the end-entity
>     certificate
>
> That's from RFC6962 s3.1, and the wording is identical in rfc6962-bis.xml
> in
> the github repo at the time of writing.
>
> Of all the mentions of "issuer" in 6962, the closest relevant mention I can
> find is in s3.2, "Structure of the Signed Certificate Timestamp", in the
> paragraph discussing what `tbs_certificate` is, which talks (rather
> densely)
> about how precerts differ from regular certs, and how the TBSCertificate
> structure's issuer and AKI extension need to be those of the final
> certificate issuer, not the precert issuer.
>
> This variation between the issuer listed in the precert and the *actual*
> issuer of the precert would potentially be a problem, if the usual chain
> verification methods were employed, but it does mention elsewhere in 6962
> (s3.1, para 4) that normal X.509 verification rules "may be relaxed" to
> accommodate this sort of situation.  This is reasonable because the chain
> verification is for spam prevention, rather than for information security.
>
> For my log implementation, I've just made sure that the signature of the
> cert was made by the public key in the next cert up the chain.  I'm not
> looking at revocation, notBefore/notAfter, issuer/subject matching, or
> anything else of that nature
>
> Nobody other than logs need to verify the chain of the precert, either,
> because browsers can verify the signature for the precert and then compare
> the contents of the precert (from the log) and the presented cert and make
> sure those details match.
>
> - Matt
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

--20cf307d06b27a1ed005029e7f6d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I see two issues:<div>* What should the precertificate con=
tain.</div><div>* What should be the format of the precertificate.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>First I&#39;d like to point out that there already is a wa=
y to issue precertificates without violating section 4.1.2.2 in 5280:</div>=
<div>As Matt correctly pointed out, when a Precertificate =C2=A0is signed b=
y a Precertificate Signing Certificate, then the log produces a signature o=
ver a TBSCertificate that _uses the final issuer&#39;s identity_, not the o=
ne in the Precertificate Signing Certificate (hence the requirement that th=
e Precertificate Signing Certificate will be signed directly by the certifi=
cate that will ultimately sign the end-entity certificate the Precertificat=
e represents).</div><div>That is explained in section 3.2 of RFC6962 (&quot=
;Structure of the Signed Certificate Timestamp&quot;) or in compliant=C2=A0=
<a href=3D"https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/j=
ava/src/org/certificatetransparency/ctlog/LogSignatureVerifier.java#L149">c=
ode</a>. =C2=A0We could do a better job of explaining this in RFC6962-bis (=
I personally found it confusing when implementing the Java CT API).</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>On what precertificates should contain:</div><div>Seems l=
ike there&#39;s a consensus that it should be all data in the final certifi=
cate, except for the serial number, for which there&#39;s no agreement.</di=
v><div>The argument against including the serial number, raised mostly by S=
tephen, is that it may be difficult for CAs who use HSMs to determine/gener=
ate the serial number in advance. I don&#39;t recall any CA strongly suppor=
ting this position (and, given precertificates from several CAs have alread=
y hit CT Logs, that&#39;s definitely not an issue for several CAs).</div><d=
iv>The argument for including the serial number is its necessity for revoki=
ng a certificate - Somebody has mentioned alternative revocation mechanisms=
 that do not require it but have not provided any references, and all curre=
nt mechanisms I know of require the serial number.</div><div>We all realize=
 the requirement for pre-generating the serial number is a disruptive one f=
or the certificate issuance process - Given the authors of RFC6962 have tri=
ed hard not to introduce disruptive changes, I think this is a reasonable g=
iven the necessity of the serial number.</div><div>Melinda, how do you prop=
ose we reach a consensus on the issue if serial number inclusion?</div><div=
><br></div><div>On the format of precertificates:</div><div>As far as I und=
erstand the main motivation behind exploring alternative formats is the des=
ire to avoid two (bitwise-different) X.509 certificates with the same seria=
l number, signed by the same issuer.</div><div>Recall that the log requires=
 a signature over the to-be-issued certificate as an indicator of the CA&#3=
9;s intent to issue a certificate, but that format does not have to be the =
same as the one that will be signed by the log itself.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>My proposal is that the structure the log signs would remain the TBSCe=
rtificate as RFC6962-bis describes today, but the data structure for the Pr=
ecertificate could be something else:</div><div>A structure described using=
 ASN.1 notation or a very crude transformation over the TBSCertificate (lik=
e a signature over the base64-encoded DER representation of the TBSCertific=
ate).</div><div>The main concern here is that CAs should be able to sign th=
is structure (basically, an arbitrary blob) with the issuer&#39;s key.</div=
><div>Which encoding / formats are CAs comfortable with?</div><div><br></di=
v><div>The reason for distinguishing the data structure the log signs from =
the one the CA submits is simplifying client implementation - to make CT ea=
sy to adopt by as many TLS clients as possible, we should avoid as much as =
possible introducing additional requirements on clients. The ability to man=
ipulate X.509 certificates is an ability a TLS client should already have, =
which is why I suggest we stick to that format for the data structure the l=
og signs.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>To sum up, I propose:</di=
v><div>* Finding out how to reach a consensus regarding the serial number i=
nclusion.</div><div>* Changing only the Precertificates format that is sign=
ed by certificate issuers, keeping the X.509 TBSCertificate as the data str=
ucture signed by logs.</div><div>* Soliciting feedback from certificate iss=
uers on what encoding / formats are they comfortable signing using the fina=
l issuer&#39;s key.</div><div><br></div><div>Eran</div></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 2:14 AM,=
 Matt Palmer <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mpalmer@hezmatt.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">mpalmer@hezmatt.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Mon, Sep 08, 2014 at 04:24:26PM -0700=
, Rick Andrews wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the prod=
uction<br>
&gt; &gt; CA certificate.=C2=A0 Then, there would be no duplicate serial nu=
mber issues.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert&#39;s i=
ssuer<br>
&gt; name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has =
to<br>
&gt; be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don&#39;t think that solves =
the<br>
&gt; problem.<br>
<br>
</span>As the Wikipedians say, &quot;Citation Needed&quot;.=C2=A0 My unders=
tanding is that there<br>
is no restriction on the contents of the issuer certificate of a precert,<b=
r>
other than:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 a special-purpose (CA:true, Extended Key Usage: Certificate<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Transparency, OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) Precertificate Sig=
ning<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Certificate.=C2=A0 The Precertificate Signing Certificate MUS=
T be directly<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certified by the (root or intermediate) CA certificate that w=
ill<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ultimately sign the end-entity TBSCertificate yielding the en=
d-entity<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certificate<br>
<br>
That&#39;s from RFC6962 s3.1, and the wording is identical in rfc6962-bis.x=
ml in<br>
the github repo at the time of writing.<br>
<br>
Of all the mentions of &quot;issuer&quot; in 6962, the closest relevant men=
tion I can<br>
find is in s3.2, &quot;Structure of the Signed Certificate Timestamp&quot;,=
 in the<br>
paragraph discussing what `tbs_certificate` is, which talks (rather densely=
)<br>
about how precerts differ from regular certs, and how the TBSCertificate<br=
>
structure&#39;s issuer and AKI extension need to be those of the final<br>
certificate issuer, not the precert issuer.<br>
<br>
This variation between the issuer listed in the precert and the *actual*<br=
>
issuer of the precert would potentially be a problem, if the usual chain<br=
>
verification methods were employed, but it does mention elsewhere in 6962<b=
r>
(s3.1, para 4) that normal X.509 verification rules &quot;may be relaxed&qu=
ot; to<br>
accommodate this sort of situation.=C2=A0 This is reasonable because the ch=
ain<br>
verification is for spam prevention, rather than for information security.<=
br>
<br>
For my log implementation, I&#39;ve just made sure that the signature of th=
e<br>
cert was made by the public key in the next cert up the chain.=C2=A0 I&#39;=
m not<br>
looking at revocation, notBefore/notAfter, issuer/subject matching, or<br>
anything else of that nature<br>
<br>
Nobody other than logs need to verify the chain of the precert, either,<br>
because browsers can verify the signature for the precert and then compare<=
br>
the contents of the precert (from the log) and the presented cert and make<=
br>
sure those details match.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
- Matt<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From nobody Tue Sep  9 02:49:53 2014
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Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 11:49:46 +0200
From: Tomas Gustavsson <tomas@primekey.se>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Hi,

I originally suggested (in the mail thread referenced) the CertTemplate 
format from RFC4211, it has subject, issuer, serialNumber and extensions 
(basically a TBSCertificate).

Although the RFC says that serialNumber MUST be omitted, this is for 
certificate request purposes and can surely be redefined.

Don't remember if there were any other technical issues preventing a 
CertTemplate to be used?

Cheers,
Tomas


On 2014-09-09 00:09, Melinda Shore wrote:
> To be honest I'm a bit concerned that this has been kicked around
> for as long as it has, without progress.  This was one of the first
> topics to be discussed shortly after working group formation (see
> thread starting here:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00050.html).
>
> It may be worth taking a look at that thread and seeing if you
> ("you" working group participants, not Steve specifically)
> can find something useful.  I do think it's time to start coming
> up with concrete counterproposals.
>
> Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>


From nobody Tue Sep  9 03:17:09 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 08/09/14 19:50, Melinda Shore wrote:
> It seems as if we've been talking about precertificate format for
> quite some time, without coming to resolution.  Let's try to find
> agreement on how to handle it and close issue 26.
>
> The ticket, with description, is here:
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/26
>
> The fundamental problem is that because precertificates are currently
> encoded as X.509 structures we have the potential for two certificates
> to exist with the same issuer and same serial number.  Because the
> precertificate is not usable as a TLS certificate in practice, this
> may not be an issue.  However, it's a clear violation of section 4.1.2.2
> in 5280 (and to be honest I'm a little fuzzy on its implications for
> CRL processing).
>
> So, are you all comfortable with letting the X.509 representation
> stand, or do you have an alternative proposal?

I don't mind us adding an alternative Precertificate format to 6962-bis 
(if we can agree on a suitable format!), but I'd also like to retain the 
RFC6962 Precertificate format as an option.

Several CAs have already deployed code to generate RFC6962 
Precertificates.  Why force these CAs to change to a different format 
just because some other CAs find it hard to implement the RFC6962 format?

Some CAs will actually find it _easier_ to implement the RFC6962 
Precertificate format than to implement some new format that we haven't 
defined yet.  (My experience: When I wrote Comodo's code for RFC6962 
Precertificates, reusing the TBSCertificate format was definitely a 
blessing rather than a curse).

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 9 September 2014 00:24, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com> wrote:
>> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
>
> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the problem.

Surely it does, since it is actually signed by the precert signing
cert. Changing the issuer name just means its even less of a conflict,
since it then shouldn't even validate according to normal rules.


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Thread-Topic: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 9/9/14, 8:07 AM, "Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com> wrote:

>On 9 September 2014 00:24, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com> wrote:
>>> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
>>>Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production
>>>CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
>>
>> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer
>>name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to
>>be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the
>>problem.
>
>Surely it does, since it is actually signed by the precert signing
>cert.=20

I think the point above is that the issuerName/serialNumber is what is
required to be unique, not issuer=E2=80=99s public key/serial number.


>Changing the issuer name just means its even less of a conflict,
>since it then shouldn't even validate according to normal rules.

It may be worth requiring the pre-certificate signing certificate to omit
the basicConstraints extension to further reduce conflict.

Different question, why must the SKID in the pre signing certificate match
the AKID in the TBSCertificate (as noted in 3.3)?  Seems like a bad idea
to have the same SKID in both the pre-certificate signing certificate and
in the real CA certificate.  Allowing the SKID be calculated as per normal
and placing the SKID of the final issuer in a SAN may be a better
approach. =20



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Brian,

Can you re-state your proposal. I'm confused, in part because one does
not sign anything using a cert; one verifies a signed thing using a public
key from a cert.

Steve


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Brad,

>> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that is being
>> logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be present. Maybe that
>> will show us how to avoid the concern that I and others have raised. It would also
>> provide us with a starting point for the format of a new data structure for the SCT
>> request, and the set of data that is input to the SCT hash computation.
> The serial number needs to be part of the logged proof because that is the key on which existing revocation mechanisms operate.  Transparently identifying that a certificate has been issued incorrectly is of little utility unless that certificate can be revoked.
I agree that the serial number is critical if one plans to revoke the 
cert. But ,
the I-D makes no mention of remediation mechanisms, an omission I noted 
in my review
a while ago. In some cases it appears that CT plans to shame CAs into 
submission, in
which case revocation may not be needed ;-).
> The alternatives are revoking the issuing CA on any leaf mis-issuance or inventing alternate revocation mechanisms.
I agree that those mechanisms would effect revocation of the offending 
cert, but they
may be overkill, and so should be avoided if possible.
> The latter may be less of an obstacle than it appears since the major implementers of CT are also in the process of inventing and deploying their own (currently) proprietary revocation systems alongside CT.
I didn't know that. Since the WG does not know how these might work, we 
also don't
know if the cert serial number is required.
> Nevertheless, one would need something stable to uniquely identify the certificate for these purposes, which ends up looking a lot like a serial number however you slice it.  (You can't use a cryptograhpic hash of the final cert for this, either, because that would require a preimage in the log.)
I agree that something that uniquely identifies the evil cert is needed, 
which is why
I suggested that we revisit this problem and look at each cert component 
to see what
we need, and why.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Matt,

>> However, Ben has noted that even if we use a different format for the
>> pre-cert data, the data MUST contain the serial number of the cert that is
>> eventually issued.  This is almost as much of a problem for CAs, at least
>> in principle.  Remember that the DigiNotar breach (which is a major
>> motivation for CT) was especially bad because the attackers were able
>> erase all evidence of the bogus certs that they issued.  Countermeasures
>> to such attacks might preclude a CA from knowing what serial number will
>> appear in a cert until it is issued.  (I mentioned one such counter-
>> measure in a FIPS level 3 HSM from long ago, in a prior post.)
> I don't know all the specifics of the Diginotar breach, but I'm not
> conceiving of a situation in which knowing the serial number of a
> certificate in advance helps an attacker erase the evidence of a bogus cert
> having been issued.  Knowing a serial number in advance, or being able to
> specify a serial (rather than having one auto-generated) shouldn't have any
> impact on the tamper-proof log of CA operations which I would expect to be a
> fundamental part of any CA.  Also, it'll be awfully hard for a future
> attacker to erase proof of issuance if the CA is logging all their certs to
> a variety of CT servers.
Sorry if I was unclear. I intended to say that if the attackers had not
been able to erase evidence of the issuance of bogus certs, then the attack
might have been discovered quickly. Using an HSM that assigns serial 
numbers,
helps with this concern, but such a design is precluded if one is 
required to
issue two certs with the same serial number.
>> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that is
>> being logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be
>> present.  Maybe that will show us how to avoid the concern that I and
>> others have raised.  It would also provide us with a starting point for
>> the format of a new data structure for the SCT request, and the set of
>> data that is input to the SCT hash computation.
> I can't speak for Ben, Adam, or the others with significant input into the
> CT spec, but for myself I would want to see *everything* that goes into the
> final certificate.  The goal of CT is to provide a publically available
> database of the data which is being attested to by CAs.  I wouldn't want to
> limit what the public is capable of auditing because of a lack of
> imagination at the time the specification was codified.
I don't recall seeing the goal you described above in the I-D. More 
importantly
your statement is a description of a mechanism, not a security goal per se.
one would have to follow your statement of transparency with one that says,
then ....

I have suggested we need is a clear statement of the threat and a mapping
of CT to that threat model. I still think this is needed, and that it 
may help
us decide what needs to be covered by the SCT.

Steve


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Rob,
> ...
> I don't mind us adding an alternative Precertificate format to 
> 6962-bis (if we can agree on a suitable format!), but I'd also like to 
> retain the RFC6962 Precertificate format as an option.
>
> Several CAs have already deployed code to generate RFC6962 
> Precertificates. Why force these CAs to change to a different format 
> just because some other CAs find it hard to implement the RFC6962 format?
Commonly in the IETF, there is no preference given to folks who have 
implemented against
an experimental RFC when that RFC is being revised to become a standards 
track doc.

Another way to look at this is to ask why a standards track should have 
to adopt a
design element from an Experimental RFC that received little review?

So, saying that clients, logs, auditors, etc. MUST support both seems 
inappropriate.
> Some CAs will actually find it _easier_ to implement the RFC6962 
> Precertificate format than to implement some new format that we 
> haven't defined yet. (My experience: When I wrote Comodo's code for 
> RFC6962 Precertificates, reusing the TBSCertificate format was 
> definitely a blessing rather than a curse).
I can't argue with your personal experience as a developer. I can argue 
that, on the
basis of 5280 (4.1.2.2), and on my experience as a developer of an HSM, 
the pre-cert
model is very problematic.

Steve


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Tomas,

>
> Hi,
>
> I originally suggested (in the mail thread referenced) the 
> CertTemplate format from RFC4211, it has subject, issuer, serialNumber 
> and extensions (basically a TBSCertificate).
>
> Although the RFC says that serialNumber MUST be omitted, this is for 
> certificate request purposes and can surely be redefined.
>
> Don't remember if there were any other technical issues preventing a 
> CertTemplate to be used?
>
> Cheers,
> Tomas
I agree that using a redefined (to include the serial number) cert 
template from CRMF would avoid the 5280 issue, but it still requires the 
CA to assign the serial number before
the cert is issued. That is my biggest concern, i.e., it imposes a new 
requirement on
CAs, one that may have adverse security implication for some. 
Nonetheless, I like your suggestion (minus the serial number) as a 
starting point. See my next message.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Eran,

> I see two issues:
> * What should the precertificate contain.
> * What should be the format of the precertificate.
>
> First I'd like to point out that there already is a way to issue 
> precertificates without violating section 4.1.2.2 in 5280:
> As Matt correctly pointed out, when a Precertificate  is signed by a 
> Precertificate Signing Certificate, then the log produces a signature 
> over a TBSCertificate that _uses the final issuer's identity_, not the 
> one in the Precertificate Signing Certificate (hence the requirement 
> that the Precertificate Signing Certificate will be signed directly by 
> the certificate that will ultimately sign the end-entity certificate 
> the Precertificate represents).
Well, since certs are NOT used to sign anything, I can't agree with the 
phrase "As Matt correctly pointed out" ;-).
> That is explained in section 3.2 of RFC6962 ("Structure of the Signed 
> Certificate Timestamp") or in compliant code 
> <https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/java/src/org/certificatetransparency/ctlog/LogSignatureVerifier.java#L149>. 
>  We could do a better job of explaining this in RFC6962-bis (I 
> personally found it confusing when implementing the Java CT API).
6962-bis is what needs to be clear. Also, code is not generally viewed 
as a spec, for IETF purposes.
> On what precertificates should contain:
> Seems like there's a consensus that it should be all data in the final 
> certificate, except for the serial number, for which there's no agreement.
> The argument against including the serial number, raised
Count me as not part of the consensus. I still want to see an analysis 
of why selected
cert data needs to be part of the SCT.
> mostly by Stephen, is that it may be difficult for CAs who use HSMs to 
> determine/generate the serial number in advance. I don't recall any CA 
> strongly supporting this position (and, given precertificates from 
> several CAs have already hit CT Logs, that's definitely not an issue 
> for several CAs).
On this list, very few CAs seem to be participating. I seem to recall 
one CA commenting that
they had concerns about the per-cert model. I see that one CA, a 
co-author of the doc, says
it was easy to implement. When I was in Beijing last week I spoke with 
folks who deal
with cert issuance there (under CNNIC) and they were completely unaware 
of the TRANS WG.
I wonder how many other CAs outside of the CABF are tracking this activity?
> The argument for including the serial number is its necessity for 
> revoking a certificate - Somebody has mentioned alternative revocation 
> mechanisms that do not require it but have not provided any 
> references, and all current mechanisms I know of require the serial 
> number.
> We all realize the requirement for pre-generating the serial number is 
> a disruptive one for the certificate issuance process - Given the 
> authors of RFC6962 have tried hard not to introduce disruptive 
> changes, I think this is a reasonable given the necessity of the 
> serial number.
here's an off-the-cuff idea on how to have our cake and eat it too.

1. A CA submits a cert template ala CRMF.

2. A log operator generates an SCT* based on this data, and returns it.

3. The SCT* is embedded in a cert by the CA.

4. The CA submits the SCT*, plus the issued cert plus to the same log 
operator, and
a new data item is created, the SCT. It links the serial number to the 
previously-issued
SCT*. If there is a mismatch between the SCT* and the final cert, the 
Monitor will
refuse to issue an SCT.

(A Subject who submits its cert gets an SCT. The serial number is not a 
problem here.)

A TLS client that checks for the presence of an SCT acts as before, but 
with slightly
different processing to match the SCT against the received cert. This 
seems to offer
equivalent (analogous) guarantees to the client, but without a threat 
model I can't be
sure if there is a gap here.

A Monitor will examine a log to determine when an SCT* was issued and no 
SCT was issued subsequently. That is a red flag. An SCT without a 
preceding SCT* is not a problem, as this
is what would occur if a Subject (or OCPS server?) requested an SCT.

Steve

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    Eran,<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEee_=1HTBvF3MQEZeeZc9VL_rK2eRjwVjOnhZKEO+8r=w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">I see two issues:
        <div>* What should the precertificate contain.</div>
        <div>* What should be the format of the precertificate.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>First I'd like to point out that there already is a way to
          issue precertificates without violating section 4.1.2.2 in
          5280:</div>
        <div>As Matt correctly pointed out, when a Precertificate &nbsp;is
          signed by a Precertificate Signing Certificate, then the log
          produces a signature over a TBSCertificate that _uses the
          final issuer's identity_, not the one in the Precertificate
          Signing Certificate (hence the requirement that the
          Precertificate Signing Certificate will be signed directly by
          the certificate that will ultimately sign the end-entity
          certificate the Precertificate represents).</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    Well, since certs are NOT used to sign anything, I can't agree with
    the phrase "As Matt correctly pointed out" ;-).<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEee_=1HTBvF3MQEZeeZc9VL_rK2eRjwVjOnhZKEO+8r=w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>That is explained in section 3.2 of RFC6962 ("Structure of
          the Signed Certificate Timestamp") or in compliant&nbsp;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/java/src/org/certificatetransparency/ctlog/LogSignatureVerifier.java#L149">code</a>.
          &nbsp;We could do a better job of explaining this in RFC6962-bis (I
          personally found it confusing when implementing the Java CT
          API).</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    6962-bis is what needs to be clear. Also, code is not generally
    viewed as a spec, for IETF purposes.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEee_=1HTBvF3MQEZeeZc9VL_rK2eRjwVjOnhZKEO+8r=w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>On what precertificates should contain:</div>
        <div>Seems like there's a consensus that it should be all data
          in the final certificate, except for the serial number, for
          which there's no agreement.</div>
        <div>The argument against including the serial number, raised </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    Count me as not part of the consensus. I still want to see an
    analysis of why selected<br>
    cert data needs to be part of the SCT.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEee_=1HTBvF3MQEZeeZc9VL_rK2eRjwVjOnhZKEO+8r=w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>mostly by Stephen, is that it may be difficult for CAs who
          use HSMs to determine/generate the serial number in advance. I
          don't recall any CA strongly supporting this position (and,
          given precertificates from several CAs have already hit CT
          Logs, that's definitely not an issue for several CAs).</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    On this list, very few CAs seem to be participating. I seem to
    recall one CA commenting that<br>
    they had concerns about the per-cert model. I see that one CA, a
    co-author of the doc, says<br>
    it was easy to implement. When I was in Beijing last week I spoke
    with folks who deal<br>
    with cert issuance there (under CNNIC) and they were completely
    unaware of the TRANS WG.<br>
    I wonder how many other CAs outside of the CABF are tracking this
    activity?<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEee_=1HTBvF3MQEZeeZc9VL_rK2eRjwVjOnhZKEO+8r=w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>The argument for including the serial number is its
          necessity for revoking a certificate - Somebody has mentioned
          alternative revocation mechanisms that do not require it but
          have not provided any references, and all current mechanisms I
          know of require the serial number.</div>
        <div>We all realize the requirement for pre-generating the
          serial number is a disruptive one for the certificate issuance
          process - Given the authors of RFC6962 have tried hard not to
          introduce disruptive changes, I think this is a reasonable
          given the necessity of the serial number.</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    here's an off-the-cuff idea on how to have our cake and eat it too.<br>
    <br>
    1. A CA submits a cert template ala CRMF.<br>
    <br>
    2. A log operator generates an SCT* based on this data, and returns
    it.<br>
    <br>
    3. The SCT* is embedded in a cert by the CA.<br>
    <br>
    4. The CA submits the SCT*, plus the issued cert plus to the same
    log operator, and<br>
    a new data item is created, the SCT. It links the serial number to
    the previously-issued<br>
    SCT*. If there is a mismatch between the SCT* and the final cert,
    the Monitor will<br>
    refuse to issue an SCT.<br>
    <br>
    (A Subject who submits its cert gets an SCT. The serial number is
    not a problem here.)<br>
    <br>
    A TLS client that checks for the presence of an SCT acts as before,
    but with slightly <br>
    different processing to match the SCT against the received cert.
    This seems to offer <br>
    equivalent (analogous) guarantees to the client, but without a
    threat model I can't be<br>
    sure if there is a gap here.<br>
    <br>
    A Monitor will examine a log to determine when an SCT* was issued
    and no SCT was issued subsequently. That is a red flag. An SCT
    without a preceding SCT* is not a problem, as this <br>
    is what would occur if a Subject (or OCPS server?) requested an SCT.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------020607060209090202000002--


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On 9 September 2014 18:39, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> I agree that the serial number is critical if one plans to revoke the cert.
> But ,
> the I-D makes no mention of remediation mechanisms, an omission I noted in
> my review
> a while ago.

It makes no mention because they are not in scope. The point of CT is
to allow others to vet certificates and take appropriate action when
needed.

It is not up to us to describe all possible problems and how they are
remedied. If you think that's a valuable exercise, be my guest.

However, when you suggest that inclusion of some particular thing is
problematic, then we can, of course, refer to potential problems CT
might reveal and available remedies as an illustration of why that
thing is needed.


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From: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Whatever is logged ought to be as close as is possible to the actual certif=
icate and ought to include all meaningful information in the certificate ot=
her than a preimage-resistant hash. =20

Detecting problematic issuance isn't confined just to organizational author=
ity.  Looking at the recent history of bugs in this area, observing a flurr=
y of issuance of certificates of the form "www.legit.com\0www.evil.com", or=
 certificates with large "tumors" in rarely used or obsolete extensions mig=
ht have been cause to investigate deeper and additionally could've provided=
 evidence of stealthier prior exploitation of such bugs.

We can't predict in advance what such problems will be, so the default stan=
ce should be that everything is logged, and the onus fall on those who want=
 to exclude content to justify that action.

With regard particularly to serial numbers it's clear they are necessary as=
 input to revocation mechanisms.

-Brad


On Sep 9, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

> Brad,
>=20
>>> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that =
is being
>>> logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be prese=
nt. Maybe that
>>> will show us how to avoid the concern that I and others have raised. It=
 would also
>>> provide us with a starting point for the format of a new data structure=
 for the SCT
>>> request, and the set of data that is input to the SCT hash computation.
>> The serial number needs to be part of the logged proof because that is t=
he key on which existing revocation mechanisms operate.  Transparently iden=
tifying that a certificate has been issued incorrectly is of little utility=
 unless that certificate can be revoked.
> I agree that the serial number is critical if one plans to revoke the cer=
t. But ,
> the I-D makes no mention of remediation mechanisms, an omission I noted i=
n my review
> a while ago. In some cases it appears that CT plans to shame CAs into sub=
mission, in
> which case revocation may not be needed ;-).
>> The alternatives are revoking the issuing CA on any leaf mis-issuance or=
 inventing alternate revocation mechanisms.
> I agree that those mechanisms would effect revocation of the offending ce=
rt, but they
> may be overkill, and so should be avoided if possible.
>> The latter may be less of an obstacle than it appears since the major im=
plementers of CT are also in the process of inventing and deploying their o=
wn (currently) proprietary revocation systems alongside CT.
> I didn't know that. Since the WG does not know how these might work, we a=
lso don't
> know if the cert serial number is required.
>> Nevertheless, one would need something stable to uniquely identify the c=
ertificate for these purposes, which ends up looking a lot like a serial nu=
mber however you slice it.  (You can't use a cryptograhpic hash of the fina=
l cert for this, either, because that would require a preimage in the log.)
> I agree that something that uniquely identifies the evil cert is needed, =
which is why
> I suggested that we revisit this problem and look at each cert component =
to see what
> we need, and why.
>=20
> Steve
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Brad,

> Whatever is logged ought to be as close as is possible to the actual certificate and ought to include all meaningful information in the certificate other than a preimage-resistant hash.
Absent a clear description of scope, i.e., what problem is being solved, 
the approach
of "include everything" is understandable. But that doesn't make it the 
best approach.
> Detecting problematic issuance isn't confined just to organizational authority.  Looking at the recent history of bugs in this area, observing a flurry of issuance of certificates of the form "www.legit.com\0www.evil.com", or certificates with large "tumors" in rarely used or obsolete extensions might have been cause to investigate deeper and additionally could've provided evidence of stealthier prior exploitation of such bugs.
Again, if the I-D stated what problem is being solved, and the examples 
you cite are
part of that description, then covering everything in a cert makes more 
sense, but ...
> We can't predict in advance what such problems will be, so the default stance should be that everything is logged, and the onus fall on those who want to exclude content to justify that action.
I see your point, and if the I-D clearly stated the sort of very broad 
goals that you
note above, I think your argument would be a good one. We already have 
one example of
folks wanting to exclude info, in the case of redacted certs. I'm not 
yet convinced
that the proposed mechanism is safe, but we'll see.
> With regard particularly to serial numbers it's clear they are necessary as input to revocation mechanisms.
yes, and my suggested alternative mechanism preserves logging of serial 
numbers, as
a separate step for CAs (not for Subjects or others who have a cert for 
which an SCT
is to be created as a post-issuance artifact.) But, I think the I-D 
needs to be clear
about the threat model so that we can see why revocation is part of a 
remediation plan
in some circumstances. The current text is way too vague on this topic, 
as I noted in
my review prior to the Toronto meeting.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com> wrote:
>> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
>
> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the problem.

Thanks for pointing that out. Basically, the cause of that problem is
that a Precertificate is a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, and
so it could be considered a duplicate of the final certificate. If the
Precertificate weren't a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, then
there would be no way it could be considered a duplicate. So, why not
make this simple change to the syntax:

enum { x509_entry(0), precert_entry(1), (65535) } LogEntryType;

  struct {
    LogEntryType entry_type;
    select (entry_type) {
      case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
      case precert_entry: ASN.1Precert;
    } entry;
    ASN.1Cert certificate_chain<0..2^24-1>;
  } LogEntry;

  opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
  opaque ASN.1Precert<1..2^24-1>;

where the internal syntax of ASN.1Precert is (in ASN.1):

  ASN1Precert ::=  SEQUENCE  {
    precertSigningCert [0] EXPLICIT OptionalCertificate,
    tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
    signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signatureValue BIT STRING }

  OptionalCertificate ::= certificate Certificate OPTIONAL;

In other words, ASN1Precert is exactly an X.509 Certificate except
that it starts with an explicitly-tagged, possibly-empty
precertSigningCert field. Thus, no X.509 certificate parser would
parse a precert as though it were a real certificate, and so the
precert could never be considered a duplicate of the final cert.
Additionally, there would be no need for the "poison extension"
because the added precertSigningCert field serves the same purpose.

This strawman only attempts to solve the "duplicate certificate"
problem, not the "must reserve the serial number in advance" problem.
However, I suspect that this change would make it more difficult for
some CAs to create precertificates.

Cheers,
Brian


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From: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Stephen,

Below was your original question, which I've attempted to answer in as stra=
ightforward a manner as possible, including illustrative examples from rece=
nt history.  Detecting mis-issuance of certificates through public logging =
of such is the stated goal of the I-D.  The complex nature of X.509/PKIX an=
d the surrounding technology ecosystem and the history of vulnerabilities i=
n such demonstrates that including everything in the log except that which =
MUST be excluded furthers that goal.  There is not a specific threat model =
nor any need to articulate one.  We desire a technology that is useful agai=
nst as many threats to the broad certificate ecosystem as possible, includi=
ng those yet to be formally anticipated.

-Brad

On Sep 8, 2014, at 4:45 PM, Hill, Brad <bhill@paypal.com> wrote:

>> I suggest that the CT designers list which data items from a cert that i=
s being
>> logged need to be in the SCT request, and why each item has to be presen=
t. Maybe that
>> will show us how to avoid the concern that I and others have raised. It =
would also
>> provide us with a starting point for the format of a new data structure =
for the SCT
>> request, and the set of data that is input to the SCT hash computation.


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 12:56 PM, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
> where the internal syntax of ASN.1Precert is (in ASN.1):
>
>   ASN1Precert ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>     precertSigningCert [0] EXPLICIT OptionalCertificate,
>     tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
>     signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
>     signatureValue BIT STRING }
>
>   OptionalCertificate ::= certificate Certificate OPTIONAL;
>
> In other words, ASN1Precert is exactly an X.509 Certificate except
> that it starts with an explicitly-tagged, possibly-empty
> precertSigningCert field.

...and where signatureValue covers both precertSigningCert and
tbsCertificate, instead of just tbsCertificate. (This would have been
more clear if I would have wrapped precertSigningCert and
tbsCertificate in a SEQUENCE.)

Cheers,
Brian


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From: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 3:17 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> I don't mind us adding an alternative Precertificate format to 6962-bis (if
> we can agree on a suitable format!), but I'd also like to retain the RFC6962
> Precertificate format as an option.

If the old form is acceptable, then there would be no point in
defining a new form. The chief issue is that technically the old form
of precertificate is technically a certificate, and since it has the
same issuer name it must (according to RFC 5280) have a different
serial number. It would be good for the group to decide whether or not
that issue is so bad that we cannot accept it. If it is that bad, it
makes sense to define a replacement format. If it isn't so bad that we
can't accept it, then it doesn't make sense to define a replacement
format, IMO.

> Several CAs have already deployed code to generate RFC6962 Precertificates.
> Why force these CAs to change to a different format just because some other
> CAs find it hard to implement the RFC6962 format?

If the only issue is whether it is a little bit tricky to implement
the X.509-certificate form of precertificate, then there's no point in
defining a new format. CAs always have the non-precertificate
mechanism to fall back on.

IMO, the ultimate goal should be to get the non-precertificate
mechanisms working well enough that we can remove (or at least
deprecate) the precertificate mechanism completely.

Cheers,
Brian


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Brad,
> Stephen,
>
> Below was your original question, which I've attempted to answer in as straightforward a manner as possible, including illustrative examples from recent history.  Detecting mis-issuance of certificates through public logging of such is the stated goal of the I-D.
The I-D fails to describe what constitutes mis-issuance. there appears 
to be many examples
where Web PKI CAs issue certs that do not comply with RFC 5280 (see the 
WPKOPS WG).
Are those certs mis-issued? Or, are certs that are syntactically valid, 
maybe even
5280-compliant, but issued to the "wrong" subject mis-issued? or, ...

The I-D needs to be more precise in defining. Logging, per se, permits 
folks who monitor
logs to detect mis-issuance, but does not solve the problems caused by 
mis-issuance. If detection were sufficient, then there would be no need 
for TLS clients to reject certs w/o
SCTs (as mandated by the current I-D). I'm guessing that there is a 
notion of how the various elements of CT work together to address the 
problems that result from mis-issuance, but the
I-D fails to articulate this notion. That's a serious omission.
> The complex nature of X.509/PKIX and the surrounding technology ecosystem and the history of vulnerabilities in such demonstrates that including everything in the log except that which MUST be excluded furthers that goal.  There is not a specific threat model nor any need to articulate one.
For several years it has been common practice to require a threat model 
for new security efforts in the IETF. Why do uyou believe that TRANS 
should be an exception?
>   We desire a technology that is useful against as many threats to the broad certificate ecosystem as possible, including those yet to be formally anticipated.
The scope here is essentially the Web PKI used with TLS, primarily as 
used by in browsers;
it is not all possible uses of certs with IETF security protocols. So 
the "broad certificate ecosystem" is not universal, right?

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 10:30 AM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Brian,
>
> Can you re-state your proposal. I'm confused, in part because one does
> not sign anything using a cert; one verifies a signed thing using a public
> key from a cert.

Rick and Carl did a good job of explaining why my line of reasoning
didn't make sense in the first place, regardless of my poor choice of
terminology.

By the way, in draft -04 there are similar abuses of terminology that
should be cleaned up. Here's one example, "The resulting
TBSCertificate [RFC5280] is then signed with either [...] a
special-purpose [...] Precertificate Signing Certificate [...] or, the
CA certificate that will sign the final certificate." There are
probably more.

Also, it might be worth mentioning in the draft that it doesn't make
sense to use a Precertificate Signing Certificate if it has the same
public key as the issuing certificate.

Cheers,
Brian


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From: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 16:40:35 -0700
To: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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I think the best way to change a Certificate into a Precertificate would be to alter the first field of the tbsCertificate to be non-optional and explicitly tagged as something other than tag [0].  Then, reconstruct the actual tbsCertificate by changing the first field to tag [0], perform any other necessary edits (like, for name redaction), re-encode the validly-tagged tbsCertificate to DER, and digest the encoded data.

But, I also proposed (a few years ago) a way to include an issued certificate list in a CRL extension to mitigate the Diginotar-style "we didn't know it had been issued" problem, and to be able to feed CRL-based OCSP responders with a minimum of code changes. That didn't go anywhere, and I expect this suggestion to go nowhere as well.

-Kyle H

On September 9, 2014 12:56:11 PM PST, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:
>On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Rick Andrews
><Rick_Andrews@symantec.com> wrote:
>>> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
>Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production
>CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
>>
>> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's
>issuer name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial
>number has to be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think
>that solves the problem.
>
>Thanks for pointing that out. Basically, the cause of that problem is
>that a Precertificate is a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, and
>so it could be considered a duplicate of the final certificate. If the
>Precertificate weren't a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, then
>there would be no way it could be considered a duplicate. So, why not
>make this simple change to the syntax:
>
>enum { x509_entry(0), precert_entry(1), (65535) } LogEntryType;
>
>  struct {
>    LogEntryType entry_type;
>    select (entry_type) {
>      case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
>      case precert_entry: ASN.1Precert;
>    } entry;
>    ASN.1Cert certificate_chain<0..2^24-1>;
>  } LogEntry;
>
>  opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>  opaque ASN.1Precert<1..2^24-1>;
>
>where the internal syntax of ASN.1Precert is (in ASN.1):
>
>  ASN1Precert ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>    precertSigningCert [0] EXPLICIT OptionalCertificate,
>    tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
>    signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
>    signatureValue BIT STRING }
>
>  OptionalCertificate ::= certificate Certificate OPTIONAL;
>
>In other words, ASN1Precert is exactly an X.509 Certificate except
>that it starts with an explicitly-tagged, possibly-empty
>precertSigningCert field. Thus, no X.509 certificate parser would
>parse a precert as though it were a real certificate, and so the
>precert could never be considered a duplicate of the final cert.
>Additionally, there would be no need for the "poison extension"
>because the added precertSigningCert field serves the same purpose.
>
>This strawman only attempts to solve the "duplicate certificate"
>problem, not the "must reserve the serial number in advance" problem.
>However, I suspect that this change would make it more difficult for
>some CAs to create precertificates.
>
>Cheers,
>Brian
>
>_______________________________________________
>Trans mailing list
>Trans@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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<html><head></head><body>I think the best way to change a Certificate into a Precertificate would be to alter the first field of the tbsCertificate to be non-optional and explicitly tagged as something other than tag [0].  Then, reconstruct the actual tbsCertificate by changing the first field to tag [0], perform any other necessary edits (like, for name redaction), re-encode the validly-tagged tbsCertificate to DER, and digest the encoded data.<br>
<br>
But, I also proposed (a few years ago) a way to include an issued certificate list in a CRL extension to mitigate the Diginotar-style &quot;we didn&#39;t know it had been issued&quot; problem, and to be able to feed CRL-based OCSP responders with a minimum of code changes. That didn&#39;t go anywhere, and I expect this suggestion to go nowhere as well.<br>
<br>
-Kyle H<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On September 9, 2014 12:56:11 PM PST, Brian Smith &lt;brian@briansmith.org&gt; wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<pre class="k9mail">On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Rick Andrews &lt;Rick_Andrews@symantec.com&gt; wrote:<br /><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #729fcf; padding-left: 1ex;"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #ad7fa8; padding-left: 1ex;"> The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production CA certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.<br /></blockquote><br /> Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to be that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the problem.<br /></blockquote><br />Thanks for pointing that out. Basically, the cause of that problem is<br />that a Precertificate is a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, and<br />so it could be
considered a duplicate of the final certificate. If the<br />Precertificate weren't a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, then<br />there would be no way it could be considered a duplicate. So, why not<br />make this simple change to the syntax:<br /><br />enum { x509_entry(0), precert_entry(1), (65535) } LogEntryType;<br /><br />  struct {<br />    LogEntryType entry_type;<br />    select (entry_type) {<br />      case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;<br />      case precert_entry: ASN.1Precert;<br />    } entry;<br />    ASN.1Cert certificate_chain&lt;0..2^24-1&gt;;<br />  } LogEntry;<br /><br />  opaque ASN.1Cert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;<br />  opaque ASN.1Precert&lt;1..2^24-1&gt;;<br /><br />where the internal syntax of ASN.1Precert is (in ASN.1):<br /><br />  ASN1Precert ::=  SEQUENCE  {<br />    precertSigningCert [0] EXPLICIT OptionalCertificate,<br />    tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,<br />    signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,<br />    signatureValue BIT STRING }<br /><br />
 OptionalCertificate ::= certificate Certificate OPTIONAL;<br /><br />In other words, ASN1Precert is exactly an X.509 Certificate except<br />that it starts with an explicitly-tagged, possibly-empty<br />precertSigningCert field. Thus, no X.509 certificate parser would<br />parse a precert as though it were a real certificate, and so the<br />precert could never be considered a duplicate of the final cert.<br />Additionally, there would be no need for the "poison extension"<br />because the added precertSigningCert field serves the same purpose.<br /><br />This strawman only attempts to solve the "duplicate certificate"<br />problem, not the "must reserve the serial number in advance" problem.<br />However, I suspect that this change would make it more difficult for<br />some CAs to create precertificates.<br /><br />Cheers,<br />Brian<br /><br /><hr /><br />Trans mailing list<br />Trans@ietf.org<br /><a
href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br /></pre></blockquote></div><br>
-- <br>
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.</body></html>
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think the best way to change a Certificate into a Precertificate would be
> to alter the first field of the tbsCertificate to be non-optional and
> explicitly tagged as something other than tag [0]. Then, reconstruct the
> actual tbsCertificate by changing the first field to tag [0], perform any
> other necessary edits (like, for name redaction), re-encode the
> validly-tagged tbsCertificate to DER, and digest the encoded data.

Let's back up a bit: we want to ensure that the certificate chains
browsers use are a matter of public record. To do this we need to
record the chain in a log, and give the server back a way to prove
"yes, we've seen this chain" from the log. What I don't understand
here is the role of the CA and the Precertificate in this process.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> But, I also proposed (a few years ago) a way to include an issued
> certificate list in a CRL extension to mitigate the Diginotar-style "we
> didn't know it had been issued" problem, and to be able to feed CRL-based
> OCSP responders with a minimum of code changes. That didn't go anywhere, and
> I expect this suggestion to go nowhere as well.
>
> -Kyle H
>
> On September 9, 2014 12:56:11 PM PST, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  The CA may use a Precertificate Signing Certificate to sign the
>>>> Precertificate, and then sign the final certificate with the production CA
>>>> certificate. Then, there would be no duplicate serial number issues.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Brian, even if the CA uses a Precert signing cert, the precert's issuer
>>> name has to be that of the ultimate issuer, and the serial number has to be
>>> that of the ultimate certificate, so I don't think that solves the problem.
>>
>>
>> Thanks for pointing that out. Basically, the cause of that problem is
>> that a Precertificate is a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, and
>> so it could be
>> considered a duplicate of the final certificate. If the
>> Precertificate weren't a syntactically-valid X.509 certificate, then
>> there would be no way it could be considered a duplicate. So, why not
>> make this simple change to the syntax:
>>
>> enum { x509_entry(0), precert_entry(1), (65535) } LogEntryType;
>>
>>   struct {
>>     LogEntryType entry_type;
>>     select (entry_type) {
>>       case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
>>       case precert_entry: ASN.1Precert;
>>     } entry;
>>     ASN.1Cert certificate_chain<0..2^24-1>;
>>   } LogEntry;
>>
>>   opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
>>   opaque ASN.1Precert<1..2^24-1>;
>>
>> where the internal syntax of ASN.1Precert is (in ASN.1):
>>
>>   ASN1Precert ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>>     precertSigningCert [0] EXPLICIT OptionalCertificate,
>>     tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
>>     signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
>>     signatureValue BIT STRING }
>>
>>
>>  OptionalCertificate ::= certificate Certificate OPTIONAL;
>>
>> In other words, ASN1Precert is exactly an X.509 Certificate except
>> that it starts with an explicitly-tagged, possibly-empty
>> precertSigningCert field. Thus, no X.509 certificate parser would
>> parse a precert as though it were a real certificate, and so the
>> precert could never be considered a duplicate of the final cert.
>> Additionally, there would be no need for the "poison extension"
>> because the added precertSigningCert field serves the same purpose.
>>
>> This strawman only attempts to solve the "duplicate certificate"
>> problem, not the "must reserve the serial number in advance" problem.
>> However, I suspect that this change would make it more difficult for
>> some CAs to create precertificates.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Brian
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
> --
> Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>



-- 
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 2014-09-09 21:43, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Brad,
>
>> Whatever is logged ought to be as close as is possible to the actual
>> certificate and ought to include all meaningful information in the
>> certificate other than a preimage-resistant hash.
> Absent a clear description of scope, i.e., what problem is being solved,
> the approach
> of "include everything" is understandable. But that doesn't make it the
> best approach.
>> Detecting problematic issuance isn't confined just to organizational
>> authority.  Looking at the recent history of bugs in this area,
>> observing a flurry of issuance of certificates of the form
>> "www.legit.com\0www.evil.com", or certificates with large "tumors" in
>> rarely used or obsolete extensions might have been cause to
>> investigate deeper and additionally could've provided evidence of
>> stealthier prior exploitation of such bugs.
> Again, if the I-D stated what problem is being solved, and the examples
> you cite are
> part of that description, then covering everything in a cert makes more
> sense, but ...
>> We can't predict in advance what such problems will be, so the default
>> stance should be that everything is logged, and the onus fall on those
>> who want to exclude content to justify that action.

The question of logging everything is not that clear even today. As 
there is currently drafted how to exclude private domain names in the 
PreCertificates being logged. I see possibility for either:
- Log everything by default, risking to add one item after another that 
can optionally not be logged (=can become complex)
- Define what is to be logged, risking adding new things continuously 
(=can become complex)

In any way, the PreCertificate will most likely (almost)never have 
exactly the same information as the real certificate.

> I see your point, and if the I-D clearly stated the sort of very broad
> goals that you
> note above, I think your argument would be a good one. We already have
> one example of
> folks wanting to exclude info, in the case of redacted certs. I'm not
> yet convinced
> that the proposed mechanism is safe, but we'll see.
>> With regard particularly to serial numbers it's clear they are
>> necessary as input to revocation mechanisms.
> yes, and my suggested alternative mechanism preserves logging of serial
> numbers, as
> a separate step for CAs (not for Subjects or others who have a cert for
> which an SCT
> is to be created as a post-issuance artifact.) But, I think the I-D
> needs to be clear
> about the threat model so that we can see why revocation is part of a
> remediation plan
> in some circumstances. The current text is way too vague on this topic,
> as I noted in
> my review prior to the Toronto meeting.
>
> Steve
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 10/09/14 02:25, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 4:40 PM, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I think the best way to change a Certificate into a Precertificate would be
>> to alter the first field of the tbsCertificate to be non-optional and
>> explicitly tagged as something other than tag [0]. Then, reconstruct the
>> actual tbsCertificate by changing the first field to tag [0], perform any
>> other necessary edits (like, for name redaction), re-encode the
>> validly-tagged tbsCertificate to DER, and digest the encoded data.
>
> Let's back up a bit: we want to ensure that the certificate chains
> browsers use are a matter of public record. To do this we need to
> record the chain in a log, and give the server back a way to prove
> "yes, we've seen this chain" from the log. What I don't understand
> here is the role of the CA and the Precertificate in this process.

Hi Watson.

Without Precertificates, we would have to wait for all of the world's 
TLS Servers to be updated to support the RFC6962 TLS extension and/or 
OCSP Stapling before TLS Clients would then be able/willing to abort TLS 
handshakes when an SCT is not provided.  We don't want to have to wait 
that long!

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Hi Stephen.  That's an interesting idea, but I see a few issues.

Step 4 requires the final cert to be logged, so it's incompatible with 
the name redaction mechanism.

Monitors want to detect misissuance (i.e. certs that have been issued 
incorrectly).  I'm not sure that it's reasonable to expect Monitors to 
also take responsibility for detecting non-issuance of certs that should 
have been issued.

On 09/09/14 19:23, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Eran,
>
>> I see two issues:
>> * What should the precertificate contain.
>> * What should be the format of the precertificate.
>>
>> First I'd like to point out that there already is a way to issue
>> precertificates without violating section 4.1.2.2 in 5280:
>> As Matt correctly pointed out, when a Precertificate  is signed by a
>> Precertificate Signing Certificate, then the log produces a signature
>> over a TBSCertificate that _uses the final issuer's identity_, not the
>> one in the Precertificate Signing Certificate (hence the requirement
>> that the Precertificate Signing Certificate will be signed directly by
>> the certificate that will ultimately sign the end-entity certificate
>> the Precertificate represents).
> Well, since certs are NOT used to sign anything, I can't agree with the
> phrase "As Matt correctly pointed out" ;-).
>> That is explained in section 3.2 of RFC6962 ("Structure of the Signed
>> Certificate Timestamp") or in compliant code
>> <https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/master/java/src/org/certificatetransparency/ctlog/LogSignatureVerifier.java#L149>.
>>  We could do a better job of explaining this in RFC6962-bis (I
>> personally found it confusing when implementing the Java CT API).
> 6962-bis is what needs to be clear. Also, code is not generally viewed
> as a spec, for IETF purposes.
>> On what precertificates should contain:
>> Seems like there's a consensus that it should be all data in the final
>> certificate, except for the serial number, for which there's no agreement.
>> The argument against including the serial number, raised
> Count me as not part of the consensus. I still want to see an analysis
> of why selected
> cert data needs to be part of the SCT.
>> mostly by Stephen, is that it may be difficult for CAs who use HSMs to
>> determine/generate the serial number in advance. I don't recall any CA
>> strongly supporting this position (and, given precertificates from
>> several CAs have already hit CT Logs, that's definitely not an issue
>> for several CAs).
> On this list, very few CAs seem to be participating. I seem to recall
> one CA commenting that
> they had concerns about the per-cert model. I see that one CA, a
> co-author of the doc, says
> it was easy to implement. When I was in Beijing last week I spoke with
> folks who deal
> with cert issuance there (under CNNIC) and they were completely unaware
> of the TRANS WG.
> I wonder how many other CAs outside of the CABF are tracking this activity?
>> The argument for including the serial number is its necessity for
>> revoking a certificate - Somebody has mentioned alternative revocation
>> mechanisms that do not require it but have not provided any
>> references, and all current mechanisms I know of require the serial
>> number.
>> We all realize the requirement for pre-generating the serial number is
>> a disruptive one for the certificate issuance process - Given the
>> authors of RFC6962 have tried hard not to introduce disruptive
>> changes, I think this is a reasonable given the necessity of the
>> serial number.
> here's an off-the-cuff idea on how to have our cake and eat it too.
>
> 1. A CA submits a cert template ala CRMF.
>
> 2. A log operator generates an SCT* based on this data, and returns it.
>
> 3. The SCT* is embedded in a cert by the CA.
>
> 4. The CA submits the SCT*, plus the issued cert plus to the same log
> operator, and
> a new data item is created, the SCT. It links the serial number to the
> previously-issued
> SCT*. If there is a mismatch between the SCT* and the final cert, the
> Monitor will
> refuse to issue an SCT.
>
> (A Subject who submits its cert gets an SCT. The serial number is not a
> problem here.)
>
> A TLS client that checks for the presence of an SCT acts as before, but
> with slightly
> different processing to match the SCT against the received cert. This
> seems to offer
> equivalent (analogous) guarantees to the client, but without a threat
> model I can't be
> sure if there is a gap here.
>
> A Monitor will examine a log to determine when an SCT* was issued and no
> SCT was issued subsequently. That is a red flag. An SCT without a
> preceding SCT* is not a problem, as this
> is what would occur if a Subject (or OCPS server?) requested an SCT.
>
> Steve
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
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On 9 September 2014 19:23, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> I agree that using a redefined (to include the serial number) cert template
> from CRMF would avoid the 5280 issue, but it still requires the CA to assign
> the serial number before
> the cert is issued. That is my biggest concern, i.e., it imposes a new
> requirement on
> CAs, one that may have adverse security implication for some. Nonetheless, I
> like your suggestion (minus the serial number) as a starting point. See my
> next message.

I have a suggestion: let the RFC say that any certificate which the
log knows can be revoked without knowing its serial number can omit
the serial number.


From nobody Wed Sep 10 03:31:11 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 09/09/14 21:15, Brian Smith wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 3:17 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>> I don't mind us adding an alternative Precertificate format to 6962-bis (if
>> we can agree on a suitable format!), but I'd also like to retain the RFC6962
>> Precertificate format as an option.
>
> If the old form is acceptable, then there would be no point in
> defining a new form. The chief issue is that technically the old form
> of precertificate is technically a certificate, and since it has the
> same issuer name it must (according to RFC 5280) have a different
> serial number. It would be good for the group to decide whether or not
> that issue is so bad that we cannot accept it.

Chairs,

Do we have the option of keeping the existing Precertificate format, 
such that once 6962-bis becomes a standards track RFC it would violate 
the serial number uniqueness rule in the RFC5280?
Or, does the IETF process absolutely require that we don't violate any 
rules in existing standards track RFCs?

> If it is that bad, it makes sense to define a replacement format. If it isn't
> so bad that we can't accept it, then it doesn't make sense to define a
> replacement format, IMO.

Brian,

Unless it turns out that there is no single format that all CAs are able 
to use, I agree.

>> Several CAs have already deployed code to generate RFC6962 Precertificates.
>> Why force these CAs to change to a different format just because some other
>> CAs find it hard to implement the RFC6962 format?
>
> If the only issue is whether it is a little bit tricky to implement
> the X.509-certificate form of precertificate, then there's no point in
> defining a new format. CAs always have the non-precertificate
> mechanism to fall back on.
>
> IMO, the ultimate goal should be to get the non-precertificate
> mechanisms working well enough that we can remove (or at least
> deprecate) the precertificate mechanism completely.

I'm not convinced that this should be the ultimate goal.  A benefit of 
the Precertificate mechanism is that the certificate holder doesn't need 
to worry about configure their TLS Server for CT, because the CA has 
already taken care of the CT stuff for them.

Also, out of scope for 6962-bis but in scope for discussion on this list...
Precertificates could be useful if/when we extend CT to Code Signing 
certificates, S/MIME certificates, etc, but the RFC6962 TLS Extension 
won't be useful in these contexts.

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Brian,

> On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 10:30 AM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>> Brian,
>>
>> Can you re-state your proposal. I'm confused, in part because one does
>> not sign anything using a cert; one verifies a signed thing using a public
>> key from a cert.
> Rick and Carl did a good job of explaining why my line of reasoning
> didn't make sense in the first place, regardless of my poor choice of
> terminology.
no problem. people often refer to certs "signing" stuff; I have
a compulsion to note the error every time I see it :-).
> By the way, in draft -04 there are similar abuses of terminology that
> should be cleaned up. Here's one example, "The resulting
> TBSCertificate [RFC5280] is then signed with either [...] a
> special-purpose [...] Precertificate Signing Certificate [...] or, the
> CA certificate that will sign the final certificate." There are
> probably more.
I believe I noted these terminology problems in -03, in my review.

Steve


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tRob,

> ...
> Hi Watson.
>
> Without Precertificates, we would have to wait for all of the world's 
> TLS Servers to be updated to support the RFC6962 TLS extension and/or 
> OCSP Stapling before TLS Clients would then be able/willing to abort 
> TLS handshakes when an SCT is not provided. We don't want to have to 
> wait that long!
You noted this rationale previously, when I asked whether we really need 
pre-certs, and
I failed to reply to your message. (lost in the inbox clutter)

I understand the desire to reduced the delay in deployment.

However, the specific mechanism you mentioned, a TLS client aborting a 
handshake because
of a lack of an SCT (embedded or passed explicitly in the handshake) is 
still being debated.
Specifically, I noted that this hard fail approach, does not seem 
compatible with an
incremental deployment model, absent a lot of details. During the IETF 
meeting in Toronto,
Ben stated that he agreed that an incremental deployment model was 
desirable, and thus
requirements for TLS client behavior need to be revisited.

Steve


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Ben,

> On 9 September 2014 18:39, Stephen Kent<kent@bbn.com>  wrote:
>> I agree that the serial number is critical if one plans to revoke the cert.
>> But ,
>> the I-D makes no mention of remediation mechanisms, an omission I noted in
>> my review
>> a while ago.
> It makes no mention because they are not in scope. The point of CT is
> to allow others to vet certificates and take appropriate action when
> needed.
As I noted earlier, there is no threat model for the CT mechanism.

And there is no mapping of CT to the threat model.

We usually do not standardize security mechanisms when these two
critical elements are missing.

> It is not up to us to describe all possible problems and how they are
> remedied. If you think that's a valuable exercise, be my guest.
There is a big difference between "all" and "none."
> However, when you suggest that inclusion of some particular thing is
> problematic, then we can, of course, refer to potential problems CT
> might reveal and available remedies as an illustration of why that
> thing is needed.
I don't know what this last, rather long sentence means. Please elaborate.

Steve


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Rob,

> Hi Stephen. That's an interesting idea, but I see a few issues.
>
> Step 4 requires the final cert to be logged, so it's incompatible with 
> the name redaction mechanism.
Oops, an oversimplified description on my part. In step 4 I think one 
can apply the whatever redaction mechanisms that we adopt.
> Monitors want to detect misissuance (i.e. certs that have been issued 
> incorrectly). I'm not sure that it's reasonable to expect Monitors to 
> also take responsibility for detecting non-issuance of certs that 
> should have been issued.
The current I-D says
Monitors watch logs and check that they behave correctly.They also

watch for certificates of interest.


The non-issuance of an SCT after issuance of an SCT* for a "certificate 
of interest"
would seem to be within scope, given the somewhat vague description in 
the I-D.


Steve



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    Rob,<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:5410189E.4020808@comodo.com" type="cite">Hi
      Stephen.&nbsp; That's an interesting idea, but I see a few issues. <br>
      <br>
      Step 4 requires the final cert to be logged, so it's incompatible
      with the name redaction mechanism. <br>
    </blockquote>
    Oops, an oversimplified description on my part. In step 4 I think
    one can apply the whatever redaction mechanisms that we adopt.<br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:5410189E.4020808@comodo.com" type="cite">
      Monitors want to detect misissuance (i.e. certs that have been
      issued incorrectly).&nbsp; I'm not sure that it's reasonable to expect
      Monitors to also take responsibility for detecting non-issuance of
      certs that should have been issued. <br>
    </blockquote>
    The current I-D says <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Monitors watch logs and check that they behave correctly.<span
      style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>They also<o:p></o:p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; &nbsp; </span>watch

      for certificates of interest.<br>
    </p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
    </p>
    The non-issuance of an SCT after issuance of an SCT* for a
    "certificate of interest"<br>
    would seem to be within scope, given the somewhat vague description
    in the I-D.<br>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
    </p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText">Steve<br>
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From nobody Wed Sep 10 09:09:14 2014
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Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 12:08:58 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Ben,

> On 9 September 2014 19:23, Stephen Kent<kent@bbn.com>  wrote:
>> I agree that using a redefined (to include the serial number) cert template
>> from CRMF would avoid the 5280 issue, but it still requires the CA to assign
>> the serial number before
>> the cert is issued. That is my biggest concern, i.e., it imposes a new
>> requirement on
>> CAs, one that may have adverse security implication for some. Nonetheless, I
>> like your suggestion (minus the serial number) as a starting point. See my
>> next message.
> I have a suggestion: let the RFC say that any certificate which the
> log knows can be revoked without knowing its serial number can omit
> the serial number.
because, as you noted, we have no IETF-standard way to revoke a single
cert w/o knowing its serial number, I don't think this is a good fix.

Nonetheless, I do appreciate your willingness to explore alternative 
approaches
to address the concern I raised.

Steve


From nobody Wed Sep 10 09:12:13 2014
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On 9/10/14 2:31 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
> Chairs,

> Do we have the option of keeping the existing Precertificate format,
> such that once 6962-bis becomes a standards track RFC it would violate
> the serial number uniqueness rule in the RFC5280?
> Or, does the IETF process absolutely require that we don't violate any
> rules in existing standards track RFCs?

We do have the option of keeping the existing format and still see
6962-bis published as a standards-track document.  However, I would
expect that doing so would lead to an unpleasant working group last
call, an unpleasant IETF last call, and possibly an unpleasant IESG
review.  If there's a workable alternative on which we can get broad
(but not necessarily unanimous) agreement, let's do that.

Melinda


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Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 08:25:43 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 9/10/14 8:08 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> As I noted earlier, there is no threat model for the CT mechanism.
> 
> And there is no mapping of CT to the threat model.
> 
> We usually do not standardize security mechanisms when these two
> critical elements are missing.

Steve, I think this is a bit of an overstatement of the role of
thread models in the process.  The IETF has recently fallen into
a few process habits that aren't supported by any formal changes.
Some are good, some are awful.  The development of threat models
and discussion of a given mechanism within the framework of a threat
is a good process habit and one we'd encourage, but is not necessarily
required.

As an aside, I'd be grateful if tone could be ratched back a notch.
It's not just that we're working cooperatively to produce a document
and a combative tone makes it more difficult to reach agreement,
but that there's been concerned expressed within the IESG that
harshness and/or combativeness can drive away new participants and
people who'd otherwise be willing to do work.  You're raising good
points and they need to be addressed, but it would be better if they
were expressed in a way unlikely to put their recipients into a
defensive posture.

Thanks,

Melinda


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Subject: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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--001a11c2a2b0e61abf0502c7cab2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Bonjour,

It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the final
certificate regarding to the Precert.
Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT signatures
by constructing the Precert from the final certificate? Where should a CA
add the poisonous extension? And the future "redactedlabels" extension (it
has no name)?

-- 
Erwann.

--001a11c2a2b0e61abf0502c7cab2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<div><br></div><div>It seems there&#39;s no constr=
aint on the order of extensions in the final certificate regarding to the P=
recert.</div><div>Won&#39;t it be problematic if the browser wants to valid=
ate the SCT signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certifica=
te? Where should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future &quot;red=
actedlabels&quot; extension (it has no name)?</div><div><div><br></div>-- <=
br>Erwann.
</div></div>

--001a11c2a2b0e61abf0502c7cab2--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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--001a113397e4885a160502c805bd
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The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What the
TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension  from the
certificate prior to validating the signature.

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:

> Bonjour,
>
> It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the final
> certificate regarding to the Precert.
> Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
> signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate? Where
> should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future "redactedlabels"
> extension (it has no name)?
>
> --
> Erwann.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

--001a113397e4885a160502c805bd
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<div dir=3D"ltr">The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate pr=
ior to the log producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know abou=
t it. What the TLS client has to do is to remove the &quot;embedded SCTs&qu=
ot; extension =C2=A0from the certificate prior to validating the signature.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep=
 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:eabalea@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">eabalea@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<div><br></d=
iv><div>It seems there&#39;s no constraint on the order of extensions in th=
e final certificate regarding to the Precert.</div><div>Won&#39;t it be pro=
blematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT signatures by constructin=
g the Precert from the final certificate? Where should a CA add the poisono=
us extension? And the future &quot;redactedlabels&quot; extension (it has n=
o name)?</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><div><br>=
</div>-- <br>Erwann.
</div></font></span></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113397e4885a160502c805bd--


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To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 10 September 2014 17:08, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>
>> On 9 September 2014 18:39, Stephen Kent<kent@bbn.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>> I agree that the serial number is critical if one plans to revoke the
>>> cert.
>>> But ,
>>> the I-D makes no mention of remediation mechanisms, an omission I noted
>>> in
>>> my review
>>> a while ago.
>>
>> It makes no mention because they are not in scope. The point of CT is
>> to allow others to vet certificates and take appropriate action when
>> needed.
>
> As I noted earlier, there is no threat model for the CT mechanism.
>
> And there is no mapping of CT to the threat model.
>
> We usually do not standardize security mechanisms when these two
> critical elements are missing.

I think its pretty clear what the purpose of CT is - to make it
possible to detect mis-issuance of certificates - i.e. that
certificates conform to all the requirements for issuance. And its
also clear that to do this, you need to be able to see the contents of
the certificate. This is the threat model. Or, if you really want it
phrased as a threat, the threat is that some CA might issue a
certificate that does not conform to the requirements for issuance
(which, btw, vary over time) and the mitigation is a public,
append-only, verifiable log of the contents of all issued
certificates.

The I-D clearly states this already, I think, but if you don't like
the text, perhaps you can propose something you'd like better?

>> It is not up to us to describe all possible problems and how they are
>> remedied. If you think that's a valuable exercise, be my guest.
>
> There is a big difference between "all" and "none."

At least one problem is described: "Those who are concerned about
misissue can monitor the logs, asking

   them regularly for all new entries, and can thus check whether
   domains they are responsible for have had certificates issued that
   they did not expect."

I guess we could add some other examples, such as conformance to the
Baseline Requirements.

>>
>> However, when you suggest that inclusion of some particular thing is
>> problematic, then we can, of course, refer to potential problems CT
>> might reveal and available remedies as an illustration of why that
>> thing is needed.
>
> I don't know what this last, rather long sentence means. Please elaborate.

What I meant was that mentioning a problem in order to explain why
some field is needed does not mean that we then have to enumerate all
problems, find a problem that justifies every field, etc.

>
>
> Steve
>
> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 12:17:04 +0100
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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On 11 September 2014 11:56, Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com> wrote:
> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What the
> TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension  from the
> certificate prior to validating the signature.

This does imply that the remaining extensions have to be in the same
order in both precert and cert, I think?

>
> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Bonjour,
>>
>> It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the final
>> certificate regarding to the Precert.
>> Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
>> signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate? Where
>> should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future "redactedlabels"
>> extension (it has no name)?
>>
>> --
>> Erwann.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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>


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On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:
> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What
> the TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension
>   from the certificate prior to validating the signature.

Ditto for the future "redactedlabels" extension.

> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com
> <mailto:eabalea@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Bonjour,
>
>     It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the
>     final certificate regarding to the Precert.
>     Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
>     signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate?
>     Where should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future
>     "redactedlabels" extension (it has no name)?
>
>     --
>     Erwann.
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Trans mailing list
>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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On 11/09/14 12:17, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 11 September 2014 11:56, Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com> wrote:
>> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
>> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What the
>> TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension  from the
>> certificate prior to validating the signature.
>
> This does imply that the remaining extensions have to be in the same
> order in both precert and cert, I think?

Yes.

I think this bit...
   "The Precertificate is constructed from the certificate to be issued
    by adding a special critical poison extension..."
...implies that the other extensions shouldn't be shuffled, but should 
we make it more explicit?

>> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Bonjour,
>>>
>>> It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the final
>>> certificate regarding to the Precert.
>>> Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
>>> signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate? Where
>>> should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future "redactedlabels"
>>> extension (it has no name)?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Erwann.
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Trans mailing list
>>> Trans@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
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Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 12:27:15 +0100
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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On 11 September 2014 12:17, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:
>>
>> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
>> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What
>> the TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension
>>   from the certificate prior to validating the signature.
>
>
> Ditto for the future "redactedlabels" extension.

That one appears in the cert, too, doesn't it?

>
>> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com
>> <mailto:eabalea@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     Bonjour,
>>
>>     It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the
>>     final certificate regarding to the Precert.
>>     Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
>>     signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate?
>>     Where should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future
>>     "redactedlabels" extension (it has no name)?
>>
>>     --
>>     Erwann.
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Trans mailing list
>>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
> Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
> www.comodo.com
>
> COMODO CA Limited, Registered in England No. 04058690
> Registered Office:
>   3rd Floor, 26 Office Village, Exchange Quay,
>   Trafford Road, Salford, Manchester M5 3EQ
>
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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On 11 September 2014 12:27, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
> On 11 September 2014 12:17, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>> On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:
>>>
>>> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
>>> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What
>>> the TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension
>>>   from the certificate prior to validating the signature.
>>
>>
>> Ditto for the future "redactedlabels" extension.
>
> That one appears in the cert, too, doesn't it?

Sorry, ignore that, it is in the cert but not the precert (though that
seems like an arbitrary decision to me).

>
>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:40 AM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com
>>> <mailto:eabalea@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Bonjour,
>>>
>>>     It seems there's no constraint on the order of extensions in the
>>>     final certificate regarding to the Precert.
>>>     Won't it be problematic if the browser wants to validate the SCT
>>>     signatures by constructing the Precert from the final certificate?
>>>     Where should a CA add the poisonous extension? And the future
>>>     "redactedlabels" extension (it has no name)?
>>>
>>>     --
>>>     Erwann.
>>>
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     Trans mailing list
>>>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Trans mailing list
>>> Trans@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>>
>>
>> --
>> Rob Stradling
>> Senior Research & Development Scientist
>> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
>> Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
>> Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
>> www.comodo.com
>>
>> COMODO CA Limited, Registered in England No. 04058690
>> Registered Office:
>>   3rd Floor, 26 Office Village, Exchange Quay,
>>   Trafford Road, Salford, Manchester M5 3EQ
>>
>> This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended
>> solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed.
>> If you have received this email in error please notify the sender by
>> replying to the e-mail containing this attachment. Replies to this email may
>> be monitored by COMODO for operational or business reasons. Whilst every
>> endeavour is taken to ensure that e-mails are free from viruses, no
>> liability can be accepted and the recipient is requested to use their own
>> virus checking software.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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On 11/09/14 12:31, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 11 September 2014 12:27, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>> On 11 September 2014 12:17, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log
>>>> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What
>>>> the TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension
>>>>    from the certificate prior to validating the signature.
>>>
>>> Ditto for the future "redactedlabels" extension.
>>
>> That one appears in the cert, too, doesn't it?
>
> Sorry, ignore that, it is in the cert but not the precert (though that
> seems like an arbitrary decision to me).

I was ditto-ing Eran's second sentence, not his first.  Sorry if I 
wasn't clear.

Yes, I think we could put the "redactedlabels" extension in the precert 
too.  Or, might those who wish to use the redaction mechanism also want 
to keep secret the number of redacted domain components?

Hmmm...if we do decide that the number of redacted domain components can 
be revealed by the precert, then it might be simpler to scrap the 
"redactedlabels" extension altogether and instead say that "(PRIVATE)" 
always covers precisely 1 domain component.  Then, if you want to redact 
3 components, you'd put 
"SAN:dNSName=(PRIVATE).(PRIVATE).(PRIVATE).mydomain.com" in the precert.

(To reduce bloat, we could shrink "(PRIVATE)" to "?".  e.g. 
"SAN:dNSName=?.?.?.mydomain.com").

<snip>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Certificate and Precertificate extensions ordering
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--bcaec547c999cef4b40502c8cd7b
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On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 12:45 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
wrote:

> On 11/09/14 12:31, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
>> On 11 September 2014 12:27, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 September 2014 12:17, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the
>>>>> log
>>>>> producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What
>>>>> the TLS client has to do is to remove the "embedded SCTs" extension
>>>>>    from the certificate prior to validating the signature.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ditto for the future "redactedlabels" extension.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That one appears in the cert, too, doesn't it?
>>>
>>
>> Sorry, ignore that, it is in the cert but not the precert (though that
>> seems like an arbitrary decision to me).
>>
>
> I was ditto-ing Eran's second sentence, not his first.  Sorry if I wasn't
> clear.
>
> Yes, I think we could put the "redactedlabels" extension in the precert
> too.  Or, might those who wish to use the redaction mechanism also want to
> keep secret the number of redacted domain components?
>
> Hmmm...if we do decide that the number of redacted domain components can
> be revealed by the precert, then it might be simpler to scrap the
> "redactedlabels" extension altogether and instead say that "(PRIVATE)"
> always covers precisely 1 domain component.  Then, if you want to redact 3
> components, you'd put "SAN:dNSName=(PRIVATE).(PRIVATE).(PRIVATE).mydomain.
> com" in the precert.
>
> (To reduce bloat, we could shrink "(PRIVATE)" to "?".  e.g.
> "SAN:dNSName=?.?.?.mydomain.com").
>
+1 to that - seems like it would significantly simplify the implementation
of redacted domain name label: The risk of misalignment between the values
in the extension that counts the number of redacted subdomains for each SAN
and the actual SANs goes away.

>
> <snip>
>
>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
>

--bcaec547c999cef4b40502c8cd7b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 12:45 PM, Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@=
comodo.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D"">On 11/09/14 12:31, Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 11 September 2014 12:27, Ben Laurie &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:benl@google.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">benl@google.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 11 September 2014 12:17, Rob Stradling &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rob.stradli=
ng@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 11/09/14 11:56, Eran Messeri wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The poison extension is removed from the Precertificate prior to the log<br=
>
producing an SCT over it, so a client never has to know about it. What<br>
the TLS client has to do is to remove the &quot;embedded SCTs&quot; extensi=
on<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0from the certificate prior to validating the signature.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Ditto for the future &quot;redactedlabels&quot; extension.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
That one appears in the cert, too, doesn&#39;t it?<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Sorry, ignore that, it is in the cert but not the precert (though that<br>
seems like an arbitrary decision to me).<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
I was ditto-ing Eran&#39;s second sentence, not his first.=C2=A0 Sorry if I=
 wasn&#39;t clear.<br>
<br>
Yes, I think we could put the &quot;redactedlabels&quot; extension in the p=
recert too.=C2=A0 Or, might those who wish to use the redaction mechanism a=
lso want to keep secret the number of redacted domain components?<br>
<br>
Hmmm...if we do decide that the number of redacted domain components can be=
 revealed by the precert, then it might be simpler to scrap the &quot;redac=
tedlabels&quot; extension altogether and instead say that &quot;(PRIVATE)&q=
uot; always covers precisely 1 domain component.=C2=A0 Then, if you want to=
 redact 3 components, you&#39;d put &quot;SAN:dNSName=3D(PRIVATE).(<u></u>P=
RIVATE).(PRIVATE).<a href=3D"http://mydomain.com" target=3D"_blank">mydomai=
n.<u></u>com</a>&quot; in the precert.<br>
<br>
(To reduce bloat, we could shrink &quot;(PRIVATE)&quot; to &quot;?&quot;.=
=C2=A0 e.g. &quot;SAN:dNSName=3D?.?.?.<a href=3D"http://mydomain.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">mydomain.<u></u>com</a>&quot;).<br></blockquote><div>+1 to tha=
t - seems like it would significantly simplify the implementation of redact=
ed domain name label: The risk of misalignment between the values in the ex=
tension that counts the number of redacted subdomains for each SAN and the =
actual SANs goes away.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&lt;snip&gt;<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
-- <br>
Rob Stradling<br>
Senior Research &amp; Development Scientist<br>
COMODO - Creating Trust Online<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--bcaec547c999cef4b40502c8cd7b--


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On 10/09/14 17:08, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Rob,
>
>> Hi Stephen.  That's an interesting idea, but I see a few issues.
>>
>> Step 4 requires the final cert to be logged, so it's incompatible with
>> the name redaction mechanism.
> Oops, an oversimplified description on my part. In step 4 I think one
> can apply the whatever redaction mechanisms that we adopt.

Steve, can you suggest a name redaction mechanism that would be 
compatible with your idea?

>> Monitors want to detect misissuance (i.e. certs that have been issued
>> incorrectly).  I'm not sure that it's reasonable to expect Monitors to
>> also take responsibility for detecting non-issuance of certs that
>> should have been issued.
> The current I-D says
>      Monitors watch logs and check that they behave correctly.They also
>      watch for certificates of interest.
>
>
> The non-issuance of an SCT after issuance of an SCT* for a "certificate
> of interest"
> would seem to be within scope, given the somewhat vague description in
> the I-D.

OK, let's explore this avenue and see whether or not we hit any 
roadblocks.  :-)

> Steve
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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On 10 September 2014 17:08, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>
>
>> On 9 September 2014 19:23, Stephen Kent<kent@bbn.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>> I agree that using a redefined (to include the serial number) cert
>>> template
>>> from CRMF would avoid the 5280 issue, but it still requires the CA to
>>> assign
>>> the serial number before
>>> the cert is issued. That is my biggest concern, i.e., it imposes a new
>>> requirement on
>>> CAs, one that may have adverse security implication for some.
>>> Nonetheless, I
>>> like your suggestion (minus the serial number) as a starting point. See
>>> my
>>> next message.
>>
>> I have a suggestion: let the RFC say that any certificate which the
>> log knows can be revoked without knowing its serial number can omit
>> the serial number.
>
> because, as you noted, we have no IETF-standard way to revoke a single
> cert w/o knowing its serial number

Quite.

> I don't think this is a good fix.

Until there is such a mechanism, omitting serial numbers makes it hard
(or impossible?) for anyone to take effective action on violations
discovered via CT. So, CT has to require serial numbers until then.
This language allows that to happen.

> Nonetheless, I do appreciate your willingness to explore alternative
> approaches
> to address the concern I raised.
>
>
> Steve
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Ben,
> Until there is such a mechanism, omitting serial numbers makes it hard
> (or impossible?) for anyone to take effective action on violations
> discovered via CT. So, CT has to require serial numbers until then.
> This language allows that to happen.
I think we're in agreement, which I why I proposed an alternative
mechanism to log serial numbers, without requiring a CA to have
to assign them prior to final cert issuance.

Steve


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On 11 September 2014 16:21, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>>
>> Until there is such a mechanism, omitting serial numbers makes it hard
>> (or impossible?) for anyone to take effective action on violations
>> discovered via CT. So, CT has to require serial numbers until then.
>> This language allows that to happen.
>
> I think we're in agreement, which I why I proposed an alternative
> mechanism to log serial numbers, without requiring a CA to have
> to assign them prior to final cert issuance.

I managed to miss that proposal. I've found it now.

There seems to be a flaw: if I'm an evil CA wishing to issue an evil
certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a
certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested
to do so,

In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a
second copy with a different serial, containing the original SCT*, and
the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in
audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if
the serial is included in the pre-certificate.

Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what
appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.


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Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text contained an 
adequate
threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text, I 
have done so.

Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC 
dealing with
security mechanisms.

Steve
--------

Threat Model

Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate 
problems arising from mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI 
context. The Web PKI context refers to the use of a set of Certification 
Authorities (CAs) that issue X.509 certificates to web servers to enable 
TLS-protected access by clients [cite WPKOPS?].

A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificateis issued 
to an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server) 
named in the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name 
extension. <do we want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)

<Discuss classes of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities>

1.Criminals

2.Hacktivists

3.Nation states (intelligence organizations)

4.Other?

Attack Model and CT Mitigation Mechanisms

Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. The ways that 
CT helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of the 
mis-issuance.

1.A non-malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of 
an error or because it was the victim of a social engineering attack. In 
this case the CA has a record of the certificate and it is prepared to 
revoke the bogus certificate once it has been convinced of its error. If 
the CA is submitting the certificates it issues to one or more logs, 
there will be records of the bogus certificate. If one of Monitors to 
which the certificate was submitted is tracking the targeted Subject, it 
will detect the mis-issuance, and will alert the Subject. Because the CA 
has a record of the mis-issuance, the only data needed to identify the 
bogus certificate is the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of which are 
available from the log. The presence of an embed SCT in the bogus 
certificate, or an SCT accompanying the bogus certificate does not 
appear to contribute to the mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)

2.A non-malicious Web PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack 
(c.f., DigiNotar) which results in mis-issuance of one or more 
certificates. In this case the CA is not aware of the mis-issuance and 
may have no record of the certificate content.

a.The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs 
prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to 
acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor to which the 
certificates had been submitted (and which is tracking the targeted 
Subject), would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted 
Subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus 
certificate. In this case, the CA will depend on the certificate serial 
number provided via the log entry, to effect revocation. (See Notes 1 + 
2 below.) If TLS clients rejects a certificate when no SCT is present, 
this might motivate the attacker to log the bogus certificates, thus 
justifying such client behavior. (However, such client behavior needs to 
be defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment.)

b.A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this 
case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject 
a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker 
will be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)

3.A malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of 
being bribed or compelled to do so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a 
bogus certificate my a government agency or a criminal 
organization.)This CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor 
(aka root CA).

a.The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs 
prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to 
acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor tracking the 
targeted Subject would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted 
subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus 
certificate. In this case, the CA may refuse, or substantially delay, to 
revoke the bogus certificate. (It could make excuses about inadequate 
proof that the certificate is bogus, or argue that it cannot quickly 
revoke the certificate because of local, legal concerns, etc.) In this 
case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are not able to 
remedy the problem. (See Note 4 below.)

b.A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this 
case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject 
a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker 
will be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)

Notes:

1.If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not 
watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not 
mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor 
MUST offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be 
monitored. Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know 
which set of Monitors will provide "sufficient" coverage. Unless these 
details are addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even 
when certificates are logged.

2.A CA being presented with evidence of a bogus certificate probably 
will require more than the serial number of the bogus certificate. It 
will want to verify the Issuer and Subject (SAN) to ensure that the 
certificate being revoked is not one that it has knowingly issued (which 
would fall under case #1). Other certificate fields and extensions may 
be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect 
revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus. 
The SCT itself, because it contains a timestamp from a third party, is 
probably valuable for forensic purposes.

3.If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT, 
or is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be 
defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing 
a warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on 
experience with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of 
certificate revocation status information, and similar errors that 
violate RFC 5280 path validation rules.

4.The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to 
revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of 
this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for 
significant collateral damage.

As the analysis above shows, logs play a critical role in enabling 
detection of certificate mis-issuance, although they do not, per se, 
perform such detection. Thus logs represent another target for 
adversaries who wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a log 
generates SCTs for an attacker, but does not provide the log entries for 
these SCTs to all, or some, Monitors, CT will not detect mis-issuance. 
Thus it is critical that Monitors be able to compare the results of log 
data acquisition to detect mis-behaving logs.

Absent a protocol (a so-called "gossip" protocol) that enables Monitors 
to verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does not provide 
protection against logs that may conspire with, or be victims of, 
attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip 
protocol is deployed, it is necessary to describe how the CT system will 
deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For example, will there be 
a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs issued by such a 
log. Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to deal with 
mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection, much less 
remediation, of mis-issuance.

Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate 
mis-issuance, for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their 
certificates. Thus Monitors represent another target for adversaries who 
wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, 
or is complicit with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a 
mis-issued certificate targeting the Subject. This raises the question 
of whether a Subject needs to request certificate monitoring from 
multiple sources to guard against such failures.



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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text
    contained an adequate<br>
    threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text,
    I have done so.<br>
    <br>
    Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC
    dealing with<br>
    security mechanisms.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    --------<br>
    <br>
    <meta name="Title" content="">
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Threat Model<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Certificate
        Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate problems
        arising from
        mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI context. The Web
        PKI context
        refers to the use of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
        that issue X.509 certificates
        to web servers to enable TLS-protected access by clients [cite
        WPKOPS?].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A certificate is
        characterized as mis-issued if the certificate<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>is issued to an entity that
        is not authorized to represent the host (web
        server) named in the certificate Subject field or Subject
        Alternative Name
        extension. &lt;do we want to focus exclusively on SAN vs.
        Subject?)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">&lt;Discuss classes
        of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Criminals <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Hacktivists <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1
      level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Nation states
        (intelligence organizations) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1
      level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">4.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Other?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Attack Model and CT
        Mitigation Mechanisms<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Certificate
        mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. <span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>The ways that CT helps detect
        and remedy mis-issuance
        depends on the context of the mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2
      level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A non-malicious Web
        PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of an error or
        because it was
        the victim of a social engineering attack. In this case the CA
        has a record of
        the certificate and it is prepared to revoke the bogus
        certificate once it has
        been convinced of its error. If the CA is submitting the
        certificates it issues
        to one or more logs, there will be records of the bogus
        certificate. If one of
        Monitors to which the certificate was submitted is tracking the
        targeted
        Subject, it will detect the mis-issuance, and will alert the
        Subject. Because
        the CA has a record of the mis-issuance, the only data needed to
        identify the
        bogus certificate is the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of
        which are
        available from the log. The presence of an embed SCT in the
        bogus certificate,
        or an SCT accompanying the bogus certificate does not appear to
        contribute to
        the mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2
      level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A non-malicious Web
        PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack (c.f.,
        DigiNotar) which
        results in mis-issuance of one or more certificates. In this
        case the CA is not
        aware of the mis-issuance and may have no record of the
        certificate content. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:auto;
      text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">a.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">The bogus
        certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs prior
        to issuance,
        to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to acquire a
        standalone SCT. In either
        case, a Monitor to which the certificates had been submitted
        (and which is tracking
        the targeted Subject), would detect a bogus certificate and
        alert the targeted
        Subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke
        the bogus certificate.
        In this case, the CA will depend on the certificate serial
        number provided via
        the log entry, to effect revocation. (See Notes 1 + 2 below.) If
        TLS clients
        rejects a certificate when no SCT is present, this might
        motivate the attacker
        to log the bogus certificates, thus justifying such client
        behavior. (However,
        such client behavior needs to be defined in a way that is
        compatible with
        incremental deployment.)<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:auto;
      text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">b.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A bogus certificate
        may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors
        will not detect
        the bogus certificate. If clients reject a certificate that
        lacks (or is not
        accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker will be thwarted in this
        case. (See Note 3
        below.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A malicious Web PKI
        CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of being bribed or
        compelled to do
        so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a bogus certificate my a
        government
        agency or a criminal organization.)<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>This
        CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root
        CA). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:
      auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">a.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">The bogus
        certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs prior
        to issuance,
        to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to acquire a
        standalone SCT. In
        either case, a Monitor tracking the targeted Subject would
        detect a bogus
        certificate and alert the targeted subject. The Subject, in
        turn, would request
        the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA may
        refuse, or
        substantially delay, to revoke the bogus certificate. (It could
        make excuses
        about inadequate proof that the certificate is bogus, or argue
        that it cannot
        quickly revoke the certificate because of local, legal concerns,
        etc.) In this
        case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are not
        able to remedy
        the problem. (See Note 4 below.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:auto;
      text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">b.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A bogus certificate
        may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors
        will not detect
        the bogus certificate. If clients reject a certificate that
        lacks (or is not
        accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker will be thwarted in this
        case. (See Note 3
        below.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Notes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">If a CA submits the
        bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not watched by a
        Monitor that is
        tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not mitigate a
        mis-issuance attack. It
        is not clear whether every Monitor MUST offer to track every
        Subject that
        requests its certificates be monitored. Absent such a guarantee,
        how do TLS
        clients and CAs know which set of Monitors will provide
        &#8220;sufficient&#8221; coverage.
        Unless these details are addressed, use of CT does not
        mitigation mis-issuance
        even when certificates are logged.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A CA being presented
        with evidence of a bogus certificate probably will require more
        than the serial
        number of the bogus certificate. It will want to verify the
        Issuer and Subject
        (SAN) to ensure that the certificate being revoked is not one
        that it has
        knowingly issued (which would fall under case #1). Other
        certificate fields and
        extensions may be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not
        required to
        effect revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be
        revoked is bogus.
        The SCT itself, because it contains a timestamp from a third
        party, is probably
        valuable for forensic purposes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
      level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">If a TLS client is to
        reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT, or is not
        accompanied by a
        post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be defined in a way
        that is
        compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing a warning to a
        (human) user is
        probably insufficient, based on experience with warnings
        displayed for expired
        certificates, lack of certificate revocation status information,
        and similar
        errors that violate RFC 5280 path validation rules.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
      level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">4.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">The targeted Subject
        might request the parent or the offending CA to revoke the
        certificate of the
        non-cooperative CA. However, a request of this sort may be
        rejected, e.g.,
        because of the potential for significant collateral damage. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">As the analysis above
        shows, logs play a critical role in enabling detection of
        certificate
        mis-issuance, although they do not, per se, perform such
        detection. Thus logs
        represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect
        certificate
        mis-issuance. If a log generates SCTs for an attacker, but does
        not provide the
        log entries for these SCTs to all, or some, Monitors, CT will
        not detect
        mis-issuance. Thus it is critical that Monitors be able to
        compare the results
        of log data acquisition to detect mis-behaving logs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Absent a protocol (a
        so-called &#8220;gossip&#8221; protocol) that enables Monitors to verify
        that data from
        logs are consistent, CT does not provide protection against logs
        that may
        conspire with, or be victims of, attackers effecting certificate
        mis-issuance.
        Even when a gossip protocol is deployed, it is necessary to
        describe how the CT
        system will deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For
        example, will
        there be a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs
        issued by such a
        log. Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to deal with
        mis-behaving or
        compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection, much less
        remediation, of
        mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Monitors also play a
        critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuance, for
        Subjects that have
        requested monitoring of their certificates. Thus Monitors
        represent another
        target for adversaries who wish to effect certificate
        mis-issuance. If a
        Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit with, an attacker, it
        will fail to
        alert a Subject to a mis-issued certificate targeting the
        Subject. This raises
        the question of whether a Subject needs to request certificate
        monitoring from
        multiple sources to guard against such failures. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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--------------000409020506010004070309--


From nobody Thu Sep 11 11:20:22 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Ben,

> ...
> I managed to miss that proposal. I've found it now.
>
> There seems to be a flaw: if I'm an evil CA wishing to issue an evil
> certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a
> certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested
> to do so,
>
> In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a
> second copy with a different serial, containing the original SCT*, and
> the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in
> audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if
> the serial is included in the pre-certificate.
I agree that the attack you describe would work, but it needs to be
evaluated in the overall context of how CT works in the case of several
different types of attack scenarios. The threat model and attack model text
I just submitted provides a first cut at describing such scenarios. Once we
get agreement on that model, let's revisit the question of whether the 
vulnerability
you noted above is significant relative to other residual vulnerabilities.
> Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what
> appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.
I do know that when VeriSign used the Safekeyper HSM to issue all of its 
certs
(which it did for several years), it would have been impossible to 
generate a
pre-cert and matching final cert. So, the concern I raise would have 
been a show
stopper for them in that time frame. I guess it depends on how one defines a
"theoretical use case" :-)

Separately, the pre-cert model, requires a CA to issue two certs with 
the same
serial number, which is a bad security practice. I think it makes sense to
re-consider forcing CAs to behave this way.

Steve


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Rob,

My intent, perhaps not well articulated, was that the SCT* submission 
would use
the same name redaction mechanism you proposed, if they prove to be viable.

The step 4 submission would include that same data, the serial number, 
and the
previously-issued SCT*. This would enable a log (doing more work) to 
ensure that
the SCT it issues is consistent between the two submissions. It also 
ensures that
the serial number is available for revocation when needed (which arises 
in only
some of the attack scenarios).

Thus, whatever name redaction mechanism the WG ultimately deems suitable 
should
work in my suggested two-phase protocol.

As Ben noted, there is a residual vulnerability with my proposal since 
the SCT*
is not tied to the serial number. But, in the context of the attack 
analysis I just
submitted,  I'm not sure how serious this vulnerability is, relative to 
the other
ones that I identified in the current CT design. We should discuss that 
later,
once we have agreement on an attack analysis.

Steve


From katrielalex@gmail.com  Thu Sep 11 12:44:30 2014
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I=E2=80=99ve also been thinking about a threat model, though your writing=
 is much clearer than mine=21

tl;dr: (a) There=E2=80=99s a lot of text about the details of revocation =
that I thought was out of scope for CT. (b) A client specification may an=
swer many of the questions you raise about Monitors.

--
Katriel Cohn-Gordon
Student, Cyber Security
Merton College, Oxford



On Thursday, 11 September 2014 at 19:08, Stephen Kent wrote: =20
> Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate...

Is it intended to mitigate problems=3F (-04) says so but immediately foll=
ows it with =E2=80=9Cthe logs do not themselves prevent misissue, but the=
y ensure that interested parties (particularly those named in certificate=
s) can detect such misissuance=E2=80=9D

A fairer introduction might be =E2=80=9CCT is intended to allow subjects =
to detect=E2=80=A6=22
> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issu=
ed to an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server)=
 named in the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name exten=
sion.

Or doesn=E2=80=99t follow certain regulations, or some other definition (=
e.g. comes from a root that the CA can but does not use to issue certific=
ates). I think it should be up to individual Monitors to define what they=
 consider to be mis-issued, though it makes sense to give a minimal crite=
rion, and hence that the text should say something like =E2=80=9CIn the f=
ollowing, a certificate is characterised as mis-issued if=E2=80=A6 but an=
y Monitor may choose to use an alternative definition, since CT is defini=
tion-agnostic.=22
> =20
> =20
> Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. The ways tha=
t CT helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of the m=
is-issuance.

I think the key distinction to be made is between contexts that cause the=
 certificate to be submitted to a non-malicious Log Server, and those tha=
t do not. As you say, in the former case a Monitor tracking the targeted =
Subject will detect the mis-issued certificate and set off the out-of-sco=
pe revocation process. In the latter, TLS clients which are not backwards=
 compatible will refuse to accept the certificate, while TLS clients whic=
h do not yet enforce CT will act as they do today.

Once the certificate is detected, is the revocation process (e.g. what da=
ta the CA requires) in scope for this document=3F
> =20
> 1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are no=
t watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not=
 mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MU=
ST offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitor=
ed. Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of=
 Monitors will provide =E2=80=9Csufficient=E2=80=9D coverage. Unless thes=
e details are addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even =
when certificates are logged.

I understood Monitors to be run by Subjects (or paid by Subjects to do th=
eir tracking for them), so I see no reason why they MUST offer to track a=
nybody. It=E2=80=99s log servers for which you need sufficient coverage, =
though, not Monitors: one of the latter will suffice as long as it watche=
s all the former. I don=E2=80=99t know what the current definition of =E2=
=80=9Cthe set of all log servers=E2=80=9D is (*); for the moment I assume=
 it is defined by Google=E2=80=99s list for Chrome.

I agree it=E2=80=99s important to specify how Monitors can find out the s=
et of log servers. (e.g. it=E2=80=99s Very Bad if I run my own monitor bu=
t don=E2=80=99t update its list, since then a mis-issued certificate subm=
itted to a new log server will pass me by.)
> =20
> 3. If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SC=
T, or is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to b=
e defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuin=
g a warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on experien=
ce with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of certificate =
revocation status information, and similar errors that violate R=46C 5280=
 path validation rules.

What=E2=80=99s the precedent for defining incremental deployment in this =
type of document=3F I suppose the wording would be something like =E2=80=9C=
TLS clients wishing to respect incremental deployment MAY choose to accep=
t certificates without embedded SCTs, but=E2=80=A6=22
> =20
> 4. The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to=
 revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of =
this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for significant=
 collateral damage.

Again, is this in scope for CT=3F This issue exists in today=E2=80=99s in=
frastructure just as much (c.f. when people removed DigiNotar from trust =
lists).
> =20
> =20
> =20
> Absent a protocol (a so-called =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol) that =
enables Monitors to verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does no=
t provide protection against logs that may conspire with, or be victims o=
f, attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip proto=
col is deployed, it is necessary to describe how the CT system will deal =
with a mis-behaving or compromised log. =46or example, will there be a me=
chanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log.

I believe this is the same question as at (*): who controls the list of t=
rusted logs=3F One assumes that anybody doing so (e.g. Chrome) would also=
 run a Monitor, and thus detect misissuances and remove said logs from th=
eir list the same way they would have removed DigiNotar.

I think a section specifying the actions of TLS clients should answer a l=
ot of these questions. Such a section would say in part that clients must=
 keep lists of CAs and log servers, maintained either by themselves or by=
 a trusted third party, and that the signatures on the cert and the SCT s=
hould be from entities in the respective lists. Whoever maintains the lis=
t undertakes to remove both bad CAs and bad log servers if they are detec=
ted.
> =20
> Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuanc=
e, for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their certificates. Thu=
s Monitors represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect ce=
rtificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit w=
ith, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a mis-issued certifi=
cate targeting the Subject. This raises the question of whether a Subject=
 needs to request certificate monitoring from multiple sources to guard a=
gainst such failures.

Subjects must choose a trusted Monitor because the Monitor is by definiti=
on the thing that watches the logs; they can do this themselves or they c=
an delegate to a third party, in which case they rely on that party not t=
o be compromised. This doesn=E2=80=99t seem particular to CT: if I instal=
l a burglar alarm either I have to monitor it, or I have to pay someone e=
lse to monitor it and trust them to respond if it goes off, or I have to =
accept that the alarm might be ignored.
> =20



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Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 15:51:18 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Fwd:  Threat model outline, attack model
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You'll note that we have an open ticket on this (ticket
#41: http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/41).
I'd like to see this get some attention sooner rather than
later (along with the precertificate discussion).

Melinda


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	[Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
Date: 	Thu, 11 Sep 2014 14:08:17 -0400
From: 	Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
To: 	trans@ietf.org <trans@ietf.org>



Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text contained an
adequate
threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text, I
have done so.

Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC
dealing with
security mechanisms.

Steve
--------

Threat Model



Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate
problems arising from mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI
context. The Web PKI context refers to the use of a set of Certification
Authorities (CAs) that issue X.509 certificates to web servers to enable
TLS-protected access by clients [cite WPKOPS?].



A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificateis issued
to an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server)
named in the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name
extension. <do we want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)





<Discuss classes of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities>



1.Criminals



2.Hacktivists



3.Nation states (intelligence organizations)



4.Other?







Attack Model and CT Mitigation Mechanisms



Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways.  The ways
that CT helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of
the mis-issuance.



1.A non-malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of
an error or because it was the victim of a social engineering attack. In
this case the CA has a record of the certificate and it is prepared to
revoke the bogus certificate once it has been convinced of its error. If
the CA is submitting the certificates it issues to one or more logs,
there will be records of the bogus certificate. If one of Monitors to
which the certificate was submitted is tracking the targeted Subject, it
will detect the mis-issuance, and will alert the Subject. Because the CA
has a record of the mis-issuance, the only data needed to identify the
bogus certificate is the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of which are
available from the log. The presence of an embed SCT in the bogus
certificate, or an SCT accompanying the bogus certificate does not
appear to contribute to the mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)



2.A non-malicious Web PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack
(c.f., DigiNotar) which results in mis-issuance of one or more
certificates. In this case the CA is not aware of the mis-issuance and
may have no record of the certificate content.



a.The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to
acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor to which the
certificates had been submitted (and which is tracking the targeted
Subject), would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted
Subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus
certificate. In this case, the CA will depend on the certificate serial
number provided via the log entry, to effect revocation. (See Notes 1 +
2 below.) If TLS clients rejects a certificate when no SCT is present,
this might motivate the attacker to log the bogus certificates, thus
justifying such client behavior. (However, such client behavior needs to
be defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment.)

b.A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject
a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker
will be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)



3.A malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of
being bribed or compelled to do so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a
bogus certificate my a government agency or a criminal organization.)
This CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root CA).

a.The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to
acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor tracking the
targeted Subject would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted
subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus
certificate. In this case, the CA may refuse, or substantially delay, to
revoke the bogus certificate. (It could make excuses about inadequate
proof that the certificate is bogus, or argue that it cannot quickly
revoke the certificate because of local, legal concerns, etc.) In this
case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are not able to
remedy the problem. (See Note 4 below.)

b.A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject
a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker
will be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)



Notes:



1.If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not
watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not
mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor
MUST offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be
monitored. Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know
which set of Monitors will provide “sufficient” coverage. Unless these
details are addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even
when certificates are logged.



2.A CA being presented with evidence of a bogus certificate probably
will require more than the serial number of the bogus certificate. It
will want to verify the Issuer and Subject (SAN) to ensure that the
certificate being revoked is not one that it has knowingly issued (which
would fall under case #1). Other certificate fields and extensions may
be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect
revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus.
The SCT itself, because it contains a timestamp from a third party, is
probably valuable for forensic purposes.



3.If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT,
or is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be
defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing
a warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on
experience with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of
certificate revocation status information, and similar errors that
violate RFC 5280 path validation rules.



4.The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to
revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of
this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for
significant collateral damage.





As the analysis above shows, logs play a critical role in enabling
detection of certificate mis-issuance, although they do not, per se,
perform such detection. Thus logs represent another target for
adversaries who wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a log
generates SCTs for an attacker, but does not provide the log entries for
these SCTs to all, or some, Monitors, CT will not detect mis-issuance.
Thus it is critical that Monitors be able to compare the results of log
data acquisition to detect mis-behaving logs.



Absent a protocol (a so-called “gossip” protocol) that enables Monitors
to verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does not provide
protection against logs that may conspire with, or be victims of,
attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip
protocol is deployed, it is necessary to describe how the CT system will
deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For example, will there be
a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs issued by such a
log. Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to deal with
mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection, much less
remediation, of mis-issuance.



Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate
mis-issuance, for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their
certificates. Thus Monitors represent another target for adversaries who
wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by,
or is complicit with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a
mis-issued certificate targeting the Subject. This raises the question
of whether a Subject needs to request certificate monitoring from
multiple sources to guard against such failures.





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From nobody Fri Sep 12 03:04:04 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] redacted names and my proposal
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Steve, my point is that the name redaction mechanism I proposed is, 
necessarily, a one-phase protocol.  The Precertificate must be logged 
(hence phase 1), and the final certificate must not be required to be 
logged (hence the lack of a phase 2).

If the final certificate is logged, then the redacted names become 
public.  If the final certificate is not logged, then we need to at 
least know its serial number so that it is revocable.

I don't think we can avoid requiring the serial number of the final 
certificate to be seen by the log before the final certificate is 
actually issued, because the embedded SCT(s) in the final certificate 
need to prove that the log(s) have seen that serial number.

And if we can't avoid that requirement, I don't see how a two-phase 
approach would offer any benefit.

On 11/09/14 19:37, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Rob,
>
> My intent, perhaps not well articulated, was that the SCT* submission
> would use
> the same name redaction mechanism you proposed, if they prove to be viable.
>
> The step 4 submission would include that same data, the serial number,
> and the
> previously-issued SCT*. This would enable a log (doing more work) to
> ensure that
> the SCT it issues is consistent between the two submissions. It also
> ensures that
> the serial number is available for revocation when needed (which arises
> in only
> some of the attack scenarios).
>
> Thus, whatever name redaction mechanism the WG ultimately deems suitable
> should
> work in my suggested two-phase protocol.
>
> As Ben noted, there is a residual vulnerability with my proposal since
> the SCT*
> is not tied to the serial number. But, in the context of the attack
> analysis I just
> submitted,  I'm not sure how serious this vulnerability is, relative to
> the other
> ones that I identified in the current CT design. We should discuss that
> later,
> once we have agreement on an attack analysis.
>
> Steve

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On 11 September 2014 19:08, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text contained an
> adequate
> threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text, I hav=
e
> done so.

Thanks!

>
> Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC deal=
ing
> with
> security mechanisms.
>
> Steve
> --------
>
> Threat Model
>
>
>
> Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate problems
> arising from mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI context. The We=
b
> PKI context refers to the use of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
> that issue X.509 certificates to web servers to enable TLS-protected acce=
ss
> by clients [cite WPKOPS?].
>
>
>
> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issued=
 to
> an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server) named=
 in
> the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name extension. <do =
we
> want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)

This is not the only form of mis-issue - for example, the Baseline
Requirements impose key size limits, lifetime limits, usage bits
restrictions and so forth.

EV adds even more stuff.

>
>
>
>
>
> <Discuss classes of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities>
>
>
>
> 1. Criminals
>
>
>
> 2. Hacktivists
>
>
>
> 3. Nation states (intelligence organizations)
>
>
>
> 4. Other?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Attack Model and CT Mitigation Mechanisms
>
>
>
> Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways.  The ways that=
 CT
> helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of the
> mis-issuance.
>
>
>
> 1. A non-malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of =
an
> error or because it was the victim of a social engineering attack. In thi=
s
> case the CA has a record of the certificate and it is prepared to revoke =
the
> bogus certificate once it has been convinced of its error. If the CA is
> submitting the certificates it issues to one or more logs, there will be
> records of the bogus certificate. If one of Monitors to which the
> certificate was submitted is tracking the targeted Subject, it will detec=
t
> the mis-issuance, and will alert the Subject. Because the CA has a record=
 of
> the mis-issuance, the only data needed to identify the bogus certificate =
is
> the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of which are available from the lo=
g.
> The presence of an embed SCT in the bogus certificate, or an SCT
> accompanying the bogus certificate does not appear to contribute to the
> mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)
>
>
>
> 2. A non-malicious Web PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack
> (c.f., DigiNotar) which results in mis-issuance of one or more certificat=
es.
> In this case the CA is not aware of the mis-issuance and may have no reco=
rd
> of the certificate content.
>
>
>
> a. The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
> prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to acquir=
e a
> standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor to which the certificates had b=
een
> submitted (and which is tracking the targeted Subject), would detect a bo=
gus
> certificate and alert the targeted Subject. The Subject, in turn, would
> request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA will
> depend on the certificate serial number provided via the log entry, to
> effect revocation. (See Notes 1 + 2 below.) If TLS clients rejects a
> certificate when no SCT is present, this might motivate the attacker to l=
og
> the bogus certificates, thus justifying such client behavior. (However, s=
uch
> client behavior needs to be defined in a way that is compatible with
> incremental deployment.)
>
> b. A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
> case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject a
> certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker wi=
ll
> be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)
>
>
>
> 3. A malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of bein=
g
> bribed or compelled to do so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a bogus
> certificate my a government agency or a criminal organization.)  This CA
> might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root CA).
>
> a. The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
> prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to acqui=
re
> a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor tracking the targeted Subject
> would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted subject. The
> Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. I=
n
> this case, the CA may refuse, or substantially delay, to revoke the bogus
> certificate. (It could make excuses about inadequate proof that the
> certificate is bogus, or argue that it cannot quickly revoke the certific=
ate
> because of local, legal concerns, etc.) In this case, the CT mechanisms h=
ave
> detected mis-issuance, but are not able to remedy the problem. (See Note =
4
> below.)
>
> b. A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
> case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject a
> certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker wi=
ll
> be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)
>
>
>
> Notes:
>
>
>
> 1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not
> watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not
> mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUS=
T
> offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitored.
> Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of
> Monitors will provide =E2=80=9Csufficient=E2=80=9D coverage. Unless these=
 details are
> addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even when certifica=
tes
> are logged.
>
>
>
> 2. A CA being presented with evidence of a bogus certificate probably wil=
l
> require more than the serial number of the bogus certificate. It will wan=
t
> to verify the Issuer and Subject (SAN) to ensure that the certificate bei=
ng
> revoked is not one that it has knowingly issued (which would fall under c=
ase
> #1). Other certificate fields and extensions may be of interest for foren=
sic
> purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to verify that th=
e
> certificate to be revoked is bogus.

I think they are (or, at least, may be, depending on the nature of the
bogosity), see above.

> The SCT itself, because it contains a
> timestamp from a third party, is probably valuable for forensic purposes.
>
>
>
> 3. If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT,=
 or
> is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be defi=
ned
> in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing a warnin=
g
> to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on experience with
> warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of certificate revocati=
on
> status information, and similar errors that violate RFC 5280 path validat=
ion
> rules.
>
>
>
> 4. The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to
> revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of t=
his
> sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for significant
> collateral damage.

The other recourse is to revoke directly in the browsers - either the
whole CA or the offending certificate(s). This is what happened to
DigiNotar, for example.

>
>
>
>
>
> As the analysis above shows, logs play a critical role in enabling detect=
ion
> of certificate mis-issuance, although they do not, per se, perform such
> detection. Thus logs represent another target for adversaries who wish to
> effect certificate mis-issuance. If a log generates SCTs for an attacker,
> but does not provide the log entries for these SCTs to all, or some,
> Monitors, CT will not detect mis-issuance. Thus it is critical that Monit=
ors
> be able to compare the results of log data acquisition to detect
> mis-behaving logs.
>
>
>
> Absent a protocol (a so-called =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol) that en=
ables Monitors to
> verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does not provide protection
> against logs that may conspire with, or be victims of, attackers effectin=
g
> certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip protocol is deployed, it is
> necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or
> compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS
> clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log. Absent a description of a
> mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT can=
not
> ensure detection, much less remediation, of mis-issuance.

I do agree that we need to define the gossip protocol to complete the CT st=
ory.

> Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuance,
> for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their certificates. Thus
> Monitors represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect
> certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit
> with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a mis-issued
> certificate targeting the Subject. This raises the question of whether a
> Subject needs to request certificate monitoring from multiple sources to
> guard against such failures.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>


From nobody Fri Sep 12 11:44:56 2014
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From: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>
To: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Why not use a TBSCertificate from RFC 5280 with no modifications from the f=
inal certificate (no poison extension) and sign it with a PKCS7 signature i=
nstead of a RFC 5280 signature?  By doing this you are not creating a valid=
 certificate so you are not technically breaking RFC 5280 (re-using serial =
numbers) and it couldn't be used as a certificate even if some software inc=
orrectly ignored the poison extension. =20

Jeremy

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 12:15 PM
To: trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format

Ben,

> ...
> I managed to miss that proposal. I've found it now.
>
> There seems to be a flaw: if I'm an evil CA wishing to issue an evil=20
> certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a=20
> certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested=20
> to do so,
>
> In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a=20
> second copy with a different serial, containing the original SCT*, and=20
> the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in=20
> audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if=20
> the serial is included in the pre-certificate.
I agree that the attack you describe would work, but it needs to be evaluat=
ed in the overall context of how CT works in the case of several different =
types of attack scenarios. The threat model and attack model text I just su=
bmitted provides a first cut at describing such scenarios. Once we get agre=
ement on that model, let's revisit the question of whether the vulnerabilit=
y you noted above is significant relative to other residual vulnerabilities=
.
> Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what=20
> appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.
I do know that when VeriSign used the Safekeyper HSM to issue all of its ce=
rts (which it did for several years), it would have been impossible to gene=
rate a pre-cert and matching final cert. So, the concern I raise would have=
 been a show stopper for them in that time frame. I guess it depends on how=
 one defines a "theoretical use case" :-)

Separately, the pre-cert model, requires a CA to issue two certs with the s=
ame serial number, which is a bad security practice. I think it makes sense=
 to re-consider forcing CAs to behave this way.

Steve

_______________________________________________
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Nice idea, solves the RFC5280 concerns, and doesn't require a completely
new data structure.

IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a
signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate
(name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerInfo
refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).

It can only work if the log signs the content (=TBSCertificate) and not the
whole CMS, thus ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that
signature aside isn't more risky than it is now because it's already the
case (the log removes the poison extension before signing the resulting
certificate, right?).
If the log signs the whole CMS, the SCT covers information unknown to the
browser at connection time (content of SignerInfo, maybe additional
attributes --authenticated or not--, digest algorithm chosen by the PreCert
issuer, etc).


2014-09-12 20:44 GMT+02:00 Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>:

> Why not use a TBSCertificate from RFC 5280 with no modifications from the
> final certificate (no poison extension) and sign it with a PKCS7 signature
> instead of a RFC 5280 signature?  By doing this you are not creating a
> valid certificate so you are not technically breaking RFC 5280 (re-using
> serial numbers) and it couldn't be used as a certificate even if some
> software incorrectly ignored the poison extension.
>
> Jeremy
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 12:15 PM
> To: trans@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
>
> Ben,
>
> > ...
> > I managed to miss that proposal. I've found it now.
> >
> > There seems to be a flaw: if I'm an evil CA wishing to issue an evil
> > certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a
> > certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested
> > to do so,
> >
> > In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a
> > second copy with a different serial, containing the original SCT*, and
> > the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in
> > audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if
> > the serial is included in the pre-certificate.
> I agree that the attack you describe would work, but it needs to be
> evaluated in the overall context of how CT works in the case of several
> different types of attack scenarios. The threat model and attack model text
> I just submitted provides a first cut at describing such scenarios. Once we
> get agreement on that model, let's revisit the question of whether the
> vulnerability you noted above is significant relative to other residual
> vulnerabilities.
> > Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what
> > appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.
> I do know that when VeriSign used the Safekeyper HSM to issue all of its
> certs (which it did for several years), it would have been impossible to
> generate a pre-cert and matching final cert. So, the concern I raise would
> have been a show stopper for them in that time frame. I guess it depends on
> how one defines a "theoretical use case" :-)
>
> Separately, the pre-cert model, requires a CA to issue two certs with the
> same serial number, which is a bad security practice. I think it makes
> sense to re-consider forcing CAs to behave this way.
>
> Steve
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>



-- 
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Nice idea, solves the RFC5280 concerns, and doesn&#39;t re=
quire a completely new data structure.<div><br></div><div>IIUC, what you pr=
opose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a signedData content-type=
, for which the data is the TBSCertificate (name-redacted or not, no necess=
ary poison extension). The SignerInfo refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or d=
edicated issuer, same as now).</div><div><br></div><div>It can only work if=
 the log signs the content (=3DTBSCertificate) and not the whole CMS, thus =
ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that signature aside isn&#39=
;t more risky than it is now because it&#39;s already the case (the log rem=
oves the poison extension before signing the resulting certificate, right?)=
.</div><div>If the log signs the whole CMS, the SCT covers information unkn=
own to the browser at connection time (content of SignerInfo, maybe additio=
nal attributes --authenticated or not--, digest algorithm chosen by the Pre=
Cert issuer, etc).</div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">2014-09-12 20:44 GMT+02:00 Jeremy Rowley <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex">Why not use a TBSCertificate from RFC 5280 with no modifications from=
 the final certificate (no poison extension) and sign it with a PKCS7 signa=
ture instead of a RFC 5280 signature?=C2=A0 By doing this you are not creat=
ing a valid certificate so you are not technically breaking RFC 5280 (re-us=
ing serial numbers) and it couldn&#39;t be used as a certificate even if so=
me software incorrectly ignored the poison extension.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Jeremy<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Trans [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org">trans-bounces=
@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent<br>
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 12:15 PM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org">trans@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format<br>
<br>
Ben,<br>
<br>
&gt; ...<br>
&gt; I managed to miss that proposal. I&#39;ve found it now.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There seems to be a flaw: if I&#39;m an evil CA wishing to issue an ev=
il<br>
&gt; certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a<=
br>
&gt; certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested<b=
r>
&gt; to do so,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a<=
br>
&gt; second copy with a different serial, containing the original SCT*, and=
<br>
&gt; the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in<br=
>
&gt; audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if<br=
>
&gt; the serial is included in the pre-certificate.<br>
I agree that the attack you describe would work, but it needs to be evaluat=
ed in the overall context of how CT works in the case of several different =
types of attack scenarios. The threat model and attack model text I just su=
bmitted provides a first cut at describing such scenarios. Once we get agre=
ement on that model, let&#39;s revisit the question of whether the vulnerab=
ility you noted above is significant relative to other residual vulnerabili=
ties.<br>
&gt; Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what<br>
&gt; appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.<br>
I do know that when VeriSign used the Safekeyper HSM to issue all of its ce=
rts (which it did for several years), it would have been impossible to gene=
rate a pre-cert and matching final cert. So, the concern I raise would have=
 been a show stopper for them in that time frame. I guess it depends on how=
 one defines a &quot;theoretical use case&quot; :-)<br>
<br>
Separately, the pre-cert model, requires a CA to issue two certs with the s=
ame serial number, which is a bad security practice. I think it makes sense=
 to re-consider forcing CAs to behave this way.<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Erwann.
</div></div></div>

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Stephen,

thank you for the formal description of treat model.

But I think that the Auditors should be mentioned in it too. If I am not
mistaken, they are designed to watch the certificates with suspicious
properties (CA permissions, etc.).

So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems to be
missing.


On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:08 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text contained an
> adequate
> threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text, I hav=
e
> done so.
>
> Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC
> dealing with
> security mechanisms.
>
> Steve
> --------
>
> Threat Model
>
>
>
> Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate problems
> arising from mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI context. The We=
b
> PKI context refers to the use of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
> that issue X.509 certificates to web servers to enable TLS-protected acce=
ss
> by clients [cite WPKOPS?].
>
>
>
> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issued
> to an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server)
> named in the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name
> extension. <do we want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)
>
>
>
>
>
> <Discuss classes of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities>
>
>
>
> 1. Criminals
>
>
>
> 2. Hacktivists
>
>
>
> 3. Nation states (intelligence organizations)
>
>
>
> 4. Other?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Attack Model and CT Mitigation Mechanisms
>
>
>
> Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways.  The ways that
> CT helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of the
> mis-issuance.
>
>
>
> 1. A non-malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of
> an error or because it was the victim of a social engineering attack. In
> this case the CA has a record of the certificate and it is prepared to
> revoke the bogus certificate once it has been convinced of its error. If
> the CA is submitting the certificates it issues to one or more logs, ther=
e
> will be records of the bogus certificate. If one of Monitors to which the
> certificate was submitted is tracking the targeted Subject, it will detec=
t
> the mis-issuance, and will alert the Subject. Because the CA has a record
> of the mis-issuance, the only data needed to identify the bogus certifica=
te
> is the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of which are available from the
> log. The presence of an embed SCT in the bogus certificate, or an SCT
> accompanying the bogus certificate does not appear to contribute to the
> mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)
>
>
>
> 2. A non-malicious Web PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack
> (c.f., DigiNotar) which results in mis-issuance of one or more
> certificates. In this case the CA is not aware of the mis-issuance and ma=
y
> have no record of the certificate content.
>
>
>
> a. The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
> prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to acquir=
e
> a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor to which the certificates had
> been submitted (and which is tracking the targeted Subject), would detect=
 a
> bogus certificate and alert the targeted Subject. The Subject, in turn,
> would request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the C=
A
> will depend on the certificate serial number provided via the log entry, =
to
> effect revocation. (See Notes 1 + 2 below.) If TLS clients rejects a
> certificate when no SCT is present, this might motivate the attacker to l=
og
> the bogus certificates, thus justifying such client behavior. (However,
> such client behavior needs to be defined in a way that is compatible with
> incremental deployment.)
>
> b. A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
> case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject a
> certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker wi=
ll
> be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)
>
>
>
> 3. A malicious Web PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of
> being bribed or compelled to do so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a
> bogus certificate my a government agency or a criminal organization.)  Th=
is
> CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root CA).
>
> a. The bogus certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs
> prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to acqui=
re
> a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor tracking the targeted Subject
> would detect a bogus certificate and alert the targeted subject. The
> Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. I=
n
> this case, the CA may refuse, or substantially delay, to revoke the bogus
> certificate. (It could make excuses about inadequate proof that the
> certificate is bogus, or argue that it cannot quickly revoke the
> certificate because of local, legal concerns, etc.) In this case, the CT
> mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are not able to remedy the
> problem. (See Note 4 below.)
>
> b. A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this
> case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. If clients reject a
> certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker wi=
ll
> be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3 below.)
>
>
>
> Notes:
>
>
>
> 1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not
> watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not
> mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUS=
T
> offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitored.
> Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of
> Monitors will provide =E2=80=9Csufficient=E2=80=9D coverage. Unless these=
 details are
> addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even when
> certificates are logged.
>
>
>
> 2. A CA being presented with evidence of a bogus certificate probably
> will require more than the serial number of the bogus certificate. It wil=
l
> want to verify the Issuer and Subject (SAN) to ensure that the certificat=
e
> being revoked is not one that it has knowingly issued (which would fall
> under case #1). Other certificate fields and extensions may be of interes=
t
> for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to
> verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus. The SCT itself, becau=
se
> it contains a timestamp from a third party, is probably valuable for
> forensic purposes.
>
>
>
> 3. If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT,
> or is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be
> defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing =
a
> warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on experience
> with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of certificate
> revocation status information, and similar errors that violate RFC 5280
> path validation rules.
>
>
>
> 4. The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to
> revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of
> this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for significant
> collateral damage.
>
>
>
>
>
> As the analysis above shows, logs play a critical role in enabling
> detection of certificate mis-issuance, although they do not, per se,
> perform such detection. Thus logs represent another target for adversarie=
s
> who wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a log generates SCTs for =
an
> attacker, but does not provide the log entries for these SCTs to all, or
> some, Monitors, CT will not detect mis-issuance. Thus it is critical that
> Monitors be able to compare the results of log data acquisition to detect
> mis-behaving logs.
>
>
>
> Absent a protocol (a so-called =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol) that en=
ables Monitors to
> verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does not provide protection
> against logs that may conspire with, or be victims of, attackers effectin=
g
> certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip protocol is deployed, it is
> necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or
> compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS
> clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log. Absent a description of a
> mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT
> cannot ensure detection, much less remediation, of mis-issuance.
>
>
>
> Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuance,
> for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their certificates. Thus
> Monitors represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect
> certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit
> with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a mis-issued
> certificate targeting the Subject. This raises the question of whether a
> Subject needs to request certificate monitoring from multiple sources to
> guard against such failures.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>


--=20
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--20cf300e4d51b44a5d050314ea8a
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Stephen,<br><br></div>thank you for the for=
mal description of treat model.<br><br></div>But I think that the Auditors =
should be mentioned in it too. If I am not mistaken, they are designed to w=
atch the certificates with suspicious properties (CA permissions, etc.).<br=
><br></div>So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems t=
o be missing.<br><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:08 PM, Stephen Kent <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.c=
om</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Since there was a suggestion that the current (-04) CT text
    contained an adequate<br>
    threat model, and if a better one were needed, I should offer text,
    I have done so.<br>
    <br>
    Here is an initial cut at the sort of text I expect to see in an RFC
    dealing with<br>
    security mechanisms.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    --------<br>
    <br>
   =20
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Threat Model<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Certificate
        Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate problems
        arising from
        mis-issuance of certificates, in the Web PKI context. The Web
        PKI context
        refers to the use of a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
        that issue X.509 certificates
        to web servers to enable TLS-protected access by clients [cite
        WPKOPS?].<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>A certificate is
        characterized as mis-issued if the certificate<span> </span>is issu=
ed to an entity that
        is not authorized to represent the host (web
        server) named in the certificate Subject field or Subject
        Alternative Name
        extension. &lt;do we want to focus exclusively on SAN vs.
        Subject?)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>&lt;Discuss classes
        of adversaries, motivations, and capabilities&gt;<u></u><u></u></sp=
an></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>1.<span style=3D"font:7.0p=
t &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>Criminals <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>2.<span style=3D"font:7.0p=
t &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>Hacktivists <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>3.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>Nation states
        (intelligence organizations) <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>4.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>Other?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Attack Model and CT
        Mitigation Mechanisms<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Certificate
        mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. <span>=C2=A0</span>T=
he ways that CT helps detect
        and remedy mis-issuance
        depends on the context of the mis-issuance.<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>1.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>A non-malicious Web
        PKI CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of an error or
        because it was
        the victim of a social engineering attack. In this case the CA
        has a record of
        the certificate and it is prepared to revoke the bogus
        certificate once it has
        been convinced of its error. If the CA is submitting the
        certificates it issues
        to one or more logs, there will be records of the bogus
        certificate. If one of
        Monitors to which the certificate was submitted is tracking the
        targeted
        Subject, it will detect the mis-issuance, and will alert the
        Subject. Because
        the CA has a record of the mis-issuance, the only data needed to
        identify the
        bogus certificate is the Subject (SAN) and public key, both of
        which are
        available from the log. The presence of an embed SCT in the
        bogus certificate,
        or an SCT accompanying the bogus certificate does not appear to
        contribute to
        the mitigation. (See Note 1 below.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>2.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>A non-malicious Web
        PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack (c.f.,
        DigiNotar) which
        results in mis-issuance of one or more certificates. In this
        case the CA is not
        aware of the mis-issuance and may have no record of the
        certificate content. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><spa=
n>a.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>The bogus
        certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs prior
        to issuance,
        to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to acquire a
        standalone SCT. In either
        case, a Monitor to which the certificates had been submitted
        (and which is tracking
        the targeted Subject), would detect a bogus certificate and
        alert the targeted
        Subject. The Subject, in turn, would request the CA to revoke
        the bogus certificate.
        In this case, the CA will depend on the certificate serial
        number provided via
        the log entry, to effect revocation. (See Notes 1 + 2 below.) If
        TLS clients
        rejects a certificate when no SCT is present, this might
        motivate the attacker
        to log the bogus certificates, thus justifying such client
        behavior. (However,
        such client behavior needs to be defined in a way that is
        compatible with
        incremental deployment.)<span>=C2=A0 </span><u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><spa=
n>b.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>A bogus certificate
        may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors
        will not detect
        the bogus certificate. If clients reject a certificate that
        lacks (or is not
        accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker will be thwarted in this
        case. (See Note 3
        below.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>3.<span style=3D"font:7.0p=
t &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>A malicious Web PKI
        CA may mis-issue a certificate as a result of being bribed or
        compelled to do
        so. (A CA might be compelled to issue a bogus certificate my a
        government
        agency or a criminal organization.)<span>=C2=A0 </span>This
        CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root
        CA). <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><spa=
n>a.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>The bogus
        certificate(s) may have been submitted to one or more logs prior
        to issuance,
        to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance, to acquire a
        standalone SCT. In
        either case, a Monitor tracking the targeted Subject would
        detect a bogus
        certificate and alert the targeted subject. The Subject, in
        turn, would request
        the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA may
        refuse, or
        substantially delay, to revoke the bogus certificate. (It could
        make excuses
        about inadequate proof that the certificate is bogus, or argue
        that it cannot
        quickly revoke the certificate because of local, legal concerns,
        etc.) In this
        case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are not
        able to remedy
        the problem. (See Note 4 below.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><spa=
n>b.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>A bogus certificate
        may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors
        will not detect
        the bogus certificate. If clients reject a certificate that
        lacks (or is not
        accompanied by) an SCT, the attacker will be thwarted in this
        case. (See Note 3
        below.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Notes:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>1.<span style=3D"font:7.0p=
t &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>If a CA submits the
        bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not watched by a
        Monitor that is
        tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not mitigate a
        mis-issuance attack. It
        is not clear whether every Monitor MUST offer to track every
        Subject that
        requests its certificates be monitored. Absent such a guarantee,
        how do TLS
        clients and CAs know which set of Monitors will provide
        =E2=80=9Csufficient=E2=80=9D coverage.
        Unless these details are addressed, use of CT does not
        mitigation mis-issuance
        even when certificates are logged.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>2.<span style=3D"font:7.0p=
t &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><span>A CA being presented
        with evidence of a bogus certificate probably will require more
        than the serial
        number of the bogus certificate. It will want to verify the
        Issuer and Subject
        (SAN) to ensure that the certificate being revoked is not one
        that it has
        knowingly issued (which would fall under case #1). Other
        certificate fields and
        extensions may be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not
        required to
        effect revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be
        revoked is bogus.
        The SCT itself, because it contains a timestamp from a third
        party, is probably
        valuable for forensic purposes.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>3.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>If a TLS client is to
        reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT, or is not
        accompanied by a
        post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be defined in a way
        that is
        compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing a warning to a
        (human) user is
        probably insufficient, based on experience with warnings
        displayed for expired
        certificates, lack of certificate revocation status information,
        and similar
        errors that violate RFC 5280 path validation rules.<u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>4.<span>
          </span></span></span><span>The targeted Subject
        might request the parent or the offending CA to revoke the
        certificate of the
        non-cooperative CA. However, a request of this sort may be
        rejected, e.g.,
        because of the potential for significant collateral damage. <u></u>=
<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>As the analysis above
        shows, logs play a critical role in enabling detection of
        certificate
        mis-issuance, although they do not, per se, perform such
        detection. Thus logs
        represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect
        certificate
        mis-issuance. If a log generates SCTs for an attacker, but does
        not provide the
        log entries for these SCTs to all, or some, Monitors, CT will
        not detect
        mis-issuance. Thus it is critical that Monitors be able to
        compare the results
        of log data acquisition to detect mis-behaving logs. <u></u><u></u>=
</span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Absent a protocol (a
        so-called =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol) that enables Monitors =
to verify
        that data from
        logs are consistent, CT does not provide protection against logs
        that may
        conspire with, or be victims of, attackers effecting certificate
        mis-issuance.
        Even when a gossip protocol is deployed, it is necessary to
        describe how the CT
        system will deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For
        example, will
        there be a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs
        issued by such a
        log. Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to deal with
        mis-behaving or
        compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection, much less
        remediation, of
        mis-issuance.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Monitors also play a
        critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuance, for
        Subjects that have
        requested monitoring of their certificates. Thus Monitors
        represent another
        target for adversaries who wish to effect certificate
        mis-issuance. If a
        Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit with, an attacker, it
        will fail to
        alert a Subject to a mis-issued certificate targeting the
        Subject. This raises
        the question of whether a Subject needs to request certificate
        monitoring from
        multiple sources to guard against such failures. <u></u><u></u></sp=
an></p>
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>SY, Dmitry Belyavsk=
y
</div>

--20cf300e4d51b44a5d050314ea8a--


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Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 10:32:06 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 12/09/14 20:26, Erwann Abalea wrote:
> Nice idea, solves the RFC5280 concerns, and doesn't require a completely
> new data structure.
>
> IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a
> signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate
> (name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerInfo
> refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).
>
> It can only work if the log signs the content (=TBSCertificate) and not
> the whole CMS, thus ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that
> signature aside isn't more risky than it is now because it's already the
> case (the log removes the poison extension before signing the resulting
> certificate, right?).

Yes.  The log removes the poison extension, and (if a Precertificate 
Signing Certificate was used) it also changes the issuer name and AKI to 
match those of the final certificate's issuing CA.  This behaviour can 
remain the same.

I agree that using CMS to sign the Precert TBSCertificate is a good 
solution to the duplicated certificate serial number problem.  :-)

> If the log signs the whole CMS, the SCT covers information unknown to
> the browser at connection time (content of SignerInfo, maybe additional
> attributes --authenticated or not--, digest algorithm chosen by the
> PreCert issuer, etc).
>
>
> 2014-09-12 20:44 GMT+02:00 Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com
> <mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>>:
>
>     Why not use a TBSCertificate from RFC 5280 with no modifications
>     from the final certificate (no poison extension) and sign it with a
>     PKCS7 signature instead of a RFC 5280 signature?  By doing this you
>     are not creating a valid certificate so you are not technically
>     breaking RFC 5280 (re-using serial numbers) and it couldn't be used
>     as a certificate even if some software incorrectly ignored the
>     poison extension.
>
>     Jeremy
>
>     -----Original Message-----
>     From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org
>     <mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
>     Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 12:15 PM
>     To: trans@ietf.org <mailto:trans@ietf.org>
>     Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
>
>     Ben,
>
>      > ...
>      > I managed to miss that proposal. I've found it now.
>      >
>      > There seems to be a flaw: if I'm an evil CA wishing to issue an evil
>      > certificate, I simply log a precert, minus serial, get an SCT*, log a
>      > certificate containing that SCT*, which I then revoke when requested
>      > to do so,
>      >
>      > In order to attack a user with the evil certificate, I simply issue a
>      > second copy with a different serial, containing the original
>     SCT*, and
>      > the certificate works. Yes, the discrepancy should be discovered in
>      > audit, but that is a significantly weaker protection than we get if
>      > the serial is included in the pre-certificate.
>     I agree that the attack you describe would work, but it needs to be
>     evaluated in the overall context of how CT works in the case of
>     several different types of attack scenarios. The threat model and
>     attack model text I just submitted provides a first cut at
>     describing such scenarios. Once we get agreement on that model,
>     let's revisit the question of whether the vulnerability you noted
>     above is significant relative to other residual vulnerabilities.
>      > Also this adds quite a lot of complexity in order to allow what
>      > appears to be, so far, an entirely theoretical use case.
>     I do know that when VeriSign used the Safekeyper HSM to issue all of
>     its certs (which it did for several years), it would have been
>     impossible to generate a pre-cert and matching final cert. So, the
>     concern I raise would have been a show stopper for them in that time
>     frame. I guess it depends on how one defines a "theoretical use
>     case" :-)
>
>     Separately, the pre-cert model, requires a CA to issue two certs
>     with the same serial number, which is a bad security practice. I
>     think it makes sense to re-consider forcing CAs to behave this way.
>
>     Steve
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Trans mailing list
>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Trans mailing list
>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
>
> --
> Erwann.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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--001a11c2bb1e93d49105031a976f
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2014-09-15 11:32 GMT+02:00 Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>:

> On 12/09/14 20:26, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
>> [...]
>> It can only work if the log signs the content (=TBSCertificate) and not
>> the whole CMS, thus ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that
>> signature aside isn't more risky than it is now because it's already the
>> case (the log removes the poison extension before signing the resulting
>> certificate, right?).
>>
>
> Yes.  The log removes the poison extension, and (if a Precertificate
> Signing Certificate was used) it also changes the issuer name and AKI to
> match those of the final certificate's issuing CA.  This behaviour can
> remain the same.
>

Concerning these last changes (issuer name and AKI), are they under the
responsibility of the certificate issuer, or of the log signer?
My understanding was that it's the issuer's job. AKI being a variable
extension, how could the log know which one of {issuerName+serialNumber},
{keyIdentifier}, {issuerName+serialNumber+keyIdentifier} content will be
found in the final certificate?
If it's the log signer's job, then in the PreCert signing certificate
situation, there's no non-conformance to RFC5280 (regarding to
issuerName+serialNumber uniqueness).

-- 
Erwann.

--001a11c2bb1e93d49105031a976f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2014-09-15 11:32 GMT+02:00 Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com<=
/a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On 12/09=
/14 20:26, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">[...]<br>
It can only work if the log signs the content (=3DTBSCertificate) and not<b=
r>
the whole CMS, thus ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that<br>
signature aside isn&#39;t more risky than it is now because it&#39;s alread=
y the<br>
case (the log removes the poison extension before signing the resulting<br>
certificate, right?).<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
Yes.=C2=A0 The log removes the poison extension, and (if a Precertificate S=
igning Certificate was used) it also changes the issuer name and AKI to mat=
ch those of the final certificate&#39;s issuing CA.=C2=A0 This behaviour ca=
n remain the same.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Concerning these las=
t changes (issuer name and AKI), are they under the responsibility of the c=
ertificate issuer, or of the log signer?</div><div>My understanding was tha=
t it&#39;s the issuer&#39;s job. AKI being a variable extension, how could =
the log know which one of {issuerName+serialNumber}, {keyIdentifier}, {issu=
erName+serialNumber+keyIdentifier} content will be found in the final certi=
ficate?</div><div>If it&#39;s the log signer&#39;s job, then in the PreCert=
 signing certificate situation, there&#39;s no non-conformance to RFC5280 (=
regarding to issuerName+serialNumber uniqueness).</div></div><div><br></div=
>-- <br>Erwann.
</div></div>

--001a11c2bb1e93d49105031a976f--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 15/09/14 14:27, Erwann Abalea wrote:
> 2014-09-15 11:32 GMT+02:00 Rob Stradling wrote:
>     Yes.  The log removes the poison extension, and (if a Precertificate
>     Signing Certificate was used) it also changes the issuer name and
>     AKI to match those of the final certificate's issuing CA.  This
>     behaviour can remain the same.
>
> Concerning these last changes (issuer name and AKI), are they under the
> responsibility of the certificate issuer, or of the log signer?

Hi Erwann.  That was my understanding too until Emilia corrected me a 
few days ago!

> My understanding was that it's the issuer's job.

No, it's the log signer's job.  The Precertificate's Issuer Name and AKI 
need to match the Precertificate Signing Certificate's Subject Name and SKI.

Upon receipt of a Precertificate, the log signer does the following:
   1. Verify the Precertificate's signature.
   2. Extract the TBSCertificate part of the Precertificate.
   3. Remove the poison extension.
   4. Change the Issuer name to match the Issuer name of the final 
cert's issuer.
   5. Change the AKI to match the SKI of the final cert's issuer.
   6. Use that modified TBSCertificate to construct the SCT.
   7. Generate the SCT signature.

> AKI being a variable extension, how could the log know which one of
> {issuerName+serialNumber}, {keyIdentifier},
> {issuerName+serialNumber+keyIdentifier} content will be found in the
> final certificate?

Funny you should mention this.  Right now I'm working on SCT 
verification code for OpenSSL with Steve Henson and Emilia.  Just a few 
minutes ago Steve asked the very same question you've just asked here.

So I just looked at the language in RFC6962 Section 3.2.  I think "the 
TBSCertificate also has its Authority Key Identifier changed to match 
the final issuer" is sufficiently vague that we need to file an erratum 
to RFC6962 to specify exactly how to deal with the optionality of the 
various AKI components.

I also just looked at the certificate-transparency.org code for 
inspiration, but it seems to be doing completely the wrong thing!  It's 
copying the final cert issuer's AKI rather than SKI.  :-(

> If it's the log signer's job, then in the PreCert signing certificate
> situation, there's no non-conformance to RFC5280 (regarding to
> issuerName+serialNumber uniqueness).

Correct.  The serialNumber is identical, but the issuerName is different.

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Ben,


> ...
> I think its pretty clear what the purpose of CT is - to make it
> possible to detect mis-issuance of certificates - i.e. that
> certificates conform to all the requirements for issuance. And its
> also clear that to do this, you need to be able to see the contents of
> the certificate. This is the threat model. Or, if you really want it
> phrased as a threat, the threat is that some CA might issue a
> certificate that does not conform to the requirements for issuance
> (which, btw, vary over time) and the mitigation is a public,
> append-only, verifiable log of the contents of all issued
> certificates.
>
> The I-D clearly states this already, I think, but if you don't like
> the text, perhaps you can propose something you'd like better?
Here's some suggested text that matches my model for a threat model 
description:


> ...
>
>>> However, when you suggest that inclusion of some particular thing is
>>> problematic, then we can, of course, refer to potential problems CT
>>> might reveal and available remedies as an illustration of why that
>>> thing is needed.
>> I don't know what this last, rather long sentence means. Please elaborate.
> What I meant was that mentioning a problem in order to explain why
> some field is needed does not mean that we then have to enumerate all
> problems, find a problem that justifies every field, etc.
Thanks for the clarification. I disagree. If one lists every field
to be covered by an SCT, and notes why the field needs to be covered,
then the coverage is clearly justified. Saying that we'll cover every field
because there might be a need to do so, even though we can't articulate
it, can lead to unnecessary complexity. For example, right now TCPINC
WG is performing this exercise for the TCP header, to justify which fields
needs to be integrity-protected. I agree that an X.509 cert is a much
bigger, more complex data structure, but the principle is the same.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] redacted names and my proposal
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Rob,
> Steve, my point is that the name redaction mechanism I proposed is, 
> necessarily, a one-phase protocol. The Precertificate must be logged 
> (hence phase 1), and the final certificate must not be required to be 
> logged (hence the lack of a phase 2).
Your requirements are not in conflict with my proposal. In phase 1 the 
redacted name would be
input. In Phase 2, the same input as in Phase 1 would be supplied, plus 
the serial number. My
initial characterization of the proposal didn't consider name redaction, 
and thus described
the second phase as using the issued cert. But, I tried to clarify that 
when you pointed out
that I had failed to consider redacted certs, initially.
> If the final certificate is logged, then the redacted names become 
> public. If the final certificate is not logged, then we need to at 
> least know its serial number so that it is revocable.
see my reply above.
> I don't think we can avoid requiring the serial number of the final 
> certificate to be seen by the log before the final certificate is 
> actually issued, because the embedded SCT(s) in the final certificate 
> need to prove that the log(s) have seen that serial number.
My proposal does have the serial number in the log, acquired in the 
second pass. It's not clear
that an embedded SCT needs to include the serial number, absent a more 
thorough description of
client and Monitor behavior. I agree that there is a residual 
vulnerability, noted by Ben, if the serial number is not present. But, 
there appear to be several other vulnerabilities with the
current design, based on my first cut attack analysis.

Steve


From nobody Mon Sep 15 12:03:19 2014
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/ZV-PaReL4HWUCzcURSZoLCtXzVI
Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Jeremy,
> Why not use a TBSCertificate from RFC 5280 with no modifications from the final certificate (no poison extension) and sign it with a PKCS7 signature instead of a RFC 5280 signature?  By doing this you are not creating a valid certificate so you are not technically breaking RFC 5280 (re-using serial numbers) and it couldn't be used as a certificate even if some software incorrectly ignored the poison extension.
Using either a TBS cert with a different signature format or CRMF would 
avoid the
53280 conflict. It would not, however, address the "know the serial 
number before you issue the
cert" concern that I raised. So, we have a couple of proposals that 
address at least half of
the problem, which is a start.

Steve


From nobody Mon Sep 15 12:03:39 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Dimitry,

> Stephen,
>
> thank you for the formal description of treat model.
>
> But I think that the Auditors should be mentioned in it too. If I am 
> not mistaken, they are designed to watch the certificates with 
> suspicious properties (CA permissions, etc.).
>
> So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems to be 
> missing.is case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are 
> not able to remedy the problem. (See Note 4 below.)

In 6962-bis (-04) the definition of the Auditor function is:

Auditors take partial information about a log as input and verify

that this information is consistent with other partial information

they have.


This is way too vague to be meaningful. So, I agree that an Auditor 
might be relevant
to the attack analysis, I didn't include it this time because there is 
not a sufficiently
detailed description of its functions. The examples of what an Auditor 
"can" do don't
mention checking cert content against a set of criteria. They focus on 
detecting log
inconsistencies. So, maybe Auditors should be mentioned in the 
discussion of detecting
log misbehavior.

Steve

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    Dimitry,<br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CADqLbzJ1MVjgGu8_Rw9DWm5NXe9pGH1v47WVH=kXFin5NrZuvA@mail.gmail.com"
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            <div>Stephen,<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            thank you for the formal description of treat model.<br>
            <br>
          </div>
          But I think that the Auditors should be mentioned in it too.
          If I am not mistaken, they are designed to watch the
          certificates with suspicious properties (CA permissions,
          etc.).<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems
        to be missing.<span>is case, the CT mechanisms have detected
          mis-issuance, but are not able to remedy the problem. (See
          Note 4 below.)</span></div>
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    <br>
    In 6962-bis (-04) the definition of the Auditor function is:<br>
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    This is way too vague to be meaningful. So, I agree that an Auditor
    might be relevant<br>
    to the attack analysis, I didn't include it this time because there
    is not a sufficiently<br>
    detailed description of its functions. The examples of what an
    Auditor "can" do don't<br>
    mention checking cert content against a set of criteria. They focus
    on detecting log<br>
    inconsistencies. So, maybe Auditors should be mentioned in the
    discussion of detecting<br>
    log misbehavior.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
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--------------040906070300090704040000--


From nobody Mon Sep 15 12:03:41 2014
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Ben,

Thanks for explaining what you and your co-authors have in mind when
you use the term mis-issuance. This is a very important first step toward
clarification for CT.
>
>> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issued to
>> an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server) named in
>> the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name extension. <do we
>> want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)
> This is not the only form of mis-issue - for example, the Baseline
> Requirements impose key size limits, lifetime limits, usage bits
> restrictions and so forth.
>
> EV adds even more stuff.
So the scope of mis-issuance is much broader than what I had imagined.

I think we may need to add two things to 6269-bis:

     - normative references to CABF documents that are the basis for the 
broader
       set of cert issuance criteria that you note

     - maybe two appendices to enumerate the criteria. this will be 
critical if
       if the CABF docs contain other criteria that are outside the 
scope of CT,
       e.g., criteria that cannot be evaluated based on what is logged.

Do you agree?
>
>> ...
> The other recourse is to revoke directly in the browsers - either the
> whole CA or the offending certificate(s). This is what happened to
> DigiNotar, for example.
I agree that one might do that, but I am aware of no IETF standards for
doing so. My understanding is that DigiNotar, as a trust anchor, was
removed from the TA list. I am not aware (but then I am not a browser
vendor) of an equivalent mechanism for CAs below TAs. Also, the TA list
mechanism is not an IETF standard. We need to cite a spec, preferably
a standard, on how to deal with browser-based revocation. Is there an
appropriate CABF document that needs to become a normative reference?

> ...
> I do agree that we need to define the gossip protocol to complete the CT story.
I'm glad that we're in agreement here.

Steve



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Katriel,
> I’ve also been thinking about a threat model, though your writing is much clearer than mine!
thanks.
> tl;dr: (a) There’s a lot of text about the details of revocation that I thought was out of scope for CT. (b) A client specification may answer many of the questions you raise about Monitors.
well, revocation, per se, may not be in scope for CT, but unless we can 
specify what actions
can/will be taken in response to the detection afforded by CT, this 
seems like a hard sell.
> On Thursday, 11 September 2014 at 19:08, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> Certificate Transparency (CT) is intended to detect and mitigate...
> Is it intended to mitigate problems? (-04) says so but immediately follows it with “the logs do not themselves prevent misissue, but they ensure that interested parties (particularly those named in certificates) can detect such misissuance”
fair point. I'll revise that text if there is general agreement to do so.
> A fairer introduction might be “CT is intended to allow subjects to detect…"
Well, it's not necessarily subjects, in the PKI sense. 6279-bis suggest 
that a Subject
can ask a Monitor to look for certs that have been issued without the 
authorization
of the Subject. Only if every Subject were to perform Monitoring for 
itself would your
text be accurate. Still, this will be easy to fix.
>> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issued to an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server) named in the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name extension.
> Or doesn’t follow certain regulations, or some other definition (e.g. comes from a root that the CA can but does not use to issue certificates). I think it should be up to individual Monitors to define what they consider to be mis-issued, though it makes sense to give a minimal criterion, and hence that the text should say something like “In the following, a certificate is characterised as mis-issued if… but any Monitor may choose to use an alternative definition, since CT is definition-agnostic."
"regulations?" We need to be precise. Ben replied with a much more 
general characterization
of the term, which I believe is derived from CABF docs. I agree that we 
don't want each
Monitor to make up its own criteria; I don't agree that a "minimal" set 
of criteria is a
good idea. I would like to see uniformity in the criteria, based on 
published standards,
so that everyone knows what will be OK, and what is not OK.
>>   
>>   
>> Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. The ways that CT helps detect and remedy mis-issuance depends on the context of the mis-issuance.
> I think the key distinction to be made is between contexts that cause the certificate to be submitted to a non-malicious Log Server, and those that do not. As you say, in the former case a Monitor tracking the targeted Subject will detect the mis-issued certificate and set off the out-of-scope revocation process. In the latter, TLS clients which are not backwards compatible will refuse to accept the certificate, while TLS clients which do not yet enforce CT will act as they do today.
Submission to a log server, or lack thereof, is part of the analysis, as 
noted later. We may disagree
on what is the best way to structure the taxonomy.
> Once the certificate is detected, is the revocation process (e.g. what data the CA requires) in scope for this document?
I included the topic of what info is needed to help justify what is 
covered by an SCT. The
(initial) analysis I performed noted that the serial number is not 
required in all cases,
and it may not suffice in others (a malicious CA). So, to the extent 
that we are discussing
what data needs to be covered by an SCT, this part of the analysis is 
needed, and thus in scope.
>>   
>> 1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUST offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitored. Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of Monitors will provide “sufficient” coverage. Unless these details are addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even when certificates are logged.
> I understood Monitors to be run by Subjects (or paid by Subjects to do their tracking for them), so I see no reason why they MUST offer to track anybody. It’s log servers for which you need sufficient coverage, though, not Monitors: one of the latter will suffice as long as it watches all the former. I don’t know what the current definition of “the set of all log servers” is (*); for the moment I assume it is defined by Google’s list for Chrome.
I don't recall that the text made it clear who was running Monitors. if 
every Subject had to
run its own Monitor, it might be hard to argue that CT will provide very 
wide coverage in the
near term. Yet, near term, broad coverage is precisely the argument made 
to justify the need for
pre-certs. So, there is an important question here. I could easily 
envision Monitors that are
paid by Subjects to watch over certs. But, if that is part of the model, 
the doc needs to say
so. One Monitor, with a "pay for protection" business model probably 
would NOT suffice. Also,
relying on one company's list to define the set of log servers is not 
the sort approach we follow
in IETF standards, so ...

> I agree it’s important to specify how Monitors can find out the set of log servers. (e.g. it’s Very Bad if I run my own monitor but don’t update its list, since then a mis-issued certificate submitted to a new log server will pass me by.)
>>   
>> 3. If a TLS client is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT, or is not accompanied by a post-issuance SCT, this behavior needs to be defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing a warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on experience with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of certificate revocation status information, and similar errors that violate RFC 5280 path validation rules.
> What’s the precedent for defining incremental deployment in this type of document? I suppose the wording would be something like “TLS clients wishing to respect incremental deployment MAY choose to accept certificates without embedded SCTs, but…"
The IETF hates flag days; we almost never approve a protocol design that 
relies on all instances of
something to switch to a new something in unison. We're very big on 
backwards compatibility :-).
>>   
>> 4. The targeted Subject might request the parent or the offending CA to revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for significant collateral damage.
> Again, is this in scope for CT? This issue exists in today’s infrastructure just as much (c.f. when people removed DigiNotar from trust lists).
The analysis needs to address what happens in response to detection of 
mis-issuance, so that the
community can decide if the burden of deploying a big system of this 
sort is justified by the
benefits.
>>   
>>   
>>   
>> Absent a protocol (a so-called “gossip” protocol) that enables Monitors to verify that data from logs are consistent, CT does not provide protection against logs that may conspire with, or be victims of, attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. Even when a gossip protocol is deployed, it is necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log.
> I believe this is the same question as at (*): who controls the list of trusted logs? One assumes that anybody doing so (e.g. Chrome) would also run a Monitor, and thus detect misissuances and remove said logs from their list the same way they would have removed DigiNotar.
Chrome is a browser; Google is the vendor. If a vendor operates a 
Monitor, it can detect some
types of mis-issuance where knowledge of Subject cert info is not 
needed. For example, if
the cert issuance criteria require a minimum of 1024-bit RSA keys, any 
Monitor can detect a
cert with a 512-bit key, and flag it as "bad." But, if one is trying to 
detect that a cert
for foo.com was issued to the wrong entity, one needs to have 
authoritative info about the
real foo.com cert, or knowledge that foo.com has never requested a cert. 
A browser vendor
would have that info for itself, but not for web sites in general. So, I 
disagree with your
analysis that anyone who runs a log, such as a browser vendor, is in a 
position to detect
the form of mis-issuance that I had assumed was the primary motivation 
for CT. I agree that
any entity running a log could choose to run a Monitor, but by itself, 
one Monitor cannot
necessarily discover a misbehaving log.
> I think a section specifying the actions of TLS clients should answer a lot of these questions. Such a section would say in part that clients must keep lists of CAs and log servers, maintained either by themselves or by a trusted third party, and that the signatures on the cert and the SCT should be from entities in the respective lists. Whoever maintains the list undertakes to remove both bad CAs and bad log servers if they are detected.
Yes, these are topics that should be addressed in the description of TLS 
client behavior.
>>   
>> Monitors also play a critical role in detecting certificate mis-issuance, for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their certificates. Thus Monitors represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, or is complicit with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a mis-issued certificate targeting the Subject. This raises the question of whether a Subject needs to request certificate monitoring from multiple sources to guard against such failures.
> Subjects must choose a trusted Monitor because the Monitor is by definition the thing that watches the logs; they can do this themselves or they can delegate to a third party, in which case they rely on that party not to be compromised. This doesn’t seem particular to CT: if I install a burglar alarm either I have to monitor it, or I have to pay someone else to monitor it and trust them to respond if it goes off, or I have to accept that the alarm might be ignored.
Your analogy is reasonable. Nonetheless, the topic of trust in Monitors 
has a place in the
attack analysis.

Steve


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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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--20cf3011e24366df3705032293c7
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Hello Stephen,


On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Dimitry,
>
>    Stephen,
>
>  thank you for the formal description of treat model.
>
>  But I think that the Auditors should be mentioned in it too. If I am not
> mistaken, they are designed to watch the certificates with suspicious
> properties (CA permissions, etc.).
>
>  So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems to be
> missing.is case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but are
> not able to remedy the problem. (See Note 4 below.)
>
>
> In 6962-bis (-04) the definition of the Auditor function is:
>
>    Auditors take partial information about a log as input and verify
>
>    that this information is consistent with other partial information
>
>    they have.
>
> This is way too vague to be meaningful. So, I agree that an Auditor might
> be relevant
> to the attack analysis, I didn't include it this time because there is no=
t
> a sufficiently
> detailed description of its functions. The examples of what an Auditor
> "can" do don't
> mention checking cert content against a set of criteria. They focus on
> detecting log
> inconsistencies. So, maybe Auditors should be mentioned in the discussion
> of detecting
> log misbehavior.
>
>
My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be
Monitored, not Audited.

There is a high-level description of the Auditors here:
http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct:
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Auditors are lightweight software components that typically perform two
functions. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly and are
cryptographically consistent. If a log is not behaving properly, then the
log will need to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they can
verify that a particular certificate appears in a log. This is a
particularly important auditing function because the Certificate
Transparency framework requires that all SSL certificates be registered in
a log. If a certificate has not been registered in a log, it=E2=80=99s a si=
gn that
the certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may refuse to connect to sites
that have suspect certificates.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, but
it provides a high-level explanation of the Auditors' role.


--=20
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--20cf3011e24366df3705032293c7
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello Stephen,<div><br></div><div><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:52 PM, S=
tephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D=
"_blank" onclick=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dc=
m&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3Dkent@bbn.com&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=
=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes=
,width=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-sty=
le:solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Dimitry,<br>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><span class=3D"">
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>Stephen,<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            thank you for the formal description of treat model.<br>
            <br>
          </div>
          But I think that the Auditors should be mentioned in it too.
          If I am not mistaken, they are designed to watch the
          certificates with suspicious properties (CA permissions,
          etc.).<br>
          <br>
        </div></span>
        So the treats which are to be avoided using the Auditors seems
        to be missing.<span>is case, the CT mechanisms have detected
          mis-issuance, but are not able to remedy the problem. (See
          Note 4 below.)</span></div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    In 6962-bis (-04) the definition of the Auditor function is:<br>
    <br>
   =20
    <p><span>=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span>Auditors

      take partial information about a log as input and verify<u></u><u></u=
></p>
    <p><span>=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span>that

      this information is consistent with other partial information<u></u><=
u></u></p>
    <p><span>=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span>they

      have<span></span><u></u><u></u><span></span><span style=3D"font-size:=
12pt;font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;"><big><font face=3D"Courier New,=
 Courier, monospace"><small>.</small></font></big></span><tt>
      </tt><br>
    </p>
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
    <br>
    This is way too vague to be meaningful. So, I agree that an Auditor
    might be relevant<br>
    to the attack analysis, I didn&#39;t include it this time because there
    is not a sufficiently<br>
    detailed description of its functions. The examples of what an
    Auditor &quot;can&quot; do don&#39;t<br>
    mention checking cert content against a set of criteria. They focus
    on detecting log<br>
    inconsistencies. So, maybe Auditors should be mentioned in the
    discussion of detecting<br>
    log misbehavior.<br>
    <br></div></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div></div><div>My fault. The certs =
with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be Monitored, not Audited.=C2=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>There is a high-level description of the Audit=
ors here:=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-c=
t">http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct</a>:</div><div>=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D</div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Verdana,Hel=
vetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:16.6666660308838px">Audi=
tors are lightweight software components that typically perform two functio=
ns. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly and are cryptog=
raphically consistent. If a log is not behaving properly, then the log will=
 need to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they can verify th=
at a particular certificate appears in a log. This is a particularly import=
ant auditing function because the Certificate Transparency framework requir=
es that all SSL certificates be registered in a log. If a certificate has n=
ot been registered in a log, it=E2=80=99s a sign that the certificate is su=
spect, and TLS clients may refuse to connect to sites that have suspect cer=
tificates.=C2=A0</span><br></div><div>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</div><div>It is not i=
ntegrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, but it provides =
a high-level explanation of the Auditors&#39; role.</div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div>-- <br>SY, Dmitry Belyavsky
</div></div>

--20cf3011e24366df3705032293c7--


From nobody Tue Sep 16 03:26:02 2014
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References: <540DFA75.2040000@gmail.com><540E0E90.1070208@bbn.com><540E28FD.7050809@gmail.com><540ECD3A.4040704@primekey.se><540F4598.5010505@bbn.com><CABrd9SSg5=wuierLoqAU00pMHxgGx+=ai5mHv4u5t6zm43yDWg@mail.gmail.com><5410779A.20209@bbn.com><CABrd9STnjqDBF4-5ABJ86M_d0bwRyjRNjRW6Hnj9UpeYC7Xz9A@mail.gmail.com><5411BDE4.1060508@bbn.com><CABrd9STAHzg_KJi=nA7hsvz+k0SMS+bg6c3hcBtUwfOUm=hqTQ@mail.gmail.com><5411E6B4.5040401@bbn.com><02c365fdc2b8478fb78f310382ae0bb7@EX2.corp.digicert.com><CA+i=0E4bKzn6DB73H7p8k+kDyrku54WhU5ZFcA2g5zY69Kn-Hg@mail.gmail.com><5416B216.6050904@comodo.com><CA+i=0E6svuD8RGNWqHaywtGm17JWz7Mw005OhRbnb+hPDrdrSw@mail.gmail.com> <5416EFD8.1040801@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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On 15/09/14 14:55, Rob Stradling wrote:
> On 15/09/14 14:27, Erwann Abalea wrote:
<snip>
>> AKI being a variable extension, how could the log know which one of
>> {issuerName+serialNumber}, {keyIdentifier},
>> {issuerName+serialNumber+keyIdentifier} content will be found in the
>> final certificate?
>
> Funny you should mention this.  Right now I'm working on SCT
> verification code for OpenSSL with Steve Henson and Emilia.  Just a few
> minutes ago Steve asked the very same question you've just asked here.
>
> So I just looked at the language in RFC6962 Section 3.2.  I think "the
> TBSCertificate also has its Authority Key Identifier changed to match
> the final issuer" is sufficiently vague that we need to file an erratum
> to RFC6962 to specify exactly how to deal with the optionality of the
> various AKI components.
>
> I also just looked at the certificate-transparency.org code for
> inspiration, but it seems to be doing completely the wrong thing!  It's
> copying the final cert issuer's AKI rather than SKI.  :-(

Sorry, ignore that.  Looks like the certificate-transparency.org code is 
actually copying the Issuer Name and AKI from the Precertificate Signing 
Certificate.  That's correct.

Nonetheless, I still think RFC6962 needs an erratum to deal with the 
optionality of the various AKI components.

>> If it's the log signer's job, then in the PreCert signing certificate
>> situation, there's no non-conformance to RFC5280 (regarding to
>> issuerName+serialNumber uniqueness).
>
> Correct.  The serialNumber is identical, but the issuerName is different.

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Precertificate format
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Bonjour Rob,

Thanks for your valuable comments, we're currently implementing this in our
CA, and the RFC5280 conformance of the PreCert Signing Certificate scenario
is pleasing. No need to remove our constraints or cheat to circumvent
them...

2014-09-16 12:25 GMT+02:00 Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>:

> On 15/09/14 14:55, Rob Stradling wrote:
>
>> On 15/09/14 14:27, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>>
> <snip>
>
>> AKI being a variable extension, how could the log know which one of
>>> {issuerName+serialNumber}, {keyIdentifier},
>>> {issuerName+serialNumber+keyIdentifier} content will be found in the
>>> final certificate?
>>>
>>
>> Funny you should mention this.  Right now I'm working on SCT
>> verification code for OpenSSL with Steve Henson and Emilia.  Just a few
>> minutes ago Steve asked the very same question you've just asked here.
>>
>> So I just looked at the language in RFC6962 Section 3.2.  I think "the
>> TBSCertificate also has its Authority Key Identifier changed to match
>> the final issuer" is sufficiently vague that we need to file an erratum
>> to RFC6962 to specify exactly how to deal with the optionality of the
>> various AKI components.
>>
>> I also just looked at the certificate-transparency.org code for
>> inspiration, but it seems to be doing completely the wrong thing!  It's
>> copying the final cert issuer's AKI rather than SKI.  :-(
>>
>
> Sorry, ignore that.  Looks like the certificate-transparency.org code is
> actually copying the Issuer Name and AKI from the Precertificate Signing
> Certificate.  That's correct.
>

Ok. So the reference code takes for granted that the CA will use the same
strategy to populate the PreCert Signing Certificate and the final issued
certificate. That's not an unusual assumption, but:


> Nonetheless, I still think RFC6962 needs an erratum to deal with the
> optionality of the various AKI components.


+1
This should be stated somewhere.

-- 
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour Rob,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for your valuable c=
omments, we&#39;re currently implementing this in our CA, and the RFC5280 c=
onformance of the PreCert Signing Certificate scenario is pleasing. No need=
 to remove our constraints or cheat to circumvent them...<br><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2014-09-16 12:25 GMT+02:00 Rob =
Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com"=
 target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On 15/09/14 14:55, Rob Stradling wrote:=
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 15/09/14 14:27, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br>
</blockquote></span>
&lt;snip&gt;<span class=3D""><br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
AKI being a variable extension, how could the log know which one of<br>
{issuerName+serialNumber}, {keyIdentifier},<br>
{issuerName+serialNumber+<u></u>keyIdentifier} content will be found in the=
<br>
final certificate?<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Funny you should mention this.=C2=A0 Right now I&#39;m working on SCT<br>
verification code for OpenSSL with Steve Henson and Emilia.=C2=A0 Just a fe=
w<br>
minutes ago Steve asked the very same question you&#39;ve just asked here.<=
br>
<br>
So I just looked at the language in RFC6962 Section 3.2.=C2=A0 I think &quo=
t;the<br>
TBSCertificate also has its Authority Key Identifier changed to match<br>
the final issuer&quot; is sufficiently vague that we need to file an erratu=
m<br>
to RFC6962 to specify exactly how to deal with the optionality of the<br>
various AKI components.<br>
<br>
I also just looked at the <a href=3D"http://certificate-transparency.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">certificate-transparency.org</a> code for<br>
inspiration, but it seems to be doing completely the wrong thing!=C2=A0 It&=
#39;s<br>
copying the final cert issuer&#39;s AKI rather than SKI.=C2=A0 :-(<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
Sorry, ignore that.=C2=A0 Looks like the <a href=3D"http://certificate-tran=
sparency.org" target=3D"_blank">certificate-transparency.org</a> code is ac=
tually copying the Issuer Name and AKI from the Precertificate Signing Cert=
ificate.=C2=A0 That&#39;s correct.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok. =
So the reference code takes for granted that the CA will use the same strat=
egy to populate the PreCert Signing Certificate and the final issued certif=
icate. That&#39;s not an unusual assumption, but:</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Nonetheless, I still think RFC6962 needs an erratum to deal with the option=
ality of the various AKI components.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>+1</di=
v><div>This should be stated somewhere.</div><div>=C2=A0</div></div>-- <br>=
Erwann.
</div></div></div>

--089e0115f04846941505032c5515--


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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:22:20 -0400
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Dmitry,
> My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be 
> Monitored, not Audited.
no problem.
>
> There is a high-level description of the Auditors here: 
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct:
> =====
> Auditors are lightweight software components that typically perform 
> two functions. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly 
> and are cryptographically consistent. If a log is not behaving 
> properly, then the log will need to explain itself or risk being shut 
> down. Second, they can verify that a particular certificate appears in 
> a log. This is a particularly important auditing function because the 
> Certificate Transparency framework requires that all SSL certificates 
> be registered in a log. If a certificate has not been registered in a 
> log, it's a sign that the certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may 
> refuse to connect to sites that have suspect certificates.
> =====
> It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, 
> but it provides a high-level explanation of the Auditors' role.
Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn't enter into our 
discussion :-).

Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site where 
info about CT is
being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.

Steve

--------------040909080404040200010202
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Dmitry,<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CADqLbzJcvhb9aw4xWtY+byxkNqr8FfuxL33kEwQoTOO5wtQoqg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_quote">
          <div>My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a
            subject to be Monitored, not Audited. <br>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    no problem.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CADqLbzJcvhb9aw4xWtY+byxkNqr8FfuxL33kEwQoTOO5wtQoqg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_extra">
          <div><br>
          </div>
          <div>There is a high-level description of the Auditors here:&nbsp;<a
              moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct">http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct</a>:</div>
          <div>=====</div>
          <div><span
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Verdana,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:16.6666660308838px">Auditors
              are lightweight software components that typically perform
              two functions. First, they can verify that logs are
              behaving correctly and are cryptographically consistent.
              If a log is not behaving properly, then the log will need
              to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they
              can verify that a particular certificate appears in a log.
              This is a particularly important auditing function because
              the Certificate Transparency framework requires that all
              SSL certificates be registered in a log. If a certificate
              has not been registered in a log, it&#8217;s a sign that the
              certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may refuse to
              connect to sites that have suspect certificates.&nbsp;</span><br>
          </div>
          <div>=====</div>
          <div>It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor
            current draft, but it provides a high-level explanation of
            the Auditors' role.</div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn't enter into
    our discussion :-).<br>
    <br>
    Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site
    where info about CT is<br>
    being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Hello Stephen,

On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Dmitry,
>
>  My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a subject to be
> Monitored, not Audited.
>
> no problem.
>
>
>  There is a high-level description of the Auditors here:
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct:
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Auditors are lightweight software components that typically perform two
> functions. First, they can verify that logs are behaving correctly and ar=
e
> cryptographically consistent. If a log is not behaving properly, then the
> log will need to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they can
> verify that a particular certificate appears in a log. This is a
> particularly important auditing function because the Certificate
> Transparency framework requires that all SSL certificates be registered i=
n
> a log. If a certificate has not been registered in a log, it=E2=80=99s a =
sign that
> the certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may refuse to connect to site=
s
> that have suspect certificates.
>  =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor current draft, but
> it provides a high-level explanation of the Auditors' role.
>
> Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn't enter into our
> discussion :-).
>
> Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site where
> info about CT is
> being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.
>

I think that the information I have quoted should either become the part of
the RFC or should be removed from the site. The RFC says too little about
the Auditors functions.


--=20
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--485b397dced9646e88050331040b
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello Stephen,<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"lt=
r">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank" onclick=3D"window.=
open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3Dkent@=
bbn.com&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#=
39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=3D800,height=3D600&#3=
9;);return false;">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Dmitry,<span class=3D""><br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
          <div>My fault. The certs with unnecessery permissions are a
            subject to be Monitored, not Audited. <br>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote></span>
    no problem.<span class=3D""><br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra">
          <div><br>
          </div>
          <div>There is a high-level description of the Auditors here:=C2=
=A0<a href=3D"http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct" target=3D=
"_blank">http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct</a>:</div>
          <div>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</div>
          <div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Verdana,Helvetic=
a,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:16.6666660308838px">Auditors
              are lightweight software components that typically perform
              two functions. First, they can verify that logs are
              behaving correctly and are cryptographically consistent.
              If a log is not behaving properly, then the log will need
              to explain itself or risk being shut down. Second, they
              can verify that a particular certificate appears in a log.
              This is a particularly important auditing function because
              the Certificate Transparency framework requires that all
              SSL certificates be registered in a log. If a certificate
              has not been registered in a log, it=E2=80=99s a sign that th=
e
              certificate is suspect, and TLS clients may refuse to
              connect to sites that have suspect certificates.=C2=A0</span>=
<br>
          </div>
          <div>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</div>
          <div>It is not integrated as a part of neither RFC 6962 nor
            current draft, but it provides a high-level explanation of
            the Auditors&#39; role.</div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote></span>
    Until this text is part of an IETF document, it doesn&#39;t enter into
    our discussion :-).<br>
    <br>
    Frankly it seems a bit counterproductive to have a separate site
    where info about CT is<br>
    being posted, while we try to discuss 69269-bis in this WG.<br></div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think that the information I have quoted s=
hould either become the part of the RFC or should be removed from the site.=
 The RFC says too little about the Auditors functions.</div></div><br clear=
=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>SY, Dmitry Belyavsky
</div></div>

--485b397dced9646e88050331040b--


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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 13:45:50 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Where do things stand with the precertificate format discussion?
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It looks like we've got two closely-related discussions:

1) precertificate format (representation), and
2) precertificate contents

There've been a couple of proposals for alternative representation,
including TBS (alternatively, the CertTemplate format from 4211) and
CRMF, and there seems to be some agreement congealing around Erwann's
summary:

>IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a
>signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate
>(name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerInfo
>refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).

>It can only work if the log signs the content (=TBSCertificate) and not
>the whole CMS, thus ignoring the PreCert issuer signature. Leaving that
>signature aside isn't more risky than it is now because it's already
> the case (the log removes the poison extension before signing the
> resulting certificate, right?).

with an open question around serial numbers.

Related, there's a proposal on the table to walk through cert data and
justify SCT contents.

Does this sound about right?

Melinda


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On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> wrote:
> There've been a couple of proposals for alternative representation,
> including TBS (alternatively, the CertTemplate format from 4211) and
> CRMF, and there seems to be some agreement congealing around Erwann's
> summary:
>
>>IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a
>>signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate
>>(name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerInfo
>>refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).

CMS is not a good format for the PreCert, because CMS is highly
complicated and unnecessarily complex for this purpose. And, in
particular, CMS is specified as a BER-encoded format, not a
DER-encoded format, and it isn't reasonable to require implementations
to support a BER-encoded format for CT when all other things they
process are DER-encoded. In particular, some implementations may have
specialized DER decoders that cannot be practically adapted to deal
with BER.

I previously suggested an alternative syntax that would be much easier
to implement:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00500.html

> Related, there's a proposal on the table to walk through cert data and
> justify SCT contents.

There is a proposal for that, but I don't think it has much support. I
myself do not think that would be a useful thing to do.

Cheers,
Brian


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On 9/17/14 2:35 PM, Brian Smith wrote:
> I previously suggested an alternative syntax that would be much easier
> to implement:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00500.html

Right, thanks.  My real question is whether or not we've got
something on which there's sufficient agreement to move forward.

Melinda



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Bonjour,

2014-09-18 0:35 GMT+02:00 Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>:

> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > There've been a couple of proposals for alternative representation,
> > including TBS (alternatively, the CertTemplate format from 4211) and
> > CRMF, and there seems to be some agreement congealing around Erwann's
> > summary:
> >
> >>IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with a
> >>signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate
> >>(name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerInfo
> >>refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).
>
> CMS is not a good format for the PreCert, because CMS is highly
> complicated and unnecessarily complex for this purpose. And, in
> particular, CMS is specified as a BER-encoded format, not a
> DER-encoded format,


BER/DER doesn't concern the payload of the CMS (here, the TBSCertificate,
which will be DER encoded anyway).
CMS is complex and flexible, but this complexity is already known, and it
will be handled by logs+monitors+auditors only.
More important, CMS is already present in the bestiary of objects that
anyone involved in PKI knows.

and it isn't reasonable to require implementations
> to support a BER-encoded format for CT when all other things they
> process are DER-encoded. In particular, some implementations may have
> specialized DER decoders that cannot be practically adapted to deal
> with BER.
>

Fine. Let's say that for the purpose of CT, the CMS SHOULD be DER encoded.
Those CMS objects will still be RFC5652 compliant (DER is a subset of BER).

I previously suggested an alternative syntax that would be much easier
> to implement:
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00500.html
>

That's another solution, but it will force everyone to add this specific
object to their libraries. It will require more efforts.

-- 
Erwann.

--001a1133a0fe469fb705035d86ad
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour,<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">2014-09-18 0:35 GMT+02:00 Brian Smith <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:brian@briansmith.org" target=3D"_blank">brian@briansmith.org=
</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Wed,=
 Sep 17, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Melinda Shore &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:melinda.shore=
@gmail.com">melinda.shore@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; There&#39;ve been a couple of proposals for alternative representation=
,<br>
&gt; including TBS (alternatively, the CertTemplate format from 4211) and<b=
r>
&gt; CRMF, and there seems to be some agreement congealing around Erwann&#3=
9;s<br>
&gt; summary:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;IIUC, what you propose is that the PreCert is a CMS (RFC5652) with =
a<br>
&gt;&gt;signedData content-type, for which the data is the TBSCertificate<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;(name-redacted or not, no necessary poison extension). The SignerIn=
fo<br>
&gt;&gt;refers to the PreCert issuer (CA or dedicated issuer, same as now).=
<br>
<br>
</span>CMS is not a good format for the PreCert, because CMS is highly<br>
complicated and unnecessarily complex for this purpose. And, in<br>
particular, CMS is specified as a BER-encoded format, not a<br>
DER-encoded format, </blockquote><div><br></div><div>BER/DER doesn&#39;t co=
ncern the payload of the CMS (here, the TBSCertificate, which will be DER e=
ncoded anyway).</div><div>CMS is complex and flexible, but this complexity =
is already known, and it will be handled by logs+monitors+auditors only.</d=
iv><div>More important, CMS is already present in the bestiary of objects t=
hat anyone involved in PKI knows.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">and it isn&#39;t reasonable to require implementations<br>
to support a BER-encoded format for CT when all other things they<br>
process are DER-encoded. In particular, some implementations may have<br>
specialized DER decoders that cannot be practically adapted to deal<br>
with BER.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Fine. Let&#39;s say that for =
the purpose of CT, the CMS SHOULD be DER encoded. Those CMS objects will st=
ill be RFC5652 compliant (DER is a subset of BER).</div><div><br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I previously suggested an alternative syntax that would be much easier<br>
to implement:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00500.html=
" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg0=
0500.html</a><span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>T=
hat&#39;s another solution, but it will force everyone to add this specific=
 object to their libraries. It will require more efforts.</div></div><div><=
br></div>-- <br>Erwann.
</div></div>

--001a1133a0fe469fb705035d86ad--


From nobody Fri Sep 19 10:18:54 2014
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Melinda,

> Related, there's a proposal on the table to walk through cert data and 
> justify SCT contents. Does this sound about right?

Based on Ben's response to my attack analysis, in which indicated that 
he had a much
broader definition for mis-issuance, I plan to find the relevant CABF 
docs, and generate
the appendices that I think are needed to define the term accurately. 
I'll revise my
attack analysis text, including the definition of mis-issuance. Once 
that is done,
I'll generate the mapping between cert content and requirements for SCT 
inclusion.

I hope to provide some new text next week.

Steve



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Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 11:50:20 -0700
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Subject: [Trans] RFC 6962 clarification: entry type vs SCTs origin
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Hi,

Since in RFC6962, the entry type in an SCTs is not explicit, one has
to either guess or try both type in order to validate the SCTs.

Does it make sense to infer the entry type from the origin of the SCT?

If the SCT is embedded in a cert, it has to be a precert entry. In
case of an SCT in the TLS handshake, I would expect in most case it's
an x509 entry.

But are there any situations where having a SCT with precert entry in
the TLS extension or OCSP response would make sense ?

Thanks

-- Fabrice


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Subject: [Trans] List of servers implementing CT ?
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Hi,

Does anyone has a list of servers that implement CT with any of the
current known Logs ?

I've found www.digicert.com and embed.ct.digicert.com do, but is there
anywhere else out there ?

Ideally, I'd love a list of server along with which Log their certs
are logged into, and which type of SCTs they use.

Thanks

-- Fabrice


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On 9/19/14 9:18 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> I hope to provide some new text next week.

Excellent, thank you.

Melinda


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Necessary clarification: I mean a list of TLS server implementing CT,
not a list of Logs.

Thanks

-- Fabrice

On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Fabrice Gautier
<fabrice.gautier@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Does anyone has a list of servers that implement CT with any of the
> current known Logs ?
>
> I've found www.digicert.com and embed.ct.digicert.com do, but is there
> anywhere else out there ?
>
> Ideally, I'd love a list of server along with which Log their certs
> are logged into, and which type of SCTs they use.
>
> Thanks
>
> -- Fabrice


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From: Eduardo Robles Elvira <edulix@agoravoting.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 11:43:51 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Trans] end to end email encryption using CT gossip protocol
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Hi there:

The way merkle-trees are used in Certificate Transparency is
trustworthy, but at the same convenient, in a way that preserves the
client<>server architecture. This can have many applications in other
protocols and places, that we are only starting to see. It would
probably be quite good in general to try to facilitate the usage this
kind of security architecture design and tools to other projects.

Regards,

On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 5:16 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 11:15:38
> From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
> To: Trans <trans-bounces@ietf.org>
> Subject: end to end email encryption using CT gossip protocol
>
>
> FYI
>
> https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/wiki/KeyDistribution
>
>         For End-To-End, our current approach to key distribution, is to use
> a
>         model similar to Certificate Transparency, and use the email
> messages
>         themselves as a gossip protocol, which allow the users themselves to
>         keep the centralized authorities honest. This approach allows users
> to
>         not have to know about keys, but at the same time, be able to make
> sure
>         that the servers involved aren't doing anything malicious behind the
>         users' back.
>
>         To allow the system to be easily distributed (across multiple
> identity
>         providers), key servers can authenticate the user via existing
> federated
>         identity protocols (with OpenID Connect for example). The model of a
> key
>         server with a transparency backend is based on the premise that a
> user
>         is willing to trust the security of a centralized service, as long
> as it
>         is subject to public scrutiny, and that can be easily discovered if
> it's
>         compromised (so it is still possible to compromise the user's
> account,
>         but the user will be able to know that as soon as possible).
>
>         It's worth noting that End-to-End is still under active development,
> and
>         we might change our approach to key distribution if we find
> weaknesses
>         in this model, or if we find something else that is as easy to use,
> and
>         as likely to work. Part of the reason we release this document is to
>         seek early feedback from the community, and adapt as needed.
>
>         We also want to point out we will do our very best to continue to
>         support existing OpenPGP users who want to manually manage and
> verify
>         keys and fingerprints manually, as we understand that system has
> been
>         around for a long time, and has been more battle tested than what we
> are
>         proposing.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans



-- 
Eduardo Robles Elvira     @edulix             skype: edulix2
http://agoravoting.org       @agoravoting     +34 634 571 634


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Subject: [Trans] pretty URIs whose integrity is associated to transparent certificates
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Hi everyone,

I will start right away recognizing that I'm not an expert in this
field, and that I might be proposing something dumb because it's
already being taken care of in some new promising standard I don't
know of, that resolves the issue in a much better way. Or it might
well happen that this is not the correct mailing list (maybe it's more
related to X509 extensions, or maybe public-webappsec mailing-list? I
just thought that it might be of interest to discuss it here). Please,
forgive me if that's case, as I'm new here.

Investigating, I recently found out that rfc6920 [1] ("Naming Things
with Hashes") defines a scheme for naming URIs with hashes too, by
creating the ni URI scheme name for .well-known URIs (rfc5785) [2].
That allows to have URIs that define incontestably the data they point
to. In my opinion, that's a very powerful and important concept,
security-wise.

A problem with ni .well-known URIs is that they look like this:

   https://agoravoting.org/.well-known/ni/sha256/UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1aGQAlMO2X_-Q

That's not very user friendly, and reduces the scope of where this
kind of secure URIs can be used. Hopefully, we can find a reasonable
and secure way to solve that problem. That's the aim of this thread.
The idea is to convert that link into something like the following,
without loosing much security:

    https://agoravoting.org/user-friendly

Thinking about it, I thought about Certificate Transparency. As you
know, CT logs publicly and transparently the X509 certificates
associated to web domains. And X509 has an "Extensions" field, so this
gets interesting. A first approach proposal, which might well end up
not being the best one, is the possibility of creating a new X509
extension that refers to the hash of a file that contains the list
URIs and their integrity meta-data. For example, the file might
contain a line like this:

<alias uri="https://agoravoting.org/user-friendly"
integrity-metadata="ni:///sha-256;UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1aGQAlMO2X_-Q"
/>

And the X509 certificate could contain something like [3]:

  Extensions:
    Identifier: Named Information URIs aliases x.x.x.x
      Critical: No
      Aliases integrity:
ni:///sha-256;f4OxZX_x_FO5LcGBSKHWXfwtSx-j1ncoSt3SABJtkGk

Some thoughts about this solution:
* This proposal is actually not directly related to CT, but using CT
together the proposal would give it a reasonable level of security,
that's why I comment it here. Also, I comment it here because others
might also try to use certificates extensions/meta-data to take
advantage of the security features of CT. Maybe this has been
discussed already before?
* It's obviously not as secure as inserting the resource's hash in the
URI, but it provides an interesting mix of security and usability.
* Provides graceful degradation: if your web browser (or any software
accessing an URI) does not support this X509 extension, it will just
not check the integrity of the resource, but otherwise the URI will
work just fine.
* Integrate well with current Internet security architecture (CAs and such).

It has some drawbacks too, though:
* when registering the certificate you need to have the pre-generated
all the aliased URIs. And if you want to modify the aliases file, you
need a new certificate. Well, if you want this level of security and
usability with current Internet infrastructure, this could be the
price of it.
* Both browser vendors and CAs would have to add some kind of support
for this X509 extension for this to work well.

All in all, as I said I just wanted to open the debate with a
proposal. Any thoughts?

Regards,
--
[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6920
[2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5785
[3] I haven't added information as to where to find the integrity file
and only its integrity metadata because I think that a good way to
solve this is to find the file with its well-known ni URI, but anyway
that's an implementation detail.
-- 
Eduardo Robles Elvira     @edulix             skype: edulix2
http://agoravoting.org       @agoravoting     +34 634 571 634


From nobody Mon Sep 22 03:29:51 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] RFC 6962 clarification: entry type vs SCTs origin
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On 19/09/14 19:50, Fabrice Gautier wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Since in RFC6962, the entry type in an SCTs is not explicit, one has
> to either guess or try both type in order to validate the SCTs.
>
> Does it make sense to infer the entry type from the origin of the SCT?
>
> If the SCT is embedded in a cert, it has to be a precert entry. In
> case of an SCT in the TLS handshake, I would expect in most case it's
> an x509 entry.

For RFC6962, an SCT sent via the CT TLS extension or OCSP Stapling MUST 
have an entry_type of x509_entry.

> But are there any situations where having a SCT with precert entry in
> the TLS extension or OCSP response would make sense ?

For 6962-bis, yes.

See http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/10

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
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One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable
to expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's
serial number prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that
needs to be considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation
either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.

Thanks,

Melinda


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Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 15:13:57 +0200
From: i-barreira@izenpe.net
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
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Hi Melinda,

You=B4ve made a good point and this is the way we=B4re implementing CT =
at Izenpe.=20


I=F1igo Barreira
Responsable del =C1rea t=E9cnica
i-barreira@izenpe.net
945067705


ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta =
egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada =
(helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, =
korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!
ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial =
a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo =
recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion =
y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.

-----Mensaje original-----
De: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] En nombre de Melinda Shore
Enviado el: martes, 23 de septiembre de 2014 18:08
Para: trans@ietf.org
Asunto: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number

One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable to =
expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's serial =
number prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that needs to =
be considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation =
either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.

Thanks,

Melinda

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
Trans@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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From: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 12:05:51 -0700
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Melinda,

At Symantec we know the serial number prior to issuance, because we generat=
e it and put it in the TBSCertficate.

The only problem we have with serial numbers is in the case where we fail t=
o get enough SCTs to put in the cert. We'll retry the operation up to 48 ho=
urs, but we always want to set the notBefore date to the day we issue the c=
ert, so we don't short-change customers (believe me, there are customers wh=
o notice). But if we update the notBefore date and retry the logging operat=
ion, we have to change the serial number too. Otherwise we might log differ=
ent certs with the same serial number in different logs, and that would be =
inconsistent. However, we use the combination of issuer name and serial num=
ber as a unique key for that order in our database, so changing serial numb=
ers is challenging. The simpler alternative is to reject the order and ask =
the customer to start over, but that's a bad customer experience. We're not=
 sure yet how we'll solve this, but we'll figure something out (we don't ex=
pect 6962-bis to provide a solution). And while we hope that this situation=
 will occur very rarely, it could happen, so we're preparing for it.

-Rick=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 9:08 AM
To: trans@ietf.org
Subject: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number

One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable to ex=
pect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's serial number=
 prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that needs to be consi=
dered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation eit=
her in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.

Thanks,

Melinda

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
Trans@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
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--001a11c2d150135e940503d489d1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Bonsoir Rick,

If the dates set in the final certificate is different than the dates used
in the Precertificate, the browser won't be able to verify the SCT. That
means that all the Precertificates you publish for the same final
certificate MUST be identical in every aspect.

We also have an issuerName+serialNumber constraint in database, that's why
Option 1 isn't an easy task.

2014-09-24 21:05 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>:

> Melinda,
>
> At Symantec we know the serial number prior to issuance, because we
> generate it and put it in the TBSCertficate.
>
> The only problem we have with serial numbers is in the case where we fail
> to get enough SCTs to put in the cert. We'll retry the operation up to 48
> hours, but we always want to set the notBefore date to the day we issue the
> cert, so we don't short-change customers (believe me, there are customers
> who notice). But if we update the notBefore date and retry the logging
> operation, we have to change the serial number too. Otherwise we might log
> different certs with the same serial number in different logs, and that
> would be inconsistent. However, we use the combination of issuer name and
> serial number as a unique key for that order in our database, so changing
> serial numbers is challenging. The simpler alternative is to reject the
> order and ask the customer to start over, but that's a bad customer
> experience. We're not sure yet how we'll solve this, but we'll figure
> something out (we don't expect 6962-bis to provide a solution). And while
> we hope that this situation will occur very rarely
>  , it could happen, so we're preparing for it.
>
> -Rick
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore
> Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 9:08 AM
> To: trans@ietf.org
> Subject: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
>
> One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable to
> expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's serial
> number prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that needs to be
> considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
> We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation
> either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>



-- 
Erwann.

--001a11c2d150135e940503d489d1
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonsoir Rick,<div><br></div><div>If the dates set in the f=
inal certificate is different than the dates used in the Precertificate, th=
e browser won&#39;t be able to verify the SCT. That means that all the Prec=
ertificates you publish for the same final certificate MUST be identical in=
 every aspect.</div><div><br></div><div>We also have an issuerName+serialNu=
mber constraint in database, that&#39;s why Option 1 isn&#39;t an easy task=
.<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2014-09-24 2=
1:05 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Rick_An=
drews@symantec.com" target=3D"_blank">Rick_Andrews@symantec.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Melinda,<br>
<br>
At Symantec we know the serial number prior to issuance, because we generat=
e it and put it in the TBSCertficate.<br>
<br>
The only problem we have with serial numbers is in the case where we fail t=
o get enough SCTs to put in the cert. We&#39;ll retry the operation up to 4=
8 hours, but we always want to set the notBefore date to the day we issue t=
he cert, so we don&#39;t short-change customers (believe me, there are cust=
omers who notice). But if we update the notBefore date and retry the loggin=
g operation, we have to change the serial number too. Otherwise we might lo=
g different certs with the same serial number in different logs, and that w=
ould be inconsistent. However, we use the combination of issuer name and se=
rial number as a unique key for that order in our database, so changing ser=
ial numbers is challenging. The simpler alternative is to reject the order =
and ask the customer to start over, but that&#39;s a bad customer experienc=
e. We&#39;re not sure yet how we&#39;ll solve this, but we&#39;ll figure so=
mething out (we don&#39;t expect 6962-bis to provide a solution). And while=
 we hope that this situation will occur very rarely<br>
=C2=A0, it could happen, so we&#39;re preparing for it.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-Rick<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Trans [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org">trans-bounces=
@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore<br>
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 9:08 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org">trans@ietf.org</a><br>
Subject: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number<br>
<br>
One of the questions that&#39;s come up is whether or not it&#39;s reasonab=
le to expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate&#39;s s=
erial number prior to issuance - it&#39;s one of the basic questions that n=
eeds to be considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.<br>
We&#39;d be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation=
 either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Melinda<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Erwann.
</div></div></div>

--001a11c2d150135e940503d489d1--


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From nobody Wed Sep 24 13:58:53 2014
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Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 22:58:39 +0200
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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
To: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
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Cc: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
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Well, that's possible, of course. Explaining this to an auditor may be
tricky.

I wanted to make it clear that if, for example, you generate the Precert at
date D with {notBefore=3DD, notAfter=3DD+3y}, finalize the push to all the =
logs
on day D+1, and issue the final cert immediately after that, thus on day
D+1, you MUST NOT have the final certificate with {notBefore=3DD+1,
notAfter=3DD+1+3y}. It won't work.

2014-09-24 21:42 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>:

> Erwann,
>
>
>
> Isn=E2=80=99t it possible that I log a Precertificate in one or more log =
servers
> and then can=E2=80=99t issue the final certificate, either because of log=
 server
> failure or failure of my issuance system? The log server records my INTEN=
T
> to issue a certificate, but I don=E2=80=99t think it COMPELS me to issue =
that
> certificate. I must be able to reject that order, change the date and
> serial number and start over.
>
>
>
> We worked around the issuerName+serialNumber constraint by storing
> certificates in one table, Precertificates in another.
>
>
>
> -Rick
>
>
>
> *From:* Erwann Abalea [mailto:eabalea@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 24, 2014 12:18 PM
> *To:* Rick Andrews
> *Cc:* Melinda Shore; trans@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
>
>
>
> Bonsoir Rick,
>
>
>
> If the dates set in the final certificate is different than the dates use=
d
> in the Precertificate, the browser won't be able to verify the SCT. That
> means that all the Precertificates you publish for the same final
> certificate MUST be identical in every aspect.
>
>
>
> We also have an issuerName+serialNumber constraint in database, that's wh=
y
> Option 1 isn't an easy task.
>
>
>
> 2014-09-24 21:05 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>:
>
> Melinda,
>
> At Symantec we know the serial number prior to issuance, because we
> generate it and put it in the TBSCertficate.
>
> The only problem we have with serial numbers is in the case where we fail
> to get enough SCTs to put in the cert. We'll retry the operation up to 48
> hours, but we always want to set the notBefore date to the day we issue t=
he
> cert, so we don't short-change customers (believe me, there are customers
> who notice). But if we update the notBefore date and retry the logging
> operation, we have to change the serial number too. Otherwise we might lo=
g
> different certs with the same serial number in different logs, and that
> would be inconsistent. However, we use the combination of issuer name and
> serial number as a unique key for that order in our database, so changing
> serial numbers is challenging. The simpler alternative is to reject the
> order and ask the customer to start over, but that's a bad customer
> experience. We're not sure yet how we'll solve this, but we'll figure
> something out (we don't expect 6962-bis to provide a solution). And while
> we hope that this situation will occur very rarely
>  , it could happen, so we're preparing for it.
>
> -Rick
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore
> Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 9:08 AM
> To: trans@ietf.org
> Subject: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number
>
> One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable to
> expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's serial
> number prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that needs to =
be
> considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
> We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation
> either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Erwann.
>



--=20
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Well, that&#39;s possible, of course. Explaining this to a=
n auditor may be tricky.<div><br></div><div>I wanted to make it clear that =
if, for example, you generate the Precert at date D with {notBefore=3DD, no=
tAfter=3DD+3y}, finalize the push to all the logs on day D+1, and issue the=
 final cert immediately after that, thus on day D+1, you MUST NOT have the =
final certificate with {notBefore=3DD+1, notAfter=3DD+1+3y}. It won&#39;t w=
ork.<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2014-09-2=
4 21:42 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Rick=
_Andrews@symantec.com" target=3D"_blank">Rick_Andrews@symantec.com</a>&gt;<=
/span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue"=
 vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0=
pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Er=
wann,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f4=
97d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;colo=
r:#1f497d">Isn=E2=80=99t it possible that I log a Precertificate in one or =
more log servers and then can=E2=80=99t issue the final certificate, either=
 because of log server failure or failure of my issuance system? The log se=
rver records my INTENT to issue a certificate, but I don=E2=80=99t think it=
 COMPELS me to issue that certificate. I must be able to reject that order,=
 change the date and serial number and start over.<u></u><u></u></span></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></spa=
n></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&q=
uot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">We worked around th=
e issuerName+serialNumber constraint by storing certificates in one table, =
Precertificates in another.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-=
serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">-Rick<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b>=
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-s=
erif&quot;"> Erwann Abalea [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:eabalea@gmail.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">eabalea@gmail.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, September=
 24, 2014 12:18 PM<br><b>To:</b> Rick Andrews<br><b>Cc:</b> Melinda Shore; =
<a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">trans@ietf.org</a><br><=
b>Subject:</b> Re: [Trans] Prior knowledge of certificate serial number<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p><div><div class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" styl=
e=3D"margin-left:.5in">Bonsoir Rick,<u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">If the dates set in the final c=
ertificate is different than the dates used in the Precertificate, the brow=
ser won&#39;t be able to verify the SCT. That means that all the Precertifi=
cates you publish for the same final certificate MUST be identical in every=
 aspect.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin=
-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:.5in">We also have an issuerName+serialNumber constraint in=
 database, that&#39;s why Option 1 isn&#39;t an easy task.<u></u><u></u></p=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">2014-09-24 21:0=
5 GMT+02:00 Rick Andrews &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">Rick_Andrews@symantec.com</a>&gt;:<u></u><u></u></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">Melinda,<br><br>At Symantec we =
know the serial number prior to issuance, because we generate it and put it=
 in the TBSCertficate.<br><br>The only problem we have with serial numbers =
is in the case where we fail to get enough SCTs to put in the cert. We&#39;=
ll retry the operation up to 48 hours, but we always want to set the notBef=
ore date to the day we issue the cert, so we don&#39;t short-change custome=
rs (believe me, there are customers who notice). But if we update the notBe=
fore date and retry the logging operation, we have to change the serial num=
ber too. Otherwise we might log different certs with the same serial number=
 in different logs, and that would be inconsistent. However, we use the com=
bination of issuer name and serial number as a unique key for that order in=
 our database, so changing serial numbers is challenging. The simpler alter=
native is to reject the order and ask the customer to start over, but that&=
#39;s a bad customer experience. We&#39;re not sure yet how we&#39;ll solve=
 this, but we&#39;ll figure something out (we don&#39;t expect 6962-bis to =
provide a solution). And while we hope that this situation will occur very =
rarely<br>=C2=A0, it could happen, so we&#39;re preparing for it.<br><span =
style=3D"color:#888888"><br><span>-Rick</span></span><u></u><u></u></p><div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><br>-----Original M=
essage-----<br>From: Trans [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org=
" target=3D"_blank">trans-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore<=
br>Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 9:08 AM<br>To: <a href=3D"mailto:trans=
@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">trans@ietf.org</a><br>Subject: [Trans] Prior k=
nowledge of certificate serial number<br><br>One of the questions that&#39;=
s come up is whether or not it&#39;s reasonable to expect that CAs will (or=
 can) have knowledge of a certificate&#39;s serial number prior to issuance=
 - it&#39;s one of the basic questions that needs to be considered in the c=
ontext of the precertificate discussions.<br>We&#39;d be grateful if any CA=
s (particularly ones with a CT implementation either in the works or planne=
d) could give some feedback on that.<br><br>Thanks,<br><br>Melinda<br><br>_=
______________________________________________<br>Trans mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br><a h=
ref=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">https=
://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br><br>_________________________=
______________________<br>Trans mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Trans@iet=
f.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/=
listinfo/trans</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><br><br clear=3D"all"><u></u><u></u></p><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">-- <br>Erwann. <u></u=
><u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><b=
r><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Erwann.
</div></div></div>

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From: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
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Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 14:20:27 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Apologies for delay.

On 15 September 2014 19:52, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>
> Thanks for explaining what you and your co-authors have in mind when
> you use the term mis-issuance. This is a very important first step toward
> clarification for CT.
>>
>>
>>> A certificate is characterized as mis-issued if the certificate is issued
>>> to
>>> an entity that is not authorized to represent the host (web server) named
>>> in
>>> the certificate Subject field or Subject Alternative Name extension. <do
>>> we
>>> want to focus exclusively on SAN vs. Subject?)
>>
>> This is not the only form of mis-issue - for example, the Baseline
>> Requirements impose key size limits, lifetime limits, usage bits
>> restrictions and so forth.
>>
>> EV adds even more stuff.
>
> So the scope of mis-issuance is much broader than what I had imagined.
>
> I think we may need to add two things to 6269-bis:
>
>     - normative references to CABF documents that are the basis for the
> broader
>       set of cert issuance criteria that you note

This seems sensible. Note, though, that I would not want to constrain
mis-issue to be solely defined by CABF. Part of the point is that
anyone can monitor any aspect of issuance they want, and if they think
something is wrong, raise it to appropriate authorities...

>     - maybe two appendices to enumerate the criteria. this will be critical
> if
>       if the CABF docs contain other criteria that are outside the scope of
> CT,
>       e.g., criteria that cannot be evaluated based on what is logged.

It would certainly be interesting to know though I don't think it is
essential - an example of something CT cannot reveal is who generates
the key (obviously it is bad practice for CAs to do this for their
customers - I don't know if BRs or EV ban the practice though - in any
case, CT would not tell you who did it).

> Do you agree?
>>
>>
>>> ...
>>
>> The other recourse is to revoke directly in the browsers - either the
>> whole CA or the offending certificate(s). This is what happened to
>> DigiNotar, for example.
>
> I agree that one might do that, but I am aware of no IETF standards for
> doing so. My understanding is that DigiNotar, as a trust anchor, was
> removed from the TA list. I am not aware (but then I am not a browser
> vendor) of an equivalent mechanism for CAs below TAs. Also, the TA list
> mechanism is not an IETF standard. We need to cite a spec, preferably
> a standard, on how to deal with browser-based revocation. Is there an
> appropriate CABF document that needs to become a normative reference?

As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.


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Ben,

> ...
>> So the scope of mis-issuance is much broader than what I had imagined.
>>
>> I think we may need to add two things to 6269-bis:
>>
>>      - normative references to CABF documents that are the basis for the
>> broader
>>        set of cert issuance criteria that you note
> This seems sensible. Note, though, that I would not want to constrain
> mis-issue to be solely defined by CABF. Part of the point is that
> anyone can monitor any aspect of issuance they want, and if they think
> something is wrong, raise it to appropriate authorities...
Mis-issuance is the primary (sole?) rationale for CT, so I am not 
comfortable
with the notion that mis-issuance is not well-defined.

>>      - maybe two appendices to enumerate the criteria. this will be critical
>> if
>>        if the CABF docs contain other criteria that are outside the scope of
>> CT,
>>        e.g., criteria that cannot be evaluated based on what is logged.
> It would certainly be interesting to know though I don't think it is
> essential - an example of something CT cannot reveal is who generates
> the key (obviously it is bad practice for CAs to do this for their
> customers - I don't know if BRs or EV ban the practice though - in any
> case, CT would not tell you who did it).
I'm puzzled; how would CT allow a Monitor to determine who generated the
key pair used in a cert that was logged? I don't understand your example 
here.
> As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
> a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
> I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.
Well, if we can't say how this is done, preferably based on some standard,
then we can't make an argument that, after being being detected by CT, that
there is a fix. If so, then the security considerations section will have to
discuss this residual issue.

Steve


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Melinda,

> One of the questions that's come up is whether or not it's reasonable
> to expect that CAs will (or can) have knowledge of a certificate's
> serial number prior to issuance - it's one of the basic questions that
> needs to be considered in the context of the precertificate discussions.
> We'd be grateful if any CAs (particularly ones with a CT implementation
> either in the works or planned) could give some feedback on that.
I've expressed concern that many of the Web PKI CAs may not be
tracking the CT work. I suggest you contact someone at the CABF and
ask them to conduct a poll of their members. I propose two questions:

1. Is anyone from your organization tracking the IETF TRANS WG?

2. Would your (Web PKI) certificate issuance process be adversely
affected if you
- generated a TBScertificate, including all the fields normally present 
in certs you issue
- submit this TBScert structure to two or more third parties (over the 
Internet)
- wait to receive a (newly-defined) extension value from each of these 
parties
- insert the extension values into the cert and sign it, without 
changing any of the
cert fields in the TBScert from step 1

Steve


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Subject: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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As I promised last week, I have taken an initial cut at defining 
mis-issuance in the
broader sense that Ben seemed to imply in his comments on my initial 
threat and
attack model. I used the CABF Guidelines for Dv and Ev certs as the 
basis for this, so
that mis-issuance is defined objectively (unlike art and porn, which are 
distinguishable
only in the eye of the beholder).

The CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely 
syntactic and thus
could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to issue an SCT. I 
want to suggest
we consider that as a possible change to the current design. A goal of 
CT is to
discourage acceptance of mis-issued certs by TLS clients, and part of 
the plan is
to have clients (eventually) reject certs without SCTs. So if we have a 
set of well-
defined, syntactic checks that logs can apply before issuing an SCT, we 
can provide
immediate feedback to CAs (and/or Subjects) when problems are detected 
with certs,
before the certs sent to clients, maybe even before they are issued.  If 
we adopt this
approach, then  Monitors can focus on "protecting" specific Subjects, 
based on having
received certs (or equivalent data) from those clients.

Anyway, based on my review of the CABF Guidelines, almost all of the 
cert fields have
to be covered by an SCT, as do several common extensions. Amusingly, 
these Guidelines
don't have a readily testable requirement for a cert serial number, so 
the need to
include a serial number in an SCT is driven exclusively by the need to 
provide that
number to a CA for revocation, under attack scenario #2 in my attack 
analysis.

I hope CABF experts will be able to review the text I am providing 
below, to any
errors/omissions due to my misunderstanding of those docs. It took a 
little effort
to translate some sections of the docs into (more) straightforward 
requirements language.

I have not written the EV cert syntactic requirements part of the doc 
yet. Since there
is considerable overlap with DV cert requirements I anticipate it will 
be easier.

There are some comments in *bold* in the text, noting some unresolved 
issues.

Have a nice weekend,

Steve
--------

*Appendix A -- Specification and Verification of Certificate Issuance 
Requirements (Normative)*

The following requirements are extracted from the CA Browser Forum 
(CABF) document "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management 
of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" version 1.1.9 [CABF- Baseline] and 
"Guidelines For The Issuance And Management Of Extended Validation 
Certificates" version 1.5.1 [CABF-EV]. These requirements are used to 
define what constitutes mis-issuance of a certificate in the context 
certificate transparency (CT). The CABF specifications from which these 
requirements are derived include many aspects of CA operation that are 
outside of the scope of CT-based detection of certificate mis-issuance, 
i.e., they impose requirements that could not be verified by a Monitor 
examining certificate logs. Hence this appendix was created to provide a 
concise enumeration of certificate issuance verification requirements 
relevant to CT.

The Appendix is divided into two parts: requirements for so-called 
"domain validation" certificates and requirement for "extended 
validation" certificates. This organization parallels the CABF 
guidelines cited above.

The verification criteria enumerated below are to be applied to any 
certificate for which an SCT has been (or will be?) created. Note that 
"root" CA certificates are not subject to verificationagainst these 
criteria. Each log maintains a list of the root CAs for which it is 
willing to accept SCT generation requests. This implies that the log 
operator has already determined that these CAs, and their corresponding 
self-signed certificates, are acceptable. A subordinate CA certificate 
will be checked against the criteria below only if it is submitted as 
the target of an SCT. (If a subordinate CA certificate appears as part 
of a chain submitted for SCT generation, but is not the last certificate 
in that chain, it is not checked.)

The CABF documents cited above describe both syntactic and semantic 
requirements for certificate issuance. This Appendix deals primarily 
with syntactic checks. The vast majority of syntactic checks can be 
performed without access to external information about the Issuer or the 
Subject of a certificate.

*A.1 Syntactic Verification of a Domain Validation Certificate*

An X.509 certificate consists of a set of fields (all but two of which 
are mandatory), plus a set of optional extensions. This section of the 
Appendix defines the syntactic requirements imposed on the certificate 
fields. The next section deals with extensions.

The CABF guidelines for DV and EV certificates differ. To determine 
which set of guidelines are applicable, one must first determine which 
type of certificate is being examined. A certificate is marked as an EV 
certificate based on the Certificate Policy OID contained in the 
certificatePolicies extension. Each CA that issues EV certificates 
defines one or more policy OIDs that represent EV certificate policies. 
A Monitor performing syntactic checks first acquires a current list of 
EV certificate policy OIDs to use in determining whether a given 
certificate is an EV certificate. One such list is available from 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate).

*(Is there a better reference for EV certificate policy OIDs?)*

1. Version number: The certificates MUST be an X.509 v3 certificate. 
This requirement is derived from Appendix B of [CABF-Baseline], where it 
is explicitly stated for Subordinate CA certificates. Since 
otherportions of [CABF-Baseline] mandate support for extensions and only 
v3 certificates can contain extensions [RC5280], this requirement is 
inferred to apply to Subscriber (EE) certificates as well.

2. serialNumber: No requirements beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are 
mandated by [CABF-Baseline]. ([CABF-Baseline] requires that a serial 
number contan at least 20 bits of entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not 
clear how this can be verified through syntactic examination of a 
certificate.)

3. signature: For any certificate issued after December 31, 2010, the 
allowed digest algorithms are: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. If 
RSA is used to sign the certificate, the minimum modulus size is 2048 
bits. (No requirement is imposed on the public exponent.) If DSA is used 
to sign the certificate, the following pairs of values are permitted: L= 
2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256, L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256. If 
the certificate signature is based on ECC (presumably ECDSA), the 
allowed curves are NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521. To verify that a 
certificate employs an accepted digest and signature algorithm, one 
examines the OID contained in this field. OIDs defined in the following 
RFCs are applicable here: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (*Do we 
want to enumerate the specific OID strings applicable to certificate 
signatures?)*

4. issuer: The Issuer name MUST contain the countryName attribute and it 
MUST contain an ISO-3166-1 country code This requirement is derived from 
section 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline]. The Issuer name MUST contain the 
organizationName attribute. This requirement is derived from section 
9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline]

5. validity: A Subscriber certificate issued after July 1, 2012 MUST not 
contain a validity interval longer than 60 months. ([CABF-Baseline] 
establishes criteria in Section 9.4.1 that describe the circumstances 
under which Subscriber certificates may be issued with validity 
intervals between 39 and 60 months. Since these criteria cannot be 
evaluated without external knowledge, this Appendix adopts the 60-month 
limit for syntactic checking.)

6. subject: A certificate MAY contain a NULL Subject name If it contains 
a non-null Subject name:

A.it MAY contain a commonName attribute. If this attribute is present, 
it MUST contain a single IP address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name that 
is one of the values contained in the Certificate's subjectAltName 
extension. Thus verification of this attribute requires comparing values 
in this attribute against the content of the subjectAltname extension, 
which MUST be present (see below).

B.it MAY contain an organizationalUnitName attribute. This requirement 
is derived from section 9.2.6 of [CABF-Baseline].

C.if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the 
streetAddress attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName 
attribute is present, the streetAddress attribute MAY be present. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.2.4b of [CABF-Baseline].

D.if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the 
localityName attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName 
attribute is present, the localityName attribute MAY be present. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.2.4c of [CABF-Baseline].

E.if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the 
stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST NOT be present. If the 
organizationName attribute is present, and the localityName is absent, 
then the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST be present. If the 
organizationName attribute is present, and the localityName is present, 
then the stateOrProvinceName attribute MAY be present. This requirement 
is derived from section 9.2.4d of [CABF-Baseline].

1.the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST NOT be present if the 
organizationName attributeis missing

2.the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST be present if the 
organizationName attributeis present and the localityName is absent

F.if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the 
postalCode attribute MUST NOT be present. If the name contains an 
organizationName attribute, then the postalCode attribute MAY be 
present. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.4e of [CABF-Baseline].

G.if the namecontains an organizationName attribute, then the 
countryName attribute MUST be present. if the name does not contain an 
organizationName attribute, then the countryName attribute MAY be 
present. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.5 of [CABF-Baseline].

H.The Subject MAY contain other attributes as specified in Appendix A of 
[RFC5280]. These attributes MUST NOT contain metadata such as '.', '-', 
or ' ' (i.e. space) characters. This requirement is derived from section 
9.2.8 of [CABF-Baseline].

7. subjectPublicKeyInfo: If this field contains an RSA public key the 
minimum modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requirement is imposed on the 
public exponent.) If it carries a DSA key, the following pairs of values 
are permitted: L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256, L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 
2048, N=256. If the field conveys an ECC (presumably ECDSA) public key, 
the allowed curves are NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.To verify that a 
certificate employs an accepted digest and signature algorithm, one 
examines the OID contained in this field. OIDs defined in the following 
RFCs are applicable here: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (*Do we 
want to enumerate the specific OID strings applicable to certificate 
signatures?)***

8. issuerUniqueId: This is an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 
certificate. [CABF-Basline] imposes no requirements on this field, so no 
constraints beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.

9. subjectUniqueId: : This is an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 
certificate. [CABF-Basline] imposes no requirements on this field, so no 
constraints beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.

10. signatureAlgorithm: This field MUST match the signature field 
contained within the certificate (see # 3 above).

11. signatureValue: This field is verified using the public key 
extracted from the certificate of the Issuer of this certificate, and 
the algorithms specified in the preceding field.

A.1.2 An X.509 v3 certificate may contain extensions. [CABF-baseline] 
mandates the presence of several extensions, and imposes requirements on 
their content.

1. The certificate MUST contain the subjectAltName extension, and that 
extension MUST contain at least one entry. Each entry MUST be either a 
dNSName containing a Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or an iPAddress. 
Wildcard FQDNs are permitted. No other entry types are permitted. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.2.1 of [CABF-Baseline].

2. A certificate issued to a CAMUST include the certificatePolcies 
extension. It may r MAY NOT be marked CRITICAL. The policyQualifiers 
field MAY be present, and the policyQualifierId and/or the cPSuri fields 
may be populated, using the syntax specified in [RFC5280]. This 
requirement is derived from Appendix B, Section 2.A of [CABF-Baseline].

A.If this extension contains the OID 2.23.140.1.2.1, then the Subject 
field MUST NOT contain an organizationalName, streetAddress, 
localityName, stateOrProvinceName, or postalCode attribute. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline].

B.If this extension contains the OID 2.23.140.1.2.2, then the Subject 
field MUST contain organizationName,

*C.*localityName, stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and countryName 
attributes. This requirement is derived from section 9.3.1 of 
[CABF-Baseline]. *(How does one know whether the stateOrProvinceName is 
applicable?)*

3. The basicConstraints extension MUST be present, marked CRITICAL and 
the cA flag MUST be set TRUE in a CA certificate. This requirement is 
derived from Appendix A Section 2.D of [CABF-Baseline]. The presence of 
this extension is optional for an EE certificates. If the extension is 
present in a Subscriber certificate it MUST have the cA flag set FALSE. 
(If a certificate does not contain this extension it is presumed to be a 
Subscriber certificate and MUST be processed as such with regard to all 
other verification checks.)

4. The cRLDistributinPoints extension MUST be present in a CA 
certificate. It MUST NOT be marked critical and it MUST contain an HTTP 
URL. This extension is optional for Subscriber certificates, but if 
present the same syntactic constraints apply. This requirement is 
derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.B and 3.B of [CABF-Baseline].

5. The keyUsage extension MUST be present in a CA certificate and it 
MUST be marked critical. The keyCertSign and cRLSign bits MUST be set 
TRUE. The digitalSignature bit MAY be set TRUE as well. This requirement 
is derived from Appendix B, Section 2.E of [CABF-Baseline].

6. The authorityInformatinAccess extension MAY be present and, if 
present, MUST NOT be marked CRITICAL. It MUST specify accessMethod 
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 and MAY specify accessMethod 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2. This 
requirement is derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.C and 3.C of 
[CABF-Baseline].

7. The extendedKeyusage extension MAY be present in a CA certificate. If 
present, it need not be marked CRITICAL. If the extension is present in 
a CA certificate, and if the certificate contains the nameConstraints 
extension, then the value id-kp-serverAuth MUST be present. The 
extendedKeyusage extension MUST be present in a Subscriber certificate. 
Either the value id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth or both values 
MUST be present. id-kp-emailProtection MAY be present. This requirement 
is derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.G and 3.F of [CABF-Baseline].

8. The nameConstraints extension MAY appear in CA certificates and need 
not be marked CRITICAL (contrary to [RCC5280]). If the certificate also 
contains the extendedKeyusage extension and that extension contains the 
value id-kp-serverAuth, then that extension MUST NOT contain the 
anyExtendedKeyusage value in the KeyPurposeID.

Moreover the nameConstrants extension MUST impose constraints on 
dNSName, iPAddress and DirectoryName name types. Both the 
permittedSubtrees and excludedsubtrees fields MAY be employed. This 
requirement is derived from Appendix B, Section 2.F and Section 9.7 of 
[CABF-Baseline].

9. Other extensions defined in [RFC5280] MAY be present and MUST be 
marked with respect to criticality as specified therein.

*A.2 Semantic Verification of a Certificate *

1. [CABF-Baseline] imposes a number of requirements on certificate 
issuance that cannot be verified without access to reference information 
for the certificate Subject, or information about the CA hierarchy. For 
example:

1.The CA must verify that the Subject has the right to use or control 
of, all Domain Names and/or IP Addresses listed in the Subject field 
and/or the subjectAltName extension in the certificate. This requirement 
is derived from Section 7.1 of [CABF-Baseline].

2.The Issuer name MUST contain a "meaningful" identifier of the CA that 
issued the certificate, in the organizationName attribute of the Issuer 
name. This requirement is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline].

3.The Issuer name MUST contain the countryName attribute corresponding 
to the country on which the Issuer's place of business is located. This 
requirement is derived from Section 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline].

4.If the Subject is non-null, it MUST contain either the (verified) 
Subject's name or DBA. The CA MUST verify the streetAddress, 
localityName, stateOrProvinceName, postalCode, countryName, and 
organizationalUnitName attributes, if present. This requirement is 
derived from Section 9.2.4a of [CABF-Baseline].

**

2. A certificate issued to a subordinate CA that is not an affiliate of 
a "root" CA MUST NOT contain the anyPolicy policy identifier. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. *(How 
would a Monitor know whether the subordinate CA is affiliated with the 
root CA?)*

**

3. A certificate issued to a subordinate CA that is an affiliate of a 
"root" CA MAY include one or more explicit policy identifiers (either 
2.23.140.1.2.1 or 2.23.140.1.2.2 or policy identifiers defined by the CA 
in its CP and/or CPS). It also MAY include the anyPolicy OID. This 
requirement is derived from section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. If the 
extension contains any of the OIDs noted explicitly above, it is 
acceptable. *(How would a Monitor know whether the subordinate CA is 
affiliated with the root CA?) *

4. A Subscriber certificate issued after April 1, 2015 MUST not contain 
a validity interval longer than 39 months, unless the issuer asserts 
that the certificate meets all of the criteria described in Section 
9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline], from which this requirement is derived. *(How 
would a Monitor determine that a certificate with a validity interval 
between 39 and 60 months is acceptable, based on Section 9.4.1 of 
[CABF-Baseline]?)*

A Monitor cannot, in general determine if these requirements have been 
met; it lacks knowledge of the processes employed by the CA to verify 
the Subject name, and it may not be able to determine whether the CA is 
"meaningfully" identified by the Issuer name. A Monitor may not be able 
to determine the organizational relationships between a "root" CA and 
subordinate CAs. Thus mis-issuance relative to these requirements 
cannot, in general, be detected by a Monitor.

Nonetheless, a Monitor can "protect" specific Subjects, based on 
reference data provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying to determine 
that a certificate has been issued to the "right" Subject can do so 
using the certificate(s) issued to the Subject, as a reference. For 
example, if a Monitor is providing "protection" for a Subject, it 
requires the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subject field or 
subjectAltName extension) and the public key associated with that 
Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can examine every log 
entry to determine if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If 
a log entry matches either of these names, and if it contain a different 
public key, this is evidence of mis-issuance.

*A.3 Syntactic Verification of an Extended Validation Certificate*


     coming soon ...


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    As I promised last week, I have taken an initial cut at defining
    mis-issuance in the<br>
    broader sense that Ben seemed to imply in his comments on my initial
    threat and<br>
    attack model. I used the CABF Guidelines for Dv and Ev certs as the
    basis for this, so<br>
    that mis-issuance is defined objectively (unlike art and porn, which
    are distinguishable<br>
    only in the eye of the beholder).<br>
    <br>
    The CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely
    syntactic and thus<br>
    could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to issue an SCT.
    I want to suggest<br>
    we consider that as a possible change to the current design. A goal
    of CT is to<br>
    discourage acceptance of mis-issued certs by TLS clients, and part
    of the plan is <br>
    to have clients (eventually) reject certs without SCTs. So if we
    have a set of well-<br>
    defined, syntactic checks that logs can apply before issuing an SCT,
    we can provide <br>
    immediate feedback to CAs (and/or Subjects) when problems are
    detected with certs, <br>
    before the certs sent to clients, maybe even before they are
    issued.&nbsp; If we adopt this<br>
    approach, then&nbsp; Monitors can focus on "protecting" specific
    Subjects, based on having<br>
    received certs (or equivalent data) from those clients. <br>
    <br>
    Anyway, based on my review of the CABF Guidelines, almost all of the
    cert fields have<br>
    to be covered by an SCT, as do several common extensions. Amusingly,
    these Guidelines<br>
    don't have a readily testable requirement for a cert serial number,
    so the need to<br>
    include a serial number in an SCT is driven exclusively by the need
    to provide that<br>
    number to a CA for revocation, under attack scenario #2 in my attack
    analysis.<br>
    <br>
    I hope CABF experts will be able to review the text I am providing
    below, to any<br>
    errors/omissions due to my misunderstanding of those docs. It took a
    little effort<br>
    to translate some sections of the docs into (more) straightforward
    requirements language.<br>
    <br>
    I have not written the EV cert syntactic requirements part of the
    doc yet. Since there<br>
    is considerable overlap with DV cert requirements I anticipate it
    will be easier.<br>
    <br>
    There are some comments in <b>bold</b> in the text, noting some
    unresolved issues.<br>
    <br>
    Have a nice weekend,<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    --------<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">Appendix A &#8211; Specification and
          Verification of Certificate
          Issuance Requirements (Normative)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">The
        following
        requirements are extracted from the CA Browser Forum (CABF)
        document &#8220;Baseline
        Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
        Certificates&#8221;
        version 1.1.9 [CABF- Baseline] and </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
        font-family:Courier">&#8220;</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
        Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Guidelines
        For The Issuance And
        Management Of Extended Validation Certificates&#8221; version 1.5.1
        [CABF-EV]</span><span style="font-family:Courier">. These
        requirements are used to define what
        constitutes mis-issuance of a certificate in the context
        certificate
        transparency (CT). The CABF specifications from which these
        requirements are
        derived include many aspects of CA operation that are outside of
        the scope of
        CT-based detection of certificate mis-issuance, i.e., they
        impose requirements
        that could not be verified by a Monitor examining certificate
        logs. Hence this
        appendix was created to provide a concise enumeration of
        certificate issuance
        verification requirements relevant to CT.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">The
        Appendix is divided
        into two parts: requirements for so-called &#8220;domain validation&#8221;
        certificates and
        requirement for &#8220;extended validation&#8221; certificates. This
        organization parallels
        the CABF guidelines cited above. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">The
        verification criteria
        enumerated below are to be applied to any certificate for which
        an SCT has been
        (or will be?) created. Note that &#8220;root&#8221; CA certificates are not
        subject to
        verification<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>against
        these criteria.
        Each log maintains a list of the root CAs for which it is
        willing to accept SCT
        generation requests. This implies that the log operator has
        already determined
        that these CAs, and their corresponding self-signed
        certificates, are
        acceptable. A subordinate CA certificate will be checked against
        the criteria
        below only if it is submitted as the target of an SCT. (If a
        subordinate CA
        certificate appears as part of a chain submitted for SCT
        generation, but is not
        the last certificate in that chain, it is not checked.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">The CABF
        documents cited
        above describe both syntactic and semantic requirements for
        certificate
        issuance. This Appendix deals primarily with syntactic checks.
        The vast
        majority of syntactic checks can be performed without access to
        external
        information about the Issuer or the Subject of a certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">A.1 Syntactic Verification of a
          Domain Validation Certificate<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">An X.509
        certificate
        consists of a set of fields (all but two of which are
        mandatory), plus a set of
        optional extensions. This section of the Appendix defines the
        syntactic
        requirements imposed on the certificate fields. The next section
        deals with
        extensions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">The CABF
        guidelines for DV
        and EV certificates differ. To determine which set of guidelines
        are
        applicable, one must first determine which type of certificate
        is being
        examined. A certificate is marked as an EV certificate based on
        the Certificate
        Policy OID contained in the certificatePolicies extension. Each
        CA that issues
        EV certificates defines one or more policy OIDs that represent
        EV certificate policies.
        A Monitor performing syntactic checks first acquires a current
        list of EV
        certificate policy OIDs to use in determining whether a given
        certificate is an
        EV certificate. One such list is available from (</span><a
        href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate</span></a><span
        style="font-family:Courier">).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">(Is there a better reference for
          EV certificate
          policy OIDs?)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">1. Version
        number: The
        certificates MUST be an X.509 v3 certificate. This requirement
        is derived from
        Appendix B of [CABF-Baseline], where it is explicitly stated for
        Subordinate CA
        certificates. Since other<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>portions
        of [CABF-Baseline]
        mandate support for extensions and only v3 certificates can
        contain extensions
        [RC5280], this requirement is inferred to apply to Subscriber
        (EE) certificates
        as well. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">2.
        serialNumber: No
        requirements beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are mandated by
        [CABF-Baseline].
        ([CABF-Baseline] requires that a serial number contan at least
        20 bits of
        entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not clear how this can be
        verified through
        syntactic examination of a certificate.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">3.
        signature: For any
        certificate issued after December 31, 2010, the allowed digest
        algorithms are:
        SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. If RSA is used to sign the
        certificate, the
        minimum modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requirement is imposed on
        the public
        exponent.) <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>If DSA is
        used to sign the
        certificate, the following pairs of values are permitted: </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;&iuml;\0027A9&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">L=
2048,
        N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256, L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256. If
        the
        certificate signature is based on ECC (presumably ECDSA), the
        allowed curves
        are NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>To
verify
        that a certificate employs an accepted digest and signature
        algorithm,
        one examines the OID contained in this field. OIDs defined in
        the following
        RFCs are applicable here: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (<b
          style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">Do we want to enumerate
          the specific OID
          strings applicable to certificate signatures?)</b></span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">4. issuer:
        The Issuer name
        MUST contain the countryName attribute and it MUST contain an
        ISO-3166-1
        country code This requirement is derived from section 9.1.4 of
        [CABF-Baseline].
        The Issuer name MUST contain the organizationName attribute.
        This requirement
        is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">5. validity:
        A Subscriber
        certificate issued after July 1, 2012 MUST not contain a
        validity interval
        longer than 60 months. ([CABF-Baseline] establishes criteria in
        Section 9.4.1 that
        describe the circumstances under which Subscriber certificates
        may be issued
        with validity intervals between 39 and 60 months. <span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>Since these criteria cannot
        be evaluated
        without external knowledge, this Appendix adopts the 60-month
        limit for
        syntactic checking.) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">6. subject: A
        certificate MAY
        contain a NULL Subject name If it contains a non-null Subject
        name:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-pagination:
      none;mso-list:l3 level1
      lfo2;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">A.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">it MAY contain
        a commonName attribute. If this attribute is present, it MUST
        contain </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;&copy;&deg;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">a
        single IP address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name that is one of
        the values
        contained in the Certificate&#8217;s subjectAltName extension. Thus
        verification of
        this attribute requires comparing values in this attribute
        against the content
        of the subjectAltname extension, which MUST be present (see
        below).</span><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">B.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">it MAY contain
        an organizationalUnitName attribute. This requirement is derived
        from section
        9.2.6 of [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">C.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">if the name
        does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the
        streetAddress
        attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName attribute
        is present,
        the streetAddress attribute MAY be present. This requirement is
        derived from
        section 9.2.4b of [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">D.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">if the name
        does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the
        localityName attribute
        MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName attribute is
        present, the localityName
        attribute MAY be present. This requirement is derived from
        section 9.2.4c of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">E.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">if the name
        does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the
        stateOrProvinceName
        attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName attribute
        is present,
        and the localityName is absent, then the stateOrProvinceName
        attribute MUST be
        present. If the organizationName attribute is present, and the
        localityName is
        present, then the stateOrProvinceName attribute MAY be present.
        This
        requirement is derived from section 9.2.4d of [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:
      auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">the stateOrProvinceName
        attribute MUST NOT be present if the organizationName attribute</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"> is
        missing</span><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:
      auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">the
        stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST be present if the
        organizationName attribute</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"> is
        present and the
        localityName is absent</span><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">F.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">if the name
        does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the
        postalCode attribute
        MUST NOT be present. If the name contains an organizationName
        attribute, then
        the postalCode attribute MAY be present. This requirement is
        derived from
        section 9.2.4e of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">G.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">if the
        name<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>contains an
        organizationName
        attribute, then the countryName attribute MUST be present. if
        the name does not
        contain an organizationName attribute, then the countryName
        attribute MAY be
        present. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.5 of
        [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">H.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">The Subject
        MAY contain other attributes as specified in Appendix A of
        [RFC5280]. These
        attributes MUST NOT contain </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;6&atilde;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">metadata
        such as
        &#8216;.&#8217;, &#8216;-&#8216;, or &#8216; &#8216; (i.e. space) characters. </span><span
        style="font-family:Courier">This
        requirement is derived from section 9.2.8 of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">7.
        subjectPublicKeyInfo:
        If this field contains an RSA public key the minimum modulus
        size is 2048 bits.
        (No requirement is imposed on the public exponent.) If it
        carries a DSA key,
        the following pairs of values are permitted: </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;&iuml;\0027A9&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">L=
2048,
        N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256, L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N=256. If
        the field
        conveys an ECC (presumably ECDSA) public key, the allowed curves
        are NIST
        P-256, P-384 and P-521.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>To
        verify that a
        certificate employs an accepted digest and signature algorithm,
        one examines
        the OID contained in this field. OIDs defined in the following
        RFCs are
        applicable here: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (<b
          style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
          normal">Do we want to enumerate the specific OID strings
          applicable to
          certificate signatures?)</b></span><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">8.
        issuerUniqueId: This is
        an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 certificate.
        [CABF-Basline] imposes no
        requirements on this field, so no constraints beyond those in
        [RFC5280] are
        applicable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">9.
        subjectUniqueId: : This
        is an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 certificate.
        [CABF-Basline] imposes
        no requirements on this field, so no constraints beyond those in
        [RFC5280] are
        applicable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">10.
        signatureAlgorithm:
        This field MUST match the signature field contained within the
        certificate (see
        # 3 above).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">11.
        signatureValue: This
        field is verified using the public key extracted from the
        certificate of the Issuer
        of this certificate, and the algorithms specified in the
        preceding field.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">A.1.2 An
        X.509 v3
        certificate may contain extensions. [CABF-baseline] mandates the
        presence of
        several extensions, and imposes requirements on their content.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">1. The
        certificate MUST
        contain the subjectAltName extension, and that extension MUST
        contain at least
        one entry. Each entry MUST be either a dNSName containing a
        Fully-Qualified
        Domain Name (FQDN) or an iPAddress. Wildcard FQDNs are
        permitted. No other
        entry types are permitted. This requirement is derived from
        section 9.2.1 of
        [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">2. A
        certificate issued to
        a CA<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span></span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
        12.0pt;font-family:Courier">MUST include the certificatePolcies
        extension. It
        may r MAY NOT be marked CRITICAL. The policyQualifiers field MAY
        be present,
        and the policyQualifierId and/or the cPSuri fields may be
        populated, using the
        syntax specified in [RFC5280]. This requirement is derived from
        Appendix B,
        Section 2.A of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">A.<span style="font:7.0pt
            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
        font-family:Courier">If this extension contains the OID </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;^&aacute;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>2.23.140.1.2.1, then the
        Subject field MUST
        NOT contain an organizationalName, streetAddress, localityName,
        stateOrProvinceName, or postalCode attribute. </span><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier">This requirement is derived from section 9.3.1 of
        [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-pagination:
      none;mso-list:l2 level1
      lfo1;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">B.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;"> </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier">If this
        extension
        contains the OID </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
        Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;^&aacute;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>2.23.140.1.2.2, then the
        Subject field MUST
        contain </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;\.&ccedil;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">organizationName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"
      style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-pagination:
      none;mso-list:l2 level1
      lfo1;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;
          mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
            style="mso-list:Ignore">C.<span style="font:7.0pt
              &quot;Times New Roman&quot;"> </span></span></span></b><!--[endif]--><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;\.&ccedil;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">localityName,
stateOrProvinceName
        (if applicable), and countryName attributes. </span><span
        style="font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from
        section 9.3.1 of
        [CABF-Baseline]. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">(How
          does one know
          whether the stateOrProvinceName is applicable?)<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">3. The
        basicConstraints
        extension MUST be present, marked CRITICAL and the cA flag MUST
        be set TRUE in
        a CA certificate. This requirement is derived from Appendix A
        Section 2.D of
        [CABF-Baseline]. The presence of this extension is optional for
        an EE
        certificates. If the extension is present in a Subscriber
        certificate it MUST
        have the cA flag set FALSE. (If a certificate does not contain
        this extension
        it is presumed to be a Subscriber certificate and MUST be
        processed as such with
        regard to all other verification checks.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">4. The
        cRLDistributinPoints extension MUST be present in a CA
        certificate. It MUST NOT
        be marked critical and it MUST contain an HTTP URL. This
        extension is optional
        for Subscriber certificates, but if present the same syntactic
        constraints
        apply. This requirement is derived from </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">Appendix
        B,
        Sections 2.B and 3.B of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">5. The
        keyUsage
        extension MUST be present in a CA certificate and it MUST be
        marked critical.
        The keyCertSign and cRLSign bits MUST be set TRUE. The
        digitalSignature bit MAY
        be set TRUE as well. This requirement is derived from </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">Appendix
B,
        Section 2.E of [CABF-Baseline]. </span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">6. The
        authorityInformatinAccess
        extension MAY be present and, if present, MUST NOT be marked
        CRITICAL. It MUST
        specify </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;\]&sect;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">accessMethod
        1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 and
        MAY specify </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">accessMethod
        1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2. This
        requirement is derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.C and 3.C of
        [CABF-Baseline].
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">7. The
        extendedKeyusage extension MAY
        be present in a CA certificate. If present, it need not be
        marked CRITICAL. If
        the extension is present in a CA certificate, and if the
        certificate contains
        the nameConstraints extension, then </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;y&iuml;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">the
        value id-kp-serverAuth
        MUST be present</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">. The
        extendedKeyusage extension MUST
        be present in a Subscriber certificate. </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;_&deg;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">Either
        the
        value id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth or both values MUST
        be present.
        id-kp-emailProtection MAY be present. This requirement is
        derived from Appendix
        B, Sections 2.G and 3.F of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;_&deg;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;_&deg;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">8. The
        nameConstraints extension MAY
        appear in CA certificates and need not be marked CRITICAL
        (contrary to [RCC5280]).
        If the certificate also contains the </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;i&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">extendedKeyusage
extension
        and that extension contains the value </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;y&iuml;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">id-kp-serverAuth,
        <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>then that extension MUST
        NOT contain the
        anyExtendedKeyusage value in the KeyPurposeID. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;y&iuml;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">Moreover the
        nameConstrants </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;O&Oslash;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">extension
MUST
        impose constraints on dNSName, iPAddress and DirectoryName name
        types.
        Both the permittedSubtrees and excludedsubtrees fields MAY be
        employed. </span><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;_&deg;&#8217;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">This
requirement
        is derived from Appendix B, Section 2.F and Section 9.7 of
        [CABF-Baseline].</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">9. Other
        extensions
        defined in [RFC5280] MAY be present and MUST be marked with
        respect to
        criticality as specified therein. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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          style="font-family:Courier">A.2 Semantic Verification of a
          Certificate <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">1.
        [CABF-Baseline] imposes
        a number of requirements on certificate issuance that cannot be
        verified
        without access to reference information for the certificate
        Subject, or
        information about the CA hierarchy. For example:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
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style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">The CA must
        verify that the Subject has the right to use or control of, all
        Domain Names
        and/or IP Addresses listed in the Subject field and/or the
        subjectAltName
        extension in the certificate. This requirement is derived from
        Section 7.1 of [CABF-Baseline].
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
      level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">The Issuer
        name MUST contain a &#8220;meaningful&#8221; identifier of the CA that
        issued the
        certificate, in the organizationName attribute of the Issuer
        name. This
        requirement is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
      level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">The Issuer
        name MUST contain the countryName attribute corresponding to the
        country on
        which the Issuer&#8217;s place of business is located. This
        requirement is derived
        from Section 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline]. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0
      level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">4.<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier">If the Subject
        is non-null, it MUST contain </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;&aring;&egrave;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">either
        the
        (verified) Subject&#8217;s name or DBA</span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
        font-family:Courier">. </span><span style="font-family:Courier">The
        CA MUST
        verify the streetAddress, localityName, stateOrProvinceName,
        postalCode,
        countryName, and organizationalUnitName attributes, if present.
        This
        requirement is derived from Section 9.2.4a of [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier">2.
        A certificate issued to a subordinate CA that is not an
        affiliate of a &#8220;root&#8221;
        CA MUST NOT contain the anyPolicy policy identifier. </span><span
        style="font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from
        section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline].
        <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">(How would a Monitor know
          whether the
          subordinate CA is affiliated with the root CA?)<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">3. <span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span></span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
        font-family:Courier">A certificate issued to a subordinate CA
        that is an
        affiliate of a &#8220;root&#8221; CA MAY include one or more explicit policy
        identifiers
        (either </span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;^&aacute;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;">2.23.140.1.2.1
        or 2.23.140.1.2.2 or
        policy identifiers defined by the CA in its CP and/or CPS). It
        also MAY include
        the anyPolicy OID. </span><span style="font-family:Courier">This
        requirement is
        derived from section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. If the extension
        contains any of
        the OIDs noted explicitly above, it is acceptable. <b
          style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
          normal">(How would a Monitor know whether the subordinate CA
          is affiliated with
          the root CA?) </b></span><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:
        Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;^&aacute;\0027F8&#63743;&#711;&oslash;&Ecirc;&#8734;&#8212;&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">4. A
        Subscriber
        certificate issued after April 1, 2015 MUST not contain a
        validity interval
        longer than 39 months, unless the issuer asserts that the
        certificate meets all
        of the criteria described in Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline],
        from which this
        requirement is derived. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">(How
          would a Monitor
          determine that a certificate with a validity interval between
          39 and 60 months
          is acceptable, based on Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline]?)</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">A Monitor
        cannot, in
        general determine if these requirements have been met; it lacks
        knowledge of
        the processes employed by the CA to verify the Subject name, and
        it may not be
        able to determine whether the CA is &#8220;meaningfully&#8221; identified by
        the Issuer
        name. A Monitor may not be able to determine the organizational
        relationships
        between a &#8220;root&#8221; CA and subordinate CAs. Thus mis-issuance
        relative to these
        requirements cannot, in general, be detected by a Monitor.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier">Nonetheless,
        a Monitor
        can &#8220;protect&#8221; specific Subjects, based on reference data
        provided by these
        Subjects. A Monitor trying to determine that a certificate has
        been issued to
        the &#8220;right&#8221; Subject can do so using the certificate(s) issued to
        the Subject,
        as a reference. For example, if a Monitor is providing
        &#8220;protection&#8221; for a
        Subject, it requires the name of the Subject (as it appears in
        the Subject
        field or subjectAltName extension) and the public key associated
        with that
        Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can examine
        every log entry to
        determine if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If
        a log entry
        matches either of these names, and if it contain a different
        public key, this
        is evidence of mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:none;
      text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Courier"><b>A.3
          Syntactic
          Verification of an Extended Validation Certificate</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; coming soon ...<br>
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--------------060304020109010908060108--


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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On 25 September 2014 16:06, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>
>> ...
>>>
>>> So the scope of mis-issuance is much broader than what I had imagined.
>>>
>>> I think we may need to add two things to 6269-bis:
>>>
>>>      - normative references to CABF documents that are the basis for the
>>> broader
>>>        set of cert issuance criteria that you note
>>
>> This seems sensible. Note, though, that I would not want to constrain
>> mis-issue to be solely defined by CABF. Part of the point is that
>> anyone can monitor any aspect of issuance they want, and if they think
>> something is wrong, raise it to appropriate authorities...
>
> Mis-issuance is the primary (sole?) rationale for CT, so I am not
> comfortable
> with the notion that mis-issuance is not well-defined.

Reality doesn't always make us comfortable :-)

We keep finding new ways for people to get certs wrong, and thus
creating new rules for them. Also, the exact rules are context
dependent, and may even depend on contracts and other things we can't
even see.

>
>>>      - maybe two appendices to enumerate the criteria. this will be
>>> critical
>>> if
>>>        if the CABF docs contain other criteria that are outside the scope
>>> of
>>> CT,
>>>        e.g., criteria that cannot be evaluated based on what is logged.
>>
>> It would certainly be interesting to know though I don't think it is
>> essential - an example of something CT cannot reveal is who generates
>> the key (obviously it is bad practice for CAs to do this for their
>> customers - I don't know if BRs or EV ban the practice though - in any
>> case, CT would not tell you who did it).
>
> I'm puzzled; how would CT allow a Monitor to determine who generated the
> key pair used in a cert that was logged? I don't understand your example
> here.

I said it wouldn't, so you are right to be puzzled.

>> As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
>> a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
>> I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.
>
> Well, if we can't say how this is done, preferably based on some standard,
> then we can't make an argument that, after being being detected by CT, that
> there is a fix. If so, then the security considerations section will have to
> discuss this residual issue.

I think we have ample evidence that there are fixes to mis-issuance.
Some of them are based on standards, too (e.g. revoking in CRLs or via
OCSP).


From nobody Fri Sep 26 08:49:12 2014
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Ben,

> ...
>> Mis-issuance is the primary (sole?) rationale for CT, so I am not
>> comfortable
>> with the notion that mis-issuance is not well-defined.
> Reality doesn't always make us comfortable :-)
>
> We keep finding new ways for people to get certs wrong, and thus
> creating new rules for them. Also, the exact rules are context
> dependent, and may even depend on contracts and other things we can't
> even see.
I don't accept that rationale as a basis for avoiding creating a definition
for mis-issuance.

The CABF Guidelines are revised over time. We can update the RFC to match.
We do that for other IETF Standards.

I don't understand the notion of context dependence for the definition
of mis-issuance. Can you provide some examples? Who decides what constitutes
a mi-issued cert inn what context?

I agree that a contracts between a CA and a Subject can include terms and
conditions that might cause aert to be "mis-issued" relative to those
Ts & Cs. But, I though CT was trying to enable Monitors to detect 
mis-issuance
on an Internet-wide scale. Violation of Ts & Cs is something that the
Subject and CA would be able to determine, but not others, in general.
At a minimum we need a set of universally-applicable issuance standards to
apply, based on two things:
- the syntax of the cert, which everyone can examine
- comparison of logged certs against reference certs, i.e., valid
certs already issued to (legitimate) Subjects. A Monitor can
perform this comparison if provided with a reference cert. if the
Monitor wants to perform additional checks, that may be fine

if we're going to create a standard that purports to detect mis-issuance,
but we can't define mis-issuance in a well-articulated, testable fashion, I
question the utility of this effort.
>> I'm puzzled; how would CT allow a Monitor to determine who generated the
>> key pair used in a cert that was logged? I don't understand your example
>> here.
> I said it wouldn't, so you are right to be puzzled.
Then why cite this as as an example of mis-issuance, and yet claim that CT
is intended to detect mis-issuance? That's what I find puzzling.
>>> As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
>>> a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
>>> I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.
>> Well, if we can't say how this is done, preferably based on some standard,
>> then we can't make an argument that, after being being detected by CT, that
>> there is a fix. If so, then the security considerations section will have to
>> discuss this residual issue.
> I think we have ample evidence that there are fixes to mis-issuance.
> Some of them are based on standards, too (e.g. revoking in CRLs or via
> OCSP).
I believe we have to be able to explain how mis-issuance (if it can be 
defined)
is detected by CT, and then how the detection provided by CT is used to 
address
the problem. That's why I believe we need an architecture and a 
threat/attack model, so
that there is a framework for explaining how CT fits into a solution to 
the problem.
When there are standards-bases ways to respond to mis-issuance detected 
by CT, then we
need to point to them. When there are not, we need to admit that and say 
that there
are residual problems, or that there are extant, but not standardized, 
mitigation
techniques.

Steve


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On 26 September 2014 16:49, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> Ben,
>
>> ...
>>>
>>> Mis-issuance is the primary (sole?) rationale for CT, so I am not
>>> comfortable
>>> with the notion that mis-issuance is not well-defined.
>>
>> Reality doesn't always make us comfortable :-)
>>
>> We keep finding new ways for people to get certs wrong, and thus
>> creating new rules for them. Also, the exact rules are context
>> dependent, and may even depend on contracts and other things we can't
>> even see.
>
> I don't accept that rationale as a basis for avoiding creating a definition
> for mis-issuance.
>
> The CABF Guidelines are revised over time. We can update the RFC to match.
> We do that for other IETF Standards.
>
> I don't understand the notion of context dependence for the definition
> of mis-issuance. Can you provide some examples? Who decides what constitutes
> a mi-issued cert inn what context?
>
> I agree that a contracts between a CA and a Subject can include terms and
> conditions that might cause aert to be "mis-issued" relative to those
> Ts & Cs.

This is the kind of thing I meant.

> But, I though CT was trying to enable Monitors to detect
> mis-issuance
> on an Internet-wide scale. Violation of Ts & Cs is something that the
> Subject and CA would be able to determine, but not others, in general.

I want to enable as much to be detected as possible. Certainly if we
could only help in these narrow cases, that would be a cause for
concern - but my point is I don't think we can _fully_ nail down all
instances of mis-issuance.

> At a minimum we need a set of universally-applicable issuance standards to
> apply, based on two things:
> - the syntax of the cert, which everyone can examine
> - comparison of logged certs against reference certs, i.e., valid
> certs already issued to (legitimate) Subjects. A Monitor can
> perform this comparison if provided with a reference cert. if the
> Monitor wants to perform additional checks, that may be fine
>
> if we're going to create a standard that purports to detect mis-issuance,
> but we can't define mis-issuance in a well-articulated, testable fashion, I
> question the utility of this effort.

I didn't intend to suggest there was no point in defining mis-issuance
to the extent that its possible, just that I don't think its likely
we'll manage to completely define it, so we should not attempt to do
so. i.e. I would not like to see the RFC say "this is mis-issuance,
and nothing else is".

>>>
>>> I'm puzzled; how would CT allow a Monitor to determine who generated the
>>> key pair used in a cert that was logged? I don't understand your example
>>> here.
>>
>> I said it wouldn't, so you are right to be puzzled.
>
> Then why cite this as as an example of mis-issuance, and yet claim that CT
> is intended to detect mis-issuance? That's what I find puzzling.

I was supporting your claim that not all forms of mis-issuance are
detectable by simply looking at the certificate (though I guess almost
all are).

>>>>
>>>> As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
>>>> a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
>>>> I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.
>>>
>>> Well, if we can't say how this is done, preferably based on some
>>> standard,
>>> then we can't make an argument that, after being being detected by CT,
>>> that
>>> there is a fix. If so, then the security considerations section will have
>>> to
>>> discuss this residual issue.
>>
>> I think we have ample evidence that there are fixes to mis-issuance.
>> Some of them are based on standards, too (e.g. revoking in CRLs or via
>> OCSP).
>
> I believe we have to be able to explain how mis-issuance (if it can be
> defined)
> is detected by CT, and then how the detection provided by CT is used to
> address
> the problem. That's why I believe we need an architecture and a
> threat/attack model, so
> that there is a framework for explaining how CT fits into a solution to the
> problem.
> When there are standards-bases ways to respond to mis-issuance detected by
> CT, then we
> need to point to them. When there are not, we need to admit that and say
> that there
> are residual problems, or that there are extant, but not standardized,
> mitigation
> techniques.

Sure thing.


From nobody Fri Sep 26 11:46:49 2014
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From: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
To: "kent@bbn.com" <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:45:34 -0700
Thread-Topic: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Subject: Re: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Stephen,

Great work here. It's clear you've taken a lot of time and care to go throu=
gh the documents with a fine-toothed comb. I have some answers/comments bel=
ow:

> The CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely synta=
ctic and thus
> could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to issue an SCT. I wa=
nt to suggest
> we consider that as a possible change to the current design.

I think this idea has merit. In a separate thread, I asked Google to remove=
 some of Symantec's roots from their log servers' trust store, because we h=
ave never and don't ever expect to issue EV certs from those roots (the cur=
rent implementation of CT is required for EV only). I pointed out that by r=
emoving those roots, the log server could _prevent_ an unintended mis-isuan=
ce rather than just record it. Google didn't agree with me.
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/DHf74DdO2r=
s

Also, although I like the idea of log servers rejecting syntactically-inval=
id certificates, that may create problems for CAs because the CABF requirem=
ents have changed over time and will likely change in the future. Any chang=
es would have to be rolled out to log servers and browsers in time to preve=
nt rejection of a valid certificate.
A.1 Syntactic Verification of a Domain Validation Certificate
(Is there a better reference for EV certificate policy OIDs?)
I might suggest Chrome's source code itself: https://code.google.com/p/chro=
mium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc&sq=3Dpackage:c=
hromium
2. serialNumber: No requirements beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are mand=
ated by [CABF-Baseline]. ([CABF-Baseline] requires that a serial number con=
tan at least 20 bits of entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not clear how this=
 can be verified through syntactic examination of a certificate.)
[CABF-Baseline] says it's a SHOULD, not a must, although I agree that it ca=
n't clearly be verified, except at the extreme where the serial number is l=
ess than 20 bits long.
 6. subject: A certificate MAY contain a NULL Subject name If it contains a=
 non-null Subject name:
There's a period missing before "If".
2. A certificate issued to a CA  MUST include the certificatePolcies extens=
ion. It may r MAY NOT be
Typo: "r" -> "or"

C. localityName, stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and countryName attri=
butes. This requirement is derived from section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline]. (=
How does one know whether the stateOrProvinceName is applicable?)

I think bullet point C is a copy and paste error, and should be removed. Yo=
ur question, though, is relevant. This is an open question. At the last CA/=
Browser Forum face-to-face meeting, some CA attendees indicated that they h=
ad difficulty as there are many countries with no states/provinces, like "B=
ouvet Island", "British Virgin Islands", "Christmas Island", "Falkland Isla=
nds", "Faroe Islands", "French Guiana", "Gibraltar", "Guadeloupe", "Guam", =
"Guernsey", "Isle of Man", "Jersey", "Lebanon", "Macedonia", "Martinique", =
"Mayotte", "Montenegro", "Netherlands Antilles", "Niue", "Norfolk Island", =
"Palestinian Territory", "Pitcairn", "Reunion", "Serbia", "Singapore", "Slo=
venia", "South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands", "Svalbard and Jan M=
ayen", "Western Sahara", "Vatican", Taiwan, etc. I expect we'll debate this=
 further in the Forum and perhaps change [CABF-Baseline].
4. The cRLDistributinPoints extension MUST be present in a CA certificate. =
It MUST NOT be marked
Typo: "cRLDistributinPoints" -> "cRLDistributionPoints"
6. The authorityInformatinAccess extension MAY be present and, if present, =
MUST NOT be marked
Typo: "authorityInformatinAccess" -> "authorityInformationAccess"

A.2 Semantic Verification of a Certificate
Nonetheless, a Monitor can "protect" specific Subjects, based on reference =
data provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying to determine that a certi=
ficate has been issued to the "right" Subject can do so using the certifica=
te(s) issued to the Subject, as a reference. For example, if a Monitor is p=
roviding "protection" for a Subject, it requires the name of the Subject (a=
s it appears in the Subject field or subjectAltName extension) and the publ=
ic key associated with that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor=
 can examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same Subject o=
r SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of these names, and if it c=
ontain a different public key, this is evidence of mis-issuance.
There's no requirement that a Subject be associated with a single public ke=
y. In some cases, web site owners generate a different key pair on each mac=
hine behind a load balancer, and apply for certificates with the same Subje=
ct name but different key.
I'm not sure if you've captured the type of mis-issuance that CT was origin=
ally intended to detect: when a hacked, faulty or rogue CA issues a certifi=
cate to a Subject without the Subject's knowledge. The Monitor alone cannot=
 detect that. It can report to the Subject that a certificate was logged fo=
r the Subject, but only the Subject can tell if that was a valid issuance o=
r mis-issuance.
-Rick



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 link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Stephen, <o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0p=
t;color:#1F497D'>Great work here. It&#8217;s clear you&#8217;ve taken a lot=
 of time and care to go through the documents with a fine-toothed comb. I h=
ave some answers/comments below:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>&gt; Th=
e CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely syntactic=
 and thus<br>&gt; could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to is=
sue an SCT. I want to suggest<br>&gt; we consider that as a possible change=
 to the current design. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>I think this id=
ea has merit. In a separate thread, I asked Google to remove some of Symant=
ec&#8217;s roots from their log servers&#8217; trust store, because we have=
 never and don&#8217;t ever expect to issue EV certs from those roots (the =
current implementation of CT is required for EV only). I pointed out that b=
y removing those roots, the log server could _<i>prevent</i>_ an unintended=
 mis-isuance rather than just record it. Google didn&#8217;t agree with me.=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;=
color:#1F497D'><a href=3D"https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!=
topic/ct-policy/DHf74DdO2rs">https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum=
/#!topic/ct-policy/DHf74DdO2rs</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Also,=
 although I like the idea of log servers rejecting syntactically-invalid ce=
rtificates, that may create problems for CAs because the CABF requirements =
have changed over time and will likely change in the future. Any changes wo=
uld have to be rolled out to log servers and browsers in time to prevent re=
jection of a valid certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in=
;text-autospace:none'><b><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>A.1 Syntactic =
Verification of a Domain Validation Certificate</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:a=
uto;margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'> (Is there a b=
etter reference for EV certificate policy OIDs?)</span></b><b><span style=
=3D'font-family:Courier;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>I might suggest Chrome&#8217;=
s source code itself: <a href=3D"https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesea=
rch#chromium/src/net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc&amp;sq=3Dpackage:chromium"=
>https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/cert/ev_roo=
t_ca_metadata.cc&amp;sq=3Dpackage:chromium</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;m=
argin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>2. serialNumber: No re=
quirements beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are mandated by [CABF-Baseline=
]. ([CABF-Baseline] requires that a serial number contan at least 20 bits o=
f entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not clear how this can be verified throu=
gh syntactic examination of a certificate.)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>[CABF-Baseline] says it&#8217=
;s a SHOULD, not a must, although I agree that it can&#8217;t clearly be ve=
rified, except at the extreme where the serial number is less than 20 bits =
long.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt=
:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-fami=
ly:Courier'>&nbsp;6. subject: A certificate MAY contain a NULL Subject name=
 If it contains a non-null Subject name:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>There&#8217;s a period missing bef=
ore &#8220;If&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'ms=
o-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span st=
yle=3D'font-family:Courier'>2. A certificate issued to a CA&nbsp; MUST incl=
ude the certificatePolcies extension. It may r MAY NOT be</span><span style=
=3D'font-family:Courier;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Typo: &#8220;r&#8221; -&gt; &#8220;=
or&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraphCxSpFirst style=
=3D'margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space:auto;text-indent:-.25in;text-autospace:=
none'><b><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>C.</span></b><b><span style=3D=
'font-size:7.0pt'> </span></b><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>localityN=
ame, stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and countryName attributes. </spa=
n><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>This requirement is derived from sect=
ion 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline]. <b>(How does one know whether the stateOrProv=
inceName is applicable?)<o:p></o:p></b></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagra=
phCxSpLast style=3D'margin-left:0in;mso-add-space:auto;text-autospace:none'=
><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>I think bullet point C is a=
 copy and paste error, and should be removed. Your question, though, is rel=
evant. This is an open question. At the last CA/Browser Forum face-to-face =
meeting, some CA attendees indicated that they had difficulty as there are =
many countries with no states/provinces, like &quot;Bouvet Island&quot;, &q=
uot;British Virgin Islands&quot;, &quot;Christmas Island&quot;, &quot;Falkl=
and Islands&quot;, &quot;Faroe Islands&quot;, &quot;French Guiana&quot;, &q=
uot;Gibraltar&quot;, &quot;Guadeloupe&quot;, &quot;Guam&quot;, &quot;Guerns=
ey&quot;, &quot;Isle of Man&quot;, &quot;Jersey&quot;, &quot;Lebanon&quot;,=
 &quot;Macedonia&quot;, &quot;Martinique&quot;, &quot;Mayotte&quot;, &quot;=
Montenegro&quot;, &quot;Netherlands Antilles&quot;, &quot;Niue&quot;, &quot=
;Norfolk Island&quot;, &quot;Palestinian Territory&quot;, &quot;Pitcairn&qu=
ot;, &quot;Reunion&quot;, &quot;Serbia&quot;, &quot;Singapore&quot;, &quot;=
Slovenia&quot;, &quot;South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands&quot;, &=
quot;Svalbard and Jan Mayen&quot;, &quot;Western Sahara&quot;, &quot;Vatica=
n&quot;, Taiwan, etc. I expect we&#8217;ll debate this further in the Forum=
 and perhaps change [CABF-Baseline].<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>4. The cRLDistributinPoints exte=
nsion MUST be present in a CA certificate. It MUST NOT be marked </span><sp=
an style=3D'font-family:Courier;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'=
><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Typo: &#8220;cRLDistributin=
Points&#8221; -&gt; &#8220;cRLDistributionPoints&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none'><span style=3D'font-family:Co=
urier'>6. The authorityInformatinAccess extension MAY be present and, if pr=
esent, MUST NOT be marked </span><span style=3D'font-family:Courier;color:#=
1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-=
alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-autospace:none'><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Typo: &#8220;authorityInformatinAccess&#8221; =
-&gt; &#8220;authorityInformationAccess&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;m=
argin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none'><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>&n=
bsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:=
auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><b><span style=3D'font-fa=
mily:Courier'>A.2 Semantic Verification of a Certificate </span></b><o:p></=
o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bo=
ttom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none'><span style=3D'font-fam=
ily:Courier'>Nonetheless, a Monitor can &#8220;protect&#8221; specific Subj=
ects, based on reference data provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying =
to determine that a certificate has been issued to the &#8220;right&#8221; =
Subject can do so using the certificate(s) issued to the Subject, as a refe=
rence. For example, if a Monitor is providing &#8220;protection&#8221; for =
a Subject, it requires the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subjec=
t field or subjectAltName extension) and the public key associated with tha=
t Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can examine every log ent=
ry to determine if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log=
 entry matches either of these names, and if it contain a different public =
key, this is evidence of mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-auto=
space:none'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>There&#8217;s no=
 requirement that a Subject be associated with a single public key. In some=
 cases, web site owners generate a different key pair on each machine behin=
d a load balancer, and apply for certificates with the same Subject name bu=
t different key.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-mar=
gin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-autospace:none'><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m not sure if you&#8217;ve cap=
tured the type of mis-issuance that CT was originally intended to detect: w=
hen a hacked, faulty or rogue CA issues a certificate to a Subject without =
the Subject&#8217;s knowledge. The Monitor alone cannot detect that. It can=
 report to the Subject that a certificate was logged for the Subject, but o=
nly the Subject can tell if that was a valid issuance or mis-issuance.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-=
margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-autospace:none'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;color:#1F497D'>-Rick<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'ms=
o-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in;text-auto=
space:none'><span style=3D'font-family:Courier'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-family=
:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></s=
pan></p></div></body></html>=

--_000_544B0DD62A64C1448B2DA253C011414607D1628D70TUS1XCHEVSPIN_--


From nobody Fri Sep 26 12:01:48 2014
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Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:01:43 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Fwd: The RFC Style Guide (RFC 7322)
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As we hurtle (we hope) towards publication of the bis document,
it's a good idea to take a look at the just-published RFC Editor
style guide and make sure that the document is in alignment with
it.  Content is the core question but documents get hung up on
formal nits more often than they should.

Melinda


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: The RFC Style Guide (RFC 7322)
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:56:13 -0700
From: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
To: rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org, ietf-announce@ietf.org
CC: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>

Greetings,

RFC 7322, "RFC Style Guide", has been published.  This document
obsoletes RFC 2223 and other style information previously provided.
Please review the complete set of style guidelines impacting the RFC
series that is available here:

   http://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide.html

With the publication of the new RFC Style Guide, the RFC Editor will
be enforcing the guidance set forth in RFC 7322.  This applies to
documents currently in process, including those in AUTH48.  The
documents will be updated and authors will be notified of that the
updates are ready for review.  Please be sure to review the udpates
carefully.

Thank you,
RFC Editor Team




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Dear Stephen,

I've been reading through this thread with fascination. Thank you for =
bringing up the fact that CT needs to more clearly (and accurately) =
state what its threat model is, what sort of protections it does and =
does not provide to netizens, etc.

Had I found this thread earlier this week, I would have cited parts of =
it in a blog post I wrote on the same topic a few days ago [1].

I don't know whether you'll find that post useful or not, but for the =
sake of building a threat model, I think the visual diagrams there might =
help others more quickly grasp the sort of attack that CT should expect =
to face from certain actors. I know that I am primarily a visual thinker =
and learner, so for me visuals are essential to fully grasping complex =
systems.

The post does not discuss gossip because, to my understanding, the =
details of gossip have still not been fully agreed upon and specified in =
the RFC. Once they are, I will be very interested to re-evaluate what =
sort of impact might have.

Thanks again for raising this topic on the list.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

[1] =
http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparenc=
y/

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_3F77C03A-B312-40E4-92A9-F7E94D88B067
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Stephen,<div><br></div><div>I've been reading through this thread with =
fascination. Thank you for bringing up the fact that CT needs to more =
clearly (and accurately) state what its threat model is, what sort of =
protections it does and does not provide to netizens, =
etc.</div><div><br></div><div>Had I found this thread earlier this week, =
I would have cited parts of it in a blog post I wrote on the same topic =
a few days ago [1].</div><div><br></div><div>I don't know whether you'll =
find that post useful or not, but for the sake of building a threat =
model, I think the visual diagrams there might help others more quickly =
grasp the sort of attack that CT should expect to face from certain =
actors. I know that I am primarily a visual thinker and learner, so for =
me visuals are essential to fully grasping complex =
systems.</div><div><br></div><div>The post does not discuss gossip =
because, to my understanding, the details of gossip have still not been =
fully agreed upon and specified in the RFC. Once they are, I will be =
very interested to re-evaluate what sort of impact might =
have.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks again for raising this topic on =
the list.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div><br></div><div>[1]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-tra=
nsparency/">http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate=
-transparency/</a></div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br></body></html>=

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From nobody Fri Sep 26 19:38:53 2014
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On Fri, 26 Sep 2014, Tao Effect wrote:

> The post does not discuss gossip because, to my understanding, the details of gossip have
> still not been fully agreed upon and specified in the RFC. Once they are, I will be very
> interested to re-evaluate what sort of impact might have.

It would be even better it you would be part of the discussion here on
the trans working group to ensure the gossip protocol is implemented
in a way that is secure and useful to everyone, including yourself.

Paul


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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Dear Paul,

On Sep 26, 2014, at 7:38 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> It would be even better it you would be part of the discussion here on
> the trans working group to ensure the gossip protocol is implemented
> in a way that is secure and useful to everyone, including yourself.

That's very kind of you to invite me to the discussion, so I spent some =
time just now thinking about how to do gossip right.

To start, I re-read the most recent document I have on gossip:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/90/slides/slides-90-trans-2.pdf

Then something occurred to me: for some reason, perhaps because of how =
complicated the details of CT are, I hadn't realized that I was wrong =
about something, that now seems obvious. In my blog post, I'd written:

At its core, it introduces the concept of an append-only auditable log =
that is guaranteed to show the most recently issued SSL cert for any =
given domain (IF you=92re able to ask it).

That is actually not true (for Auditors).

So then I re-read parts of Steve's original post in this thread that I =
had skipped. Indeed, there it was in his "Notes", the same thing I just =
now realized (he really did a fantastic job):

1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not =
watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not =
mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor =
MUST offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be =
monitored. Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know =
which set of Monitors will provide =93sufficient=94 coverage. Unless =
these details are addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance =
even when certificates are logged.


For Auditors, it doesn't mitigate mis-issuance even for *the same* log. =
I.e., a rouge CA/log combo (let's just call them "Clogs" :P) is free to =
step in, create a fraudulent certificate, use it for MITM, and then =
restore the original, undetected even by Auditors that successfully =
gossip STHs! For the same log!

The only ones who can stop this are Monitors, since they are able to =
request everything that's in the Clog and verify for themselves that =
there aren't any fraudulently issued certs.

And this, my friends, is Game Over.

I see no way that Monitors can save us here, even with successful gossip =
of STHs.

To save us, Monitors would need to monitor *all* logs for *all* domains =
and somehow successfully get this information to people who are being =
attacked with a fraudulent certificate.

Sorry, I tried, and in trying, I've realized that CT is more broken than =
I originally thought. I have no recommendations to give (except ones =
that you've heard already, and are likely "off topic" on this list).

:-\

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_422AABEC-4C09-4CD0-8856-75E828AD8F2A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true">Dear Paul,</div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br></div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true">On Sep 26, 2014, at 7:38 PM, Paul Wouters =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br></div><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">It would be even better it you would be part of the =
discussion here on<br>the trans working group to ensure the gossip =
protocol is implemented<br>in a way that is secure and useful to =
everyone, including yourself.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That's =
very kind of you to invite me to the discussion, so I spent some time =
just now thinking about how to do gossip =
right.</div><div><br></div><div>To start, I re-read the most recent =
document I have on gossip:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/90/slides/slides-90-trans-2.pdf">h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/proceedings/90/slides/slides-90-trans-2.pdf</a></div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Then something occurred to me: for some reason, =
perhaps because of how complicated the details of CT are, I hadn't =
realized that I was wrong about something, that now seems obvious. In my =
blog post, I'd written:</div><div><br></div></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div>At =
its core, it introduces the concept of an append-only auditable =
<strong>log</strong> that is <em>guaranteed</em> to show the most =
recently issued SSL cert for any given domain (IF you=92re able to ask =
it).</div></div></blockquote><div><div><br></div><div>That is actually =
not true (for Auditors).</div><div><br></div><div>So then I re-read =
parts of Steve's original post in this thread that I had skipped. =
Indeed, there it was in his "Notes", the same thing I just now realized =
(he really did a fantastic job):</div><div><br></div></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.5in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: =
Cambria; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style=3D"font-family: =
Courier;">1.<span style=3D"font-size: 7pt; font-family: 'Times New =
Roman';">&nbsp;</span></span><span style=3D"font-family: Courier;">If a =
CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not watched =
by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not mitigate =
a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUST offer =
to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitored. =
Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of =
Monitors will provide =93sufficient=94 coverage. Unless these details =
are addressed, use of <b>CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even when =
certificates are logged.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.5in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Cambria;"><span =
style=3D"font-family: =
Courier;">&nbsp;</span></div></div></div></blockquote><div><div><br></div>=
<div>For Auditors, it doesn't mitigate mis-issuance even for *the same* =
log. I.e., a rouge CA/log combo (let's just call them "Clogs" :P) is =
free to step in, create a fraudulent certificate, use it for MITM, and =
then restore the original, undetected <i>even by Auditors that =
successfully gossip STHs! For the same =
log!</i></div><div><br></div><div>The only ones who can stop this are =
Monitors, since they are able to request everything that's in the Clog =
and verify for themselves that there aren't any fraudulently issued =
certs.</div><div><br></div><div>And this, my friends, is Game =
Over.</div><div><br></div><div>I see no way that Monitors can save us =
here, even with successful gossip of STHs.</div><div><br></div><div>To =
save us, Monitors would need to monitor *all* logs for *all* domains and =
somehow successfully get this information to people who are being =
attacked with a fraudulent certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>Sorry, =
I tried, and in trying, I've realized that CT is more broken than I =
originally thought. I have no recommendations to give (except ones that =
you've heard already, and are likely "off topic" on this =
list).</div><div><br></div><div>:-\</div><div><br></div><div>Kind =
regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><br><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

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References: <5411E511.1040605@bbn.com> <CABrd9STmog8-JZCg9Tfv_ToUswY=9LBcZAPQM2cqUVcO0dhAnQ@mail.gmail.com> <54173589.3000404@bbn.com> <CABrd9SRShqm1r-2ajbqD5w1s686ciyjcEvywsXZaapgmi57NsA@mail.gmail.com> <54242F8A.2080602@bbn.com> <CABrd9SSwAdv-mAgofNT6bMWky7q=bZhAaX=L4gZUQDkROQ-3ZA@mail.gmail.com> <54258AF0.7090602@bbn.com> <4842B04F-A058-4F3C-9DA3-F29735EC7570@taoeffect.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1409262236210.27616@bofh.nohats.ca> <FC4A18E2-A42C-472F-B9FE-2278BB5A0BBA@taoeffect.com>
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On 27 September 2014 06:05, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:
> Dear Paul,
>
> On Sep 26, 2014, at 7:38 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>
> It would be even better it you would be part of the discussion here on
> the trans working group to ensure the gossip protocol is implemented
> in a way that is secure and useful to everyone, including yourself.
>
>
> That's very kind of you to invite me to the discussion, so I spent some t=
ime
> just now thinking about how to do gossip right.
>
> To start, I re-read the most recent document I have on gossip:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/90/slides/slides-90-trans-2.pdf
>
> Then something occurred to me: for some reason, perhaps because of how
> complicated the details of CT are, I hadn't realized that I was wrong abo=
ut
> something, that now seems obvious. In my blog post, I'd written:
>
> At its core, it introduces the concept of an append-only auditable log th=
at
> is guaranteed to show the most recently issued SSL cert for any given dom=
ain
> (IF you=E2=80=99re able to ask it).

This is not a guarantee CT aims to provide, nor, as you illustrate
below, is it a particularly useful guarantee.

> That is actually not true (for Auditors).

Quite.

> So then I re-read parts of Steve's original post in this thread that I ha=
d
> skipped. Indeed, there it was in his "Notes", the same thing I just now
> realized (he really did a fantastic job):
>
> 1. If a CA submits the bogus certificate to logs, but these logs are not
> watched by a Monitor that is tracking the targeted Subject, CT will not
> mitigate a mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUS=
T
> offer to track every Subject that requests its certificates be monitored.
> Absent such a guarantee, how do TLS clients and CAs know which set of
> Monitors will provide =E2=80=9Csufficient=E2=80=9D coverage. Unless these=
 details are
> addressed, use of CT does not mitigation mis-issuance even when certifica=
tes
> are logged.

I agree that CT doesn't mitigate mis-issuance for subjects that do not
participate. On monitors and guarantees - anyone can run a monitor,
including, of course, the subjects themselves, so clearly there's no
barrier to participation for subjects who want to participate.

> For Auditors, it doesn't mitigate mis-issuance even for *the same* log.
> I.e., a rouge CA/log combo (let's just call them "Clogs" :P) is free to s=
tep
> in, create a fraudulent certificate, use it for MITM, and then restore th=
e
> original, undetected even by Auditors that successfully gossip STHs! For =
the
> same log!
>
> The only ones who can stop this are Monitors, since they are able to requ=
est
> everything that's in the Clog and verify for themselves that there aren't
> any fraudulently issued certs.
>
> And this, my friends, is Game Over.
>
> I see no way that Monitors can save us here, even with successful gossip =
of
> STHs.
>
> To save us, Monitors would need to monitor *all* logs for *all* domains a=
nd
> somehow successfully get this information to people who are being attacke=
d
> with a fraudulent certificate.
>
> Sorry, I tried, and in trying, I've realized that CT is more broken than =
I
> originally thought. I have no recommendations to give (except ones that
> you've heard already, and are likely "off topic" on this list).
>
> :-\
>
> Kind regards,
> Greg Slepak
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing
> with the NSA.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>


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Subject: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Hi,

This gossiping that people is talking about, what is it? Here's a
summary of what I think some people mean when they say gossip and what
problem this thing tries to solve. It's based on a few IETF-related
documents and not the full picture. I'd be interested to hear what other
people read into the concept of gossiping in CT


A CT log which is audited and monitored without complaints can still
mount a partitioning attack on its clients. The easiest case, from the
logs perspective, is to divide the clients in two sets and serve them
two different views of the log. So set A sees view A and set B sees view
B.

If a client in one set sees an STH from a view meant for another set, it
could conclude that the log is misbehaving since the log cannot produce
a consistency proof between STH(A) and STH(B). (Unless A and B are forks
from a tree splitting at the older of the two tree heads, but then
they'd technically not be different views.)

The same is true for a client seeing an SCT from one view and an STH
from another because the log cannot produce an inclusion proof of an
entry in A being part of STH(B).

Gossiping then is the spreading of information about a given log, aiming
to cross the potential boundaries between different sets of clients of
that log.

* Whom to gossip with

In order to maximise the chance of crossing a border between to sets of
clients in a partitioning attack, clients should try to talk with as
many different clients as possible.

* What to gossip

The more information shared, the better detection we seem to get. But
sharing information have privacy implications. It seems to me that
sharing STH's is much less problematic than sharing SCT's.

Showing someone an STH will reveal that you've been receiving data,
directly or indirectly, from a given log as late as 'timestamp'. (The
log is not identified more than with a tree hash and a signature but
that's enough for confirming a given log, given access to it and its
public key.) The increase in fingerprintability that CT gossiping of
STH's would add would depend on the deployment of CT support in browsers
and how browser vendors select which logs to use.

Showing someone an SCT will reveal that you've received data about a
given site (through the x509 certificate) from a given log (through the
LogID) no later than a given time (timestamp). This might be a strong
indication that you've visited that site but this depends on how other
clients behave.

It's been suggested that STH's are to be gossiped. The question about
which STH's to gossip about has not been answered.

* How to gossip

It's been suggested that web browsers should use TLS connections to web
servers for gossiping. One argument for that is that this makes the
attack of blocking the gossiping messages hard to get away with without
people noticing because it means blocking TLS to all servers
participating.



This can hopefully be useful as a starting point for discussing
gossiping in trans.


From nobody Sat Sep 27 09:59:01 2014
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References: <5411E511.1040605@bbn.com> <CABrd9STmog8-JZCg9Tfv_ToUswY=9LBcZAPQM2cqUVcO0dhAnQ@mail.gmail.com> <54173589.3000404@bbn.com> <CABrd9SRShqm1r-2ajbqD5w1s686ciyjcEvywsXZaapgmi57NsA@mail.gmail.com> <54242F8A.2080602@bbn.com> <CABrd9SSwAdv-mAgofNT6bMWky7q=bZhAaX=L4gZUQDkROQ-3ZA@mail.gmail.com> <54258AF0.7090602@bbn.com> <4842B04F-A058-4F3C-9DA3-F29735EC7570@taoeffect.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1409262236210.27616@bofh.nohats.ca> <FC4A18E2-A42C-472F-B9FE-2278BB5A0BBA@taoeffect.com> <CABrd9SQBuQO1wrv7s06aT-GGyeWmu2sFzJrH6a+t81aq-dei+w@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Dear Ben,

On Sep 27, 2014, at 4:53 AM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:

> I agree that CT doesn't mitigate mis-issuance for subjects that do not =
participate.

If by "participate" you mean owners who submit their certs to logs, CT =
doesn't detect mis-issuance even for those who do, as that email =
explained.

> On monitors and guarantees - anyone can run a monitor,
> including, of course, the subjects themselves, so clearly there's no
> barrier to participation for subjects who want to participate.

"No barrier"? Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* the =
logs out there.

There will be like 1000+ logs out there.

Each log will be how large (gigabytes?), and CT is not P2P, so Monitors =
must *poll* 1000+ logs constantly for updates, just for the purpose of =
detecting mis-issuance.

On top of this, Section 4.6 of your RFC (bis-04) states that logs are =
not required to send monitors everything they ask for, making it unclear =
whether a log is misbehaving or not.

This is not practical.

###

But that is all besides the point.

The point is that gossip doesn't detect mis-issuance, whether or not =
"subjects participate" in CT or not.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


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charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear Ben,</div><div><br></div>On Sep 27, 2014, =
at 4:53 AM, Ben Laurie &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:benl@google.com">benl@google.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><br><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">I agree that CT doesn't =
mitigate mis-issuance for subjects that do =
not&nbsp;participate.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>If by =
"participate" you mean owners who submit their certs to logs, CT doesn't =
detect mis-issuance even for those who do, as that email =
explained.</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On monitors and guarantees =
- anyone can run a monitor,<br>including, of course, the subjects =
themselves, so clearly there's no<br>barrier to participation for =
subjects who want to =
participate.</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>"No barrier"? =
Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* the logs out =
there.</div><div><br></div><div>There will be like 1000+ logs out =
there.</div></div><div><br></div><div>Each log will be how large =
(gigabytes?), and CT is not P2P, so Monitors must *poll* 1000+ logs =
constantly for updates, just for the purpose of detecting =
mis-issuance.</div><div><br></div><div>On top of this, Section 4.6 of =
your RFC (bis-04) states that logs are not required to send monitors =
everything they ask for, making it unclear whether a log is misbehaving =
or not.</div><div><br></div><div><div>This is not =
practical.</div></div><div><br></div><div>###</div><div><br></div><div>But=
 that is all besides the point.</div><div><br></div><div>The point is =
that gossip doesn't detect mis-issuance, whether or not "subjects =
participate" in CT or not.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind =
regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><div><br></div><div><div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
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Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<div><div><br></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

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To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Dear Linus,

Thanks for starting this thread on Gossip!

> It's been suggested that web browsers should use TLS connections to =
web
> servers for gossiping. One argument for that is that this makes the
> attack of blocking the gossiping messages hard to get away with =
without
> people noticing because it means blocking TLS to all servers
> participating.


I just want to point out that successful gossip does not protect clients =
against MITM from mis-issued certificates. It also does not detect =
mis-issued certificates.

The selective partitioning of a log is one attack, but the standard =
attack that we have today, which doesn't require partitioning of a log, =
is not detected by CT's gossip as elaborated on in the "Threat model =
outline, attack model" thread, here (and in followup replies):

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00588.html

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_0F1EF191-ACED-490A-A2AB-738847CF5CC1
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charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Linus,<div><br></div><div>Thanks for starting this thread on =
Gossip!</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">It's been =
suggested that web browsers should use TLS connections to web<br>servers =
for gossiping. One argument for that is that this makes the<br>attack of =
blocking the gossiping messages hard to get away with without<br>people =
noticing because it means blocking TLS to all =
servers<br>participating.</blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>I just =
want to point out that successful gossip does not protect clients =
against MITM from mis-issued certificates. It also does not detect =
mis-issued certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>The selective =
partitioning of a log is one attack, but the standard attack that we =
have today, which doesn't require partitioning of a log, is not detected =
by CT's gossip as elaborated on in the "Threat model outline, attack =
model" thread, here (and in followup =
replies):</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00588.html">=
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00588.html</a></div>=
<div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak<br><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
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none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
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line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
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none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

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Subject: [Trans] Design of gossip
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Dear all,

As has been noted a lot depends on the gossip protocol, and there
isn't a lot said about it right now. I'd like to kick that off by
outlining some of the fundamental choices that need to be made, and
what I think (possibly wrongly) their implications are.

The first choice is what to gossip: tree heads and proofs or certs.
Both have privacy implications: while certs more directly reveal which
sites are visited, it's possible that tree heads will be unique per
cert due to the impact of adding to a tree one cert at a time, so each
precert will end up showing a different head. This is a tricky issue.

The second choice is what gossip produces. In particular do we push
consistency proofs towards clients, or pull the heads towards
monitors? Either approach can work, but the first approach could save
bandwidth: a consistent head does not need to be reported. The first
also enables remembering what has been recorded. The second approach
is simpler for gossipers.

The third choice is how to gossip. Probably the best approach is some
sort of peer-to-peer network, with the possibility of using other
servers if the P2P approach doesn't work. However, gossip needs to be
censorship resistant, which can be a bit tricky. We also want gossip
to deal with a small fraction of malicious nodes, which means some
approaches are tricky: in particular nodes can't stop if some nodes
say "we've heard it before".

We also need to make sure we don't lose submitted heads, even as old
heads grow in number. Using consistency proofs to reduce the number of
heads helps with this problem.

DHTs may be a workable approach, but I don't know of Byzantine proof
ones. Flood-fill on random graphs scales if you make it publish only,
but dealing with old data gets tricky: we want new nodes to learn it,
without having to send it unnecessarily. Showing the result of an
audit and backfilling can work, but we need to think about the details
and try some experiments.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Love_H=F6rnquist_=C5strand?= <lha@kth.se>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
Thread-Index: AQHP2lfmERNm1Zg/Kku+1GEoYDckLJwVFfYAgAA1f6E=
Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 18:23:02 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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> 27 sep 2014 kl. 19:11 skrev Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>:
>=20
> Thanks for starting this thread on Gossip!
>=20
>> It's been suggested that web browsers should use TLS connections to web
>> servers for gossiping. One argument for that is that this makes the
>> attack of blocking the gossiping messages hard to get away with without
>> people noticing because it means blocking TLS to all servers
>> participating.
>=20
>=20
> I just want to point out that successful gossip does not protect clients =
against MITM from mis-issued certificates. It also does not detect mis-issu=
ed certificates.
>=20
> The selective partitioning of a log is one attack, but the standard attac=
k that we have today, which doesn't require partitioning of a log, is not d=
etected by CT's gossip as elaborated on in the "Threat model outline, attac=
k model" thread, here (and in followup replies):

- the CA is sloppy/forced to issue the cert to the attacker
- cert is injected into log
- cert have SCT
- client check the SCT with the logs the clients trust, like one the is not=
 under the same control as the CA
- any other SCT in the cert is ignored by the client since they are not tru=
sted.
- MITM happened
- Auditor finds the fraudulent issued cert
- public out roar=20
- ca falls out from the public trust
- second ca will now refuse the attacker since they know the cost (loss of =
company)


Gossip is about not trusting log owners to keep them honest and unrelated t=
o your attack.

until you have namecoin working and enabled on all running all TLS clients =
and servers, I find CT is a acceptable compromise.

Love  =


From nobody Sat Sep 27 12:12:21 2014
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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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References: <878ul5tcby.fsf@nordberg.se>, <BC424D29-F537-4F98-93C8-A6D35E98B9DA@taoeffect.com> <E441364F-D860-4E7A-823B-6227DBB180B7@kth.se>
To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Love_H=F6rnquist_=C5strand?= <lha@kth.se>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Dear Love,

On Sep 27, 2014, at 11:23 AM, Love H=F6rnquist =C5strand <lha@kth.se> =
wrote:
> - the CA is sloppy/forced to issue the cert to the attacker
> - cert is injected into log
> - cert have SCT
> - client check the SCT with the logs the clients trust, like one the =
is not under the same control as the CA
> - any other SCT in the cert is ignored by the client since they are =
not trusted.
> - MITM happened
> - Auditor finds the fraudulent issued cert

Exactly how will the Auditor do that?

Kind regards,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_8BD3F110-29B3-4B70-868C-D224D026406A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear Love,</div><div><br></div>On Sep 27, 2014, =
at 11:23 AM, Love H=F6rnquist =C5strand &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:lha@kth.se">lha@kth.se</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">- the CA is sloppy/forced to issue the cert to the =
attacker<br>- cert is injected into log<br>- cert have SCT<br>- client =
check the SCT with the logs the clients trust, like one the is not under =
the same control as the CA<br>- any other SCT in the cert is ignored by =
the client since they are not trusted.<br>- MITM happened<br>- Auditor =
finds the fraudulent issued =
cert<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Exactly how will the Auditor do =
that?</div><br><div apple-content-edited=3D"true">Kind =
regards,</div><div apple-content-edited=3D"true">Greg</div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Sat Sep 27 14:04:11 2014
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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Love_H=F6rnquist_=C5strand?= <lha@kth.se>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 21:03:00 +0000
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References: <878ul5tcby.fsf@nordberg.se>, <BC424D29-F537-4F98-93C8-A6D35E98B9DA@taoeffect.com> <E441364F-D860-4E7A-823B-6227DBB180B7@kth.se>, <9DB4CB42-68A3-4BFE-B6BF-9C24DD925EDD@taoeffect.com>
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>> - Auditor finds the fraudulent issued cert
>=20
> Exactly how will the Auditor do that?

By looking at logs that the clients care about. You claim that there will b=
e thousands of logs, I somewhat don't think so since then there will be tho=
usands of logs the ca will send the cert to be issuing it, and that is not =
reasonable.

So how do you keep the log honest and stop it from not adding the SCT to th=
e log ?

Well, by using gossip about the logs.

You are claiming that PKIX and Internet roots are a hopeless endeavor, and =
I somewhat agree, you seem to want us to switch to namecoin and forget abou=
t Internet roots, and I see that as even more hopeless endeavor short term.

Short term CT will make a difference. If you disagree, then there is not mu=
ch more we can do then agree to disagree.

Love



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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 09:58:56AM -0700, Tao Effect wrote:
> "No barrier"? Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* the logs out there.
> 
> There will be like 1000+ logs out there.

"Citation needed", as the Wikipedeans say.  I'm not sure how you could
possibly come to that conclusion.

Even if there were that many logs in existence, the number of logs that a
subject would have to monitor would be limited to the set of logs that are
trusted by browsers and other SSL-using clients who implement CT (because
one or more of those logs are going to *have* to receive the certificate in
order for the log entry to be of any use).

While the requirements for running a log that is eligible for inclusion in
Chromium aren't *hugely* arduous, they're still not so trivial that every
man and his dog is going to be doing it.  In fact, given that there's no way
to monetize running a log, there are strong *dis*incentives to doing so
"just for the hell of it".

- Matt


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On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:19 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 09:58:56AM -0700, Tao Effect wrote:
>> "No barrier"? Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* =
the logs out there.
>>=20
>> There will be like 1000+ logs out there.
>=20
> "Citation needed", as the Wikipedeans say.  I'm not sure how you could
> possibly come to that conclusion.

I am citing your own documentation:

"we think =93every major CA=94 is within limits of feasibility"

http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq

And using Jacob's numbers from here:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.html

> Please also see these estimates which are even higher:
>=20
> https://zakird.com/slides/durumeric-https-imc13.pdf
>=20
> "Identified 1,832 CA certificates  belonging to 683 organizations"
> "311 (45%) of the organizations were provided certificates by
> German National Research and Education Network (DFN) "
>=20
> http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-39884-1_28
>=20
> "More than 1200 root and intermediate CAs can currently sign
> certificates for any domain and be trusted by popular browsers."
Now, should the number be less than 1000, it will still be in the =
hundreds, and that is still impractical for Monitors to provide any sort =
of a useful service to most website owners.

Not to mention that it does nothing to help with gossiping clients, they =
will still be MITM attacked, and they will likely not notice it for the =
aforementioned reasons.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.




--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_93E312D6-1110-440C-B698-D19647CB874D
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" =
content=3D"text/html charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div>On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:19 =
PM, Matt Palmer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mpalmer@hezmatt.org">mpalmer@hezmatt.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 09:58:56AM -0700, Tao Effect =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">"No barrier"? Subjects (domain =
owners) would need to monitor *all* the logs out there.<br><br>There =
will be like 1000+ logs out there.<br></blockquote><br>"Citation =
needed", as the Wikipedeans say. &nbsp;I'm not sure how you =
could<br>possibly come to that =
conclusion.<br></blockquote><div><br></div>I am citing your own =
documentation:<div><br></div><div>"we think =93every major CA=94 is =
within limits of feasibility"<br><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq">http://www.certificat=
e-transparency.org/faq</a><br><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>And using Jacob's numbers =
from here:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.=
html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.ht=
ml</a></div><div><br></div></div></div><div><pre></pre><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><pre>Please also see these estimates which are even =
higher:

<a rel=3D"nofollow" =
href=3D"https://zakird.com/slides/durumeric-https-imc13.pdf">https://zakir=
d.com/slides/durumeric-https-imc13.pdf</a>

"Identified 1,832 CA certificates  belonging to 683 organizations"
"311 (45%) of the organizations were provided certificates by
German National Research and Education Network (DFN) "

<a rel=3D"nofollow" =
href=3D"http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-39884-1_28">h=
ttp://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-39884-1_28</a>

"More than 1200 root and intermediate CAs can currently sign
certificates for any domain and be trusted by popular =
browsers."</pre></blockquote><div>Now, should the number be less than =
1000, it will still be in the hundreds, and that is still impractical =
for Monitors to provide any sort of a useful service to most website =
owners.</div></div><div><br></div><div>Not to mention that it does =
nothing to help with gossiping clients, they will still be MITM =
attacked, and they will likely not notice it for the aforementioned =
reasons.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></div><br><br><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:03 PM, Love H=F6rnquist =C5strand <lha@kth.se> =
wrote:

>=20
>>> - Auditor finds the fraudulent issued cert
>>=20
>> Exactly how will the Auditor do that?
>=20
> By looking at logs that the clients care about.

Auditors do not look at the logs, Monitors do that.

> You claim that there will be thousands of logs, I somewhat don't think =
so since then there will be thousands of logs the ca will send the cert =
to be issuing it, and that is not reasonable.
>=20
> So how do you keep the log honest and stop it from not adding the SCT =
to the log ?
>=20
> Well, by using gossip about the logs.

Sorry, don't quite understand what you're saying here...

Both SCTs (legitimate and otherwise) will happily be accepted by any =
log. Gossip won't help clients detect fraudulent certs issued by rogue =
CAs (as explained in the "Threat model" thread).

> You are claiming that PKIX and Internet roots are a hopeless endeavor, =
and I somewhat agree, you seem to want us to switch to namecoin and =
forget about Internet roots, and I see that as even more hopeless =
endeavor short term.

Well, switch to a decent blockchain and using something like DNSChain to =
talk to it, yes. :)

If Google wanted to make that a reality in the short term, they could.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


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charset=3Diso-8859-1"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:03 PM, Love H=F6rnquist =
=C5strand &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lha@kth.se">lha@kth.se</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">- =
Auditor finds the fraudulent issued cert<br></blockquote><br>Exactly how =
will the Auditor do that?<br></blockquote><br>By looking at logs that =
the clients care about.</blockquote><div><br></div>Auditors do not look =
at the logs, Monitors do that.<div><br></div><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">You claim that there will be thousands of logs, I somewhat =
don't think so since then there will be thousands of logs the ca will =
send the cert to be issuing it, and that is not reasonable.<br><br>So =
how do you keep the log honest and stop it from not adding the SCT to =
the log ?<br><br>Well, by using gossip about the =
logs.</blockquote><div><br></div>Sorry, don't quite understand what =
you're saying here...</div><div><br></div><div>Both SCTs (legitimate and =
otherwise) will happily be accepted by any log. Gossip won't help =
clients detect fraudulent certs issued by rogue CAs (as explained in the =
"Threat model" thread).</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">You are claiming that PKIX and Internet roots are a =
hopeless endeavor, and I somewhat agree, you seem to want us to switch =
to namecoin and forget about Internet roots, and I see that as even more =
hopeless endeavor short term.<br></blockquote><br></div><div>Well, =
switch to a decent blockchain and using something like DNSChain to talk =
to it, yes. :)</div><div><br></div><div>If Google wanted to make that a =
reality in the short term, they could.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind =
regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></div></body></html>=

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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Dear Linus,

Paul Wouters brought up the idea of sharing certs on [metzdowd], and I =
guess that's the same thing as gossiping SCTs, right?

I think that could actually be very useful for detecting a MITM, here's =
my reply to him there:

=
http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-September/023037.html

> The more information shared, the better detection we seem to get. But
> sharing information have privacy implications. It seems to me that
> sharing STH's is much less problematic than sharing SCT's.

Why do you think sharing SCTs is problematic, and what privacy =
implications does it pose?

If the SCTs are shared over an encrypted connection, only the server, =
the client, and the potential MITM will know about them.

Any time a cert changes, the client would tell the server about that =
change over the established TLS connection.

When MITM leaves, the server would find out that a fraudulent cert had =
been generated for their website, and could then identify the CA =
responsible.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_8F132BB3-828E-45A2-A384-007DD8390D4D
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charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Linus,<div><br></div><div>Paul Wouters brought up the idea of sharing =
certs on [metzdowd], and I guess that's the same thing as gossiping =
SCTs, right?</div><div><br></div><div>I think that could actually be =
very useful for detecting a MITM, here's my reply to him =
there:</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-September/0230=
37.html">http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-September/023=
037.html</a></div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">The more =
information shared, the better detection we seem to get. But<br>sharing =
information have privacy implications. It seems to me that<br>sharing =
STH's is much less problematic than sharing =
SCT's.<br></blockquote><div><br></div>Why do you think sharing SCTs is =
problematic, and what privacy implications does it =
pose?</div><div><br></div><div>If the SCTs are shared over an encrypted =
connection, only the server, the client, and the potential MITM will =
know about them.</div><div><br></div><div>Any time a cert changes, the =
client would tell the server about that change over the established TLS =
connection.</div><div><br></div><div>When MITM leaves, the server would =
find out that a fraudulent cert had been generated for their website, =
and could then identify the CA =
responsible.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
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-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br></body></html>=

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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Steve,

I read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chain.

Why not add path validation to the list of rules you defined below.  That w=
ould be good given the wide variance in how browsers process chains.  This =
gives us another opportunity at log level to have correct logic for path va=
lidation.

Note that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.509, EKU is processed =
somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy mapping).

On a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with respect to interaction =
between name constraints and EKU.

From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2014 4:16 PM
To: trans@ietf.org
Subject: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"

As I promised last week, I have taken an initial cut at defining mis-issuan=
ce in the
broader sense that Ben seemed to imply in his comments on my initial threat=
 and
attack model. I used the CABF Guidelines for Dv and Ev certs as the basis f=
or this, so
that mis-issuance is defined objectively (unlike art and porn, which are di=
stinguishable
only in the eye of the beholder).

The CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely syntact=
ic and thus
could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to issue an SCT. I want=
 to suggest
we consider that as a possible change to the current design. A goal of CT i=
s to
discourage acceptance of mis-issued certs by TLS clients, and part of the p=
lan is
to have clients (eventually) reject certs without SCTs. So if we have a set=
 of well-
defined, syntactic checks that logs can apply before issuing an SCT, we can=
 provide
immediate feedback to CAs (and/or Subjects) when problems are detected with=
 certs,
before the certs sent to clients, maybe even before they are issued.  If we=
 adopt this
approach, then  Monitors can focus on "protecting" specific Subjects, based=
 on having
received certs (or equivalent data) from those clients.

Anyway, based on my review of the CABF Guidelines, almost all of the cert f=
ields have
to be covered by an SCT, as do several common extensions. Amusingly, these =
Guidelines
don't have a readily testable requirement for a cert serial number, so the =
need to
include a serial number in an SCT is driven exclusively by the need to prov=
ide that
number to a CA for revocation, under attack scenario #2 in my attack analys=
is.

I hope CABF experts will be able to review the text I am providing below, t=
o any
errors/omissions due to my misunderstanding of those docs. It took a little=
 effort
to translate some sections of the docs into (more) straightforward requirem=
ents language.

I have not written the EV cert syntactic requirements part of the doc yet. =
Since there
is considerable overlap with DV cert requirements I anticipate it will be e=
asier.

There are some comments in bold in the text, noting some unresolved issues.

Have a nice weekend,

Steve
--------


Appendix A - Specification and Verification of Certificate Issuance Require=
ments (Normative)

The following requirements are extracted from the CA Browser Forum (CABF) d=
ocument "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-=
Trusted Certificates" version 1.1.9 [CABF- Baseline] and "Guidelines For Th=
e Issuance And Management Of Extended Validation Certificates" version 1.5.=
1 [CABF-EV]. These requirements are used to define what constitutes mis-iss=
uance of a certificate in the context certificate transparency (CT). The CA=
BF specifications from which these requirements are derived include many as=
pects of CA operation that are outside of the scope of CT-based detection o=
f certificate mis-issuance, i.e., they impose requirements that could not b=
e verified by a Monitor examining certificate logs. Hence this appendix was=
 created to provide a concise enumeration of certificate issuance verificat=
ion requirements relevant to CT.

The Appendix is divided into two parts: requirements for so-called "domain =
validation" certificates and requirement for "extended validation" certific=
ates. This organization parallels the CABF guidelines cited above.

The verification criteria enumerated below are to be applied to any certifi=
cate for which an SCT has been (or will be?) created. Note that "root" CA c=
ertificates are not subject to verification  against these criteria. Each l=
og maintains a list of the root CAs for which it is willing to accept SCT g=
eneration requests. This implies that the log operator has already determin=
ed that these CAs, and their corresponding self-signed certificates, are ac=
ceptable. A subordinate CA certificate will be checked against the criteria=
 below only if it is submitted as the target of an SCT. (If a subordinate C=
A certificate appears as part of a chain submitted for SCT generation, but =
is not the last certificate in that chain, it is not checked.)

The CABF documents cited above describe both syntactic and semantic require=
ments for certificate issuance. This Appendix deals primarily with syntacti=
c checks. The vast majority of syntactic checks can be performed without ac=
cess to external information about the Issuer or the Subject of a certifica=
te.


A.1 Syntactic Verification of a Domain Validation Certificate

An X.509 certificate consists of a set of fields (all but two of which are =
mandatory), plus a set of optional extensions. This section of the Appendix=
 defines the syntactic requirements imposed on the certificate fields. The =
next section deals with extensions.

The CABF guidelines for DV and EV certificates differ. To determine which s=
et of guidelines are applicable, one must first determine which type of cer=
tificate is being examined. A certificate is marked as an EV certificate ba=
sed on the Certificate Policy OID contained in the certificatePolicies exte=
nsion. Each CA that issues EV certificates defines one or more policy OIDs =
that represent EV certificate policies. A Monitor performing syntactic chec=
ks first acquires a current list of EV certificate policy OIDs to use in de=
termining whether a given certificate is an EV certificate. One such list i=
s available from (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certific=
ate).
(Is there a better reference for EV certificate policy OIDs?)

1. Version number: The certificates MUST be an X.509 v3 certificate. This r=
equirement is derived from Appendix B of [CABF-Baseline], where it is expli=
citly stated for Subordinate CA certificates. Since other  portions of [CAB=
F-Baseline] mandate support for extensions and only v3 certificates can con=
tain extensions [RC5280], this requirement is inferred to apply to Subscrib=
er (EE) certificates as well.

2. serialNumber: No requirements beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are mand=
ated by [CABF-Baseline]. ([CABF-Baseline] requires that a serial number con=
tan at least 20 bits of entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not clear how this=
 can be verified through syntactic examination of a certificate.)

3. signature: For any certificate issued after December 31, 2010, the allow=
ed digest algorithms are: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. If RSA is use=
d to sign the certificate, the minimum modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requi=
rement is imposed on the public exponent.)  If DSA is used to sign the cert=
ificate, the following pairs of values are permitted: L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 o=
r L=3D 2048, N=3D256, L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048, N=3D256. If the cer=
tificate signature is based on ECC (presumably ECDSA), the allowed curves a=
re NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.  To verify that a certificate employs an ac=
cepted digest and signature algorithm, one examines the OID contained in th=
is field. OIDs defined in the following RFCs are applicable here: [RFC4055]=
, [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (Do we want to enumerate the specific OID strin=
gs applicable to certificate signatures?)

4. issuer: The Issuer name MUST contain the countryName attribute and it MU=
ST contain an ISO-3166-1 country code This requirement is derived from sect=
ion 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline]. The Issuer name MUST contain the organization=
Name attribute. This requirement is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Bas=
eline]

5. validity: A Subscriber certificate issued after July 1, 2012 MUST not co=
ntain a validity interval longer than 60 months. ([CABF-Baseline] establish=
es criteria in Section 9.4.1 that describe the circumstances under which Su=
bscriber certificates may be issued with validity intervals between 39 and =
60 months.  Since these criteria cannot be evaluated without external knowl=
edge, this Appendix adopts the 60-month limit for syntactic checking.)

6. subject: A certificate MAY contain a NULL Subject name If it contains a =
non-null Subject name:


A. it MAY contain a commonName attribute. If this attribute is present, it =
MUST contain a single IP address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name that is one=
 of the values contained in the Certificate's subjectAltName extension. Thu=
s verification of this attribute requires comparing values in this attribut=
e against the content of the subjectAltname extension, which MUST be presen=
t (see below).

B. it MAY contain an organizationalUnitName attribute. This requirement is =
derived from section 9.2.6 of [CABF-Baseline].

C. if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the str=
eetAddress attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName attribute=
 is present, the streetAddress attribute MAY be present. This requirement i=
s derived from section 9.2.4b of [CABF-Baseline].

D. if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the loc=
alityName attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName attribute =
is present, the localityName attribute MAY be present. This requirement is =
derived from section 9.2.4c of [CABF-Baseline].

E. if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the sta=
teOrProvinceName attribute MUST NOT be present. If the organizationName att=
ribute is present, and the localityName is absent, then the stateOrProvince=
Name attribute MUST be present. If the organizationName attribute is presen=
t, and the localityName is present, then the stateOrProvinceName attribute =
MAY be present. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.4d of [CABF-Ba=
seline].

1. the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST NOT be present if the organizatio=
nName attribute is missing

2. the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST be present if the organizationNam=
e attribute is present and the localityName is absent

F. if the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the pos=
talCode attribute MUST NOT be present. If the name contains an organization=
Name attribute, then the postalCode attribute MAY be present. This requirem=
ent is derived from section 9.2.4e of [CABF-Baseline].

G. if the name  contains an organizationName attribute, then the countryNam=
e attribute MUST be present. if the name does not contain an organizationNa=
me attribute, then the countryName attribute MAY be present. This requireme=
nt is derived from section 9.2.5 of [CABF-Baseline].

H. The Subject MAY contain other attributes as specified in Appendix A of [=
RFC5280]. These attributes MUST NOT contain metadata such as '.', '-', or '=
 ' (i.e. space) characters. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.8 =
of [CABF-Baseline].


7. subjectPublicKeyInfo: If this field contains an RSA public key the minim=
um modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requirement is imposed on the public expo=
nent.) If it carries a DSA key, the following pairs of values are permitted=
: L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048, N=3D256, L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 20=
48, N=3D256. If the field conveys an ECC (presumably ECDSA) public key, the=
 allowed curves are NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.  To verify that a certific=
ate employs an accepted digest and signature algorithm, one examines the OI=
D contained in this field. OIDs defined in the following RFCs are applicabl=
e here: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (Do we want to enumerate the s=
pecific OID strings applicable to certificate signatures?)

8. issuerUniqueId: This is an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 certifi=
cate. [CABF-Basline] imposes no requirements on this field, so no constrain=
ts beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.

9. subjectUniqueId: : This is an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 cert=
ificate. [CABF-Basline] imposes no requirements on this field, so no constr=
aints beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.

10. signatureAlgorithm: This field MUST match the signature field contained=
 within the certificate (see # 3 above).

11. signatureValue: This field is verified using the public key extracted f=
rom the certificate of the Issuer of this certificate, and the algorithms s=
pecified in the preceding field.

A.1.2 An X.509 v3 certificate may contain extensions. [CABF-baseline] manda=
tes the presence of several extensions, and imposes requirements on their c=
ontent.

1. The certificate MUST contain the subjectAltName extension, and that exte=
nsion MUST contain at least one entry. Each entry MUST be either a dNSName =
containing a Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or an iPAddress. Wildcard F=
QDNs are permitted. No other entry types are permitted. This requirement is=
 derived from section 9.2.1 of [CABF-Baseline].

2. A certificate issued to a CA  MUST include the certificatePolcies extens=
ion. It may r MAY NOT be marked CRITICAL. The policyQualifiers field MAY be=
 present, and the policyQualifierId and/or the cPSuri fields may be populat=
ed, using the syntax specified in [RFC5280]. This requirement is derived fr=
om Appendix B, Section 2.A of [CABF-Baseline].


A. If this extension contains the OID  2.23.140.1.2.1, then the Subject fie=
ld MUST NOT contain an organizationalName, streetAddress, localityName, sta=
teOrProvinceName, or postalCode attribute. This requirement is derived from=
 section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline].

B. If this extension contains the OID  2.23.140.1.2.2, then the Subject fie=
ld MUST contain organizationName,

C. localityName, stateOrProvinceName (if applicable), and countryName attri=
butes. This requirement is derived from section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline]. (=
How does one know whether the stateOrProvinceName is applicable?)

3. The basicConstraints extension MUST be present, marked CRITICAL and the =
cA flag MUST be set TRUE in a CA certificate. This requirement is derived f=
rom Appendix A Section 2.D of [CABF-Baseline]. The presence of this extensi=
on is optional for an EE certificates. If the extension is present in a Sub=
scriber certificate it MUST have the cA flag set FALSE. (If a certificate d=
oes not contain this extension it is presumed to be a Subscriber certificat=
e and MUST be processed as such with regard to all other verification check=
s.)

4. The cRLDistributinPoints extension MUST be present in a CA certificate. =
It MUST NOT be marked critical and it MUST contain an HTTP URL. This extens=
ion is optional for Subscriber certificates, but if present the same syntac=
tic constraints apply. This requirement is derived from Appendix B, Section=
s 2.B and 3.B of [CABF-Baseline].

5. The keyUsage extension MUST be present in a CA certificate and it MUST b=
e marked critical. The keyCertSign and cRLSign bits MUST be set TRUE. The d=
igitalSignature bit MAY be set TRUE as well. This requirement is derived fr=
om Appendix B, Section 2.E of [CABF-Baseline].

6. The authorityInformatinAccess extension MAY be present and, if present, =
MUST NOT be marked CRITICAL. It MUST specify accessMethod 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.=
1 and MAY specify accessMethod 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2. This requirement is deri=
ved from Appendix B, Sections 2.C and 3.C of [CABF-Baseline].

7. The extendedKeyusage extension MAY be present in a CA certificate. If pr=
esent, it need not be marked CRITICAL. If the extension is present in a CA =
certificate, and if the certificate contains the nameConstraints extension,=
 then the value id-kp-serverAuth MUST be present. The extendedKeyusage exte=
nsion MUST be present in a Subscriber certificate. Either the value id-kp-s=
erverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth or both values MUST be present. id-kp-emailPr=
otection MAY be present. This requirement is derived from Appendix B, Secti=
ons 2.G and 3.F of [CABF-Baseline].

8. The nameConstraints extension MAY appear in CA certificates and need not=
 be marked CRITICAL (contrary to [RCC5280]). If the certificate also contai=
ns the extendedKeyusage extension and that extension contains the value id-=
kp-serverAuth,  then that extension MUST NOT contain the anyExtendedKeyusag=
e value in the KeyPurposeID.
Moreover the nameConstrants extension MUST impose constraints on dNSName, i=
PAddress and DirectoryName name types. Both the permittedSubtrees and exclu=
dedsubtrees fields MAY be employed. This requirement is derived from Append=
ix B, Section 2.F and Section 9.7 of [CABF-Baseline].

9. Other extensions defined in [RFC5280] MAY be present and MUST be marked =
with respect to criticality as specified therein.


A.2 Semantic Verification of a Certificate

1. [CABF-Baseline] imposes a number of requirements on certificate issuance=
 that cannot be verified without access to reference information for the ce=
rtificate Subject, or information about the CA hierarchy. For example:


1. The CA must verify that the Subject has the right to use or control of, =
all Domain Names and/or IP Addresses listed in the Subject field and/or the=
 subjectAltName extension in the certificate. This requirement is derived f=
rom Section 7.1 of [CABF-Baseline].


2. The Issuer name MUST contain a "meaningful" identifier of the CA that is=
sued the certificate, in the organizationName attribute of the Issuer name.=
 This requirement is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline].


3. The Issuer name MUST contain the countryName attribute corresponding to =
the country on which the Issuer's place of business is located. This requir=
ement is derived from Section 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline].


4. If the Subject is non-null, it MUST contain either the (verified) Subjec=
t's name or DBA. The CA MUST verify the streetAddress, localityName, stateO=
rProvinceName, postalCode, countryName, and organizationalUnitName attribut=
es, if present. This requirement is derived from Section 9.2.4a of [CABF-Ba=
seline].

2. A certificate issued to a subordinate CA that is not an affiliate of a "=
root" CA MUST NOT contain the anyPolicy policy identifier. This requirement=
 is derived from section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. (How would a Monitor kno=
w whether the subordinate CA is affiliated with the root CA?)

3.  A certificate issued to a subordinate CA that is an affiliate of a "roo=
t" CA MAY include one or more explicit policy identifiers (either 2.23.140.=
1.2.1 or 2.23.140.1.2.2 or policy identifiers defined by the CA in its CP a=
nd/or CPS). It also MAY include the anyPolicy OID. This requirement is deri=
ved from section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. If the extension contains any of=
 the OIDs noted explicitly above, it is acceptable. (How would a Monitor kn=
ow whether the subordinate CA is affiliated with the root CA?)

4. A Subscriber certificate issued after April 1, 2015 MUST not contain a v=
alidity interval longer than 39 months, unless the issuer asserts that the =
certificate meets all of the criteria described in Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-B=
aseline], from which this requirement is derived. (How would a Monitor dete=
rmine that a certificate with a validity interval between 39 and 60 months =
is acceptable, based on Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline]?)

A Monitor cannot, in general determine if these requirements have been met;=
 it lacks knowledge of the processes employed by the CA to verify the Subje=
ct name, and it may not be able to determine whether the CA is "meaningfull=
y" identified by the Issuer name. A Monitor may not be able to determine th=
e organizational relationships between a "root" CA and subordinate CAs. Thu=
s mis-issuance relative to these requirements cannot, in general, be detect=
ed by a Monitor.

Nonetheless, a Monitor can "protect" specific Subjects, based on reference =
data provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying to determine that a certi=
ficate has been issued to the "right" Subject can do so using the certifica=
te(s) issued to the Subject, as a reference. For example, if a Monitor is p=
roviding "protection" for a Subject, it requires the name of the Subject (a=
s it appears in the Subject field or subjectAltName extension) and the publ=
ic key associated with that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor=
 can examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same Subject o=
r SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of these names, and if it c=
ontain a different public key, this is evidence of mis-issuance.

A.3 Syntactic Verification of an Extended Validation Certificate

    coming soon ...


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<body bgcolor=3D"white" lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Steve,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">I read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chai=
n.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Why not add path validation to the list of rules you =
defined below.&nbsp; That would be good given the wide variance in how brow=
sers process chains.&nbsp; This gives us another
 opportunity at log level to have correct logic for path validation.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Note that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.=
509, EKU is processed somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy mapp=
ing).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">On a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with r=
espect to interaction between name constraints and EKU.<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:windowtext;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt=
;color:windowtext;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"> Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@=
ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, September 25, 2014 4:16 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> trans@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Trans] defining &quot;mis-issuance&quot;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As I promised last week, I have taken an initial cut=
 at defining mis-issuance in the<br>
broader sense that Ben seemed to imply in his comments on my initial threat=
 and<br>
attack model. I used the CABF Guidelines for Dv and Ev certs as the basis f=
or this, so<br>
that mis-issuance is defined objectively (unlike art and porn, which are di=
stinguishable<br>
only in the eye of the beholder).<br>
<br>
The CABF Guidelines establish a lot of requirements that are purely syntact=
ic and thus<br>
could be checked by a log operator, before agreeing to issue an SCT. I want=
 to suggest<br>
we consider that as a possible change to the current design. A goal of CT i=
s to<br>
discourage acceptance of mis-issued certs by TLS clients, and part of the p=
lan is
<br>
to have clients (eventually) reject certs without SCTs. So if we have a set=
 of well-<br>
defined, syntactic checks that logs can apply before issuing an SCT, we can=
 provide
<br>
immediate feedback to CAs (and/or Subjects) when problems are detected with=
 certs,
<br>
before the certs sent to clients, maybe even before they are issued.&nbsp; =
If we adopt this<br>
approach, then&nbsp; Monitors can focus on &quot;protecting&quot; specific =
Subjects, based on having<br>
received certs (or equivalent data) from those clients. <br>
<br>
Anyway, based on my review of the CABF Guidelines, almost all of the cert f=
ields have<br>
to be covered by an SCT, as do several common extensions. Amusingly, these =
Guidelines<br>
don't have a readily testable requirement for a cert serial number, so the =
need to<br>
include a serial number in an SCT is driven exclusively by the need to prov=
ide that<br>
number to a CA for revocation, under attack scenario #2 in my attack analys=
is.<br>
<br>
I hope CABF experts will be able to review the text I am providing below, t=
o any<br>
errors/omissions due to my misunderstanding of those docs. It took a little=
 effort<br>
to translate some sections of the docs into (more) straightforward requirem=
ents language.<br>
<br>
I have not written the EV cert syntactic requirements part of the doc yet. =
Since there<br>
is considerable overlap with DV cert requirements I anticipate it will be e=
asier.<br>
<br>
There are some comments in <b>bold</b> in the text, noting some unresolved =
issues.<br>
<br>
Have a nice weekend,<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
--------<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Appendix A &#8211; Specific=
ation and Verification of Certificate Issuance Requirements (Normative)</sp=
an></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The following requirements are extracte=
d from the CA Browser Forum (CABF) document &#8220;Baseline Requirements fo=
r the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates&#8221; versi=
on 1.1.9 [CABF- Baseline] and &#8220;Guidelines For
 The Issuance And Management Of Extended Validation Certificates&#8221; ver=
sion 1.5.1 [CABF-EV]. These requirements are used to define what constitute=
s mis-issuance of a certificate in the context certificate transparency (CT=
). The CABF specifications from which
 these requirements are derived include many aspects of CA operation that a=
re outside of the scope of CT-based detection of certificate mis-issuance, =
i.e., they impose requirements that could not be verified by a Monitor exam=
ining certificate logs. Hence this
 appendix was created to provide a concise enumeration of certificate issua=
nce verification requirements relevant to CT.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The Appendix is divided into two parts:=
 requirements for so-called &#8220;domain validation&#8221; certificates an=
d requirement for &#8220;extended validation&#8221; certificates. This orga=
nization parallels the CABF guidelines cited above.
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The verification criteria enumerated be=
low are to be applied to any certificate for which an SCT has been (or will=
 be?) created. Note that &#8220;root&#8221; CA certificates are not subject=
 to verification&nbsp; against these criteria. Each
 log maintains a list of the root CAs for which it is willing to accept SCT=
 generation requests. This implies that the log operator has already determ=
ined that these CAs, and their corresponding self-signed certificates, are =
acceptable. A subordinate CA certificate
 will be checked against the criteria below only if it is submitted as the =
target of an SCT. (If a subordinate CA certificate appears as part of a cha=
in submitted for SCT generation, but is not the last certificate in that ch=
ain, it is not checked.)</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The CABF documents cited above describe=
 both syntactic and semantic requirements for certificate issuance. This Ap=
pendix deals primarily with syntactic checks. The vast majority of syntacti=
c checks can be performed without
 access to external information about the Issuer or the Subject of a certif=
icate.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A.1 Syntactic Verification of a Doma=
in Validation Certificate</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">An X.509 certificate consists =
of a set of fields (all but two of which are mandatory), plus a set of opti=
onal extensions. This section of the Appendix
 defines the syntactic requirements imposed on the certificate fields. The =
next section deals with extensions.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The CABF guidelines for DV and=
 EV certificates differ. To determine which set of guidelines are applicabl=
e, one must first determine which type
 of certificate is being examined. A certificate is marked as an EV certifi=
cate based on the Certificate Policy OID contained in the certificatePolici=
es extension. Each CA that issues EV certificates defines one or more polic=
y OIDs that represent EV certificate
 policies. A Monitor performing syntactic checks first acquires a current l=
ist of EV certificate policy OIDs to use in determining whether a given cer=
tificate is an EV certificate. One such list is available from (</span><a h=
ref=3D"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validat=
ion_Certificate</span></a><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">).</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">(Is there a better referenc=
e for EV certificate policy OIDs?)</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">1. Version number: The certifi=
cates MUST be an X.509 v3 certificate. This requirement is derived from App=
endix B of [CABF-Baseline], where it is
 explicitly stated for Subordinate CA certificates. Since other&nbsp; porti=
ons of [CABF-Baseline] mandate support for extensions and only v3 certifica=
tes can contain extensions [RC5280], this requirement is inferred to apply =
to Subscriber (EE) certificates as well.
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">2. serialNumber: No requiremen=
ts beyond those imposed by [RFC5280] are mandated by [CABF-Baseline]. ([CAB=
F-Baseline] requires that a serial number
 contan at least 20 bits of entropy (see Section 9.6, but it not clear how =
this can be verified through syntactic examination of a certificate.)</span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">3. signature: For any certificate issue=
d after December 31, 2010, the allowed digest algorithms are: SHA-1, SHA-25=
6, SHA-384 or SHA-512. If RSA is used to sign the certificate, the minimum =
modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requirement
 is imposed on the public exponent.)&nbsp; If DSA is used to sign the certi=
ficate, the following pairs of values are permitted:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048=
, N=3D256, L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048, N=3D256. If the certificate si=
gnature is based on ECC (presumably ECDSA), the allowed curves are NIST P-2=
56, P-384 and P-521.&nbsp; To verify that a certificate
 employs an accepted digest and signature algorithm, one examines the OID c=
ontained in this field. OIDs defined in the following RFCs are applicable h=
ere: [RFC4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (<b>Do we want to enumerate the s=
pecific OID strings applicable to
 certificate signatures?)</b></span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">4. issuer: The Issuer name MUS=
T contain the countryName attribute and it MUST contain an ISO-3166-1 count=
ry code This requirement is derived from
 section 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline]. The Issuer name MUST contain the organiz=
ationName attribute. This requirement is derived from section 9.1.3 of [CAB=
F-Baseline]</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">5. validity: A Subscriber cert=
ificate issued after July 1, 2012 MUST not contain a validity interval long=
er than 60 months. ([CABF-Baseline] establishes
 criteria in Section 9.4.1 that describe the circumstances under which Subs=
criber certificates may be issued with validity intervals between 39 and 60=
 months.&nbsp; Since these criteria cannot be evaluated without external kn=
owledge, this Appendix adopts the 60-month
 limit for syntactic checking.) </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">6. subject: A certificate MAY =
contain a NULL Subject name If it contains a non-null Subject name:</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;text-aut=
ospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt=
"> </span>
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">it MAY contain a commonName attribute. =
If this attribute is present, it MUST contain
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">a single IP address or Fully-Qua=
lified Domain Name that is one of the values contained in the Certificate&#=
8217;s subjectAltName extension. Thus verification of this attribute requir=
es comparing values in this attribute against
 the content of the subjectAltname extension, which MUST be present (see be=
low).</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">B.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">it MAY contain an organizational=
UnitName attribute. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.6 of [CABF=
-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">C.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">if the name does not contain an =
organizationName attribute, then the streetAddress attribute MUST NOT be pr=
esent. If the organizationName attribute is present, the streetAddress attr=
ibute MAY be present. This requirement
 is derived from section 9.2.4b of [CABF-Baseline]. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">D.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">if the name does not contain an =
organizationName attribute, then the localityName attribute MUST NOT be pre=
sent. If the organizationName attribute is present, the localityName attrib=
ute MAY be present. This requirement
 is derived from section 9.2.4c of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">E.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">if the name does not contain an =
organizationName attribute, then the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST NOT=
 be present. If the organizationName attribute is present, and the locality=
Name is absent, then the stateOrProvinceName
 attribute MUST be present. If the organizationName attribute is present, a=
nd the localityName is present, then the stateOrProvinceName attribute MAY =
be present. This requirement is derived from section 9.2.4d of [CABF-Baseli=
ne].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-=
space:auto;text-indent:-.25in">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">1.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt=
"> </span>
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST =
NOT be present if the organizationName attribute is missing</span><o:p></o:=
p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-=
space:auto;text-indent:-.25in">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">2.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt=
"> </span>
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">the stateOrProvinceName attribute MUST =
be present if the organizationName attribute is present and the localityNam=
e is absent</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">F.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">if the name does not contain an =
organizationName attribute, then the postalCode attribute MUST NOT be prese=
nt. If the name contains an organizationName attribute, then the postalCode=
 attribute MAY be present. This requirement
 is derived from section 9.2.4e of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span =
style=3D"font-family:Courier">G.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">if the name&nbsp; contains an or=
ganizationName attribute, then the countryName attribute MUST be present. i=
f the name does not contain an organizationName attribute, then the country=
Name attribute MAY be present. This requirement
 is derived from section 9.2.5 of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span st=
yle=3D"font-family:Courier">H.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The Subject MAY contain other at=
tributes as specified in Appendix A of [RFC5280]. These attributes MUST NOT=
 contain
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">metadata such as &#8216;.&#8217;=
, &#8216;-&#8216;, or &#8216; &#8216; (i.e. space) characters.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from=
 section 9.2.8 of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">7. subjectPublicKeyInfo: If this field =
contains an RSA public key the minimum modulus size is 2048 bits. (No requi=
rement is imposed on the public exponent.) If it carries a DSA key, the fol=
lowing pairs of values are permitted:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048=
, N=3D256, L=3D 2048, N=3D 224 or L=3D 2048, N=3D256. If the field conveys =
an ECC (presumably ECDSA) public key, the allowed curves are NIST P-256, P-=
384 and P-521.&nbsp; To verify that a certificate employs
 an accepted digest and signature algorithm, one examines the OID contained=
 in this field. OIDs defined in the following RFCs are applicable here: [RF=
C4055], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758]. (<b>Do we want to enumerate the specific =
OID strings applicable to certificate
 signatures?)</b></span><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"> </span></b>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">8. issuerUniqueId: This is an =
optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 certificate. [CABF-Basline] imposes n=
o requirements on this field, so no constraints
 beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">9. subjectUniqueId: : This is =
an optional field (a BIT STRING) in a v3 certificate. [CABF-Basline] impose=
s no requirements on this field, so no
 constraints beyond those in [RFC5280] are applicable.</span><o:p></o:p></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">10. signatureAlgorithm: This f=
ield MUST match the signature field contained within the certificate (see #=
 3 above).</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">11. signatureValue: This field=
 is verified using the public key extracted from the certificate of the Iss=
uer of this certificate, and the algorithms
 specified in the preceding field.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A.1.2 An X.509 v3 certificate =
may contain extensions. [CABF-baseline] mandates the presence of several ex=
tensions, and imposes requirements on
 their content.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">1. The certificate MUST contai=
n the subjectAltName extension, and that extension MUST contain at least on=
e entry. Each entry MUST be either a dNSName
 containing a Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or an iPAddress. Wildcard =
FQDNs are permitted. No other entry types are permitted. This requirement i=
s derived from section 9.2.1 of [CABF-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">2. A certificate issued to a C=
A&nbsp; MUST include the certificatePolcies extension. It may r MAY NOT be =
marked CRITICAL. The policyQualifiers field
 MAY be present, and the policyQualifierId and/or the cPSuri fields may be =
populated, using the syntax specified in [RFC5280]. This requirement is der=
ived from Appendix B, Section 2.A of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:Courier">A.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">If this extension contains the O=
ID </span>
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;2.23.140.1.2.1, then the Subject =
field MUST NOT contain an organizationalName, streetAddress, localityName, =
stateOrProvinceName, or postalCode attribute.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from=
 section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;text-au=
tospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">B.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt=
"> </span>
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">If this extension contains the OID </sp=
an><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;2.23.140.1.2.2, then the Subje=
ct field MUST contain
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">organizationName,</span><o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;text-auto=
space:none">
<b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">C.</span></b><b><span style=3D"font-=
size:7.0pt">
</span></b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">localityName, stateOrProvinc=
eName (if applicable), and countryName attributes.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from=
 section 9.3.1 of [CABF-Baseline].
<b>(How does one know whether the stateOrProvinceName is applicable?)</b></=
span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">3. The basicConstraints extens=
ion MUST be present, marked CRITICAL and the cA flag MUST be set TRUE in a =
CA certificate. This requirement is derived
 from Appendix A Section 2.D of [CABF-Baseline]. The presence of this exten=
sion is optional for an EE certificates. If the extension is present in a S=
ubscriber certificate it MUST have the cA flag set FALSE. (If a certificate=
 does not contain this extension
 it is presumed to be a Subscriber certificate and MUST be processed as suc=
h with regard to all other verification checks.)</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">4. The cRLDistributinPoints ex=
tension MUST be present in a CA certificate. It MUST NOT be marked critical=
 and it MUST contain an HTTP URL. This
 extension is optional for Subscriber certificates, but if present the same=
 syntactic constraints apply. This requirement is derived from
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Appendix B, Sections 2.B and 3.B=
 of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">5. The keyUsage extension MUST be prese=
nt in a CA certificate and it MUST be marked critical. The keyCertSign and =
cRLSign bits MUST be set TRUE. The digitalSignature bit MAY be set TRUE as =
well. This requirement is derived
 from </span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Appendix B, Section 2.E of=
 [CABF-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">6. The authorityInformatinAccess extens=
ion MAY be present and, if present, MUST NOT be marked CRITICAL. It MUST sp=
ecify
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">accessMethod 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 =
and MAY specify
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">accessMethod 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2.=
 This requirement is derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.C and 3.C of [CABF=
-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">7. The extendedKeyusage extension MAY b=
e present in a CA certificate. If present, it need not be marked CRITICAL. =
If the extension is present in a CA certificate, and if the certificate con=
tains the nameConstraints extension,
 then </span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">the value id-kp-serverAuth=
 MUST be present</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">. The extendedKe=
yusage extension MUST be present in a Subscriber certificate.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Either the value id-kp-serverAut=
h or id-kp-clientAuth or both values MUST be present. id-kp-emailProtection=
 MAY be present. This requirement is derived from Appendix B, Sections 2.G =
and 3.F of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">8. The nameConstraints extension MAY ap=
pear in CA certificates and need not be marked CRITICAL (contrary to [RCC52=
80]). If the certificate also contains the
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">extendedKeyusage extension and t=
hat extension contains the value
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">id-kp-serverAuth,&nbsp; then tha=
t extension MUST NOT contain the anyExtendedKeyusage value in the KeyPurpos=
eID.
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Moreover the nameConstrants </span><spa=
n style=3D"font-family:Courier">extension MUST impose constraints on dNSNam=
e, iPAddress and DirectoryName name types. Both the permittedSubtrees and e=
xcludedsubtrees fields MAY be employed.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from=
 Appendix B, Section 2.F and Section 9.7 of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">9. Other extensions defined in=
 [RFC5280] MAY be present and MUST be marked with respect to criticality as=
 specified therein.
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A.2 Semantic Verification o=
f a Certificate
</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">1. [CABF-Baseline] imposes a n=
umber of requirements on certificate issuance that cannot be verified witho=
ut access to reference information for
 the certificate Subject, or information about the CA hierarchy. For exampl=
e:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family:Courier">1.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The CA must verify that the Subj=
ect has the right to use or control of, all Domain Names and/or IP Addresse=
s listed in the Subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension in the ce=
rtificate. This requirement is derived
 from Section 7.1 of [CABF-Baseline]. </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family:Courier">2.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The Issuer name MUST contain a &=
#8220;meaningful&#8221; identifier of the CA that issued the certificate, i=
n the organizationName attribute of the Issuer name. This requirement is de=
rived from section 9.1.3 of [CABF-Baseline].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family:Courier">3.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The Issuer name MUST contain the=
 countryName attribute corresponding to the country on which the Issuer&#82=
17;s place of business is located. This requirement is derived from Section=
 9.1.4 of [CABF-Baseline].
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"f=
ont-family:Courier">4.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt">
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">If the Subject is non-null, it M=
UST contain
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">either the (verified) Subject&#8=
217;s name or DBA</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">. The CA MUST v=
erify the streetAddress, localityName, stateOrProvinceName, postalCode, cou=
ntryName, and organizationalUnitName attributes,
 if present. This requirement is derived from Section 9.2.4a of [CABF-Basel=
ine].</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">2. A certificate issued to a subordinat=
e CA that is not an affiliate of a &#8220;root&#8221; CA MUST NOT contain t=
he anyPolicy policy identifier. This requirement is derived from section 9.=
3.3 of [CABF-Baseline].
<b>(How would a Monitor know whether the subordinate CA is affiliated with =
the root CA?)</b></span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">3.&nbsp; A certificate issued to a subo=
rdinate CA that is an affiliate of a &#8220;root&#8221; CA MAY include one =
or more explicit policy identifiers (either
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">2.23.140.1.2.1 or 2.23.140.1.2.2=
 or policy identifiers defined by the CA in its CP and/or CPS). It also MAY=
 include the anyPolicy OID.
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This requirement is derived from=
 section 9.3.3 of [CABF-Baseline]. If the extension contains any of the OID=
s noted explicitly above, it is acceptable.
<b>(How would a Monitor know whether the subordinate CA is affiliated with =
the root CA?)
</b></span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">4. A Subscriber certificate issued afte=
r April 1, 2015 MUST not contain a validity interval longer than 39 months,=
 unless the issuer asserts that the certificate meets all of the criteria d=
escribed in Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline],
 from which this requirement is derived. <b>(How would a Monitor determine =
that a certificate with a validity interval between 39 and 60 months is acc=
eptable, based on Section 9.4.1 of [CABF-Baseline]?)</b></span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A Monitor cannot, in general determine =
if these requirements have been met; it lacks knowledge of the processes em=
ployed by the CA to verify the Subject name, and it may not be able to dete=
rmine whether the CA is &#8220;meaningfully&#8221;
 identified by the Issuer name. A Monitor may not be able to determine the =
organizational relationships between a &#8220;root&#8221; CA and subordinat=
e CAs. Thus mis-issuance relative to these requirements cannot, in general,=
 be detected by a Monitor.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Nonetheless, a Monitor can &#8220;prote=
ct&#8221; specific Subjects, based on reference data provided by these Subj=
ects. A Monitor trying to determine that a certificate has been issued to t=
he &#8220;right&#8221; Subject can do so using the certificate(s)
 issued to the Subject, as a reference. For example, if a Monitor is provid=
ing &#8220;protection&#8221; for a Subject, it requires the name of the Sub=
ject (as it appears in the Subject field or subjectAltName extension) and t=
he public key associated with that Subject.
 Armed with this information, a Monitor can examine every log entry to dete=
rmine if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry mat=
ches either of these names, and if it contain a different public key, this =
is evidence of mis-issuance.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;text-autospace:none">
<b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">A.3 Syntactic Verification of an Ext=
ended Validation Certificate</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; coming soon ...<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;ms=
o-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_4262AC0DB9856847A2D00EF817E81139232E23scygexch10cygnaco_--


From nobody Sun Sep 28 05:17:47 2014
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Hi,

> And using Jacob's numbers from here:
> 
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.html

It is interesting that this rumour, which was started with the EFF's
talk at DEFCON years ago, is still perpetuated. It has been disputed
numerous times and is most likely inflated by at least a factor of 2.

* DFN is not a collection of many CAs, but of one CA whose RAs are
identified in intermediate certificates - they do not hold the private
keys corresponding to the latter, however. They even document this fact
publicly.

* The number of organisations in the Mozilla root store holding CA
certificates is below 100, although about 60 are waiting for inclusion.
The number of root certificates is higher, but that is because many
organisations operate under several brand names and use different root
certs for different purposes (most notably EV).

* That leaves us with an undisclosed number of intermediate certificates
issued by CAs. Some of these may indicate subordinate CAs. This is a
problem as browsers often cache such certs for later use (once trusted,
always trusted). Mozilla has thus made it an obligation for CAs to
disclose their subordinate CAs if they are not identical to the "mother
organisation".

The latter factor gives huge leeway in the number of certs accepted by
browsers as root certs. But however you look at it, the number of such
certs will be comfortably below 1000 - anything from the 150+ root certs
in the Mozilla store up to a few hundred.

Applied to CT, these numbers matter even less if gossiping, monitoring
and auditing can be used. First, logs only accept a limited number of
CAs, as a anti-flooding protection. I'd love to hear what CAs plan here
- if their subordinates are eligible for acceptance by a log or not. And
second, the gossiping between logs and between clients has an important
effect: an attacker would have to compromise quite a few logs to make
sure his MITM is effective. Just requiring, say, 3 SCTs in a handshake
would already result in considerable work for the attacker (I know the
current number is 2, though). There is no need for clients to cooperate
with 1000 logs.

That's my understanding at least - happy to hear comments.

Ralph

-- 
Ralph Holz
I8 - Network Architectures and Services
Technische Universität München
http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/
Phone +49.89.289.18010
PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4  86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF


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On 27 September 2014 17:58, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:
> Dear Ben,
>
> On Sep 27, 2014, at 4:53 AM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
>
> I agree that CT doesn't mitigate mis-issuance for subjects that do not
> participate.
>
>
> If by "participate" you mean owners who submit their certs to logs, CT
> doesn't detect mis-issuance even for those who do, as that email explained.

By "participate" I mean monitor (or cause to be monitored) the logs.

> On monitors and guarantees - anyone can run a monitor,
> including, of course, the subjects themselves, so clearly there's no
> barrier to participation for subjects who want to participate.
>
>
> "No barrier"? Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* the logs
> out there.
>
> There will be like 1000+ logs out there.
>
> Each log will be how large (gigabytes?), and CT is not P2P, so Monitors must
> *poll* 1000+ logs constantly for updates, just for the purpose of detecting
> mis-issuance.

The total size is presumably some smallish multiplier of the total
number of valid certs, so certainly not terabytes as you imply. I
don't believe there will be as many as 1,000 logs, though I do believe
CT would still work if there were.

> On top of this, Section 4.6 of your RFC (bis-04) states that logs are not
> required to send monitors everything they ask for, making it unclear whether
> a log is misbehaving or not.

You really are clutching at straws. Yes, perhaps 4.6 should say that
at least one entry must be returned.

> This is not practical.
>
> ###
>
> But that is all besides the point.
>
> The point is that gossip doesn't detect mis-issuance, whether or not
> "subjects participate" in CT or not.

Gossip detects misbehaviour on the part of logs (in particular,
advertising different logs to different people).

>
> Kind regards,
> Greg Slepak
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing
> with the NSA.
>


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To: Ralph Holz <holz@net.in.tum.de>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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Dear Ralph,

On Sep 28, 2014, at 5:17 AM, Ralph Holz <holz@net.in.tum.de> wrote:

> The latter factor gives huge leeway in the number of certs accepted by
> browsers as root certs. But however you look at it, the number of such
> certs will be comfortably below 1000 - anything from the 150+ root =
certs
> in the Mozilla store up to a few hundred.

Thanks for clarifying some of this!

This is just Mozilla, however. Even if we go by your numbers, we still =
need to do a union on the certs accepted by other browsers, and other =
operating systems.

Do you happen to have numbers for that too?

> Just requiring, say, 3 SCTs in a handshake
> would already result in considerable work for the attacker

Yes, I think that would improve things.

> (I know the current number is 2, though).


The current number is 1 according to the most recent version of the RFC =
I could find (bis-04):

=
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/mas=
ter/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-04.txt

> There is no need for clients to cooperate with 1000 logs.


Well, if they want to know for certain that they weren't MITM'd, they're =
going to have to search up to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, whatever =
the number happens to be).

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear Ralph,</div><div><br></div>On Sep 28, =
2014, at 5:17 AM, Ralph Holz &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:holz@net.in.tum.de">holz@net.in.tum.de</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">The latter factor gives huge =
leeway in the number of certs accepted by<br>browsers as root certs. But =
however you look at it, the number of such<br>certs will be comfortably =
below 1000 - anything from the 150+ root certs<br>in the Mozilla store =
up to a few hundred.</blockquote><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Thanks for clarifying some =
of this!</div><div><br></div><div>This is just Mozilla, however. Even if =
we go by your numbers, we still need to do a union on the certs accepted =
by other browsers, and other operating =
systems.</div><div><br></div><div>Do you happen to have numbers for that =
too?</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">Just requiring, =
say, 3 SCTs in a handshake<br>would already result in considerable work =
for the attacker</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I think that would =
improve things.</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">(I know =
the&nbsp;current number is 2, though).</blockquote></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>The current number is 1 =
according to the most recent version of the RFC I could find =
(bis-04):</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/certificate-transparency-=
rfcs/master/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-04.txt">https://raw.githubusercon=
tent.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/master/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6=
962-bis-04.txt</a></div><div><br></div><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">There is no need for clients to cooperate&nbsp;with 1000 =
logs.</blockquote></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Well, if they want to know =
for certain that they weren't MITM'd, they're going to have to search up =
to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, whatever the number happens to =
be).</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Sun Sep 28 10:04:45 2014
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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2014 10:04:42 -0700
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Cc: Ralph Holz <holz@net.in.tum.de>, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>, trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On Sep 28, 2014, at 10:01 AM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:
>=20
>> There is no need for clients to cooperate with 1000 logs.
>=20
>=20
> Well, if they want to know for certain that they weren't MITM'd, =
they're going to have to search up to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, =
whatever the number happens to be).

Erm, sorry, not "for certain", because even if they did scan those logs =
for inappropriate certs, that still won't tell them whether or not the =
certificate is fraudulent for two reasons:

1. Only the website owner determines whether the certificate is actually =
fraudulent. Clients cannot determine this with CT, no matter how much =
gossip they do, nor how many logs they query.

2. Similar to #1 but not identical is the possibility that a revoked =
certificate was used to MITM.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Sep 28, 2014, at 10:01 AM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> Dear Ralph,
>=20
> On Sep 28, 2014, at 5:17 AM, Ralph Holz <holz@net.in.tum.de> wrote:
>=20
>> The latter factor gives huge leeway in the number of certs accepted =
by
>> browsers as root certs. But however you look at it, the number of =
such
>> certs will be comfortably below 1000 - anything from the 150+ root =
certs
>> in the Mozilla store up to a few hundred.
>=20
> Thanks for clarifying some of this!
>=20
> This is just Mozilla, however. Even if we go by your numbers, we still =
need to do a union on the certs accepted by other browsers, and other =
operating systems.
>=20
> Do you happen to have numbers for that too?
>=20
>> Just requiring, say, 3 SCTs in a handshake
>> would already result in considerable work for the attacker
>=20
> Yes, I think that would improve things.
>=20
>> (I know the current number is 2, though).
>=20
>=20
> The current number is 1 according to the most recent version of the =
RFC I could find (bis-04):
>=20
> =
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/mas=
ter/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-04.txt
>=20
>> There is no need for clients to cooperate with 1000 logs.
>=20
>=20
> Well, if they want to know for certain that they weren't MITM'd, =
they're going to have to search up to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, =
whatever the number happens to be).
>=20
> Kind regards,
> Greg Slepak
>=20
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


--Apple-Mail=_9938E68B-A68D-4036-AEC6-5E67342AFB84
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">On Sep =
28, 2014, at 10:01 AM, Tao Effect &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:contact@taoeffect.com">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">There is no need for =
clients to cooperate&nbsp;with 1000 logs.</blockquote></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Well, if they want to know =
for certain that they weren't MITM'd, they're going to have to search up =
to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, whatever the number happens to =
be).</div></div></blockquote><div><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><br></div><div>Erm, sorry, not "for certain", =
because even if they did scan those logs for inappropriate certs, that =
still won't tell them whether or not the certificate is fraudulent for =
two reasons:</div><div><br></div><div>1. Only the website owner =
determines whether the certificate is actually fraudulent. Clients =
cannot determine this with CT, no matter how much gossip they do, nor =
how many logs they query.</div><div><br></div><div>2. Similar to #1 but =
not identical is the possibility that a revoked certificate was used to =
MITM.</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div><br></div></div></div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Sep 28, 2014, at 10:01 AM, Tao Effect &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:contact@taoeffect.com">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear Ralph,</div><div><br></div>On Sep 28, =
2014, at 5:17 AM, Ralph Holz &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:holz@net.in.tum.de">holz@net.in.tum.de</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">The latter factor gives huge =
leeway in the number of certs accepted by<br>browsers as root certs. But =
however you look at it, the number of such<br>certs will be comfortably =
below 1000 - anything from the 150+ root certs<br>in the Mozilla store =
up to a few hundred.</blockquote><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Thanks for clarifying some =
of this!</div><div><br></div><div>This is just Mozilla, however. Even if =
we go by your numbers, we still need to do a union on the certs accepted =
by other browsers, and other operating =
systems.</div><div><br></div><div>Do you happen to have numbers for that =
too?</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">Just requiring, =
say, 3 SCTs in a handshake<br>would already result in considerable work =
for the attacker</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, I think that would =
improve things.</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">(I know =
the&nbsp;current number is 2, though).</blockquote></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>The current number is 1 =
according to the most recent version of the RFC I could find =
(bis-04):</div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/certificate-transparency-=
rfcs/master/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-04.txt">https://raw.githubusercon=
tent.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/master/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6=
962-bis-04.txt</a></div><div><br></div><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">There is no need for clients to cooperate&nbsp;with 1000 =
logs.</blockquote></div><div><br =
class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Well, if they want to know =
for certain that they weren't MITM'd, they're going to have to search up =
to a 1000 logs (or several hundred, whatever the number happens to =
be).</div><div><br></div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg =
Slepak</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">--</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>Trans =
mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans<br></blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

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From nobody Sun Sep 28 15:35:36 2014
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From: Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Threat model outline, attack model
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On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 02:40:59PM -0700, Greg wrote:
> On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:19 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 09:58:56AM -0700, Tao Effect wrote:
> >> "No barrier"? Subjects (domain owners) would need to monitor *all* the logs out there.
> >> 
> >> There will be like 1000+ logs out there.
> > 
> > "Citation needed", as the Wikipedeans say.  I'm not sure how you could
> > possibly come to that conclusion.
> 
> I am citing your own documentation:

I had nothing to do with the content on that webpage.  Not everyone
interested in CT works for Google, y'know.

> "we think “every major CA” is within limits of feasibility"
> 
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq

> And using Jacob's numbers from here:
> 
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.html

The word "major" does not appear anywhere in the content of that resource. 
Thus, you're comparing apples with oranges -- the Google CT FAQ suggests
that "every major CA" may run a log, while your resource says there may be
between "more than 1200" and 1832 CA certificates (total, comprising both
roots and intermediates) in active existence, but with no indication of how
many of those may be considered "major".

- Matt

-- 
The New York Times: the paper that asks for more verification from its
readers than its writers.


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From: Greg <greg@kinostudios.com>
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To: Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>
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Dear Matt,

On Sep 28, 2014, at 3:35 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:

> I had nothing to do with the content on that webpage.  Not everyone
> interested in CT works for Google, y'know.

Right you are, my apologies, I should have said "Google's =
documentation".

>> "we think =93every major CA=94 is within limits of feasibility"
>>=20
>> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq
>=20
>> And using Jacob's numbers from here:
>>=20
>> =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.html
>=20
> The word "major" does not appear anywhere in the content of that =
resource.
> Thus, you're comparing apples with oranges -- the Google CT FAQ =
suggests
> that "every major CA" may run a log, while your resource says there =
may be
> between "more than 1200" and 1832 CA certificates (total, comprising =
both
> roots and intermediates) in active existence, but with no indication =
of how
> many of those may be considered "major".


Thank you (and Ralph) for bringing this up!

I've updated the blog post to add this sentence in bold underneath the =
attack picture (at the end of claim #1):

Edit September 28, 2014: The number of CAs out there is disputed [1], =
and not all CAs will necessarily [2] have their own log.

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00604.html
[2] =
http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparenc=
y/www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00606.html

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.


--Apple-Mail=_4B106115-AC12-4C79-9960-FCE899674279
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>Dear Matt,</div><div><br></div><div>On Sep 28, =
2014, at 3:35 PM, Matt Palmer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mpalmer@hezmatt.org">mpalmer@hezmatt.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">I had nothing =
to do with the content on that webpage. &nbsp;Not everyone<br>interested =
in CT works for Google, =
y'know.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right you are, my apologies, =
I should have said "Google's =
documentation".</div><div><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">"we think =93every major CA=94 is within limits of =
feasibility"<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq">http://www.certificat=
e-transparency.org/faq</a><br></blockquote><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">And using Jacob's numbers from here:<br><br><a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.=
html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/therightkey/current/msg00745.ht=
ml</a><br></blockquote><br>The word "major" does not appear anywhere in =
the content of that resource.&nbsp;<br>Thus, you're comparing apples =
with oranges -- the Google CT FAQ suggests<br>that "every major CA" may =
run a log, while your resource says there may be<br>between "more than =
1200" and 1832 CA certificates (total, comprising both<br>roots and =
intermediates) in active existence, but with no indication of =
how<br>many of those may be considered =
"major".</blockquote><br></div><div><br></div><div>Thank you (and Ralph) =
for bringing this up!</div><div><br></div><div>I've updated the blog =
post to add this sentence in bold underneath the attack picture (at the =
end of claim #1):</div><div><br></div><i><b>Edit September 28, =
2014:&nbsp;The number of CAs out there&nbsp;is disputed [1], and not all =
CAs&nbsp;will necessarily [2]&nbsp;have their&nbsp;own =
log.</b></i><div><br></div><div>[1]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00604.html">=
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00604.html</a></div>=
<div>[2]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-tra=
nsparency/www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00606.html">http:=
//blog.okturtles.com/2014/09/the-trouble-with-certificate-transparency/www=
.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00606.html</a></div><div><br><=
/div><div>Kind regards,</div><div>Greg Slepak</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote
Sat, 27 Sep 2014 14:47:24 -0700:

| On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:03 PM, Love Hörnquist Åstrand <lha@kth.se> wrote:
| 
| > So how do you keep the log honest and stop it from not adding the
| > SCT to the log ?
| > 
| > Well, by using gossip about the logs.
| 
| Sorry, don't quite understand what you're saying here...
| 
| Both SCTs (legitimate and otherwise) will happily be accepted by any
| log. Gossip won't help clients detect fraudulent certs issued by rogue
| CAs (as explained in the "Threat model" thread).

This is hard to follow. SCT's are not added to nor accepted by
logs. They are the response to a log submission. An SCT is a promise
from a log that a given certificate will be included in said log within
some time.

Detecting of fraudulent certs is done by the particular type of CT
client called a monitor.

Successful gossiping will help detecting logs presenting different views
to different clients, among them monitors. This includes malicious log
operators as well as attackers able to mount man-in-the-middle (or
man-on-the-side) attacks who are also able to sign as the log (for
example by having a copy of the logs private key).


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Gossiping in CT
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Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote
Sat, 27 Sep 2014 16:10:35 -0700:

| Paul Wouters brought up the idea of sharing certs on [metzdowd], and I guess that's the same thing as gossiping SCTs, right?

That's not how I read that. The suggestion seems to be sharing
information about seeing two different certificates with the same CN
within some period of time. That's not what an SCT carry. 


| > The more information shared, the better detection we seem to get. But
| > sharing information have privacy implications. It seems to me that
| > sharing STH's is much less problematic than sharing SCT's.
| 
| Why do you think sharing SCTs is problematic, and what privacy implications does it pose?
| 
| If the SCTs are shared over an encrypted connection, only the server, the client, and the potential MITM will know about them.

The fear is that the web server would get a good idea about what sites
the client has visited. If clients would gossip sufficiently about
_other_ clients SCT:s _and_ there would be no way of linking an SCT to a
given client, this might be less of a problem. Can we do this?


| Any time a cert changes, the client would tell the server about that change over the established TLS connection.
| 
| When MITM leaves, the server would find out that a fraudulent cert had been generated for their website, and could then identify the CA responsible.

Here is the cert change again. I'll leave it to others to explain more
about that idea. Sounds interesting.


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On 27/09/14 14:36, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> This gossiping that people is talking about, what is it? Here's a
> summary of what I think some people mean when they say gossip and what
> problem this thing tries to solve. It's based on a few IETF-related
> documents and not the full picture. I'd be interested to hear what other
> people read into the concept of gossiping in CT

It seems that your summary might have one misapprehension. As I
understand it, gossiping is not something that clients (in the web
browser sense) do. After all, one point of CT is to avoid extra network
requests at connection time. Gossiping is a log-to-log concept, where a
group of logs can determine that a particular log is rogue because of
what they hear about what it's saying, and any inconsistencies in that.

Gerv


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On 29 September 2014 14:03, Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 27/09/14 14:36, Linus Nordberg wrote:
>> This gossiping that people is talking about, what is it? Here's a
>> summary of what I think some people mean when they say gossip and what
>> problem this thing tries to solve. It's based on a few IETF-related
>> documents and not the full picture. I'd be interested to hear what other
>> people read into the concept of gossiping in CT
>
> It seems that your summary might have one misapprehension. As I
> understand it, gossiping is not something that clients (in the web
> browser sense) do. After all, one point of CT is to avoid extra network
> requests at connection time. Gossiping is a log-to-log concept, where a
> group of logs can determine that a particular log is rogue because of
> what they hear about what it's saying, and any inconsistencies in that.

We imagine _all_ participants in the protocol gossiping. Yes,
gossiping STHs in the current plan does introduce a small amount of
extra overhead into the connection, but it really is small.


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On 28/09/14 13:17, Ralph Holz wrote:
> * That leaves us with an undisclosed number of intermediate certificates
> issued by CAs.

And why would any of those want to run a log anyway, more than a random
person? I'd expect them in most cases to submit their certs to the log
run by the parent CA.

I wonder also if small CAs would pool resources to run a log. After all,
it's not a customer-facing function.

So I'd be surprised if we see 60 logs.

Gerv


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Design of gossip
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Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote
Sat, 27 Sep 2014 10:42:30 -0700:

| The first choice is what to gossip: tree heads and proofs or certs.

What's the reason for including proofs in the gossiping? Is it an
optimisation of network resources? My initial thought has been that
gossiping about anything that's not signed by logs opens up for attacks
against log reputation.


| Both have privacy implications: while certs more directly reveal which
| sites are visited, it's possible that tree heads will be unique per
| cert due to the impact of adding to a tree one cert at a time, so each
| precert will end up showing a different head. This is a tricky issue.

I think that this would have to be handled by stipulating that logs
cannot issue "crazy numbers" of STH's. Numbers get crazy and dangerous
when they come near some number related to the number of unique requests
for STH's. Unique per client, that is. (Imagine a log producing a new
tree head for each STH request and "watermarking" clients by recording
which unique STH was delivered to them, so that when someone come asking
for an inclusion proof for that STH, the log could link a site to a
client.)

If there's going to be any point in this maximum number of STH's issued
per something, it has to be auditable. In the CT case, I can think of
STH's per time unit and STH's per logged certificate.

A new log parameter _minimum_ merge delay could be defined for the per
time solution. The time would have to be chosen based on expected number
of STH requests per time unit.

For the "per new entry" idea, we would also have to add a new maximum
new entries per time unit. Not sure that this is such a great thing for
CT. Might be useful for other types of logs.


| The second choice is what gossip produces. In particular do we push
| consistency proofs towards clients, or pull the heads towards
| monitors? Either approach can work, but the first approach could save
| bandwidth: a consistent head does not need to be reported. The first
| also enables remembering what has been recorded. The second approach
| is simpler for gossipers.

I think consistent heads need to be reported too since that's the only
way to learn about you being the only one seeing a particular, from your
point of view well behaving, log.

I'm reading "consistent head" to mean an STH that checks out correctly
against an older trusted STH and a consistency proof from that point.


| The third choice is how to gossip. Probably the best approach is some
| sort of peer-to-peer network, with the possibility of using other
| servers if the P2P approach doesn't work. However, gossip needs to be
| censorship resistant, which can be a bit tricky. We also want gossip
| to deal with a small fraction of malicious nodes, which means some
| approaches are tricky: in particular nodes can't stop if some nodes
| say "we've heard it before".
| 
| We also need to make sure we don't lose submitted heads, even as old
| heads grow in number. Using consistency proofs to reduce the number of
| heads helps with this problem.
| 
| DHTs may be a workable approach, but I don't know of Byzantine proof
| ones. Flood-fill on random graphs scales if you make it publish only,
| but dealing with old data gets tricky: we want new nodes to learn it,
| without having to send it unnecessarily. Showing the result of an
| audit and backfilling can work, but we need to think about the details
| and try some experiments.

This is a pretty large subject. My initial thoughts are that i) boy are
there ways we could mess this up and ii) we don't want clients to have
to try to talk to other clients directly. Taken together that leads me
to a somewhat defensive model where clients use an already established,
untrusted, peer as a vehicle for conveying their gossip messages. That
doesn't mean one couldn't build a useful protocol on top of that though.


From nobody Mon Sep 29 07:42:00 2014
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Subject: [Trans] path validation
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I realized, after I sent my reply, that Santosh's point wrt path validation
is important. I believe Ben indicated that he did not envision logs 
performing all
of the 5280 checks, just verifying the signatures in the path. So, I 
misspoke when
I noted that 6962-bis already called for path checking; it calls for it, 
but only
in a very superficial way.

Thus we need to decide if we believe that a sig-only check on a path 
consistent with
the CABF guidelines. I don't think it is. The Definitions section of the 
CABF guidelines
includes the following entry:

     Valid Certificate: A Certificate that passes the validation 
procedure specified in RFC 5280.

Steve


From nobody Mon Sep 29 07:50:23 2014
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Subject: Re: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Rick,

Thanks for taking the time to review my initial cut at an Appendix.

I have made changes to reflect all of the typos you noted.

> Also, although I like the idea of log servers rejecting 
> syntactically-invalid certificates, that may create problems for CAs 
> because the CABF requirements have changed over time and will likely 
> change in the future. Any changes would have to be rolled out to log 
> servers and browsers in time to prevent rejection of a valid certificate.
>

Your observation about the need to coordinate CABF requirements changes 
with what log servers
would check gave me an idea. Why not have the add (pre-cert) chain to 
log request specify
whether the cert being added is to be checked against DV or EV specs, 
and note the version
of the DV/EV spec to be used? This would make it easy for the log to 
know which set of
checks to employ. Since each log needs to advertise a set of data about 
itself anyway
(e.g., what root CAs it supports), it could also advertise the set of 
specs against which
it is prepared to check submissions. This way a CA or Subject would know 
whether the log
was prepared to accept a chain for checking under the selected criteria. 
Note that a Monitor
could not perform checks as easily, because it does not interact 
directly with the entity
submitting the log request. I think that argues for logs performing 
these checks.
>
> *A.2 Semantic Verification of a Certificate *
>
> Nonetheless, a Monitor can "protect" specific Subjects, based on 
> reference data provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying to 
> determine that a certificate has been issued to the "right" Subject 
> can do so using the certificate(s) issued to the Subject, as a 
> reference. For example, if a Monitor is providing "protection" for a 
> Subject, it requires the name of the Subject (as it appears in the 
> Subject field or subjectAltName extension) and the public key 
> associated with that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor 
> can examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same 
> Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of these 
> names, and if it contain a different public key, this is evidence of 
> mis-issuance.
>
> There's no requirement that a Subject be associated with a single 
> public key. In some cases, web site owners generate a different key 
> pair on each machine behind a load balancer, and apply for 
> certificates with the same Subject name but different key.
>
> I'm not sure if you've captured the type of mis-issuance that CT was 
> originally intended to detect: when a hacked, faulty or rogue CA 
> issues a certificate to a Subject without the Subject's knowledge. The 
> Monitor alone cannot detect that. It can report to the Subject that a 
> certificate was logged for the Subject, but only the Subject can tell 
> if that was a valid issuance or mis-issuance.
>
Your observation is correct; that's what I get for trying to write a 
quick description of
the algorithm for this.  Accommodating multiple keys per Subject is easy 
to fix.

    For example, if a Monitor is providing "protection" for a Subject,
    it requires the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subject
    field or subjectAltName extension) and the public key(s) associated
    with that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can
    examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same Subject
    or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of these names, and
    if it contain a public key other that the one(s) provided by the
    Subject, this is evidence of mis-issuance.


If the Subject provides a list of all o the keys associated with the 
Subject, perhaps in the form
of certs issued to the Subject (and currently valid) this would enable a 
Monitor to detect this form of mis-issuance, agreed?

A separate topic is issuance of a bogus cert for a Subject who doesn't 
have a cert issued legitimately.
In this case there is no reference cert to present to a Monitor. It may 
be hard for a Subject who
doesn't have a cert to convince a 3rd party Monitor to check for certs 
issued to the Subject name
in question. Should we classify this as mis-issuance as well?

Steve

Steve

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    Rick,<br>
    <br>
    Thanks for taking the time to review my initial cut at an Appendix.<br>
    <br>
    I have made changes to reflect all of the typos you noted.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
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            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"></span><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">Also, although I like
            the idea of log servers rejecting syntactically-invalid
            certificates, that may create problems for CAs because the
            CABF requirements have changed over time and will likely
            change in the future. Any changes would have to be rolled
            out to log servers and browsers in time to prevent rejection
            of a valid certificate.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Your observation about the need to coordinate CABF requirements
    changes with what log servers <br>
    would check gave me an idea. Why not have the add (pre-cert) chain
    to log request specify<br>
    whether the cert being added is to be checked against DV or EV
    specs, and note the version <br>
    of the DV/EV spec to be used? This would make it easy for the log to
    know which set of <br>
    checks to employ. Since each log needs to advertise a set of data
    about itself anyway<br>
    (e.g., what root CAs it supports), it could also advertise the set
    of specs against which<br>
    it is prepared to check submissions. This way a CA or Subject would
    know whether the log<br>
    was prepared to accept a chain for checking under the selected
    criteria. Note that a Monitor<br>
    could not perform checks as easily, because it does not interact
    directly with the entity<br>
    submitting the log request. I think that argues for logs performing
    these checks.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:544B0DD62A64C1448B2DA253C011414607D1628D70@TUS1XCHEVSPIN33.SYMC.SYMANTEC.COM"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1"><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span><span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span>
        <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none"><span
            style="font-family:Courier">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in"><b><span
              style="font-family:Courier">A.2 Semantic Verification of a
              Certificate </span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in;text-autospace:none"><span
            style="font-family:Courier">Nonetheless, a Monitor can
            &#8220;protect&#8221; specific Subjects, based on reference data
            provided by these Subjects. A Monitor trying to determine
            that a certificate has been issued to the &#8220;right&#8221; Subject
            can do so using the certificate(s) issued to the Subject, as
            a reference. For example, if a Monitor is providing
            &#8220;protection&#8221; for a Subject, it requires the name of the
            Subject (as it appears in the Subject field or
            subjectAltName extension) and the public key associated with
            that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can
            examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same
            Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of
            these names, and if it contain a different public key, this
            is evidence of mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-autospace:none"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">There&#8217;s no
            requirement that a Subject be associated with a single
            public key. In some cases, web site owners generate a
            different key pair on each machine behind a load balancer,
            and apply for certificates with the same Subject name but
            different key.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"
style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;text-autospace:none"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">I&#8217;m not sure if
            you&#8217;ve captured the type of mis-issuance that CT was
            originally intended to detect: when a hacked, faulty or
            rogue CA issues a certificate to a Subject without the
            Subject&#8217;s knowledge. The Monitor alone cannot detect that.
            It can report to the Subject that a certificate was logged
            for the Subject, but only the Subject can tell if that was a
            valid issuance or mis-issuance.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    Your observation is correct; that's what I get for trying to write a
    quick description of<br>
    the algorithm for this.&nbsp; Accommodating multiple keys per Subject is
    easy to fix. <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote><big><span style="font-family:Courier">For example, if a
          Monitor is providing &#8220;protection&#8221; for a Subject, it requires
          the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subject field or
          subjectAltName extension) and the public key(s) associated
          with that Subject. Armed with this information, a Monitor can
          examine every log entry to determine if it contains the same
          Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches either of
          these names, and if it contain a public key other that the
          one(s) provided by the Subject, this is evidence of
          mis-issuance.</span></big><br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    If the Subject provides a list of all o the keys associated with the
    Subject, perhaps in the form<br>
    of certs issued to the Subject (and currently valid) this would
    enable a Monitor to detect this form of mis-issuance, agreed?<br>
    <br>
    A separate topic is issuance of a bogus cert for a Subject who
    doesn't have a cert issued legitimately.<br>
    In this case there is no reference cert to present to a Monitor. It
    may be hard for a Subject who<br>
    doesn't have a cert to convince a 3rd party Monitor to check for
    certs issued to the Subject name<br>
    in question. Should we classify this as mis-issuance as well?<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
  </body>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Santosh,
>
> Steve,
>
> I read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chain.
>
> Why not add path validation to the list of rules you defined below.  
> That would be good given the wide variance in how browsers process 
> chains.  This gives us another opportunity at log level to have 
> correct logic for path validation.
>
I believe 6962-bit already requires a log operator to validate the cert 
chain to
one of the roots from which it accepts SCT requests, based on text in 
Section 3.1.
But I can add a specific reminder of the need to do that.
>
> Note that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.509, EKU is 
> processed somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy mapping).
Can you point to the CABF text that makes this clear? Also, I'd be 
thankful if you can
provide suggested changes to my text to highlight this.
>
> On a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with respect to 
> interaction between name constraints and EKU.
I read Section**9.7 of the DV (1.1.9) spec as implying a linkage between 
the two, but
the wording is somewhat confusing to me.

Steve

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    Santosh,<br>
    <blockquote
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Steve,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">I
            read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chain.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Why

            not add path validation to the list of rules you defined
            below.&nbsp; That would be good given the wide variance in how
            browsers process chains.&nbsp; This gives us another opportunity
            at log level to have correct logic for path validation.</span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    I believe 6962-bit already requires a log operator to validate the
    cert chain to<br>
    one of the roots from which it accepts SCT requests, based on text
    in Section 3.1.<br>
    But I can add a specific reminder of the need to do that.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:4262AC0DB9856847A2D00EF817E81139232E23@scygexch10.cygnacom.com"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1">
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
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        <span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Note

          that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.509, EKU is
          processed somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy
          mapping).</span></div>
    </blockquote>
    Can you point to the CABF text that makes this clear? Also, I'd be
    thankful if you can<br>
    provide suggested changes to my text to highlight this.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:4262AC0DB9856847A2D00EF817E81139232E23@scygexch10.cygnacom.com"
      type="cite">
      <div class="WordSection1"><span
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            style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <span
          style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">On

          a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with respect to
          interaction between name constraints and EKU.<o:p></o:p></span>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    I read Section<b> </b>9.7 of the DV (1.1.9) spec as implying a
    linkage between the two, but<br>
    the wording is somewhat confusing to me.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
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Ben,

> On 26 September 2014 16:49, Stephen Kent<kent@bbn.com>  wrote:
>> Ben,
>>
>>> ...
>>>> Mis-issuance is the primary (sole?) rationale for CT, so I am not
>>>> comfortable
>>>> with the notion that mis-issuance is not well-defined.
>>> Reality doesn't always make us comfortable :-)
>>>
>>> We keep finding new ways for people to get certs wrong, and thus
>>> creating new rules for them. Also, the exact rules are context
>>> dependent, and may even depend on contracts and other things we can't
>>> even see.
>> I don't accept that rationale as a basis for avoiding creating a definition
>> for mis-issuance.
>>
>> The CABF Guidelines are revised over time. We can update the RFC to match.
>> We do that for other IETF Standards.
>>
>> I don't understand the notion of context dependence for the definition
>> of mis-issuance. Can you provide some examples? Who decides what constitutes
>> a mi-issued cert inn what context?
>>
>> I agree that a contracts between a CA and a Subject can include terms and
>> conditions that might cause aert to be "mis-issued" relative to those
>> Ts & Cs.
> This is the kind of thing I meant.
I didn't see replies to my other comments above.

As for the contract example, I think this is out of scope for anything we
are trying to do. If we say that CT enables detection of mis-issuance based
on the model I described in my proposed Appendix, we cover a lot of cases
that are defined objectively, are universal, and have a basis in the 
Guidelines
to which you alluded when you mentioned EV certs. We can say that 
examination of
logs MAY be enable detect ingother forms of mis-issuance, but that 
because we
have no definition of what that might be, it's out of scope for this doc.
>> But, I though CT was trying to enable Monitors to detect
>> mis-issuance
>> on an Internet-wide scale. Violation of Ts & Cs is something that the
>> Subject and CA would be able to determine, but not others, in general.
> I want to enable as much to be detected as possible. Certainly if we
> could only help in these narrow cases, that would be a cause for
> concern - but my point is I don't think we can _fully_ nail down all
> instances of mis-issuance.
And I don't think we cannot discuss, not make design decisions, based on
types of mis-issuance we can't define.
>> At a minimum we need a set of universally-applicable issuance standards to
>> apply, based on two things:
>> - the syntax of the cert, which everyone can examine
>> - comparison of logged certs against reference certs, i.e., valid
>> certs already issued to (legitimate) Subjects. A Monitor can
>> perform this comparison if provided with a reference cert. if the
>> Monitor wants to perform additional checks, that may be fine
>>
>> if we're going to create a standard that purports to detect mis-issuance,
>> but we can't define mis-issuance in a well-articulated, testable fashion, I
>> question the utility of this effort.
> I didn't intend to suggest there was no point in defining mis-issuance
> to the extent that its possible, just that I don't think its likely
> we'll manage to completely define it, so we should not attempt to do
> so. i.e. I would not like to see the RFC say "this is mis-issuance,
> and nothing else is".
Again, I disagree. We should define what we can and make design decisions
based on that definition. Anything else that might be considered 
mis-issuanve,
is out of scope for purposes of this work. This is the sort of 
delineation that
we often impose on RFCs; we define a scope for a standard and declare 
that other
stuff is out of scope, relative to the standard.
>>>> I'm puzzled; how would CT allow a Monitor to determine who generated the
>>>> key pair used in a cert that was logged? I don't understand your example
>>>> here.
>>> I said it wouldn't, so you are right to be puzzled.
>> Then why cite this as as an example of mis-issuance, and yet claim that CT
>> is intended to detect mis-issuance? That's what I find puzzling.
> I was supporting your claim that not all forms of mis-issuance are
> detectable by simply looking at the certificate (though I guess almost
> all are).
Well, there are a lot of examples that I think most folks will agree are 
mis-issuance,
and which are syntactic. The original case I envisioned, issuing a cert 
to the wrong
entity, is addressed by having a reference to the "right" cert or to 
equivalent data. There
is also the interesting case of non-existence of issuance, as asserted 
by the entity
that controls the Subject name. I didn't address that, but one could 
imagine doing so.
>>>>> As far as I know there are no standards in this area. Chrome contains
>>>>> a blacklist of certificate hashes (from memory, its been a while since
>>>>> I looked at this) - I don't know what other browsers do.
>>>> Well, if we can't say how this is done, preferably based on some
>>>> standard,
>>>> then we can't make an argument that, after being being detected by CT,
>>>> that
>>>> there is a fix. If so, then the security considerations section will have
>>>> to
>>>> discuss this residual issue.
>>> I think we have ample evidence that there are fixes to mis-issuance.
>>> Some of them are based on standards, too (e.g. revoking in CRLs or via
>>> OCSP).
>> I believe we have to be able to explain how mis-issuance (if it can be
>> defined)
>> is detected by CT, and then how the detection provided by CT is used to
>> address
>> the problem. That's why I believe we need an architecture and a
>> threat/attack model, so
>> that there is a framework for explaining how CT fits into a solution to the
>> problem.
>> When there are standards-bases ways to respond to mis-issuance detected by
>> CT, then we
>> need to point to them. When there are not, we need to admit that and say
>> that there
>> are residual problems, or that there are extant, but not standardized,
>> mitigation
>> techniques.
> Sure thing.
OK. I think we may be converging on some aspects of this issue.

Steve


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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"
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Steve,

See I will respond to the other thread you created for path validation.  Th=
at seems to be a more appropriate place.

I will be sure to include the EKU processing language there.

From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 10:53 AM
To: trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] defining "mis-issuance"

Santosh,

Steve,

I read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chain.

Why not add path validation to the list of rules you defined below.  That w=
ould be good given the wide variance in how browsers process chains.  This =
gives us another opportunity at log level to have correct logic for path va=
lidation.
I believe 6962-bit already requires a log operator to validate the cert cha=
in to
one of the roots from which it accepts SCT requests, based on text in Secti=
on 3.1.
But I can add a specific reminder of the need to do that.


Note that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.509, EKU is processed =
somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy mapping).
Can you point to the CABF text that makes this clear? Also, I'd be thankful=
 if you can
provide suggested changes to my text to highlight this.


On a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with respect to interaction =
between name constraints and EKU.
I read Section 9.7 of the DV (1.1.9) spec as implying a linkage between the=
 two, but
the wording is somewhat confusing to me.

Steve

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Steve,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">See I will respond to the other thread you created fo=
r path validation.&nbsp; That seems to be a more appropriate place.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">I will be sure to include the EKU processing language=
 there.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:windowtext;=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt=
;color:windowtext;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"> Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@=
ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, September 29, 2014 10:53 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> trans@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Trans] defining &quot;mis-issuance&quot;<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Santosh,<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Steve,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">I read 6962-bis saying submission of certificate chai=
n.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">Why not add path validation to the list of rules you =
defined below.&nbsp; That would be good given the wide variance in how brow=
sers process chains.&nbsp; This gives us another
 opportunity at log level to have correct logic for path validation.</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quo=
t;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">I believe 6962-bit already=
 requires a log operator to validate the cert chain to<br>
one of the roots from which it accepts SCT requests, based on text in Secti=
on 3.1.<br>
But I can add a specific reminder of the need to do that.<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ti=
mes New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN=
-US">Note that if one follows CABF, unlike RFC 5280 and X.509, EKU is proce=
ssed somewhat akin to certificate policy (less policy mapping).</span><span=
 style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-far=
east-language:EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quo=
t;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Can you point to the CABF =
text that makes this clear? Also, I'd be thankful if you can<br>
provide suggested changes to my text to highlight this.<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fa=
reast-language:EN-US">&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ti=
mes New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN=
-US">On a side note, I fail to see CABF requirement with respect to interac=
tion between name constraints and EKU.</span><span style=3D"font-family:&qu=
ot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quo=
t;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">I read Section<b>
</b>9.7 of the DV (1.1.9) spec as implying a linkage between the two, but<b=
r>
the wording is somewhat confusing to me.<br>
<br>
Steve<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] path validation
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Steve,

As I mentioned, I think log is a good place to ensure that hygiene of the p=
ath and not just the leaf certificate.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
I do not know if an Appendix would help log operators with some of the past=
 erroneous implementations or interpretations of RFC 5280.  I mention this =
if the log operators choose to use some of the existing platforms to implem=
ent path validation.  Newer versions may or may not have fixed some of thes=
e issues such as:

1.  Not enforcing name constraints on intermediate certificates in the path
2.  Interpreting name constraints as the only name forms allowed and reject=
ing certificates with other name forms.  For example, if the name constrain=
ts contain DN based names and SAN contain RFC 822 names, rejecting the cert=
ificates erroneously.
3. Misapplying name constraints on URI.  This has caused real problems in c=
ircles I work in.  Since not all URI schemes have authority component, the =
URI name constraint should not be applied to the ones that do not (e.g., ev=
en if URI name constraints are present, they do not apply to URN and certif=
icates should not be rejected.

EKU PROCESSING
I went back to the CAB Forum document and it has no processing rules for EK=
U for the path.  But, based on their desire to constrain the path how some =
of the more popular implementation has done it, the following logic seems t=
o make sense.

Assume n certificates in the certificate chain. Set the value of EKU for a =
certificate to Universal Set if the extension is absent or contains anyExte=
ndedKeyUsage; otherwise set the value to the set of OIDs in the EKU extensi=
on.  Now, take the intersection of all n sets.  If the intersection is empt=
y, the path validation fails.  If the intersection in Universal set, the en=
d certificate can be used for any purpose.  Otherwise, the end certificate =
can be used for purpose(s) in the intersection.

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"

I only bring it up because 6962 seems to be using that as a baseline.

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 10:42 AM
To: trans@ietf.org
Subject: [Trans] path validation

I realized, after I sent my reply, that Santosh's point wrt path validation=
 is important. I believe Ben indicated that he did not envision logs perfor=
ming all of the 5280 checks, just verifying the signatures in the path. So,=
 I misspoke when I noted that 6962-bis already called for path checking; it=
 calls for it, but only in a very superficial way.

Thus we need to decide if we believe that a sig-only check on a path consis=
tent with the CABF guidelines. I don't think it is. The Definitions section=
 of the CABF guidelines includes the following entry:

     Valid Certificate: A Certificate that passes the validation procedure =
specified in RFC 5280.

Steve

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
Trans@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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From: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 12:00:51 -0700
Thread-Topic: [Trans] path validation
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Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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Santosh,

I believe that text is there because Microsoft has been advocating the use =
of EKUs in intermediate certificates to limit their scope, and they've buil=
t nested EKU checking into their chain validation code. See http://social.t=
echnet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/1760.windows-root-certificate-p=
rogram-technical-requirements-version-2-0.aspx

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 11:28 AM
To: Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation

<snip>

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"



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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Rick,

I thought so. =20

But, the reason I made the comment is that the CABF document requires the C=
A to be "technically" constrained by using the EKU in the CA certificate.  =
To me that is the same as what Microsoft says.  Am I missing something?  Be=
sides, the only way I see enforcement of this "technical constraint" coming=
 is either the SCT provider doing the check or the relying party or both pe=
rform the check listed at the bottom of this mail thread.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:01 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

I believe that text is there because Microsoft has been advocating the use =
of EKUs in intermediate certificates to limit their scope, and they've buil=
t nested EKU checking into their chain validation code. See http://social.t=
echnet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/1760.windows-root-certificate-p=
rogram-technical-requirements-version-2-0.aspx

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 11:28 AM
To: Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation

<snip>

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"



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Greg,

I'm impressed by your web site graphics.

Unfortunately, for RFCs, we have to stick with ASCII art, which is 
painful and
only black and white.  So, although I agree that diagrams are very helpful
when trying to understand the CT context, I won't be able to incorporate 
them
into my text.

I have not visited the Google CT web site because I focus on what we do 
in IETF
WGs, and for that only material published in that context counts. In 
fact, I have
complained about referring to the CT web site to gain a better understanding
of what 6962-bis is supposed to mean; discussion and explanations of CT 
need to
be part of the IETF archival data, not on an independent web site. But, 
that's another
issue.

I'm continuing to revise the attack analysis, based on my analysis of the
CABF guidelines, more thought, and helpful feedback from folks like Rick 
and Santosh.
I'll post an updated version of the attack analysis later this week,

Steve



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To: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/mMNVDGw0EgQi5RRbMs00bJPJTx0
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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Santosh,

The CABF Baseline Requirements don't require the intermediate to be technic=
ally constrained, and most are not. The language about technical constraint=
s is there to address Mozilla's CA policy (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/ab=
out/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/inclusion/) which waive=
s the audit and disclosure requirements for intermediates ("subordinates" i=
n Mozilla's language) that are technically constrained.=20

Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or f=
rom individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot enforc=
e the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:schokhani@cygnacom.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 12:13 PM
To: Rick Andrews; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Rick,

I thought so. =20

But, the reason I made the comment is that the CABF document requires the C=
A to be "technically" constrained by using the EKU in the CA certificate.  =
To me that is the same as what Microsoft says.  Am I missing something?  Be=
sides, the only way I see enforcement of this "technical constraint" coming=
 is either the SCT provider doing the check or the relying party or both pe=
rform the check listed at the bottom of this mail thread.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:01 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

I believe that text is there because Microsoft has been advocating the use =
of EKUs in intermediate certificates to limit their scope, and they've buil=
t nested EKU checking into their chain validation code. See http://social.t=
echnet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/1760.windows-root-certificate-p=
rogram-technical-requirements-version-2-0.aspx

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 11:28 AM
To: Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation

<snip>

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"



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Cc: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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--001a11c25c3e4c9c8f05043969e9
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

On Monday, September 29, 2014, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
wrote:

> Santosh,



> Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or
> from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot
> enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.
>

We're talking about (non-normatively-specified) monitor servers here, right?

Log servers need to continue to accept based solely on signature validity;
otherwise they'll miss misissuance. (So *log* servers will necessarily be
agnostic about this.)

--001a11c25c3e4c9c8f05043969e9
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Monday, September 29, 2014, Rick Andrews &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Rick_Andr=
ews@symantec.com">Rick_Andrews@symantec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">Santosh,</blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
Since it&#39;s not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF =
or from individual browsers&#39; policies) I suggest that log servers canno=
t enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>We&#39;re talking about (non-normatively-specified=
)=C2=A0monitor servers=C2=A0here, right?</div><div><br></div>Log servers ne=
ed to continue to=C2=A0accept based solely on signature validity; otherwise=
 they&#39;ll miss misissuance. (So *log* servers will necessarily be agnost=
ic about this.)

--001a11c25c3e4c9c8f05043969e9--


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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] path validation
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Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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Rick,

Are you saying that the presence of EKU in CA certificates is simply gratui=
tous?

And how does technical constraining the CA without enforcement on the other=
 end help relieve one of audit requirements?

To me, this all sounds like putting head in the sand and inviting the probl=
ems all over again that CT is supposed to solve.  If the CA goes rogue or i=
s hacked, the only way to detect and reject such mis-issued certificates is=
 to see if they were in compliance with EKUs CA was constrained for. =20

May be that is not what you mean.  May be you mean not all CAs need to be t=
echnically constrained.  If so, the logic at the start of this mail thread =
is fine since the EKU constraint is only invoked when present.

Separately, in light of how some of most commonly used platforms view absen=
ce on EKU or presence of anyExtendedKeyUsage as legitimate code signing cer=
tificate, and not all parties agreeing on how to mitigate this concern, I s=
ee good security value in departure from 5280 by asserting (and more import=
antly enforcing) EKU in certification path.=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:27 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

The CABF Baseline Requirements don't require the intermediate to be technic=
ally constrained, and most are not. The language about technical constraint=
s is there to address Mozilla's CA policy (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/ab=
out/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/inclusion/) which waive=
s the audit and disclosure requirements for intermediates ("subordinates" i=
n Mozilla's language) that are technically constrained.=20

Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or f=
rom individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot enforc=
e the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:schokhani@cygnacom.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 12:13 PM
To: Rick Andrews; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Rick,

I thought so. =20

But, the reason I made the comment is that the CABF document requires the C=
A to be "technically" constrained by using the EKU in the CA certificate.  =
To me that is the same as what Microsoft says.  Am I missing something?  Be=
sides, the only way I see enforcement of this "technical constraint" coming=
 is either the SCT provider doing the check or the relying party or both pe=
rform the check listed at the bottom of this mail thread.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:01 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

I believe that text is there because Microsoft has been advocating the use =
of EKUs in intermediate certificates to limit their scope, and they've buil=
t nested EKU checking into their chain validation code. See http://social.t=
echnet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/1760.windows-root-certificate-p=
rogram-technical-requirements-version-2-0.aspx

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 11:28 AM
To: Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation

<snip>

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"



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From: Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews@symantec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 13:02:06 -0700
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/TABrLwP6EHc5GGEBVDXkkyB-Ee4
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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Santosh,

I'm making no judgments at all. I'm just trying to report the facts as I kn=
ow them, to help explain why certain language is in the CABF Baseline Requi=
rements.

Your second question needs to be directed to someone from Mozilla. I will p=
oint out, however, that Mozilla's policy is that technical constraints incl=
ude not just EKUs but name constraints in the intermediate. Mozilla would p=
robably say that if the proper name constraints are in the intermediate (li=
miting the intermediate, for example, to signing only certs for <something>=
.example.com), then any damage done by mis-issuance using that intermediate=
 would be limited to that domain.

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:schokhani@cygnacom.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 12:44 PM
To: Rick Andrews; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Rick,

Are you saying that the presence of EKU in CA certificates is simply gratui=
tous?

And how does technical constraining the CA without enforcement on the other=
 end help relieve one of audit requirements?

To me, this all sounds like putting head in the sand and inviting the probl=
ems all over again that CT is supposed to solve.  If the CA goes rogue or i=
s hacked, the only way to detect and reject such mis-issued certificates is=
 to see if they were in compliance with EKUs CA was constrained for. =20

May be that is not what you mean.  May be you mean not all CAs need to be t=
echnically constrained.  If so, the logic at the start of this mail thread =
is fine since the EKU constraint is only invoked when present.

Separately, in light of how some of most commonly used platforms view absen=
ce on EKU or presence of anyExtendedKeyUsage as legitimate code signing cer=
tificate, and not all parties agreeing on how to mitigate this concern, I s=
ee good security value in departure from 5280 by asserting (and more import=
antly enforcing) EKU in certification path.=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:27 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

The CABF Baseline Requirements don't require the intermediate to be technic=
ally constrained, and most are not. The language about technical constraint=
s is there to address Mozilla's CA policy (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/ab=
out/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/inclusion/) which waive=
s the audit and disclosure requirements for intermediates ("subordinates" i=
n Mozilla's language) that are technically constrained.=20

Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or f=
rom individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot enforc=
e the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:schokhani@cygnacom.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 12:13 PM
To: Rick Andrews; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Rick,

I thought so. =20

But, the reason I made the comment is that the CABF document requires the C=
A to be "technically" constrained by using the EKU in the CA certificate.  =
To me that is the same as what Microsoft says.  Am I missing something?  Be=
sides, the only way I see enforcement of this "technical constraint" coming=
 is either the SCT provider doing the check or the relying party or both pe=
rform the check listed at the bottom of this mail thread.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Andrews [mailto:Rick_Andrews@symantec.com]=20
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 3:01 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Trans] path validation

Santosh,

I believe that text is there because Microsoft has been advocating the use =
of EKUs in intermediate certificates to limit their scope, and they've buil=
t nested EKU checking into their chain validation code. See http://social.t=
echnet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/1760.windows-root-certificate-p=
rogram-technical-requirements-version-2-0.aspx

-Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 11:28 AM
To: Stephen Kent; trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation

<snip>

BTW, I am confused by what the CABF document says in Appendix B item:
"Generally Extended Key Usage will only appear within end entity certificat=
es (as highlighted in RFC 5280 (4.2.1.12)), however, Subordinate CAs MAY in=
clude the extension to further protect relying parties until the use of the=
 extension is consistent between Application Software Suppliers whose softw=
are is used by a substantial portion of Relying Parties worldwide"



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Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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On 9/29/14 11:26 AM, Rick Andrews wrote:
> The CABF Baseline Requirements don't require the intermediate to be
> technically constrained, and most are not. The language about
> technical constraints is there to address Mozilla's CA policy
> (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/inclusion/)
> which waives the audit and disclosure requirements for intermediates
> ("subordinates" in Mozilla's language) that are technically
> constrained.

We've received a reminder from our friendly area director not
to introduce any normative dependencies on CAB Forum documents
or processes, as well as a query about how much x.509 processing
should be specified, as well.

Melinda


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Hi Gervase,

I agree; I was trying to give an upper bound.

I think the original CT design documents spoke about "maybe 30 logs, but
certainly a lot less than 1000" or so.

Ralph

On 09/29/2014 03:23 PM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 28/09/14 13:17, Ralph Holz wrote:
>> * That leaves us with an undisclosed number of intermediate
>> certificates issued by CAs.
> 
> And why would any of those want to run a log anyway, more than a
> random person? I'd expect them in most cases to submit their certs to
> the log run by the parent CA.
> 
> I wonder also if small CAs would pool resources to run a log. After
> all, it's not a customer-facing function.
> 
> So I'd be surprised if we see 60 logs.
> 
> Gerv
> 
> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list 
> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
> 


-- 
Ralph Holz
I8 - Network Architectures and Services
Technische Universität München
http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/
Phone +49.89.289.18010
PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4  86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF


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Stephen,

You said "Your observation about the need to coordinate CABF requirements c=
hanges with what log servers
would check gave me an idea. Why not have the add (pre-cert) chain to log r=
equest specify
whether the cert being added is to be checked against DV or EV specs, and n=
ote the version
of the DV/EV spec to be used? This would make it easy for the log to know w=
hich set of
checks to employ. Since each log needs to advertise a set of data about its=
elf anyway
(e.g., what root CAs it supports), it could also advertise the set of specs=
 against which
it is prepared to check submissions. This way a CA or Subject would know wh=
ether the log
was prepared to accept a chain for checking under the selected criteria. No=
te that a Monitor
could not perform checks as easily, because it does not interact directly w=
ith the entity
submitting the log request. I think that argues for logs performing these c=
hecks."

It's doable, but it still leaves the CA in a bind. What if the CA wants to =
start issuing certs according to new CABF docs, but finds that none of the =
existing log servers support that version? This is probably a moot point, i=
sn't it, because Melinda has reminded us not to introduce any normative dep=
endencies on CAB Forum documents or processes.

Your observation is correct; that's what I get for trying to write a quick =
description of
the algorithm for this.  Accommodating multiple keys per Subject is easy to=
 fix.
For example, if a Monitor is providing "protection" for a Subject, it requi=
res the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subject field or subjectA=
ltName extension) and the public key(s) associated with that Subject. Armed=
 with this information, a Monitor can examine every log entry to determine =
if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches e=
ither of these names, and if it contain a public key other that the one(s) =
provided by the Subject, this is evidence of mis-issuance.

If the Subject provides a list of all o the keys associated with the Subjec=
t, perhaps in the form
of certs issued to the Subject (and currently valid) this would enable a Mo=
nitor to detect this form of mis-issuance, agreed?
Agreed, but it puts a burden on the Subject. Before issuing any new legitim=
ate certificate, the Subject would need to notify the Monitor of the new Su=
bject name and/or public key. We've got some customers who issue thousands =
of certificates across their organization. IMO, the model might work better=
 if the Monitor is simply a conduit, providing information found in log ser=
vers to the Subject, and then the Subject can decide if each new certificat=
e was intentionally issued.


A separate topic is issuance of a bogus cert for a Subject who doesn't have=
 a cert issued legitimately.
In this case there is no reference cert to present to a Monitor. It may be =
hard for a Subject who
doesn't have a cert to convince a 3rd party Monitor to check for certs issu=
ed to the Subject name
in question. Should we classify this as mis-issuance as well?
See my comment above. Must the Monitor be able to decide by itself what is =
legitimate and what is mis-issued, or is that the role of the Subject, with=
 help from the Monitor? In other words, couldn't we say that it's mis-issua=
nce if the Monitor finds a cert in a log, forwards it to the Subject, and t=
he Subject determines that it's mis-issued?

-Rick

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 link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Stephen,<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;color:#1F497D'>You said &#8220;Your observation about the need to coordina=
te CABF requirements changes with what log servers <o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>would che=
ck gave me an idea. Why not have the add (pre-cert) chain to log request sp=
ecify<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;color:#1F497D'>whether the cert being added is to be checked against D=
V or EV specs, and note the version <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>of the DV/EV spec to be =
used? This would make it easy for the log to know which set of <o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497=
D'>checks to employ. Since each log needs to advertise a set of data about =
itself anyway<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>(e.g., what root CAs it supports), it could als=
o advertise the set of specs against which<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>it is prepared to =
check submissions. This way a CA or Subject would know whether the log<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color=
:#1F497D'>was prepared to accept a chain for checking under the selected cr=
iteria. Note that a Monitor<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>could not perform checks as easil=
y, because it does not interact directly with the entity<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>subm=
itting the log request. I think that argues for logs performing these check=
s.&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'>It&#8217;s doable, but it stil=
l leaves the CA in a bind. What if the CA wants to start issuing certs acco=
rding to new CABF docs, but finds that none of the existing log servers sup=
port that version? This is probably a moot point, isn&#8217;t it, because M=
elinda has reminded us not to introduce any normative dependencies on CAB F=
orum documents or processes.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bo=
ttom:12.0pt;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman",=
"serif";mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Your observation is correct; that's wha=
t I get for trying to write a quick description of<br>the algorithm for thi=
s.&nbsp; Accommodating multiple keys per Subject is easy to fix. <o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'=
font-size:13.5pt;font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>For exampl=
e, if a Monitor is providing &#8220;protection&#8221; for a Subject, it req=
uires the name of the Subject (as it appears in the Subject field or subjec=
tAltName extension) and the public key(s) associated with that Subject. Arm=
ed with this information, a Monitor can examine every log entry to determin=
e if it contains the same Subject or SubjectAltName. If a log entry matches=
 either of these names, and if it contain a public key other that the one(s=
) provided by the Subject, this is evidence of mis-issuance.</span><span st=
yle=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span s=
tyle=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><=
br>If the Subject provides a list of all o the keys associated with the Sub=
ject, perhaps in the form<br>of certs issued to the Subject (and currently =
valid) this would enable a Monitor to detect this form of mis-issuance, agr=
eed?</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F49=
7D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Ag=
reed, but it puts a burden on the Subject. Before issuing any new legitimat=
e certificate, the Subject would need to notify the Monitor of the new Subj=
ect name and/or public key. We&#8217;ve got some customers who issue thousa=
nds of certificates across their organization. IMO, the model might work be=
tter if the Monitor is simply a conduit, providing information found in log=
 servers to the Subject, and then the Subject can decide if each new certif=
icate was intentionally issued.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","ser=
if";mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><br><br>A separate topic is issuance of a b=
ogus cert for a Subject who doesn't have a cert issued legitimately.<br>In =
this case there is no reference cert to present to a Monitor. It may be har=
d for a Subject who<br>doesn't have a cert to convince a 3rd party Monitor =
to check for certs issued to the Subject name<br>in question. Should we cla=
ssify this as mis-issuance as well?</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Times=
 New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D=
;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>See my comment above. Must the Monitor be able=
 to decide by itself what is legitimate and what is mis-issued, or is that =
the role of the Subject, with help from the Monitor? In other words, couldn=
&#8217;t we say that it&#8217;s mis-issuance if the Monitor finds a cert in=
 a log, forwards it to the Subject, and the Subject determines that it&#821=
7;s mis-issued?</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";=
mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>-Rick<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
></body></html>=

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From nobody Mon Sep 29 17:55:33 2014
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From: Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org>
To: trans@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Trans] path validation
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On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 12:26:47PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:
> Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or
> from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot
> enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.

Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.  A log isn't a judge, it's a record. 
The only constraints on what should be rejected from being accepted by a
log should be those things which prevent abuse sufficient to render a log
unusable.

- Matt


From nobody Mon Sep 29 18:17:59 2014
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From: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>
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Thread-Topic: [Trans] path validation
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+1. My thoughts exactly.


Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:

On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 12:26:47PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:
> Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or
> from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot
> enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.

Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.  A log isn't a judge, it's a record=
.
The only constraints on what should be rejected from being accepted by a
log should be those things which prevent abuse sufficient to render a log
unusable.

- Matt

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
Trans@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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<div>&#43;1. My thoughts exactly.</div>
</div>
<br>
<br>
Matt Palmer &lt;mpalmer@hezmatt.org&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 12:26:47PM -0700, Rick And=
rews wrote:<br>
&gt; Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF=
 or<br>
&gt; from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot<=
br>
&gt; enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.<br>
<br>
Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.&nbsp; A log isn't a judge, it's a r=
ecord. <br>
The only constraints on what should be rejected from being accepted by a<br=
>
log should be those things which prevent abuse sufficient to render a log<b=
r>
unusable.<br>
<br>
- Matt<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
Trans@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
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On 9/29/14 4:55 PM, Matt Palmer wrote:
> Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.  A log isn't a judge, it's a record. 

Thank you.

Melinda



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So, the CA is the executive, and the log is the public records clerk?

-Kyke H



On September 29, 2014 5:55:24 PM PDT, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:
>On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 12:26:47PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:
>> Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from
>CABF or
>> from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot
>> enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.
>
>Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.  A log isn't a judge, it's a
>record. 
>The only constraints on what should be rejected from being accepted by
>a
>log should be those things which prevent abuse sufficient to render a
>log
>unusable.
>
>- Matt
>
>_______________________________________________
>Trans mailing list
>Trans@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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<html><head></head><body>So, the CA is the executive, and the log is the public records clerk?<br>
<br>
-Kyke H<br>
<br>
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On September 29, 2014 5:55:24 PM PDT, Matt Palmer &lt;mpalmer@hezmatt.org&gt; wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<pre class="k9mail">On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 12:26:47PM -0700, Rick Andrews wrote:<br /><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #729fcf; padding-left: 1ex;"> Since it's not an absolute requirement at this point (either from CABF or<br /> from individual browsers' policies) I suggest that log servers cannot<br /> enforce the use of technical constraints in intermediate CAs.<br /></blockquote><br />Logs shouldn't be enforcing *anything*.  A log isn't a judge, it's a record. <br />The only constraints on what should be rejected from being accepted by a<br />log should be those things which prevent abuse sufficient to render a log<br />unusable.<br /><br />- Matt<br /><br /><hr /><br />Trans mailing list<br />Trans@ietf.org<br /><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br /></pre></blockquote></div><br>
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On 29 September 2014 15:52, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>>> At a minimum we need a set of universally-applicable issuance standards
>>> to
>>> apply, based on two things:
>>> - the syntax of the cert, which everyone can examine
>>> - comparison of logged certs against reference certs, i.e., valid
>>> certs already issued to (legitimate) Subjects. A Monitor can
>>> perform this comparison if provided with a reference cert. if the
>>> Monitor wants to perform additional checks, that may be fine
>>>
>>> if we're going to create a standard that purports to detect mis-issuance,
>>> but we can't define mis-issuance in a well-articulated, testable fashion,
>>> I
>>> question the utility of this effort.
>>
>> I didn't intend to suggest there was no point in defining mis-issuance
>> to the extent that its possible, just that I don't think its likely
>> we'll manage to completely define it, so we should not attempt to do
>> so. i.e. I would not like to see the RFC say "this is mis-issuance,
>> and nothing else is".
>
> Again, I disagree. We should define what we can and make design decisions
> based on that definition. Anything else that might be considered
> mis-issuanve,
> is out of scope for purposes of this work. This is the sort of delineation
> that
> we often impose on RFCs; we define a scope for a standard and declare that
> other
> stuff is out of scope, relative to the standard.

Then perhaps we should have a broader scope. Focusing on mis-issuance
seems to lead to all sorts of, IMO, unnecessary complications.

It might be simpler to define CT as a mechanism for allowing the
public examination of the contents of all issued certificates, without
getting into exactly what might be done as a result of that
examination. Detecting mis-issuance is, of course, an obvious example.


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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Design of gossip
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On 27 September 2014 18:42, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> The first choice is what to gossip: tree heads and proofs or certs.
> Both have privacy implications: while certs more directly reveal which
> sites are visited, it's possible that tree heads will be unique per
> cert due to the impact of adding to a tree one cert at a time, so each
> precert will end up showing a different head. This is a tricky issue.

Precerts (and certs) are not linked to any particular head.


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Design of gossip
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On 29 September 2014 14:37, Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net> wrote:
> | The first choice is what to gossip: tree heads and proofs or certs.
>
> What's the reason for including proofs in the gossiping? Is it an
> optimisation of network resources? My initial thought has been that
> gossiping about anything that's not signed by logs opens up for attacks
> against log reputation.

Proofs are signed by logs, though (if you include the entity they are proving).


From nobody Tue Sep 30 20:57:18 2014
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From: David Leon Gil <coruus@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Proving certificate freshness
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Something that is rather difficult to prove, at present, is that a
certificate has been used after it has expired or been revoked.

If servers were required to include a signature over a recent STH (or
STH+OCSP staple) along with their SCT, this would provide an easy way
of showing that a *server* was behaving incorrectly. E.g., as a TLS
extension:

struct {
  STH;
  sign(SignedCertificateTimestamp || OCSP || STH);
} FreshnessProof;

This seems rather better than signing a timestamp; the STH isn't
predictable without a colluding log, so it isn't possible to
"accidentally" sign a future time.

Any thoughts?

