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#59: Clarify STH versioning


Comment (by benl@google.com):

 I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.

 However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we
 discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2 STH
 and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to use v1
 STHs and the corresponding APIs.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #50 (client-behavior): Ordering of revocation checking and SCT processing by TLS Clients
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#50: Ordering of revocation checking and SCT processing by TLS Clients

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * component:  rfc6962-bis => client-behavior


-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  client-behavior          |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/50#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Errata for RFC6962 - precertificates_chain
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--001a113e3fa0e0434805104f8e0d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

I'm proposing that the reported errata for RFC6962 (here
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6962>) would be accepted.
The new text:

   "precertificate_chain" is a chain of additional certificates required
   to verify the Precertificate submission.  The first certificate MAY
   be a valid Precertificate Signing Certificate and MUST certify the
   *Precertificate*.  Each following certificate MUST directly certify
   the one preceding it.  The final certificate MUST be a root
   certificate accepted by the log.

Has 'precertificate' in it rather than 'first certificate' as the first
certificate in the precertificate_chain should certify the submitted
precertificate, not any other certificate.

Any questions, let me know.
Eran

--001a113e3fa0e0434805104f8e0d
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m proposing that the reported errata for RFC6962 (<a=
 href=3D"http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D6962">here</a>) =
would be accepted.<div>The new text:<br><div><br><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0&qu=
ot;precertificate_chain&quot; is a chain of additional certificates require=
d</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0to verify the Precertificate submission.=C2=A0 The=
 first certificate MAY</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0be a valid Precertificate Sig=
ning Certificate and MUST certify the</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0<b>Precertific=
ate</b>.=C2=A0 Each following certificate MUST directly certify</div><div>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the one preceding it.=C2=A0 The final certificate MUST be a ro=
ot</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate accepted by the log.</div></div></div=
></div><div><br></div><div>Has &#39;precertificate&#39; in it rather than &=
#39;first certificate&#39; as the first certificate in the precertificate_c=
hain should certify the submitted precertificate, not any other certificate=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Any questions, let me know.</div><div>Eran</div>=
</div>

--001a113e3fa0e0434805104f8e0d--


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#59: Clarify STH versioning


Comment (by eranm@google.com):

 Ben sent this out for review in https://github.com/google/certificate-
 transparency-rfcs/pull/34

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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#59: Clarify STH versioning

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closed with https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/c7fa413ae0bb04c233c3825e00578ae78ad371b3.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #47 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify how to deal with (minor) DER violations when manipulating a TBSCertificate
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#47: Clarify how to deal with (minor) DER violations when manipulating a
TBSCertificate

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closed at https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/b2e798e2d40a92989ce9c2855d099465bcea561f.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
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  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/47#comment:5>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#48: Enforce the rules for Name-constrained Intermediates

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closed with https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/ef13d6c134911dc4d82816b5f0c45475c6cb2c4f.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
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  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/48#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Erwann,

Thanks for the pointers to the IEEE work; we'll see how that progresses
and whether the PKI aspects of it transition to the IETF.

Also thanks for the acknowledgement that ASN.1 is considered
the preferred syntax for X.509 extensions.

Steve
> Bonsoir Stephen,
>
> 2015-02-27 22:16 GMT+01:00 Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com 
> <mailto:kent@bbn.com>>:
>
>     Erwann,
>
>         The "TLS" syntax/notation is also used to describe
>         certificates and messages in ITS world. It's very bad, but
>         that's not RFC5246 authors's fault.
>
>     What is the "ITS" world? And is it under the IETF standards
>     umbrella? if not, then this is
>     not a good rationale for veering from the statement in 5246.
>
>
> "Intelligent Transport System". Cars, trucks, motorbikes, tramways, 
> trains, road equipment, ... See IEEE1609.2 and ETSI TS103097 if you're 
> curious :)
> That's not (yet) under IETF umbrella. Point taken.
>
>         X.509 permits the inclusion of anything in an extension, as
>         long as it's enclosed in something that has an ASN.1+DER
>         representation, whence the double OCTET STRING sometimes
>         found. That's not new to CT.
>
>     True, but I think that is not commonly done in standard
>     extensions. Do you have some examples
>     that counter my perception? In my experience, people developing
>     extensions for
>     X.509 usually try to avoid cramming arbitrary data into an OCTET
>     string.
>
>
> You're right again. I can't think of a single extension except 
> SignedCertificateTimestampList defined in anything other than ASN.1. 
> When working around X.509, ASN.1 is natural.
>
> Going back into "silent lurker" mode...
>
> -- 
> Erwann.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Erwann,<br>
    <br>
    Thanks for the pointers to the IEEE work; we'll see how that
    progresses<br>
    and whether the PKI aspects of it transition to the IETF. <br>
    <br>
    Also thanks for the acknowledgement that ASN.1 is considered<br>
    the preferred syntax for X.509 extensions.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CA+i=0E7UuxUg3CGuSs3jfBNEUr-g=tZNRzat7obFOa+AStqfzg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">Bonsoir Stephen,<br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">2015-02-27 22:16 GMT+01:00 Stephen
            Kent <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:kent@bbn.com" target="_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Erwann,<br>
              <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                The "TLS" syntax/notation is also used to describe
                certificates and messages in ITS world. It's very bad,
                but that's not RFC5246 authors's fault.<br>
              </blockquote>
              What is the "ITS" world? And is it under the IETF
              standards umbrella? if not, then this is<br>
              not a good rationale for veering from the statement in
              5246.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>"Intelligent Transport System". Cars, trucks,
              motorbikes, tramways, trains, road equipment, ... See
              IEEE1609.2 and ETSI TS103097 if you're curious :)</div>
            <div>That's not (yet) under IETF umbrella. Point taken.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                X.509 permits the inclusion of anything in an extension,
                as long as it's enclosed in something that has an
                ASN.1+DER representation, whence the double OCTET STRING
                sometimes found. That's not new to CT.<br>
              </blockquote>
              True, but I think that is not commonly done in standard
              extensions. Do you have some examples<br>
              that counter my perception? In my experience, people
              developing extensions for<br>
              X.509 usually try to avoid cramming arbitrary data into an
              OCTET string.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>You're right again. I can't think of a single extension
              except SignedCertificateTimestampList defined in anything
              other than ASN.1. When working around X.509, ASN.1 is
              natural.</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Going back into "silent lurker" mode...</div>
          </div>
          <div><br>
          </div>
          -- <br>
          <div class="gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
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</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From nobody Tue Mar  3 08:03:23 2015
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To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Melinda:

> First, I need to apologize for being largely checked out the
> past while - I've been down with a particularly virulent flu
> and am still largely flattened by it.  I'll do better.

I'm sorry you were stricken, but I'm glad to hear you are feeling much =
better.

> Second, taking my chair hat off, a couple of comments on the
> syntax question: I'm not sure that there have been any
> technical arguments made for why either approach must be
> excluded, which would be the first place to start, I think.
> 5246 definitely does not say that that syntax must not be used
> for anything else, ever.  What it says is:
>=20
> "The purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only; it
> has no general application beyond that particular goal."
>=20
> Because you've wanted to treat this legalistically I think it's
> reasonable to point out that the phrase "has no general application"
> does not exclude the use of the same syntax to describe what
> are TLS-coupled data structures, unless you're arguing that
> CT logging of TLS certs would be a "general application."  Even so,
> you don't have to look through many IETF specifications to find
> instances of later protocols violating some of the constraints written
> into earlier specifications - for example, in RSVP-TE extensions to
> RSVP.  So, I think that's a tough path to follow.
>=20
> Frankly, in the absence of compelling technical arguments either
> way, my personal inclination is to privilege implementation.  Again,
> that's my *personal* inclination.  In the meantime, if there's a
> compelling technical argument against this encoding, it's definitely
> time to make it.  We do need to make progress and not keep
> going over the same ground and arriving at same outcomes.

At the time that certificate extensions were invented, the OCTET STRING =
wrapper was used so that the ASN.1 decode would not fail if an =
unsupported extension was encountered.  Some people complained about the =
performance hit that that additional wrapper imposed on universally =
supported extensions, but this is the syntax that was chosen by ITU-T in =
X.509 version 3.  I do not recall any discussion at that time about =
allowing the OCTET String to contain anything other than an ASN.1 DER =
encoded structure.

RFC 2459, section 4.2 says:  "Each extension includes an OID and an =
ASN.1 structure."  That remains in RFC 5280.

Russ


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Errata for RFC6962 - precertificates_chain
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--------------070607020208070800010703
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Eran,

I don't understand the 2nd sentence below. If the first cert is
a pre-cert, then it does not "certify" a pre-cert. Did you mean to say 
something like:

"The first certificate in the chain MAY be a Precertificate. If it is a 
Precertificate,
then it MUST be used to validate the signature on the submission. If the 
first certificate
is not a  Precertificate, then that certificate MUST be used to validate 
the Precertificate
being submitted."

also, the original text required the last cert to be a root known by the 
log,
or a cert that is (transitively) issued under a root known to the log. 
The new
text changes this require that the last cert in the chain be a root. 
This goes
beyond what the errata reported as an issue. Is that intentional? if so, 
then this
is a change to the spec and probably does not qualify as just an errata.

Steve

> I'm proposing that the reported errata for RFC6962 (here 
> <http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6962>) would be 
> accepted.
> The new text:
>
>    "precertificate_chain" is a chain of additional certificates required
>    to verify the Precertificate submission.  The first certificate MAY
>    be a valid Precertificate Signing Certificate and MUST certify the
> *Precertificate*.  Each following certificate MUST directly certify
>    the one preceding it.  The final certificate MUST be a root
>    certificate accepted by the log.
>
> Has 'precertificate' in it rather than 'first certificate' as the 
> first certificate in the precertificate_chain should certify the 
> submitted precertificate, not any other certificate.
>
> Any questions, let me know.
> Eran
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Eran,<br>
    <br>
    I don't understand the 2nd sentence below. If the first cert is<br>
    a pre-cert, then it does not "certify" a pre-cert. Did you mean to
    say something like:<br>
    <br>
    "The first certificate in the chain MAY be a Precertificate. If it
    is a Precertificate,<br>
    then it MUST be used to validate the signature on the submission. If
    the first certificate <br>
    is not a  Precertificate, then that certificate MUST be used to
    validate the Precertificate<br>
    being submitted."<br>
    <br>
    also, the original text required the last cert to be a root known by
    the log,<br>
    or a cert that is (transitively) issued under a root known to the
    log. The new<br>
    text changes this require that the last cert in the chain be a root.
    This goes<br>
    beyond what the errata reported as an issue. Is that intentional? if
    so, then this<br>
    is a change to the spec and probably does not qualify as just an
    errata.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CALzYgEf9GF4n8o01mLFhKYVtJGoG11Rzx2k3rSLg-1bU_tVoSA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">I'm proposing that the reported errata for RFC6962
        (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6962">here</a>)
        would be accepted.
        <div>The new text:<br>
          <div><br>
            <div>
              <div>   "precertificate_chain" is a chain of additional
                certificates required</div>
              <div>   to verify the Precertificate submission.  The
                first certificate MAY</div>
              <div>   be a valid Precertificate Signing Certificate and
                MUST certify the</div>
              <div>   <b>Precertificate</b>.  Each following certificate
                MUST directly certify</div>
              <div>   the one preceding it.  The final certificate MUST
                be a root</div>
              <div>   certificate accepted by the log.</div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Has 'precertificate' in it rather than 'first certificate'
          as the first certificate in the precertificate_chain should
          certify the submitted precertificate, not any other
          certificate.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Any questions, let me know.</div>
        <div>Eran</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
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From nobody Tue Mar  3 08:58:34 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Ben,

The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for
a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will
transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.

Steve

> #59: Clarify STH versioning
>
>
> Comment (bybenl@google.com):
>
>   I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>
>   However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we
>   discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2 STH
>   and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to use v1
>   STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>


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Shouldn't it be described when a new STH version is introduced, depending
on the changes to the STH structure?

On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

> Ben,
>
> The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for
> a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will
> transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>
> Steve
>
>  #59: Clarify STH versioning
>>
>>
>> Comment (bybenl@google.com):
>>
>>   I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>>
>>   However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we
>>   discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2 STH
>>   and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to use
>> v1
>>   STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Shouldn&#39;t it be described when a new STH version is in=
troduced, depending on the changes to the STH structure?</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 PM=
, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=
=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex">Ben,<br>
<br>
The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for=
<br>
a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will<b=
r>
transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<br>
<br>
Steve<span class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
#59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (<a href=3D"mailto:bybenl@google.com" target=3D"_blank">bybenl@goog=
le.com</a>):<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 I can&#39;t find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we<=
br>
=C2=A0 discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2=
 STH<br>
=C2=A0 and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to u=
se v1<br>
=C2=A0 STHs and the corresponding APIs.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 17:14:32 +0000
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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Errata for RFC6962 - precertificates_chain
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On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Eran,
>
> I don't understand the 2nd sentence below. If the first cert is
> a pre-cert, then it does not "certify" a pre-cert. Did you mean to say
> something like:
>
> "The first certificate in the chain MAY be a Precertificate. If it is a
> Precertificate,
> then it MUST be used to validate the signature on the submission. If the
> first certificate
> is not a  Precertificate, then that certificate MUST be used to validate
> the Precertificate
> being submitted."
>
Conceptually you're right - this errata applies particularly to the
"precertificate_chain" field of the PrecertChainEntry structure which has
the actual Precertificate in a separate field (pre_certificate), not in the
precertificate_chain field - so none of the items in the
precertificate_chain field may be a precertificate - they should all be
certificates, with the first one certifying the Precertificate in the
pre_certificate field, then each element certifying its predecessor in the
precertificate_chain field.


> also, the original text required the last cert to be a root known by the
> log,
> or a cert that is (transitively) issued under a root known to the log. The
> new
> text changes this require that the last cert in the chain be a root. This
> goes
> beyond what the errata reported as an issue. Is that intentional? if so,
> then this
> is a change to the spec and probably does not qualify as just an errata.
>
Good catch - when looking into that I found a confusing difference between
the end of section 3.1 and the parameters to add-pre-chain detailed in
section 4.2.. In section 4.2. the last element in the 'chain' argument is
required to be the root certificate or a certificate that chains directly
to a known root. However in section 3.1. the precertificate_chain field
must contain all certificates including the root certificate.
My interpretation is that logs, when creating and logging the
PrecertChainEntry object must ensure that the last element in the
 precertificate_chain field is the root certificate and add it if necessary.

>
> Steve
>
>  I'm proposing that the reported errata for RFC6962 (here
> <http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6962>) would be
> accepted.
> The new text:
>
>     "precertificate_chain" is a chain of additional certificates required
>    to verify the Precertificate submission.  The first certificate MAY
>    be a valid Precertificate Signing Certificate and MUST certify the
>    *Precertificate*.  Each following certificate MUST directly certify
>    the one preceding it.  The final certificate MUST be a root
>    certificate accepted by the log.
>
>  Has 'precertificate' in it rather than 'first certificate' as the first
> certificate in the precertificate_chain should certify the submitted
> precertificate, not any other certificate.
>
>  Any questions, let me know.
> Eran
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing listTrans@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-styl=
e:solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    Eran,<br>
    <br>
    I don&#39;t understand the 2nd sentence below. If the first cert is<br>
    a pre-cert, then it does not &quot;certify&quot; a pre-cert. Did you me=
an to
    say something like:<br>
    <br>
    &quot;The first certificate in the chain MAY be a Precertificate. If it
    is a Precertificate,<br>
    then it MUST be used to validate the signature on the submission. If
    the first certificate <br>
    is not a=C2=A0 Precertificate, then that certificate MUST be used to
    validate the Precertificate<br>
    being submitted.&quot;<br></div></blockquote><div>Conceptually you&#39;=
re right - this errata applies particularly to the &quot;precertificate_cha=
in&quot; field of the=C2=A0PrecertChainEntry structure which has the actual=
 Precertificate in a separate field (pre_certificate), not in the precertif=
icate_chain field - so none of the items in the precertificate_chain field =
may be a precertificate - they should all be certificates, with the first o=
ne certifying the Precertificate in the pre_certificate field, then each el=
ement certifying its predecessor in the precertificate_chain field.</div><d=
iv><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-=
style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <br>
    also, the original text required the last cert to be a root known by
    the log,<br>
    or a cert that is (transitively) issued under a root known to the
    log. The new<br>
    text changes this require that the last cert in the chain be a root.
    This goes<br>
    beyond what the errata reported as an issue. Is that intentional? if
    so, then this<br>
    is a change to the spec and probably does not qualify as just an
    errata.<br></div></blockquote><div>Good catch - when looking into that =
I found a confusing difference between the end of section 3.1 and the param=
eters to add-pre-chain detailed in section 4.2.. In section 4.2. the last e=
lement in the &#39;chain&#39; argument is required to be the root certifica=
te or a certificate that chains directly to a known root. However in sectio=
n 3.1. the precertificate_chain field must contain all certificates includi=
ng the root certificate.</div><div>My interpretation is that logs, when cre=
ating and logging the PrecertChainEntry object must ensure that the last el=
ement in the =C2=A0precertificate_chain field is the root certificate and a=
dd it if necessary.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);=
border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"=
#FFFFFF">
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <div><br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"h5">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;m proposing that the reported errata for RFC69=
62
        (<a href=3D"http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D6962"=
 target=3D"_blank">here</a>)
        would be accepted.
        <div>The new text:<br>
          <div><br>
            <div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;precertificate_chain&quot; is a chain=
 of additional
                certificates required</div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0to verify the Precertificate submission.=C2=
=A0 The
                first certificate MAY</div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0be a valid Precertificate Signing Certifica=
te and
                MUST certify the</div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0<b>Precertificate</b>.=C2=A0 Each following=
 certificate
                MUST directly certify</div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0the one preceding it.=C2=A0 The final certi=
ficate MUST
                be a root</div>
              <div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate accepted by the log.</div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Has &#39;precertificate&#39; in it rather than &#39;first cert=
ificate&#39;
          as the first certificate in the precertificate_chain should
          certify the submitted precertificate, not any other
          certificate.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Any questions, let me know.</div>
        <div>Eran</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><pre>_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

> Ben,
>
> The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for
> a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will
> transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>

That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this ticket
describes!



>
> Steve
>
>  #59: Clarify STH versioning
>>
>>
>> Comment (bybenl@google.com):
>>
>>   I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>>
>>   However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we
>>   discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2 STH
>>   and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to use
>> v1
>>   STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Ben,<br>
<br>
The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for=
<br>
a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will<b=
r>
transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<br></blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this tic=
ket describes!</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">
<br>
Steve<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
#59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (<a href=3D"mailto:bybenl@google.com" target=3D"_blank">bybenl@goog=
le.com</a>):<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 I can&#39;t find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we<=
br>
=C2=A0 discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2=
 STH<br>
=C2=A0 and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to u=
se v1<br>
=C2=A0 STHs and the corresponding APIs.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/trans</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Eran,

The means by which a new version is introduced should be described now, to
show that the design will accommodate a new version in a backward 
compatible fashion.

In protocols we usually include an explicit version number from the 
beginning, so
that one can tell the difference between v1 and v2, long before v2 has 
been designed.

Steve

> Shouldn't it be described when a new STH version is introduced, 
> depending on the changes to the STH structure?


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Ben,

Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.

But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of 
github for
communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.

First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have to
cut and paste them together to get to the right page.

Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to scroll
to the right to read what has been written.

Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of issues 
is not being
sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone who 
wants to
track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail and 
see what
is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection 
that is
at best awkward, as noted above.

Steve
>
>
> On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com 
> <mailto:kent@bbn.com>> wrote:
>
>     Ben,
>
>     The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an
>     need for
>     a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the
>     system will
>     transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>
>
> That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this ticket 
> describes!
>
> Â
>
>
>     Steve
>
>         #59: Clarify STH versioning
>
>
>         Comment (bybenl@google.com <mailto:bybenl@google.com>):
>
>         Â  I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>
>         Â  However, I agree that we do not need to make this change
>         yet: if we
>         Â  discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can
>         introduce a v2 STH
>         Â  and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can
>         continue to use v1
>         Â  STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     Trans mailing list
>     Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>


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<html>
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    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.<br>
    <br>
    But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of
    github for <br>
    communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.<br>
    <br>
    First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have
    to<br>
    cut and paste them together to get to the right page.<br>
    <br>
    Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to
    scroll<br>
    to the right to read what has been written.<br>
    <br>
    Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
    issues is not being <br>
    sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone
    who wants to<br>
    track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail
    and see what<br>
    is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of
    indirection that is<br>
    at best awkward, as noted above.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9STdugWv6hnH6RUGfO7cmv_TJA7R18OmUH44g-UsaWGJUA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen
            Kent <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:kent@bbn.com" target="_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Ben,<br>
              <br>
              The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have
              identified an need for<br>
              a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how
              the system will<br>
              transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue
              this ticket describes!</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div> </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> <br>
              Steve<span class=""><br>
                <br>
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                  .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                  #59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  Comment (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                    href="mailto:bybenl@google.com" target="_blank">bybenl@google.com</a>):<br>
                  <br>
                    I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.<br>
                  <br>
                    However, I agree that we do not need to make this
                  change yet: if we<br>
                    discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we
                  can introduce a v2 STH<br>
                    and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code
                  can continue to use v1<br>
                    STHs and the corresponding APIs.<br>
                  <br>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span> _______________________________________________<br>
              Trans mailing list<br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org"
                target="_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
              <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans"
                target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------030700000300060001080405--


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Subject: [Trans] changes to attack analysis
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based on comments from Ben, I made changes to the attack model text.

The diffs appear below.

Steve
------

*XX*.1.2.1 The mis-issued certificate may have been submitted to one or 
more logs prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or 
post-issuance to acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor 
that is protecting the targeted Subject will detect the bogus 
certificate and can alert the Subject. The Subject, in turn, will 
request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA 
will make use of the log entry (supplied by the Subject) to determine 
the serial number of the mis-issued certificate, and revoke it (after 
investigation). (See Notes 1 + 2.) _Since there is no requirement for a 
TLS client to reject a certificate_If clients do not reject certificates 
or otherwise notify usersIf clients do not reject certificates or 
otherwise notify userswhen no SCT is provided, the preferred strategy 
for an attacker is to not log bogus certificates. (See XX.1.2.2 and Note 3.)

*XX*.1.2.2 The bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any 
logs. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. 
_Since TLS _Ifclients _are _donot _required to _reject _a certificate 
that lacks (_certificates or _is not accompanied by) an SCT, or even 
to_otherwisenotify _a user in such situations_users when no SCT is 
provided, the preferred strategy for an attacker _will_is tonot _be 
thwarted in this case_log bogus certificates.(See Note 3.)

XX.1.2.3 The bogus certificate may have been submitted to logs that are 
conspiring with the attacker. In this case, Monitors will not detect the 
bogus certificate because the logs will suppress a bogus certificate log 
entry. TLS clients will not reject a bogus certificate in this case, 
because it is accompanied by an SCT.In this scenario, unless Monitors 
“gossip” to detect conspiring logs, the bogus certificate will not be 
detected. _Because_Untilthere _are no requirements_is a (mandatory to 
implement) specificationfor _such _gossiping, an attack of this sort can 
succeed_based on the current CT design_.__

__

*XX*.2.1

_Since there is no requirement that a _If TLS _client can be configured 
to _clients do not reject _a certificate_certificatesthat _has_donot 
appear to have been syntactically checkedby a log(as indicated by the 
SCT), a malicious CA need not worry about failing a log-based check. 
Similarly, __

_since_ifthere is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a 
certificate that was logged by an operator that does not 
perform__syntactic checks, the fourth approach noted above will succeed 
as well. If a client were configured to know which versions of 
certificate types are applicable to its use of a certificate, the second 
and third strategies noted above could be thwarted.

*XX*.2.2 Because the CA is presumed malicious, it may choose to not 
submit a certificate to a log. This avoids detection of syntactic 
mis-issuance by a log, but it also means there is no SCT for the 
certificate. _Since there is no requirement for a TLS client to _If 
clients do not reject _a certificate that lacks (_certificates or _is 
not accompanied by) an _otherwise notify users when no SCTis provided, 
this form of mis-issuance will succeed. (See Note 3.)

*XX*.2.3 A malicious CA may submit a certificate to one or more logs 
that collude with this CA to not perform syntactic checks, even though 
they claim to do so. In this case syntactic mis-issuance will not be 
detected by logs. The log entry and the SCT for a syntactically invalid 
certificate will assert that the certificate syntax was verified. Unless 
Monitors also perform syntactic checks, this form of mis-issuance will 
not be thwarted. A TLS clientsclient that relies on a syntactic checking 
by a log will believe that the certificate has been syntactically 
verifiedin this circumstance.

*XX*.2.4.1 A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. 
In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. _Since 
there is no requirement for a TLS client to _If clients do not reject _a 
certificate that lacks (_certificates or _is not accompanied by) an 
_otherwise notify users when no SCT_, there is no motivation_is 
provided, the preferred strategyfor an attacker _to submit the 
certificate in this case_is to not log bogus certificates. (See Note 3.)

*XX*.2.5 A bogus certificate may have been submitted to one or more 
conspiring logs. These logs will issue SCTs, but will hide the log 
entries from some or all Monitors. Any Monitor (even a self-Monitor) 
from which the log is hiding data will not detect the bogus certificate, 
even if it is trying to protect the targeted Subject. If a client 
accepts an SCT from a conspiring log, then the client will not reject 
the bogus certificate on the basis of a missing SCT.In this case CT will 
not detect the bogus certificate.

The audit function is intended to detect logs that conspire to suppress 
log entries, based on consistency checking of logs and use of a “gossip” 
protocol. It is assumed that Monitors will perform the audit functions 
described in Section <*insert #*>.

A Monitor performing an audit function could alert its clients if the 
Monitor detects evidence of malfeasant log operation. This would cause 
Monitors to avoid using such a log, and clients would reject SCTs 
generated by such a log. _Because_Untilthere is _no defined gossip 
protocol_a (mandatory to implement) specification for gossiping, CT 
_does not provide the necessary info_cannot be relied uponto detect this 
form of mis-issuance. (See Note 5 below.)

Notes:

1.The combination of a malicious CA and one or more conspiring logs 
motivates the definition of an audit function, to detect conspiring 
logs. If a Monitor protecting s Subject does not see mis-issued 
certificates, it cannot alert the Subject. If one or more SCTs are 
present in a certificate, or passed via the TLS handshake, a client has 
no way to know that the logged certificate is not visible to Monitors. 
Only if Monitors and clients reject certificates that contains SCTs from 
conspiring logs (based on info from an audit) will CT be able to deter 
use of such logs. Thus the means by which a Monitor performing an audit 
function detect such logs, and inform TLS clients must be specified for 
this to be effective. Moreover, if a certificate (or TLS handshake) 
contains more than one SCT, unless the client verifies all of them if it 
is to counter the threat posed by conspiring logs.

Absent a(mandatory to implement) “gossip” protocol that enables Monitors 
to verify that data from logs are reported in a consistent fashion, CT 
does notcannot claim to provide protection against logs that may 
conspire with, or are victims of, attackers effecting certificate 
mis-issuance. When a gossip protocol is defined and deployed, it will be 
necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or 
compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS 
clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log? Absent a description of a 
mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT 
cannot ensure detection of mis-issuance.



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    based on comments from Ben, I made changes to the attack model text.<br>
    <br>
    The diffs appear below.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    ------<br>
    <br>
    <meta name="Title" content="">
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.1.2.1
The
        mis-issued certificate may have been submitted to one or more
        logs prior to
        issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to
        acquire a standalone
        SCT. In either case, a Monitor that is protecting the targeted
        Subject will
        detect the bogus certificate and can alert the Subject. The
        Subject, in turn, will
        request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case,
        the CA will make
        use of the log entry (supplied by the Subject) to determine the
        serial number
        of the mis-issued certificate, and revoke it (after
        investigation). (See Notes
        1 + 2.) <u><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Since
              there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject
              a certificate</del></span></u><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If
            clients do not reject certificates or otherwise
            notify users</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
        </span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">If clients do
        not reject certificates
        or otherwise notify users</span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"> <span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">when
          no SCT is provided,
          the preferred strategy for an attacker is to not log bogus
          certificates</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">. (See
        XX.1.2.2 and Note 3.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.1.2.2
The
        bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In
        this case,
        Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. <u><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Since TLS</del></span>
        </u><span class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot;
          20150303T1548"> clients </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">are</del></span> </span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">do</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          not </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">required
              to </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">reject
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a certificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">or
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is not accompanied by)
              an SCT, or even to</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">otherwise</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          notify </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a
              user in such
              situations</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">users
            when no SCT is
            provided</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">,
          the </span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">preferred strategy for
            an </ins></span></span><span style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">attacker
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">will</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is to</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          not </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">be
              thwarted in this
              case</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">log
            bogus certificates</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">.</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"> (See Note 3.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">XX.1.2.3 The bogus
        certificate may have been submitted to logs that are conspiring
        with the
        attacker. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus
        certificate because
        the logs will suppress a bogus certificate log entry. <s><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">TLS clients will not
              reject a bogus certificate in this case, because it is
              accompanied by an SCT.</del></span></s><span
          class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> </del></span>In
        this scenario, unless Monitors “gossip” to detect conspiring
        logs, the bogus
        certificate will not be detected. <u><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Because</del></span></u><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Until</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          there </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">are
              no requirements</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is a (mandatory to
            implement) specification</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          for </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">such </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">gossiping,
an
          attack of this sort can succeed</span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:
          Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
          Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">
              based on the current CT design</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot;
          20150303T1548">.</span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><o:p><span style="text-decoration:none"> </span></o:p></span></u></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.2.1
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Since
              there is no
              requirement that a </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">TLS
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">client can be
              configured to </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">clients
            do not </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">reject
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a certificate</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">certificates</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          that </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">has</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">do</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          not </span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">appear
            to have </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">been
syntactically
          checked</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> by
            a log</ins></span></span><span style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          (as indicated by the SCT), a malicious CA need not worry about
          failing a
          log-based check. Similarly, </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;
          mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
          Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"><o:p></o:p></del></span></span></u></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">since</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">if</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a
          certificate that was
          logged by an operator that does not perform</span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"> </span></u><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier"><span style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot;
          20150303T1548">syntactic
          checks, the fourth approach noted above will succeed as well</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">. If a client
        were configured to know
        which versions of certificate types are applicable to its use of
        a certificate,
        the second and third strategies noted above could be thwarted.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph"
      style="margin-left:.25in;mso-add-space:auto"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.2.2
Because
        the CA is presumed malicious, it may choose to not submit a
        certificate
        to a log. This avoids detection of syntactic mis-issuance by a
        log, but it also
        means there is no SCT for the certificate. <u><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Since there is no
              requirement for a TLS client to </del></span></u><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If clients do not </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">reject
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a certificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">or
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is not accompanied by)
              an </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">otherwise
            notify users
            when no </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">SCT</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> is provided</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">,
          this form of mis-issuance will succeed. (See Note 3.)</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.2.3
A
        malicious CA may submit a certificate to one or more logs that
        collude with
        this CA to not perform syntactic checks, even though they claim
        to do so. In
        this case syntactic mis-issuance will not be detected by logs. <span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The log entry and the SCT for
        a syntactically
        invalid certificate will assert that the certificate syntax was
        verified.
        Unless Monitors also perform syntactic checks, this form of
        mis-issuance will
        not be thwarted. <span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">A </ins></span>TLS
        <span class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">clients</del></span><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">client
            that relies on a syntactic checking by a log</ins></span>
        will believe that the
        certificate has been syntactically verified<span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> in
            this circumstance</ins></span>.
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.2.4.1
A
        bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In
        this case,
        Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. <u><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Since there is no
              requirement for a TLS client to </del></span></u><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If clients do not </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">reject
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a certificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">or
        </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is not accompanied by)
              an </del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">otherwise
            notify users
            when no </ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">SCT</span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">, there is no
              motivation</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> is
            provided, the
            preferred strategy</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          for an attacker </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">to submit the
              certificate in this case</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">is
            to not log bogus certificates</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">.
          (See Note 3.)</span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
        New Roman&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;;
          mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">XX</span></b><span
        style="font-family:
        Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">.2.5
A
        bogus certificate may have been submitted to one or more
        conspiring logs.
        These logs will issue SCTs, but will hide the log entries from
        some or all
        Monitors. Any Monitor (even a self-Monitor) from which the log
        is hiding data
        will not detect the bogus certificate, even if it is trying to
        protect the
        targeted Subject. <s><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">If
              a client accepts an SCT from a conspiring log,
              then the client will not reject the bogus certificate on
              the basis of a missing
              SCT.</del></span></s><span class="msoDel"><del
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> </del></span>In
        this case CT will not detect the bogus
        certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">The audit function is
        intended to detect logs that conspire to suppress log entries,
        based on
        consistency checking of logs and use of a “gossip” protocol. It
        is assumed that
        Monitors will perform the audit functions described in Section
        &lt;<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">insert #</b>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">A Monitor performing
        an audit function could alert its clients if the Monitor detects
        evidence of
        malfeasant log operation. This would cause Monitors to avoid
        using such a log,
        and clients would reject SCTs generated by such a log. <u><span
            class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
              datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Because</del></span></u><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Until</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          there is </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">no
              defined gossip
              protocol</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">a
            (mandatory to
            implement) specification for gossiping</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">,
          CT </span></span><u><span
          style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
          &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
          New Roman&quot;"><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">does
              not provide the
              necessary info</del></span></span></u><span
        style="font-family:Courier;
        mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
          class="msoIns"><ins cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">cannot
            be relied upon</ins></span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier"><span
          style="mso-prop-change:&quot;Stephen Kent&quot; 20150303T1548">
          to detect this form of
          mis-issuance. </span></span><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">(See Note 5 below.) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Notes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoListParagraph"
      style="margin-left:58.0pt;mso-add-space:auto;
      text-indent:-58.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:Courier;mso-bidi-font-family:
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            &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">          
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">The combination of a
        malicious CA and one or more conspiring logs motivates the
        definition of an
        audit function, to detect conspiring logs. If a Monitor
        protecting s Subject
        does not see mis-issued certificates, it cannot alert the
        Subject. If one or
        more SCTs are present in a certificate, or passed via the TLS
        handshake, a
        client has no way to know that the logged certificate is not
        visible to
        Monitors. Only if Monitors and clients reject certificates that
        contains SCTs
        from conspiring logs (based on info from an audit) will CT be
        able to deter use
        of such logs. Thus the means by which a Monitor performing an
        audit function
        detect such logs, and inform TLS clients must be specified for
        this to be
        effective. <s><span class="msoDel"><del
              cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">Moreover,
              if a certificate (or TLS handshake)
              contains more than one SCT, unless the client verifies all
              of them if it is to
              counter the threat posed by conspiring logs.</del></span></s><span
          class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48"> </del></span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;">Absent a<span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">
            (mandatory
            to implement)</ins></span> “gossip” protocol that enables
        Monitors to verify
        that data from logs are reported in a consistent fashion, CT <span
          class="msoDel"><del cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent"
            datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">does
            not</del></span><span class="msoIns"><ins
            cite="mailto:Stephen%20Kent" datetime="2015-03-03T15:48">cannot
            claim to</ins></span> provide protection
        against logs that may conspire with, or are victims of,
        attackers effecting
        certificate mis-issuance. When a gossip protocol is defined and
        deployed, it
        will be necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a
        mis-behaving
        or compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to
        alert all TLS
        clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log? Absent a
        description of a
        mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised
        logs, CT cannot
        ensure detection of mis-issuance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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        style="font-family:Courier;mso-fareast-font-family:
        &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
        Roman&quot;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
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--------------080902000906050400010602--


From nobody Tue Mar  3 13:30:38 2015
Return-Path: <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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+1

From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:53 PM
Cc: trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning

Ben,

Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.

But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of github f=
or
communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.

First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have to
cut and paste them together to get to the right page.

Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to scroll
to the right to read what has been written.

Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of issues is n=
ot being
sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone who wan=
ts to
track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail and see=
 what
is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection th=
at is
at best awkward, as noted above.

Steve



On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com<mailto:kent@bbn.com>> =
wrote:
Ben,

The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for
a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will
transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.

That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this ticket describe=
s!

=C2

Steve
#59: Clarify STH versioning


Comment (bybenl@google.com<mailto:bybenl@google.com>):

=C2  I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.

=C2  However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if we
=C2  discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a v2 S=
TH
=C2  and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue to use=
 v1
=C2  STHs and the corresponding APIs.

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
Trans@ietf.org<mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans



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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
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<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style=3D"=
font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;color:windowtex=
t"> Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Stephen Kent<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:53 PM<br>
<b>Cc:</b> trans@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioni=
ng<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ben,<br>
<br>
Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.<br>
<br>
But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of github f=
or <br>
communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.<br>
<br>
First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have to<br>
cut and paste them together to get to the right page.<br>
<br>
Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to scroll<br>
to the right to read what has been written.<br>
<br>
Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of issues is n=
ot being
<br>
sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone who wan=
ts to<br>
track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail and see=
 what<br>
is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection th=
at is<br>
at best awkward, as noted above.<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p>=
</o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ben,<br>
<br>
The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need for=
<br>
a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system will<b=
r>
transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the iss=
ue this ticket describes!<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><br>
Steve<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">#59: Clarify STH vers=
ioning<br>
<br>
<br>
Comment (<a href=3D"mailto:bybenl@google.com" target=3D"_blank">bybenl@goog=
le.com</a>):<br>
<br>
=C2&nbsp; I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.<br>
<br>
=C2&nbsp; However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: if =
we<br>
=C2&nbsp; discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce a=
 v2 STH<br>
=C2&nbsp; and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue t=
o use v1<br>
=C2&nbsp; STHs and the corresponding APIs.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
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From nobody Tue Mar  3 13:41:51 2015
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Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 12:41:44 -0900
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On 3/3/15 11:52 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
> issues is not being sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF
> practice? Someone who wants to track what is happening in trans
> should be able to look at the mail and see what is being
> changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection that
> is at best awkward, as noted above.

The resolutions are being sent to the mailing list, by the
issue tracker.  You've raised some objections and discussed a
few others, so clearly the information associated with a ticket
state change is being communicated.

We've instituted a change, however, and that's that going forward,
issues will not be closed by document authors but by Paul and me.

Melinda


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Melinda et al.,

As an ordinary participant who doesn't have anywhere near a photographic 
memory and who's often swamped just like most everyone else,  I find 
it's hard to keep track of the discussions, especially when they stop 
and start over several months.  So I'd like to distinguish between 2 
parts of the problem.  First, I'd be most grateful if the person 
addressing an issue wrote a description of the proposed final 
resolution.  If the I-D text is being changed, this would just need to 
be the new text.  For example, the email that Eran sent on 3/2 re: 
Errata for RFC6962 made it really easy for me to quickly review it.  And 
this work, e.g., the new text, has to be written in any case -- so 
hopefully this doesn't require more work than would otherwise be done. 
Second, it would be slightly easier (one fewer steps) and therefore I'm 
more likely to find the time,  if the proposed resolution were 
distributed to the list in email, rather than in a link.  But since the 
proposed resolution should be documented in the issue tracker, it would 
be fine to do this via the ticket system. But in any case, please put 
the proposed resolution (new text, etc.) at the top of the ticket for WG 
review.  That way when I receive the ticket, the thing to be reviewed is 
right there.

Thank you,
Karen




-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
Resent-Date: 	Mon, 2 Mar 2015 07:14:39 -0800 (PST)
Resent-From: 	trac+trans@tools.ietf.org
Resent-To: 	draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@ietf.org
Date: 	Mon, 02 Mar 2015 15:14:38 -0000
From: 	trans issue tracker <trac+trans@tools.ietf.org>
To: 	draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org, benl@google.com, 
eranm@google.com
CC: 	trans@ietf.org



#59: Clarify STH versioning


Comment (by eranm@google.com):

  Ben sent this out for review in https://github.com/google/certificate-
  transparency-rfcs/pull/34

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
  Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
   rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
      Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
  Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
  Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
  Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans







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  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Melinda et al.,<br>
      <br>
      As an ordinary participant who doesn't have anywhere near a
      photographic memory and who's often swamped just like most
      everyone else,  I find it's hard to keep track of the discussions,
      especially when they stop and start over several months.  So I'd
      like to distinguish between 2 parts of the problem.  First, I'd be
      most grateful if the person addressing an issue wrote a
      description of the proposed final resolution.  If the I-D text is
      being changed, this would just need to be the new text.  For
      example, the email that Eran sent on 3/2 re: Errata for RFC6962
      made it really easy for me to quickly review it.  And this work,
      e.g., the new text, has to be written in any case -- so hopefully
      this doesn't require more work than would otherwise be done. 
      Second, it would be slightly easier (one fewer steps) and
      therefore I'm more likely to find the time,  if the proposed
      resolution were distributed to the list in email, rather than in a
      link.  But since the proposed resolution should be documented in
      the issue tracker, it would be fine to do this via the ticket
      system. But in any case, please put the proposed resolution (new
      text, etc.) at the top of the ticket for WG review.  That way when
      I receive the ticket, the thing to be reviewed is right there.<br>
      <br>
      Thank you,<br>
      Karen<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
        <br>
        -------- Forwarded Message --------
        <table class="moz-email-headers-table" border="0"
          cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Subject:
              </th>
              <td>Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH
                versioning</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Resent-Date:
              </th>
              <td>Mon, 2 Mar 2015 07:14:39 -0800 (PST)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Resent-From:
              </th>
              <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:trac+trans@tools.ietf.org">trac+trans@tools.ietf.org</a></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Resent-To:
              </th>
              <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@ietf.org">draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@ietf.org</a></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Date:
              </th>
              <td>Mon, 02 Mar 2015 15:14:38 -0000</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">From:
              </th>
              <td>trans issue tracker <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:trac+trans@tools.ietf.org">&lt;trac+trans@tools.ietf.org&gt;</a></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">To: </th>
              <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org">draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org</a>,
                <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:benl@google.com">benl@google.com</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:eranm@google.com">eranm@google.com</a></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">CC: </th>
              <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:trans@ietf.org">trans@ietf.org</a></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <br>
        <br>
        <pre>#59: Clarify STH versioning


Comment (by <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:eranm@google.com">eranm@google.com</a>):

 Ben sent this out for review in <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://github.com/google/certificate">https://github.com/google/certificate</a>-
 transparency-rfcs/pull/34

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>           |  <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org">rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org</a>
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:2">&lt;http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59#comment:2&gt;</a>
trans <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://tools.ietf.org/trans/">&lt;http://tools.ietf.org/trans/&gt;</a>

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a>

</pre>
        <br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: [Trans] Update on recently closed trans trac tickets (Jan-March 2015)
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Hi all,

Below is a summary of the activity on all recently-closed trac tickets.

I hope this summary would help other trans participants catch up and
surface potential problems with the proposed resolutions.

We marked those tickets as closed as it was the only way for us to track
that we=E2=80=99ve dealt with them - we expect them to be re-opened if ther=
e are
issues with the proposed resolutions.

As Melinda said, in the future a new status will be used to indicate that a
ticket has proposed resolution but needs a review.

42: redacted cert dangers
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/42>

We=E2=80=99ve added a clarification on what can be considered =E2=80=9Cover=
ly-redacted=E2=80=9D
precertificate (since there=E2=80=99s no standard for defining too-broad wi=
ldcards
in X.509 certificates we could not refer to it). We=E2=80=99ve left out the
implications for the client, as it=E2=80=99s up to the client to decide wha=
t to do
when encountering such a Precertificate (and we do not intend to specify
client behaviour, based on previous discussion in the last IETF meeting).

37: client gossping <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/37>

The ticket correctly made the point that gossip is not well defined enough
to make any concrete claims about it. Correspondingly, the BIS text was
changed to be less prescriptive about how STHs are exchanged and point to
the gossip I-D.

40: Auditor behavior <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/40>

RFC6962 originally described =E2=80=98auditors=E2=80=99, but in a very broa=
d way. We=E2=80=99ve
realized that stand-alone auditing isn=E2=80=99t likely to happen (and wasn=
=E2=80=99t the
intention of RFC6962 either), so we=E2=80=99ve clarified what additional au=
diting
responsibilities each type of client can take upon itself.

13: Deal with server farm skew
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/13>

Added text and an API call to address the problem of a log front-end not
knowing about a recent STH another log front-end served.

17: Add advice on CNs <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/17>

How to redact the CN? Non-contentious suggestion was to allow a single CN
that matches the first dNSName entry and use the first entry in the
redaction list for both.

19: Rejig API for efficiency/correctness
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/19>

Originally a client had to make up to three calls to get an inclusion proof
(get-sth, get-consistency, get-inclusion-proof). A new API has been added
to get all three. This ticket was also partially addressed by the changes
relevant to ticket 13 (server farm skew).

21: Clarify signature checking purpose and mechanism
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/21>

The original goal was to clarify that this is a spam mitigation measure. As
Stephen Kent pointed out, the way X.509 certificate validity checks are
performed must be accurately specified so logs behave consistently. The BIS
was changed to indicate that logs MUST accept certificate chains that are
valid according to the X.509 verification rules and may accept ones that
have expired, not yet valid, etc.


22: Explain why there are three delivery mechanisms for SCTs
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/22>

Text was added to clarify the motivation for each.

25: Freezing a log's state
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/25>

As a part of the metadata description for a log, its final valid STH has
been added.

26: Precertificates: Find alternative format to X.509
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/26>

After a lengthy discussion about the pros and cons of using X.509 for
Precertificates, the consensus seemed to be using CMS signed-data objects
for Precertificates.

27: Signature & hash alg specification
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/27>

The original concern was that since RFC6962 defines hash and signature
algorithms logs must use, clients must support both. Ben=E2=80=99s justific=
ation
was that only EC signatures would have been fine but since there are IP
concerns, RSA is specified as an alternative.

28: Algorithm agility <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/28>

Concerned both algorithms used by logs and algorithms used for certificates
acceptable by logs. The fix was to point out changing algorithms used by
log is unnecessary (would require significant changes to all data
structures) and a simple alternative would be to freeze a log and start a
new one. As for algorithms used for certificates submitted to logs, the
relevant RFCs already specify algorithm agility.

29: "what does ""immediately"" mean?"
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/29>

The section that says this was removed from the draft.

32: algorithm needed for client checks of SCT
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/32>

The original ticket was about specifying the details of checks a client
should do when verifying SCTs. Ben believes that this has been addressed in
the changes made to sections 3 and 5.

33: Cert chain length as log metadata
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/33>

Added to the list of log metadata.

34: use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/34>

ASN.1 was suggested as a more appropriate format for defining SCTs as they
are served in multiple contexts. Rob and Ben argued that RFC5246 does not
forbid the use of TLS encoding and that there are good reasons not to have
multiple SCT formats (complexity, extra signing overhead).

36: error indications for log/client exchanges
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/36>

A bunch of error codes were added.

43: key rollover <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/43>

Log key roll-over is deemed unfeasible because it would add significant
complexity to all data structures involved while a simpler way, of freezing
the existing log and starting a new log, exists.

45: Incorporate RFC6962 errata
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/45>

The errata was incorporated.

46: Provide explicit instructions for how log servers should handle
already-logged certs <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/46>

How should log handle certificates that already have SCTs embedded in them?
Text was added to clarify that a log should return a different SCTs for a
precertificate and its corresponding final X.509 certificate.

47: Clarify how to deal with (minor) DER violations when manipulating a
TBSCertificate <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/47>

Certificates with DER violations would be hard to manipulate by clients for
the purpose of SCT checking. Ben suggested logs should log such
certificates and return an error rather than issue an SCT (if they can
detect the violations).

48: Enforce the rules for Name-constrained Intermediates
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/48>

Text was added to indicate that client can verify an SCT corresponds to the
certificate it arrived - which is the final certificate or a Precertificate
that is appropriately name-constrained.

Not included is what the client  should be doing with the result of this
check, as we do not specify client behaviour.

49: Explain why OCSP Stapling is acceptable but OCSP Fetching is not
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/49>

Ben believes the current explanation is adequate.

54: Simplify name redaction
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/54>

Closed as invalid as we (myself, Ben, Rob) decided not to use Rob=E2=80=99s
simplification suggestion (personally I found it introduced different
complexities).

56: """*"" domain labels MUST NOT be redacted"
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/56>

There were no arguments in favour of allowing redaction of =E2=80=9C*=E2=80=
=9D domain
labels, so the text was changed to reflect that it should not be done.

59: Clarify STH versioning
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/59>

The STH versioning was rolled-back from V2 to V1 as the only addition, of
the CtExtensions field, was not deemed necessary - and could always be
added in the future.

35: server SCT transmission restriction is misstated
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/35>
Small clarification that servers may send SCTs to clients if they are
embedded in the certificate or in the stapled OCSP response, even if the
client did not indicate it can receive SCTs in the TLS handshake.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><span id=3D"docs-internal-guid-d8999465-e45e-da7c-0cfc-ab7=
f436e2424"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-b=
ottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent"=
>Hi all,</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:=
0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:=
transparent">Below is a summary of the activity on all recently-closed trac=
 tickets.</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt=
;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:r=
gb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:tra=
nsparent">I hope this summary would help other trans participants catch up =
and surface potential problems with the proposed resolutions.</span></p><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-alig=
n:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">We marked tho=
se tickets as closed as it was the only way for us to track that we=E2=80=
=99ve dealt with them - we expect them to be re-opened if there are issues =
with the proposed resolutions.</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-heigh=
t:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font=
-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap=
;background-color:transparent">As Melinda said, in the future a new status =
will be used to indicate that a ticket has proposed resolution but needs a =
review.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/t=
icket/42" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font=
-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space=
:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">42: redacted cert dangers</span></a=
></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:=
0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);verti=
cal-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">We=E2=
=80=99ve added a clarification on what can be considered =E2=80=9Coverly-re=
dacted=E2=80=9D precertificate (since there=E2=80=99s no standard for defin=
ing too-broad wildcards in X.509 certificates we could not refer to it). We=
=E2=80=99ve left out the implications for the client, as it=E2=80=99s up to=
 the client to decide what to do when encountering such a Precertificate (a=
nd we do not intend to specify client behaviour, based on previous discussi=
on in the last IETF meeting).</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-he=
ight:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ie=
tf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/37" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=
=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">37: client g=
ossping</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color=
:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:t=
ransparent">The ticket correctly made the point that gossip is not well def=
ined enough to make any concrete claims about it. Correspondingly, the BIS =
text was changed to be less prescriptive about how STHs are exchanged and p=
oint to the gossip I-D.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org=
/wg/trans/trac/ticket/40" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:base=
line;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">40: Auditor behavio=
r</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;mar=
gin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0=
,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpa=
rent">RFC6962 originally described =E2=80=98auditors=E2=80=99, but in a ver=
y broad way. We=E2=80=99ve realized that stand-alone auditing isn=E2=80=99t=
 likely to happen (and wasn=E2=80=99t the intention of RFC6962 either), so =
we=E2=80=99ve clarified what additional auditing responsibilities each type=
 of client can take upon itself.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line=
-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools=
.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/13" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-a=
lign:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">13: Deal w=
ith server farm skew</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-famil=
y:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;backg=
round-color:transparent">Added text and an API call to address the problem =
of a log front-end not knowing about a recent STH another log front-end ser=
ved.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;=
margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/tick=
et/17" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-fa=
mily:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pr=
e-wrap;background-color:transparent">17: Add advice on CNs</span></a></p><p=
 dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">How to redac=
t the CN? Non-contentious suggestion was to allow a single CN that matches =
the first dNSName entry and use the first entry in the redaction list for b=
oth.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;=
margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/tick=
et/19" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-fa=
mily:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pr=
e-wrap;background-color:transparent">19: Rejig API for efficiency/correctne=
ss</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;ma=
rgin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(=
0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transp=
arent">Originally a client had to make up to three calls to get an inclusio=
n proof (get-sth, get-consistency, get-inclusion-proof). A new API has been=
 added to get all three. This ticket was also partially addressed by the ch=
anges relevant to ticket 13 (server farm skew).</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr=
" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"ht=
tp://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/21" style=3D"text-decoration:=
none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:under=
line;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpar=
ent">21: Clarify signature checking purpose and mechanism</span></a></p><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-alig=
n:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">The original =
goal was to clarify that this is a spam mitigation measure. As Stephen Kent=
 pointed out, the way X.509 certificate validity checks are performed must =
be accurately specified so logs behave consistently. The BIS was changed to=
 indicate that logs MUST accept certificate chains that are valid according=
 to the X.509 verification rules and may accept ones that have expired, not=
 yet valid, etc.</span></p><br><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg=
/trans/trac/ticket/22" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">22: Explain why there =
are three delivery mechanisms for SCTs</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-=
size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-=
space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Text was added to clarify the =
motivation for each.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg=
/trans/trac/ticket/25" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">25: Freezing a log&#39=
;s state</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:=
0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:=
transparent">As a part of the metadata description for a log, its final val=
id STH has been added.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.=
38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/=
wg/trans/trac/ticket/26" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font=
-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:basel=
ine;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">26: Precertificates:=
 Find alternative format to X.509</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"lin=
e-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15=
px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:p=
re-wrap;background-color:transparent">After a lengthy discussion about the =
pros and cons of using X.509 for Precertificates, the consensus seemed to b=
e using CMS signed-data objects for Precertificates.</span></p><br><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a hre=
f=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/27" style=3D"text-deco=
ration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoratio=
n:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:t=
ransparent">27: Signature &amp; hash alg specification</span></a></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:b=
aseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">The original con=
cern was that since RFC6962 defines hash and signature algorithms logs must=
 use, clients must support both. Ben=E2=80=99s justification was that only =
EC signatures would have been fine but since there are IP concerns, RSA is =
specified as an alternative.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-hei=
ght:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.iet=
f.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/28" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=
=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-ali=
gn:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">28: Algorith=
m agility</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top=
:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;col=
or:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color=
:transparent">Concerned both algorithms used by logs and algorithms used fo=
r certificates acceptable by logs. The fix was to point out changing algori=
thms used by log is unnecessary (would require significant changes to all d=
ata structures) and a simple alternative would be to freeze a log and start=
 a new one. As for algorithms used for certificates submitted to logs, the =
relevant RFCs already specify algorithm agility.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"h=
ttp://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/29" style=3D"text-decoration=
:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:unde=
rline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpa=
rent">29: &quot;what does &quot;&quot;immediately&quot;&quot; mean?&quot;</=
span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin=
-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,=
0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparen=
t">The section that says this was removed from the draft.</span></p><br><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a =
href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/32" style=3D"text-d=
ecoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decora=
tion:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-colo=
r:transparent">32: algorithm needed for client checks of SCT</span></a></p>=
<p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt">=
<span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-a=
lign:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">The origin=
al ticket was about specifying the details of checks a client should do whe=
n verifying SCTs. Ben believes that this has been addressed in the changes =
made to sections 3 and 5.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height=
:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.o=
rg/wg/trans/trac/ticket/33" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:ba=
seline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">33: Cert chain le=
ngth as log metadata</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38=
;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-famil=
y:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;backg=
round-color:transparent">Added to the list of log metadata.</span></p><br><=
p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><=
a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/34" style=3D"text=
-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-deco=
ration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-co=
lor:transparent">34: use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT</span></a></p=
><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"=
><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-=
align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">ASN.1 was=
 suggested as a more appropriate format for defining SCTs as they are serve=
d in multiple contexts. Rob and Ben argued that RFC5246 does not forbid the=
 use of TLS encoding and that there are good reasons not to have multiple S=
CT formats (complexity, extra signing overhead).</span></p><br><p dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"h=
ttp://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/36" style=3D"text-decoration=
:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:unde=
rline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpa=
rent">36: error indications for log/client exchanges</span></a></p><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span =
style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:b=
aseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">A bunch of error=
 codes were added.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;m=
argin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/t=
rans/trac/ticket/43" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;=
white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">43: key rollover</span><=
/a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-botto=
m:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);ver=
tical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Log=
 key roll-over is deemed unfeasible because it would add significant comple=
xity to all data structures involved while a simpler way, of freezing the e=
xisting log and starting a new log, exists.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" st=
yle=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http:/=
/trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/45" style=3D"text-decoration:none=
"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline=
;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent"=
>45: Incorporate RFC6962 errata</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-=
height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px=
;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre=
-wrap;background-color:transparent">The errata was incorporated.</span></p>=
<br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0=
pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/46" style=3D=
"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text=
-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;backgrou=
nd-color:transparent">46: Provide explicit instructions for how log servers=
 should handle already-logged certs</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:=
15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space=
:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">How should log handle certificates =
that already have SCTs embedded in them? Text was added to clarify that a l=
og should return a different SCTs for a precertificate and its correspondin=
g final X.509 certificate.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-heigh=
t:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.=
org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/47" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"=
font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:b=
aseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">47: Clarify how =
to deal with (minor) DER violations when manipulating a TBSCertificate</spa=
n></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bo=
ttom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);=
vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">=
Certificates with DER violations would be hard to manipulate by clients for=
 the purpose of SCT checking. Ben suggested logs should log such certificat=
es and return an error rather than issue an SCT (if they can detect the vio=
lations).</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top=
:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac=
/ticket/48" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;fo=
nt-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline;white-spa=
ce:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">48: Enforce the rules for Name-co=
nstrained Intermediates</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-fa=
mily:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;ba=
ckground-color:transparent">Text was added to indicate that client can veri=
fy an SCT corresponds to the certificate it arrived - which is the final ce=
rtificate or a Precertificate that is appropriately name-constrained.</span=
></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:=
0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);verti=
cal-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">Not i=
ncluded is what the client =C2=A0should be doing with the result of this ch=
eck, as we do not specify client behaviour.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" st=
yle=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http:/=
/trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/49" style=3D"text-decoration:none=
"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline=
;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent"=
>49: Explain why OCSP Stapling is acceptable but OCSP Fetching is not</span=
></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bot=
tom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);v=
ertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">B=
en believes the current explanation is adequate.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"h=
ttp://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/54" style=3D"text-decoration=
:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:unde=
rline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpa=
rent">54: Simplify name redaction</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"lin=
e-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15=
px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:p=
re-wrap;background-color:transparent">Closed as invalid as we (myself, Ben,=
 Rob) decided not to use Rob=E2=80=99s simplification suggestion (personall=
y I found it introduced different complexities).</span></p><br><p dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"h=
ttp://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/56" style=3D"text-decoration=
:none"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:unde=
rline;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transpa=
rent">56: &quot;&quot;&quot;*&quot;&quot; domain labels MUST NOT be redacte=
d&quot;</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color=
:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:t=
ransparent">There were no arguments in favour of allowing redaction of =E2=
=80=9C*=E2=80=9D domain labels, so the text was changed to reflect that it =
should not be done.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/=
trans/trac/ticket/59" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:baseline=
;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">59: Clarify STH version=
ing</span></a></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;m=
argin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:15px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb=
(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:trans=
parent">The STH versioning was rolled-back from V2 to V1 as the only additi=
on, of the CtExtensions field, was not deemed necessary - and could always =
be added in the future.</span></p><br><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1=
.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org=
/wg/trans/trac/ticket/35" style=3D"text-decoration:none"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:15px;font-family:Arial;text-decoration:underline;vertical-align:base=
line;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:transparent">35: server SCT tran=
smission restriction is misstated</span></a></p><span style=3D"font-size:15=
px;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);vertical-align:baseline;white-space:p=
re-wrap;background-color:transparent">Small clarification that servers may =
send SCTs to clients if they are embedded in the certificate or in the stap=
led OCSP response, even if the client did not indicate it can receive SCTs =
in the TLS handshake.</span></span><br></div>

--001a113e3fa0f7941c05107417b0--


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Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:11:07 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Cc: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On 03/03/15 16:02, Russ Housley wrote:
<snip>
> At the time that certificate extensions were invented, the OCTET STRING wrapper was used so that the ASN.1 decode would not fail if an unsupported extension was encountered.  Some people complained about the performance hit that that additional wrapper imposed on universally supported extensions, but this is the syntax that was chosen by ITU-T in X.509 version 3.  I do not recall any discussion at that time about allowing the OCTET String to contain anything other than an ASN.1 DER encoded structure.
>
> RFC 2459, section 4.2 says:  "Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure."  That remains in RFC 5280.
>
> Russ

Russ, this is how X.680 defines the OCTET STRING type:

   "3.8.55  octetstring type: A simple type whose distinguished values
            are an ordered sequence of zero, one or more octets, each
            octet being an ordered sequence of eight bits.
    ...
    23.1  The octetstring type (see 3.8.55) shall be referenced by the
          notation "OctetStringType":
            OctetStringType ::= OCTET STRING"

It seems clear to me that an OCTET STRING can contain absolutely 
anything.  (If an OCTET STRING could only contain ASN.1 object(s), then 
surely that would defeat the whole point of having the OCTET STRING type 
in the first place?)

Regarding your quote from RFC2459/5280:
Is "ASN.1 structure" defined somewhere?  Does "structure" imply that it 
MUST be a constructed type such as a SEQUENCE or SET (rather than a 
primitive type such as OCTET STRING or INTEGER)?
I presume not, because RFC5280 also says:

   "Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
         extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
         critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
         extnValue   OCTET STRING
                     -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
                     -- corresponding to the extension type identified
                     -- by extnID
         }"

Surely an OCTET STRING _is_ "an ASN.1 value"?


BTW, the clarifications proposed by this ticket might be relevant to 
this discussion:
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14


P.S. At least we're not trying to embed an MPEG video of a cat into a 
certificate field that you might expect to contain ASN.1 object(s).  ;-)
http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/T2a_X509_Certs.pdf (page 9)

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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--001a1140a9c6655394051074f1b8
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On 3 March 2015 at 16:02, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Melinda:
>
> > First, I need to apologize for being largely checked out the
> > past while - I've been down with a particularly virulent flu
> > and am still largely flattened by it.  I'll do better.
>
> I'm sorry you were stricken, but I'm glad to hear you are feeling much
> better.
>
> > Second, taking my chair hat off, a couple of comments on the
> > syntax question: I'm not sure that there have been any
> > technical arguments made for why either approach must be
> > excluded, which would be the first place to start, I think.
> > 5246 definitely does not say that that syntax must not be used
> > for anything else, ever.  What it says is:
> >
> > "The purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS only; it
> > has no general application beyond that particular goal."
> >
> > Because you've wanted to treat this legalistically I think it's
> > reasonable to point out that the phrase "has no general application"
> > does not exclude the use of the same syntax to describe what
> > are TLS-coupled data structures, unless you're arguing that
> > CT logging of TLS certs would be a "general application."  Even so,
> > you don't have to look through many IETF specifications to find
> > instances of later protocols violating some of the constraints written
> > into earlier specifications - for example, in RSVP-TE extensions to
> > RSVP.  So, I think that's a tough path to follow.
> >
> > Frankly, in the absence of compelling technical arguments either
> > way, my personal inclination is to privilege implementation.  Again,
> > that's my *personal* inclination.  In the meantime, if there's a
> > compelling technical argument against this encoding, it's definitely
> > time to make it.  We do need to make progress and not keep
> > going over the same ground and arriving at same outcomes.
>
> At the time that certificate extensions were invented, the OCTET STRING
> wrapper was used so that the ASN.1 decode would not fail if an unsupported
> extension was encountered.  Some people complained about the performance
> hit that that additional wrapper imposed on universally supported
> extensions, but this is the syntax that was chosen by ITU-T in X.509
> version 3.  I do not recall any discussion at that time about allowing the
> OCTET String to contain anything other than an ASN.1 DER encoded structure.
>
> RFC 2459, section 4.2 says:  "Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1
> structure."  That remains in RFC 5280.
>

6962 and 6962-bis are compliant with 5280. The ASN.1 structure that is
included is an OCTET STRING. The value of that OCTET STRING is the TLS
structure.

The alternatives are:

a) Encode SCTs different ways for different contexts. This seems like
pointless complexity.

b) Change SCTs to ASN.1 structures, and wrap these in a TLS opaque when
presented in a TLS extension. This is exactly analogous to the current
situation, and analogous arguments can be made for/against it.

I hope no-one is arguing for a), leaving us with b), and no convincing
reason to choose it over the current format on the basis of what the
standards say (or vice versa), as far as I can see.

Given that since Jan 1 2015 significant numbers of certificates have been
deployed using the existing format, I suggest that the appropriate
resolution is to continue with the format that is already deployed.

--001a1140a9c6655394051074f1b8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 3 March 2015 at 16:02, Russ Housley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target=3D"_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Melinda:<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; First, I need to apologize for being largely checked out the<br>
&gt; past while - I&#39;ve been down with a particularly virulent flu<br>
&gt; and am still largely flattened by it.=C2=A0 I&#39;ll do better.<br>
<br>
</span>I&#39;m sorry you were stricken, but I&#39;m glad to hear you are fe=
eling much better.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; Second, taking my chair hat off, a couple of comments on the<br>
&gt; syntax question: I&#39;m not sure that there have been any<br>
&gt; technical arguments made for why either approach must be<br>
&gt; excluded, which would be the first place to start, I think.<br>
&gt; 5246 definitely does not say that that syntax must not be used<br>
&gt; for anything else, ever.=C2=A0 What it says is:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;The purpose of this presentation language is to document TLS onl=
y; it<br>
&gt; has no general application beyond that particular goal.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Because you&#39;ve wanted to treat this legalistically I think it&#39;=
s<br>
&gt; reasonable to point out that the phrase &quot;has no general applicati=
on&quot;<br>
&gt; does not exclude the use of the same syntax to describe what<br>
&gt; are TLS-coupled data structures, unless you&#39;re arguing that<br>
&gt; CT logging of TLS certs would be a &quot;general application.&quot;=C2=
=A0 Even so,<br>
&gt; you don&#39;t have to look through many IETF specifications to find<br=
>
&gt; instances of later protocols violating some of the constraints written=
<br>
&gt; into earlier specifications - for example, in RSVP-TE extensions to<br=
>
&gt; RSVP.=C2=A0 So, I think that&#39;s a tough path to follow.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Frankly, in the absence of compelling technical arguments either<br>
&gt; way, my personal inclination is to privilege implementation.=C2=A0 Aga=
in,<br>
&gt; that&#39;s my *personal* inclination.=C2=A0 In the meantime, if there&=
#39;s a<br>
&gt; compelling technical argument against this encoding, it&#39;s definite=
ly<br>
&gt; time to make it.=C2=A0 We do need to make progress and not keep<br>
&gt; going over the same ground and arriving at same outcomes.<br>
<br>
</span>At the time that certificate extensions were invented, the OCTET STR=
ING wrapper was used so that the ASN.1 decode would not fail if an unsuppor=
ted extension was encountered.=C2=A0 Some people complained about the perfo=
rmance hit that that additional wrapper imposed on universally supported ex=
tensions, but this is the syntax that was chosen by ITU-T in X.509 version =
3.=C2=A0 I do not recall any discussion at that time about allowing the OCT=
ET String to contain anything other than an ASN.1 DER encoded structure.<br=
>
<br>
RFC 2459, section 4.2 says:=C2=A0 &quot;Each extension includes an OID and =
an ASN.1 structure.&quot;=C2=A0 That remains in RFC 5280.<br></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>6962 and 6962-bis are compliant with 5280. The ASN.1 str=
ucture that is included is an OCTET STRING. The value of that OCTET STRING =
is the TLS structure.</div><div><br></div><div>The alternatives are:</div><=
div><br></div><div>a) Encode SCTs different ways for different contexts. Th=
is seems like pointless complexity.</div><div><br></div><div>b) Change SCTs=
 to ASN.1 structures, and wrap these in a TLS opaque when presented in a TL=
S extension. This is exactly analogous to the current situation, and analog=
ous arguments can be made for/against it.</div><div><br></div><div>I hope n=
o-one is arguing for a), leaving us with b), and no convincing reason to ch=
oose it over the current format on the basis of what the standards say (or =
vice versa), as far as I can see.</div><div><br></div><div>Given that since=
 Jan 1 2015 significant numbers of certificates have been deployed using th=
e existing format, I suggest that the appropriate resolution is to continue=
 with the format that is already deployed.</div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv></div></div></div>

--001a1140a9c6655394051074f1b8--


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References: <064.8c7fdcc81bea3236b4aa924cd51122dd@tools.ietf.org> <079.a8405ed6e5efa1bbb9b5f7991f377ade@tools.ietf.org> <54F5E837.7010806@bbn.com> <CABrd9STdugWv6hnH6RUGfO7cmv_TJA7R18OmUH44g-UsaWGJUA@mail.gmail.com> <54F61F19.2050400@bbn.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 14:40:30 +0000
Message-ID: <CABrd9SRb-3M_Xc5ak7A10YVDthLA0-D-c07-G-W6PLHiyR3u=g@mail.gmail.com>
From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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On 3 March 2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Ben,
>
> Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.
>
> But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of github
> for
> communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.
>
> First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have to
> cut and paste them together to get to the right page.
>

Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to scroll
> to the right to read what has been written.
>

This only occurs in the "conversation" view, as far as I know. If you click
on "View full changes" you get a wrapped view of the change.


>
> Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of issues is
> not being
> sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone who
> wants to
> track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail and
> see what
> is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection
> that is
> at best awkward, as noted above.
>

The obvious answer to this particular awkwardness is to "watch" the
repository on github (button on the top page:
https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs).

The good reason for not sending issues via messages is that it adds a layer
of indirection for the authors that is at best awkward.



>
> Steve
>
>
>
> On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>
>> Ben,
>>
>> The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need
>> for
>> a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system wil=
l
>> transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>>
>
>  That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this ticket
> describes!
>
>  =C3=82
>
>>
>> Steve
>>
>>  #59: Clarify STH versioning
>>>
>>>
>>> Comment (bybenl@google.com):
>>>
>>> =C3=82  I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>>>
>>> =C3=82  However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: i=
f we
>>> =C3=82  discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduce=
 a v2
>>> STH
>>> =C3=82  and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continue=
 to
>>> use v1
>>> =C3=82  STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>>>
>>>
>>  _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 3 March 2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.<br>
    <br>
    But, while we&#39;re on the topic of response to issues, I find use of
    github for <br>
    communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.<br>
    <br>
    First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have
    to<br>
    cut and paste them together to get to the right page.<br></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);borde=
r-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#0000=
00">
    Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to
    scroll<br>
    to the right to read what has been written.<br></div></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>This only occurs in the &quot;conversation&quot; view, as fa=
r as I know. If you click on &quot;View full changes&quot; you get a wrappe=
d view of the change.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-colo=
r:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <br>
    Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
    issues is not being <br>
    sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone
    who wants to<br>
    track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail
    and see what<br>
    is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of
    indirection that is<br>
    at best awkward, as noted above.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>The obvious answer to this particular awkwardness is to &quot;watch&quo=
t; the repository on github (button on the top page: <a href=3D"https://git=
hub.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs">https://github.com/google/cer=
tificate-transparency-rfcs</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>The good reason f=
or not sending issues via messages is that it adds a layer of indirection f=
or the authors that is at best awkward.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid=
;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On 3 March 2015 at 16=
:58, Stephen
            Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-s=
tyle:solid;padding-left:1ex">Ben,<br>
              <br>
              The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have
              identified an need for<br>
              a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how
              the system will<br>
              transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue
              this ticket describes!</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            </span><div>=C3=82=C2=A0</div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-s=
tyle:solid;padding-left:1ex"> <br>
              Steve<span><br>
                <br>
                <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-le=
ft-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
                  #59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  Comment (<a href=3D"mailto:bybenl@google.com" target=3D"_=
blank">bybenl@google.com</a>):<br>
                  <br></span>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 I can&#39;t find anywhere that requires a v2=
 STH.<br>
                  <br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 However, I agree that we do not need to make=
 this
                  change yet: if we<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 discover a need for extensions in an STH, th=
en we
                  can introduce a v2 STH<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existin=
g code
                  can continue to use v1<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 STHs and the corresponding APIs.<br>
                  <br>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span><span class=3D""> ____________________________________=
___________<br>
              Trans mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
            </span></blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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References: <064.8c7fdcc81bea3236b4aa924cd51122dd@tools.ietf.org> <079.a8405ed6e5efa1bbb9b5f7991f377ade@tools.ietf.org> <54F5E837.7010806@bbn.com> <CABrd9STdugWv6hnH6RUGfO7cmv_TJA7R18OmUH44g-UsaWGJUA@mail.gmail.com> <54F61F19.2050400@bbn.com> <CABrd9SRb-3M_Xc5ak7A10YVDthLA0-D-c07-G-W6PLHiyR3u=g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2015 12:07:29 +0000
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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By the way, if it would be helpful, I can easily post the current rfcdiff
between the last I-D and our proposed next I-D any time anyone wants it.

You can also check out the git repo and make it yourself.

And, of course, once we update the I-D on the IETF site, the diff is also
available there.

On 4 March 2015 at 14:40, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 3 March 2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>
>>  Ben,
>>
>> Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.
>>
>> But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find use of githu=
b
>> for
>> communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.
>>
>> First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have to
>> cut and paste them together to get to the right page.
>>
>
> Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to scroll
>> to the right to read what has been written.
>>
>
> This only occurs in the "conversation" view, as far as I know. If you
> click on "View full changes" you get a wrapped view of the change.
>
>
>>
>> Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of issues i=
s
>> not being
>> sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone who
>> wants to
>> track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail and
>> see what
>> is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection
>> that is
>> at best awkward, as noted above.
>>
>
> The obvious answer to this particular awkwardness is to "watch" the
> repository on github (button on the top page:
> https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs).
>
> The good reason for not sending issues via messages is that it adds a
> layer of indirection for the authors that is at best awkward.
>
>
>
>>
>> Steve
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Ben,
>>>
>>> The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have identified an need
>>> for
>>> a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how the system wi=
ll
>>> transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>>>
>>
>>  That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this ticket
>> describes!
>>
>>  =C3=82
>>
>>>
>>> Steve
>>>
>>>  #59: Clarify STH versioning
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Comment (bybenl@google.com):
>>>>
>>>> =C3=82  I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>>>>
>>>> =C3=82  However, I agree that we do not need to make this change yet: =
if we
>>>> =C3=82  discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we can introduc=
e a v2
>>>> STH
>>>> =C3=82  and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code can continu=
e to
>>>> use v1
>>>> =C3=82  STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>  _______________________________________________
>>> Trans mailing list
>>> Trans@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>>
>

--001a1135af32796a4b051089693a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">By the way, if it would be helpful, I can easily post the =
current rfcdiff between the last I-D and our proposed next I-D any time any=
one wants it.<div><br></div><div>You can also check out the git repo and ma=
ke it yourself.</div><div><br></div><div>And, of course, once we update the=
 I-D on the IETF site, the diff is also available there.<br><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 4 March 2015 at 14:40, Ben La=
urie <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:benl@google.com" target=3D"_bl=
ank">benl@google.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote"><span class=3D"">On 3 March 2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br></span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,2=
04);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Ben,<br>
    <br><span class=3D"">
    Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.<br>
    <br>
    But, while we&#39;re on the topic of response to issues, I find use of
    github for <br>
    communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.<br>
    <br>
    First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so I have
    to<br>
    cut and paste them together to get to the right page.<br></span></div><=
/blockquote><span class=3D""><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-colo=
r:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have to
    scroll<br>
    to the right to read what has been written.<br></div></blockquote><div>=
<br></div></span><div>This only occurs in the &quot;conversation&quot; view=
, as far as I know. If you click on &quot;View full changes&quot; you get a=
 wrapped view of the change.</div><span class=3D""><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-wi=
dth:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <br>
    Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
    issues is not being <br>
    sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice? Someone
    who wants to<br>
    track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the mail
    and see what<br>
    is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of
    indirection that is<br>
    at best awkward, as noted above.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
/span><div>The obvious answer to this particular awkwardness is to &quot;wa=
tch&quot; the repository on github (button on the top page: <a href=3D"http=
s://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs" target=3D"_blank">http=
s://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs</a>).</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>The good reason for not sending issues via messages is that it adds=
 a layer of indirection for the authors that is at best awkward.</div><span=
 class=3D""><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-colo=
r:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span>On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephe=
n
            Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-s=
tyle:solid;padding-left:1ex">Ben,<br>
              <br>
              The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have
              identified an need for<br>
              a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how
              the system will<br>
              transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue
              this ticket describes!</div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            </span><div>=C3=82=C2=A0</div>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-s=
tyle:solid;padding-left:1ex"> <br>
              Steve<span><br>
                <br>
                <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-le=
ft-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
                  #59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  Comment (<a href=3D"mailto:bybenl@google.com" target=3D"_=
blank">bybenl@google.com</a>):<br>
                  <br></span>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 I can&#39;t find anywhere that requires a v2=
 STH.<br>
                  <br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 However, I agree that we do not need to make=
 this
                  change yet: if we<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 discover a need for extensions in an STH, th=
en we
                  can introduce a v2 STH<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existin=
g code
                  can continue to use v1<br>
                  =C3=82=C2=A0 STHs and the corresponding APIs.<br>
                  <br>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span><span> _______________________________________________=
<br>
              Trans mailing list<br>
              <a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@iet=
f.org</a><br>
              <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
            </span></blockquote>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></span></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

--001a1135af32796a4b051089693a--


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #61 (client-behavior): Precertificates are not proper nouns
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#61: Precertificates are not proper nouns

 We should spell it "precertificate" not "Precertificate".

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  benl@google.com        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/61>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#9: Security Considerations for number and variety of SCTs

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => needs-review


Comment:

 Proposed resolution: https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/3f8420990b8a31df7249013e43800b8d3970c9b6.

-- 
--------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  rob.stradling@comodo.com  |       Owner:  benl@google.com
     Type:  defect                    |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  minor                     |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis               |     Version:
 Severity:  -                         |  Resolution:  needs-review
 Keywords:                            |
--------------------------------------+------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/9#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


From nobody Thu Mar  5 09:24:43 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Melinda,

yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is that they
often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on the
proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany the
issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow the
embedded link to see what has changed.

If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the list, I think 
that would be
preferable, independent of the process change you noted about how/when 
issues will be closed.

Steve
> On 3/3/15 11:52 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
>> issues is not being sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF
>> practice? Someone who wants to track what is happening in trans
>> should be able to look at the mail and see what is being
>> changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection that
>> is at best awkward, as noted above.
> The resolutions are being sent to the mailing list, by the
> issue tracker.  You've raised some objections and discussed a
> few others, so clearly the information associated with a ticket
> state change is being communicated.
>
> We've instituted a change, however, and that's that going forward,
> issues will not be closed by document authors but by Paul and me.
>
> Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>


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Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2015 17:28:32 +0000
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

> Melinda,
>
> yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is that they
> often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on the
> proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany the
> issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow the
> embedded link to see what has changed.
>
> If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the list, I think that
> would be
> preferable, independent of the process change you noted about how/when
> issues will be closed.
>

Would a diff included in the issue be sufficient?


>
> Steve
>
>  On 3/3/15 11:52 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>
>>> Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of
>>> issues is not being sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF
>>> practice? Someone who wants to track what is happening in trans
>>> should be able to look at the mail and see what is being
>>> changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection that
>>> is at best awkward, as noted above.
>>>
>> The resolutions are being sent to the mailing list, by the
>> issue tracker.  You've raised some objections and discussed a
>> few others, so clearly the information associated with a ticket
>> state change is being communicated.
>>
>> We've instituted a change, however, and that's that going forward,
>> issues will not be closed by document authors but by Paul and me.
>>
>> Melinda
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Melinda,<br>
<br>
yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is that they<br>
often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on the<br>
proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany the<br>
issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow the<br>
embedded link to see what has changed.<br>
<br>
If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the list, I think that =
would be<br>
preferable, independent of the process change you noted about how/when issu=
es will be closed.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Would a diff include=
d in the issue be sufficient?</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">
<br>
Steve<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 3/3/15 11:52 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution of<br>
issues is not being sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF<br>
practice? Someone who wants to track what is happening in trans<br>
should be able to look at the mail and see what is being<br>
changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of indirection that<br>
is at best awkward, as noted above.<br>
</blockquote>
The resolutions are being sent to the mailing list, by the<br>
issue tracker.=C2=A0 You&#39;ve raised some objections and discussed a<br>
few others, so clearly the information associated with a ticket<br>
state change is being communicated.<br>
<br>
We&#39;ve instituted a change, however, and that&#39;s that going forward,<=
br>
issues will not be closed by document authors but by Paul and me.<br>
<br>
Melinda<br>
<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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Hi, Ben,

That would be great (speaking just for myself) if you mean that for a 
given issue, you'd post the before and after applicable to just that 
issue, not a complete diff between draft versions.

Thanks very much,
Karen


On 3/5/15 7:07 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> By the way, if it would be helpful, I can easily post the current 
> rfcdiff between the last I-D and our proposed next I-D any time anyone 
> wants it.
>
> You can also check out the git repo and make it yourself.
>
> And, of course, once we update the I-D on the IETF site, the diff is 
> also available there.
>
> On 4 March 2015 at 14:40, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com 
> <mailto:benl@google.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
>     On 3 March 2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com
>     <mailto:kent@bbn.com>> wrote:
>
>         Ben,
>
>         Whoops. Sorry my response was not on target.
>
>         But, while we're on the topic of response to issues, I find
>         use of github for
>         communicating of issues to be very inconvenient.
>
>         First, the URLs in the messages are broken into two lines, so
>         I have to
>         cut and paste them together to get to the right page.
>
>
>         Second, the lines in the files are often very long, so I have
>         to scroll
>         to the right to read what has been written.
>
>
>     This only occurs in the "conversation" view, as far as I know. If
>     you click on "View full changes" you get a wrapped view of the change.
>
>
>         Is there a good reason that the text for proposed resolution
>         of issues is not being
>         sent via messages to this list, as is common IETF practice?
>         Someone who wants to
>         track what is happening in trans should be able to look at the
>         mail and see what
>         is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github adds a layer of
>         indirection that is
>         at best awkward, as noted above.
>
>
>     The obvious answer to this particular awkwardness is to "watch"
>     the repository on github (button on the top page:
>     https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs).
>
>     The good reason for not sending issues via messages is that it
>     adds a layer of indirection for the authors that is at best awkward.
>
>
>         Steve
>>
>>
>>         On 3 March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com
>>         <mailto:kent@bbn.com>> wrote:
>>
>>             Ben,
>>
>>             The issue here is not whether, at this time, we have
>>             identified an need for
>>             a v2 STH. The issue is that the doc needs to describe how
>>             the system will
>>             transition to a new version, if it is ever needed.
>>
>>
>>         That may indeed be _an_ issue, but it is not the issue this
>>         ticket describes!
>>
>>         Â
>>
>>
>>             Steve
>>
>>                 #59: Clarify STH versioning
>>
>>
>>                 Comment (bybenl@google.com <mailto:bybenl@google.com>):
>>
>>                 Â  I can't find anywhere that requires a v2 STH.
>>
>>                 Â  However, I agree that we do not need to make this
>>                 change yet: if we
>>                 Â  discover a need for extensions in an STH, then we
>>                 can introduce a v2 STH
>>                 Â  and new APIs that deal with v2 STHs. Existing code
>>                 can continue to use v1
>>                 Â  STHs and the corresponding APIs.
>>
>>
>>             _______________________________________________
>>             Trans mailing list
>>             Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>
>>
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         Trans mailing list
>         Trans@ietf.org <mailto:Trans@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi, Ben,<br>
      <br>
      That would be great (speaking just for myself) if you mean that
      for a given issue, you'd post the before and after applicable to
      just that issue, not a complete diff between draft versions. <br>
      <br>
      Thanks very much,<br>
      Karen<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 3/5/15 7:07 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SQQ29sDGqF+AdKHEijH-TVpPq4qEZjDVqbGOt+rxPrSNg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">By the way, if it would be helpful, I can easily
        post the current rfcdiff between the last I-D and our proposed
        next I-D any time anyone wants it.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>You can also check out the git repo and make it yourself.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>And, of course, once we update the I-D on the IETF site,
          the diff is also available there.<br>
          <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
            <div class="gmail_quote">On 4 March 2015 at 14:40, Ben
              Laurie <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:benl@google.com" target="_blank">benl@google.com</a>&gt;</span>
              wrote:<br>
              <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                <div dir="ltr"><br>
                  <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                    <div class="gmail_quote"><span class="">On 3 March
                        2015 at 20:52, Stephen Kent <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                            moz-do-not-send="true"
                            href="mailto:kent@bbn.com" target="_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
                        wrote:<br>
                      </span>
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
                        0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
                        <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> Ben,<br>
                          <br>
                          <span class=""> Whoops. Sorry my response was
                            not on target.<br>
                            <br>
                            But, while we're on the topic of response to
                            issues, I find use of github for <br>
                            communicating of issues to be very
                            inconvenient.<br>
                            <br>
                            First, the URLs in the messages are broken
                            into two lines, so I have to<br>
                            cut and paste them together to get to the
                            right page.<br>
                          </span></div>
                      </blockquote>
                      <span class="">
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                          style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
                          <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> Second,
                            the lines in the files are often very long,
                            so I have to scroll<br>
                            to the right to read what has been written.<br>
                          </div>
                        </blockquote>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                      </span>
                      <div>This only occurs in the "conversation" view,
                        as far as I know. If you click on "View full
                        changes" you get a wrapped view of the change.</div>
                      <span class="">
                        <div> </div>
                        <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                          style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
                          <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
                            Is there a good reason that the text for
                            proposed resolution of issues is not being <br>
                            sent via messages to this list, as is common
                            IETF practice? Someone who wants to<br>
                            track what is happening in trans should be
                            able to look at the mail and see what<br>
                            is being changed/proposed, etc. Using github
                            adds a layer of indirection that is<br>
                            at best awkward, as noted above.<br>
                          </div>
                        </blockquote>
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                      </span>
                      <div>The obvious answer to this particular
                        awkwardness is to "watch" the repository on
                        github (button on the top page: <a
                          moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs"
                          target="_blank">https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs</a>).</div>
                      <div><br>
                      </div>
                      <div>The good reason for not sending issues via
                        messages is that it adds a layer of indirection
                        for the authors that is at best awkward.</div>
                      <span class="">
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        <div> </div>
                        <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                          style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
                          <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
                            Steve<br>
                            <blockquote type="cite">
                              <div dir="ltr"><br>
                                <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                                  <div class="gmail_quote"><span>On 3
                                      March 2015 at 16:58, Stephen Kent
                                      <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                                          moz-do-not-send="true"
                                          href="mailto:kent@bbn.com"
                                          target="_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
                                      wrote:<br>
                                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                        style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">Ben,<br>
                                        <br>
                                        The issue here is not whether,
                                        at this time, we have identified
                                        an need for<br>
                                        a v2 STH. The issue is that the
                                        doc needs to describe how the
                                        system will<br>
                                        transition to a new version, if
                                        it is ever needed.<br>
                                      </blockquote>
                                      <div><br>
                                      </div>
                                      <div>That may indeed be _an_
                                        issue, but it is not the issue
                                        this ticket describes!</div>
                                      <div><br>
                                      </div>
                                    </span>
                                    <div> </div>
                                    <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                      style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                      <br>
                                      Steve<span><br>
                                        <br>
                                        <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                          style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
                                            #59: Clarify STH versioning<br>
                                            <br>
                                            <br>
                                            Comment (<a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="mailto:bybenl@google.com"
                                              target="_blank">bybenl@google.com</a>):<br>
                                            <br>
                                          </span>   I can't find
                                          anywhere that requires a v2
                                          STH.<br>
                                          <br>
                                            However, I agree that we do
                                          not need to make this change
                                          yet: if we<br>
                                            discover a need for
                                          extensions in an STH, then we
                                          can introduce a v2 STH<br>
                                            and new APIs that deal with
                                          v2 STHs. Existing code can
                                          continue to use v1<br>
                                            STHs and the corresponding
                                          APIs.<br>
                                          <br>
                                        </blockquote>
                                        <br>
                                      </span><span>
                                        _______________________________________________<br>
                                        Trans mailing list<br>
                                        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                          href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org"
                                          target="_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
                                        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                          href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans"
                                          target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
                                      </span></blockquote>
                                  </div>
                                  <br>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                            <br>
                          </div>
                          <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
                          Trans mailing list<br>
                          <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                            href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target="_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
                          <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                            href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans"
                            target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
                          <br>
                        </blockquote>
                      </span></div>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
            <br>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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#9: Security Considerations for number and variety of SCTs

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  needs-review =>
 * milestone:   => review


-- 
--------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  rob.stradling@comodo.com  |       Owner:  benl@google.com
     Type:  defect                    |      Status:  reopened
 Priority:  minor                     |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis               |     Version:
 Severity:  -                         |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                            |
--------------------------------------+------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/9#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#9: Security Considerations for number and variety of SCTs

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 New text:
 {{{
       <section title="Multiple SCTs">
         <t>
           TLS servers may wish to offer multiple SCTs, each from a
 different log.
           <list style="symbols">
             <t>
               If a CA and a log collude, it is possible to temporarily
 hide misissuance from clients. Incorporating SCTs from different logs
 makes it more difficult to mount this attack.
             </t>
             <t>
               If a log misbehaves, a consequence may be that clients cease
 to trust it. Since the time an SCT may be in use can be considerable
 (several years is common in current practice when the SCT is embedded in a
 certificate), servers may wish to reduce the probability of their
 certificates being rejected as a result by including SCTs from different
 logs.
             </t>
             <t>
               TLS clients may have policies related to the above risks
 requiring servers to present multiple SCTs. For example <xref
 target="Chromium.Log.Policy">Chromium</xref> currently requires multiple
 SCTs to be presented with EV certificates in order for the EV indicator to
 be shown.
             </t>
           </list>
         </t>
       </section>
 }}}

-- 
--------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  rob.stradling@comodo.com  |       Owner:  benl@google.com
     Type:  defect                    |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  minor                     |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis               |     Version:
 Severity:  -                         |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                            |
--------------------------------------+------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/9#comment:4>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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yes, that would be better than the current approach.

Steve

>
>
> On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com 
> <mailto:kent@bbn.com>> wrote:
>
>     Melinda,
>
>     yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is that they
>     often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on the
>     proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany the
>     issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow the
>     embedded link to see what has changed.
>
>     If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the list, I
>     think that would be
>     preferable, independent of the process change you noted about
>     how/when issues will be closed.
>
>
> Would a diff included in the issue be sufficient?
>

--------------050907030501080208090009
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    yes, that would be better than the current approach.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SQWOQ23e-=Q=OObOqFfwGvgMdc1MDMCSJCeqmB_Utk13w@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen
            Kent <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:kent@bbn.com" target="_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Melinda,<br>
              <br>
              yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is
              that they<br>
              often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on
              the<br>
              proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany
              the<br>
              issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow
              the<br>
              embedded link to see what has changed.<br>
              <br>
              If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the
              list, I think that would be<br>
              preferable, independent of the process change you noted
              about how/when issues will be closed.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Would a diff included in the issue be sufficient?</div>
            <div> <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
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Overall comments

The correct expansion of the acronym CA is certification authority, not 
certificate authority. I believe I noted this typo in my comments months 
ago. I won’t cite each instance of it the document.

There are a number of instances where the document cites normative 
references, but the cited documents appear as informative references in 
Section 10.2

**

**

**

*Abstract*

Reword the opening sentence; it’s five lines long!

*1. Informal Introduction*

Why is this still an “informal” introduction? Doesn’t a standards track 
RFC deserve a real introduction :-)?

public CAs -> Web PKI CAs? (since the scope, is TLS)

each chain is rooted in a CA certificate … -> each chain terminates with 
a certificate verifiable under a CA certificate …

“provide evidence to TLS clients that the chain has been submitted …” 
just TLS clients, not monitors?

The text still talks about TLS clients requiring that all certificates 
they accept having been logged.Since TLS client behavior is out of 
scope, this statement, which motivates the use of logs, is out of scope 
as well. (we can’t have it both ways, i.e., defer definitive statement 
about client behavior and then cite such behavior as a motivation for 
the proposed mechanism.)

This section still discusses monitoring of logs, but defers 
specification of exactly how that monitoring is performed. Again, if 
monitor behavior is out of scope for this document, it is inappropriate 
to make vague statements about how such behavior justifies the 
development of a specification for logs.

The phrase “domains for which they are responsible” is vague. It 
suggests an attempt to convey how monitoring works, while deferring the 
real definition to another document.

“The checking operation is asynchronous to allow TLS connections to 
proceed …” The reference to asynchronicity suggests that this is 
describing TLS client behavior, which is out of scope.

The last paragraph in this section asserts that it is efficient for 
(unspecified parties, formerly known as Auditors) to detect log 
misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such detection is, in 
fact, efficient.

This section refers to certificate mis-issuance, yet defines it 
nowhere.Since mitigating problems caused by mis-issued certificates is 
the rationale cited for CT, this omission is serious. And, I note, that 
I have offered text to define this term.

*2. Cryptographic Components*

As I noted in my initial review of 6269-bis, I think most of the text in 
2.1.1-3 belongs in an appendix.

It is common practice in the IETF today to place crypto algorithm specs 
in a separate document, to better accommodate changes to such specs in 
the future. This suggests removing the specs of hash and signature 
algorithms from 2.1.4. There also is a need to describe how changes to 
the algorithms will be accommodated by CT.


--------------030207070201050205060000
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    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">Overall
        comments<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
        <!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br
          style="mso-special-character:line-break">
        <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">The correct
        expansion of
        the acronym CA is certification authority, not certificate
        authority. I believe
        I noted this typo in my comments months ago. I won’t cite each
        instance of it
        the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">There are a
        number of
        instances where the document cites normative references, but the
        cited
        documents appear as informative references in Section 10.2<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">Abstract<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">Reword the
        opening
        sentence; it’s five lines long!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-family:Courier">1. Informal Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">Why is this
        still an
        “informal” introduction? Doesn’t a standards track RFC deserve a
        real
        introduction :-)?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">public CAs
        -&gt; Web PKI
        CAs? (since the scope, is TLS)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier">each
        chain is rooted in a CA certificate … -&gt; each chain
        terminates with a
        certificate verifiable under a CA certificate …<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">“provide
        evidence to TLS
        clients that the chain has been submitted …” just TLS clients,
        not monitors? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">The text
        still talks about
        TLS clients requiring that all certificates they accept having
        been
        logged.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>Since TLS client
        behavior is out
        of scope, this statement, which motivates the use of logs, is
        out of
        scope as well. (we can’t have it both ways, i.e., defer
        definitive statement
        about client behavior and then cite such behavior as a
        motivation for the
        proposed mechanism.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">This section
        still
        discusses monitoring of logs, but defers specification of
        exactly how that
        monitoring is performed. Again, if monitor behavior is out of
        scope for this
        document, it is inappropriate to make vague statements about how
        such behavior
        justifies the development of a specification for logs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">The phrase
        “domains for
        which they are responsible” is vague. It suggests an attempt to
        convey how
        monitoring works, while deferring the real definition to another
        document. <br>
      </span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">“The checking
        operation is
        asynchronous to allow TLS connections to proceed …” The
        reference to
        asynchronicity suggests that this is describing TLS client
        behavior, which is
        out of scope. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The last
        paragraph in this section asserts
        that it is efficient for (unspecified parties, formerly known as
        Auditors) to detect
        log misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such
        detection is, in fact,
        efficient.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This section
        refers to
        certificate mis-issuance, yet defines it nowhere.<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>Since mitigating problems
        caused by
        mis-issued certificates is the rationale cited for CT, this
        omission is serious. And, I note, that I have offered text to
        define this term.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt">2. Cryptographic Components<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">As I noted in
        my initial
        review of 6269-bis, I think most of the text in 2.1.1-3 belongs
        in an appendix.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">It is common
        practice in
        the IETF today to place crypto algorithm specs in a separate
        document, to
        better accommodate changes to such specs in the future. This
        suggests removing
        the specs of hash and signature algorithms from 2.1.4. There
        also is a need to
        describe how changes to the algorithms will be accommodated by
        CT.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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*3. Log Format and Operation*

This section contains several instances of specified, mandatory behavior 
for clients, which contradicts the “client behavior is out of scope” 
assertion, e.g.:

“…since certificates will not be accepted by TLS clients unless logged…”

“TLS clients MUST reject certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT 
for either the end-entity certificate or for a name-constraine 
intermediate the end-entity certificate chains to” (this sentence 
appears to have been truncated, as well as containing a typo.)

The text also says “TLS servers MUST present an SCT from one or more

logs to the TLS client together with the certificate.“ Since there is no 
specified behavior for clients, I question why mandating behavior for 
TLS servers is in scope.

“When encountering an SCT, an Auditor …” We’ve told that an auditing is 
no longer a stand alone function. Looking ahead, Section 5.4, appears to 
be unchanged since the -03 version, when I noted that it was vacuous.



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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt">3. Log Format and Operation<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This section
        contains
        several instances of specified, mandatory behavior for clients,
        which
        contradicts the “client behavior is out of scope” assertion,
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>“…since certificates will not
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">“TLS clients
        MUST reject certificates
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        certificate or for
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        to” (this
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        TLS client
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        behavior for
        clients, I question why mandating behavior for TLS servers is in
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        an Auditor …” <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>We’ve told
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        auditing is no longer a stand alone function. Looking ahead,
        Section 5.4, appears
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #8 (client-privacy): Need a way to obtain Merkle proofs for a batch for certificates around the SCT timestamp
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#8: Need a way to obtain Merkle proofs for a batch for certificates around the
SCT timestamp

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * component:  rfc6962-bis => client-privacy


-- 
------------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm@google.com  |       Owner:  eranm@google.com
     Type:  defect            |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major             |   Milestone:
Component:  client-privacy    |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/8#comment:10>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #24 (rfc6962-bis): Add a section about log metadata
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#24: Add a section about log metadata

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * milestone:   => review


-- 
------------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm@google.com  |       Owner:  eranm@google.com
     Type:  enhancement       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  minor             |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/24#comment:5>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #60 (rfc6962-bis): The number of redacted labels should be revealed in the Precertificate
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#60: The number of redacted labels should be revealed in the Precertificate

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * milestone:   => review


-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  assigned
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/60#comment:6>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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This is getting quite hard to read as a whole - could you provide the
complete, revised text? Thanks!

If I get it soon, I can try to use it as a basis for a new section in the
I-D before Monday's submission deadline...

Some minor comments below.

On 3 March 2015 at 20:54, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  based on comments from Ben, I made changes to the attack model text.
>
> The diffs appear below.
>
> Steve
> ------
>
> *XX*.1.2.1 The mis-issued certificate may have been submitted to one or
> more logs prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance
> to acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor that is protecting
> the targeted Subject will detect the bogus certificate and can alert the
> Subject. The Subject, in turn, will request the CA to revoke the bogus
> certificate. In this case, the CA will make use of the log entry (supplie=
d
> by the Subject) to determine the serial number of the mis-issued
> certificate, and revoke it (after investigation). (See Notes 1 + 2.) *Sin=
ce
> there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a certificate*If
> clients do not reject certificates or otherwise notify users If clients
> do not reject certificates or otherwise notify users when no SCT is
> provided, the preferred strategy for an attacker is to not log bogus
> certificates. (See XX.1.2.2 and Note 3.)
>
>
>
> *XX*.1.2.2 The bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs.
> In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. *Since TLS =
*
> If clients *are *do not *required to *reject *a certificate that lacks (*=
certificates
> or *is not accompanied by) an SCT, or even to*otherwise notify *a user in
> such situations*users when no SCT is provided, the preferred strategy for
> an attacker *will*is to not *be thwarted in this case*log bogus
> certificates. (See Note 3.)
>
>
>
> XX.1.2.3 The bogus certificate may have been submitted to logs that are
> conspiring with the attacker. In this case, Monitors will not detect the
> bogus certificate because the logs will suppress a bogus certificate log
> entry. TLS clients will not reject a bogus certificate in this case,
> because it is accompanied by an SCT. In this scenario, unless Monitors
> =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D to detect conspiring logs, the bogus certificate=
 will not be
> detected. *Because*Until there *are no requirements*is a (mandatory to
> implement) specification for *such *gossiping, an attack of this sort can
> succeed* based on the current CT design*.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *XX*.2.1
>
>
>
> *Since there is no requirement that a *If TLS *client can be configured
> to *clients do not reject *a certificate*certificates that *has*do not ap=
pear
> to have been syntactically checked by a log (as indicated by the SCT), a
> malicious CA need not worry about failing a log-based check. Similarly,
>
> *since*if there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a
> certificate that was logged by an operator that does not perform syntacti=
c
> checks, the fourth approach noted above will succeed as well. If a client
> were configured to know which versions of certificate types are applicabl=
e
> to its use of a certificate, the second and third strategies noted above
> could be thwarted.
>

I still don't really understand this point: the log has no power to check
syntax that is not also available to a client, so I don't see how the log
checking/not checking syntax is interesting - a malicious CA presumably
cannot know what all clients will do? Because of this, I also still do not
see the real value of logs checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against
it, but it doesn't seem to me to add much.

>
>
> *XX*.2.2 Because the CA is presumed malicious, it may choose to not
> submit a certificate to a log. This avoids detection of syntactic
> mis-issuance by a log, but it also means there is no SCT for the
> certificate. *Since there is no requirement for a TLS client to *If
> clients do not reject *a certificate that lacks (*certificates or *is not
> accompanied by) an *otherwise notify users when no SCT is provided, this
> form of mis-issuance will succeed. (See Note 3.)
>
>
>
> *XX*.2.3 A malicious CA may submit a certificate to one or more logs that
> collude with this CA to not perform syntactic checks, even though they
> claim to do so. In this case syntactic mis-issuance will not be detected =
by
> logs.  The log entry and the SCT for a syntactically invalid certificate
> will assert that the certificate syntax was verified. Unless Monitors als=
o
> perform syntactic checks, this form of mis-issuance will not be thwarted.=
 A
> TLS clientsclient that relies on a syntactic checking by a log will
> believe that the certificate has been syntactically verified in this
> circumstance.
>

Again, this seems to me to reduce the value of syntactic checks.


>
>
> *XX*.2.4.1 A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs.
> In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. *Since
> there is no requirement for a TLS client to *If clients do not reject *a
> certificate that lacks (*certificates or *is not accompanied by) an *othe=
rwise
> notify users when no SCT*, there is no motivation* is provided, the
> preferred strategy for an attacker *to submit the certificate in this
> case*is to not log bogus certificates. (See Note 3.)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *XX*.2.5 A bogus certificate may have been submitted to one or more
> conspiring logs. These logs will issue SCTs, but will hide the log entrie=
s
> from some or all Monitors. Any Monitor (even a self-Monitor) from which t=
he
> log is hiding data will not detect the bogus certificate, even if it is
> trying to protect the targeted Subject. If a client accepts an SCT from a
> conspiring log, then the client will not reject the bogus certificate on
> the basis of a missing SCT. In this case CT will not detect the bogus
> certificate.
>
>
>
> The audit function is intended to detect logs that conspire to suppress
> log entries, based on consistency checking of logs and use of a =E2=80=9C=
gossip=E2=80=9D
> protocol. It is assumed that Monitors will perform the audit functions
> described in Section <*insert #*>.
>
> A Monitor performing an audit function could alert its clients if the
> Monitor detects evidence of malfeasant log operation. This would cause
> Monitors to avoid using such a log, and clients would reject SCTs generat=
ed
> by such a log. *Because*Until there is *no defined gossip protocol*a
> (mandatory to implement) specification for gossiping, CT *does not
> provide the necessary info*cannot be relied upon to detect this form of
> mis-issuance. (See Note 5 below.)
>
>
>
> Notes:
>
>
>
> 1.           The combination of a malicious CA and one or more conspiring
> logs motivates the definition of an audit function, to detect conspiring
> logs. If a Monitor protecting s Subject does not see mis-issued
> certificates, it cannot alert the Subject. If one or more SCTs are presen=
t
> in a certificate, or passed via the TLS handshake, a client has no way to
> know that the logged certificate is not visible to Monitors. Only if
> Monitors and clients reject certificates that contains SCTs from conspiri=
ng
> logs (based on info from an audit) will CT be able to deter use of such
> logs. Thus the means by which a Monitor performing an audit function dete=
ct
> such logs, and inform TLS clients must be specified for this to be
> effective. Moreover, if a certificate (or TLS handshake) contains more
> than one SCT, unless the client verifies all of them if it is to counter
> the threat posed by conspiring logs.
>
>
>
> Absent a (mandatory to implement) =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol that =
enables Monitors
> to verify that data from logs are reported in a consistent fashion, CT do=
es
> notcannot claim to provide protection against logs that may conspire
> with, or are victims of, attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. Wh=
en
> a gossip protocol is defined and deployed, it will be necessary to descri=
be
> how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For
> example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCT=
s
> issued by such a log? Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to de=
al
> with mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection of
> mis-issuance.
>

It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as some
fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected from
non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify
gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.

Indeed, it is important that gossip is not required to be 100% universal -
if it were, then a single malicious gossiper would break the protocol!
Obviously absent a spec I can't rigorously show how we can avoid that, but
nevertheless, from my and others' informal work on the topic, I am
confident that we can.



>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">This is getting quite hard to read as a whole - could you =
provide the complete, revised text? Thanks!<div><br></div><div>If I get it =
soon, I can try to use it as a basis for a new section in the I-D before Mo=
nday&#39;s submission deadline...</div><div><br></div><div>Some minor comme=
nts below.<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On =
3 March 2015 at 20:54, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
    based on comments from Ben, I made changes to the attack model text.<br=
>
    <br>
    The diffs appear below.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    ------<br>
    <br>
   =20
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.1.2.1
The
        mis-issued certificate may have been submitted to one or more
        logs prior to
        issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to
        acquire a standalone
        SCT. In either case, a Monitor that is protecting the targeted
        Subject will
        detect the bogus certificate and can alert the Subject. The
        Subject, in turn, will
        request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case,
        the CA will make
        use of the log entry (supplied by the Subject) to determine the
        serial number
        of the mis-issued certificate, and revoke it (after
        investigation). (See Notes
        1 + 2.) <u><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Since
              there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject
              a certificate</del></span></u><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-=
03T15:48">If
            clients do not reject certificates or otherwise
            notify users</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Cour=
ier"><span>
        </span></span><span>If clients do
        not reject certificates
        or otherwise notify users</span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"=
> <span>when
          no SCT is provided,
          the preferred strategy for an attacker is to not log bogus
          certificates</span></span><span>. (See
        XX.1.2.2 and Note 3.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.1.2.2
The
        bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In
        this case,
        Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. <u><span><del datet=
ime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Since TLS</del></span>
        </u><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">If</ins></span></span>=
<span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span> clients </span></span><u><span><=
span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">are</del></span> </span></u><span><=
span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">do</ins></span></span><span style=
=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>
          not </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8">required
              to </del></span></span></u><span style=3D"font-family:Courier=
"><span>reject
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">a c=
ertificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2=
015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>or
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is =
not accompanied by)
              an SCT, or even to</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins da=
tetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">otherwise</ins></span></span><span style=3D"fon=
t-family:Courier"><span>
          notify </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T1=
5:48">a
              user in such
              situations</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=
=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">users
            when no SCT is
            provided</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"=
><span>,
          the </span></span><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">=
preferred strategy for
            an </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><spa=
n>attacker
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">wil=
l</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is =
to</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>
          not </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8">be
              thwarted in this
              case</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015=
-03-03T15:48">log
            bogus certificates</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-famil=
y:Courier"><span>.</span></span><span> (See Note 3.)<u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>XX.1.2.3 The bogus
        certificate may have been submitted to logs that are conspiring
        with the
        attacker. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus
        certificate because
        the logs will suppress a bogus certificate log entry. <s><span><del=
 datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">TLS clients will not
              reject a bogus certificate in this case, because it is
              accompanied by an SCT.</del></span></s><span><del datetime=3D=
"2015-03-03T15:48"> </del></span>In
        this scenario, unless Monitors =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D to detect c=
onspiring
        logs, the bogus
        certificate will not be detected. <u><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03=
-03T15:48">Because</del></span></u><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"=
>Until</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>
          there </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15=
:48">are
              no requirements</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datet=
ime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is a (mandatory to
            implement) specification</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font=
-family:Courier"><span>
          for </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8">such </del></span></span></u><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>g=
ossiping,
an
          attack of this sort can succeed</span></span><u><span><span><del =
datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">
              based on the current CT design</del></span></span></u><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>.</span></span><u><span><u></u><u></u></=
span></u></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><span><u></u><span style=3D"text-decoration:n=
one">=C2=A0</span><u></u></span></u></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.2.1
        <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48=
">Since
              there is no
              requirement that a </del></span></span></u><span><span><ins d=
atetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">If </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-fam=
ily:Courier"><span>TLS
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">cli=
ent can be
              configured to </del></span></span></u><span><span><ins dateti=
me=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">clients
            do not </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">=
<span>reject
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">a c=
ertificate</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T1=
5:48">certificates</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><=
span>
          that </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:=
48">has</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8">do</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>
          not </span></span><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">=
appear
            to have </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"=
><span>been
syntactically
          checked</span></span><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8"> by
            a log</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><s=
pan>
          (as indicated by the SCT), a malicious CA need not worry about
          failing a
          log-based check. Similarly, </span></span><u><span><span><del dat=
etime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"><u></u><u></u></del></span></span></u></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48=
">since</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:4=
8">if</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>
          there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a
          certificate that was
          logged by an operator that does not perform</span></span><u><span=
> </span></u><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>syntactic
          checks, the fourth approach noted above will succeed as well</spa=
n></span><span>. If a client
        were configured to know
        which versions of certificate types are applicable to its use of
        a certificate,
        the second and third strategies noted above could be thwarted.</spa=
n></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I still don&#39;t really under=
stand this point: the log has no power to check syntax that is not also ava=
ilable to a client, so I don&#39;t see how the log checking/not checking sy=
ntax is interesting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all client=
s will do? Because of this, I also still do not see the real value of logs =
checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against it, but it doesn&#39;t see=
m to me to add much.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u><u></u></=
span></p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:.25in"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.2.2
Because
        the CA is presumed malicious, it may choose to not submit a
        certificate
        to a log. This avoids detection of syntactic mis-issuance by a
        log, but it also
        means there is no SCT for the certificate. <u><span><del datetime=
=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Since there is no
              requirement for a TLS client to </del></span></u><span><ins d=
atetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">If clients do not </ins></span></span><span st=
yle=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>reject
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">a c=
ertificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2=
015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>or
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is =
not accompanied by)
              an </del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-=
03-03T15:48">otherwise
            notify users
            when no </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"=
><span>SCT</span></span><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"> is =
provided</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>,
          this form of mis-issuance will succeed. (See Note 3.)</span></spa=
n><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.2.3
A
        malicious CA may submit a certificate to one or more logs that
        collude with
        this CA to not perform syntactic checks, even though they claim
        to do so. In
        this case syntactic mis-issuance will not be detected by logs. <spa=
n>=C2=A0</span>The log entry and the SCT for
        a syntactically
        invalid certificate will assert that the certificate syntax was
        verified.
        Unless Monitors also perform syntactic checks, this form of
        mis-issuance will
        not be thwarted. <span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">A </ins><=
/span>TLS
        <span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">clients</del></span><span>=
<ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">client
            that relies on a syntactic checking by a log</ins></span>
        will believe that the
        certificate has been syntactically verified<span><ins datetime=3D"2=
015-03-03T15:48"> in
            this circumstance</ins></span>.</span></p></div></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Again, this seems to me to reduce the value of syntactic =
checks.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>
        <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.2.4.1
A
        bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In
        this case,
        Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. <u><span><del datet=
ime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Since there is no
              requirement for a TLS client to </del></span></u><span><ins d=
atetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">If clients do not </ins></span></span><span st=
yle=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>reject
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">a c=
ertificate that
              lacks (</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2=
015-03-03T15:48">certificates
          </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>or
        </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is =
not accompanied by)
              an </del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-=
03-03T15:48">otherwise
            notify users
            when no </ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"=
><span>SCT</span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">,=
 there is no
              motivation</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=
=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"> is
            provided, the
            preferred strategy</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-famil=
y:Courier"><span>
          for an attacker </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"201=
5-03-03T15:48">to submit the
              certificate in this case</del></span></span></u><span><span><=
ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">is
            to not log bogus certificates</ins></span></span><span style=3D=
"font-family:Courier"><span>.
          (See Note 3.)</span></span><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span>XX</span></b><span>.2.5
A
        bogus certificate may have been submitted to one or more
        conspiring logs.
        These logs will issue SCTs, but will hide the log entries from
        some or all
        Monitors. Any Monitor (even a self-Monitor) from which the log
        is hiding data
        will not detect the bogus certificate, even if it is trying to
        protect the
        targeted Subject. <s><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">If
              a client accepts an SCT from a conspiring log,
              then the client will not reject the bogus certificate on
              the basis of a missing
              SCT.</del></span></s><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"=
> </del></span>In
        this case CT will not detect the bogus
        certificate. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>The audit function is
        intended to detect logs that conspire to suppress log entries,
        based on
        consistency checking of logs and use of a =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D =
protocol. It
        is assumed that
        Monitors will perform the audit functions described in Section
        &lt;<b>insert #</b>&gt;.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>A Monitor performing
        an audit function could alert its clients if the Monitor detects
        evidence of
        malfeasant log operation. This would cause Monitors to avoid
        using such a log,
        and clients would reject SCTs generated by such a log. <u><span><de=
l datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Because</del></span></u><span><ins datetime=
=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Until</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:C=
ourier"><span>
          there is </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03=
T15:48">no
              defined gossip
              protocol</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins datetime=3D"=
2015-03-03T15:48">a
            (mandatory to
            implement) specification for gossiping</ins></span></span><span=
 style=3D"font-family:Courier"><span>,
          CT </span></span><u><span><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48=
">does
              not provide the
              necessary info</del></span></span></u><span><span><ins dateti=
me=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">cannot
            be relied upon</ins></span></span><span style=3D"font-family:Co=
urier"><span>
          to detect this form of
          mis-issuance. </span></span><span>(See Note 5 below.) <u></u><u><=
/u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Notes:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p style=3D"margin-left:58.0pt"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><sp=
an>1.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
          </span></span></span><span>The combination of a
        malicious CA and one or more conspiring logs motivates the
        definition of an
        audit function, to detect conspiring logs. If a Monitor
        protecting s Subject
        does not see mis-issued certificates, it cannot alert the
        Subject. If one or
        more SCTs are present in a certificate, or passed via the TLS
        handshake, a
        client has no way to know that the logged certificate is not
        visible to
        Monitors. Only if Monitors and clients reject certificates that
        contains SCTs
        from conspiring logs (based on info from an audit) will CT be
        able to deter use
        of such logs. Thus the means by which a Monitor performing an
        audit function
        detect such logs, and inform TLS clients must be specified for
        this to be
        effective. <s><span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">Moreover,
              if a certificate (or TLS handshake)
              contains more than one SCT, unless the client verifies all
              of them if it is to
              counter the threat posed by conspiring logs.</del></span></s>=
<span><del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48"> </del></span><u></u><u></u></span=
></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>Absent a<span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T=
15:48">
            (mandatory
            to implement)</ins></span> =E2=80=9Cgossip=E2=80=9D protocol th=
at enables
        Monitors to verify
        that data from logs are reported in a consistent fashion, CT <span>=
<del datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">does
            not</del></span><span><ins datetime=3D"2015-03-03T15:48">cannot
            claim to</ins></span> provide protection
        against logs that may conspire with, or are victims of,
        attackers effecting
        certificate mis-issuance. When a gossip protocol is defined and
        deployed, it
        will be necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a
        mis-behaving
        or compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to
        alert all TLS
        clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log? Absent a
        description of a
        mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised
        logs, CT cannot
        ensure detection of mis-issuance.</span></p></div></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So l=
ong as some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected fro=
m non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify =
gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Indeed, it is important that gossip is not required =
to be 100% universal - if it were, then a single malicious gossiper would b=
reak the protocol! Obviously absent a spec I can&#39;t rigorously show how =
we can avoid that, but nevertheless, from my and others&#39; informal work =
on the topic, I am confident that we can.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-lef=
t:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000=
"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
    <br>
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #59 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify STH versioning
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On 5 March 2015 at 21:31, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  yes, that would be better than the current approach.
>

OK, I will do that from now on.


>
> Steve
>
>
>
> On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>
>> Melinda,
>>
>> yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is that they
>> often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on the
>> proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany the
>> issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow the
>> embedded link to see what has changed.
>>
>> If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the list, I think
>> that would be
>> preferable, independent of the process change you noted about how/when
>> issues will be closed.
>>
>
>  Would a diff included in the issue be sufficient?
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 5 March 2015 at 21:31, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    yes, that would be better than the current approach.<br></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>OK, I will do that from now on.</div><div>=C2=A0</d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"=
>
    <br>
    Steve<span class=3D""><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr"><br>
        <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 5 March 2015 at 17:23, Stephen
            Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Melinda,<br>
              <br>
              yes, I am seeing the issue state changes. My concern is
              that they<br>
              often point to github postings. Sometimes I can comment on
              the<br>
              proposed change based on the terse text that may accompany
              the<br>
              issuer tracker message. In other cases one has to follow
              the<br>
              embedded link to see what has changed.<br>
              <br>
              If the individual proposing changed text sent it to the
              list, I think that would be<br>
              preferable, independent of the process change you noted
              about how/when issues will be closed.<br>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Would a diff included in the issue be sufficient?</div>
            <div>=C2=A0<br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </span></div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11c128b00a031a05109f6e3a--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on -05 (Abstract, Section 1 and Section 2)
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In general, if you want us to remember to do something about your comments,
you need to open or update Trac tickets (discussion here before doing so is
fine, of course).

On 5 March 2015 at 21:39, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Overall comments
>
>  The correct expansion of the acronym CA is certification authority, not
> certificate authority. I believe I noted this typo in my comments months
> ago. I won=E2=80=99t cite each instance of it the document.
>

I have just done this, so no need to open a ticket.


>
>
> There are a number of instances where the document cites normative
> references, but the cited documents appear as informative references in
> Section 10.2
>

And I am doing this right now, so again, no need for a ticket.


>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Abstract*
>
>
>
> Reword the opening sentence; it=E2=80=99s five lines long!
>
>
>
>
>
> *1. Informal Introduction*
>
>
>
> Why is this still an =E2=80=9Cinformal=E2=80=9D introduction? Doesn=E2=80=
=99t a standards track
> RFC deserve a real introduction :-)?
>

It is informal in that the treatment of the subject is informal. The
remainder of the RFC is the formal part.


>
>
> public CAs -> Web PKI CAs? (since the scope, is TLS)
>
>
>
> each chain is rooted in a CA certificate =E2=80=A6 -> each chain terminat=
es with a
> certificate verifiable under a CA certificate =E2=80=A6
>
>
>
> =E2=80=9Cprovide evidence to TLS clients that the chain has been submitte=
d =E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D just
> TLS clients, not monitors?
>
>
>
> The text still talks about TLS clients requiring that all certificates
> they accept having been logged.  Since TLS client behavior is out of
> scope, this statement, which motivates the use of logs, is out of scope a=
s
> well. (we can=E2=80=99t have it both ways, i.e., defer definitive stateme=
nt about
> client behavior and then cite such behavior as a motivation for the
> proposed mechanism.)
>
>
>
> This section still discusses monitoring of logs, but defers specification
> of exactly how that monitoring is performed. Again, if monitor behavior i=
s
> out of scope for this document, it is inappropriate to make vague
> statements about how such behavior justifies the development of a
> specification for logs.
>
>
>
> The phrase =E2=80=9Cdomains for which they are responsible=E2=80=9D is va=
gue. It suggests
> an attempt to convey how monitoring works, while deferring the real
> definition to another document.
>
>
>
> =E2=80=9CThe checking operation is asynchronous to allow TLS connections =
to
> proceed =E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D The reference to asynchronicity suggests that =
this is describing
> TLS client behavior, which is out of scope.
>
>
>
> The last paragraph in this section asserts that it is efficient for
> (unspecified parties, formerly known as Auditors) to detect log
> misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such detection is, in fac=
t,
> efficient.
>

However, the remainder of the document does. If we turn the introduction
into a formal treatment, it becomes the whole document. And then we need to
write a new introduction.


>
>
> This section refers to certificate mis-issuance, yet defines it nowhere. =
 Since
> mitigating problems caused by mis-issued certificates is the rationale
> cited for CT, this omission is serious. And, I note, that I have offered
> text to define this term.
>
>
>
> *2. Cryptographic Components*
>
>
>
>
>
> As I noted in my initial review of 6269-bis, I think most of the text in
> 2.1.1-3 belongs in an appendix.
>
>
>
> It is common practice in the IETF today to place crypto algorithm specs i=
n
> a separate document, to better accommodate changes to such specs in the
> future. This suggests removing the specs of hash and signature algorithms
> from 2.1.4. There also is a need to describe how changes to the algorithm=
s
> will be accommodated by CT.
>

This point has already been addressed in the next version of the I-D.


>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">In general, if you want us to remember to do something abo=
ut your comments, you need to open or update Trac tickets (discussion here =
before doing so is fine, of course).<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On 5 March 2015 at 21:39, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"=
ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
   =20
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Overall
        comments<br>
        <br>
        <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The correct
        expansion of
        the acronym CA is certification authority, not certificate
        authority. I believe
        I noted this typo in my comments months ago. I won=E2=80=99t cite e=
ach
        instance of it
        the document.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I ha=
ve just done this, so no need to open a ticket.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u><u></u></span></=
p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">There are a
        number of
        instances where the document cites normative references, but the
        cited
        documents appear as informative references in Section 10.2</span></=
p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>And I am doing this right now, so =
again, no need for a ticket.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></b></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></b></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></b></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Abstract<=
u></u><u></u></span></b></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Reword the
        opening
        sentence; it=E2=80=99s five lines long!<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">1. Inform=
al Introduction<u></u><u></u></span></b></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">Why is this
        still an
        =E2=80=9Cinformal=E2=80=9D introduction? Doesn=E2=80=99t a standard=
s track RFC deserve a
        real
        introduction :-)?</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
It is informal in that the treatment of the subject is informal. The remain=
der of the RFC is the formal part.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">public CAs
        -&gt; Web PKI
        CAs? (since the scope, is TLS)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">each
        chain is rooted in a CA certificate =E2=80=A6 -&gt; each chain
        terminates with a
        certificate verifiable under a CA certificate =E2=80=A6<u></u><u></=
u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">=E2=80=9Cprovide
        evidence to TLS
        clients that the chain has been submitted =E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D just T=
LS clients,
        not monitors? <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The text
        still talks about
        TLS clients requiring that all certificates they accept having
        been
        logged.<span>=C2=A0 </span>Since TLS client
        behavior is out
        of scope, this statement, which motivates the use of logs, is
        out of
        scope as well. (we can=E2=80=99t have it both ways, i.e., defer
        definitive statement
        about client behavior and then cite such behavior as a
        motivation for the
        proposed mechanism.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">This section
        still
        discusses monitoring of logs, but defers specification of
        exactly how that
        monitoring is performed. Again, if monitor behavior is out of
        scope for this
        document, it is inappropriate to make vague statements about how
        such behavior
        justifies the development of a specification for logs.<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier">The phrase
        =E2=80=9Cdomains for
        which they are responsible=E2=80=9D is vague. It suggests an attemp=
t to
        convey how
        monitoring works, while deferring the real definition to another
        document. <br>
      </span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Courier"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">=E2=80=9CThe checking
        operation is
        asynchronous to allow TLS connections to proceed =E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D=
 The
        reference to
        asynchronicity suggests that this is describing TLS client
        behavior, which is
        out of scope. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">The last
        paragraph in this section asserts
        that it is efficient for (unspecified parties, formerly known as
        Auditors) to detect
        log misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such
        detection is, in fact,
        efficient.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>However=
, the remainder of the document does. If we turn the introduction into a fo=
rmal treatment, it becomes the whole document. And then we need to write a =
new introduction.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div=
 text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><=
u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">This section
        refers to
        certificate mis-issuance, yet defines it nowhere.<span>=C2=A0 </spa=
n>Since mitigating problems
        caused by
        mis-issued certificates is the rationale cited for CT, this
        omission is serious. And, I note, that I have offered text to
        define this term.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">2. Cryptographic Components<u></=
u><u></u></span></b></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">As I noted in
        my initial
        review of 6269-bis, I think most of the text in 2.1.1-3 belongs
        in an appendix.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
    <p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">It is common
        practice in
        the IETF today to place crypto algorithm specs in a separate
        document, to
        better accommodate changes to such specs in the future. This
        suggests removing
        the specs of hash and signature algorithms from 2.1.4. There
        also is a need to
        describe how changes to the algorithms will be accommodated by
        CT.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This point has=
 already been addressed in the next version of the I-D.</div><div>=C2=A0</d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"=
><p><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
   =20
  </div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1147b5760c91e705109fec2e--


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#62: change title for section 1

 to remove the word "Informal"

 see https://www.rfc-editor.org/policy.html

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |    Version:
 Severity:  -            |   Keywords:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/62>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#63: remove all normative references to client behavior

 the text contains several normative statement about client behavior,
 especially for TLS clients.  Since the WG has decided to not specify
 client behavior in this doc, all of these need to be removed.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Active WG    |
  Document               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/63>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#64: remove specification of signature and hash lags from section 2

 curent practice in the IETF, in support of alg agility, is to specify
 crypto algs by reference to a separate doc, which may change over time as
 new lags are introduced.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/64>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#65: remove section 5.4 and reference to "Auditor" in section 3

 The WG has been told that the editors no longer believe that the audit
 function will be performed by a standalone entity. Thus the reference to
 an "Auditor" inn Section 3 is no longer appropriate. Also, Section 5.4
 does not provide an implementable spec of what an Auditor (or the audit
 function) does, so it should be removed. Since this function is performed
 by a log client, and specification of the behavior of such clients is out
 of scope for this doc, this is another reason to remove 5.4

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  critical     |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/65>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #66 (client-behavior): revise the description of what logs MAY do re cert syntax checking
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#66: revise the description of what logs MAY do re cert syntax checking

 The current text does not specify log behavior wrt cert syntax checking.
 The MAY here is vague and thus does not allow a Submitter to know what
 checks any log will or will not perform on submitted certs. Steve Kent's
 proposed definition of a certificate type field to submissions and SCTs
 would provide a cleaner way to deal with this, i.e., logs that do perform
 syntactic checks can do so and the result of the checks can be expressed
 in the SCT. A log operator could describe the set of syntactic checks that
 it performs (if it is not the same as DV or EV or other, published specs),
 and register them using the IANA mechanism I noted. Finally, just as a log
 advertises the set of CA certificates that it accepts as trust anchors, it
 could advertise the set of certificate types it accepts in submitted
 certificates, thus making submitters aware of what will and will not be
 checked.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/66>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #67 (rfc6962-bis): no specification of how a log advertises the max cert chain length it will accept
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#67: no specification of how a log advertises the max cert chain length it will
accept

 Section 3.1 says that logs SHOULD impose a max cert chain length, but does
 not explain how Submitters will learn what this length is for a log.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |    Version:
 Severity:  -            |   Keywords:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/67>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #68 (client-behavior): specification of sha-256 for the SCT
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#68: specification of sha-256 for the SCT

 Section 3.3 specifies use of SHA-256 for SCTs. This is not supportive of
 algorithm agility. The editors should check with the IESG to determine
 whether the IESG will be comfortable with specifying this hash, or whether
 they will require algorithm agility for hash algorithms used in this
 context.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/68>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#69: old data name (sha256_root_hash) in 3.6

 This section has been updated to support algorithm agility for STH, but
 the data structure still
 refers to SHA-256.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/69>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------040009000900000900060507
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*3.1 Log Entries*

The pre-certificate discussion here is much improved.

The text says that a log MAY accept a syntactically invalid or expired 
certificate or pre-certificate. This is still a rather vague description 
of log behavior with respect to certificate path validation.

Although I acknowledge that some Web PKI CAs issue defective 
certificates, I don’t believe the IETF should encourage such practices 
by making explicit accommodations for them in an RFC. Moreover, the MAY 
here means that a log also is allowed to reject a certificate if it is 
expired or syntactically defective in any way. How is a submitter, or a 
client, supposed to know how a log behaves in this regard?

I note that my proposed definition of a certificate type field for 
submissions and SCTs would provide a cleaner way to deal with this, 
i.e., logs that elect to perform syntactic checks can do so and the 
result of the checks can be expressed in the SCT. A log operator could 
describe the set of syntactic checks that it performs (if it is not the 
same as DV or EV or other, published specs), and register them using the 
IANA mechanism I described. Finally, just as a log advertises the set of 
CA certificates that it accepts as trust anchors, it could advertise the 
set of certificate types it checks in submitted certificates, thus 
making submitters aware of what will and will not be checked.

The text says that “Logs SHOULD limit the length of chain they will 
accept.” but does not describe how logs will make this limit known to 
submitters.

The text say: “Section 4 explains how clients should handle unknown 
entry types.” But client behavior is out of scope, so …

It appears that Section 3.2 has not yet been updated to reflect the 
recent design decisions for redacted certificates, so I have no comments 
on this section at this time.


--------------040009000900000900060507
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    <meta name="Title" content="">
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt">3.1 Log Entries<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The
        pre-certificate discussion here is much improved.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text says
        that a log MAY accept a syntactically invalid or expired
        certificate or pre-certificate. This is still a rather vague
        description of log behavior with respect to certificate path
        validation. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Although I
        acknowledge that some Web PKI CAs issue defective certificates,
        I don’t believe the IETF should encourage such practices by
        making explicit accommodations for them in an RFC. Moreover, the
        MAY here means that a log also is allowed to reject a
        certificate if it is expired or syntactically defective in any
        way. How is a submitter, or a client, supposed to know how a log
        behaves in this regard? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">I note that
        my proposed definition of a certificate type field for
        submissions and SCTs would provide a cleaner way to deal with
        this, i.e., logs that elect to perform syntactic checks can do
        so and the result of the checks can be expressed in the SCT. A
        log operator could describe the set of syntactic checks that it
        performs (if it is not the same as DV or EV or other, published
        specs), and register them using the IANA mechanism I described.
        Finally, just as a log advertises the set of CA certificates
        that it accepts as trust anchors, it could advertise the set of
        certificate types it checks in submitted certificates, thus
        making submitters aware of what will and will not be checked. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text says
        that “Logs SHOULD limit the length of chain they will accept.”
        but does not describe how logs will make this limit known to
        submitters.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text say:
        “Section 4 explains how clients should handle unknown entry
        types.” But client behavior is out of scope, so …<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">It appears
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*3.3 Structure of a Signed Certificate Timestamp*

There are several references to hash computations based on SHA-256. You 
should ask whether the IESG will be comfortable with specifying this 
hash, or whether they will require algorithm agility for hash algorithms 
used in this context.

*3.4 Including the Signed Certificate Timestamp in the TLS handshake*

My views on the appropriateness of embedding an SCT as an OCTET string 
in X.509 certificates and OCSP responses have already been posted, so 
I'll not repeat them here.

The text states “At least one SCT MUST be included.Server operators MAY 
include more than one SCT.” This specification of mandatory behavior for 
a TLS server, and the later mandate that “Servers MUST implement at 
least one of the three mechanisms”, seem at odds with the notion of 
deferring specification of all CT clients to other documents. 
Specifically, since there is no mandate for TLS client to do anything 
with an SCT, it’s hard to justify mandating that a TLS server transmit 
one.**

The text still says “TLS clients MUST implement all three 
mechanisms.“contrary to the notion of deferring all specification of 
client behavior to other documents.

*3.4.1 TLS Extension*

The text states: “Clients that support the extension SHOULD send a 
ClientHello extension with the appropriate type and empty 
"extension_data". This is a statement of client behavior.


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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt">3.3 Structure of a Signed Certificate
          Timestamp<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">There are
        several references to hash computations based on SHA-256. You
        should ask whether the IESG will be comfortable with specifying
        this hash, or whether they will require algorithm agility for
        hash algorithms used in this context. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
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          Timestamp in the TLS handshake<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">My views on
        the appropriateness of embedding an SCT as an OCTET string in
        X.509 certificates and OCSP responses have already been posted,
        so I'll not repeat them here.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text
        states “At least one SCT MUST be included.<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>Server
        operators MAY include more than one SCT.” This specification of
        mandatory behavior for a TLS server, and the later mandate that
        “Servers MUST implement at least one of the three mechanisms”,
        seem at odds with the notion of deferring specification of all
        CT clients to other documents. Specifically, since there is no
        mandate for TLS client to do anything with an SCT, it’s hard to
        justify mandating that a TLS server transmit one.</span><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><o:p></o:p></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text
        still says “TLS clients MUST implement all three mechanisms.“<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>contrary to the notion of
        deferring all specification of client behavior to other
        documents.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The text
        states: “Clients that support the extension SHOULD send a
        ClientHello extension with the appropriate type and empty
        "extension_data". This is a statement of client behavior.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From nobody Fri Mar  6 08:12:17 2015
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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #70 (client-behavior): STH spec needs to define top-level extension syntax
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#70: STH spec needs to define top-level extension syntax

 The description of the extensions field seems to be inspired by X.509v3.
 That's OK, but one needs to define a top-level format for extensions to
 ensure backward compatibility (as per v3 extensions)to make this work.
 That level of specification is missing here.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/70>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 11:09:26 -0500
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: [Trans] comments on -05 (Sections 3.5 + 3.6)
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------050506010004020603080903
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*3.5 Merkle Tree*

I’m happy to see that the design has changed to incorporate algorithm 
agility for the Merkle tree has function.

*3.6 Signed Tree Hash*

This section does not seem to have been updated to reflect the switch to 
algorithm agility in 3.5, i.e., is contains references to 
**"sha256_root_hash".

The description of the extensions field seems to be inspired by X.509v3.
That's OK, but one needs to define a top-level format for extensions to
ensure backward compatibility (as per v3 extensions)to make this work.
That level of specification is missing here.


--------------050506010004020603080903
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">I’m happy to
        see that the design has changed to incorporate algorithm agility
        for the Merkle tree has function.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This section
        does not seem to have been updated to reflect the switch to
        algorithm agility in 3.5, i.e., is contains references to </span><b
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The
        description of the extensions field seems to be inspired by
        X.509v3.<br>
        That's OK, but one needs to define a top-level format for
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        ensure backward compatibility (as per v3 extensions)to make this
        work.<br>
        That level of specification is missing here. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on -05 (Abstract, Section 1 and Section 2)
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Ben,

> In general, if you want us to remember to do something about your 
> comments, you need to open or update Trac tickets (discussion here 
> before doing so is fine, of course).
that was my plan. post comments first, then generate tickets.
> *1. Informal Introduction*
>
> Why is this still an “informal” introduction? Doesn’t a standards 
> track RFC deserve a real introduction :-)?
>
>
> It is informal in that the treatment of the subject is informal. The 
> remainder of the RFC is the formal part.
This is not a distinction we tend to make in RFCs. I don't recall seeing 
another
RFC that has an introduction labelled as informal. See 
https://www.rfc-editor.org/policy.html
>
>     The last paragraph in this section asserts that it is efficient
>     for (unspecified parties, formerly known as Auditors) to detect
>     log misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such detection
>     is, in fact, efficient.
>
>
> However, the remainder of the document does. If we turn the 
> introduction into a formal treatment, it becomes the whole document. 
> And then we need to write a new introduction.
no, just add a pointer to the place in the doc where you believe the 
assertion is substantiated.

Steve

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    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SRs+=qJSFpUwuz+SJF0NG-2xaA=BBxZ1+0oPE4mK=71Dg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">In general, if you want us to remember to do
        something about your comments, you need to open or update Trac
        tickets (discussion here before doing so is fine, of course).<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    that was my plan. post comments first, then generate tickets.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SRs+=qJSFpUwuz+SJF0NG-2xaA=BBxZ1+0oPE4mK=71Dg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_extra"><b><span style="font-family:Courier">1.
              Informal Introduction</span></b>
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"> </span></p>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier">Why
                  is this still an “informal” introduction? Doesn’t a
                  standards track RFC deserve a real introduction :-)?</span></p>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>It is informal in that the treatment of the subject is
              informal. The remainder of the RFC is the formal part.</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    This is not a distinction we tend to make in RFCs. I don't recall
    seeing another<br>
    RFC that has an introduction labelled as informal. See
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/policy.html">https://www.rfc-editor.org/policy.html</a><br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SRs+=qJSFpUwuz+SJF0NG-2xaA=BBxZ1+0oPE4mK=71Dg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div class="gmail_extra">
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div> </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Courier"></span></p>
                <span style="font-size:12.0pt"></span><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt">The last paragraph in this
                  section asserts that it is efficient for (unspecified
                  parties, formerly known as Auditors) to detect log
                  misbehavior, but does not provide evidence that such
                  detection is, in fact, efficient.</span></div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>However, the remainder of the document does. If we turn
              the introduction into a formal treatment, it becomes the
              whole document. And then we need to write a new
              introduction.</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    no, just add a pointer to the place in the doc where you believe the
    assertion is substantiated.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------030606050404050102090406--


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Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 11:12:43 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Trans] changes to attack analysis
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Ben,

Happy to oblige.  The revised text is attached.

As for your comments:

    I still don't really understand this point: the log has no power to
    check syntax that is not also available to a client,

In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many instances 
where client software
fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs represent an 
opportunity to
do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save clients 
from bad code.

    so I don't see how the log checking/not checking syntax is
    interesting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all clients
    will do? Because of this, I also still do not see the real value of
    logs checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against it, but it
    doesn't seem to me to add much.

A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser 
type and version,
fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a bogus 
cert with a
particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.

    It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as
    some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected
    from non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need
    to specify gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise
    its potential.


Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to 
implement (MTI) features, not
mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above supports 
my argument that gossip needs
to be MTI, but not MTU.

Steve


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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    Happy to oblige.  The revised text is attached.<br>
    <br>
    As for your comments:<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote>I still don't really understand this point: the log has
      no power to check syntax that is not also available to a client, <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many
    instances where client software<br>
    fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs
    represent an opportunity to<br>
    do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save
    clients from bad code.<br>
    <blockquote>so I don't see how the log checking/not checking syntax
      is interesting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all
      clients will do? Because of this, I also still do not see the real
      value of logs checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against it,
      but it doesn't seem to me to add much. <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser
    type and version, <br>
    fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a
    bogus cert with a <br>
    particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.<br>
    <blockquote>It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory.
      So long as some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are
      protected from non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not
      remove the need to specify gossip, which is clearly required for
      CT to fully realise its potential.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to
    implement (MTI) features, not<br>
    mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above
    supports my argument that gossip needs <br>
    to be MTI, but not MTU.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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--------------030302080308040501040307--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] changes to attack analysis
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On 6 March 2015 at 16:12, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Ben,
>
> Happy to oblige.  The revised text is attached.
>

Thanks.


>
> As for your comments:
>
> I still don't really understand this point: the log has no power to check
> syntax that is not also available to a client,
>
>  In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many instances
> where client software
> fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs represent an
> opportunity to
> do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save clients
> from bad code.
>
> so I don't see how the log checking/not checking syntax is interesting - a
> malicious CA presumably cannot know what all clients will do? Because of
> this, I also still do not see the real value of logs checking syntax - I am
> not fundamentally against it, but it doesn't seem to me to add much.
>
>  A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser type
> and version,
> fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a bogus
> cert with a
> particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.
>
> It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as some
> fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected from
> non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify
> gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.
>
>
Perhaps we need a mechanism analagous to TLS extensions that allow CT logs
to extend their validation and advertise that fact?


>
> Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to implement
> (MTI) features, not
> mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above supports my
> argument that gossip needs
> to be MTI, but not MTU.
>

I am not so sure, but in any case, this is a debate for the gossip RFC.


>
> Steve
>
>

--001a11c13334db386b0510a11119
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 6 March 2015 at 16:12, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    Happy to oblige.=C2=A0 The revised text is attached.<br></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div>Thanks.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <br>
    As for your comments:<span class=3D""><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote>I still don&#39;t really understand this point: the log has
      no power to check syntax that is not also available to a client, <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote></span>
    In principle that&#39;s true, but in practice we have seen many
    instances where client software<br>
    fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs
    represent an opportunity to<br>
    do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save
    clients from bad code.<span class=3D""><br>
    <blockquote>so I don&#39;t see how the log checking/not checking syntax
      is interesting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all
      clients will do? Because of this, I also still do not see the real
      value of logs checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against it,
      but it doesn&#39;t seem to me to add much. <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote></span>
    A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser
    type and version, <br>
    fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a
    bogus cert with a <br>
    particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.<span class=3D""><b=
r>
    <blockquote>It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory.
      So long as some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are
      protected from non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not
      remove the need to specify gossip, which is clearly required for
      CT to fully realise its potential.<br></blockquote></span></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div><div>Perhaps we need a mechanism analagous to TLS ex=
tensions that allow CT logs to extend their validation and advertise that f=
act?</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000=
000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><span class=3D""><blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <br></span>
    Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to
    implement (MTI) features, not<br>
    mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above
    supports my argument that gossip needs <br>
    to be MTI, but not MTU.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am =
not so sure, but in any case, this is a debate for the gossip RFC.</div><di=
v>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=
=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
  </div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11c13334db386b0510a11119--


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On 6 March 2015 at 16:11, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Ben,
>
>  In general, if you want us to remember to do something about your
> comments, you need to open or update Trac tickets (discussion here before
> doing so is fine, of course).
>
> that was my plan. post comments first, then generate tickets.
>

Thanks. Given how close we are to the submission deadline, I imagine many
of these will have to wait for the next cycle. Of course, we can continue
the conversation in the meantime...

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 6 March 2015 at 16:11, Stephen Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    Ben,<span class=3D""><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"ltr">In general, if you want us to remember to do
        something about your comments, you need to open or update Trac
        tickets (discussion here before doing so is fine, of course).<br>
      </div>
    </blockquote></span>
    that was my plan. post comments first, then generate tickets.</div></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>Thanks. Given how close we are to the submissi=
on deadline, I imagine many of these will have to wait for the next cycle. =
Of course, we can continue the conversation in the meantime...</div><div><b=
r></div></div></div></div>

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--001a11c128b09292b60510a165a0
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On 6 March 2015 at 14:58, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:

> There are a number of instances where the document cites normative
>> references, but the cited documents appear as informative references in
>> Section 10.2
>>
>
> And I am doing this right now, so again, no need for a ticket.
>

And here's the diff:

@@ -1455,41 +1455,33 @@ Carl Wallace for their valuable contributions.
       </t>
     </section>
   </middle>
-  <back>
-
-
-
-    <references title="Normative Reference">

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119" ?>
-
-</references>
-
-<references title="Informative References">
+  <back>
+    <references title="Normative References">

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2616"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119" ?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2560"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2560"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.3447"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.2616"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.4627"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.3447"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.4648"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.4627"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5246"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.4648"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5280"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5246"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5652"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5280"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5905"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5652"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6066"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.5905"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6125"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6066"?>

-    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6962"?>
+      <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6125"?>

       <reference anchor="DSS" target="
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf">
         <front>
@@ -1504,21 +1496,16 @@ Technology</organization>
         <format type="PDF" target="
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf"/>
       </reference>

-      <reference anchor="CrosbyWallach"
-target="http://static.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf">
+      <reference anchor="FIPS.180-4"
+target="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf">
         <front>
-          <title>Efficient Data Structures for Tamper-Evident
Logging</title>
-          <author initials='S.' surname='Crosby' fullname='Scott A.
Crosby'>
-            <organization/>
-          </author>
-          <author initials='D.' surname='Wallach' fullname='Dan S.
Wallach'>
-            <organization/>
+          <title>Secure Hash Standard</title>
+          <author>
+            <organization>National Institute of Standards and
Technology</organization>
           </author>
-          <date month="August" year="2009"/>
+          <date month="March" year="2012"/>
         </front>
-<seriesInfo name="Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium,"
-value="Montreal"/>
-        <format type="PDF" target="
http://static.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf"/>
+        <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 180-4"/>
       </reference>

       <reference anchor="HTML401" target="
http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224">
@@ -1539,17 +1526,27 @@ value="Montreal"/>
         <format type="HTML" target="
http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224"/>
       </reference>

+    </references>

-      <reference anchor="FIPS.180-4"
-target="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf">
+<references title="Informative References">
+
+    <?rfc include="reference.RFC.6962"?>
+
+      <reference anchor="CrosbyWallach"
+target="http://static.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf">
         <front>
-          <title>Secure Hash Standard</title>
-          <author>
-            <organization>National Institute of Standards and
Technology</organization>
+          <title>Efficient Data Structures for Tamper-Evident
Logging</title>
+          <author initials='S.' surname='Crosby' fullname='Scott A.
Crosby'>
+            <organization/>
           </author>
-          <date month="March" year="2012"/>
+          <author initials='D.' surname='Wallach' fullname='Dan S.
Wallach'>
+            <organization/>
+          </author>
+          <date month="August" year="2009"/>
         </front>
-        <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 180-4"/>
+<seriesInfo name="Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium,"
+value="Montreal"/>
+        <format type="PDF" target="
http://static.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf"/>
       </reference>

       <reference anchor="EVSSLGuidelines" target="
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf">

--001a11c128b09292b60510a165a0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On 6 March 2015 at 14:58, Ben Laurie <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:benl@google.com" target=3D"_blank">benl@google.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(2=
04,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div text=3D"#000000"=
 bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-family:Cour=
ier">There are a
        number of
        instances where the document cites normative references, but the
        cited
        documents appear as informative references in Section 10.2</span></=
p></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>And I am doing this right n=
ow, so again, no need for a ticket.</div></blockquote></div><br>And here&#3=
9;s the diff:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">@@ -1455,41 +1455,33 @@ Carl Wallace for=
 their valuable contributions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=
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9;Wallach&#39; fullname=3D&#39;Dan S. Wallach&#39;&gt;</div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra">+ =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;organization/&gt=
;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">+ =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/=
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=C2=A0&lt;date month=3D&quot;August&quot; year=3D&quot;2009&quot;/&gt;</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;/front&gt=
;</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">- =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&lt;seriesIn=
fo name=3D&quot;FIPS&quot; value=3D&quot;PUB 180-4&quot;/&gt;</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra">+&lt;seriesInfo name=3D&quot;Proceedings of the 18th USE=
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//static.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf">http://static.=
usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/crosby.pdf</a>&quot;/&gt;</div><div=
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=3D&quot;<a href=3D"https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/EV_Certificate_=
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--001a11c128b09292b60510a165a0--


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#67: no specification of how a log advertises the max cert chain length it will
accept

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * milestone:   => review


Comment:

 This is already resolved in -06.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/67#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#60: The number of redacted labels should be revealed in the Precertificate

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
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  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
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Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/60#comment:7>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#67: no specification of how a log advertises the max cert chain length it will
accept

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/67#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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I had a go at incorporating this, but in the process, I realised it is
probably not quite ready yet. I could have a go at editing it myself, but I
will definitely not have time before Monday's deadline.

I suspect more revision is required before it can be incorporated. I have
comments, but they will probably have to wait a while.

I do now have a version that is in xml2rfc format, though - more or less.

On 6 March 2015 at 16:12, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>  Ben,
>
> Happy to oblige.  The revised text is attached.
>
> As for your comments:
>
> I still don't really understand this point: the log has no power to check
> syntax that is not also available to a client,
>
>  In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many instances
> where client software
> fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs represent an
> opportunity to
> do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save clients
> from bad code.
>
> so I don't see how the log checking/not checking syntax is interesting - a
> malicious CA presumably cannot know what all clients will do? Because of
> this, I also still do not see the real value of logs checking syntax - I am
> not fundamentally against it, but it doesn't seem to me to add much.
>
>  A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser type
> and version,
> fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a bogus
> cert with a
> particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.
>
> It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as some
> fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected from
> non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify
> gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.
>
>
> Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to implement
> (MTI) features, not
> mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above supports my
> argument that gossip needs
> to be MTI, but not MTU.
>
> Steve
>
>

--001a113518087c9cdc0510a328bc
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I had a go at incorporating this, but in the process, I re=
alised it is probably not quite ready yet. I could have a go at editing it =
myself, but I will definitely not have time before Monday&#39;s deadline.<d=
iv><div><br></div><div>I suspect more revision is required before it can be=
 incorporated. I have comments, but they will probably have to wait a while=
.</div></div><div><br></div><div>I do now have a version that is in xml2rfc=
 format, though - more or less.</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 6 March 2015 at 16:12, Stephen Kent <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    Ben,<br>
    <br>
    Happy to oblige.=C2=A0 The revised text is attached.<br>
    <br>
    As for your comments:<span class=3D""><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote>I still don&#39;t really understand this point: the log has
      no power to check syntax that is not also available to a client, <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote></span>
    In principle that&#39;s true, but in practice we have seen many
    instances where client software<br>
    fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs
    represent an opportunity to<br>
    do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save
    clients from bad code.<span class=3D""><br>
    <blockquote>so I don&#39;t see how the log checking/not checking syntax
      is interesting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all
      clients will do? Because of this, I also still do not see the real
      value of logs checking syntax - I am not fundamentally against it,
      but it doesn&#39;t seem to me to add much. <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote></span>
    A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser
    type and version, <br>
    fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a
    bogus cert with a <br>
    particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.<span class=3D""><b=
r>
    <blockquote>It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory.
      So long as some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are
      protected from non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not
      remove the need to specify gossip, which is clearly required for
      CT to fully realise its potential.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br></span>
    Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to
    implement (MTI) features, not<br>
    mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above
    supports my argument that gossip needs <br>
    to be MTI, but not MTU.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
  </div>

</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a113518087c9cdc0510a328bc--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] changes to attack analysis
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--001a1141bd802cdcc70510c657ba
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On 6 Mar 2015 16:18, "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>
> Ben,
>
> Happy to oblige.  The revised text is attached.
>
> As for your comments:
>
>
>> I still don't really understand this point: the log has no power to
check syntax that is not also available to a client,
>>
> In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many instances
where client software
> fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs represent an
opportunity to
> do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save clients
from bad code.


Can we put the extra checks logs may do in the CtExtensions field of the
SCT? That way the additional checks can be defined in a separate document.
In principal I agree that providing extra information to TLS clients about
the certificates they receive is useful. Given it's not entirely clear what
clients do with this information (and complicates the log implementation)
my only suggestion is we make this an extension rather than a mandatory
part of the spec.


>
>> so I don't see how the log checking/not checking syntax is interesting -
a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all clients will do? Because of
this, I also still do not see the real value of logs checking syntax - I am
not fundamentally against it, but it doesn't seem to me to add much.
>>
> A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser type
and version,
> fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a bogus
cert with a
> particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.
>
>> It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as some
fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected from
non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify
gossip, which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.
>
>
> Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to implement
(MTI) features, not
> mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above supports my
argument that gossip needs
> to be MTI, but not MTU.
>
> Steve
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

--001a1141bd802cdcc70510c657ba
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On 6 Mar 2015 16:18, &quot;Stephen Kent&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bb=
n.com" target=3D"_blank">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Ben,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Happy to oblige.=C2=A0 The revised text is attached.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As for your comments:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I still don&#39;t really understand this point: the log has no pow=
er to check syntax that is not also available to a client, <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; In principle that&#39;s true, but in practice we have seen many instan=
ces where client software<br>
&gt; fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs represent =
an opportunity to<br>
&gt; do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save client=
s from bad code.</p><p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
Can we put the extra checks logs may do in the CtExtensions field of the SC=
T? That way the additional checks can be defined in a separate document.<br=
>
In principal I agree that providing extra information to TLS clients about =
the certificates they receive is useful. Given it&#39;s not entirely clear =
what clients do with this information (and complicates the log implementati=
on) my only suggestion is we make this an extension rather than a mandatory=
 part of the spec.</p><p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; so I don&#39;t see how the log checking/not checking syntax is int=
eresting - a malicious CA presumably cannot know what all clients will do? =
Because of this, I also still do not see the real value of logs checking sy=
ntax - I am not fundamentally against it, but it doesn&#39;t seem to me to =
add much. <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by browser t=
ype and version, <br>
&gt; fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a bogu=
s cert with a <br>
&gt; particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long as =
some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are protected from non-t=
argeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove the need to specify gossip,=
 which is clearly required for CT to fully realise its potential.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Remember that IETF standards almost always specify mandatory to implem=
ent (MTI) features, not<br>
&gt; mandatory to use (MTU) features. I believe your comment above supports=
 my argument that gossip needs <br>
&gt; to be MTI, but not MTU.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Steve<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Trans mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Trans@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_bla=
nk">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
&gt;<br>
</p>
</div>

--001a1141bd802cdcc70510c657ba--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #61 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificates are not proper nouns
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#61: Precertificates are not proper nouns

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * component:  client-behavior => rfc6962-bis


-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  benl@google.com        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/61#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #61 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificates are not proper nouns
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#61: Precertificates are not proper nouns

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * milestone:   => review


Comment:

 https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/c4a35ea43bd42a789787e1b0863c413dc11f648a

 @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ it is expected that certificate owners or their CAs
 will usually submit them. A
  log is a single, ever-growing, append-only Merkle Tree of such
 certificates.
        </t>
        <t>
 -        When a valid certificate is submitted to a log, the log MUST
 return a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT). The SCT is the log's promise
 to incorporate the certificate in the Merkle Tree within a fixed amount of
 time known as the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). If the log has previously
 seen the certificate, it MAY return the same SCT as it returned before
 (note that if a certificate was previously logged as a Precertificate,
 then the Precertificate's SCT would not be appropriate, instead a fresh
 SCT of type x509_entry should be generated). TLS servers MUST present an
 SCT from one or more logs to the TLS client together with the certificate.
 A certificate not accompanied by an SCT (either for the end-entity
 certificate or for a name-constrained intermediate the end-entity
 certificate chains to) MUST NOT be considered compliant by TLS clients.
 +        When a valid certificate is submitted to a log, the log MUST
 return a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT). The SCT is the log's promise
 to incorporate the certificate in the Merkle Tree within a fixed amount of
 time known as the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). If the log has previously
 seen the certificate, it MAY return the same SCT as it returned before
 (note that if a certificate was previously logged as a precertificate,
 then the precertificate's SCT would not be appropriate, instead a fresh
 SCT of type x509_entry should be generated). TLS servers MUST present an
 SCT from one or more logs to the TLS client together with the certificate.
 A certificate not accompanied by an SCT (either for the end-entity
 certificate or for a name-constrained intermediate the end-entity
 certificate chains to) MUST NOT be considered compliant by TLS clients.
        </t>
        <t>
          Periodically, each log appends all its new entries to the Merkle
 Tree and signs the root of the tree. The log MUST incorporate a
 certificate in its Merkle Tree within the Maximum Merge Delay period after
 the issuance of the SCT. When encountering an SCT, an Auditor can verify
 that the certificate was added to the Merkle Tree within that timeframe.
  @@ -327,9 +327,9 @@ log is a single, ever-growing, append-only Merkle
 Tree of such certificates.
          <t>
            Alternatively, (root as well as intermediate) certification
 authorities
  may preannounce a certificate to logs prior to issuance in order to
 incorporate
 -the SCT in the issued certificate. To do this, the CA submits a
 Precertificate
 +the SCT in the issued certificate. To do this, the CA submits a
 precertificate
  that the log can use to create an entry that will be valid against the
 issued
 -certificate. A Precertificate is a CMS <xref target="RFC5652"/>
 +certificate. A precertificate is a CMS <xref target="RFC5652"/>
  <spanx style="verb">signed-data</spanx> object that contains a
 TBSCertificate
  <xref target="RFC5280"/> in its
  <spanx style="verb">SignedData.encapContentInfo.eContent</spanx> field,
  @@ -343,26 +343,26 @@ in the issued certificate.
  the same (root or intermediate) CA that will ultimately issue the
 certificate.
  This signature indicates the certification authority's intent to issue
 the
  certificate. This intent is considered binding (i.e., misissuance of the
 -Precertificate is considered equivalent to misissuance of the
 certificate).
 -As above, the Precertificate submission MUST be accompanied by all the
 +precertificate is considered equivalent to misissuance of the
 certificate).
 +As above, the precertificate submission MUST be accompanied by all the
  additional certificates required to verify the chain up to an accepted
 root
  certificate. This does not involve using the
  <spanx style="verb">SignedData.certificates</spanx> field, so that field
 SHOULD
  be omitted.
          </t>
          <t>
 -          Logs MUST verify that the submitted certificate or
 Precertificate has
 +          Logs MUST verify that the submitted certificate or
 precertificate has
  a valid signature chain to an accepted root certificate, using the chain
 of
  intermediate CA certificates provided by the submitter. Logs MUST accept
  certificates that are fully valid according to X.509 verification rules
  and are submitted with such a chain. Logs MAY accept
 -certificates and Precertificates that have expired, are not yet valid,
 have been
 +certificates and precertificates that have expired, are not yet valid,
 have been
  revoked, or are otherwise not fully valid according to X.509 verification
 rules
  in order to accommodate quirks of CA certificate-issuing software.
 However, logs
  MUST reject certificates without a valid signature chain to an accepted
 root
  certificate. If a certificate is accepted and an SCT issued, the
 accepting log
  MUST store the entire chain used for verification, including the
 certificate or
 -Precertificate itself and including the root certificate used to verify
 the
 +precertificate itself and including the root certificate used to verify
 the
  chain (even if it was omitted from the submission), and MUST present this
 chain
  for auditing upon request. This chain is required to prevent a CA from
 avoiding
  blame by logging a partial or empty chain. (Note: This effectively
 excludes
  @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ self-signed and DANE-based certificates until some
 mechanism to limit the
  submission of spurious certificates is found. The authors welcome
 suggestions.)
          </t>
          <t>
 -          Each certificate or Precertificate entry in a log MUST include
 the
 +          Each certificate or precertificate entry in a log MUST include
 the
  following components:
          </t>
  <figure>
  @@ -413,10 +413,10 @@ following components:
            <spanx style="verb">certificate_chain</spanx> is a chain of
 additional certificates required to verify the end-entity certificate. The
 first certificate MUST certify the end-entity certificate. Each following
 certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. The final
 certificate MUST either be, or be issued by, a root certificate accepted
 by the log.
          </t>
          <t>
 -          <spanx style="verb">pre_certificate</spanx> is the
 Precertificate submitted for auditing.
 +          <spanx style="verb">pre_certificate</spanx> is the
 precertificate submitted for auditing.
          </t>
          <t>
 -          <spanx style="verb">precertificate_chain</spanx> is a chain of
 additional certificates required to verify the Precertificate submission.
 The first certificate MUST certify the Precertificate. Each following
 certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. The final
 certificate MUST be a root certificate accepted by the log.
 +          <spanx style="verb">precertificate_chain</spanx> is a chain of
 additional certificates required to verify the precertificate submission.
 The first certificate MUST certify the precertificate. Each following
 certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. The final
 certificate MUST be a root certificate accepted by the log.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section title="Private Domain Name Labels">
  @@ -444,13 +444,13 @@ Validation Certificates</xref>.
          </section>
          <section title="Redacting Domain Name Labels in Precertificates"
 anchor="redacting_subdomains">
            <t>
 -            When creating a Precertificate, the CA MAY substitute one or
 more
 +            When creating a precertificate, the CA MAY substitute one or
 more
  labels in each DNS-ID with a corresponding number of
  <spanx style="verb">?</spanx> labels. Every label to the left of a
  <spanx style="verb">?</spanx> label MUST also be redacted. For example,
 if a
  certificate contains a DNS-ID of
  <spanx style="verb">top.secret.example.com</spanx>, then the
 corresponding
 -Precertificate could contain <spanx style="verb">?.?.example.com</spanx>
 +precertificate could contain <spanx style="verb">?.?.example.com</spanx>
  instead, but not <spanx style="verb">top.?.example.com</spanx> instead.
            </t>
            <t>
  @@ -460,26 +460,26 @@ However, if the complete leftmost label of a DNS-ID
 is
  determining if the label to the right may be redacted. For example, if a
  certificate contains a DNS-ID of
  <spanx style="verb">*.top.secret.example.com</spanx>, then the
 corresponding
 -Precertificate could contain
 +precertificate could contain
  <spanx style="verb">*.?.?.example.com</spanx> instead, but not
  <spanx style="verb">?.?.?.example.com</spanx> instead.
            </t>
            <t>
 -            When a Precertificate contains one or more redacted labels, a
 +            When a precertificate contains one or more redacted labels, a
  non-critical extension (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.6, whose extnValue
 OCTET STRING
  contains an ASN.1 SEQUENCE OF INTEGERs) MUST be added to the
 corresponding
  certificate: the first INTEGER indicates the total number of redacted
 labels
  and wildcard <spanx style="verb">*</spanx> labels in the
 -Precertificate's first DNS-ID; the second INTEGER does the same for the
 -Precertificate's second DNS-ID; etc. There MUST NOT be more INTEGERs than
 there
 +precertificate's first DNS-ID; the second INTEGER does the same for the
 +precertificate's second DNS-ID; etc. There MUST NOT be more INTEGERs than
 there
  are DNS-IDs. If there are fewer INTEGERs than there are DNS-IDs, the
 shortfall
  is made up by implicitly repeating the last INTEGER. Each INTEGER MUST
 have a
  value of zero or more. The purpose of this extension is to enable TLS
 clients
 -to accurately reconstruct the TBSCertificate component of the
 Precertificate
 +to accurately reconstruct the TBSCertificate component of the
 precertificate
  from the certificate without having to perform any guesswork.
            </t>
            <t>
 -            When a Precertificate contains that extension and contains a
 +            When a precertificate contains that extension and contains a
  <xref target="RFC6125">CN-ID</xref>, the CN-ID MUST match the first DNS-
 ID and
  have the same labels redacted.  TLS clients will use the first
  entry in the SEQUENCE OF INTEGERs to reconstruct both the first DNS-ID
 and the
  @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ CN-ID.
          </section>
          <section title="Using a Name-Constrained Intermediate CA"
 anchor="name_constrained">
            <t>
 -            An intermediate CA certificate or intermediate CA
 Precertificate that contains the
 +            An intermediate CA certificate or intermediate CA
 precertificate that contains the
  critical or non-critical <xref target="RFC5280">Name Constraints</xref>
 extension
  MAY be logged in place of end-entity certificates issued by that
 intermediate
  CA, as long as all of the following conditions are met:
  @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ SEQUENCE {
          </t>
          <t>
            <spanx style="verb">tbs_certificate</spanx> is the DER-encoded
 -TBSCertificate component of the Precertificate. Note that it is also
 possible to
 +TBSCertificate component of the precertificate. Note that it is also
 possible to
  reconstruct this TBSCertificate from the issued certificate by extracting
 the
  TBSCertificate from it, redacting the domain name labels indicated by the
  redacted labels extension, and deleting the SCT list extension and
 redacted
  @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ body:
            At least one SCT MUST be included. Server operators MAY include
 more than one SCT.
          </t>
          <t>
 -          Similarly, a certification authority MAY submit a
 Precertificate to more
 +          Similarly, a certification authority MAY submit a
 precertificate to more
  than one log, and all obtained SCTs can be directly embedded in the
 issued
  certificate, by encoding the SignedCertificateTimestampList structure as
 an
  ASN.1 OCTET STRING and inserting the resulting data in the TBSCertificate
 as a
  @@ -907,11 +907,11 @@ messages.
              <t hangText="Inputs:">
                <list style="hanging">
                 <t hangText="precertificate:">
 -                  The base64-encoded Precertificate.
 +                  The base64-encoded precertificate.
                 </t>
                 <t hangText="chain:">
                    An array of base64-encoded CA certificates. The first
 element is
 -the signer of the Precertificate; the second chains to the first and so
 on to
 +the signer of the precertificate; the second chains to the first and so
 on to
  the last, which is either the root certificate or a certificate that
 chains to
  an accepted root certificate.
                 </t>
  @@ -1258,12 +1258,12 @@ but it is expected there will be a variety.
        </section>
        <section title="Submitters">
          <t>
 -          Submitters submit certificates or Precertificates to the log as
 described above. When a Submitter intends to use the returned SCT directly
 in a TLS handshake or to construct a certificate, they SHOULD validate the
 SCT as described in <xref target="tls_clients"/> if they understand its
 format.
 +          Submitters submit certificates or precertificates to the log as
 described above. When a Submitter intends to use the returned SCT directly
 in a TLS handshake or to construct a certificate, they SHOULD validate the
 SCT as described in <xref target="tls_clients"/> if they understand its
 format.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section title="TLS Client" anchor="tls_clients">
          <t>
 -          TLS clients receive SCTs alongside or in certificates, either
 for the server certificate itself or for intermediate CA Precertificates.
 In
 +          TLS clients receive SCTs alongside or in certificates, either
 for the server certificate itself or for intermediate CA precertificates.
 In
  addition to normal validation of the certificate and its chain, TLS
 clients
  SHOULD validate the SCT by computing the signature input from the SCT
 data as
  well as the certificate and verifying the signature, using the
 corresponding
  @@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ the STH changes.
            A <xref target="monitor">monitor</xref> can audit by verifying
 the consistency of STHs it receives, ensure that each entry can be fetched
 and that the STH is indeed the result of making a tree from all fetched
 entries.
          </t>
          <t>
 -          A <xref target="tls_clients">TLS client</xref> can audit by
 verifying an SCT against any STH dated after the SCT timestamp + the
 Maximum Merge Delay by requesting a Merkle inclusion proof (<xref
 target="fetch_proof"/>). It can also verify that the SCT corresponds to
 the certificate it arrived with (i.e. the log entry is that certificate,
 is a Precertificate for that certificate or is an appropriate name-
 constrained intermediate [see <xref target="name_constrained"/>]).
 +          A <xref target="tls_clients">TLS client</xref> can audit by
 verifying an SCT against any STH dated after the SCT timestamp + the
 Maximum Merge Delay by requesting a Merkle inclusion proof (<xref
 target="fetch_proof"/>). It can also verify that the SCT corresponds to
 the certificate it arrived with (i.e. the log entry is that certificate,
 is a precertificate for that certificate or is an appropriate name-
 constrained intermediate [see <xref target="name_constrained"/>]).
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>
  @@ -1391,13 +1391,13 @@ corrective action when a misissue is detected.
        </section>
        <section title="Redaction of Public Domain Name Labels">
          <t>
 -          CAs SHOULD NOT redact domain name labels in Precertificates
 such that the entirety of the domain space below the unredacted part of
 the domain name is not owned or controlled by a single entity
 +          CAs SHOULD NOT redact domain name labels in precertificates
 such that the entirety of the domain space below the unredacted part of
 the domain name is not owned or controlled by a single entity
  (e.g. <spanx style="verb">?.com</spanx> and
  <spanx style="verb">?.co.uk</spanx> would both be problematic). Logs
 -MUST NOT reject any Precertificate that is overly redacted but which is
 +MUST NOT reject any precertificate that is overly redacted but which is
  otherwise considered compliant. It is expected that monitors will treat
 overly
 -redacted Precertificates as potentially misissued. TLS clients MAY reject
 a
 -certificate whose corresponding Precertificate would be overly redacted,
 perhaps using the same mechanism for determining whether a wildcard in a
 domain name of a certificate is too broad.
 +redacted precertificates as potentially misissued. TLS clients MAY reject
 a
 +certificate whose corresponding precertificate would be overly redacted,
 perhaps using the same mechanism for determining whether a wildcard in a
 domain name of a certificate is too broad.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section title="Misbehaving Logs">

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  benl@google.com        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/61#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #62 (rfc6962-bis): change title for section 1
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#62: change title for section 1

Changes (by benl@google.com):

 * milestone:   => review


Comment:

 https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/c4a35ea43bd42a789787e1b0863c413dc11f648a

 @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ submissions and queries that are defined in this
 document.
      </abstract>
    </front>
    <middle>
 -    <section title="Informal Introduction">
 +    <section title="Introduction">
        <t>
          Certificate transparency aims to mitigate the problem of
 misissued
  certificates by providing publicly auditable, append-only, untrusted logs
 of

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/62#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #61 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificates are not proper nouns
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#61: Precertificates are not proper nouns

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  benl@google.com        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  minor        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/61#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#62: change title for section 1

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/62#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


From nobody Mon Mar  9 07:19:18 2015
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Public Notary Transparency  Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Certificate Transparency
        Authors         : Ben Laurie
                          Adam Langley
                          Emilia Kasper
                          Eran Messeri
                          Rob Stradling
	Filename        : draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-06.txt
	Pages           : 35
	Date            : 2015-03-09

Abstract:
   This document describes a protocol for publicly logging the existence
   of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or
   observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification
   authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect
   certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves.
   The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor
   certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to
   add all issued certificates to the logs.

   Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for
   submissions and queries that are defined in this document.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Public Notary Transparency  Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : Certificate Transparency
        Authors         : Ben Laurie
                          Adam Langley
                          Emilia Kasper
                          Eran Messeri
                          Rob Stradling
	Filename        : draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-07.txt
	Pages           : 35
	Date            : 2015-03-09

Abstract:
   This document describes a protocol for publicly logging the existence
   of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or
   observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification
   authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect
   certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves.
   The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor
   certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to
   add all issued certificates to the logs.

   Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for
   submissions and queries that are defined in this document.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Mar  9 13:40:10 2015
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Eran,

> ...
> > In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many 
> instances where client software
> > fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs 
> represent an opportunity to
> > do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save 
> clients from bad code.
>
>
> Can we put the extra checks logs may do in the CtExtensions field of 
> the SCT? That way the additional checks can be defined in a separate 
> document.
> In principal I agree that providing extra information to TLS clients 
> about the certificates they receive is useful. Given it's not entirely 
> clear what clients do with this information (and complicates the log 
> implementation) my only suggestion is we make this an extension rather 
> than a mandatory part of the spec.
>
I identified two reasons for including cert type assertion in the log 
request and
adding that plus cert syntactic validation results in the SCT. One, 
noted above,
is that many TLS clients have, historically, not done a good job of cert 
syntax checking,
and this represents an opportunity to help improve that situation. 
Second, the current
(and previous) text is vague  about what checks a log does perform when 
performing
cert path validation. Using the cert type assertion and allowing a log 
to advertise
what types of checks it performs (based on IANA-registered values) 
removes this ambiguity
for submitters.

I think the cert type marking and checking info should be included in 
the base spec, if only to
address the second problem

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #14 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify ASN.1 encoding
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#14: Clarify ASN.1 encoding

Changes (by rob.stradling@comodo.com):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => needs-review


Comment:

 Whilst tackling this ticket, I took the opportunity to revamp the whole of
 section 3.4.  It's quite a big diff, but much of it is just moving
 sentences around.

 Since this is the only change between -06 and -07, you can view it here:
 http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-06&url2
 =draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-07

 P.S. Does anyone know why xml2rfc has not added sections 3.4.2.1 and
 3.4.2.2 to the table of contents?

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major                    |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:  needs-review
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


From nobody Mon Mar  9 16:12:24 2015
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On 09/03/15 20:39, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Eran,
>
>> ...
>>> In principle that's true, but in practice we have seen many
>>> instances where client software
>>> fails to perform checks established by standards. Thus logs
>>> represent an opportunity to
>>> do a better job (since they are new code) and perhaps help save
>>> clients from bad code.
>>
>> Can we put the extra checks logs may do in the CtExtensions field of
>> the SCT? That way the additional checks can be defined in a separate
>> document.
<snip>
> I think the cert type marking and checking info should be included in
> the base spec, if only to address the second problem

+1 to Eran's suggestion of using the CtExtensions field, regardless of 
whether Steve's proposed cert compliance checks are included in the base 
spec or a separate document.  I can't think of any better place (than 
CtExtensions) in which to put optional fields into an SCT.

Incidentally, +1 to Steve's recent comment...
"The description of the extensions field seems to be inspired by X.509v3.
That's OK, but one needs to define a top-level format for extensions to
ensure backward compatibility (as per v3 extensions)to make this work.
That level of specification is missing here."

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01
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Hi TRANS,

[draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01] includes the following changes from -00:

- Add the SCT feedback mechanism: Clients send SCTs to originating web
  server which shares them with auditors.
- Stop assuming that clients see STHs.
- Don't use HTTP headers but instead .well-known URL's -- avoid that
  battle.
- Stop referring to trans-gossip and trans-gossip-transport-https --
  too complicated.
- Remove all protocols but HTTPS in order to simplify -- let's come
  back and add more later.
- Add more reasoning about privacy.
- Do specify data formats.

Looks like I won't make it to Dallas. Since I won't be there, any
discussion on the list prior to the meeting would be much appreciated.

[draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01

Thanks,
Linus


From nobody Mon Mar  9 18:06:21 2015
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On Mon 2015-03-09 16:18:24 -0700, Linus Nordberg wrote:

> [draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01] includes the following changes from -00:
>
> - Add the SCT feedback mechanism: Clients send SCTs to originating web
>   server which shares them with auditors.
> - Stop assuming that clients see STHs.
> - Don't use HTTP headers but instead .well-known URL's -- avoid that
>   battle.
> - Stop referring to trans-gossip and trans-gossip-transport-https --
>   too complicated.
> - Remove all protocols but HTTPS in order to simplify -- let's come
>   back and add more later.
> - Add more reasoning about privacy.
> - Do specify data formats.

> Looks like I won't make it to Dallas. Since I won't be there, any
> discussion on the list prior to the meeting would be much appreciated.

Thanks for the new revision, Linus.  I'm also happy to present this work
in Dallas, if there's room on the agenda for it.

   --dkg


From nobody Tue Mar 10 11:47:06 2015
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On 3/9/15 5:06 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Thanks for the new revision, Linus.  I'm also happy to present this work
> in Dallas, if there's room on the agenda for it.

There is - this is an important topic and we' like to spend some time
on it.  We'll get a draft agenda out in the next few days, along with
several other updates.

Melinda



From nobody Wed Mar 11 08:31:54 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Ben,

> 6962 and 6962-bis are compliant with 5280. The ASN.1 structure that is 
> included is an OCTET STRING. The value of that OCTET STRING is the TLS 
> structure.
the use of OCTET STRING is only superficially compliant; it is 
inconsistent with all of the
prior X.509 extensions of which I am aware, and with the text that Russ 
Housley cited in
his message on 3/3. Rob's observation about what X.680 says is not 
relevant to this debate:
the issue is not what an OCTET STRING is allowed to contain in general, 
but what is the syntax
of an X.509 extension.
>
> The alternatives are:
>
> a) Encode SCTs different ways for different contexts. This seems like 
> pointless complexity.
to me it seems entirely appropriate.
>
> b) Change SCTs to ASN.1 structures, and wrap these in a TLS opaque 
> when presented in a TLS extension. This is exactly analogous to the 
> current situation, and analogous arguments can be made for/against it.
I agree that this is unattractive.
> I hope no-one is arguing for a), leaving us with b), and no convincing 
> reason to choose it over the current format on the basis of what the 
> standards say (or vice versa), as far as I can see.
I am arguing for a).
> Given that since Jan 1 2015 significant numbers of certificates have 
> been deployed using the existing format, I suggest that the 
> appropriate resolution is to continue with the format that is already 
> deployed.
Experience gained with 6269 is relevant, as it presumably shows that 
implementers have been
able to make the current syntax work. But, an experimental RFC represent 
does not establish
a precedent relevant to a standards track RFC that precedes it. In many 
(most?) cases
Experimental RFCs receive little review before being published. If the 
IETF were to agree that
implementations based on such RFCs establish design precedents for 
standards track RFCs,
especially when they conflict with existing, standards track RFCs, this 
would encourage publication
of experimental RFCs as a way to game the system.

Steve


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Rob,
> ...
>> I think the cert type marking and checking info should be included in
>> the base spec, if only to address the second problem
>
> +1 to Eran's suggestion of using the CtExtensions field, regardless of 
> whether Steve's proposed cert compliance checks are included in the 
> base spec or a separate document.  I can't think of any better place 
> (than CtExtensions) in which to put optional fields into an SCT.
I'm arguing that there must be a way to a log to advertise what checks 
it performs when
it does cert path validation to one of the trust anchors that it 
advertises. This should
not be optional.

But, I agree that this does not require a submitter to assert a cert type.
However, there still seems to be considerable benefit to having the SCT 
declare
to a client what cert path validation was performed as part of log 
acceptance.
> Incidentally, +1 to Steve's recent comment...
> "The description of the extensions field seems to be inspired by X.509v3.
> That's OK, but one needs to define a top-level format for extensions to
> ensure backward compatibility (as per v3 extensions)to make this work.
> That level of specification is missing here."
>
thanks.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On 11/03/15 15:31, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Ben,
>
>> 6962 and 6962-bis are compliant with 5280. The ASN.1 structure that is
>> included is an OCTET STRING. The value of that OCTET STRING is the TLS
>> structure.
>
> the use of OCTET STRING is only superficially compliant;

<silliness>
How about we base64-encode the SCT and put it in a PrintableString 
instead?  ;-)
</silliness>

> it is inconsistent with all of the prior X.509 extensions of which I am
> aware, and with the text that Russ Housley cited in his message on 3/3.

How does putting an RFC5246-encoding-rules SCT into an OCTET STRING 
violate the sanctity of ASN.1 any more than the RFC5280 practice of 
putting an RFC3986 URI into an IA5String does?

Or, to put it another way, why didn't the RFC5280 authors insist on 
coming up with a different "pure ASN.1" format for encoding the 
components of a URI?

> Rob's observation about what X.680 says is not relevant to this debate:
> the issue is not what an OCTET STRING is allowed to contain in general,
> but what is the syntax of an X.509 extension.
>>
>> The alternatives are:
>>
>> a) Encode SCTs different ways for different contexts. This seems like
>> pointless complexity.
> to me it seems entirely appropriate.
>>
>> b) Change SCTs to ASN.1 structures, and wrap these in a TLS opaque
>> when presented in a TLS extension. This is exactly analogous to the
>> current situation, and analogous arguments can be made for/against it.
> I agree that this is unattractive.
>> I hope no-one is arguing for a), leaving us with b), and no convincing
>> reason to choose it over the current format on the basis of what the
>> standards say (or vice versa), as far as I can see.
> I am arguing for a).
>> Given that since Jan 1 2015 significant numbers of certificates have
>> been deployed using the existing format, I suggest that the
>> appropriate resolution is to continue with the format that is already
>> deployed.
> Experience gained with 6269 is relevant, as it presumably shows that
> implementers have been
> able to make the current syntax work. But, an experimental RFC represent
> does not establish
> a precedent relevant to a standards track RFC that precedes it. In many
> (most?) cases
> Experimental RFCs receive little review before being published. If the
> IETF were to agree that
> implementations based on such RFCs establish design precedents for
> standards track RFCs,
> especially when they conflict with existing, standards track RFCs, this
> would encourage publication
> of experimental RFCs as a way to game the system.
>
> Steve
-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Hi Steve,

On 11/03/15 15:31, Stephen Kent wrote:
> the use of OCTET STRING is only superficially compliant; it is
> inconsistent with all of the
> prior X.509 extensions of which I am aware, and with the text that Russ
> Housley cited in
> his message on 3/3. Rob's observation about what X.680 says is not
> relevant to this debate:
> the issue is not what an OCTET STRING is allowed to contain in general,
> but what is the syntax
> of an X.509 extension.

Point of information. I remember talking with Hoyt about this
back before X.509v3 was started (Hoyt was the editor of X.509
then as you know) and in that conversation we concluded that
using OCTET STRING was better than ANY for exactly the reason
that someone might have a good reason to not use ASN.1 for an
extension value. (That was back during the UK MoD sponsored
sostdp pre-cursor to PKIX, I guess in '94 or early '95.)

That said, I can't think of any RFC that does that other than
6962.

But on the 3rd hand - 6962 hasn't broken anything that we know
of, so it's probably not incredibly dangerous.

And lastly, I don't believe we have any written down guidance
with IETF rough consensus on whether or not the OCTET STRING
has to be decodable using ASN.1.

So, my take as AD, is that the WG have the freedom to choose
what they want here and it's up to the WG chairs to figure
out where the rough consensus lies.

That said, if you separately wanted to discuss the point on (one
of) the saag or pkix lists, that might be useful since we may
find that values such as are proposed here work just fine or
break something or that there are other cases like this. If that
discussion turns up something we can always factor that in later,
so a separate discussion on this elsewhere shouldn't need to hold
up the trans WG.

Cheers,
S.



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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On Wed, 11 Mar 2015, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> That said, I can't think of any RFC that does that other than
> 6962.

I looked for this and found a few examples:

RFC 3709 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3709#section-4.1

HashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
    hashAlg         AlgorithmIdentifier,
    hashValue       OCTET STRING }

RFC 3126 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3126#section-3.2

   The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octet
    strings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the
    application.  Such strings need not have any internal structure
    (although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or other
    structure).


RFC 5652 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5652#section-4

  The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octet
    strings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the
    application.  Such strings need not have any internal structure
    (although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or other
    structure).

Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] changes to attack analysis
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Ben,
>
>
> ...
>
>     A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which clients, by
>     browser type and version,
>     fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is creating a
>     bogus cert with a
>     particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.
>
>         It is not clear to me that gossip has to be mandatory. So long
>         as some fraction of participants gossip, then clients are
>         protected from non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not
>         remove the need to specify gossip, which is clearly required
>         for CT to fully realise its potential.
>
>
> Perhaps we need a mechanism analagous to TLS extensions that allow CT 
> logs to extend their validation and advertise that fact?
I don't see how your comment relates to the discussion above. 
Nonetheless, I note that there
is a proposed mechanism to embed this info in the SCT, along with the 
mechanism by which a submitter
declares the type of cert being submitted (relative to IANA-registered 
validation criteria).
I envisioned using this in case logs elect to perform cert validation 
relative to profiles
such as the CABF DV and EV cert specs. But, one might consider using it 
to inform consumers
of SCTs of the cert path validation performed by a log.

Steve

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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Ben,
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CABrd9SRLy_sAS9YViJbw2DzpOrszUL6hQuS+gpsYU4GoB=VhPQ@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr"><br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">...<br>
            <br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><span class=""></span>
                A malicious CA can determine (via testing) which
                clients, by browser type and version, <br>
                fail to perform certain syntactic checks. If the CA is
                creating a bogus cert with a <br>
                particular set of clients in mind, this may suffice.<span
                  class=""><br>
                  <blockquote>It is not clear to me that gossip has to
                    be mandatory. So long as some fraction of
                    participants gossip, then clients are protected from
                    non-targeted attacks. Obviously this does not remove
                    the need to specify gossip, which is clearly
                    required for CT to fully realise its potential.<br>
                  </blockquote>
                </span></div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Perhaps we need a mechanism analagous to TLS extensions
              that allow CT logs to extend their validation and
              advertise that fact?</div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    I don't see how your comment relates to the discussion above.
    Nonetheless, I note that there<br>
    is a proposed mechanism to embed this info in the SCT, along with
    the mechanism by which a submitter <br>
    declares the type of cert being submitted (relative to
    IANA-registered validation criteria). <br>
    I envisioned using this in case logs elect to perform cert
    validation relative to profiles<br>
    such as the CABF DV and EV cert specs. But, one might consider using
    it to inform consumers <br>
    of SCTs of the cert path validation performed by a log.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------010307090208010200030302--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Rob,


> ...
> <silliness>
> How about we base64-encode the SCT and put it in a PrintableString 
> instead?  ;-)
> </silliness>
and then we specify delivery only via IP over avian carrier, as per RFC 
1149 :-).
>
>> it is inconsistent with all of the prior X.509 extensions of which I am
>> aware, and with the text that Russ Housley cited in his message on 3/3.
>
> How does putting an RFC5246-encoding-rules SCT into an OCTET STRING 
> violate the sanctity of ASN.1 any more than the RFC5280 practice of 
> putting an RFC3986 URI into an IA5String does?
A URI is a string. there is no base data type for URI, so printable string
was the closest native ASN.1 base data type. That's a very reasonable 
way to
accommodate this data.
> Or, to put it another way, why didn't the RFC5280 authors insist on 
> coming up with a different "pure ASN.1" format for encoding the 
> components of a URI?
Because, as I said above, a URI is a string.

In contrast, the major elements of an SCT are a version # (integer), a 
time value
(for which there are 2 base ASN.1 data types), a key ID (bit string), a
cert or TBS cert (which are already ASN.1), and the TBD CtExtensions 
(which could, plausibly, be
designated as an OCTET STRING.

The vast majority of ASN.1 knowledgeable folks I know would find it easy
and obvious to encode an SCT in ASN.1.

Steve


From nobody Thu Mar 12 07:46:29 2015
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Stephen,
> Hi Steve,
>
> On 11/03/15 15:31, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> the use of OCTET STRING is only superficially compliant; it is
>> inconsistent with all of the
>> prior X.509 extensions of which I am aware, and with the text that Russ
>> Housley cited in
>> his message on 3/3. Rob's observation about what X.680 says is not
>> relevant to this debate:
>> the issue is not what an OCTET STRING is allowed to contain in general,
>> but what is the syntax
>> of an X.509 extension.
> Point of information. I remember talking with Hoyt about this
> back before X.509v3 was started (Hoyt was the editor of X.509
> then as you know) and in that conversation we concluded that
> using OCTET STRING was better than ANY for exactly the reason
> that someone might have a good reason to not use ASN.1 for an
> extension value. (That was back during the UK MoD sponsored
> sostdp pre-cursor to PKIX, I guess in '94 or early '95.)
I was party to that conversation, and although I've known
Hoyt for many years, I don't recall him every suggesting this
as a rationale.
> That said, I can't think of any RFC that does that other than
> 6962.
at least we agree on that :-).
> But on the 3rd hand - 6962 hasn't broken anything that we know
> of, so it's probably not incredibly dangerous.
This gets to my point of why it is inappropriate to cite a
design decision of an Experimental RFC as an alternative to
existing Standards. The fact that a small group of implementers
elected to use a questionable encoding for a cert extension
does not, per se, justify perpetuating that.
> And lastly, I don't believe we have any written down guidance
> with IETF rough consensus on whether or not the OCTET STRING
> has to be decodable using ASN.1.
true. In my 17 years as PKIX co-chair this topic was never
considered, so there was no need to document this.
> So, my take as AD, is that the WG have the freedom to choose
> what they want here and it's up to the WG chairs to figure
> out where the rough consensus lies
> That said, if you separately wanted to discuss the point on (one
> of) the saag or pkix lists, that might be useful since we may
> find that values such as are proposed here work just fine or
> break something or that there are other cases like this. If that
> discussion turns up something we can always factor that in later,
> so a separate discussion on this elsewhere shouldn't need to hold
> up the trans WG.

As per your suggestion, I will raise the topic on the PKIX list,
and bring it to the attention of the current X.509 editors.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On 12/03/15 14:46, Stephen Kent wrote:
> This gets to my point of why it is inappropriate to cite a
> design decision of an Experimental RFC as an alternative to
> existing Standards. 

No, we currently have no existing standard or bcp that
says the OCTET STRING value has to be decodable as ASN.1.
So this is not a question of an alternative to an existing
standard but is only about a new standard.

> The fact that a small group of implementers
> elected to use a questionable encoding for a cert extension
> does not, per se, justify perpetuating that.

Well, the above is clearly coming at the issue from only
one point of view, and "small group", "questionable" and
"perpetuating" are all pejorative terms when looked at
from the point of view of those who have running code.

S.


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Subject: [Trans] Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Hi, all:

We've been banging away on the SCT encoding issue for a year,
and we really must close it out.  Paul and I have been doing due
diligence on the issue in the background.  We made a concerted effort
to find technical problems with the current text that would exclude the
possibility of allowing it in the -bis document.  Here's what we found:

1) The proposed encoding does not violate the letter of any
   specification that we can find,
2) Peter Gutmann said that it's not a good idea but it isn't
   incorrect,
3) We checked with the authors of several widely-used pieces of
   certificate processing software and in every case that person
   said that the proposed encoding would not cause problems with
   their code, and
4) We verified that the IETF security ADs would not reject the
   encoding during IESG review

Basically, in a nutshell, where we've landed is that while the current
encoding probably isn't the best idea ever, it doesn't violate any
specification that anybody could identify and it doesn't appear to
break anything.  So, it's going to stand.  We will not be revisiting
this issue unless new information is presented.  This includes
discussion at the upcoming meeting in Dallas.

Thanks,

Melinda and Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #24 (rfc6962-bis): Add a section about log metadata
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#24: Add a section about log metadata

Changes (by melinda.shore@gmail.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


-- 
------------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm@google.com  |       Owner:  eranm@google.com
     Type:  enhancement       |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  minor             |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/24#comment:6>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


From nobody Fri Mar 13 11:58:58 2015
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Stephen:

I strongly disagree with this technical decision.  The content of =
certificate extensions should be OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1 structures, =
and I pointed out the text in RFC 2459 (that remains in RFC 5280) during =
this discussion.  I am quite concerned with (4) listed below.  I hope =
you will revisit this decision.

Please treat this as the first step in the appeal of this technical =
decision.

Russ


On Mar 12, 2015, at 11:21 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:

> Hi, all:
>=20
> We've been banging away on the SCT encoding issue for a year,
> and we really must close it out.  Paul and I have been doing due
> diligence on the issue in the background.  We made a concerted effort
> to find technical problems with the current text that would exclude =
the
> possibility of allowing it in the -bis document.  Here's what we =
found:
>=20
> 1) The proposed encoding does not violate the letter of any
>   specification that we can find,
> 2) Peter Gutmann said that it's not a good idea but it isn't
>   incorrect,
> 3) We checked with the authors of several widely-used pieces of
>   certificate processing software and in every case that person
>   said that the proposed encoding would not cause problems with
>   their code, and
> 4) We verified that the IETF security ADs would not reject the
>   encoding during IESG review
>=20
> Basically, in a nutshell, where we've landed is that while the current
> encoding probably isn't the best idea ever, it doesn't violate any
> specification that anybody could identify and it doesn't appear to
> break anything.  So, it's going to stand.  We will not be revisiting
> this issue unless new information is presented.  This includes
> discussion at the upcoming meeting in Dallas.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Melinda and Paul
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


From nobody Fri Mar 13 13:25:14 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Hi Russ,

On 13/03/15 18:58, Russ Housley wrote:
> Stephen:
> 
> I strongly disagree with this technical decision.  The content of
> certificate extensions should be OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1
> structures, and I pointed out the text in RFC 2459 (that remains in
> RFC 5280) during this discussion.  

So you did - I missed that earlier. Yes, you do raise an issue
that needs dealing with if it's not already been dealt with (and
I think that is the case, but I'm not 100% sure).

The issue being whether (or not) the 5280 wording does in fact
call for all extnValue fields ever defined by the IETF to contain
DER encoded ASN.1 structures.

The question seems to boil down to whether or not the wording in
RFC 5280 section 4.2 [1] 2nd para applies to only the extensions
defined in 5280 or (I guess?) to all extensions ever documented
in IETF stream RFCs.

In other words does "Each extension" in that sentence mean "Each
extension defined in 5280" or does it mean "Any extension defined
in an IETF stream RFC" or something else.

   [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2

If one interprets the statement in the former/looser manner as
only being about extensions defined in 5280 then I guess one
would read the chairs' decision as being consistent with 5280.

If one interprets 5280 in the latter/stricter manner, I guess
a subsequent question might be whether that's (still) a good
plan and if not, what to do about it.

And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose, or something
else.

I think the question of whether or not doing this would break
something isn't a new question but is one that was dealt with
already in that we don't know of any such breakage. And in any
case the chairs sensibly indicated that new facts would cause a
reappraisal. So I take it that you're not claiming that there
is some known system that'd be damaged here, but rather that
deviating from the stricter reading of 5280 might cause such
breakage, even if we don't know of any such case.

Lastly, there is a comment in the ASN.1 module that says that
extnValue contains a DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, but I
think we don't need to worry about that as it's really the
same question as the first one above.

Does the above correctly capture your objection/appeal?

> I am quite concerned with (4)
> listed below.  I hope you will revisit this decision.
> 
> Please treat this as the first step in the appeal of this technical
> decision.

Given that we're not at AD or IESG evaluation, I guess you're
appealing the WG chairs' decision here and so the initial
response should I think come from the WG chairs. If you're still
not satisfied at that point then it'd be time for you to appeal
to me, as the responsible AD. (At which point I'll process it.)
But for now, I guess I get to pass the parcel back to the chairs.

So chairs - assuming Russ agrees with my characterisation above,
will you take a look at that and consider his appeal?

Cheers,
S.


> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> On Mar 12, 2015, at 11:21 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:
> 
>> Hi, all:
>> 
>> We've been banging away on the SCT encoding issue for a year, and
>> we really must close it out.  Paul and I have been doing due 
>> diligence on the issue in the background.  We made a concerted
>> effort to find technical problems with the current text that would
>> exclude the possibility of allowing it in the -bis document.
>> Here's what we found:
>> 
>> 1) The proposed encoding does not violate the letter of any 
>> specification that we can find, 2) Peter Gutmann said that it's not
>> a good idea but it isn't incorrect, 3) We checked with the authors
>> of several widely-used pieces of certificate processing software
>> and in every case that person said that the proposed encoding would
>> not cause problems with their code, and 4) We verified that the
>> IETF security ADs would not reject the encoding during IESG review
>> 
>> Basically, in a nutshell, where we've landed is that while the
>> current encoding probably isn't the best idea ever, it doesn't
>> violate any specification that anybody could identify and it
>> doesn't appear to break anything.  So, it's going to stand.  We
>> will not be revisiting this issue unless new information is
>> presented.  This includes discussion at the upcoming meeting in
>> Dallas.
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> 
>> Melinda and Paul
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list 
>> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
> 
> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list 
> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
> 


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:
<snip>
> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,

Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims 
to do the same.

Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING 
inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!

I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any 
better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Stephen:

Yes, you have captured the essence of my technical concern.

In addition, I point out that the currently-specified structure contains =
several elements, and these could easily be carried in an ASN.1 =
structure.  There are many places in the current specification that =
require the handling of ASN.1, so it is not an implementation imposition =
to require conformance with RFC 5280, section 4.2:

   Each extension includes an OID and an ASN.1 structure.  When an
   extension appears in a certificate, the OID appears as the field
   extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 DER encoded structure is the value
   of the octet string extnValue.  A certificate MUST NOT include more
   than one instance of a particular extension.  For example, a
   certificate may contain only one authority key identifier extension
   (Section 4.2.1.1).  An extension includes the boolean critical, with
   a default value of FALSE.  The text for each extension specifies the
   acceptable values for the critical field for CAs conforming to this
   profile.

Russ


On Mar 13, 2015, at 4:25 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:

>=20
> Hi Russ,
>=20
> On 13/03/15 18:58, Russ Housley wrote:
>> Stephen:
>>=20
>> I strongly disagree with this technical decision.  The content of
>> certificate extensions should be OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1
>> structures, and I pointed out the text in RFC 2459 (that remains in
>> RFC 5280) during this discussion. =20
>=20
> So you did - I missed that earlier. Yes, you do raise an issue
> that needs dealing with if it's not already been dealt with (and
> I think that is the case, but I'm not 100% sure).
>=20
> The issue being whether (or not) the 5280 wording does in fact
> call for all extnValue fields ever defined by the IETF to contain
> DER encoded ASN.1 structures.
>=20
> The question seems to boil down to whether or not the wording in
> RFC 5280 section 4.2 [1] 2nd para applies to only the extensions
> defined in 5280 or (I guess?) to all extensions ever documented
> in IETF stream RFCs.
>=20
> In other words does "Each extension" in that sentence mean "Each
> extension defined in 5280" or does it mean "Any extension defined
> in an IETF stream RFC" or something else.
>=20
>   [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2
>=20
> If one interprets the statement in the former/looser manner as
> only being about extensions defined in 5280 then I guess one
> would read the chairs' decision as being consistent with 5280.
>=20
> If one interprets 5280 in the latter/stricter manner, I guess
> a subsequent question might be whether that's (still) a good
> plan and if not, what to do about it.
>=20
> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose, or something
> else.
>=20
> I think the question of whether or not doing this would break
> something isn't a new question but is one that was dealt with
> already in that we don't know of any such breakage. And in any
> case the chairs sensibly indicated that new facts would cause a
> reappraisal. So I take it that you're not claiming that there
> is some known system that'd be damaged here, but rather that
> deviating from the stricter reading of 5280 might cause such
> breakage, even if we don't know of any such case.
>=20
> Lastly, there is a comment in the ASN.1 module that says that
> extnValue contains a DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, but I
> think we don't need to worry about that as it's really the
> same question as the first one above.
>=20
> Does the above correctly capture your objection/appeal?
>=20
>> I am quite concerned with (4)
>> listed below.  I hope you will revisit this decision.
>>=20
>> Please treat this as the first step in the appeal of this technical
>> decision.
>=20
> Given that we're not at AD or IESG evaluation, I guess you're
> appealing the WG chairs' decision here and so the initial
> response should I think come from the WG chairs. If you're still
> not satisfied at that point then it'd be time for you to appeal
> to me, as the responsible AD. (At which point I'll process it.)
> But for now, I guess I get to pass the parcel back to the chairs.
>=20
> So chairs - assuming Russ agrees with my characterisation above,
> will you take a look at that and consider his appeal?
>=20
> Cheers,
> S.
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>> Russ
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Mar 12, 2015, at 11:21 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:
>>=20
>>> Hi, all:
>>>=20
>>> We've been banging away on the SCT encoding issue for a year, and
>>> we really must close it out.  Paul and I have been doing due=20
>>> diligence on the issue in the background.  We made a concerted
>>> effort to find technical problems with the current text that would
>>> exclude the possibility of allowing it in the -bis document.
>>> Here's what we found:
>>>=20
>>> 1) The proposed encoding does not violate the letter of any=20
>>> specification that we can find, 2) Peter Gutmann said that it's not
>>> a good idea but it isn't incorrect, 3) We checked with the authors
>>> of several widely-used pieces of certificate processing software
>>> and in every case that person said that the proposed encoding would
>>> not cause problems with their code, and 4) We verified that the
>>> IETF security ADs would not reject the encoding during IESG review
>>>=20
>>> Basically, in a nutshell, where we've landed is that while the
>>> current encoding probably isn't the best idea ever, it doesn't
>>> violate any specification that anybody could identify and it
>>> doesn't appear to break anything.  So, it's going to stand.  We
>>> will not be revisiting this issue unless new information is
>>> presented.  This includes discussion at the upcoming meeting in
>>> Dallas.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>>=20
>>> Melinda and Paul
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list=20=

>>> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list=20
>> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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On 13/03/15 20:58, Rob Stradling wrote:
> On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> <snip>
>> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
>> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
>> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
>> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,
> 
> Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims
> to do the same.

Really?

I though the extnValue was just the SignedCertificateTimestampList
and did not contain yet another OCTET STRING tag? That how I read
6962 anyway.

S.

> 
> Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING
> inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!
> 
> I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any
> better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).
> 


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Rob:

>> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
>> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
>> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
>> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,
>=20
> Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text =
aims to do the same.
>=20
> Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING =
inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!
>=20
> I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any =
better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).

I will not speak for Steve Kent.  But I do not think tat an extra OCTET =
STRING wrapping is the way to go.  Sure, it would legalistically conform =
to the words in RFC 5280, but I think the straightforward use of ASN.1 =
would be better.

Russ


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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On 13/03/15 21:05, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> On 13/03/15 20:58, Rob Stradling wrote:
>> On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> <snip>
>>> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
>>> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
>>> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
>>> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,
>>
>> Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims
>> to do the same.
>
> Really?

Really.  That's what all the current implementations of RFC6962 are doing.

> I though the extnValue was just the SignedCertificateTimestampList
> and did not contain yet another OCTET STRING tag? That how I read
> 6962 anyway.

Some other folks read it that way too, apparently.

Hence http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14

> S.
>
>>
>> Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING
>> inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!
>>
>> I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any
>> better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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On 13/03/15 21:15, Rob Stradling wrote:
> On 13/03/15 21:05, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> On 13/03/15 20:58, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>> On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>> <snip>
>>>> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
>>>> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
>>>> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
>>>> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,
>>>
>>> Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims
>>> to do the same.
>>
>> Really?
>
> Really.  That's what all the current implementations of RFC6962 are doing.

It probably doesn't help that RFC6962 has two definitions of 
"SignedCertificateTimestampList", one using ASN.1 and one using TLS 
encoding rules.

        SignedCertificateTimestampList ::= OCTET STRING

         struct {
             SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>;
         } SignedCertificateTimestampList;

This issue is addressed in 6962-bis -07.

>> I though the extnValue was just the SignedCertificateTimestampList
>> and did not contain yet another OCTET STRING tag? That how I read
>> 6962 anyway.
>
> Some other folks read it that way too, apparently.
>
> Hence http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14
>
>> S.
>>
>>>
>>> Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING
>>> inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!
>>>
>>> I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any
>>> better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).
>

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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On 13/03/15 21:15, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>
> 
> Some other folks read it that way too, apparently.
> 
> Hence http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14

Fair enough. Count me among the mis-readers of 6962:-)

Russ - I think this changes the characterisation of the appeal
too doesn't it as there's no formal departure from 5280?

Thanks,
S.


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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Bonsoir,

Trying to do the ASN.1 conversion while trying to stay close to the current
SCTList definition, I got this:


SignedCertificateTimestampList ::= SEQUENCE OF SignedCertificateTimestamp

SignedCertificateTimestamp ::= SEQUENCE {
  sct-version Version,
  id LogID,
  extensions CtExtensions,
  signature-of-SignedEntry Signature }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } (0..255)

LogID ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))

CtExtensions ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535))

-- No extension is defined yet, but it should probably something like this
instead:
-- CtExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF CtExtension
-- CtExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
--   type SomeType,
--   value SomeValue (taken from an ObjectSet)
-- }

-- That's an acceptable way to define a signature, it's a BIT STRING in
X.509, and an OCTET STRING in CMS
Signature ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535))


But what is really signed is a SignedEntry.
The SignedEntry could also be redefined in ASN.1, but then we have a
different signature. Bad.

An ASN.1 defined SignedEntry would be something like this:
SignedEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
  sct-version Version,
  signature-type SignatureType, -- MUST be certificate-timestamp?
  timestamp Uint64,
  logentry LogEntry }

SignatureType ::= INTEGER {
  certificate-timestamp(0),
  tree-hash(1) } (0..255)

Uint64 ::= INTEGER (0..18446744073709551616)

LogEntry ::= CHOICE {
  x509entry [0] ASN1Cert,
  precertentry [1] PreCert }

PreCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer-key-hash OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
tbs-certificate TBSCertificate }

-- TBSCertificate is defined in RFC5280
ASN1Cert ::= Certificate


If we give up here and consider SignedEntry to be an OCTET STRING, then the
signature doesn't apply to the SignedEntry structure itself, but to its
content (tag and length excluded). Not really PKIX way.


I can't find a clean way to solve this.


2015-03-13 22:19 GMT+01:00 Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>:

>
> On 13/03/15 21:15, Rob Stradling wrote:
>
>> On 13/03/15 21:05, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/03/15 20:58, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>
>>>>> And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a
>>>>> good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT
>>>>> encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending
>>>>> another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims
>>>> to do the same.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Really?
>>>
>>
>> Really.  That's what all the current implementations of RFC6962 are doing.
>>
>
> It probably doesn't help that RFC6962 has two definitions of "
> SignedCertificateTimestampList", one using ASN.1 and one using TLS
> encoding rules.
>
>        SignedCertificateTimestampList ::= OCTET STRING
>
>         struct {
>             SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>;
>         } SignedCertificateTimestampList;
>
> This issue is addressed in 6962-bis -07.
>
>  I though the extnValue was just the SignedCertificateTimestampList
>>> and did not contain yet another OCTET STRING tag? That how I read
>>> 6962 anyway.
>>>
>>
>> Some other folks read it that way too, apparently.
>>
>> Hence http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14
>>
>>  S.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING
>>>> inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!
>>>>
>>>> I'd be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any
>>>> better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).
>>>>
>>>
>>
>


-- 
Erwann.

--089e01628326472de90511330a94
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonsoir,<div><br></div><div>Trying to do the ASN.1 convers=
ion while trying to stay close to the current SCTList definition, I got thi=
s:</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div>SignedCertificateTimestampL=
ist ::=3D SEQUENCE OF SignedCertificateTimestamp</div><div><br></div><div>S=
ignedCertificateTimestamp ::=3D SEQUENCE {</div><div><span style=3D"white-s=
pace:pre">=C2=A0 </span>sct-version Version,</div><div><span style=3D"white=
-space:pre">=C2=A0 </span>id LogID,</div><div><span style=3D"white-space:pr=
e">=C2=A0 </span>extensions CtExtensions,</div><div><span style=3D"white-sp=
ace:pre">=C2=A0 </span>signature-of-SignedEntry Signature }</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Version ::=3D INTEGER { v1(0) } (0..255)</div><div><br></div><div=
>LogID ::=3D OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))</div><div><br></div><div>CtExtensions =
::=3D OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535))</div><div><br></div><div>-- No extensio=
n is defined yet, but it should probably something like this instead:</div>=
<div>-- CtExtensions ::=3D SEQUENCE OF CtExtension</div><div>-- CtExtension=
 ::=3D SEQUENCE {</div><div>-- =C2=A0=C2=A0type SomeType,</div><div>-- =C2=
=A0 value SomeValue (taken from an ObjectSet)</div><div>-- }</div><div><br>=
</div><div>-- That&#39;s an acceptable way to define a signature, it&#39;s =
a BIT STRING in X.509, and an OCTET STRING in CMS</div><div>Signature ::=3D=
 OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535))</div><div><br></div></div><div><br></div><di=
v>But what is really signed is a SignedEntry.</div><div>The SignedEntry cou=
ld also be redefined in ASN.1, but then we have a different signature. Bad.=
</div><div><br></div><div>An ASN.1 defined SignedEntry would be something l=
ike this:</div><div><div>SignedEntry ::=3D SEQUENCE {</div><div><span style=
=3D"white-space:pre">=C2=A0 </span>sct-version Version,</div><div><span sty=
le=3D"white-space:pre">=C2=A0 </span>signature-type SignatureType, -- MUST =
be certificate-timestamp?</div><div><span style=3D"white-space:pre">=C2=A0 =
</span>timestamp Uint64,</div><div>=C2=A0 logentry LogEntry }</div></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><div>SignatureType ::=3D INTEGER {</div><div>=C2=A0 certi=
ficate-timestamp(0),</div><div>=C2=A0 tree-hash(1) } (0..255)</div></div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Uint64 ::=3D INTEGER (0..18446744073709551616)<br></div><=
div><br></div><div>LogEntry ::=3D CHOICE {</div><div>=C2=A0 x509entry [0] A=
SN1Cert,</div><div>=C2=A0 precertentry [1] PreCert }</div><div><br></div><d=
iv><div>PreCert ::=3D SEQUENCE {</div><div><span class=3D"" style=3D"white-=
space:pre">	</span>issuer-key-hash OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),</div><div><span=
 class=3D"" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>tbs-certificate TBSCertificat=
e }</div><div><br></div><div>-- TBSCertificate is defined in RFC5280</div><=
div>ASN1Cert ::=3D Certificate<br></div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
><div>If we give up here and consider SignedEntry to be an OCTET STRING, th=
en the signature doesn&#39;t apply to the SignedEntry structure itself, but=
 to its content (tag and length excluded). Not really PKIX way.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div>I can&#39;t find a clean way to solve this.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>2015-03-13 22:19 GMT+01:00 Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com" target=3D"_blank">rob.stradling@comodo.com=
</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);borde=
r-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D""><br>
On 13/03/15 21:15, Rob Stradling wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
On 13/03/15 21:05, Stephen Farrell wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
On 13/03/15 20:58, Rob Stradling wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
On 13/03/15 20:25, Stephen Farrell wrote:<br>
&lt;snip&gt;<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
And if we interpret 5280 strictly and conclude that is still a<br>
good plan then the question would be what to do about the SCT<br>
encoding, which could be to do something hacky like prepending<br>
another OCTET STRING tag and a length I suppose,<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Stephen, RFC6962 does precisely that, and the current 6962-bis text aims<br=
>
to do the same.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Really?<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Really.=C2=A0 That&#39;s what all the current implementations of RFC6962 ar=
e doing.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
It probably doesn&#39;t help that RFC6962 has two definitions of &quot;<u><=
/u>SignedCertificateTimestampList<u></u>&quot;, one using ASN.1 and one usi=
ng TLS encoding rules.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0SignedCertificateTimestampList ::=3D OCTET STRIN=
G<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 struct {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SerializedSCT sct_list &lt;1..2^1=
6-1&gt;;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 } SignedCertificateTimestampList<u></u>;<br>
<br>
This issue is addressed in 6962-bis -07.<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-l=
eft-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
I though the extnValue was just the SignedCertificateTimestampList<br>
and did not contain yet another OCTET STRING tag? That how I read<br>
6962 anyway.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Some other folks read it that way too, apparently.<br>
<br>
Hence <a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/14" target=
=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/<u></u>trans/trac/ticket/14</a><b=
r>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
S.<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">
<br>
Adding yet another OCTET STRING would turn it into an OCTET STRING<br>
inside an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING!<br>
<br>
I&#39;d be surprised if Russ or Steve Kent would consider that to be any<br=
>
better than the current plan (an OCTET STRING inside an OCTET STRING).<br>
</blockquote></blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
</span><div class=3D""><div class=3D"h5"><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--089e01628326472de90511330a94--


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Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:02:11 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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jn Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 02:58:32PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
> I strongly disagree with this technical decision.  The content of
> certificate extensions should be OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1
> structures, and I pointed out the text in RFC 2459 (that remains in
> RFC 5280) during this discussion.  I am quite concerned with (4)
> listed below.  I hope you will revisit this decision.

Indeed.  The fact that Certificate includes TBSCertificate without
wrapping it in an OCTET STRING has caused problems before.  Typed holes
should always include an OCTET STRING wrapper in ASN.1-based protocols.

Nico
-- 


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On Fri, 13 Mar 2015, Nico Williams wrote:

> Indeed.  The fact that Certificate includes TBSCertificate without
> wrapping it in an OCTET STRING has caused problems before.

Can you share what problems this has caused before? That would be
a useful addition to this discussion.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On 12/03/15 14:45, Stephen Kent wrote:
<snip>
>> How does putting an RFC5246-encoding-rules SCT into an OCTET STRING
>> violate the sanctity of ASN.1 any more than the RFC5280 practice of
>> putting an RFC3986 URI into an IA5String does?
>
> A URI is a string. there is no base data type for URI, so printable string
> was the closest native ASN.1 base data type. That's a very reasonable
> way to accommodate this data.
>
>> Or, to put it another way, why didn't the RFC5280 authors insist on
>> coming up with a different "pure ASN.1" format for encoding the
>> components of a URI?
>
> Because, as I said above, a URI is a string.

Steve, Russ,

"If it could be defined in ASN.1, then it MUST be defined in ASN.1".

Does that accurately capture what you're both saying?


URIs are strings, but they have structure (see RFC3986 Appendix A). 
Therefore, an alternative way to represent URIs could have been defined 
in ASN.1 [*].  RFC5280 and its predecessors did not do this.  Why not?

If URIs didn't have to be (re-)defined in ASN.1 so that they could be 
included in certs, then why should the 6962-bis structs be (re-)defined 
in ASN.1 so that they can be included in certs?


[*] For example...

    URI           = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ]

...could be represented in ASN.1 as...

    URI  ::=  SEQUENCE {
       scheme     PrintableString,
       hier_part  HierPart,
       query      PrintableString  OPTIONAL,
       fragment   PrintableString  OPTIONAL
   }

...etc, etc.

> In contrast, the major elements of an SCT are a version # (integer), a
> time value
> (for which there are 2 base ASN.1 data types), a key ID (bit string), a
> cert or TBS cert (which are already ASN.1), and the TBD CtExtensions
> (which could, plausibly, be
> designated as an OCTET STRING.
>
> The vast majority of ASN.1 knowledgeable folks I know would find it easy
> and obvious to encode an SCT in ASN.1.
>
> Steve

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Bad Technical Decision: Closing out the SCT encoding discussion
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On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 09:57:57PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Mar 2015, Nico Williams wrote:
> 
> >Indeed.  The fact that Certificate includes TBSCertificate without
> >wrapping it in an OCTET STRING has caused problems before.
> 
> Can you share what problems this has caused before? That would be
> a useful addition to this discussion.

Yes, I can.

Say you want to use an ASN.1 compiler to generate all your encoding and
decoding code...  A compiler-generated decoder will generally lose all
information about encoding options (think BER) for the TBSCertificate,
so that if you write code that passes around decoded structures without
passing around the original cert... then you can't validate signatures
that were taken over a non-canonical encoding of the tbsCertificate.
Even if you pass the original cert around, you need to hand-code a
parser to extract the tbsCertificate.

Fun stuff.

Wrapping to-be-signed objects in OCTET STRINGs completely solves the
problem.

We use ASN.1 in part because the idea that we can use off-the-shelf
compilers is attractive.

There exist such x.509 implementations, FYI.  Heimdal's libhx509, for
example.

Nico
-- 


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Rob:

> "If it could be defined in ASN.1, then it MUST be defined in ASN.1".
>=20
> Does that accurately capture what you're both saying?

I'm saying that certificate extensions are OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1 =
structures.  That is what RFC 2459, RFC 3280, and RFC 5280 all say.

The SubjectAltName extension includes a choice for URI, and it is =
carried in a single string, not broken into the ABNF parts.

Russ


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Rob,

> Steve, Russ,
>
> "If it could be defined in ASN.1, then it MUST be defined in ASN.1".
>
> Does that accurately capture what you're both saying?
I can't speak for Russ, but for me, not exactly. Looking beyond the hack of
putting data in an OCTET STRING to circumvent the obvious intention of 
5280, I'd
say that if the data types in an extension are readily represented in 
ASN.1, then
the extension SHOULD be structured as ASN.1. The SCT meets that criteria.

A few folks have argued that experience with 6269 shows that it is possible
to make the current definition work. I don't dispute that. However, it 
sets a bad
precedent to endorse this approach to cert extension definitions, 
established
via Experimental RFC. I suspect that if 6962 had gone through the 
reviews required
for a Standards Track RFC, this topic would have been raised much 
earlier, and I
suspect that the proposed syntax would have been rejected. This sets a 
bad precedent
in terms of the use of Experimental track RFCs as well, IMHO.
> URIs are strings, but they have structure (see RFC3986 Appendix A). 
> Therefore, an alternative way to represent URIs could have been 
> defined in ASN.1 [*].  RFC5280 and its predecessors did not do this.  
> Why not?
I am not an author of 5280, so I defer to Russ on this. But, as PKIX 
co-chair, my view was
precisely what I said earlier, i.e., a URI is a string, so mapping it to 
PrintableString
seems reasonable. I have not argued that one has to delve into the 
structure of a string
to beak it into a more fine grained ASN.1 object.

Steve


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A first draft of the agenda for next week's meeting has been
posted at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/92/agenda/trans/.
Please let us know if anything needs to be added or changed.
Also, if you'll be leading a discussion please get your slides
to us pretty quickly, even if they're a rough first draft and
will need updating.

Thanks,

Melinda


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Subject: [Trans] One, not three gossip drafts (was:  Agenda uploaded)
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Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> wrote
Mon, 16 Mar 2015 12:41:30 -0800:

| A first draft of the agenda for next week's meeting has been
| posted at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/92/agenda/trans/.Please let us know if anything needs to be added or changed.
| Also, if you'll be leading a discussion please get your slides
| to us pretty quickly, even if they're a rough first draft and
| will need updating.

Hi Melinda,

Sorry for not being clear on this earlier, but "Gossiping in CT" is the
only draft that's been updated and the only one to be considered for
now. It has no references to any of the other two and should stand by
itself.


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On 3/16/15 1:41 PM, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> Sorry for not being clear on this earlier, but "Gossiping in CT" is the
> only draft that's been updated and the only one to be considered for
> now. It has no references to any of the other two and should stand by
> itself.

Okay, thanks - I'll get that changed.

Melinda



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Hi, all:

I am not really willing to re-open discussion of the encoding.  We've
been spinning our wheels for a long time and it's pretty clear that
nobody is willing to compromise.  Given that and given my own
disinterest in having chairs make decisions about technical
disagreements, my basic position is that if someone wants to make
proposed text go away they need to demonstrate that either it will
violate some normative specification or that it will break something.
Neither has happened here (yet) and we've been hammering on this
for nearly a year.  It remains the case that nobody is willing to
compromise, so unless and until someone has new information to bring
to bear on the problem, I think we're done.

Melinda


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References: <052.10eb26d4fde793d0a60756eb4c9dc8cc@tools.ietf.org> <067.3f6fd76ea878508f23fc24cdf754d7e0@tools.ietf.org> <54EF8403.90307@bbn.com> <54EFAAE7.3040707@comodo.com> <54EFB7B9.1010001@gmail.com> <537F8554-19B7-4C66-BA5E-A48D11FFCB51@vigilsec.com> <CABrd9SRn0ayrWzEstsZ5xCPY5seUGtoMgZsokhkzizjM=N2wJQ@mail.gmail.com> <55005FDD.8060009@bbn.com> <550078FA.3050502@comodo.com> <5501A698.4010607@bbn.com> <5506C95E.5000806@comodo.com> <E62F5162-EBDB-4FCA-A4D7-AC8A9D11BB70@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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On 16 March 2015 at 16:56, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Rob:
>
> > "If it could be defined in ASN.1, then it MUST be defined in ASN.1".
> >
> > Does that accurately capture what you're both saying?
>
> I'm saying that certificate extensions are OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1
> structures.  That is what RFC 2459, RFC 3280, and RFC 5280 all say.
>

Once more, the 6962 and 6962-bis extensions are OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1
structures.


>
> The SubjectAltName extension includes a choice for URI, and it is carried
> in a single string, not broken into the ABNF parts.
>
> Russ
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 16 March 2015 at 16:56, Russ Housley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target=3D"_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Rob:<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; &quot;If it could be defined in ASN.1, then it MUST be defined in ASN.=
1&quot;.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Does that accurately capture what you&#39;re both saying?<br>
<br>
</span>I&#39;m saying that certificate extensions are OCTET STRING wrapped =
ASN.1 structures.=C2=A0 That is what RFC 2459, RFC 3280, and RFC 5280 all s=
ay.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Once more, the 6962 and 6962-bis ex=
tensions are OCTET STRING wrapped ASN.1 structures.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The SubjectAltName extension includes a choice for URI, and it is carried i=
n a single string, not broken into the ABNF parts.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Russ<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 10:08:08 +1100
Thread-Topic: [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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Subject: [Trans] Clarification on Precertificate Signing Certificates
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Hi,

We're (finally!) implementing full 6962 cacert handling and would like
to ask for clarification on a detail on the ExtendedKeyUsage in
Precertificate Signing Certificates.

Section 3.1. says 

   o  a special-purpose (CA:true, Extended Key Usage: Certificate
      Transparency, OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4) Precertificate Signing
      Certificate.

Should this be interpreted as "CT is the _only_ extended key usage
purpose in a Precertificate Signing Certificate"?

Thanks,
Linus


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#71: Section 1 does not define mis-issuance

 Since mis-issuance is cited as the rationale for CT, it really must be
 defined here.
 text has been proposed to define mis-issuance, but has not been
 incorporated

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  critical     |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/71>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #72 (client-behavior): Section 2.1.4 cites specific algorithms
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#72: Section 2.1.4 cites specific algorithms

 it would be preferable to cite a separate document that defines the
 algorithms used in CT, and which will be updated when new algorithms are
 proposed/adopted.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/72>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#73: Section 3 text re log cert validation is ambiguous

 Section 3 states “When a valid certificate is submitted to a log …” It
 later says: Logs MUST accept certificates that are fully valid according
 to X.509 verification rules and are submitted with such a chain. Logs MAY
 accept certificates and precertificates that have expired, are not yet
 valid, have been revoked, or are otherwise not fully valid according to
 X.509 verification rules in order to accommodate quirks of CA certificate-
 issuing software.” This specification for what constitutes a valid
 certificate is ambiguous, e.g., it fails to specify a version of the X.509
 standard. I suggest citing RFC 5280 instead. Also, as noted before (ticket
 #??) there is no specified way for a log to advertise whether is accepts
 certificates that have “issues” nor to specify what deviations from X.59
 (or 5280) are acceptable to a specific log.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  critical     |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/73>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #74 (client-behavior): normative statement of TLS client behavior in Section 3
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#74: normative statement of TLS client behavior in Section 3

 Section 3 states:
 A certificate not accompanied by an SCT (either for the end-entity
 certificate or for a name-constrained intermediate the end-entity
 certificate chains to) MUST NOT be considered compliant by TLS clients.

 This is a normative statement about client behavior. Which is out of
 scope.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  blocker      |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/74>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#75: run on sentence in section 3

 Section 3 states:

 If a certificate is accepted and an SCT issued, the
 accepting log MUST store the entire chain used for verification,
 including the certificate or precertificate itself and including the root
 certificate used to verify the chain (even if it was omitted from the
 submission), and MUST present this chain for auditing upon request.

 This sentence is 5 lines long and needs to be fixed.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  minor        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/75>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#76: Normative client behavior specified in Section 3.4

 Section 3.4 does a much better job of explaining why there are 3 options
 for transmitting the SCT. However, the description of the certificate
 extension says that a certificate is more likely to be refused if any of
 the SCTs are now “invalid.” This statement cites specific TLS client
 behavior, which is out of scope.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/76>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#77: normative client behavior specified in Section 5

 Section 5 says that it describes “some” clients and “how they could
 function.” This section specifies some client behavior, but such
 specification is supposed to be out of scope. No text in this section
 ought to employ any RFC 2109 keywords if client behavior is out of scope,
 yet such keywords appear in most of the subsections.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/77>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#78: algorithm agility discussion is inadequate

 Section 6 does not provide an adequate description of how algorithm
 agility is achieved. It refers to Section 5.1, which defines log metadata.
 See other documents, e.g., RFC 6916, that describe algorithm agility for a
 security system as an illustration of the sort of description that is
 appropriate.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  kent@bbn.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/78>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Stephen,
> On 12/03/15 14:46, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> This gets to my point of why it is inappropriate to cite a
>> design decision of an Experimental RFC as an alternative to
>> existing Standards.
> No, we currently have no existing standard or bcp that
> says the OCTET STRING value has to be decodable as ASN.1.
> So this is not a question of an alternative to an existing
> standard but is only about a new standard.
I assume your comment is meant to apply to cert extensions.
In that context I agree. Suggesting that we create a new standard that
endorses using an OCTET STRING as a catch-all for X.509 is precisely the
sort or precedent setting that should be viewed from an architectural
perspective, not from the perspective of expedience.
>> The fact that a small group of implementers
>> elected to use a questionable encoding for a cert extension
>> does not, per se, justify perpetuating that.
> Well, the above is clearly coming at the issue from only
> one point of view, and "small group", "questionable" and
> "perpetuating" are all pejorative terms when looked at
> from the point of view of those who have running code.
The set of CAs and the one browser vendor that is known to have
implemented this represents a "small group" relative to the
set of folks who deal with certs overall. Because you agree
that this is a precedent-setting issue, it may ultimately affect
certs used in other contexts, so "small" seems very accurate.

I stand by my choice of the term "questionable" as well. Most folks
who I contacted see this as a hack, even if it is not expressly a violation
of 5280 or x.509.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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As I've said several times, unless there's new information, we're
done discussing this.

Melinda


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Subject: [Trans] Slides, please!
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Hi, all:

We'd be grateful if those of you preparing slide sets for Monday's
session could send in your slides so we can get those uploaded.

Many thanks!

Melinda


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #34 (rfc6962-bis): use of RFC 5246 syntax to define the SCT
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Stephen Farrell and I discussed this today.  When this document reaches =
IETF Last Call, I will raise this question from two perspectives.  =
First, ask if others agree with my interpretation that the use of a =
structure other that ASN.1 is  prohibited by RFC 2459, RFC 3280, and RFC =
5280.  Second, ask if this decision will break any certificate =
processing software. =20

Russ


On Mar 20, 2015, at 2:48 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:

> As I've said several times, unless there's new information, we're
> done discussing this.
>=20
> Melinda


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First off, I have a general comment that there seem to be some places in
the document where it is implicitly assumed that the HTTPS client and
server trust each other to behave correctly and are "only" truing to
detect misbehavior by other parties (i.e., CAs or parties subverting the
CA infrastructure, etc.), to the exclusion of having the client and server
retain some level of distrust or sanity checking of each other.  I'm not
sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
certificates (that validate) by the attacker.

In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
that it considers legitimate?  What are the consequences if the server
misbehaves and shares "other data that they may learn from the submission
of SCTs by HTTP clients"?

I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
(assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
written may be overly broad.

I seem to be missing a normative reference for various terminology and
conventions (e.g., "the timestamp, as a number", which I assume is
milliseconds since the epoch, excluding leap seconds, in decimal, to match
the other specs).

The formatting in 4.1.3 seems funky; it looks like a list has been
condensed into running text (including bullet symbols)

-Ben


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Subject: [Trans] On version expectations of trans participants
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My apologies if we've covered this already; I think I may have mentioned
it in a larger email and it got glossed over.

In at least two documents we have phrases like "a compliant v1
implementation MUST NOT expect this [version field] to be 0 (i.e., v1)."

The word "expect" seems weird to me, somehow -- in a universe where v1 is
the only thin widely deployed, we should "expect" that responses will use
that version, in that it is the most likely occurrence.  What we are
trying to prevent is the case where implementations assume that the
version field (or really, the version of the message they are processing)
matches the version of the implementation without validating that
assumption.  Do we want to say instead something like "compliant v1
implementations MUST validate the version field while processing messages
and handle inputs from versions other than v1" or "a compliant v1
implementation MUST NOT assume this field is 0 (i.e., v1) without
validating the version field"?

Is this too trivial an issue to worry about?

-Ben


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Subject: [Trans] comments on draft-zhang-trans-ct-binary-codes-01
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Please specify what data description and interchange formats are being
used.  E.g., sections 4.1 and 4.2 are presumably using TLS syntax, and
section 5.1 should specify that both input and output are JSON structures.

In section 5.1, in the description of the 'extensions' field, we see that
"Logs should set this to the empty string.  Clients should decode the
base64-encoded data and include it in the SCT".  Should these be RFC 2119
"SHOULD"s?  Also, what "the base64-encoded data" is could probably be more
clear, i.e., saying something about if the server sets extensions to
something other than the empty string, it MUST be base64-encoded data, and
if the client receives something which is non-empty, then it does the
decoding and includes it in the CtExtensions portion of the
SignedCertificateTimestamp.  (Hmm, I don't see it explicitly mentioned
that that's what SCT means, either.)

-Ben


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Subject: [Trans] comments on draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-07
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[Why yes, I did have a printout of trans documents to read on the plane.]

In section 2.1, hash function agility has not quite been inserted, since
"[t]he output is a single 32-byte Merkle Tree Hash."

In section 3.4.1, "TLS clients that support the extension SHOULD send a
ClientHello extension with the appropriate type", is "the appropriate
type" ever anything other than "signed_certificate_timestamp"?  If not,
maybe it's best to just spell it out.

The specific contents of the "timestamp" field are only written out in its
description in section 3.3, but not in any subsequent descriptions
(whether TLS data structures or JSON).  Perhaps there should be a small
section at the beginning noting that CT represents times as milliseconds
since the epoch, ignoring leap seconds, to clarify for all occurrences.

In section 4, maybe the extra fields SHOULD be ignored?  This seems
relevant for interoperability...

At the bottom of page 19, should "synchronization" be written out in full?

In section 4, describing the "error_code" field, only one generic code is
given, but the running text is written as if multiple were provided.
Here, and elsewhere, there seems to be inconsistency about whether a colon
is used after the hang text for the itemized list.

In section 4.1, my comment about the base64-encoded 'extensions' data from
the binary codes document also seems applicable here.

At the bottom of page 21, the paragraph about avoiding forcing v1 clients
to upgrade is a little confusing to me.  Perhaps this scenario could be
spelled out in more detail to reduce the potential for confusion.

In the subsections of section 4, I don't know whether we feel a need to
specify that arrays of things are JSON arrays (as opposed to some other
sort of array; I'm not really sure what this misreading would look like).
I guess it's probably fine to leave it alone.

In 4.3, I think the document's convention should have
us explicitly say that the tree_head_signature element is base64 encoded.

In 4.4, the "Note that no signature is required on this data" seems to
only apply to the 'consistency' output, and not the others (since a
signature is supplied for them).  Probably best to just avoid the pronoun
entirely.  Also, the description for 'consistency' should be more clear
about the order in which the base64 encoding and array creation is
performed, just to be sure.


The document seems to play a bit fast and loose with claiming that (leaf?)
hashes and STHs can be "before" and "after" each other (sometimes written
as "<" or ">").  We can compare both the timestamps or the tree size from
which a STH is generated, and I think we should be clear about when which
(or both!) checks are performed, throughout the document.


-Ben (the other one)


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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on draft-linux-trans-gossip-ct-01
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On 22 March 2015 at 21:51, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> First off, I have a general comment that there seem to be some places in
> the document where it is implicitly assumed that the HTTPS client and
> server trust each other to behave correctly and are "only" truing to
> detect misbehavior by other parties (i.e., CAs or parties subverting the
> CA infrastructure, etc.), to the exclusion of having the client and server
> retain some level of distrust or sanity checking of each other.

If it is not clear, I think it should be made explicit that the
purpose of CT gossip is to detect misbehaving CT logs - and nothing
more.  The purpose of CT is to detect misbehaving CAs.

A misbehaving server is making itself vulnerable, so they have an
incentive to behave. If a server misbehaves in collusion with a log,
it will hopefully be detected by an HTTPS client sharing SCTs directly
with an auditor (which is mentioned in a sentence in 3.1.2, and is a
natural extension if a user _wishes_ to give up some privacy.) But
this scenario also doesn't seem to make a lot of sense - why would a
server collude with a log when it can achieve the same goal with
significantly less work and less risk?

> I'm not
> sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
> scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
> successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
> certificates (that validate) by the attacker.

The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
the valid server again

If it's not clear that the client does not empty it's SCT cache into a
server and say "Okay, I'm all set" -then it should be made so. The
client doesn't do that. It retains SCTs and reports them according to
some unspecified UA algorithm. (exponential backoff plus
randomization?)

> In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
> that it considers legitimate?

This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
auditor.

I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.

> What are the consequences if the server
> misbehaves and shares "other data that they may learn from the submission
> of SCTs by HTTP clients"?

It would be a privacy violation of the client.

> I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
> MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
> the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
> monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
> (assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
> a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
> written may be overly broad.

It's designed to prevent the following traffic analysis:

- Adversary is watching traffic of the auditor and client, and wants
to learn historical client behavior
- Client connects to an auditor and sends a bunch of SCTs over HTTPS
- Auditor immediately goes and queries all the domains the client sent for
- Adversary learns which domains the client sent in SCTs for

-tom


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Ben,

Thanks for the review. Addressing some issues below and others in a
separate reply to Tom's comments.


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:51:38 -0400 (EDT):

| I seem to be missing a normative reference for various terminology and
| conventions (e.g., "the timestamp, as a number", which I assume is
| milliseconds since the epoch, excluding leap seconds, in decimal, to match
| the other specs).

They are all from RFC6962. What'd be the right way of refer to it?
Mentioning 6962 in each and every entry, like

         +  sct_version - Version as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2,
            as a number.

         +  log_id - LogID as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2, as a
            base64 encoded string.

or rather put some text at the top of the section (3.1.3. in this case)?


| The formatting in 4.1.3 seems funky; it looks like a list has been
| condensed into running text (including bullet symbols)

Would capitalizing the first word of each point be sufficient or should
we get rid of the list altogether?


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Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote
Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500:

| > I'm not
| > sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
| > scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
| > successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
| > certificates (that validate) by the attacker.
| 
| The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
| server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
| itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
| for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
| the valid server again
| 
| If it's not clear that the client does not empty it's SCT cache into a
| server and say "Okay, I'm all set" -then it should be made so. The
| client doesn't do that. It retains SCTs and reports them according to
| some unspecified UA algorithm. (exponential backoff plus
| randomization?)

Branch sct-feedback of https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts.git makes
an initial attempt at explaining this [1]. Improved wording is welcome!

[1] https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts/commit/6310b87e826d0a6f650fa39532932d24176b7cbe


| > In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
| > that it considers legitimate?
| 
| This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
| as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
| doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
| auditor.
| 
| I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
| somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
| perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.

I'm thinking of SCT's being legitimate as a "policy decision" made by
the operator and not something a piece of software decides. Does this
make sense? Should we add text to explain this?


| > I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
| > MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
| > the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
| > monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
| > (assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
| > a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
| > written may be overly broad.
| 
| It's designed to prevent the following traffic analysis:
| 
| - Adversary is watching traffic of the auditor and client, and wants
| to learn historical client behavior
| - Client connects to an auditor and sends a bunch of SCTs over HTTPS
| - Auditor immediately goes and queries all the domains the client sent for
| - Adversary learns which domains the client sent in SCTs for

Should we add text explaining this? Should explanations like this go
into "Security considerations", refering to appropriate sections (like
3.1.2. in this particular case)?


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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01
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[fixed embarassing typo in the subject line]

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:

> Ben,
>
> Thanks for the review. Addressing some issues below and others in a
> separate reply to Tom's comments.
>
>
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
> Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:51:38 -0400 (EDT):
>
> | I seem to be missing a normative reference for various terminology and
> | conventions (e.g., "the timestamp, as a number", which I assume is
> | milliseconds since the epoch, excluding leap seconds, in decimal, to match
> | the other specs).
>
> They are all from RFC6962. What'd be the right way of refer to it?
> Mentioning 6962 in each and every entry, like
>
>          +  sct_version - Version as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2,
>             as a number.
>
>          +  log_id - LogID as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2, as a
>             base64 encoded string.
>
> or rather put some text at the top of the section (3.1.3. in this case)?

I would actually consider making a section 1.1 "Terminology", with
something like "this document relies on terminology and data structures
defined in RFC 6962, including but not limited to the SCT Version, LogID,
SCT timestamp, CTExtensions, ...".  Of the two you list, I would prefer
the former (mentioning 6962 in each line).

> | The formatting in 4.1.3 seems funky; it looks like a list has been
> | condensed into running text (including bullet symbols)
>
> Would capitalizing the first word of each point be sufficient or should
> we get rid of the list altogether?

This list is okay, but I would just make it a semicolon-separated list.


-Ben


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Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:50:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01
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On Mon, 23 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:

> Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote
> Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500:
>
> | > I'm not
> | > sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
> | > scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
> | > successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
> | > certificates (that validate) by the attacker.
> |
> | The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
> | server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
> | itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
> | for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
> | the valid server again

I know that, and you know that, but we want to make sure that the document
says that as well.  Linus's suggestion below is a good start.

But this is still not really addressing the issue I was trying to raise.
Yes, the goal of this protocol is to enable a client and server to
cooperate to detect misbehavior by third parties.  But that does not
absolve us of a responsibility to analyze the situation where one of the
client and/or server misbehaves, and document the security and privacy
considerations in that case.

> | If it's not clear that the client does not empty it's SCT cache into a
> | server and say "Okay, I'm all set" -then it should be made so. The
> | client doesn't do that. It retains SCTs and reports them according to
> | some unspecified UA algorithm. (exponential backoff plus
> | randomization?)
>
> Branch sct-feedback of https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts.git makes
> an initial attempt at explaining this [1]. Improved wording is welcome!
>
> [1] https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts/commit/6310b87e826d0a6f650fa39532932d24176b7cbe

That is helpful.

Could we also add a paragraph to the end of the introduction motivating
clients sending SCTs to servers due to it not presenting an additional
privacy leak?  Perhaps something like:

"""
However, there is no loss in privacy if a client sends SCTs for a given
site to the site named in the SCT, since the site's access logs would
already indicate that the client is accessing that site.  In this way a
site can accumulate records of SCTs that have been issued by various logs
for that site, providing a consolidated repository of SCTs which can be
queried by an auditor interested in that site (such as the site's owner
itself).
"""


> | > In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
> | > that it considers legitimate?
> |
> | This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
> | as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
> | doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
> | auditor.
> |
> | I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
> | somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
> | perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.
>
> I'm thinking of SCT's being legitimate as a "policy decision" made by
> the operator and not something a piece of software decides. Does this
> make sense? Should we add text to explain this?

I guess I'm coming at this from the assumption that an auditor will want
to know about all SCTs for a given site, including the "legitimate" ones.
On the other hand, it could be useful for the site to have a way to
indicate to an external auditor which SCTs it believes are legitimate.
But it's not clear that omitting them from the results is the best way to
make that indication, since it is not distinguishable from the site not
knowing about those SCTs.  In short, is the extra complexity of making
this optional justified?

> | > I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
> | > MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
> | > the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
> | > monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
> | > (assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
> | > a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
> | > written may be overly broad.
> |
> | It's designed to prevent the following traffic analysis:
> |
> | - Adversary is watching traffic of the auditor and client, and wants
> | to learn historical client behavior
> | - Client connects to an auditor and sends a bunch of SCTs over HTTPS
> | - Auditor immediately goes and queries all the domains the client sent for
> | - Adversary learns which domains the client sent in SCTs for
>
> Should we add text explaining this? Should explanations like this go
> into "Security considerations", refering to appropriate sections (like
> 3.1.2. in this particular case)?

I think it would be fine to mention this in 4.1.2 (near "SCTs [are]
sensitive data").

I still think it is possible for a properly-written auditor to add sites
to monitor in a way which does not expose client information via traffic
analysis (i.e., probabilistic/staggered/delayed queries), but I am willing
to conced that getting it right is sufficiently hard that we should not be
recommending it.

-Ben


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#58: Stipulate a maximum number of STH's published per time unit


Comment (by linus@nordu.net):

 A comment from the room (Kent i believe) made it obvious that the title of
 this ticket was far from good. I agree. Changing it.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  linus@nordu.net        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/58#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#58: Limit the number of STH's allowed to be published per time unit


-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  linus@nordu.net        |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/58#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: trans <trans@ietf.org>
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IETF attendees, please post corrections.


Status
One milestone, we're late; IETF tradition.
Using issue tracker.
Anyone implementation updates?  Nordunet and akamai still active

Ben and Eran hampered by lack of audio

RFC 6962-bit update

Threat Analysis (Steve Kent)
                Threat is a motivated capable adversary; threat analysis (s=
ee RFC 4949), taxonomy of actors and classes
                Threat analysis requires that security functionality or goa=
ls be clearly articulated
                Most don't need this, just Security Considerations, since t=
hey're not security protocols
                CT is a complex security system with many elements and thus=
 seems to merit a threat analysis
                Why? Can help guide system designers; after design, helps u=
sers understand what it provides
                Current text
                                Mis-issuance is either syntax (bad profile)=
 or semantic (to a wrong entity)
                                Malicious CA vs not-malicious; errors vs at=
tacks; logged vs not logged; benign vs conspiring logs
                                Detailed outline of attacks
                Missing in current text
                                List of adversaries?
                                Concise statement of security goals, such a=
s "the goal of CT is to deter, detect, and help mitigate certificate mis-is=
suance"
                Part of 6962-bis or separate doc? (No strong pref, but perh=
aps bis is long enough already)  If separate, perhaps rename to include "lo=
gs" in name since it doesn't talk about client behavior
                Consensus to adopt as a WG document; will go to mailing lis=
t for confirmation

Gossip (dkg)
                Gossip keeps logs accountable (e.g., meet MMD, not present =
spli view of tree head)
                Monitors are auditors, not all auditors are monitors
                Biggest issue is privacy considerations; relationship betwe=
en clients and servers, but not between auditors/log and server/log - speak=
 up if you disagree
                Gossip happens among various parties (see preso)
                Recommend mix in "noise" in auditor response to avoid discl=
osing browser history
                Terminology confusion: TLS client vs log client, e.g.
                Some updates to the (nice) multi-party pictures and flows o=
ffered
                Not enough people read it; premature to talk about adoption=
, but it got well-received in the room will raise on mailing list.

Open issues in trac (eran)
                #4 sign TBS for certs?  Consistent with precertificates, av=
oid bad encoding of sig params.  Good idea, yes.
                #10 - blinked and missed this, sorry
                #41 - handled by steven kent
                #53 - requiring logs to order entries; no, clarify it's not=
 a requirement
                #55 - security considerations, no since going to define cli=
ent behavior
                #58 - limit STH's per unit time; hard to enforce
                Client behavior - 20 tickets, slot on agenda
                #8 client privacy; significant change, but not be enough; p=
ostponed

Any interest in a document describing client behavior?  No enthusiasm; to b=
e on list

RFC 6962-bis update
                Handled server time skew
                Added machine-readable error codes to responses (e.g., malf=
ormed request, invalid cert, etc)
                New API merges Get STH, get Consistency:Proof, get Inclusio=
nProof
                Added metadata for log parameters (including final STH for =
frozen logs); comment if anything missing
                Algorithm agility: propose to freeze log, start new one; if=
 necessary, will have to include all old data in the new log.
                See Steve Kent's open issue, which pointed to an RFC for so=
me ideas and more details; agree need more details on what clients should d=
o when this happens






--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: rsalz@jabber.me<mailto:rsalz@jabber.me> Twitter: RichSalz


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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IETF attendees, please post corrections.<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Status<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">One milestone, we&#8217;re late; IETF tradition.<o:p=
></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Using issue tracker.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Anyone implementation updates?&nbsp; Nordunet and ak=
amai still active<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ben and Eran hampered by lack of audio<o:p></o:p></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 6962-bit update<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Threat Analysis (Steve Kent)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Threat is a motivated capable advers=
ary; threat analysis (see RFC 4949), taxonomy of actors and classes<o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Threat analysis requires that securi=
ty functionality or goals be clearly articulated<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Most don&#8217;t need this, just Sec=
urity Considerations, since they&#8217;re not security protocols<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CT is a complex security system with=
 many elements and thus seems to merit a threat analysis<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Why? Can help guide system designers=
; after design, helps users understand what it provides<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Current text<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Mis-issuance is eith=
er syntax (bad profile) or semantic (to a wrong entity)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Malicious CA vs=
 not-malicious; errors vs attacks; logged vs not logged; benign vs conspiri=
ng logs<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Detailed outlin=
e of attacks<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Missing in current text<o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; List of adversaries?=
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Concise stateme=
nt of security goals, such as &#8220;the goal of CT is to deter, detect, an=
d help mitigate certificate mis-issuance&#8221;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Part of 6962-bis or separate doc? (N=
o strong pref, but perhaps bis is long enough already)&nbsp; If separate, p=
erhaps rename to include &#8220;logs&#8221; in name since it doesn&#8217;t =
talk about client behavior &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Consensus to adopt as a WG document;=
 will go to mailing list for confirmation<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Gossip (dkg)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Gossip keeps logs accountable (e.g.,=
 meet MMD, not present spli view of tree head)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Monitors are auditors, not all audit=
ors are monitors<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Biggest issue is privacy considerati=
ons; relationship between clients and servers, but not between auditors/log=
 and server/log &#8211; speak up if you disagree<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Gossip happens among various parties=
 (see preso)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recommend mix in &#8220;noise&#8221;=
 in auditor response to avoid disclosing browser history<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Terminology confusion: TLS client vs=
 log client, e.g.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Some updates to the (nice) multi-par=
ty pictures and flows offered<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Not enough people read it; premature=
 to talk about adoption, but it got well-received in the room will raise on=
 mailing list.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Open issues in trac (eran)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #4 sign TBS for certs?&nbsp; Consist=
ent with precertificates, avoid bad encoding of sig params.&nbsp; Good idea=
, yes.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #10 &#8211; blinked and missed this,=
 sorry<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #41 &#8211; handled by steven kent<o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #53 &#8211; requiring logs to order =
entries; no, clarify it&#8217;s not a requirement<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #55 &#8211; security considerations,=
 no since going to define client behavior<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #58 &#8211; limit STH&#8217;s per un=
it time; hard to enforce<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Client behavior &#8211; 20 tickets, =
slot on agenda<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #8 client privacy; significant chang=
e, but not be enough; postponed<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Any interest in a document describing client behavio=
r?&nbsp; No enthusiasm; to be on list<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">RFC 6962-bis update <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Handled server time skew<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Added machine-readable error codes t=
o responses (e.g., malformed request, invalid cert, etc)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; New API merges Get STH, get Consiste=
ncy:Proof, get InclusionProof<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Added metadata for log parameters (i=
ncluding final STH for frozen logs); comment if anything missing<o:p></o:p>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Algorithm agility: propose to freeze=
 log, start new one; if necessary, will have to include all old data in the=
 new log.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; See Steve Kent&#8217;s open issue, w=
hich pointed to an RFC for some ideas and more details; agree need more det=
ails on what clients should do when this happens<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">--&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">IM: <a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@jabber.me">rsalz@jabber.=
me</a> Twitter: RichSalz<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
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Subject: [Trans] Poll for adoption of working group draft on threat analysis for CT
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Hi, all:

This is a call for adoption of a working group deliverable
providing a threat analysis for CT, based on the summary
provided by http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
and on previous discussion on this mailing list.

This call closes on Friday, April 10.  Please review the
slides and provide an indication of whether or not you
support draft adoption.

Thanks,

Melinda & Paul


From nobody Mon Mar 23 12:46:24 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Poll for adoption of working group draft on threat analysis for CT
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Yes, please adopt it.

On 3/23/15 3:22 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:
> Hi, all:
>
> This is a call for adoption of a working group deliverable
> providing a threat analysis for CT, based on the summary
> provided by 
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
> and on previous discussion on this mailing list.
>
> This call closes on Friday, April 10.  Please review the
> slides and provide an indication of whether or not you
> support draft adoption.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Melinda & Paul
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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On 03/23/2015 08:46 PM, Karen Seo wrote:
> Yes, please adopt it.

yes


From nobody Tue Mar 24 00:35:45 2015
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From: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Cc: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>, trans@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01
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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:50:26 -0400 (EDT):

| On Mon, 23 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:
| 
| > Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote
| > Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500:
| >
| > | > I'm not
| > | > sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
| > | > scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
| > | > successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
| > | > certificates (that validate) by the attacker.
| > |
| > | The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
| > | server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
| > | itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
| > | for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
| > | the valid server again
| 
| I know that, and you know that, but we want to make sure that the document
| says that as well.  Linus's suggestion below is a good start.
| 
| But this is still not really addressing the issue I was trying to raise.
| Yes, the goal of this protocol is to enable a client and server to
| cooperate to detect misbehavior by third parties.  But that does not
| absolve us of a responsibility to analyze the situation where one of the
| client and/or server misbehaves, and document the security and privacy
| considerations in that case.

Do you have suggested text?


| > | If it's not clear that the client does not empty it's SCT cache into a
| > | server and say "Okay, I'm all set" -then it should be made so. The
| > | client doesn't do that. It retains SCTs and reports them according to
| > | some unspecified UA algorithm. (exponential backoff plus
| > | randomization?)
| >
| > Branch sct-feedback of https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts.git makes
| > an initial attempt at explaining this [1]. Improved wording is welcome!
| >
| > [1]
| > https://github.com/ln5/internet-drafts/commit/6310b87e826d0a6f650fa39532932d24176b7cbe
| 
| That is helpful.
| 
| Could we also add a paragraph to the end of the introduction motivating
| clients sending SCTs to servers due to it not presenting an additional
| privacy leak?  Perhaps something like:
| 
| """
| However, there is no loss in privacy if a client sends SCTs for a given
| site to the site named in the SCT, since the site's access logs would
| already indicate that the client is accessing that site.  In this way a
| site can accumulate records of SCTs that have been issued by various logs
| for that site, providing a consolidated repository of SCTs which can be
| queried by an auditor interested in that site (such as the site's owner
| itself).
| """

Tweaked it a bit and added it (1c45c37) to section Problem, now renamed
Introduction. Thanks.


| > | > In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
| > | > that it considers legitimate?
| > |
| > | This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
| > | as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
| > | doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
| > | auditor.
| > |
| > | I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
| > | somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
| > | perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.
| >
| > I'm thinking of SCT's being legitimate as a "policy decision" made by
| > the operator and not something a piece of software decides. Does this
| > make sense? Should we add text to explain this?
| 
| I guess I'm coming at this from the assumption that an auditor will want
| to know about all SCTs for a given site, including the "legitimate" ones.
| On the other hand, it could be useful for the site to have a way to
| indicate to an external auditor which SCTs it believes are legitimate.
| But it's not clear that omitting them from the results is the best way to
| make that indication, since it is not distinguishable from the site not
| knowing about those SCTs.  In short, is the extra complexity of making
| this optional justified?

Backing up a bit, the question can be posed as whether the optimisation
of not sending them all is justified. This is somewhat related to the
open question of how (push vs. pull) and how often and much auditors and
web servers gossip. Getting an idea about the quantity of data would
help. I don't have any numbers at the moment.


| > | > I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
| > | > MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
| > | > the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
| > | > monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
| > | > (assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
| > | > a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
| > | > written may be overly broad.
| > |
| > | It's designed to prevent the following traffic analysis:
| > |
| > | - Adversary is watching traffic of the auditor and client, and wants
| > | to learn historical client behavior
| > | - Client connects to an auditor and sends a bunch of SCTs over HTTPS
| > | - Auditor immediately goes and queries all the domains the client sent for
| > | - Adversary learns which domains the client sent in SCTs for
| >
| > Should we add text explaining this? Should explanations like this go
| > into "Security considerations", refering to appropriate sections (like
| > 3.1.2. in this particular case)?
| 
| I think it would be fine to mention this in 4.1.2 (near "SCTs [are]
| sensitive data").
| 
| I still think it is possible for a properly-written auditor to add sites
| to monitor in a way which does not expose client information via traffic
| analysis (i.e., probabilistic/staggered/delayed queries), but I am willing
| to conced that getting it right is sufficiently hard that we should not be
| recommending it.

Could this be what 4.1.2 calls "mixing"? We put that down as "TBD" for
now.


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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:43:14 -0400 (EDT):

| [fixed embarassing typo in the subject line]

Don't worry. It's not the first time that's happened. :)


| > | I seem to be missing a normative reference for various terminology and
| > | conventions (e.g., "the timestamp, as a number", which I assume is
| > | milliseconds since the epoch, excluding leap seconds, in decimal, to match
| > | the other specs).
| >
| > They are all from RFC6962. What'd be the right way of refer to it?
| > Mentioning 6962 in each and every entry, like
| >
| >          +  sct_version - Version as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2,
| >             as a number.
| >
| >          +  log_id - LogID as defined in [RFC6962] Section 3.2, as a
| >             base64 encoded string.
| >
| > or rather put some text at the top of the section (3.1.3. in this case)?
| 
| I would actually consider making a section 1.1 "Terminology", with
| something like "this document relies on terminology and data structures
| defined in RFC 6962, including but not limited to the SCT Version, LogID,
| SCT timestamp, CTExtensions, ...".  Of the two you list, I would prefer
| the former (mentioning 6962 in each line).

Addressed in b3c2525.


| > | The formatting in 4.1.3 seems funky; it looks like a list has been
| > | condensed into running text (including bullet symbols)
| >
| > Would capitalizing the first word of each point be sufficient or should
| > we get rid of the list altogether?
| 
| This list is okay, but I would just make it a semicolon-separated list.

7c9801f.


From nobody Tue Mar 24 08:53:03 2015
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Much gratitude to Rich for getting the minutes done.  All,
please review.

Melinda


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Thanks for the updates.

On Tue, 24 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:

> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
> Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:43:14 -0400 (EDT):
>
>
> | > | The formatting in 4.1.3 seems funky; it looks like a list has been
> | > | condensed into running text (including bullet symbols)
> | >
> | > Would capitalizing the first word of each point be sufficient or should
> | > we get rid of the list altogether?
> |
> | This list is okay, but I would just make it a semicolon-separated list.
>
> 7c9801f.

Ah, looking at the diff makes what is going on more clear.  7c9801f is
probably not helping very much; there seems to be some issue with the
conversion process from markdown.  If you look at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01#section-4.1.3 ,
the bulleted list from the markdown ... isn't.  I have no experience with
writing I-Ds in markdown, but I am sure there are some experts who can be
consulted.

-Ben


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Subject: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01: gossiping STHs
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It seems to me that the I-D is missing a trick: everyone should gossip
STHs. They are the bedrock on which CT is founded.

If TLS clients and servers send each other STHs, then realistically, there
is no privacy issue: everyone has all STHs.

If you don't maximally gossip STHs you make forks easier.

--001a1135af32e1b4f605120fbd5f
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<div dir=3D"ltr">It seems to me that the I-D is missing a trick: everyone s=
hould gossip STHs. They are the bedrock on which CT is founded.<div><br></d=
iv><div>If TLS clients and servers send each other STHs, then realistically=
, there is no privacy issue: everyone has all STHs.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>If you don&#39;t maximally gossip STHs you make forks easier.</div><div><=
br></div></div>

--001a1135af32e1b4f605120fbd5f--


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Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 18:16:06 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] comments on draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01
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On Tue, 24 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:

> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
> Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:50:26 -0400 (EDT):
>
> | On Mon, 23 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> |
> | > Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote
> | > Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500:
> | >
> | > | > I'm not
> | > | > sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
> | > | > scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
> | > | > successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
> | > | > certificates (that validate) by the attacker.
> | > |
> | > | The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
> | > | server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
> | > | itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
> | > | for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
> | > | the valid server again
> |
> | I know that, and you know that, but we want to make sure that the document
> | says that as well.  Linus's suggestion below is a good start.
> |
> | But this is still not really addressing the issue I was trying to raise.
> | Yes, the goal of this protocol is to enable a client and server to
> | cooperate to detect misbehavior by third parties.  But that does not
> | absolve us of a responsibility to analyze the situation where one of the
> | client and/or server misbehaves, and document the security and privacy
> | considerations in that case.
>
> Do you have suggested text?

Any text I would suggest would be text that I am not entirely happy with,
since I do not have confidence that I correctly understand the security
and privacy considerations in question.

Unfortunately, I left the copy of the document that I marked up at the
hotel, so I have to recreate my work and only remember one of the places
that tickled this concern (there were at least two):

In section 3.1.1, """When the client later reconnects to any HTTPS server
for the same domain it again receives a set of SCTs.  The client [...]
MUST send to the server the ones in its store that were not received from
that server."""  This precludes the client from doing any sort of MITM
detection and refusing to send SCTs to a (presumed) attacker.  Admittedly,
the scope of exposure here is pretty small; it seems like the only privacy
loss would be that attacker A who has MITM'd the client then can learn
whether the client has *also* been MITM'd by attacker B at some point in
the past (since presumably the attackers know which SCTs are legitimate).
But, it is not too much of a stretch to think that three-letter
organizations might want to know if their target is being attacked by
someone else.



> |
> | """
> | However, there is no loss in privacy if a client sends SCTs for a given
> | site to the site named in the SCT, since the site's access logs would
> | already indicate that the client is accessing that site.  In this way a
> | site can accumulate records of SCTs that have been issued by various logs
> | for that site, providing a consolidated repository of SCTs which can be
> | queried by an auditor interested in that site (such as the site's owner
> | itself).
> | """
>
> Tweaked it a bit and added it (1c45c37) to section Problem, now renamed
> Introduction. Thanks.

Looks good; thanks for the cleanup.

> | > | > In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
> | > | > that it considers legitimate?
> | > |
> | > | This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
> | > | as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
> | > | doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
> | > | auditor.
> | > |
> | > | I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
> | > | somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
> | > | perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.
> | >
> | > I'm thinking of SCT's being legitimate as a "policy decision" made by
> | > the operator and not something a piece of software decides. Does this
> | > make sense? Should we add text to explain this?
> |
> | I guess I'm coming at this from the assumption that an auditor will want
> | to know about all SCTs for a given site, including the "legitimate" ones.
> | On the other hand, it could be useful for the site to have a way to
> | indicate to an external auditor which SCTs it believes are legitimate.
> | But it's not clear that omitting them from the results is the best way to
> | make that indication, since it is not distinguishable from the site not
> | knowing about those SCTs.  In short, is the extra complexity of making
> | this optional justified?
>
> Backing up a bit, the question can be posed as whether the optimisation
> of not sending them all is justified. This is somewhat related to the
> open question of how (push vs. pull) and how often and much auditors and
> web servers gossip. Getting an idea about the quantity of data would
> help. I don't have any numbers at the moment.


Waiting for data seems like a fine plan for now.

I do wonder if there should be an explicit way for an auditor to query
which SCTs are considered "legitimate".


> | > | > I'm also a little confused by the last paragraph of 3.1.2, "the selection
> | > | > MUST NOT be influenced by potential HTTPS clients connecting directly to
> | > | > the auditor".  It seems like the only risk of allowing a client to request
> | > | > monitoring for a given site is additional resource usage by the server
> | > | > (assuming the client is aware of the privacy considerations of making such
> | > | > a request).  I suspect that there is a valid concern here, but the text as
> | > | > written may be overly broad.
> | > |
> | > | It's designed to prevent the following traffic analysis:
> | > |
> | > | - Adversary is watching traffic of the auditor and client, and wants
> | > | to learn historical client behavior
> | > | - Client connects to an auditor and sends a bunch of SCTs over HTTPS
> | > | - Auditor immediately goes and queries all the domains the client sent for
> | > | - Adversary learns which domains the client sent in SCTs for
> | >
> | > Should we add text explaining this? Should explanations like this go
> | > into "Security considerations", refering to appropriate sections (like
> | > 3.1.2. in this particular case)?
> |
> | I think it would be fine to mention this in 4.1.2 (near "SCTs [are]
> | sensitive data").
> |
> | I still think it is possible for a properly-written auditor to add sites
> | to monitor in a way which does not expose client information via traffic
> | analysis (i.e., probabilistic/staggered/delayed queries), but I am willing
> | to conced that getting it right is sufficiently hard that we should not be
> | recommending it.
>
> Could this be what 4.1.2 calls "mixing"? We put that down as "TBD" for
> now.

They are very related issues, and TBD for now is fine.  When the mixing
question comes up again, we might think about auditors starting to monitor
more sites as well.



Hmm, re-reading the document just now I noticed a new issue -- in section
3.1.1 ("HTTPS client to server"), the first enumerated action is not
required for interoperability, so I don't think MUST is appropriate.  (It
is explicitly disclaimed as "a pure optimization".)

-Ben


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Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 00:17:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.GSO.1.10.1503241738310.22210@multics.mit.edu>
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On Tue, 24 Mar 2015, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

> On Tue, 24 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:
>
> > Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
> > Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:50:26 -0400 (EDT):
> >
> > | On Mon, 23 Mar 2015, Linus Nordberg wrote:
> > |
> > | > Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote
> > | > Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:38:48 -0500:
> > | >
> > | > | > I'm not
> > | > | > sure that the client wants to always trust the server, given that the
> > | > | > scheme is positing a universe where some clients will sometimes
> > | > | > successfully connect to hostile servers supplied with fraudulent
> > | > | > certificates (that validate) by the attacker.
> > | > |
> > | > | The client is trusting that it will eventually connect to a behaving
> > | > | server and that a server is interested in detecting mis-issuance for
> > | > | itself. Another way to phrase it is that a client is not cordoned off
> > | > | for a given server once and forever, with no way to ever connect to
> > | > | the valid server again
> > |
> > | I know that, and you know that, but we want to make sure that the document
> > | says that as well.  Linus's suggestion below is a good start.
> > |
> > | But this is still not really addressing the issue I was trying to raise.
> > | Yes, the goal of this protocol is to enable a client and server to
> > | cooperate to detect misbehavior by third parties.  But that does not
> > | absolve us of a responsibility to analyze the situation where one of the
> > | client and/or server misbehaves, and document the security and privacy
> > | considerations in that case.
> >
> > Do you have suggested text?
>
> Any text I would suggest would be text that I am not entirely happy with,
> since I do not have confidence that I correctly understand the security
> and privacy considerations in question.
>
> Unfortunately, I left the copy of the document that I marked up at the
> hotel, so I have to recreate my work and only remember one of the places
> that tickled this concern (there were at least two):
>
> In section 3.1.1, """When the client later reconnects to any HTTPS server
> for the same domain it again receives a set of SCTs.  The client [...]
> MUST send to the server the ones in its store that were not received from
> that server."""  This precludes the client from doing any sort of MITM
> detection and refusing to send SCTs to a (presumed) attacker.  Admittedly,
> the scope of exposure here is pretty small; it seems like the only privacy
> loss would be that attacker A who has MITM'd the client then can learn
> whether the client has *also* been MITM'd by attacker B at some point in
> the past (since presumably the attackers know which SCTs are legitimate).
> But, it is not too much of a stretch to think that three-letter
> organizations might want to know if their target is being attacked by
> someone else.

It looks like the other one was in 3.1.2, "HTTPS servers MUST NOT share
any other data that they may learn from the submission of SCTs by HTTP
clients".  My immediate response to that statement was "what goes wrong if
a server misbehaves?"  Thinking about it now, it seems like the answer is
"not very much, compared to a misbehaving server which does not implement
CT", but confirmation would be nice.  Maybe my response to this line of
thought would be to remove the RFC 2119 language and just ensure it's in
the security/privacy considerations, but it's probably not a big deal
either way.

-Ben


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From: Linus Nordberg <linus@nordu.net>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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References: <alpine.GSO.1.10.1503222238550.22210@multics.mit.edu> <87h9tcge8a.fsf@nordberg.se> <alpine.GSO.1.10.1503231032585.22210@multics.mit.edu> <877fu6c0d2.fsf@nordberg.se> <alpine.GSO.1.10.1503241735030.22210@multics.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 06:58:08 +0100
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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Tue, 24 Mar 2015 17:37:25 -0400 (EDT):

| Ah, looking at the diff makes what is going on more clear.  7c9801f is
| probably not helping very much; there seems to be some issue with the
| conversion process from markdown.  If you look at
| https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01#section-4.1.3 ,
| the bulleted list from the markdown ... isn't.  I have no experience with
| writing I-Ds in markdown, but I am sure there are some experts who can be
| consulted.

Oh! Fixed in e261141.


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Tue, 24 Mar 2015 18:16:06 -0400 (EDT):

| In section 3.1.1, """When the client later reconnects to any HTTPS server
| for the same domain it again receives a set of SCTs.  The client [...]
| MUST send to the server the ones in its store that were not received from
| that server."""  This precludes the client from doing any sort of MITM
| detection and refusing to send SCTs to a (presumed) attacker.  Admittedly,
| the scope of exposure here is pretty small; it seems like the only privacy
| loss would be that attacker A who has MITM'd the client then can learn
| whether the client has *also* been MITM'd by attacker B at some point in
| the past (since presumably the attackers know which SCTs are legitimate).
| But, it is not too much of a stretch to think that three-letter
| organizations might want to know if their target is being attacked by
| someone else.

That's an interesting attack. The best thing I can come up with right
now would be to s/MUST/SHOULD/1 and leave it at that.

I have very little clue about how that would change implementors minds
about the whole thing though. Guidance welcome.


| > | > | > In a related vein, in 3.1.2, should the server be allowed to exclude SCTs
| > | > | > that it considers legitimate?
| > | > |
| > | > | This is an optimization: if a server sends you SCTs A,B,C and then you
| > | > | as a client report back to it "I know about SCTs A, B, and C - it
| > | > | doesn't make a whole lot of sense for a server to report those to the
| > | > | auditor.
| > | > |
| > | > | I suppose; however, that an attacker may feed a server invalid SCTs
| > | > | somehow to 'load it's cache' such that it never reports them. So
| > | > | perhaps yes, it should report the SCTs it knows about to an auditor.
| > | >
| > | > I'm thinking of SCT's being legitimate as a "policy decision" made by
| > | > the operator and not something a piece of software decides. Does this
| > | > make sense? Should we add text to explain this?
| > |
| > | I guess I'm coming at this from the assumption that an auditor will want
| > | to know about all SCTs for a given site, including the "legitimate" ones.
| > | On the other hand, it could be useful for the site to have a way to
| > | indicate to an external auditor which SCTs it believes are legitimate.
| > | But it's not clear that omitting them from the results is the best way to
| > | make that indication, since it is not distinguishable from the site not
| > | knowing about those SCTs.  In short, is the extra complexity of making
| > | this optional justified?
| >
| > Backing up a bit, the question can be posed as whether the optimisation
| > of not sending them all is justified. This is somewhat related to the
| > open question of how (push vs. pull) and how often and much auditors and
| > web servers gossip. Getting an idea about the quantity of data would
| > help. I don't have any numbers at the moment.
| 
| 
| Waiting for data seems like a fine plan for now.
| 
| I do wonder if there should be an explicit way for an auditor to query
| which SCTs are considered "legitimate".

I've been thinking about some "score" mechanism too. My gut feeling is
that it complicates an already complicated matter. Open to suggestions
though.


| Hmm, re-reading the document just now I noticed a new issue -- in section
| 3.1.1 ("HTTPS client to server"), the first enumerated action is not
| required for interoperability, so I don't think MUST is appropriate.  (It
| is explicitly disclaimed as "a pure optimization".)

Right. I think I fixed that in d07126a.


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote
Wed, 25 Mar 2015 00:17:26 -0400 (EDT):

| It looks like the other one was in 3.1.2, "HTTPS servers MUST NOT share
| any other data that they may learn from the submission of SCTs by HTTP
| clients".  My immediate response to that statement was "what goes wrong if
| a server misbehaves?"  Thinking about it now, it seems like the answer is
| "not very much, compared to a misbehaving server which does not implement
| CT", but confirmation would be nice.  Maybe my response to this line of
| thought would be to remove the RFC 2119 language and just ensure it's in
| the security/privacy considerations, but it's probably not a big deal
| either way.

We are giving server implementors a new vehicle to hurt the privacy of
their clients. It seems proper to make sure it's not being used for
that.

That said, I'm not well versed in 2119 language. I'll wait for more
comments on this.

Thanks!


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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:10:19 -0500
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To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01: gossiping STHs
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On 24 March 2015 at 16:48, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
> If TLS clients and servers send each other STHs, then realistically, there
> is no privacy issue: everyone has all STHs.

I had thought about this for a while, I'm going to outline my train of
thought as briefly as I can, but it'll still be a tad long.

How do I (TLS Client) get STH's? Few ideas:

- Request them from logs from a given SCT (and logs learn my browsing
habits, that's bad)
- Request the latest SCT-head from logs (less privacy-worrying, but
still - I don't like the idea of my browser calling out to random
third parties so they can attempt to track me and learn my online
habits)
- My browser proxies latest SCT-head in update checks??
- Servers send me STH's (and Inclusion proofs?) with an SCT
- Servers proxy STH (and inclusion proof) requests for a client

Proxying is not a fully deployable mechanism. Not all server operators
are willing to allow outbound connections from servers, you have to be
whitelist log addresses to avoid becoming a full proxy. Even if I did
get STH's this way there is still a problem. So I'm ruling that out.

A STH is minorly useful, in that it's a signed statement we may catch
a log having lied about.  But without an inclusion proof for a SCT, a
STH is just a dead piece of data the client holds and then gives to
someone in the hope it's useful later. Assume a client gets an
inclusion proof along with an STH. This is one more component of the
lie, but still, is just dead data that does not significantly help the
client.

Are STH's (by themselves) even useful for detecting misissuance? No.
If we assume a log will misbehave we have to assume a log will try to
cover up it's misbehavior. This means an SCT will have a valid STH
associated, and that a log will be willing to continue a 'fork'
(including all other SCTs, so differing in only a single node)
essentially forever in the hope of not getting caught.  So assume the
STH 'branch' extends from the point of misissuance until present day.
So we need consistency proofs.

An STH (even on the misissuance branch) is not useful without linking
that STH to another STH. There is value in linking STHs with
consistency proofs - if one cannot get a consistency proof between two
STH's _then_ you've detected log misbehavior. But how does someone get
consistency proofs? They can only come from the log. So either the
client attempts to resolve consistency proofs itself (this brings us
back to the original problem of asking a log or proxies, so we rule
this out) or the client passes on STH's for someone else to resolve
consistency proofs.

Of note: if I've been attacked, and have a STH on a misissuance branch
I will _never_ just 'happen' to get a consistency proof that shows
it's an attack. I'll always have an STH hanging out I can't connect,
but also can't be certain _isn't_ connected. I can _only_ detect
misissuance by _actively_ querying a log for a consistency proof
between by misissuance STH and a valid STH.

Another issue with STH's is (at present) they can be uniquely
identifiable. A log can (as I read 6962) create a new STH for every
SCT they create. This is unrealistic, and it's not the bedrock of my
argument, but it's worth noting. Regardless of that loophole, a STH is
somewhat identifiable (and potentially a tracking mechanism) depending
on the algorithm they are given. Design me an algorithm, and you can
find some amount of privacy leak in it. (For example, a SCT can reveal
last online time. Or, in conjunction with other STH's, it can reveal
some indication of what sites you visited.)

Another independent component: I assume a client does _not_ have a
trusted auditor, because said auditor is basically some third party
you're going to send your SCT (aka browsing history) to. And who is
doing to run the default auditors? Privacy problem, the same as OCSP
lookups. (nb. a client can obviously opt-in to a trust auditor)  In
some cases I note "something can only come from a log" but it could
probably some from an auditor. But the problem is the same: who is
this auditor/log we're willing to release data to by default?


Gossiping STHs seems natural, but I could not arrive at a way to
connect all the data in a privacy preserving manner.  If we follow
strict privacy protection this is what I arrived at:
A) Clients get STH's (from servers I must conclude) but don't care
about them. (Or they get STH's + Inclusion Proofs and validate the
proof)
B) Clients pass the STH back to someone (which must be the server it
got it from.  (Or a opt-in trusted auditor))
C) An auditor collects the STHs from somewhere (must be servers
following from (B)) and retrieves consistency proofs between them.

Misissuance is detected at (C). Because the client itself does not do
anything with a STH, and because a SCT will always resolve to an STH,
it seemed like it would be both simpler and bandwidth reduction to
just cut it out.

-tom


From nobody Wed Mar 25 16:22:10 2015
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Rich,

> ....
>
> Any interest in a document describing client behavior?  No enthusiasm; 
> to be on list
>
I volunteered to work on this, noting that I had already documented proposed
Monitor behavior on the list, and proposed optional log behavior as well.

Steve

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    Rich,<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:02ee5dba9637499fb78676aceea3c0d6@usma1ex-dag1mb2.msg.corp.akamai.com"
      type="cite">
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        <p class="MsoNormal">Any interest in a document describing
          client behavior?  No enthusiasm; to be on list</p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    I volunteered to work on this, noting that I had already documented
    proposed<br>
    Monitor behavior on the list, and proposed optional log behavior as
    well.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From nobody Thu Mar 26 07:58:43 2015
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Subject: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01 doesn't work
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Dear all,

Suppose I can consistently redirect a client C to a masquerading
server M. The proposed gossip mechanism will not detect this, as SCTs
are only ever sent back to the server they are received from. This
should be fixed by having clients gossip constantly about STHs, thus
ensuring that if any honest server is contacted, the MITM is detected.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


From nobody Thu Mar 26 08:50:07 2015
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01 doesn't work
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On Thu, 26 Mar 2015, Watson Ladd wrote:

> Suppose I can consistently redirect a client C to a masquerading
> server M. The proposed gossip mechanism will not detect this, as SCTs
> are only ever sent back to the server they are received from. This
> should be fixed by having clients gossip constantly about STHs, thus
> ensuring that if any honest server is contacted, the MITM is detected.

First of all, this is very unlikely and consumes a lot of resources.

Second, the webserver <-> webclient is not the only path for gossip.
Please have a look at the diagram on page 6 of the gossip presentation
from last Monday:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-3.pdf

Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01 doesn't work
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On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> On Thu, 26 Mar 2015, Watson Ladd wrote:
>> Suppose I can consistently redirect a client C to a masquerading
>> server M. The proposed gossip mechanism will not detect this, as SCTs
>> are only ever sent back to the server they are received from. This
>> should be fixed by having clients gossip constantly about STHs, thus
>> ensuring that if any honest server is contacted, the MITM is detected.
>
> First of all, this is very unlikely and consumes a lot of resources.

For mobile devices that do roam, and not always on the same wireless
provider, it's probably true that it's unlikely, but in all other
cases it seems likely that an MITM can continue being present
indefinitely.

A client could gossip with the user's other devices, but gossiping
with anyone else complicates things, including security
considerations.

> Second, the webserver <-> webclient is not the only path for gossip.
> Please have a look at the diagram on page 6 of the gossip presentation
> from last Monday:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-3.pdf

Slide 7, I think you mean.  Yes, but this won't always happen, and for
a client that can be MITMed continuously we have to consider that the
MITM may MITM the auditor as well.

CT is a step forward, but it's not a miracle.  We have TTPs; all we
can do is make it a bit harder for them to behave badly, particularly
by increasing the likelihood that they will be caught doing so.

Nico
--


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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 11:06:20 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-linus-trans-gossip-ct-01 doesn't work
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On 26 March 2015 at 09:56, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> Suppose I can consistently redirect a client C to a masquerading
> server M. The proposed gossip mechanism will not detect this, as SCTs
> are only ever sent back to the server they are received from. This
> should be fixed by having clients gossip constantly about STHs, thus
> ensuring that if any honest server is contacted, the MITM is detected.

If you are able to isolate a client from a resource _forever_ then
yes, you can win. You can also stop the client from receiving browser
updates, from contacting a client's trusted auditor (if they have
one), from receiving operating system updates, trust root updates, and
so on.

An attacker who can isolate a client from a resource once and forever
is exceptionally difficult to defend against.  It's not clear (to me
at least) what a browser could even do in that situation except refuse
to work at all.  (And I'll note that unless I'm mistaken, every
browser chooses to go the other way and actually fail _open_, removing
security mechanisms if it's been unable to update for a long time.)

-tom


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [Cryptography] Certificate transparency on blockchains
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On 26 March 2015 at 15:45, Greg <greg@kinostudios.com> wrote:
> Reading over it, I still have several concerns, which I will voice here but
> let me know if it would be better to also voice them on [trans].

It would be better to voice them on trans, which I am copying.  I
suggest we move it there for follow-ups.


> In Section 3.1.1, it says:
>
> <begin>
>
> HTTPS servers MUST perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from
>    clients before storing them:
>
>    1.  if a bit-wise compare of the SCT matches one already in the
>        store, discard
>
>    2.  if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for the
>        accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log, discard
>
>    3.  if the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server is
>        authoritative for, discard
>
>    Check number 1 is a pure optimisation.  Check number 2 is to prevent
>    spamming and attacks where an adversary can fill up the store prior
>    to attacking a client.  Check number 3 is to help misbehaving clients
>    from leaking what sites they visit.
>
> </end>
>
> Concern #1: Discarding invalid SCTs
> ============================
>
> It is not clear to me what's going on in (2) above.
>
> Specifically:
>
> - How is the server verifying the SCT for validity?


It checks if the signature over the data is valid.


> - Why is the server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?
>
> Wouldn't discarding an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of clients
> sharing them?


Keeping data for an invalid signature (or a signature for a log which
I do not recognize and thus don't have the public key) would allow
clients to store arbitrary data on your server. Complex rate-limiting
and DoS concerns now apply.



> Concern #2: The use of the word SHOULD
> =================================
>
> The doc states:
>
> (with ref to server => auditor comms):
> <begin>
>
> HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and certificate data they see
>    that pass the checks above
>
> </end>
>
> <begin>
>
> Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of
>    SCT feedback data:
>
> </end>
>
> <begin>
>
> Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known sct-
>    feedback URL.  How to determine which domains to poll is outside the
>    scope of this document
>
>
> </end>
>
>
> As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" means the advice is free to be ignored after the
> implications are "carefully weighed".
>
> This means that so far the document provides no guarantees that a
> misbehaving log will be caught.


Yup. We can't force anyone to participate unfortunately.  A client
_can_ opt-in to using a trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which
then mitigates the concerns over a server not participating.  But I
will note that if a server does not participate they are essentially
opening themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive to
participate.


> It is also disconcerting that instead of taking direct action themselves,


There is nothing stopping a server from being an auditor and detecting
log misbehavior.  I suppose we could add a note in the draft to that
effect, but it's a pretty weighty option I imagine most people will
not pursue.


> servers are supposed to initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an auditor.


(nit: Server can instead just make the SCTs available for auditors to
query and retrieve from them. Server doesn't have to initiate outbound
requests.)


> This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for a global MITM to
> prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again undermining the entire point
> of sharing SCTs.


Yes, an attacker who can persistently isolate a client or server from
the rest of the internet is powerful, and is difficult to defeat. We
do not defend against such an attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,
but none really came to me.


> While it's definitely a positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and
> certificate chains is now an official recommendation, I am concerned that
> the particular implementation is without any teeth to deliver concrete
> results, and so until these concerns are addressed I am not convinced that
> the problem has been fully addressed.


That's fair.  There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but
balancing the very difficult privacy concerns of literally
broadcasting the websites you've visited is also important.


-tom


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(re-sending from the email I use with [trans].)

Thanks Tom for the very helpful reply.

Thinking this through a bit more, I remember again something that was =
previously discussed about this technique.

The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back =
to servers, and that's good, because if that's the case, shouldn't that =
be enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred =
(after the MITM leaves)?

If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. =
It would completely address our concerns about CT's ability to detect =
MITM attacks post-facto.

Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote:

> On 26 March 2015 at 15:45, Greg <greg@kinostudios.com> wrote:
>> Reading over it, I still have several concerns, which I will voice =
here but
>> let me know if it would be better to also voice them on [trans].
>=20
> It would be better to voice them on trans, which I am copying.  I
> suggest we move it there for follow-ups.
>=20
>=20
>> In Section 3.1.1, it says:
>>=20
>> <begin>
>>=20
>> HTTPS servers MUST perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from
>>   clients before storing them:
>>=20
>>   1.  if a bit-wise compare of the SCT matches one already in the
>>       store, discard
>>=20
>>   2.  if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for the
>>       accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log, discard
>>=20
>>   3.  if the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server is
>>       authoritative for, discard
>>=20
>>   Check number 1 is a pure optimisation.  Check number 2 is to =
prevent
>>   spamming and attacks where an adversary can fill up the store prior
>>   to attacking a client.  Check number 3 is to help misbehaving =
clients
>>   from leaking what sites they visit.
>>=20
>> </end>
>>=20
>> Concern #1: Discarding invalid SCTs
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> It is not clear to me what's going on in (2) above.
>>=20
>> Specifically:
>>=20
>> - How is the server verifying the SCT for validity?
>=20
>=20
> It checks if the signature over the data is valid.
>=20
>=20
>> - Why is the server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?
>>=20
>> Wouldn't discarding an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of =
clients
>> sharing them?
>=20
>=20
> Keeping data for an invalid signature (or a signature for a log which
> I do not recognize and thus don't have the public key) would allow
> clients to store arbitrary data on your server. Complex rate-limiting
> and DoS concerns now apply.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> Concern #2: The use of the word SHOULD
>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>=20
>> The doc states:
>>=20
>> (with ref to server =3D> auditor comms):
>> <begin>
>>=20
>> HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and certificate data they see
>>   that pass the checks above
>>=20
>> </end>
>>=20
>> <begin>
>>=20
>> Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of
>>   SCT feedback data:
>>=20
>> </end>
>>=20
>> <begin>
>>=20
>> Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known sct-
>>   feedback URL.  How to determine which domains to poll is outside =
the
>>   scope of this document
>>=20
>>=20
>> </end>
>>=20
>>=20
>> As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" means the advice is free to be ignored after =
the
>> implications are "carefully weighed".
>>=20
>> This means that so far the document provides no guarantees that a
>> misbehaving log will be caught.
>=20
>=20
> Yup. We can't force anyone to participate unfortunately.  A client
> _can_ opt-in to using a trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which
> then mitigates the concerns over a server not participating.  But I
> will note that if a server does not participate they are essentially
> opening themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive to
> participate.
>=20
>=20
>> It is also disconcerting that instead of taking direct action =
themselves,
>=20
>=20
> There is nothing stopping a server from being an auditor and detecting
> log misbehavior.  I suppose we could add a note in the draft to that
> effect, but it's a pretty weighty option I imagine most people will
> not pursue.
>=20
>=20
>> servers are supposed to initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an =
auditor.
>=20
>=20
> (nit: Server can instead just make the SCTs available for auditors to
> query and retrieve from them. Server doesn't have to initiate outbound
> requests.)
>=20
>=20
>> This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for a global =
MITM to
>> prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again undermining the entire =
point
>> of sharing SCTs.
>=20
>=20
> Yes, an attacker who can persistently isolate a client or server from
> the rest of the internet is powerful, and is difficult to defeat. We
> do not defend against such an attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,
> but none really came to me.
>=20
>=20
>> While it's definitely a positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and
>> certificate chains is now an official recommendation, I am concerned =
that
>> the particular implementation is without any teeth to deliver =
concrete
>> results, and so until these concerns are addressed I am not convinced =
that
>> the problem has been fully addressed.
>=20
>=20
> That's fair.  There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but
> balancing the very difficult privacy concerns of literally
> broadcasting the websites you've visited is also important.
>=20
>=20
> -tom
> _______________________________________________
> The cryptography mailing list
> cryptography@metzdowd.com
> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography


--Apple-Mail=_114DEA74-7AFD-433D-9597-FEAF9CC4D222
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><i>(re-sending from the email I use with =
[trans].)</i></div><div><br></div>Thanks Tom for the very helpful =
reply.<div><br></div><div>Thinking this through a bit more, I remember =
again something that was previously discussed about this =
technique.<div><br></div><div>The document does say that clients MUST =
send the certificate chain back to servers, and that's good, because if =
that's the case, shouldn't that be enough on its own for servers to =
detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the MITM =
leaves)?<div><br></div><div>If that is so, it seems like a point worth =
highlighting in the document. It would completely address our concerns =
about CT's ability to detect MITM attacks =
post-facto.</div><div><br></div><div>Greg</div><div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;">--</span><br style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2;"><span style=3D"orphans: =
2; widows: 2;">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span></div></div></div></div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br><div><div>On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tom@ritter.vg">tom@ritter.vg</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 26 =
March 2015 at 15:45, Greg &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:greg@kinostudios.com">greg@kinostudios.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Reading over it, I still have =
several concerns, which I will voice here but<br>let me know if it would =
be better to also voice them on [trans].<br></blockquote><br>It would be =
better to voice them on trans, which I am copying. &nbsp;I<br>suggest we =
move it there for follow-ups.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">In =
Section 3.1.1, it says:<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers MUST =
perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;clients =
before storing them:<br><br> &nbsp;&nbsp;1. &nbsp;if a bit-wise compare =
of the SCT matches one already in the<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;store, discard<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;2. &nbsp;if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for =
the<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;accompanying leaf cert, =
issued by a known log, discard<br><br> &nbsp;&nbsp;3. &nbsp;if the leaf =
cert is not for a domain that the server is<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authoritative for, discard<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;Check number 1 is a pure optimisation. &nbsp;Check number 2 =
is to prevent<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;spamming and attacks where an adversary =
can fill up the store prior<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;to attacking a client. =
&nbsp;Check number 3 is to help misbehaving clients<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;from =
leaking what sites they visit.<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>Concern #1: =
Discarding invalid SCTs<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>It is not clear to me what's =
going on in (2) above.<br><br>Specifically:<br><br>- How is the server =
verifying the SCT for validity?<br></blockquote><br><br>It checks if the =
signature over the data is valid.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">- =
Why is the server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?<br><br>Wouldn't =
discarding an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of =
clients<br>sharing them?<br></blockquote><br><br>Keeping data for an =
invalid signature (or a signature for a log which<br>I do not recognize =
and thus don't have the public key) would allow<br>clients to store =
arbitrary data on your server. Complex rate-limiting<br>and DoS concerns =
now apply.<br><br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Concern #2: The use =
of the word SHOULD<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>The doc =
states:<br><br>(with ref to server =3D&gt; auditor =
comms):<br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and =
certificate data they see<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;that pass the checks =
above<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors SHOULD =
provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;SCT =
feedback data:<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors =
SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known sct-<br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;feedback URL. &nbsp;How to determine which domains to poll =
is outside the<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;scope of this =
document<br><br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br><br>As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" =
means the advice is free to be ignored after the<br>implications are =
"carefully weighed".<br><br>This means that so far the document provides =
no guarantees that a<br>misbehaving log will be =
caught.<br></blockquote><br><br>Yup. We can't force anyone to =
participate unfortunately. &nbsp;A client<br>_can_ opt-in to using a =
trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which<br>then mitigates the =
concerns over a server not participating. &nbsp;But I<br>will note that =
if a server does not participate they are essentially<br>opening =
themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive =
to<br>participate.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">It is also =
disconcerting that instead of taking direct action =
themselves,<br></blockquote><br><br>There is nothing stopping a server =
from being an auditor and detecting<br>log misbehavior. &nbsp;I suppose =
we could add a note in the draft to that<br>effect, but it's a pretty =
weighty option I imagine most people will<br>not =
pursue.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">servers are supposed to =
initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an =
auditor.<br></blockquote><br><br>(nit: Server can instead just make the =
SCTs available for auditors to<br>query and retrieve from them. Server =
doesn't have to initiate outbound<br>requests.)<br><br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for =
a global MITM to<br>prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again =
undermining the entire point<br>of sharing =
SCTs.<br></blockquote><br><br>Yes, an attacker who can persistently =
isolate a client or server from<br>the rest of the internet is powerful, =
and is difficult to defeat. We<br>do not defend against such an =
attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,<br>but none really came to =
me.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">While it's definitely a =
positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and<br>certificate chains is now =
an official recommendation, I am concerned that<br>the particular =
implementation is without any teeth to deliver concrete<br>results, and =
so until these concerns are addressed I am not convinced that<br>the =
problem has been fully addressed.<br></blockquote><br><br>That's fair. =
&nbsp;There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but<br>balancing =
the very difficult privacy concerns of literally<br>broadcasting the =
websites you've visited is also =
important.<br><br><br>-tom<br>____________________________________________=
___<br>The cryptography mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br=
>http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography<br></blockquote></d=
iv><br></body></html>=

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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #4 (rfc6962-bis): Should we sign TBS for Certificates?
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#4: Should we sign TBS for Certificates?


Comment (by eranm@google.com):

 There seems to be a consensus among the authors that this is a good idea.
 As Emilia Kasper put it:
 "I can see only strong benefits in this: 1) unifying the handling of
 precertificates and certificates and 2) avoiding all sorts of library
 slack and brokenness in handling the unsigned component of the
 certificates."
 That implies that the signature in the SCT will not cover the signature in
 the X.509 certificate itself, so it would validate for different
 certificates that are the same TBSCertificate, signed with the same key
 multiple times (potentially yielding different signatures).
 To allow auditing of the original submission, I propose adding a field to
 the PrecertChainEntryV2/X509ChainEntry struct (which will be unified) to
 include the original submission.

-- 
------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm@google.com  |       Owner:  benl@google.com
     Type:  defect            |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major             |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/4#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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#4: Should we sign TBS for Certificates?


Comment (by rob.stradling@comodo.com):

 Eran, don't the existing PrecertChainEntryV2/X509ChainEntry structs
 already hold the original submission?

 Can't we resolve this ticket just by changing
 !SignedCertificateTimestamp.signed_entry and
 !TimestampedEntry.signed_entry from...
                select(entry_type) {
                    case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
                    case precert_entry_V2: TBSCertificate;
                } signed_entry;
 ...to...
                select(entry_type) {
                    case x509_entry: TBSCertificate;
                    case precert_entry_V2: TBSCertificate;
                } signed_entry;

 I think it makes sense to retain a different struct for each
 !LogEntryType, rather than try to unify them.  New !LogEntryType values
 might be defined in future that aren't unifiable with the existing two.

-- 
------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm@google.com  |       Owner:  benl@google.com
     Type:  defect            |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major             |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/4#comment:4>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 12:45:04 +0000
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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
To: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Trans] AIA/cRL for logged certificates
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I'd like to get opinions from the list on solutions to the following
problem, which Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Precertificates
currently, but would apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.

An "undesirable" certificate is issued and logged (without including
Authority Information Access / CRL distribution point) and upon discovery
is revoked - the CRL distribution point in the issuer or one of the
intermediate certs will list it as revoked.
That certificate would be signed a second time with the same issuer key,
but not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the first certificate
is valid for the second one). When it is served, it is served together with
a chain that is different than the one logged, and the issuer or
intermediates in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL that does *not*
show list this certificate as revoked (The implied assumption is that the
attacker controls the private key of the issuer).

Implication: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by
validating the SCT and performing an online revocation check.

Potential mitigations:
- Require that the client only use the AIA/CRL distribution point from the
chain logged in the CT log (which forces the client to fetch it online,
before completing the connection).
- Require the presence of AIA/CRL distribution point in the end-entity
certificate.

Any other suggestions?
Eran

--001a113de10c6404a00512448010
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like to get opinions from the list on solutions to=
 the following problem, which Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Pre=
certificates currently, but would apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 =
is accepted.<div><br></div><div>An &quot;undesirable&quot; certificate is i=
ssued and logged (without including Authority Information Access / CRL dist=
ribution point) and upon discovery is revoked - the CRL distribution point =
in the issuer or one of the intermediate certs will list it as revoked.</di=
v><div>That certificate would be signed a second time with the same issuer =
key, but not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the first certif=
icate is valid for the second one). When it is served, it is served togethe=
r with a chain that is different than the one logged, and the issuer or int=
ermediates in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL that does *not* show =
list this certificate as revoked (The implied assumption is that the attack=
er controls the private key of the issuer).</div><div><br></div><div>Implic=
ation: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by validating the =
SCT and performing an online revocation check.</div><div><br></div><div>Pot=
ential mitigations:</div><div>- Require that the client only use the AIA/CR=
L distribution point from the chain logged in the CT log (which forces the =
client to fetch it online, before completing the connection).</div><div>- R=
equire the presence of AIA/CRL distribution point in the end-entity certifi=
cate.</div><div><br></div><div>Any other suggestions?</div><div>Eran</div><=
/div>

--001a113de10c6404a00512448010--


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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] AIA/cRL for logged certificates
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On 27 March 2015 at 12:45, Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com> wrote:

> I'd like to get opinions from the list on solutions to the following
> problem, which Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Precertificates
> currently, but would apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.
>
> An "undesirable" certificate is issued and logged (without including
> Authority Information Access / CRL distribution point) and upon discovery
> is revoked - the CRL distribution point in the issuer or one of the
> intermediate certs will list it as revoked.
> That certificate would be signed a second time with the same issuer key,
> but not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the first certificate
> is valid for the second one). When it is served, it is served together with
> a chain that is different than the one logged, and the issuer or
> intermediates in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL that does *not*
> show list this certificate as revoked (The implied assumption is that the
> attacker controls the private key of the issuer).
>
> Implication: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by
> validating the SCT and performing an online revocation check.
>
> Potential mitigations:
> - Require that the client only use the AIA/CRL distribution point from the
> chain logged in the CT log (which forces the client to fetch it online,
> before completing the connection).
>

Then its not a potential mitigation!


> - Require the presence of AIA/CRL distribution point in the end-entity
> certificate.
>
> Any other suggestions?
> Eran
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On 27 March 2015 at 12:45, Eran Messeri <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:eranm@google.com" target=3D"_blank">eranm@google.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;d like =
to get opinions from the list on solutions to the following problem, which =
Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Precertificates currently, but wo=
uld apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.<div><br></div><di=
v>An &quot;undesirable&quot; certificate is issued and logged (without incl=
uding Authority Information Access / CRL distribution point) and upon disco=
very is revoked - the CRL distribution point in the issuer or one of the in=
termediate certs will list it as revoked.</div><div>That certificate would =
be signed a second time with the same issuer key, but not logged a second t=
ime (as the SCT produced for the first certificate is valid for the second =
one). When it is served, it is served together with a chain that is differe=
nt than the one logged, and the issuer or intermediates in this chain point=
 to a different AIA/CRL that does *not* show list this certificate as revok=
ed (The implied assumption is that the attacker controls the private key of=
 the issuer).</div><div><br></div><div>Implication: A client believes it ha=
s a legitimate certificate by validating the SCT and performing an online r=
evocation check.</div><div><br></div><div>Potential mitigations:</div><div>=
- Require that the client only use the AIA/CRL distribution point from the =
chain logged in the CT log (which forces the client to fetch it online, bef=
ore completing the connection).</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>Then its not a potential mitigation!</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>- Require the presence of AIA/CRL dis=
tribution point in the end-entity certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>Any=
 other suggestions?</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><di=
v>Eran</div></font></span></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 08:51:20 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
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Thread-Topic: [Trans] AIA/cRL for logged certificates
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From:  Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date:  Friday, March 27, 2015 at 8:47 AM
To:  Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
Cc:  "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [Trans] AIA/cRL for logged certificates

> 
> 
> On 27 March 2015 at 12:45, Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com> wrote:
>> I'd like to get opinions from the list on solutions to the following problem,
>> which Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Precertificates currently,
>> but would apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.
>> 
>> An "undesirable" certificate is issued and logged (without including
>> Authority Information Access / CRL distribution point) and upon discovery is
>> revoked - the CRL distribution point in the issuer or one of the intermediate
>> certs will list it as revoked.
>> That certificate would be signed a second time with the same issuer key, but
>> not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the first certificate is
>> valid for the second one). When it is served, it is served together with a
>> chain that is different than the one logged, and the issuer or intermediates
>> in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL that does *not* show list this
>> certificate as revoked (The implied assumption is that the attacker controls
>> the private key of the issuer).
>> 
>> Implication: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by validating
>> the SCT and performing an online revocation check.
>> 
>> Potential mitigations:
>> - Require that the client only use the AIA/CRL distribution point from the
>> chain logged in the CT log (which forces the client to fetch it online,
>> before completing the connection).
> 
> Then its not a potential mitigation!

This option would not necessarily work as the CRL referenced by the DP in
the log may not cover the newly issued certificate.

>  
>> - Require the presence of AIA/CRL distribution point in the end-entity
>> certificate.
>> 
>> Any other suggestions?
>> Eran
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans



--B_3510291083_7098146
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_B=
ODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:lef=
t; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDIN=
G-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1p=
t solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weig=
ht:bold">From: </span> Ben Laurie &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:benl@google.com">benl@=
google.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Friday, M=
arch 27, 2015 at 8:47 AM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Eran =
Messeri &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eranm@google.com">eranm@google.com</a>&gt;<br><s=
pan style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> "<a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org">tr=
ans@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org">trans@ietf.org</a>&gt;=
<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [Trans] AIA/cRL for =
logged certificates<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTR=
IBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MA=
RGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">On 27 March 2015 at 12:45, Eran Messeri <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:eranm@google.com" target=3D"_blank">eranm@google.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I'd like to get opinion=
s from the list on solutions to the following problem, which Ben originally =
pointed out. It applies to Precertificates currently, but would apply to X.5=
09 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.<div><br></div><div>An "undesirable=
" certificate is issued and logged (without including Authority Information =
Access / CRL distribution point) and upon discovery is revoked - the CRL dis=
tribution point in the issuer or one of the intermediate certs will list it =
as revoked.</div><div>That certificate would be signed a second time with th=
e same issuer key, but not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the=
 first certificate is valid for the second one). When it is served, it is se=
rved together with a chain that is different than the one logged, and the is=
suer or intermediates in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL that does *=
not* show list this certificate as revoked (The implied assumption is that t=
he attacker controls the private key of the issuer).</div><div><br></div><di=
v>Implication: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by validati=
ng the SCT and performing an online revocation check.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Potential mitigations:</div><div>- Require that the client only use the A=
IA/CRL distribution point from the chain logged in the CT log (which forces =
the client to fetch it online, before completing the connection).</div></div=
></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Then its not a potential mitigation!</div>=
</div></div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>This option would =
not necessarily work as the CRL referenced by the DP in the log may not cove=
r the newly issued certificate.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_S=
ECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LE=
FT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>- Require the presence of AIA/CRL distributio=
n point in the end-entity certificate.</div><div><br></div><div>Any other su=
ggestions?</div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div>Eran</div></=
font></span></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br=
><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">https=
://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br><br></blockquote></div><br></d=
iv></div>
_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3510291083_7098146--



From nobody Fri Mar 27 06:50:57 2015
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] AIA/cRL for logged certificates
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On 27/03/15 12:45, Eran Messeri wrote:
> I'd like to get opinions from the list on solutions to the following
> problem, which Ben originally pointed out. It applies to Precertificates
> currently, but would apply to X.509 certificates if ticket #4 is accepted.
>
> An "undesirable" certificate is issued and logged (without including
> Authority Information Access / CRL distribution point) and upon
> discovery is revoked - the CRL distribution point in the issuer or one
> of the intermediate certs will list it as revoked.

RFC5280 Section 5 says:
   "If the scope of the CRL includes one or more certificates issued by
    an entity other than the CRL issuer, then it is an indirect CRL.  The
    scope of an indirect CRL may be limited to certificates issued by a
    single CA or may include certificates issued by multiple CAs."

I don't think I've ever encountered an indirect CRL before, and I have 
no idea how widely supported they are.

Since the scope of a "normal" CRL typically only includes "child" certs, 
not "grandchild" certs, the CRLs pointed to by the CDP in the 
issuer/intermediate certs will _not_ list the "undesirable" certificate 
as revoked.

> That certificate would be signed a second time with the same issuer key,
> but not logged a second time (as the SCT produced for the first
> certificate is valid for the second one). When it is served, it is
> served together with a chain that is different than the one logged, and
> the issuer or intermediates in this chain point to a different AIA/CRL
> that does *not* show list this certificate as revoked

There's nothing to stop a TLS server from serving a logged cert plus a 
different set of issuer/intermediate certs than the set that was logged. 
  Re-signing but not re-logging makes no difference here, AFAICT.

> (The implied assumption is that the attacker controls the private key of
> the issuer).

If they control the private key, then there's a good chance they control 
the CRL/OCSP servers too.  Until we have Revocation Transparency, 
nothing prevents this attacker (or an evil CA, for that matter) from 
creating a split view of revocation information served from the same 
revocation server URL.

> Implication: A client believes it has a legitimate certificate by
> validating the SCT and performing an online revocation check.
>
> Potential mitigations:
> - Require that the client only use the AIA/CRL distribution point from
> the chain logged in the CT log (which forces the client to fetch it
> online, before completing the connection).
> - Require the presence of AIA/CRL distribution point in the end-entity
> certificate.
>
> Any other suggestions?

Didn't we decide long ago that fixing revocation is out of scope for CT?

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #79 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the TBSCertificate
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#79: Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the
TBSCertificate

 If I understand the CMS spec correctly, then we're currently defining a
 Precertificate to be a CMS structure that contains a TBSCertificate and a
 signature over just that TBSCertificate.
 That means that the components of a Precertificate can be trivially
 rearranged into an X.509 certificate with a valid signature!

 To fix this, we need to either...

 1. Require the SignedData.encapContentInfo.eContent field to contain
 "something || TBSCertificate" or "TBSCertificate || something".
 or
 2. Require a signed attribute to be present in
 SignedData.signerInfos[0].signedAttrs.  This is essentially equivalent to
 "TBSCertificate || something" in terms of what gets signed.

 I think 2 is the cleaner solution, unless there's a cryptographic reason
 to prefer "something || TBSCertificate" (e.g. to protect against chosen
 prefix collisions?)

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
 Priority:  blocker                  |  Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |    Version:
 Severity:  -                        |   Keywords:
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #79 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the TBSCertificate
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#79: Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the
TBSCertificate

Changes (by rob.stradling@comodo.com):

 * owner:  draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org =>
     rob.stradling@comodo.com
 * status:  new => assigned


-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  assigned
 Priority:  blocker                  |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #79 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the TBSCertificate
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#79: Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the
TBSCertificate


Comment (by benl@google.com):

 It is unclear to me whether this is really a problem.

 RFC 5652 says: "The input to the signature generation process includes the
 result of
    the message digest calculation process and the signer's private key.
    The details of the signature generation depend on the signature
    algorithm employed."

 It then defers to RFC 5280 for the actual definition of the algorithms.

 AFAIK, RFC 5280 only specifies algorithms that are intended to work on
 bulk data (i.e. TBSCertificates), and hence they always digest the data
 first.

 This would imply that the signature would be over a digest of a digest.
 However, its not the clearest RFC I ever read. If that interpretation is
 correct, then there is no problem.

 If there is a problem, I agree that option 2 is better.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  assigned
 Priority:  blocker                  |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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(Changed the thread's subject title to reduce likelihood this question =
was missed:)

The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back =
to servers, and that's good, because if that's the case, shouldn't that =
be enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred =
(after the MITM leaves)?

If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. =
It would completely address our concerns about CT's ability to detect =
MITM attacks post-facto.

Thanks,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:12 AM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> (re-sending from the email I use with [trans].)
>=20
> Thanks Tom for the very helpful reply.
>=20
> Thinking this through a bit more, I remember again something that was =
previously discussed about this technique.
>=20
> The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain =
back to servers, and that's good, because if that's the case, shouldn't =
that be enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack =
occurred (after the MITM leaves)?
>=20
> If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the =
document. It would completely address our concerns about CT's ability to =
detect MITM attacks post-facto.
>=20
> Greg
>=20
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.
>=20
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.
>=20
> On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote:
>=20
>> On 26 March 2015 at 15:45, Greg <greg@kinostudios.com> wrote:
>>> Reading over it, I still have several concerns, which I will voice =
here but
>>> let me know if it would be better to also voice them on [trans].
>>=20
>> It would be better to voice them on trans, which I am copying.  I
>> suggest we move it there for follow-ups.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> In Section 3.1.1, it says:
>>>=20
>>> <begin>
>>>=20
>>> HTTPS servers MUST perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from
>>>   clients before storing them:
>>>=20
>>>   1.  if a bit-wise compare of the SCT matches one already in the
>>>       store, discard
>>>=20
>>>   2.  if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for the
>>>       accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log, discard
>>>=20
>>>   3.  if the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server is
>>>       authoritative for, discard
>>>=20
>>>   Check number 1 is a pure optimisation.  Check number 2 is to =
prevent
>>>   spamming and attacks where an adversary can fill up the store =
prior
>>>   to attacking a client.  Check number 3 is to help misbehaving =
clients
>>>   from leaking what sites they visit.
>>>=20
>>> </end>
>>>=20
>>> Concern #1: Discarding invalid SCTs
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>=20
>>> It is not clear to me what's going on in (2) above.
>>>=20
>>> Specifically:
>>>=20
>>> - How is the server verifying the SCT for validity?
>>=20
>>=20
>> It checks if the signature over the data is valid.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> - Why is the server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?
>>>=20
>>> Wouldn't discarding an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of =
clients
>>> sharing them?
>>=20
>>=20
>> Keeping data for an invalid signature (or a signature for a log which
>> I do not recognize and thus don't have the public key) would allow
>> clients to store arbitrary data on your server. Complex rate-limiting
>> and DoS concerns now apply.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>> Concern #2: The use of the word SHOULD
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>=20
>>> The doc states:
>>>=20
>>> (with ref to server =3D> auditor comms):
>>> <begin>
>>>=20
>>> HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and certificate data they see
>>>   that pass the checks above
>>>=20
>>> </end>
>>>=20
>>> <begin>
>>>=20
>>> Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of
>>>   SCT feedback data:
>>>=20
>>> </end>
>>>=20
>>> <begin>
>>>=20
>>> Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known sct-
>>>   feedback URL.  How to determine which domains to poll is outside =
the
>>>   scope of this document
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> </end>
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" means the advice is free to be ignored =
after the
>>> implications are "carefully weighed".
>>>=20
>>> This means that so far the document provides no guarantees that a
>>> misbehaving log will be caught.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Yup. We can't force anyone to participate unfortunately.  A client
>> _can_ opt-in to using a trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which
>> then mitigates the concerns over a server not participating.  But I
>> will note that if a server does not participate they are essentially
>> opening themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive to
>> participate.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> It is also disconcerting that instead of taking direct action =
themselves,
>>=20
>>=20
>> There is nothing stopping a server from being an auditor and =
detecting
>> log misbehavior.  I suppose we could add a note in the draft to that
>> effect, but it's a pretty weighty option I imagine most people will
>> not pursue.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> servers are supposed to initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an =
auditor.
>>=20
>>=20
>> (nit: Server can instead just make the SCTs available for auditors to
>> query and retrieve from them. Server doesn't have to initiate =
outbound
>> requests.)
>>=20
>>=20
>>> This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for a global =
MITM to
>>> prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again undermining the =
entire point
>>> of sharing SCTs.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Yes, an attacker who can persistently isolate a client or server from
>> the rest of the internet is powerful, and is difficult to defeat. We
>> do not defend against such an attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,
>> but none really came to me.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> While it's definitely a positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and
>>> certificate chains is now an official recommendation, I am concerned =
that
>>> the particular implementation is without any teeth to deliver =
concrete
>>> results, and so until these concerns are addressed I am not =
convinced that
>>> the problem has been fully addressed.
>>=20
>>=20
>> That's fair.  There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but
>> balancing the very difficult privacy concerns of literally
>> broadcasting the websites you've visited is also important.
>>=20
>>=20
>> -tom
>> _______________________________________________
>> The cryptography mailing list
>> cryptography@metzdowd.com
>> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


--Apple-Mail=_92A61252-4777-4C04-9B7C-97866B1B4E38
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div>(Changed the thread's subject title to reduce =
likelihood this question was missed:)</div><div><br></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">The document does say that =
clients MUST send the certificate chain back to servers, and that's =
good, because if that's the case, shouldn't that be enough on its own =
for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the MITM =
leaves)?</div></div><div><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><br></div></div></div><div><div =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div>If that is so, it seems =
like a point worth highlighting in the document. It would completely =
address our concerns about CT's ability to detect MITM attacks =
post-facto.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,=
</div><div>Greg</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:12 AM, Tao Effect &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:contact@taoeffect.com">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><div><i>(re-sending from the email I use with =
[trans].)</i></div><div><br></div>Thanks Tom for the very helpful =
reply.<div><br></div><div>Thinking this through a bit more, I remember =
again something that was previously discussed about this =
technique.<div><br></div><div>The document does say that clients MUST =
send the certificate chain back to servers, and that's good, because if =
that's the case, shouldn't that be enough on its own for servers to =
detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the MITM =
leaves)?<div><br></div><div>If that is so, it seems like a point worth =
highlighting in the document. It would completely address our concerns =
about CT's ability to detect MITM attacks =
post-facto.</div><div><br></div><div>Greg</div><div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;">--</span><br style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2;"><span style=3D"orphans: =
2; widows: 2;">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span></div></div></div></div><div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">--</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;">&nbsp;with the =
NSA.</span></div><br><div><div>On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tom@ritter.vg">tom@ritter.vg</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On 26 March 2015 at 15:45, Greg &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:greg@kinostudios.com">greg@kinostudios.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Reading over it, I still have =
several concerns, which I will voice here but<br>let me know if it would =
be better to also voice them on [trans].<br></blockquote><br>It would be =
better to voice them on trans, which I am copying. &nbsp;I<br>suggest we =
move it there for follow-ups.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">In =
Section 3.1.1, it says:<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers MUST =
perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;clients =
before storing them:<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;1. &nbsp;if a bit-wise compare =
of the SCT matches one already in =
the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;store, =
discard<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;2. &nbsp;if the SCT can't be verified to be a =
valid SCT for the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;accompanying =
leaf cert, issued by a known log, discard<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;3. &nbsp;if =
the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server =
is<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authoritative for, =
discard<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;Check number 1 is a pure optimisation. =
&nbsp;Check number 2 is to prevent<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;spamming and attacks =
where an adversary can fill up the store prior<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;to =
attacking a client. &nbsp;Check number 3 is to help misbehaving =
clients<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;from leaking what sites they =
visit.<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>Concern #1: Discarding invalid =
SCTs<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>It is not clear to me what's going on in (2) =
above.<br><br>Specifically:<br><br>- How is the server verifying the SCT =
for validity?<br></blockquote><br><br>It checks if the signature over =
the data is valid.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">- Why is the =
server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?<br><br>Wouldn't discarding =
an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of clients<br>sharing =
them?<br></blockquote><br><br>Keeping data for an invalid signature (or =
a signature for a log which<br>I do not recognize and thus don't have =
the public key) would allow<br>clients to store arbitrary data on your =
server. Complex rate-limiting<br>and DoS concerns now =
apply.<br><br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Concern #2: The use of =
the word SHOULD<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>The doc =
states:<br><br>(with ref to server =3D&gt; auditor =
comms):<br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and =
certificate data they see<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;that pass the checks =
above<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors SHOULD =
provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;SCT =
feedback data:<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors =
SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known =
sct-<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;feedback URL. &nbsp;How to determine which domains =
to poll is outside the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;scope of this =
document<br><br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br><br>As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" =
means the advice is free to be ignored after the<br>implications are =
"carefully weighed".<br><br>This means that so far the document provides =
no guarantees that a<br>misbehaving log will be =
caught.<br></blockquote><br><br>Yup. We can't force anyone to =
participate unfortunately. &nbsp;A client<br>_can_ opt-in to using a =
trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which<br>then mitigates the =
concerns over a server not participating. &nbsp;But I<br>will note that =
if a server does not participate they are essentially<br>opening =
themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive =
to<br>participate.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">It is also =
disconcerting that instead of taking direct action =
themselves,<br></blockquote><br><br>There is nothing stopping a server =
from being an auditor and detecting<br>log misbehavior. &nbsp;I suppose =
we could add a note in the draft to that<br>effect, but it's a pretty =
weighty option I imagine most people will<br>not =
pursue.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">servers are supposed to =
initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an =
auditor.<br></blockquote><br><br>(nit: Server can instead just make the =
SCTs available for auditors to<br>query and retrieve from them. Server =
doesn't have to initiate outbound<br>requests.)<br><br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for =
a global MITM to<br>prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again =
undermining the entire point<br>of sharing =
SCTs.<br></blockquote><br><br>Yes, an attacker who can persistently =
isolate a client or server from<br>the rest of the internet is powerful, =
and is difficult to defeat. We<br>do not defend against such an =
attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,<br>but none really came to =
me.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">While it's definitely a =
positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and<br>certificate chains is now =
an official recommendation, I am concerned that<br>the particular =
implementation is without any teeth to deliver concrete<br>results, and =
so until these concerns are addressed I am not convinced that<br>the =
problem has been fully addressed.<br></blockquote><br><br>That's fair. =
&nbsp;There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but<br>balancing =
the very difficult privacy concerns of literally<br>broadcasting the =
websites you've visited is also =
important.<br><br><br>-tom<br>____________________________________________=
___<br>The cryptography mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br=
><a =
href=3D"http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography">http://www.=
metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br></blockquote></div><br>_=
______________________________________________<br>Trans mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans</a></div></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html=
>=

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From nobody Fri Mar 27 11:46:43 2015
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References: <007F2B41-C78E-4332-8206-7E4CB27A638B@kinostudios.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1503252231110.16175@bofh.nohats.ca> <2A773227-61C8-4196-8AFF-EC288A8AF150@kinostudios.com> <CA+cU71=7G5ZJMx3Vy+gXN00JpB61_6C+DLQRyCS=Hcq3vLR-Sg@mail.gmail.com> <CE157D3A-079C-4B09-B138-C21FD9D1FB03@taoeffect.com> <BAD439C7-60C8-44D4-89F9-AC6E5613A5EA@taoeffect.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 21:46:37 +0300
Message-ID: <CADqLbz+8br-F3CJEgTj8K3HmaGdNKfjCSeDtWrDmySmohhjXkw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Cc: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>, Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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Hello all,

On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 9:43 PM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> (Changed the thread's subject title to reduce likelihood this question was
> missed:)
>
> The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back to
> servers, and that's good, because if that's the case, shouldn't that be
> enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred (after
> the MITM leaves)?
>
> If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document.
> It would completely address our concerns about CT's ability to detect MITM
> attacks post-facto.
>
>
I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to send native
certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to client. Or am I
missing something?

Thank you!


>
> Thanks,
> Greg
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
> the NSA.
>
> On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:12 AM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:
>
> *(re-sending from the email I use with [trans].)*
>
> Thanks Tom for the very helpful reply.
>
> Thinking this through a bit more, I remember again something that was
> previously discussed about this technique.
>
> The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back to
> servers, and that's good, because if that's the case, shouldn't that be
> enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred (after
> the MITM leaves)?
>
> If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document.
> It would completely address our concerns about CT's ability to detect MITM
> attacks post-facto.
>
> Greg
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
> the NSA.
>
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
> the NSA.
>
> On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote:
>
> On 26 March 2015 at 15:45, Greg <greg@kinostudios.com> wrote:
>
> Reading over it, I still have several concerns, which I will voice here but
> let me know if it would be better to also voice them on [trans].
>
>
> It would be better to voice them on trans, which I am copying.  I
> suggest we move it there for follow-ups.
>
>
> In Section 3.1.1, it says:
>
> <begin>
>
> HTTPS servers MUST perform a number of sanity checks on SCTs from
>   clients before storing them:
>
>   1.  if a bit-wise compare of the SCT matches one already in the
>       store, discard
>
>   2.  if the SCT can't be verified to be a valid SCT for the
>       accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log, discard
>
>   3.  if the leaf cert is not for a domain that the server is
>       authoritative for, discard
>
>   Check number 1 is a pure optimisation.  Check number 2 is to prevent
>   spamming and attacks where an adversary can fill up the store prior
>   to attacking a client.  Check number 3 is to help misbehaving clients
>   from leaking what sites they visit.
>
> </end>
>
> Concern #1: Discarding invalid SCTs
> ============================
>
> It is not clear to me what's going on in (2) above.
>
> Specifically:
>
> - How is the server verifying the SCT for validity?
>
>
>
> It checks if the signature over the data is valid.
>
>
> - Why is the server discarding the SCT if it is invalid?
>
> Wouldn't discarding an invalid SCT totally undermine the point of clients
> sharing them?
>
>
>
> Keeping data for an invalid signature (or a signature for a log which
> I do not recognize and thus don't have the public key) would allow
> clients to store arbitrary data on your server. Complex rate-limiting
> and DoS concerns now apply.
>
>
>
> Concern #2: The use of the word SHOULD
> =================================
>
> The doc states:
>
> (with ref to server => auditor comms):
> <begin>
>
> HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and certificate data they see
>   that pass the checks above
>
> </end>
>
> <begin>
>
> Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL accepting HTTPS POSTing of
>   SCT feedback data:
>
> </end>
>
> <begin>
>
> Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS servers at the well-known sct-
>   feedback URL.  How to determine which domains to poll is outside the
>   scope of this document
>
>
> </end>
>
>
> As per RFC2119, "SHOULD" means the advice is free to be ignored after the
> implications are "carefully weighed".
>
> This means that so far the document provides no guarantees that a
> misbehaving log will be caught.
>
>
>
> Yup. We can't force anyone to participate unfortunately.  A client
> _can_ opt-in to using a trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, which
> then mitigates the concerns over a server not participating.  But I
> will note that if a server does not participate they are essentially
> opening themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive to
> participate.
>
>
> It is also disconcerting that instead of taking direct action themselves,
>
>
>
> There is nothing stopping a server from being an auditor and detecting
> log misbehavior.  I suppose we could add a note in the draft to that
> effect, but it's a pretty weighty option I imagine most people will
> not pursue.
>
>
> servers are supposed to initiate yet another HTTPS connection to an
> auditor.
>
>
>
> (nit: Server can instead just make the SCTs available for auditors to
> query and retrieve from them. Server doesn't have to initiate outbound
> requests.)
>
>
> This is cumbersome and will probably leave open holes for a global MITM to
> prevent SCTs from reaching auditors, yet again undermining the entire point
> of sharing SCTs.
>
>
>
> Yes, an attacker who can persistently isolate a client or server from
> the rest of the internet is powerful, and is difficult to defeat. We
> do not defend against such an attacker. I'm open to suggestions here,
> but none really came to me.
>
>
> While it's definitely a positive sign that the sharing of SCTs and
> certificate chains is now an official recommendation, I am concerned that
> the particular implementation is without any teeth to deliver concrete
> results, and so until these concerns are addressed I am not convinced that
> the problem has been fully addressed.
>
>
>
> That's fair.  There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but
> balancing the very difficult privacy concerns of literally
> broadcasting the websites you've visited is also important.
>
>
> -tom
> _______________________________________________
> The cryptography mailing list
> cryptography@metzdowd.com
> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>


-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

--001a11346dac5c133a0512498d3d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello all,<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote">On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 9:43 PM, Tao Effect <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:contact@taoeffect.com" target=3D"_blank" onclick=3D"wind=
ow.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3Dco=
ntact@taoeffect.com&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&#39;_b=
lank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=3D800,hei=
ght=3D600&#39;);return false;">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div>=
(Changed the thread&#39;s subject title to reduce likelihood this question =
was missed:)</div><div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"margin:0 0 0 40px;bor=
der:none;padding:0px"><div><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">The document=
 does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back to servers, and=
 that&#39;s good, because if that&#39;s the case, shouldn&#39;t that be eno=
ugh on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the=
 MITM leaves)?</div></div><div><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><br=
></div></div></div><div><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div>If that is=
 so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. It would com=
pletely address our concerns about CT&#39;s ability to detect MITM attacks =
post-facto.</div></div></div></blockquote></div></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to send native ce=
rtificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to client. Or am I mi=
ssing something?</div><div><br></div><div>Thank you!</div><div>=C2=A0</div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><di=
v><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Greg</div><div>
<br><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:norma=
l;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:inline!important;float:none">--<=
/span><br style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:norma=
l;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-fa=
mily:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-we=
ight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:=
inline!important;float:none">Please do not email me anything that you are n=
ot comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-fami=
ly:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weig=
ht:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;text-in=
dent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;display:in=
line!important;float:none">=C2=A0with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:12 AM, Tao Effect &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:contact@taoeffect.com" target=3D"_blank" onclick=3D"window.open(&#39;http=
s://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3Dcontact@taoeffect.c=
om&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;lo=
cation=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);r=
eturn false;">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:no=
rmal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-heig=
ht:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:=
normal;word-spacing:0px;word-wrap:break-word"><div><i>(re-sending from the =
email I use with [trans].)</i></div><div><br></div>Thanks Tom for the very =
helpful reply.<div><br></div><div>Thinking this through a bit more, I remem=
ber again something that was previously discussed about this technique.<div=
><br></div><div>The document does say that clients MUST send the certificat=
e chain back to servers, and that&#39;s good, because if that&#39;s the cas=
e, shouldn&#39;t that be enough on its own for servers to detect that a MIT=
M attack occurred (after the MITM leaves)?<div><br></div><div>If that is so=
, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. It would comple=
tely address our concerns about CT&#39;s ability to detect MITM attacks pos=
t-facto.</div><div><br></div><div>Greg</div><div><div><br><span>--</span><b=
r><span>Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also s=
haring</span><span>=C2=A0with the NSA.</span></div></div></div></div><div><=
br><span style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;fo=
nt-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline!important">--</span><br style=3D=
"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal=
;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:sta=
rt;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"=
><span style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font=
-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal=
;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline!important">Please do not email me =
anything that you are not comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"fon=
t-family:Helvetica;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;fon=
t-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;floa=
t:none;display:inline!important">=C2=A0with the NSA.</span></div><br><div><=
div>On Mar 26, 2015, at 6:18 PM, Tom Ritter &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tom@ritte=
r.vg" target=3D"_blank" onclick=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com=
/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3Dtom@ritter.vg&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp=
;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,=
resizable=3Dyes,width=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">tom@ritter.vg=
</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On 26 March 2015 at 15:4=
5, Greg &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:greg@kinostudios.com" target=3D"_blank" oncli=
ck=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&a=
mp;to=3Dgreg@kinostudios.com&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39=
;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=
=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">greg@kinostudios.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Reading over it, I still have several concer=
ns, which I will voice here but<br>let me know if it would be better to als=
o voice them on [trans].<br></blockquote><br>It would be better to voice th=
em on trans, which I am copying. =C2=A0I<br>suggest we move it there for fo=
llow-ups.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">In Section 3.1.1, it says:<b=
r><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers MUST perform a number of sanity ch=
ecks on SCTs from<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0clients before storing them:<br><br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A01. =C2=A0if a bit-wise compare of the SCT matches one already in the<=
br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0store, discard<br><br>=C2=A0=C2=A02.=
 =C2=A0if the SCT can&#39;t be verified to be a valid SCT for the<br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0accompanying leaf cert, issued by a known log=
, discard<br><br>=C2=A0=C2=A03. =C2=A0if the leaf cert is not for a domain =
that the server is<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0authoritative for=
, discard<br><br>=C2=A0=C2=A0Check number 1 is a pure optimisation.=C2=A0 C=
heck number 2 is to prevent<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0spamming and attacks where an ad=
versary can fill up the store prior<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0to attacking a client.=
=C2=A0 Check number 3 is to help misbehaving clients<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0from le=
aking what sites they visit.<br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br>Concern #1: Discard=
ing invalid SCTs<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><br>It is not clear to me what&#39;s goin=
g on in (2) above.<br><br>Specifically:<br><br>- How is the server verifyin=
g the SCT for validity?<br></blockquote><br><br>It checks if the signature =
over the data is valid.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">- Why is the s=
erver discarding the SCT if it is invalid?<br><br>Wouldn&#39;t discarding a=
n invalid SCT totally undermine the point of clients<br>sharing them?<br></=
blockquote><br><br>Keeping data for an invalid signature (or a signature fo=
r a log which<br>I do not recognize and thus don&#39;t have the public key)=
 would allow<br>clients to store arbitrary data on your server. Complex rat=
e-limiting<br>and DoS concerns now apply.<br><br><br><br><blockquote type=
=3D"cite">Concern #2: The use of the word SHOULD<br>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D<br><br>The doc states:<br><br>(with ref to server =3D&gt; auditor comms=
):<br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>HTTPS servers SHOULD share all SCTs and certific=
ate data they see<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0that pass the checks above<br><br>&lt;/end=
&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors SHOULD provide the following URL =
accepting HTTPS POSTing of<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0SCT feedback data:<br><br>&lt;/en=
d&gt;<br><br>&lt;begin&gt;<br><br>Auditors SHOULD regularly poll HTTPS serv=
ers at the well-known sct-<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0feedback URL.=C2=A0 How to determ=
ine which domains to poll is outside the<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0scope of this docum=
ent<br><br><br>&lt;/end&gt;<br><br><br>As per RFC2119, &quot;SHOULD&quot; m=
eans the advice is free to be ignored after the<br>implications are &quot;c=
arefully weighed&quot;.<br><br>This means that so far the document provides=
 no guarantees that a<br>misbehaving log will be caught.<br></blockquote><b=
r><br>Yup. We can&#39;t force anyone to participate unfortunately.=C2=A0 A =
client<br>_can_ opt-in to using a trusted auditor and send SCTs to them, wh=
ich<br>then mitigates the concerns over a server not participating.=C2=A0 B=
ut I<br>will note that if a server does not participate they are essentiall=
y<br>opening themselves to attacks by logs. So they have an incentive to<br=
>participate.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">It is also disconcerting=
 that instead of taking direct action themselves,<br></blockquote><br><br>T=
here is nothing stopping a server from being an auditor and detecting<br>lo=
g misbehavior.=C2=A0 I suppose we could add a note in the draft to that<br>=
effect, but it&#39;s a pretty weighty option I imagine most people will<br>=
not pursue.<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">servers are supposed to in=
itiate yet another HTTPS connection to an auditor.<br></blockquote><br><br>=
(nit: Server can instead just make the SCTs available for auditors to<br>qu=
ery and retrieve from them. Server doesn&#39;t have to initiate outbound<br=
>requests.)<br><br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">This is cumbersome and wil=
l probably leave open holes for a global MITM to<br>prevent SCTs from reach=
ing auditors, yet again undermining the entire point<br>of sharing SCTs.<br=
></blockquote><br><br>Yes, an attacker who can persistently isolate a clien=
t or server from<br>the rest of the internet is powerful, and is difficult =
to defeat. We<br>do not defend against such an attacker. I&#39;m open to su=
ggestions here,<br>but none really came to me.<br><br><br><blockquote type=
=3D"cite">While it&#39;s definitely a positive sign that the sharing of SCT=
s and<br>certificate chains is now an official recommendation, I am concern=
ed that<br>the particular implementation is without any teeth to deliver co=
ncrete<br>results, and so until these concerns are addressed I am not convi=
nced that<br>the problem has been fully addressed.<br></blockquote><br><br>=
That&#39;s fair.=C2=A0 There are limitations to the draft, to be sure - but=
<br>balancing the very difficult privacy concerns of literally<br>broadcast=
ing the websites you&#39;ve visited is also important.<br><br><br>-tom<br>_=
______________________________________________<br>The cryptography mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" target=3D"_blank" oncl=
ick=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&=
amp;to=3Dcryptography@metzdowd.com&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=
=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes=
,width=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a=
><br><a href=3D"http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography" targ=
et=3D"_blank">http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br>=
</blockquote></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>T=
rans mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" on=
click=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D=
1&amp;to=3DTrans@ietf.org&amp;cc=3D&amp;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&=
#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,menubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=3D8=
00,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">Trans@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https=
://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div><br>=
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org" onclick=3D"window.open(&#39;https://mail.=
google.com/mail/?view=3Dcm&amp;tf=3D1&amp;to=3DTrans@ietf.org&amp;cc=3D&amp=
;bcc=3D&amp;su=3D&amp;body=3D&#39;,&#39;_blank&#39;,&#39;location=3Dyes,men=
ubar=3Dyes,resizable=3Dyes,width=3D800,height=3D600&#39;);return false;">Tr=
ans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_signature">SY, Dmitry Belyavsky</div>
</div></div>

--001a11346dac5c133a0512498d3d--


From nobody Fri Mar 27 12:21:24 2015
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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 15:21:15 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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On Fri, 27 Mar 2015, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote:

>       The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate chain back to servers, and that's good, because if that's
>       the case, shouldn't that be enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the MITM
>       leaves)?
> 
> If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. It would completely address our concerns about CT's
> ability to detect MITM attacks post-facto.

It is.

> I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to send native certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to client. Or
> am I missing something?

If the attacker fools the client with certificates, it is those
certificates that the client wil send back to the server once
the attacker is gone. It does not matter what the attacker do.

The attacker can forever keep sending whatever certificates
to the server. Once they are no longer attacker the client,
the client will note a different (the real!) certificate
of the server and send its previous (attacker's) certificate
to the server.

Perhaps this can be reflected in an update on the okturtles blog.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=us-ascii

> Perhaps this can be reflected in an update on the okturtles blog.

That is my intention as soon as I am clear on one more question, =
prompted by something Dmitry just pointed out.

>> I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to send native =
certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to client. Or
>> am I missing something?
>=20
> If the attacker fools the client with certificates, it is those
> certificates that the client wil send back to the server once
> the attacker is gone. It does not matter what the attacker do.

I am realizing that this may or may not happen, depending on which part =
of the TLS handshake these exchanges occur.

To illustrate:

A =3D server's real certificate
B =3D malicious MITM certificate

T1. Client receives A.
T2. Client receives B, sends back A.
T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends B.

At T3, if B is handled by MITM _outside and before_ the channel is =
encrypted by A, then the MITM can prevent the server from seeing B.

So, my question is: does your document properly take that into account =
and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after a fully =
encrypted TLS connection has been established?

Scanning through it, this distinction doesn't seem to be mentioned.

Thanks,
Greg

P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC your email I get a bounced "Undelivered =
Mail" response:

Final-Recipient: rfc822; cypherpunks@nohats.ca
Original-Recipient: rfc822;paul@cypherpunks.ca
Action: failed
Status: 5.1.1
Remote-MTA: dns; 193.110.157.102
Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 <cypherpunks@nohats.ca>: Recipient =
address
   rejected: User unknown in local recipient table

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:21 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Fri, 27 Mar 2015, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote:
>=20
>>      The document does say that clients MUST send the certificate =
chain back to servers, and that's good, because if that's
>>      the case, shouldn't that be enough on its own for servers to =
detect that a MITM attack occurred (after the MITM
>>      leaves)?
>> If that is so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the =
document. It would completely address our concerns about CT's
>> ability to detect MITM attacks post-facto.
>=20
> It is.
>=20
>> I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to send native =
certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to client. Or
>> am I missing something?
>=20
> If the attacker fools the client with certificates, it is those
> certificates that the client wil send back to the server once
> the attacker is gone. It does not matter what the attacker do.
>=20
> The attacker can forever keep sending whatever certificates
> to the server. Once they are no longer attacker the client,
> the client will note a different (the real!) certificate
> of the server and send its previous (attacker's) certificate
> to the server.
>=20
> Perhaps this can be reflected in an update on the okturtles blog.
>=20
> Paul
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


--Apple-Mail=_4B60A9EE-0A13-4BA2-8E33-4C68FA8E723A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><blockquote type=3D"cite">Perhaps this can be =
reflected in an update on the okturtles =
blog.</blockquote><div><br></div>That is my intention as soon as I am =
clear on one more question, prompted by something Dmitry just pointed =
out.<div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to =
send native certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to =
client. Or<br>am I missing something?<br></blockquote><br>If the =
attacker fools the client with certificates, it is those<br>certificates =
that the client wil send back to the server once<br>the attacker is =
gone. It does not matter what the attacker =
do.</blockquote><div><br></div>I am realizing that this may or may not =
happen, depending on which part of the TLS handshake these exchanges =
occur.</div><div><br></div><div>To =
illustrate:</div><div><br></div><div>A =3D server's real =
certificate</div><div>B =3D malicious MITM =
certificate</div><div><br></div><div>T1. Client receives =
A.</div><div>T2. Client receives B, sends back A.</div><div>T3. MITM =
pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends B.</div><div><br></div><div>At =
T3, if B is handled by MITM _outside and before_ the channel is =
encrypted by A, then the MITM can prevent the server from seeing =
B.</div><div><br></div><div>So, my question is: does your document =
properly take that into account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 =
*must* be sent after a fully encrypted TLS connection has been =
established?</div><div><br></div><div>Scanning through it, this =
distinction doesn't seem to be =
mentioned.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Greg</div><div><br><=
/div><div>P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC your email I get a bounced =
"Undelivered Mail" response:</div><div><br></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: =
0px;"><div>Final-Recipient: rfc822;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a></div><div>=
Original-Recipient: rfc822;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@cypherpunks.ca">paul@cypherpunks.ca</a></div><div>Acti=
on: failed</div><div>Status: 5.1.1</div><div>Remote-MTA: dns; =
193.110.157.102</div><div>Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a>&gt;: =
Recipient address</div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;rejected: User unknown in =
local recipient table</div></blockquote><div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br><div><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 12:21 PM, Paul Wouters &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">On Fri, 27 =
Mar 2015, Dmitry Belyavsky wrote:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The document does say that clients MUST =
send the certificate chain back to servers, and that's good, because if =
that's<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the case, shouldn't that be =
enough on its own for servers to detect that a MITM attack occurred =
(after the MITM<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;leaves)?<br>If that is =
so, it seems like a point worth highlighting in the document. It would =
completely address our concerns about CT's<br>ability to detect MITM =
attacks post-facto.<br></blockquote><br>It is.<br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">I suspect that a smart enough attacker will be able to =
send native certificates back to server instead of the ones he sent to =
client. Or<br>am I missing something?<br></blockquote><br>If the =
attacker fools the client with certificates, it is those<br>certificates =
that the client wil send back to the server once<br>the attacker is =
gone. It does not matter what the attacker do.<br><br>The attacker can =
forever keep sending whatever certificates<br>to the server. Once they =
are no longer attacker the client,<br>the client will note a different =
(the real!) certificate<br>of the server and send its previous =
(attacker's) certificate<br>to the server.<br><br>Perhaps this can be =
reflected in an update on the okturtles =
blog.<br><br>Paul<br><br>_______________________________________________<b=
r>Trans mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Fri Mar 27 15:37:03 2015
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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 18:36:56 -0400 (EDT)
From: paul@nohats.ca
To: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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References: <007F2B41-C78E-4332-8206-7E4CB27A638B@kinostudios.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1503252231110.16175@bofh.nohats.ca> <2A773227-61C8-4196-8AFF-EC288A8AF150@kinostudios.com> <CA+cU71=7G5ZJMx3Vy+gXN00JpB61_6C+DLQRyCS=Hcq3vLR-Sg@mail.gmail.com> <CE157D3A-079C-4B09-B138-C21FD9D1FB03@taoeffect.com> <BAD439C7-60C8-44D4-89F9-AC6E5613A5EA@taoeffect.com> <CADqLbz+8br-F3CJEgTj8K3HmaGdNKfjCSeDtWrDmySmohhjXkw@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.11.1503271517430.14223@ns0.nohats.ca> <EAFF927A-E95B-4D5E-A631-E7209725AF18@taoeffect.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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On Fri, 27 Mar 2015, Tao Effect wrote:

> To illustrate:
> 
> A = server's real certificate
> B = malicious MITM certificate
> 
> T1. Client receives A.
> T2. Client receives B, sends back A.
> T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends B.

T3 cannot happen. The draft states:

    SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the originating
    HTTPS server at the well-known URL:

    https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback

This means you must have a valid TLS connection to send the data. As
long as the attacker does not have the private key of the attacked
web server, this cannot happen.

> So, my question is: does your document properly take that into account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after a
> fully encrypted TLS connection has been established?

Yes, but I'm sure the authors would love to received improved text for
this section of the document.

> P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC your email I get a bounced "Undelivered Mail" response:
>
>       Final-Recipient: rfc822; cypherpunks@nohats.ca
> Original-Recipient: rfc822;paul@cypherpunks.ca
> Action: failed
> Status: 5.1.1
> Remote-MTA: dns; 193.110.157.102
> Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 <cypherpunks@nohats.ca>: Recipient address
>    rejected: User unknown in local recipient table

Sorry about that. I added an alias to fix it. (my home DSL is down so
mail is rerouted temporarily, and I'm far from home)

Paul


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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Hi Rob, all,

last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values that 
are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE (Google) OIDs in 
the document - this is *completely wrong*! Private OIDs should not be 
used for I-Ds.

The authors should request a new OID assigned for trans under (most 
probably) the id-pkix OID and then define the required OIDs in that 
space. This should also be reflected, I think, in the IANA consideration 
section.

For example:

     id-trans             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix  XX }
     id-trans-xxxx   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-trans   1 }
     ...

Cheers,
Max

P.S.: Cross posting this message to the TRANS ml so that the WG can 
consider these issues in the I-D.


On 3/27/15 12:44 PM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
> Hi Rob, all,
>
> coming to your question: the extension /*will not break compatibility 
> as long as it is not marked critical*/. However, there might be some 
> aspects you want to think a bit more deeply about before taking a 
> decision.
>
> This said, I think that the text written in section 3.4.2 is wrong and 
> needs to be replaced.
>
> In particular, the argument about the encoding is weird - from the I-D:
>
>        One or more SCTs can be embedded in an X.509v3 extension that is
>        included in a certificate or an OCSP response.  Since RFC5280
>        requires the "extnValue" field (an OCTET STRING) of each X.509v3
>        extension to include the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, we cannot
>        embed a "SignedCertificateTimestampList" directly.  Instead, we
>     have
>        to wrap it inside an additional OCTET STRING (see below), which we
>        then put into the "extnValue" field.
>
> In my opinion, this text should be removed (trying to justify the use 
> of a data type in the encoding because you do not want to define the 
> required structure in ASN.1 does not really look.. good in an I-D, I 
> am surprised it is even there).
>
> However, more considerations are required here. If you want the 
> extension to have a non-ASN.1 structure it is fine, but that will have 
> implication over the (format) compliance of data in the certificate. 
> This was marginally mentioned in previous posts, but it seems it 
> requires a more explicit explanation since it was not well understood.
>
> In particular, from a parsing perspective, when using the proposed 
> encoding, the client will not perform any validation over the contents 
> of the extension since this is just a blob. Usually this type of 
> encoding is used for binary contents that have no internal structure 
> (e.g., a value of a key or a digest), but it is usually avoided for 
> complex types (again, to provide format validation of the contents).
>
> The real question here is: are you willing to live with not validating 
> the format of the content of the extension when the extension is 
> actually parsed? Are you considering the possible attack vectors that 
> can derive from that (i.e. allowing custom contents in the extension)? 
> I hope you already discussed these aspects before proposing the 
> extension. If not, my suggestion is to go back to the drawing board 
> and seriously considering these aspects. If you go ahead with the 
> current choice, I would suggest to remove the 3.4.2 text and add some 
> considerations about it in the security considerations section 
> (although, in that case I would STRONGLY suggest to revisit your choice).
>
> This is usually a good rule of thumb when it comes to adding extensions.
>
> Another operational consideration that was pointed out is about 
> debugging the bits on the wire. If you use ASN.1 structures, standard 
> network tools can parse the extension properly - however, again, this 
> will not be the case for OCTET STRING blobs. Thus, debugging of the 
> extension (in case of issues) can only happen at the end points (where 
> the extension parser is available), not on the wire.
>
> I hope this helps clarifying the issues with the current proposal.
>
> Just my 2 cents.
>
> Cheers,
> Max
>
>
> On 3/25/15 9:44 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
>> On 25/03/15 14:20, Sean Leonard wrote:
>>> On Mar 18, 2015, at 2:10 AM, Peter Gutmann 
>>> <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> it's what's in the document until someone can either point to some 
>>>>> normative
>>>>> specification that it violates or can point to something that 
>>>>> actually would
>>>>> break.
>>>>
>>>> This isn't a case of standards rules-lawyering though (in any case 
>>>> the PKIX
>>>> spec is flexible enough that you can stuff anything you want into a
>>>> certificate if you interpret things just right, see the famous 
>>>> MPEG-of-cat
>>>> quote), it's that this is creating a situation where an *X.509 
>>>> standards-
>>>> compliant certificate* contains data that can't be processed by an 
>>>> *X.509
>>>> standards-compliant certificate application*.
>>>
>>> I agree with Peter. Keep the encoding as ASN.1 for this extension. 
>>> It is not particularly onerous, and it preserves compatibility for 
>>> other applications.
>>
>> How exactly might the certificate extension we're talking about [1] 
>> break compatibility with other applications?
>>
>> The Subject Key Identifier extension uses the exact same ASN.1 syntax 
>> (the content of the extension is a plain OCTET STRING). RFC5280 does 
>> not require applications to recognize this extension.
>>
>> I'm not aware of any applications that choke on the Subject Key 
>> Identifier extension, so why should we expect any to choke on the 
>> 6962-bis extension?
>>
>>
>> [1] 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1
>>   Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.2
>>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Hi Rob, all,<br>
    <br>
    last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values
    that are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE
    (Google) OIDs in the document - this is <b>completely wrong</b>!
    Private OIDs should not be used for I-Ds.<br>
    <br>
    The authors should request a new OID assigned for trans under (most
    probably) the id-pkix OID and then define the required OIDs in that
    space. This should also be reflected, I think, in the IANA
    consideration section. <br>
    <br>
    For example:<br>
    <br>
        id-trans             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix  XX }<br>
        id-trans-xxxx   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-trans   1 }<br>
        ...<br>
    <br>
    Cheers,<br>
    Max<br>
    <br>
    P.S.: Cross posting this message to the TRANS ml so that the WG can
    consider these issues in the I-D.<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/27/15 12:44 PM, Massimiliano Pala
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:55159714.1070902@openca.org" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
        http-equiv="Content-Type">
      Hi Rob, all,<br>
      <br>
      coming to your question: the extension <i><b>will not break
          compatibility as long as it is not marked critical</b></i>.
      However, there might be some aspects you want to think a bit more
      deeply about before taking a decision.<br>
      <br>
      This said, I think that the text written in section 3.4.2 is wrong
      and needs to be replaced.<br>
      <br>
      In particular, the argument about the encoding is weird - from the
      I-D:<br>
      <blockquote>   One or more SCTs can be embedded in an X.509v3
        extension that is<br>
           included in a certificate or an OCSP response.  Since RFC5280<br>
           requires the "extnValue" field (an OCTET STRING) of each
        X.509v3<br>
           extension to include the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, we
        cannot<br>
           embed a "SignedCertificateTimestampList" directly.  Instead,
        we have<br>
           to wrap it inside an additional OCTET STRING (see below),
        which we<br>
           then put into the "extnValue" field.<br>
      </blockquote>
      In my opinion, this text should be removed (trying to justify the
      use of a data type in the encoding because you do not want to
      define the required structure in ASN.1 does not really look.. good
      in an I-D, I am surprised it is even there).<br>
      <br>
      However, more considerations are required here. If you want the
      extension to have a non-ASN.1 structure it is fine, but that will
      have implication over the (format) compliance of data in the
      certificate. This was marginally mentioned in previous posts, but
      it seems it requires a more explicit explanation since it was not
      well understood.<br>
      <br>
      In particular, from a parsing perspective, when using the proposed
      encoding, the client will not perform any validation over the
      contents of the extension since this is just a blob. Usually this
      type of encoding is used for binary contents that have no internal
      structure (e.g., a value of a key or a digest), but it is usually
      avoided for complex types (again, to provide format validation of
      the contents).<br>
      <br>
      The real question here is: are you willing to live with not
      validating the format of the content of the extension when the
      extension is actually parsed? Are you considering the possible
      attack vectors that can derive from that (i.e. allowing custom
      contents in the extension)? I hope you already discussed these
      aspects before proposing the extension. If not, my suggestion is
      to go back to the drawing board and seriously considering these
      aspects. If you go ahead with the current choice, I would suggest
      to remove the 3.4.2 text and add some considerations about it in
      the security considerations section (although, in that case I
      would STRONGLY suggest to revisit your choice).<br>
      <br>
      This is usually a good rule of thumb when it comes to adding
      extensions.<br>
      <br>
      Another operational consideration that was pointed out is about
      debugging the bits on the wire. If you use ASN.1 structures,
      standard network tools can parse the extension properly - however,
      again, this will not be the case for OCTET STRING blobs. Thus,
      debugging of the extension (in case of issues) can only happen at
      the end points (where the extension parser is available), not on
      the wire.<br>
      <br>
      I hope this helps clarifying the issues with the current proposal.<br>
      <br>
      Just my 2 cents.<br>
      <br>
      Cheers,<br>
      Max<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/25/15 9:44 AM, Rob Stradling
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote cite="mid:5512C9C7.70202@comodo.com" type="cite">On
        25/03/15 14:20, Sean Leonard wrote: <br>
        <blockquote type="cite">On Mar 18, 2015, at 2:10 AM, Peter
          Gutmann <a moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
            href="mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz&gt;</a>
          wrote: <br>
          <br>
          <blockquote type="cite">Melinda Shore <a
              moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
              href="mailto:melinda.shore@gmail.com">&lt;melinda.shore@gmail.com&gt;</a>
            writes: <br>
            <br>
            <blockquote type="cite">it's what's in the document until
              someone can either point to some normative <br>
              specification that it violates or can point to something
              that actually would <br>
              break. <br>
            </blockquote>
            <br>
            This isn't a case of standards rules-lawyering though (in
            any case the PKIX <br>
            spec is flexible enough that you can stuff anything you want
            into a <br>
            certificate if you interpret things just right, see the
            famous MPEG-of-cat <br>
            quote), it's that this is creating a situation where an
            *X.509 standards- <br>
            compliant certificate* contains data that can't be processed
            by an *X.509 <br>
            standards-compliant certificate application*. <br>
          </blockquote>
          <br>
          I agree with Peter. Keep the encoding as ASN.1 for this
          extension. It is not particularly onerous, and it preserves
          compatibility for other applications. <br>
        </blockquote>
        <br>
        How exactly might the certificate extension we're talking about
        [1] break compatibility with other applications? <br>
        <br>
        The Subject Key Identifier extension uses the exact same ASN.1
        syntax (the content of the extension is a plain OCTET STRING). 
        RFC5280 does not require applications to recognize this
        extension. <br>
        <br>
        I'm not aware of any applications that choke on the Subject Key
        Identifier extension, so why should we expect any to choke on
        the 6962-bis extension? <br>
        <br>
        <br>
        [1] <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1</a><br>
          Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.2 <br>
        <br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------020202050409080602080802--


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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Dear Paul,

This is fantastic news. Great work list!

I am working on a new blog post on this topic to post to the okTurtles =
blog and am getting ready to publish it.

If you (or anyone else on this list) would like to proof read a draft of =
it before it's published (sometime today, or tomorrow at the latest), =
please contact me off-list at this email.

> Yes, but I'm sure the authors would love to received improved text for =
this section of the document.

I'll see if I can come up with something. :)

Cheers,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Mar 27, 2015, at 3:36 PM, paul@nohats.ca wrote:

> On Fri, 27 Mar 2015, Tao Effect wrote:
>=20
>> To illustrate:
>> A =3D server's real certificate
>> B =3D malicious MITM certificate
>> T1. Client receives A.
>> T2. Client receives B, sends back A.
>> T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends B.
>=20
> T3 cannot happen. The draft states:
>=20
>   SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the originating
>   HTTPS server at the well-known URL:
>=20
>   https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback
>=20
> This means you must have a valid TLS connection to send the data. As
> long as the attacker does not have the private key of the attacked
> web server, this cannot happen.
>=20
>> So, my question is: does your document properly take that into =
account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after a
>> fully encrypted TLS connection has been established?
>=20
> Yes, but I'm sure the authors would love to received improved text for
> this section of the document.
>=20
>> P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC your email I get a bounced "Undelivered =
Mail" response:
>>=20
>>      Final-Recipient: rfc822; cypherpunks@nohats.ca
>> Original-Recipient: rfc822;paul@cypherpunks.ca
>> Action: failed
>> Status: 5.1.1
>> Remote-MTA: dns; 193.110.157.102
>> Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 <cypherpunks@nohats.ca>: Recipient =
address
>>    rejected: User unknown in local recipient table
>=20
> Sorry about that. I added an alias to fix it. (my home DSL is down so
> mail is rerouted temporarily, and I'm far from home)
>=20
> Paul
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


--Apple-Mail=_5EC5206E-39C0-494B-8008-7D3AB2E894FC
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Paul,<div><br></div><div>This is fantastic news. Great work =
list!</div><div><br></div><div>I am working on a new blog post on this =
topic to post to the okTurtles blog and am getting ready to publish =
it.</div><div><br></div><div>If you (or anyone else on this list) would =
like to proof read a draft of it before it's published (sometime today, =
or tomorrow at the latest), please contact me off-list at this =
email.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">Yes, but I'm =
sure the authors would love to received improved text for&nbsp;this =
section of the document.</blockquote><br></div><div>I'll see if I can =
come up with something. =
:)</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Greg</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br><div style=3D""><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 3:36 PM, <a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a> wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">On Fri, 27 =
Mar 2015, Tao Effect wrote:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">To =
illustrate:<br>A =3D server's real certificate<br>B =3D malicious MITM =
certificate<br>T1. Client receives A.<br>T2. Client receives B, sends =
back A.<br>T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends =
B.<br></blockquote><br>T3 cannot happen. The draft states:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the =
originating<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;HTTPS server at the well-known URL:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;https://&lt;domain&gt;/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback<br><br>T=
his means you must have a valid TLS connection to send the data. =
As<br>long as the attacker does not have the private key of the =
attacked<br>web server, this cannot happen.<br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">So, my question is: does your document properly take that =
into account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after =
a<br>fully encrypted TLS connection has been =
established?<br></blockquote><br>Yes, but I'm sure the authors would =
love to received improved text for<br>this section of the =
document.<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC =
your email I get a bounced "Undelivered Mail" response:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Final-Recipient: rfc822;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a><br>Origina=
l-Recipient: rfc822;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@cypherpunks.ca">paul@cypherpunks.ca</a><br>Action: =
failed<br>Status: 5.1.1<br>Remote-MTA: dns; =
193.110.157.102<br>Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a>&gt;: =
Recipient address<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;rejected: User unknown in local =
recipient table<br></blockquote><br>Sorry about that. I added an alias =
to fix it. (my home DSL is down so<br>mail is rerouted temporarily, and =
I'm far from =
home)<br><br>Paul<br><br>_______________________________________________<b=
r>Trans mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans<br></blockquote></div><br></body></html>=

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From nobody Fri Mar 27 17:03:22 2015
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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 19:03:17 -0500
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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On 3/27/15 6:43 PM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
> last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values that
> are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE (Google) OIDs in
> the document - this is *completely wrong*! Private OIDs should not be
> used for I-Ds.

It's fine while the document is in development.  New OIDs
will be requested before the document exits wg last call, but
it's one of a number of things in a draft that changes as
the document progresses.  You're correct that the IANA
considerations section will need to be updated, though.

Melinda


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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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References: <007F2B41-C78E-4332-8206-7E4CB27A638B@kinostudios.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1503252231110.16175@bofh.nohats.ca> <2A773227-61C8-4196-8AFF-EC288A8AF150@kinostudios.com> <CA+cU71=7G5ZJMx3Vy+gXN00JpB61_6C+DLQRyCS=Hcq3vLR-Sg@mail.gmail.com> <CE157D3A-079C-4B09-B138-C21FD9D1FB03@taoeffect.com> <BAD439C7-60C8-44D4-89F9-AC6E5613A5EA@taoeffect.com> <CADqLbz+8br-F3CJEgTj8K3HmaGdNKfjCSeDtWrDmySmohhjXkw@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.11.1503271517430.14223@ns0.nohats.ca> <EAFF927A-E95B-4D5E-A631-E7209725AF18@taoeffect.com> <alpine.LRH.2.11.1503271833020.6671@ns0.nohats.ca> <FDF308F4-1DE5-4580-ACC5-CC4AE17981B1@taoeffect.com>
To: Tao Effect Support <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Cc: paul@nohats.ca, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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We've posted a followup blog post:

Certificate Transparency=E2=80=99s improved gossip protocols show =
promise

=
https://blog.okturtles.com/2015/03/certificate-transparencys-improved-goss=
ip-protocols-show-promise/

I also updated our previous blog post to make a note of this new =
information.

Great work folks. =F0=9F=91=8D

Cheers,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

On Mar 27, 2015, at 4:56 PM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> Dear Paul,
>=20
> This is fantastic news. Great work list!
>=20
> I am working on a new blog post on this topic to post to the okTurtles =
blog and am getting ready to publish it.
>=20
> If you (or anyone else on this list) would like to proof read a draft =
of it before it's published (sometime today, or tomorrow at the latest), =
please contact me off-list at this email.
>=20
>> Yes, but I'm sure the authors would love to received improved text =
for this section of the document.
>=20
> I'll see if I can come up with something. :)
>=20
> Cheers,
> Greg
>=20
> --
> Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.
>=20
> On Mar 27, 2015, at 3:36 PM, paul@nohats.ca wrote:
>=20
>> On Fri, 27 Mar 2015, Tao Effect wrote:
>>=20
>>> To illustrate:
>>> A =3D server's real certificate
>>> B =3D malicious MITM certificate
>>> T1. Client receives A.
>>> T2. Client receives B, sends back A.
>>> T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends B.
>>=20
>> T3 cannot happen. The draft states:
>>=20
>>   SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the originating
>>   HTTPS server at the well-known URL:
>>=20
>>   https://<domain>/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback
>>=20
>> This means you must have a valid TLS connection to send the data. As
>> long as the attacker does not have the private key of the attacked
>> web server, this cannot happen.
>>=20
>>> So, my question is: does your document properly take that into =
account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after a
>>> fully encrypted TLS connection has been established?
>>=20
>> Yes, but I'm sure the authors would love to received improved text =
for
>> this section of the document.
>>=20
>>> P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC your email I get a bounced "Undelivered =
Mail" response:
>>>=20
>>>      Final-Recipient: rfc822; cypherpunks@nohats.ca
>>> Original-Recipient: rfc822;paul@cypherpunks.ca
>>> Action: failed
>>> Status: 5.1.1
>>> Remote-MTA: dns; 193.110.157.102
>>> Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 <cypherpunks@nohats.ca>: Recipient =
address
>>>    rejected: User unknown in local recipient table
>>=20
>> Sorry about that. I added an alias to fix it. (my home DSL is down so
>> mail is rerouted temporarily, and I'm far from home)
>>=20
>> Paul
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">We've =
posted a followup blog post:<div><br></div><div><b>Certificate =
Transparency=E2=80=99s improved gossip protocols show =
promise</b></div><div><br></div><div><a =
href=3D"https://blog.okturtles.com/2015/03/certificate-transparencys-impro=
ved-gossip-protocols-show-promise/">https://blog.okturtles.com/2015/03/cer=
tificate-transparencys-improved-gossip-protocols-show-promise/</a><br><div=
><br class=3D"webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>I also updated our =
previous blog post to make a note of this new =
information.</div><div><br></div><div>Great work folks. =
=F0=9F=91=8D</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Greg</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: =
none;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 4:56 PM, Tao Effect =
&lt;contact@taoeffect.com&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html charset=3Dus-ascii"><div =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Dear =
Paul,<div><br></div><div>This is fantastic news. Great work =
list!</div><div><br></div><div>I am working on a new blog post on this =
topic to post to the okTurtles blog and am getting ready to publish =
it.</div><div><br></div><div>If you (or anyone else on this list) would =
like to proof read a draft of it before it's published (sometime today, =
or tomorrow at the latest), please contact me off-list at this =
email.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite">Yes, but I'm =
sure the authors would love to received improved text for&nbsp;this =
section of the document.</blockquote><br></div><div>I'll see if I can =
come up with something. =
:)</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Greg</div><div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">--</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;"><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline =
!important;">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>

<br><div style=3D""><div>On Mar 27, 2015, at 3:36 PM, <a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a> wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">On Fri, 27 =
Mar 2015, Tao Effect wrote:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">To =
illustrate:<br>A =3D server's real certificate<br>B =3D malicious MITM =
certificate<br>T1. Client receives A.<br>T2. Client receives B, sends =
back A.<br>T3. MITM pretends to leave, sends A. Client sends =
B.<br></blockquote><br>T3 cannot happen. The draft states:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;SCTs and corresponding certificates are POSTed to the =
originating<br> &nbsp;&nbsp;HTTPS server at the well-known URL:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;https://&lt;domain&gt;/.well-known/ct/v1/sct-feedback<br><br>T=
his means you must have a valid TLS connection to send the data. =
As<br>long as the attacker does not have the private key of the =
attacked<br>web server, this cannot happen.<br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">So, my question is: does your document properly take that =
into account and state that the data sent in 3.1.3 *must* be sent after =
a<br>fully encrypted TLS connection has been =
established?<br></blockquote><br>Yes, but I'm sure the authors would =
love to received improved text for<br>this section of the =
document.<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">P.S. FYI Paul, any time I CC =
your email I get a bounced "Undelivered Mail" response:<br><br> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Final-Recipient: rfc822;&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a><br>Origina=
l-Recipient: rfc822;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@cypherpunks.ca">paul@cypherpunks.ca</a><br>Action: =
failed<br>Status: 5.1.1<br>Remote-MTA: dns; =
193.110.157.102<br>Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 5.1.1 &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cypherpunks@nohats.ca">cypherpunks@nohats.ca</a>&gt;: =
Recipient address<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;rejected: User unknown in local =
recipient table<br></blockquote><br>Sorry about that. I added an alias =
to fix it. (my home DSL is down so<br>mail is rerouted temporarily, and =
I'm far from =
home)<br><br>Paul<br><br>_______________________________________________<b=
r>Trans mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans<br></blockquote></div><br></div>___________________=
____________________________<br>Trans mailing =
list<br>Trans@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans<br><=
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From nobody Fri Mar 27 17:31:40 2015
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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 19:31:25 -0500
From: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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Hi Melinda,

I am sorry but I disagree. This should have been fixed long time ago - 
no Google private OIDs should have been put in a WG document in the 
first place.

Cheers,
Max


On 3/27/15 7:03 PM, Melinda Shore wrote:
> On 3/27/15 6:43 PM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
>> last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values that
>> are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE (Google) OIDs in
>> the document - this is *completely wrong*! Private OIDs should not be
>> used for I-Ds.
>
> It's fine while the document is in development.  New OIDs
> will be requested before the document exits wg last call, but
> it's one of a number of things in a draft that changes as
> the document progresses.  You're correct that the IANA
> considerations section will need to be updated, though.
>
> Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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References: <007F2B41-C78E-4332-8206-7E4CB27A638B@kinostudios.com> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1503252231110.16175@bofh.nohats.ca> <2A773227-61C8-4196-8AFF-EC288A8AF150@kinostudios.com> <CA+cU71=7G5ZJMx3Vy+gXN00JpB61_6C+DLQRyCS=Hcq3vLR-Sg@mail.gmail.com> <CE157D3A-079C-4B09-B138-C21FD9D1FB03@taoeffect.com> <BAD439C7-60C8-44D4-89F9-AC6E5613A5EA@taoeffect.com> <CADqLbz+8br-F3CJEgTj8K3HmaGdNKfjCSeDtWrDmySmohhjXkw@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.11.1503271517430.14223@ns0.nohats.ca> <EAFF927A-E95B-4D5E-A631-E7209725AF18@taoeffect.com> <alpine.LRH.2.11.1503271833020.6671@ns0.nohats.ca> <FDF308F4-1DE5-4580-ACC5-CC4AE17981B1@taoeffect.com> <EDFB8634-1623-407F-BD85-614E4DA504E8@taoeffect.com>
From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 20:58:43 -0500
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To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Question regarding new gossip protocols [Was: Certificate transparency on blockchains]
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On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wrote:

> We've posted a followup blog post:
>
> *Certificate Transparency=E2=80=99s improved gossip protocols show promis=
e*
>
>
> https://blog.okturtles.com/2015/03/certificate-transparencys-improved-gos=
sip-protocols-show-promise/
>
> I also updated our previous blog post to make a note of this new
> information.
>
> Great work folks. [image: =F0=9F=91=8D]
>

Cool!

I'll add a note: one of the optimizations/tricks we noted while composing
was that a server may actually detect a misbehaving log that it _doesn't_
trust.  Ordinarily we'd discard any such data (because of the
aforementioned problems with DoS and such) - but by looking at the
submitted certificate, and checking if it chains to a root cert in the
store you recognize, you may decide "Actually this one is interesting
enough to keep."  (Still some DoS concerns there, but a trick servers have
the opportunity to work with nonetheless.)

-tom

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 2=
7 March 2015 at 19:28, Tao Effect <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:c=
ontact@taoeffect.com" target=3D"_blank">contact@taoeffect.com</a>&gt;</span=
> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-s=
tyle:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">We&#39;ve =
posted a followup blog post:<div><br></div><div><b>Certificate Transparency=
=E2=80=99s improved gossip protocols show promise</b></div><div><br></div><=
div><a href=3D"https://blog.okturtles.com/2015/03/certificate-transparencys=
-improved-gossip-protocols-show-promise/" target=3D"_blank">https://blog.ok=
turtles.com/2015/03/certificate-transparencys-improved-gossip-protocols-sho=
w-promise/</a><br><div><br></div><div>I also updated our previous blog post=
 to make a note of this new information.</div><div><br></div><div>Great wor=
k folks. <img goomoji=3D"1f44d" style=3D"margin: 0px 0.2ex; vertical-align:=
 middle; max-height: 24px;" alt=3D"=F0=9F=91=8D" src=3D"cid:1f44d@goomoji.g=
mail"></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Cool!</div><div><b=
r></div>I&#39;ll add a note: one of the optimizations/tricks we noted while=
 composing was that a server may actually detect a misbehaving log that it =
_doesn&#39;t_ trust.=C2=A0 Ordinarily we&#39;d discard any such data (becau=
se of the aforementioned problems with DoS and such) - but by looking at th=
e submitted certificate, and checking if it chains to a root cert in the st=
ore you recognize, you may decide &quot;Actually this one is interesting en=
ough to keep.&quot; =C2=A0(Still some DoS concerns there, but a trick serve=
rs have the opportunity to work with nonetheless.)<br><br><div>-tom=C2=A0</=
div></div></div></div>

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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OID's are just distributed opaque identifiers.  Doesn't bother me, but if t=
he WG wants to change OID's and break deployed software, go for it

It will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.  A Trans arc under IETF seems more=
 feasible.

--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">OID&#8217;s are just dist=
ributed opaque identifiers.&nbsp; Doesn&#8217;t bother me, but if the WG wa=
nts to change OID&#8217;s and break deployed software, go for it<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It will might be hard to =
get a PKIX arc.&nbsp; A Trans arc under IETF seems more feasible.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">IM: richsalz@jabber.at Tw=
itter: RichSalz<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Subject: [Trans] Use of private OIDs in WG document
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Hi Rich,

I do not think there is any precedence about using private OIDs for I-Ds 
- the use of Google's OIDs is ok at Google, not for a standard. The 
first reason is because Google's controls its own sub-tree and can 
change the sub tree at any time - not appropriate for an RFC. The second 
reason is that, since the document is defining extensions for 
certificates and OCSP messages (both under PKIX), the natural place is 
actually under PKIX.

I also want to point out that OIDs are not just opaque identifiers - if 
that was the case, we would not use a hierarchical structure. The 
sub-tree where the OID is is actually important.

This said, I have two questions for you:

 1. Why this would not be the appropriate base OID ?
 2. Which base OID are you referring to when you say "under IETF" ?

Cheers,
Max


On 3/27/15 10:58 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>
> OID’s are just distributed opaque identifiers.  Doesn’t bother me, but 
> if the WG wants to change OID’s and break deployed software, go for it
>
> It will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.  A Trans arc under IETF seems 
> more feasible.
>
> -- 
>
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
>
> IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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    Hi Rich,<br>
    <br>
    I do not think there is any precedence about using private OIDs for
    I-Ds - the use of Google's OIDs is ok at Google, not for a standard.
    The first reason is because Google's controls its own sub-tree and
    can change the sub tree at any time - not appropriate for an RFC.
    The second reason is that, since the document is defining extensions
    for certificates and OCSP messages (both under PKIX), the natural
    place is actually under PKIX.<br>
    <br>
    I also want to point out that OIDs are not just opaque identifiers -
    if that was the case, we would not use a hierarchical structure. The
    sub-tree where the OID is is actually important.<br>
    <br>
    This said, I have two questions for you:<br>
    <ol>
      <li> Why this would not be the appropriate base OID ?</li>
      <li>Which base OID are you referring to when you say "under IETF"
        ?<br>
      </li>
    </ol>
    Cheers,<br>
    Max<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/27/15 10:58 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:2ebf955d99414800bfefd7a6edd814dd@usma1ex-dag1mb2.msg.corp.akamai.com"
      type="cite">
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">OID’s

            are just distributed opaque identifiers.  Doesn’t bother me,
            but if the WG wants to change OID’s and break deployed
            software, go for it<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">It

            will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.  A Trans arc under
            IETF seems more feasible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">-- 

              <o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Senior

              Architect, Akamai Technologies<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">IM:

              <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                href="mailto:richsalz@jabber.at">richsalz@jabber.at</a>
              Twitter: RichSalz<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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To: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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> 27 mar 2015 kl. 18:43 skrev Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>:
>=20
> Hi Rob, all,
>=20
> last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values that ar=
e used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE (Google) OIDs in the d=
ocument - this is completely wrong! Private OIDs should not be used for I-Ds=
.
>=20

sais who?

> The authors should request a new OID assigned for trans under (most probab=
ly) the id-pkix OID and then define the required OIDs in that space. This sh=
ould also be reflected, I think, in the IANA consideration section.=20
>=20
> For example:
>=20
>     id-trans             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { id-pkix  XX }
>     id-trans-xxxx   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { id-trans   1 }
>     ...
>=20
> Cheers,
> Max
>=20
> P.S.: Cross posting this message to the TRANS ml so that the WG can consid=
er these issues in the I-D.
>=20
>=20
>> On 3/27/15 12:44 PM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
>> Hi Rob, all,
>>=20
>> coming to your question: the extension will not break compatibility as lo=
ng as it is not marked critical. However, there might be some aspects you wa=
nt to think a bit more deeply about before taking a decision.
>>=20
>> This said, I think that the text written in section 3.4.2 is wrong and ne=
eds to be replaced.
>>=20
>> In particular, the argument about the encoding is weird - from the I-D:
>>    One or more SCTs can be embedded in an X.509v3 extension that is
>>    included in a certificate or an OCSP response.  Since RFC5280
>>    requires the "extnValue" field (an OCTET STRING) of each X.509v3
>>    extension to include the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, we cannot
>>    embed a "SignedCertificateTimestampList" directly.  Instead, we have
>>    to wrap it inside an additional OCTET STRING (see below), which we
>>    then put into the "extnValue" field.
>> In my opinion, this text should be removed (trying to justify the use of a=
 data type in the encoding because you do not want to define the required st=
ructure in ASN.1 does not really look.. good in an I-D, I am surprised it is=
 even there).
>>=20
>> However, more considerations are required here. If you want the extension=
 to have a non-ASN.1 structure it is fine, but that will have implication ov=
er the (format) compliance of data in the certificate. This was marginally m=
entioned in previous posts, but it seems it requires a more explicit explana=
tion since it was not well understood.
>>=20
>> In particular, from a parsing perspective, when using the proposed encodi=
ng, the client will not perform any validation over the contents of the exte=
nsion since this is just a blob. Usually this type of encoding is used for b=
inary contents that have no internal structure (e.g., a value of a key or a d=
igest), but it is usually avoided for complex types (again, to provide forma=
t validation of the contents).
>>=20
>> The real question here is: are you willing to live with not validating th=
e format of the content of the extension when the extension is actually pars=
ed? Are you considering the possible attack vectors that can derive from tha=
t (i.e. allowing custom contents in the extension)? I hope you already discu=
ssed these aspects before proposing the extension. If not, my suggestion is t=
o go back to the drawing board and seriously considering these aspects. If y=
ou go ahead with the current choice, I would suggest to remove the 3.4.2 tex=
t and add some considerations about it in the security considerations sectio=
n (although, in that case I would STRONGLY suggest to revisit your choice).
>>=20
>> This is usually a good rule of thumb when it comes to adding extensions.
>>=20
>> Another operational consideration that was pointed out is about debugging=
 the bits on the wire. If you use ASN.1 structures, standard network tools c=
an parse the extension properly - however, again, this will not be the case f=
or OCTET STRING blobs. Thus, debugging of the extension (in case of issues) c=
an only happen at the end points (where the extension parser is available), n=
ot on the wire.
>>=20
>> I hope this helps clarifying the issues with the current proposal.
>>=20
>> Just my 2 cents.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> Max
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On 3/25/15 9:44 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>>> On 25/03/15 14:20, Sean Leonard wrote:=20
>>>> On Mar 18, 2015, at 2:10 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> w=
rote:=20
>>>>=20
>>>>> Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> writes:=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> it's what's in the document until someone can either point to some no=
rmative=20
>>>>>> specification that it violates or can point to something that actuall=
y would=20
>>>>>> break.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> This isn't a case of standards rules-lawyering though (in any case the=
 PKIX=20
>>>>> spec is flexible enough that you can stuff anything you want into a=20=

>>>>> certificate if you interpret things just right, see the famous MPEG-of=
-cat=20
>>>>> quote), it's that this is creating a situation where an *X.509 standar=
ds-=20
>>>>> compliant certificate* contains data that can't be processed by an *X.=
509=20
>>>>> standards-compliant certificate application*.
>>>>=20
>>>> I agree with Peter. Keep the encoding as ASN.1 for this extension. It i=
s not particularly onerous, and it preserves compatibility for other applica=
tions.
>>>=20
>>> How exactly might the certificate extension we're talking about [1] brea=
k compatibility with other applications?=20
>>>=20
>>> The Subject Key Identifier extension uses the exact same ASN.1 syntax (t=
he content of the extension is a plain OCTET STRING).  RFC5280 does not requ=
ire applications to recognize this extension.=20
>>>=20
>>> I'm not aware of any applications that choke on the Subject Key Identifi=
er extension, so why should we expect any to choke on the 6962-bis extension=
?=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?inclu=
de_text=3D1
>>>   Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.2
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div><br><br></div><div><br>27 mar 2015 kl. 18:43 skrev Massimiliano Pala &lt;<a href="mailto:director@openca.org">director@openca.org</a>&gt;:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div>
  
    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  
  
    Hi Rob, all,<br>
    <br>
    last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values
    that are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE
    (Google) OIDs in the document - this is <b>completely wrong</b>!
    Private OIDs should not be used for I-Ds.<br>
    <br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>sais who?</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>
    The authors should request a new OID assigned for trans under (most
    probably) the id-pkix OID and then define the required OIDs in that
    space. This should also be reflected, I think, in the IANA
    consideration section. <br>
    <br>
    For example:<br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; id-trans&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix&nbsp; XX }<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; id-trans-xxxx&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-trans&nbsp;&nbsp; 1 }<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ...<br>
    <br>
    Cheers,<br>
    Max<br>
    <br>
    P.S.: Cross posting this message to the TRANS ml so that the WG can
    consider these issues in the I-D.<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/27/15 12:44 PM, Massimiliano Pala
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:55159714.1070902@openca.org" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252" http-equiv="Content-Type">
      Hi Rob, all,<br>
      <br>
      coming to your question: the extension <i><b>will not break
          compatibility as long as it is not marked critical</b></i>.
      However, there might be some aspects you want to think a bit more
      deeply about before taking a decision.<br>
      <br>
      This said, I think that the text written in section 3.4.2 is wrong
      and needs to be replaced.<br>
      <br>
      In particular, the argument about the encoding is weird - from the
      I-D:<br>
      <blockquote>&nbsp;&nbsp; One or more SCTs can be embedded in an X.509v3
        extension that is<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; included in a certificate or an OCSP response.&nbsp; Since RFC5280<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; requires the "extnValue" field (an OCTET STRING) of each
        X.509v3<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; extension to include the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value, we
        cannot<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; embed a "SignedCertificateTimestampList" directly.&nbsp; Instead,
        we have<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; to wrap it inside an additional OCTET STRING (see below),
        which we<br>
        &nbsp;&nbsp; then put into the "extnValue" field.<br>
      </blockquote>
      In my opinion, this text should be removed (trying to justify the
      use of a data type in the encoding because you do not want to
      define the required structure in ASN.1 does not really look.. good
      in an I-D, I am surprised it is even there).<br>
      <br>
      However, more considerations are required here. If you want the
      extension to have a non-ASN.1 structure it is fine, but that will
      have implication over the (format) compliance of data in the
      certificate. This was marginally mentioned in previous posts, but
      it seems it requires a more explicit explanation since it was not
      well understood.<br>
      <br>
      In particular, from a parsing perspective, when using the proposed
      encoding, the client will not perform any validation over the
      contents of the extension since this is just a blob. Usually this
      type of encoding is used for binary contents that have no internal
      structure (e.g., a value of a key or a digest), but it is usually
      avoided for complex types (again, to provide format validation of
      the contents).<br>
      <br>
      The real question here is: are you willing to live with not
      validating the format of the content of the extension when the
      extension is actually parsed? Are you considering the possible
      attack vectors that can derive from that (i.e. allowing custom
      contents in the extension)? I hope you already discussed these
      aspects before proposing the extension. If not, my suggestion is
      to go back to the drawing board and seriously considering these
      aspects. If you go ahead with the current choice, I would suggest
      to remove the 3.4.2 text and add some considerations about it in
      the security considerations section (although, in that case I
      would STRONGLY suggest to revisit your choice).<br>
      <br>
      This is usually a good rule of thumb when it comes to adding
      extensions.<br>
      <br>
      Another operational consideration that was pointed out is about
      debugging the bits on the wire. If you use ASN.1 structures,
      standard network tools can parse the extension properly - however,
      again, this will not be the case for OCTET STRING blobs. Thus,
      debugging of the extension (in case of issues) can only happen at
      the end points (where the extension parser is available), not on
      the wire.<br>
      <br>
      I hope this helps clarifying the issues with the current proposal.<br>
      <br>
      Just my 2 cents.<br>
      <br>
      Cheers,<br>
      Max<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/25/15 9:44 AM, Rob Stradling
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote cite="mid:5512C9C7.70202@comodo.com" type="cite">On
        25/03/15 14:20, Sean Leonard wrote: <br>
        <blockquote type="cite">On Mar 18, 2015, at 2:10 AM, Peter
          Gutmann <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">&lt;pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz&gt;</a>
          wrote: <br>
          <br>
          <blockquote type="cite">Melinda Shore <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:melinda.shore@gmail.com">&lt;melinda.shore@gmail.com&gt;</a>
            writes: <br>
            <br>
            <blockquote type="cite">it's what's in the document until
              someone can either point to some normative <br>
              specification that it violates or can point to something
              that actually would <br>
              break. <br>
            </blockquote>
            <br>
            This isn't a case of standards rules-lawyering though (in
            any case the PKIX <br>
            spec is flexible enough that you can stuff anything you want
            into a <br>
            certificate if you interpret things just right, see the
            famous MPEG-of-cat <br>
            quote), it's that this is creating a situation where an
            *X.509 standards- <br>
            compliant certificate* contains data that can't be processed
            by an *X.509 <br>
            standards-compliant certificate application*. <br>
          </blockquote>
          <br>
          I agree with Peter. Keep the encoding as ASN.1 for this
          extension. It is not particularly onerous, and it preserves
          compatibility for other applications. <br>
        </blockquote>
        <br>
        How exactly might the certificate extension we're talking about
        [1] break compatibility with other applications? <br>
        <br>
        The Subject Key Identifier extension uses the exact same ASN.1
        syntax (the content of the extension is a plain OCTET STRING).&nbsp;
        RFC5280 does not require applications to recognize this
        extension. <br>
        <br>
        I'm not aware of any applications that choke on the Subject Key
        Identifier extension, so why should we expect any to choke on
        the 6962-bis extension? <br>
        <br>
        <br>
        [1] <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1</a><br>
        &nbsp; Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.2 <br>
        <br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  

</div></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><div><span>_______________________________________________</span><br><span>Trans mailing list</span><br><span><a href="mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>
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Subject: [Trans] Use of Private OIDs in WG document (Re: [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax)
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Hi Leif, all,

On 3/28/15 10:14 AM, Leif Johansson wrote:
> 27 mar 2015 kl. 18:43 skrev Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org 
> <mailto:director@openca.org>>:
>
>> Hi Rob, all,
>>
>> last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID values 
>> that are used throughout the document that are using PRIVATE (Google) 
>> OIDs in the document - this is *completely wrong*! Private OIDs 
>> should not be used for I-Ds.
>>
>
> sais who?
Well, in this case, until we have an official position from IETF, me. I 
might be wrong, but it is evident that this is not a standard approach 
followed as common practice in the past.

However, my concerns are based on organizational and engineering 
considerations.

First of all, I have not seen this approach taken anywhere else - raw 
values within the document. We defined many OIDs in the past in the 
security area, and I do not recall this approach to ever been taken or 
allowed (with exceptions, I agree, but very limited and definitely not 
in recent years).

Second, I think that allowing the use of OIDs from different sub-trees 
for extending PKIX protocols and structures is not a good idea - we have 
a tree structure for a reason: be able to group together what belong 
together. Otherwise, let's just use random numbers, why bothering with a 
structure for OIDs?

Third, I have my concerns in adopting OIDs from a private sub-tree given 
the decentralized nature of the OIDs (what is the ownership of OIDs in a 
private sub-branch?)

I hope this clarifies my position.

Cheers,
Max


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    Hi Leif, all,<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/28/15 10:14 AM, Leif Johansson
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:37572999-2D1A-4073-BEB0-F8566B1FE841@mnt.se"
      type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div>27 mar 2015 kl. 18:43 skrev Massimiliano Pala &lt;<a
          moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:director@openca.org">director@openca.org</a>&gt;:<br>
        <br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <div>
          <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
            http-equiv="Content-Type">
          Hi Rob, all,<br>
          <br>
          last consideration about the I-D - there are a bunch of OID
          values that are used throughout the document that are using
          PRIVATE (Google) OIDs in the document - this is <b>completely
            wrong</b>! Private OIDs should not be used for I-Ds.<br>
          <br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>sais who?</div>
    </blockquote>
    Well, in this case, until we have an official position from IETF,
    me. I might be wrong, but it is evident that this is not a standard
    approach followed as common practice in the past.<br>
    <br>
    However, my concerns are based on organizational and engineering
    considerations.<br>
    <br>
    First of all, I have not seen this approach taken anywhere else -
    raw values within the document. We defined many OIDs in the past in
    the security area, and I do not recall this approach to ever been
    taken or allowed (with exceptions, I agree, but very limited and
    definitely not in recent years).<br>
    <br>
    Second, I think that allowing the use of OIDs from different
    sub-trees for extending PKIX protocols and structures is not a good
    idea - we have a tree structure for a reason: be able to group
    together what belong together. Otherwise, let's just use random
    numbers, why bothering with a structure for OIDs?<br>
    <br>
    Third, I have my concerns in adopting OIDs from a private sub-tree
    given the decentralized nature of the OIDs (what is the ownership of
    OIDs in a private sub-branch?)<br>
    <br>
    I hope this clarifies my position.<br>
    <br>
    Cheers,<br>
    Max<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------070907050702070200050008--


From nobody Sat Mar 28 10:15:30 2015
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Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 12:15:18 -0500
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/EnKFQNyrHvPWrTDIJsK5ASu95NQ>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Use of Private OIDs in WG document (Re: [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax)
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The oddest thing, I think, about this discussion is the
apparent expectation that working group drafts be adopted
in final shape.  That's not what happens.  Indeed, if
it were, we wouldn't need working groups in the first place.

Melinda


From nobody Sun Mar 29 09:01:39 2015
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Use of private OIDs in WG document
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In this case, the document was published with OIDs from a non-IETF OID =
arc long ago.  I see no reason to disrupt those implementations, and in =
fact, having two OIDs with exactly the same semantics is confusing.

If new OIDs are needed, we ought to assign them from an IETF arc managed =
by IANA.

Russ


On Mar 28, 2015, at 1:14 AM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:

> Hi Rich,
>=20
> I do not think there is any precedence about using private OIDs for =
I-Ds - the use of Google's OIDs is ok at Google, not for a standard. The =
first reason is because Google's controls its own sub-tree and can =
change the sub tree at any time - not appropriate for an RFC. The second =
reason is that, since the document is defining extensions for =
certificates and OCSP messages (both under PKIX), the natural place is =
actually under PKIX.
>=20
> I also want to point out that OIDs are not just opaque identifiers - =
if that was the case, we would not use a hierarchical structure. The =
sub-tree where the OID is is actually important.
>=20
> This said, I have two questions for you:
> Why this would not be the appropriate base OID ?
> Which base OID are you referring to when you say "under IETF" ?
> Cheers,
> Max
>=20
>=20
> On 3/27/15 10:58 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>> OID=92s are just distributed opaque identifiers.  Doesn=92t bother =
me, but if the WG wants to change OID=92s and break deployed software, =
go for it
>> =20
>> It will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.  A Trans arc under IETF =
seems more feasible.
>> =20
>> --=20
>> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
>> IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Trans mailing list
>> Trans@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">In =
this case, the document was published with OIDs from a non-IETF OID arc =
long ago. &nbsp;I see no reason to disrupt those implementations, and in =
fact, having two OIDs with exactly the same semantics is =
confusing.<div><br></div><div>If new OIDs are needed, we ought to assign =
them from an IETF arc managed by =
IANA.<div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On =
Mar 28, 2015, at 1:14 AM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite">
 =20
    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dwindows-1252" =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type">
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    Hi Rich,<br>
    <br>
    I do not think there is any precedence about using private OIDs for
    I-Ds - the use of Google's OIDs is ok at Google, not for a standard.
    The first reason is because Google's controls its own sub-tree and
    can change the sub tree at any time - not appropriate for an RFC.
    The second reason is that, since the document is defining extensions
    for certificates and OCSP messages (both under PKIX), the natural
    place is actually under PKIX.<br>
    <br>
    I also want to point out that OIDs are not just opaque identifiers -
    if that was the case, we would not use a hierarchical structure. The
    sub-tree where the OID is is actually important.<br>
    <br>
    This said, I have two questions for you:<br>
    <ol>
      <li> Why this would not be the appropriate base OID ?</li>
      <li>Which base OID are you referring to when you say "under IETF"
        ?<br>
      </li>
    </ol>
    Cheers,<br>
    Max<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 3/27/15 10:58 PM, Salz, Rich =
wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote =
cite=3D"mid:2ebf955d99414800bfefd7a6edd814dd@usma1ex-dag1mb2.msg.corp.akam=
ai.com" type=3D"cite">
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      <div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D">OID=92s

            are just distributed opaque identifiers.&nbsp; Doesn=92t =
bother me,
            but if the WG wants to change OID=92s and break deployed
            software, go for it<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D">It

            will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.&nbsp; A Trans arc =
under
            IETF seems more feasible. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
        <div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D">--&nbsp;

              <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D">Senior

              Architect, Akamai Technologies<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif=
&quot;;color:#1F497D">IM:

              <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:richsalz@jabber.at">richsalz@jabber.at</a>
              Twitter: RichSalz<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class=3D"mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap=3D"">_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a>
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>Trans mailing =
list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></=
html>=

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Subject: Re: [Trans] Use of private OIDs in WG document
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RFC6962 defines 4 OIDs under Google's OID arc.

1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.3 (the Precertificate Poison certificate 
extension) and 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4 (the Precertificate Signing 
Certificate EKU OID) are both no longer required, due to the 
Precertificate format change.  They've both been removed from 6962-bis.

That leaves us with 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2 (the 
SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate extension) and 
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.5 (the SignedCertificateTimestampList OCSP 
Response extension).
Ticket #10 (see comments 6 and 8) intends to extend and merge these two 
extensions into one new extension with a new OID.

I see no reason why we shouldn't use an OID from an IETF OID arc, as I 
wrote in ticket #10 comment 9.

6962-bis currently defines 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.6 (the Redacted Labels 
certificate extension) and 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.7 (the certificate 
extension to permit a Name-constrained intermediate CA certificate to be 
logged in place of end-entity certificates).
I see no reason why we shouldn't reassign these from an IETF OID arc too.

I am working on the assumption that "Russ, we're gonna need some OIDs 
for some cert/OCSP extensions - please can you assign some now, even 
though we haven't finished specifying the contents of these extensions 
yet?" would be greeted by a firm "No".  Hence why the draft is still 
using OIDs under Google's OID arc.


[1] http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/10

On 29/03/15 16:00, Russ Housley wrote:
> In this case, the document was published with OIDs from a non-IETF OID
> arc long ago.  I see no reason to disrupt those implementations, and in
> fact, having two OIDs with exactly the same semantics is confusing.
>
> If new OIDs are needed, we ought to assign them from an IETF arc managed
> by IANA.
>
> Russ
>
>
> On Mar 28, 2015, at 1:14 AM, Massimiliano Pala wrote:
>
>> Hi Rich,
>>
>> I do not think there is any precedence about using private OIDs for
>> I-Ds - the use of Google's OIDs is ok at Google, not for a standard.
>> The first reason is because Google's controls its own sub-tree and can
>> change the sub tree at any time - not appropriate for an RFC. The
>> second reason is that, since the document is defining extensions for
>> certificates and OCSP messages (both under PKIX), the natural place is
>> actually under PKIX.
>>
>> I also want to point out that OIDs are not just opaque identifiers -
>> if that was the case, we would not use a hierarchical structure. The
>> sub-tree where the OID is is actually important.
>>
>> This said, I have two questions for you:
>>
>>  1. Why this would not be the appropriate base OID ?
>>  2. Which base OID are you referring to when you say "under IETF" ?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Max
>>
>>
>> On 3/27/15 10:58 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>>>
>>> OID’s are just distributed opaque identifiers.  Doesn’t bother me,
>>> but if the WG wants to change OID’s and break deployed software, go
>>> for it
>>>
>>> It will might be hard to get a PKIX arc.  A Trans arc under IETF
>>> seems more feasible.
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
>>>
>>> IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #79 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the TBSCertificate
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--089e01634a6ef33fd405127fcb1f
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Specify that the EncapsulatedContentInfo MUST be some specific value
(allocate an OID from IETF/IANA/whatever).
RFC5652 states that if the EncapsulatedContentInfo is not id-data, then the
signedAttrs MUST be present (whence solution 2 will apply).

2015-03-27 17:08 GMT+01:00 trans issue tracker <trac+trans@tools.ietf.org>:

> #79: Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the
> TBSCertificate
>
>  If I understand the CMS spec correctly, then we're currently defining a
>  Precertificate to be a CMS structure that contains a TBSCertificate and a
>  signature over just that TBSCertificate.
>  That means that the components of a Precertificate can be trivially
>  rearranged into an X.509 certificate with a valid signature!
>
>  To fix this, we need to either...
>
>  1. Require the SignedData.encapContentInfo.eContent field to contain
>  "something || TBSCertificate" or "TBSCertificate || something".
>  or
>  2. Require a signed attribute to be present in
>  SignedData.signerInfos[0].signedAttrs.  This is essentially equivalent to
>  "TBSCertificate || something" in terms of what gets signed.
>
>  I think 2 is the cleaner solution, unless there's a cryptographic reason
>  to prefer "something || TBSCertificate" (e.g. to protect against chosen
>  prefix collisions?)
>
> --
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
>  Reporter:                           |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
>   rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
>      Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
>  Priority:  blocker                  |  Milestone:
> Component:  rfc6962-bis              |    Version:
>  Severity:  -                        |   Keywords:
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
>
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79>
> trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>



-- 
Erwann.

--089e01634a6ef33fd405127fcb1f
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Specify that the EncapsulatedContentInfo MUST be some spec=
ific value (allocate an OID from IETF/IANA/whatever).<div>RFC5652 states th=
at if the EncapsulatedContentInfo is not id-data, then the signedAttrs MUST=
 be present (whence solution 2 will apply).<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2015-03-27 17:08 GMT+01:00 trans issue tracke=
r <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trac+trans@tools.ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">trac+trans@tools.ietf.org</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">#79: Precertificate signature must be over something other th=
an just the<br>
TBSCertificate<br>
<br>
=C2=A0If I understand the CMS spec correctly, then we&#39;re currently defi=
ning a<br>
=C2=A0Precertificate to be a CMS structure that contains a TBSCertificate a=
nd a<br>
=C2=A0signature over just that TBSCertificate.<br>
=C2=A0That means that the components of a Precertificate can be trivially<b=
r>
=C2=A0rearranged into an X.509 certificate with a valid signature!<br>
<br>
=C2=A0To fix this, we need to either...<br>
<br>
=C2=A01. Require the SignedData.encapContentInfo.eContent field to contain<=
br>
=C2=A0&quot;something || TBSCertificate&quot; or &quot;TBSCertificate || so=
mething&quot;.<br>
=C2=A0or<br>
=C2=A02. Require a signed attribute to be present in<br>
=C2=A0SignedData.signerInfos[0].signedAttrs.=C2=A0 This is essentially equi=
valent to<br>
=C2=A0&quot;TBSCertificate || something&quot; in terms of what gets signed.=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0I think 2 is the cleaner solution, unless there&#39;s a cryptographic=
 reason<br>
=C2=A0to prefer &quot;something || TBSCertificate&quot; (e.g. to protect ag=
ainst chosen<br>
=C2=A0prefix collisions?)<br>
<br>
--<br>
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------=
<br>
=C2=A0Reporter:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Owner:=C2=A0 dr=
aft-ietf-trans-<br>
=C2=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com">rob.stradling@comodo.com=
</a>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 <a href=3D"mailto:rfc6=
962-bis@tools.ietf.org">rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org</a><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Type:=C2=A0 defect=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Status:=C2=A0 new<br=
>
=C2=A0Priority:=C2=A0 blocker=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 Milestone:<br>
Component:=C2=A0 rfc6962-bis=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Version:<br>
=C2=A0Severity:=C2=A0 -=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0Keywords:<br>
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------=
<br>
<br>
Ticket URL: &lt;<a href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/=
79" target=3D"_blank">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79</a=
>&gt;<br>
trans &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/trans/" target=3D"_blank">http:/=
/tools.ietf.org/trans/</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=
=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div></div>

--089e01634a6ef33fd405127fcb1f--


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The assignment of OIDs is handled by IANA.  See RFC 7299 for the =
official handover from the PKIX WG to IANA, which provides the policy =
for new OIDs in each part of the PKIX arc.

In addition, RFC 7120 provides the procedure for early assignments of =
IANA code points.  This applies to lots of different code points, not =
just OIDs in the PKIX arc.

Russ


On Mar 30, 2015, at 4:55 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:

> I am working on the assumption that "Russ, we're gonna need some OIDs =
for some cert/OCSP extensions - please can you assign some now, even =
though we haven't finished specifying the contents of these extensions =
yet?" would be greeted by a firm "No".  Hence why the draft is still =
using OIDs under Google's OID arc.


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From nobody Mon Mar 30 08:40:15 2015
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References: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73AAFB6418@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <C961CE34-4F55-4B11-86D7-1566B701911D@seantek.com> <5512C9C7.70202@comodo.com> <55159714.1070902@openca.org> <5515EB25.2090206@openca.org> <37572999-2D1A-4073-BEB0-F8566B1FE841@mnt.se> <5516D6D1.2040500@openca.org>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 10:40:08 -0500
Message-ID: <CAK3OfOhQCVSrsqihuBK-gnx-iAUqFBoKmjOma4na=5LLw+nwrQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>
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Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Trans] Use of Private OIDs in WG document (Re: [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax)
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There is nothing wrong with non-SDO OIDs in Internet-Drafts, certainly.

But also: there is nothing wrong with the use of non-SDO OIDs in RFCs
either.  (For the reasons that others have stated, namely, that the
assigning organization gives up control when the arc is assigned.)

Nico
--


From nobody Mon Mar 30 09:19:00 2015
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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> I am sorry but I disagree. This should have been fixed long time ago - no
> Google private OIDs should have been put in a WG document in the first
> place.

Are you also bothered by the OID's in CMS S/MIME and other pkcs-derived RFC=
's?

At any rate,  Russ has already responded on the issue of existing OID's: le=
ave as-is to avoid confusion and disrupting implementations.

	/r$


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Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:35:58 -0500
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>> I am sorry but I disagree. This should have been fixed long time ago - no
>> Google private OIDs should have been put in a WG document in the first
>> place.
>
> Are you also bothered by the OID's in CMS S/MIME and other pkcs-derived RFC's?

... and the other N RFCs:
wkumari-macbookpro1:rfc-mirror wkumari$ grep '1.3.6.1.4' * | awk
'{print $1}' | sed 's/:.*//' | sort | uniq | wc -l
      99

Sure, some of those include lists of assigned numbers, but we also
have things like:
RFC2079 - Definition of an X.500 Attribute Type and an Object Class to
Hold Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) (umichAttributeType.57)
RFC2601 - ILMI-Based Server Discovery for ATMARP (ATM Forum Service
Registry - atmfSrvcRegATMARP)
RFC4511 - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol
(using 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.1.2.3 - The description for 1.3.6.1.1466 says:
"This is an OID assignment to the person Mark Wahl. Many of the LDAPv3
OIDs are assigned below this point.")

We have a history of doing this. World hasn't ended yet...

W


>
> At any rate,  Russ has already responded on the issue of existing OID's: leave as-is to avoid confusion and disrupting implementations.
>
>         /r$
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans



-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf


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Subject: Re: [Trans] Use of private OIDs in WG (standard-track) documents
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The assertion that this kind of trivia needs to be resolved before
adopting a working group document is a complete non-starter.  That
is just simply incorrect - a matter of personal preference, at
best.

I'd like to propose that the draft authors create a ticket
to the effect that the IANA considerations section needs revision
(which it does, regardless of which arc the OIDs belong to).

Melinda


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The minutes from our session at IETF 92 have been uploaded.
Many, many thanks to Rich Salz for recording these.  Please
send any corrections, comments, etc. to the mailing list.

Note that we currently have a call out for adoption of a
working group deliverable providing a threat analysis for
CT.  There's been some feedback but not much - please take a
look at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
as well as:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00965.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00894.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00805.html

and the threads in which they appear.  The call for adoption closes
Friday, April 10.

Thanks,

Melinda


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #80 (client-behavior): Re-introduce the issuer key hash into the Precertificate
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#80: Re-introduce the issuer key hash into the Precertificate

 In the current draft (07), when the entry_type in the
 SignedCertificateTimestamp is precert_entry_V2, the only thing included in
 the signature is the TBSCertificate.
 The issuer key identifier is not included - the implication being that an
 SCT for a precertificate would be valid regardless of who the final issuer
 will be, so the submitter of the precertificate is may not be bound to it
 in the SCT.
 (The Authority Key Identifier,
 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1, should uniquely
 identify the issuer but AIUI this could be the key or the issuer name and
 serial number and Rob Stradling pointed out that on some platforms the
 requirement this matches the issuer may not be enforced, as the stated
 goal of this extension is to facilitate path building).

 I propose re-introducing the issuer key hash and using it for X.509
 certificates in case ticket #4 is accepted (signing TBSCertificate for
 X.509 certificates as well).

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  eranm@google.com       |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/80>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #81 (rfc6962-bis): OIDs and IANA Considerations
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#81: OIDs and IANA Considerations

 We currently use various OIDs for certificate extensions and OCSP response
 extensions that have been allocated under Google's private OID arc.

 We could switch to using OIDs allocated under an IETF/IANA OID arc.

 Melinda noted that, regardless of which OID arc we ultimately settle on,
 the IANA Considerations section will need to be updated.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |  Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |    Version:
 Severity:  -                        |   Keywords:
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/81>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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On 30/03/15 20:45, Melinda Shore wrote:
> The assertion that this kind of trivia needs to be resolved before
> adopting a working group document is a complete non-starter.  That
> is just simply incorrect - a matter of personal preference, at
> best.
>
> I'd like to propose that the draft authors create a ticket
> to the effect that the IANA considerations section needs revision
> (which it does, regardless of which arc the OIDs belong to).

Ticket created.

http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/81

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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+1 to adopting this document.

Syntactic mis-issuance detection is a great idea, but IMHO it should be 
a separate service rather than a component of log servers.

Some folks might want to operate a syntactic mis-issuance detection 
service without having to also run a log server.

On 23/03/15 19:22, Melinda Shore wrote:
> Hi, all:
>
> This is a call for adoption of a working group deliverable
> providing a threat analysis for CT, based on the summary
> provided by http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
> and on previous discussion on this mailing list.
>
> This call closes on Friday, April 10.  Please review the
> slides and provide an indication of whether or not you
> support draft adoption.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Melinda & Paul

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #79 (rfc6962-bis): Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the TBSCertificate
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#79: Precertificate signature must be over something other than just the
TBSCertificate


Comment (by rob.stradling@comodo.com):

 Replying to [comment:2 benl@…]:
 > It is unclear to me whether this is really a problem.

 OK, further investigation required.

 <snip>
 > If there is a problem, I agree that option 2 is better.

 Assuming for now that there is a problem...

 Erwann suggests:
 "Specify that the !EncapsulatedContentInfo MUST be some specific value
 (allocate an OID from IETF/IANA/whatever).
 RFC5652 states that if the !EncapsulatedContentInfo is not id-data, then
 the signedAttrs MUST be present (whence solution 2 will apply)."

 RFC5652 says that when signedAttrs is present...

      "it MUST contain, at a minimum, the following two attributes:

          A content-type attribute having as its value the content type
          of the !EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed.  Section
          11.1 defines the content-type attribute.  However, the
          content-type attribute MUST NOT be used as part of a
          countersignature unsigned attribute as defined in Section 11.4.

          A message-digest attribute, having as its value the message
          digest of the content.  Section 11.2 defines the message-digest
          attribute."

 Putting just those two required attributes in signedAttrs seems
 sufficient.

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |       Owner:
  rob.stradling@comodo.com           |  rob.stradling@comodo.com
     Type:  defect                   |      Status:  assigned
 Priority:  blocker                  |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |     Version:
 Severity:  -                        |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                           |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/79#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


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> > This is a call for adoption of a working group deliverable providing a
> > threat analysis for CT, based on the summary provided by
> > http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
> > and on previous discussion on this mailing list.

Strong +1.


From nobody Tue Mar 31 08:50:24 2015
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Subject: [Trans] [trans] #82 (client-behavior): add integrity validation to get-entries (and fetching SCTs?)
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#82: add integrity validation to get-entries (and fetching SCTs?)

 When monitoring a log, get-entries provide no assurance against in-flight
 corruption. It will get caught once verifying the entries against an STH,
 but that makes it hard to act upon (can't tell which exactly entry is
 corrupted, for example).

 Also, the question of how to fetch the SCT for a logged entry has been
 asked a few times.

 One way to solve both problems at once would be to return the SCT
 signature in get-entries. The rest of the data for the SCT is already
 there, and since it's done over all this data and the entry's digest, it
 should provide a way to check the integrity of the entry.

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  pphaneuf@gmail.com     |  rfc6962-bis@tools.ietf.org
     Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  client-      |    Version:
  behavior               |   Keywords:
 Severity:  -            |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/82>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>


From nobody Tue Mar 31 11:45:12 2015
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Poll for adoption of working group draft on threat analysis	for CT
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On Mon 2015-03-23 15:22:16 -0400, Melinda Shore wrote:

> This is a call for adoption of a working group deliverable
> providing a threat analysis for CT, based on the summary
> provided by http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-trans-0.pdf
> and on previous discussion on this mailing list.
>
> This call closes on Friday, April 10.  Please review the
> slides and provide an indication of whether or not you
> support draft adoption.

Please adopt the CT threat analysis draft.

       --dkg


From nobody Tue Mar 31 13:37:41 2015
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Rob,

> +1 to adopting this document.
thanks
>
> Syntactic mis-issuance detection is a great idea, but IMHO it should 
> be a separate service rather than a component of log servers.
It is as an independent service, which MAY be supported by log servers. 
Monitors might
offer the service too, as a way os declaring what checks they perform on 
behalf of clients.
> Some folks might want to operate a syntactic mis-issuance detection 
> service without having to also run a log server.
agreed.

Steve

