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To: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f001cfa3-e0bc-7d38-a240-4e5164e290f0@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2018 11:37:12 -0800
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Subject: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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Hi, all:

Paul and I discussed the status of the threat document and
agree that it is not appropriate for chairs to make changes
to the content of working group documents in the absence of
working group consensus.  We've been deadlocked on the
threat analysis document for several years now, and while
we would very much like for the parties who disagree to
find a compromise, and for the document to be published, it
does not weaken the protocol document if it is not.  So, if
the authors and those who have issues with the current text
cannot find some compromise text before the working group
shuts down, the document will not be published as a working
group document.  The authors, of course, are free to
pursue publication through alternative processes should they
continue to be unable to arrive at a compromise.

Melinda


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
Thread-Index: AQHUKpg+rw60FGkkj0Ke3Q3t5SVPnKSuPv+A
Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2018 16:50:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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Cc: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/L7Ow0QB0dbLJ0HGaR_quTCgsbrk>
Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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> On Aug 3, 2018, at 09:50, Salz, Rich <rsalz=3D40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>=
 wrote:
>=20
> As chairs, you can appoint a new author.

We know that. The interest in the document seems to be almost exclusively th=
e two persons involved that cannot seem to reach consensus, which is why we a=
re asking those two people to resolve their issues and/or find others intere=
sted in moving the document towards consensus.

Paul

>=20
> =EF=BB=BFOn 8/2/18, 3:37 PM, "Melinda Shore" <melinda.shore@gmail.com> wro=
te:
>=20
>    Hi, all:
>=20
>    Paul and I discussed the status of the threat document and
>    agree that it is not appropriate for chairs to make changes
>    to the content of working group documents in the absence of
>    working group consensus.  We've been deadlocked on the
>    threat analysis document for several years now, and while
>    we would very much like for the parties who disagree to
>    find a compromise, and for the document to be published, it
>    does not weaken the protocol document if it is not.  So, if
>    the authors and those who have issues with the current text
>    cannot find some compromise text before the working group
>    shuts down, the document will not be published as a working
>    group document.  The authors, of course, are free to
>    pursue publication through alternative processes should they
>    continue to be unable to arrive at a compromise.
>=20
>    Melinda
>=20
>    _______________________________________________
>    Trans mailing list
>    Trans@ietf.org
>    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
Thread-Index: AQHUKpg+rw60FGkkj0Ke3Q3t5SVPnKSuPv+AgABRSYD//8B2AA==
Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2018 17:54:05 +0000
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References: <f001cfa3-e0bc-7d38-a240-4e5164e290f0@gmail.com> <53C30786-DFBA-4E6E-8C14-8224470911A0@akamai.com> <11B3A424-55EF-4434-AB7F-900BBAB282F1@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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To: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <c9529643-fa15-5e76-4e81-62ecc303e4c4@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2018 10:05:55 -0800
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Subject: [Trans] Follow-up items from IETF 102
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Several things came out of the discussions in Montreal that
need follow up.  Let's handle the easy one first.  From the
minutes:

   change status from "Proposed Standard" to "Experimental
   Standard": There was some confusion about what was meant
   by "experimental."  There was agreement that the revision
   from 6962 to 6962-bis is extremely valuable and everybody
   plans to implement -bis, but it's going to take some
   time.  There didn't seem to be any objection

This has been hashed out on both the mailing list and during
the meeting.  Unless there's a substantive reason presented for
why the status should not be changed, we're going ahead with
this.

Thanks,

Melinda and Paul


From nobody Fri Aug  3 11:44:09 2018
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From: Stephen Kent <stephentkent@gmail.com>
To: trans@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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The chair's message is a mis-characterization of the history and status 
of this document.

As the cognizant AD, Eric Rescorla  discussed the document status with 
the WG chairs early this year. Paul stated that that there were a two 
paragraphs in the version -12 text (in sections 3.4 and 3.5) that were 
sticking points for David Cooper. A telecon was arranged and took place 
on April 12.  The participants were Paul, David, Eric, Richard Barnes 
(acting as secretary) and me. The outcome of that telecon  was text, 
crafted by Richard, which was agreed to by all parties.  This text was 
incorporated into the next version (-13) of the document which was 
published later in April.

I assumed that were were done, but I was wrong. After this version was 
posted, David sent a large number (~29) of additional comments to the 
list. Thus Paul's assertion that there were only two paragraph that need 
to be changed to satisfy David was incorrect.
I made changes based on all but 6 or 7 of David's comments. Most of his 
comments were straightforward and I agreed that the requested changes 
were appropriate. I  posted a message detailing the changes and the 
rationale for not making changes for the remaining few comments. A new 
version (-14) was posted on May 29. I think the changes I made represent 
a good faith effort to address David's legitimate issues, especially 
since all of the telecon participants believed that we had already done 
so in April.

Ryan Sleevi and I began an exchange based on his comments, on version 
-14. Ryan argued that some of the text did not represent the intent of 
CT, or the practice of CT implementations, based on his experience as a 
developer. I countered that the analysis is based on 6962-bis, and if 
that text was not consistent with intent and practice, from his 
perspective, then the document should change. We agreed to table our 
discussion pending relevant changes to 6962-bis.

I believe there have been no changes to 6269-bis that are relevant to 
the points Ryan and I discussed, and thus no new version of the threat 
analysis is merited.

Steve

>      Hi, all:
>      
>      Paul and I discussed the status of the threat document and
>      agree that it is not appropriate for chairs to make changes
>      to the content of working group documents in the absence of
>      working group consensus.  We've been deadlocked on the
>      threat analysis document for several years now, and while
>      we would very much like for the parties who disagree to
>      find a compromise, and for the document to be published, it
>      does not weaken the protocol document if it is not.  So, if
>      the authors and those who have issues with the current text
>      cannot find some compromise text before the working group
>      shuts down, the document will not be published as a working
>      group document.  The authors, of course, are free to
>      pursue publication through alternative processes should they
>      continue to be unable to arrive at a compromise.
>      
>      Melinda


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From: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>
To: Stephen Kent <stephentkent@gmail.com>, "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/vnrS6V-1a8P-B4m5rWEQJ5t1Wsc>
Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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I just re-read large portions of the document, and I agree it should be 
published.
It appears to be in excellent shape.

-Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Trans <trans-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
> Sent: Friday, August 3, 2018 2:44 PM
> To: trans@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
>
> The chair's message is a mis-characterization of the history and status of 
> this
> document.
>
> As the cognizant AD, Eric Rescorla  discussed the document status with the
> WG chairs early this year. Paul stated that that there were a two paragraphs 
> in
> the version -12 text (in sections 3.4 and 3.5) that were sticking points for
> David Cooper. A telecon was arranged and took place on April 12.  The
> participants were Paul, David, Eric, Richard Barnes (acting as secretary) 
> and
> me. The outcome of that telecon  was text, crafted by Richard, which was
> agreed to by all parties.  This text was incorporated into the next version 
> (-13)
> of the document which was published later in April.
>
> I assumed that were were done, but I was wrong. After this version was
> posted, David sent a large number (~29) of additional comments to the list.
> Thus Paul's assertion that there were only two paragraph that need to be
> changed to satisfy David was incorrect.
> I made changes based on all but 6 or 7 of David's comments. Most of his
> comments were straightforward and I agreed that the requested changes
> were appropriate. I  posted a message detailing the changes and the 
> rationale
> for not making changes for the remaining few comments. A new version (-14)
> was posted on May 29. I think the changes I made represent a good faith
> effort to address David's legitimate issues, especially since all of the 
> telecon
> participants believed that we had already done so in April.
>
> Ryan Sleevi and I began an exchange based on his comments, on version -14.
> Ryan argued that some of the text did not represent the intent of CT, or the
> practice of CT implementations, based on his experience as a developer. I
> countered that the analysis is based on 6962-bis, and if that text was not
> consistent with intent and practice, from his perspective, then the document
> should change. We agreed to table our discussion pending relevant changes to
> 6962-bis.
>
> I believe there have been no changes to 6269-bis that are relevant to the
> points Ryan and I discussed, and thus no new version of the threat analysis 
> is
> merited.
>
> Steve
>
> >      Hi, all:
> >
> >      Paul and I discussed the status of the threat document and
> >      agree that it is not appropriate for chairs to make changes
> >      to the content of working group documents in the absence of
> >      working group consensus.  We've been deadlocked on the
> >      threat analysis document for several years now, and while
> >      we would very much like for the parties who disagree to
> >      find a compromise, and for the document to be published, it
> >      does not weaken the protocol document if it is not.  So, if
> >      the authors and those who have issues with the current text
> >      cannot find some compromise text before the working group
> >      shuts down, the document will not be published as a working
> >      group document.  The authors, of course, are free to
> >      pursue publication through alternative processes should they
> >      continue to be unable to arrive at a compromise.
> >
> >      Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2018 21:40:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Trans <trans@ietf.org>
cc: Stephen Kent <stephentkent@gmail.com>,  "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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On Fri, 3 Aug 2018, Tim Hollebeek wrote:

> I just re-read large portions of the document, and I agree it should be
> published.
> It appears to be in excellent shape.

It is good to see interest from more people about the document.
Hopefully that can translate in text for the document.

The issues that seem to need consensus can be seen in thie message:

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03163.html

David, can you tell us which issues you raised in your message that you
believe are not yet resolved with the -14 version that was released in
response to your message?

Paul


From nobody Sat Aug  4 10:28:54 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Trans <trans@ietf.org>
CC: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Stephen Kent <stephentkent@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2018 17:28:44 +0000
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From nobody Mon Aug  6 12:37:23 2018
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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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On 08/04/2018 01:28 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
> You don't get an infinite number of chances to object.  You get the WGLC time period.
>
> There was one open issue, it seems to have been addressed. You don't get to come back with more issues.

Please see the message below from the WG chairs.

On 04/16/2018 05:01 PM, Paul Wouters wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> This starts a 3 week WGLC for draft-ietf-trans-threat-analysis
>
> Previously, there were some contentious issues regarding the dual CA
> attack that dkg came up with. The current version should address all
> those issues. But since it has been a (very!) long time since this
> document was discussed and consumed, please review the entire document.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-threat-analysis-13
>
> Paul & Melinda
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>


From nobody Mon Aug  6 13:05:07 2018
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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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On 8/6/18 11:36 AM, David A. Cooper wrote:
> Please see the message below from the WG chairs.

Hi, David - are you okay with the document as it stands?

Melinda


From nobody Wed Aug 15 04:31:47 2018
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/SB_I-CNyIF5lksIB7rb9iqWGVgY>
Subject: Re: [Trans] "current NTP time"
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I just started to prepare a PR for this, but...

RFC6962 says:
    "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured since the
    epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00), ignoring leap seconds, in
    milliseconds.

6962-bis currently says:
    "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured in
    milliseconds since the epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC), ignoring
    leap seconds.

RFC5905 section 6 says:
   "In the date and timestamp formats, the prime epoch, or base date of
    era 0, is 0 h 1 January 1900 UTC, when all bits are zero."

1970 != 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.

ISTM that what we're actually using is Unix time 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time), and so we should say that 
we're using Unix time.  It makes no sense to claim to be using NTP time 
if we're not actually doing that.

Two possible ways forward:

1. Replace the "NTP time" references with "Unix time", and find a 
suitable reference (any ideas?) to point to.

2. Switch to actually using the 64-bit NTP timestamp format.  This might 
confuse implementers that are already familiar with RFC6962 though.

Any preferences?  (I favour option 1).

On 28/07/18 23:37, Melinda Shore wrote:
> On 7/28/18 7:02 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> Thanks for pulling up the primary source; I was just going on the chairs'
>> summary of the issues and apparently only noticed an unrelated potential issue.
>> Clarifying that the 64-bit timestamp format (with callout to Sectino 6 of
>> RFC 5905) is the correct one sounds like a fine thing to do.
> 
> D'oh!  But in fairness the what was under discussion was in
> response to the meeting minutes, which do accurately capture
> the discussion in Montreal.  I'll bug the authors.
> 
> Melinda

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
Email: Rob@ComodoCA.com


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Subject: [Trans] Updating TLS document references in 6962-bis
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TLS 1.3 is now a thing, so I figure we need to update some references:

https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/298

Look OK?

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
Email: Rob@ComodoCA.com


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I've reviewed these and they look good to me. Thanks Rob.

On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 8:15 AM, Rob Stradling <Rob@comodoca.com> wrote:

> TLS 1.3 is now a thing, so I figure we need to update some references:
>
> https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/298
>
> Look OK?
>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> Email: Rob@ComodoCA.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

--00000000000094fbe7057379eac8
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;ve reviewed these and they look good to me. Thanks R=
ob.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, =
Aug 15, 2018 at 8:15 AM, Rob Stradling <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Rob@comodoca.com" target=3D"_blank">Rob@comodoca.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">TLS 1.3 is now a thing, so I figure w=
e need to update some references:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/298=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/google/cert<wbr>i=
ficate-transparency-rfcs/pull<wbr>/298</a><br>
<br>
Look OK?<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-- <br>
Rob Stradling<br>
Senior Research &amp; Development Scientist<br>
Email: Rob@ComodoCA.com<br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/trans</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--00000000000094fbe7057379eac8--


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From: Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>
In-reply-to: <18a82f0c-fc5c-144f-2ff8-669b3a34330c@ComodoCA.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 10:08:16 -0700
Cc: Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com>, trans@ietf.org
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References: <96c35701-9a12-9272-0295-f66a1b6c2fa9@nomountain.net> <20180725205222.GA92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <1E12735C-1C8F-4333-AC92-8D604D5A315E@isoc.org> <20180726135011.GJ92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <7cd881d9-de7b-10a2-fed6-d933be3bb867@gmail.com> <CAErg=HGhyTrUk=uXgdOwCt1noFLK0i32+LKqsRguDZpSgQTAXQ@mail.gmail.com> <20180728150251.GC25520@kduck.kaduk.org> <4d5ac6f9-2853-17cd-7115-64fe2f7786f9@gmail.com> <18a82f0c-fc5c-144f-2ff8-669b3a34330c@ComodoCA.com>
To: Rob Stradling <Rob@ComodoCA.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] "current NTP time"
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> On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling <Rob@ComodoCA.com> wrote:
>=20
> I just started to prepare a PR for this, but...
>=20
> RFC6962 says:
>   "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured since the
>   epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00), ignoring leap seconds, in
>   milliseconds.
>=20
> 6962-bis currently says:
>   "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured in
>   milliseconds since the epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC), ignoring
>   leap seconds.
>=20
> RFC5905 section 6 says:
>  "In the date and timestamp formats, the prime epoch, or base date of
>   era 0, is 0 h 1 January 1900 UTC, when all bits are zero."
>=20
> 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.
>=20
> ISTM that what we're actually using is Unix time =
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time), and so we should say that =
we're using Unix time.  It makes no sense to claim to be using NTP time =
if we're not actually doing that.
>=20
> Two possible ways forward:
>=20
> 1. Replace the "NTP time" references with "Unix time", and find a =
suitable reference (any ideas?) to point to.
>=20
> 2. Switch to actually using the 64-bit NTP timestamp format.  This =
might confuse implementers that are already familiar with RFC6962 =
though.
>=20
> Any preferences?  (I favour option 1).

Thank you for this. I think it=E2=80=99s important to define it to Unix =
time or equivalent rather than NTP. At best, NTP is going to refer it to =
Unix time or equivalent, and you=E2=80=99d have the problem of people =
debating what to do if they use some other protocol than NTP.

I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D =
it=E2=80=99s pretty well-defined. You could even explain once that =
it=E2=80=99s the number of seconds since 1 January 1970 UTC and then =
it=E2=80=99s defined about as completely as possible.

	Jon


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References: <96c35701-9a12-9272-0295-f66a1b6c2fa9@nomountain.net> <20180725205222.GA92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <1E12735C-1C8F-4333-AC92-8D604D5A315E@isoc.org> <20180726135011.GJ92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <7cd881d9-de7b-10a2-fed6-d933be3bb867@gmail.com> <CAErg=HGhyTrUk=uXgdOwCt1noFLK0i32+LKqsRguDZpSgQTAXQ@mail.gmail.com> <20180728150251.GC25520@kduck.kaduk.org> <4d5ac6f9-2853-17cd-7115-64fe2f7786f9@gmail.com> <18a82f0c-fc5c-144f-2ff8-669b3a34330c@ComodoCA.com> <3600B503-07FB-4566-B5E1-ABA9AAB91865@icloud.com>
From: Aanchal Malhotra <aanchal4@bu.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 13:25:22 -0400
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To: Jon Callas <joncallas=40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Rob Stradling <Rob@comodoca.com>, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com>, Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>, trans@ietf.org, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] "current NTP time"
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Hi All,

I am not a 100% sure what is exactly required here. So FWIW,

1) If it is a question about the encoding and wire format of the NTP
timestamp (NTP synchronize to the UTC timescale), then I would suggest
looking at the working draft
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ntp-packet-timestamps-02#page-6

2) If it is about the type of time and date format to be used, the closest
reference would be RFC 3339. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3339

3) If the idea is just to refrain from mentioning "NTP" at all, then I
would agree with what Jon said  to go with "64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=
=80=9D
should be good enough.

Best,
Aanchal.

On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Jon Callas <
joncallas=3D40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

>
>
> > On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling <Rob@ComodoCA.com> wrote:
> >
> > I just started to prepare a PR for this, but...
> >
> > RFC6962 says:
> >   "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured since the
> >   epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00), ignoring leap seconds, in
> >   milliseconds.
> >
> > 6962-bis currently says:
> >   "timestamp" is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], measured in
> >   milliseconds since the epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC), ignoring
> >   leap seconds.
> >
> > RFC5905 section 6 says:
> >  "In the date and timestamp formats, the prime epoch, or base date of
> >   era 0, is 0 h 1 January 1900 UTC, when all bits are zero."
> >
> > 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.
> >
> > ISTM that what we're actually using is Unix time (
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time), and so we should say that we're
> using Unix time.  It makes no sense to claim to be using NTP time if we'r=
e
> not actually doing that.
> >
> > Two possible ways forward:
> >
> > 1. Replace the "NTP time" references with "Unix time", and find a
> suitable reference (any ideas?) to point to.
> >
> > 2. Switch to actually using the 64-bit NTP timestamp format.  This migh=
t
> confuse implementers that are already familiar with RFC6962 though.
> >
> > Any preferences?  (I favour option 1).
>
> Thank you for this. I think it=E2=80=99s important to define it to Unix t=
ime or
> equivalent rather than NTP. At best, NTP is going to refer it to Unix tim=
e
> or equivalent, and you=E2=80=99d have the problem of people debating what=
 to do if
> they use some other protocol than NTP.
>
> I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D it=
=E2=80=99s pretty
> well-defined. You could even explain once that it=E2=80=99s the number of=
 seconds
> since 1 January 1970 UTC and then it=E2=80=99s defined about as completel=
y as
> possible.
>
>         Jon
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>

--000000000000b31a1705737c9dcb
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi All,</div><div><br></div><div>I am not a 100% sure=
 what is exactly required here. So FWIW,<br></div><div><br></div><div>1)
 If it is a=20
question about the encoding and wire format of the NTP timestamp (NTP=20
synchronize to the UTC timescale), then I would suggest looking at the=20
working draft<br></div><div><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ie=
tf-ntp-packet-timestamps-02#page-6" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.or=
g/html/dr<wbr>aft-ietf-ntp-packet-timestamps<wbr>-02#page-6</a><br></div><d=
iv><br></div><div>2) If it is about the type of time and date format to be =
used, the closest reference would be RFC 3339. <a href=3D"https://tools.iet=
f.org/html/rfc3339" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rf<wbr>c3=
339</a></div><div><br></div><div>3) If the idea is just to refrain from men=
tioning &quot;NTP&quot; at all, then I would agree with what Jon said=C2=A0=
 to go with &quot;64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D=C2=A0 should be good =
enough.</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Aanchal.<br></div></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Aug 15, 201=
8 at 1:08 PM, Jon Callas <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:joncallas=
=3D40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">joncallas=3D40icloud.com@=
dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling &lt;Rob@ComodoCA.com&gt; wr=
ote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I just started to prepare a PR for this, but...<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; RFC6962 says:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;timestamp&quot; is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], m=
easured since the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00), ignoring leap seconds, in<=
br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0milliseconds.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 6962-bis currently says:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;timestamp&quot; is the current NTP Time [RFC5905], m=
easured in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0milliseconds since the epoch (January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC),=
 ignoring<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0leap seconds.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; RFC5905 section 6 says:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 &quot;In the date and timestamp formats, the prime epoch, or bas=
e date of<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0era 0, is 0 h 1 January 1900 UTC, when all bits are zero.&=
quot;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ISTM that what we&#39;re actually using is Unix time (<a href=3D"https=
://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://en.wikipedia.org/<wbr>wiki/Unix_time</a>), and so we should say that =
we&#39;re using Unix time.=C2=A0 It makes no sense to claim to be using NTP=
 time if we&#39;re not actually doing that.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Two possible ways forward:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 1. Replace the &quot;NTP time&quot; references with &quot;Unix time&qu=
ot;, and find a suitable reference (any ideas?) to point to.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; 2. Switch to actually using the 64-bit NTP timestamp format.=C2=A0 Thi=
s might confuse implementers that are already familiar with RFC6962 though.=
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Any preferences?=C2=A0 (I favour option 1).<br>
<br>
Thank you for this. I think it=E2=80=99s important to define it to Unix tim=
e or equivalent rather than NTP. At best, NTP is going to refer it to Unix =
time or equivalent, and you=E2=80=99d have the problem of people debating w=
hat to do if they use some other protocol than NTP.<br>
<br>
I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D it=E2=
=80=99s pretty well-defined. You could even explain once that it=E2=80=99s =
the number of seconds since 1 January 1970 UTC and then it=E2=80=99s define=
d about as completely as possible.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jon<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/trans</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

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References: <96c35701-9a12-9272-0295-f66a1b6c2fa9@nomountain.net> <20180725205222.GA92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <1E12735C-1C8F-4333-AC92-8D604D5A315E@isoc.org> <20180726135011.GJ92448@kduck.kaduk.org> <7cd881d9-de7b-10a2-fed6-d933be3bb867@gmail.com> <CAErg=HGhyTrUk=uXgdOwCt1noFLK0i32+LKqsRguDZpSgQTAXQ@mail.gmail.com> <20180728150251.GC25520@kduck.kaduk.org> <4d5ac6f9-2853-17cd-7115-64fe2f7786f9@gmail.com> <18a82f0c-fc5c-144f-2ff8-669b3a34330c@ComodoCA.com> <3600B503-07FB-4566-B5E1-ABA9AAB91865@icloud.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] "current NTP time"
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Jon Callas <joncallas=3D40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling <Rob@ComodoCA.com> wrote:
> >
> > 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.

NTP's specification is amazingly opaque on this matter, but there is a
fixed offset between NTP time and POSIX time of (365*70 + 17) * 86400 =3D=
=3D
2,208,988,800 which is the "First day UNIX" value in the table in RFC 5905
section 6. You can see from the "Last day 20th Century" that NTP and Unix
apply leap seconds to their timestamps in the same way (i.e. they don't).

$ perl -MPOSIX -e 'print strftime "%F.%T\n", gmtime (3155587200 - 220898880=
0)'
1999-12-31.00:00:00

> I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D it=
=E2=80=99s pretty
> well-defined. You could even explain once that it=E2=80=99s the number of
> seconds since 1 January 1970 UTC and then it=E2=80=99s defined about as
> completely as possible.

It isn't just the number of seconds since 1970-01-01 :-)

RFC 4034 summarizes it as:

   The Signature Expiration and Inception field values specify a date
   and time in the form of a 32-bit unsigned number of seconds elapsed
   since 1 January 1970 00:00:00 UTC, ignoring leap seconds, in network
   byte order.

POSIX time is defined in The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7 /
IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, volume 1 (XBD) section 4.16 "Seconds
Since the Epoch"

http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799.2016edition/basedefs/V1_cha=
p04.html#tag_04_16

Tony.
--=20
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
South Biscay: Northerly or northwesterly 4 or 5. Slight becoming moderate.
Rain for a time. Good, occasionally moderate.
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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: Trans <trans@ietf.org>
References: <f001cfa3-e0bc-7d38-a240-4e5164e290f0@gmail.com> <53C30786-DFBA-4E6E-8C14-8224470911A0@akamai.com> <03d7a8c3-a574-c944-f4f2-115abeafabca@gmail.com> <BN6PR14MB1106071D07EF07942F56D8A783230@BN6PR14MB1106.namprd14.prod.outlook.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1808032129070.6487@bofh.nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
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  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 08/03/2018 09:40 PM, Paul Wouters
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:alpine.LRH.2.21.1808032129070.6487@bofh.nohats.ca">The
      issues that seem to need consensus can be seen in thie message: <br>
      <br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03163.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03163.html</a><br>
      <br>
      David, can you tell us which issues you raised in your message
      that you <br>
      believe are not yet resolved with the -14 version that was
      released in <br>
      response to your message? <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Paul,<br>
    <br>
    Below are the comments that I raised in my message on May 9 that I
    believe have not been resolved.<br>
    <br>
    However, it does not seem accurate to suggest that the only issues
    that need consensus are the ones from my message on May 9. Andrew
    Ayer and Ryan Sleevi also raised issues with the most recent draft
    (see for example
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03178.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03178.html</a>)
    and I have not seen any messages on the list since then to suggest
    that the issues they raised have been address - only a comment from
    Steve Kent suggesting that he does not feel any changes are needed
    (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html</a>).
    In addition, Eric Rescorla submitted some, mainly editorial,
    comments on draft -12
    (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html</a>),
    and there was never any response to his comments, many of which
    remain unaddressed.<br>
    <br>
    I would also like to note again, given the nature of
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html</a>,
    that I submitted the comments on May 9 specifically because of a
    request from the WG chairs
    (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03146.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03146.html</a>)
    to "please review the entire document." So, any implication that
    there was something inappropriate about submitting comments on new
    issues after draft -13 was published is rather unfortunate.<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05/09/2018 08:49 AM, Stephen Kent
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="2" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4 of the
            document includes a lot of text about "attacks" involving
            syntactic mis-issuance, but there is nothing explain how
            syntactic mis-issuance could be part of an attack. The text
            describes a scenario in which a malicious CA intentionally
            issues a certificate that is syntactically incorrect, the
            Subject of the certificate reports the problem, and the CA
            doesn't take action. No explanation is provided as to how
            this could be part of an attack. Can't the Subject just get
            a new certificate from a different CA? While it is clear
            that there is a benefit to detecting syntactic mis-issuance
            and working to have such errors corrected, it is not at all
            clear how syntactic mis-issuance could be part of an attack.
            Either some explanation of how syntactic mis-issuance could
            be used as part of an attack (particularly an attack in
            which the Subject is not one of the attackers) or the text
            about "attacks" in Section 4 should be removed.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">You raise an
                  interesting question. I originally assumed that
                  mis-issuance referred only to certificates that
                  misrepresented the identity of the certificate holder
                  or included bogus info intended to mislead relying
                  parties. Several years ago I requested Ben to clarify
                  what constituted mis-issuance. The term was (and is
                  still) used throughout 6962-bis without definition.
                  (I’m surprised that this lack of a definition for such
                  a critical term in 6962-bis hasn’t merited a comment
                  from you to the authors of that document!) Ben replied
                  that a certificate that violated the syntax imposed by
                  a criteria such as the CABF would qualify as
                  mis-issued. That’s why syntactic mis-issuance became
                  an element of this analysis. Violating the syntax
                  rules imposed by such criteria might cause processing
                  problems for browsers that would have adverse
                  consequences. Perhaps what concerned Ben was the
                  observation that, if a CA issues a certificate not
                  consistent with its advertised syntax criteria, that
                  merits detection by CT, as an example of CA
                  misbehavior.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The response is not related to the comment. The comment did not
    suggest that issuing a certificate with syntactic errors shouldn't
    be considered mis-issuance, nor did it suggest that the threat
    analysis document shouldn't discuss syntactic mis-issuance. The
    problem is that the text suggests that the issuance of a certificate
    with syntactic errors might be part of an attack, but it does not
    explain how it could be part of an attack.<br>
    <br>
    This text is particularly confusing in the case in which the Subject
    is aware that there is an error in the certificate. The text states
    that "<font color="#3333ff">a malicious CA may do nothing or may
      delay the action(s) needed to remedy the problem</font>." How can
    the CA "attack" the Subject in this way when the Subject can just
    get a new certificate from a different CA and not use the mis-issued
    certificate?<br>
    <br>
    The source of the problem may be that the document appears to be
    using rather bizarre definitions for "threat" and "attack." For
    example, there is new text in Section 2 that says:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">Nonetheless, it is useful to
        document perceived threats against a system to provide a context
        for understanding attacks (even though some attacks may be the
        result of errors, not threats).</font><br>
    </blockquote>
    The parenthetical makes no sense. It seems to be based on some
    definition of "attack" that encompasses unintentional errors while
    also relying on an incorrect definition of "threat" (see below). For
    what reasonable definition of "attack" could one say that an attack
    may be the result of errors in the context of certificate
    mis-issuance?<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="3" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 2 begins by
            saying that "A threat is defined, traditionally, as a
            motivated, capable adversary." But, this is not correct, nor
            is it consistent with the remainder of this draft. NISTIR
            7298, for example, defines a threat as "the potential source
            of an adverse event." This draft is supposed to describe an
            attack model and describe threats to the Web PKI.
            Mis-issuance (especially syntactic mis-issuance) does not
            require an attacker or a motivated, capable adversary.
            Mis-issuance may be the result of carelessness, but it is
            still a threat, which is why Section 4.1.1.1 discusses
            unintentional syntactic mis-issuance. Given that the threat
            model includes unintentional mis-issuance, Section 2 needs
            to be rewritten to take into account that not all threats
            involve "attacks" or "a motivated, capable adversary."</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoPlainText"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:Courier"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10.5pt"><b><span
                  class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
                  Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The
                    definition of threat used here has been employed for
                    a long time, e.g., in the U.S. DoD, decades before
                    the publication of NISTIR 7298. Several, easily
                    found examples (thanks to a quick Google search)
                    include the syllabus for Cornell CS 5430, for MIT
                    course 6.805, the NRC Report “Who Goes There:
                    Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy”, …<span
                      class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span> </span>Mis-issuance
                    is not a threat; it is an example of an attack. If
                    the mis-issuance is the result of an error, then no
                    adversary is involved. To help clarify the first
                    paragraph of Section 2, will be revised:
                    “Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived
                    threats against a system to provide a context for
                    understanding attacks (even though some attacks may
                    be the result of errors, not threats).”</span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I can find no such DoD definition for threat, cannot find the word
    "threat" in the Cornell CS 5430 syllabus, and cannot seem to access
    either the MIT course 6.805 syllabus or the NRC report. I do see,
    however, that Steve Kent is listed as one of the authors of the NRC
    report, which suggests that it is not a independent source for the
    definition. Certainly in some cases the only source of a threat may
    be a "motivated, capable adversary," and in such a context the term
    may be described in that way, but that does not mean the definition
    of threat is limited to motivated, capable adversaries.<br>
    <br>
    On the other hand, there are sources such as <a
      class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
      href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/threat">https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/threat</a>
    and <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
      href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_%28computer%29">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_(computer)</a>.
    The Wikipedia article specifically notes that "a threat type can
    have multiple origins" and it lists deliberate, accidental,
    environmental, and negligence.<br>
    <br>
    Also, note that in the original comment I did not suggest that
    mis-issuance is a threat. When I said "Mis-issuance may be the
    result of carelessness, but it is still a threat" I intended to
    suggest possibility that someone could act carelessly is a threat.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="4" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Them second paragraph of
            Section 2 begins "As noted above, the goals of CT are to
            deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of attacks on the
            web PKI." This is incorrect. What is noted above is that
            "Certificate transparency (CT) is a set of mechanisms
            designed to detect, deter, and facilitate remediation of
            certificate mis-issuance." As noted in the previous bullet,
            "certificate mis-issuance" is not the same as "attack."<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- The
                  text will be changed to reiterate that deterrence,
                  detection and remediation of mis-issuance as the goal.</span></b></span></span></span></p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This text is still odd, and seems inconsistent with the previous
    paragraph. The previous paragraph has new text that says "some
    attacks may be the result of errors," whereas this paragraph now
    says:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">As noted above, the goals of CT
        are to deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of attacks that
        result in certificate mis-issuance in the Web PKI.  (CT also may
        facilitate detection and remediation of errors that result in
        certificate mis-issuance.)</font><br>
    </blockquote>
    So, unlike in the previous paragraph, this text seems to acknowledge
    that an error is not an attack. It is still not clear the reason for
    two separate sentences. What is actually "noted above" is that CT is
    "designed to detect, deter, and facilitate remediation of
    certificate mis-issuance" (regardless of the reason the mis-issuance
    happened), so why imply that it is primarily about mis-issuance that
    was caused by an attack, especially when Section 4 is devoted to
    syntactic mis-issuance, which is far more likely to be the result of
    an error than an attack.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"></p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="6" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The final sentence of
            Section 1, paragraph 5 says that "This extension also may be
            used by a browser to request OCSP responses from a TLS
            server with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
            The sentence should be referring to the "status_request" TLS
            extension, but the only extension mentioned before this
            sentence is the Authority Information Access (AIA)
            extension. So, saying "This extension" is incorrect.<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Good catch- The
                  text in this sentence will be revised to refer to “The
                  data from this extension …”</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This text is still incorrect.  It now says "<font color="#3333ff">The
      data from this [Authority Information Access] extension also may
      be used by a browser to request OCSP responses from a TLS server
      with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961].</font>"<br>
    <br>
    To obtain OCSP responses from a TLS server the browser just sends a
    status_request [RFC6066] (or status_request_v2 [RFC6961]) extension
    in the ClientHello. The status_request extension sent in the
    ClientHello does not contain any information from the server
    certificate's AIA extension - the client doesn't obtain the server's
    certificate until after sending the ClientHello. Also, there is no
    information in the AIA extension that could be included in the
    status_request extension.<br>
    <br>
    The sentence should just be changed to something like: "A browser
    may also request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is
    communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="8" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.1 says that a
            CA "may have mis-issued a certificate as a result of an
            error." This further suggests that the "threats" that are
            covered by this draft are not limited to ones involving "a
            motivated, capable adversary."</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Not all attacks
                  are the result of a threat, and attacks are not the
                  same as threats. Thus no changes are planned in
                  response this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The response here seems to be based on the highly unusual, but
    unspecified definition of "attack" used in this document. The
    response certainly has nothing to do with the comment, which doesn't
    suggest anything like what the response implies that it does.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info"><br>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="10" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The organization of
            Section 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing. Sometimes self-monitoring
            subjects and benign third-party monitors are covered
            together (in the same section), sometimes they are covered
            in separate sections even though there are no differences
            between the two, and sometimes the third-party monitor is
            overlooked. Sometimes the case of a benign third-party
            monitor is covered, but the case of a misbehaving
            third-party monitor is overlooked.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Separate
                  subsections were created when there are meaningful
                  differences in cases involving self-monitoring vs.
                  third party m monitors, etc. But, when these
                  distinctions do not matter, the subsections have been
                  merged, and the text explains this. No changes are
                  planned in response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="12" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.2.2.1, and
            other places in the document that make similar statements,
            should be updated given that at least one browser is now
            requiring SCTs for all newly issued certificates.<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">One browser does
                  not the Internet make. Moreover, the text in 6962-bis
                  is rather “flexible” with regard to what a browser
                  MUST do, e.g.,<span> </span>“<span class="colour"
                    style="color:black">It is up to a client's local
                    policy to specify the quantity and form of evidence
                    (SCTs, inclusion proofs or a combination) needed to
                    achieve compliance and how to handle
                    non-compliance.”<span> <span
                        class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span>Thus
                  no changes are planned in response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    See
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html</a>
    and
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html</a>.<br>
    <br>
    There was no suggestion that one browser makes the Internet. The
    problem is that the text says, for example:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">If a browser rejects certificates
        without SCTs (see Section 5.4), CAs may be "encouraged" to log
        the certificates they issue.  This, in turn, would make it
        easier for Monitors to detect bogus certificates. <span
          style="background-color:#ff6;">However, the CT architecture
          does not describe how such behavior by browsers can be
          deployed incrementally throughout the Internet. As a result,
          this attack model does not assume that browsers will reject a
          certificate that is not accompanied by an SCT.</span></font><br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    It might be perfectly fine to say that the attack model does not
    assume that browsers will reject a certificate that is not
    accompanied by an SCT since the CT architecture does not require
    browsers to do so. But, that is not what the text says. The text
    says that the model doesn't make the assumption because the CT
    architecture does describe how browsers can do it.<br>
    <br>
    The comment was not suggesting that since Chrome requires SCTs for
    all newly issued certificates, the attack model needs to assume that
    browsers will reject certificates not accompanied by an SCT. The
    point is that since the developers of Chrome have described "how
    such behavior by browsers can be deployed incrementally throughout
    the Internet," the lack of such a description in "the CT
    architecture" isn't relevant. Browser developers may have good
    reasons not to reject certificates that are not accompanied by an
    SCT, but it is not because no one described to them how to deploy
    such behavior.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"> </p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="13" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">As noted previously, if
            Section 3.3 is to remain, then the text needs to be modified
            to make it clear that Section 3.3 is only about CAs/logs
            that have had their keys stolen (compromised) rather than
            all types of compromise (e.g., DigiNotar).<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Changes to 3.2 and
                  3.3 (as noted in response to comment #1) address this
                  comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This problem is still not addressed. The DigiNotar case was moved to
    Section 3.3, where parts of the corresponding paragraph notes that
    not all compromises involve theft of the private key. However, the
    second paragraph of Section 3.3 still says:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">The section focuses on undetected
        compromise of CAs.  Such compromises warrant some additional
        discussion, since some relying parties may see signed objects
        issued by the legitimate (non-malicious) CA, others may see
        signed objects from its compromised counterpart, and some may
        see objects from both</font><br>
    </blockquote>
    and Section 3.3.1 begins:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">In the case of a compromised
        (non-malicious) CA, an attacker uses the <span
          style="background-color:#ff6;">purloined private key</span> to
        generate a bogus certificate (that the CA would not knowingly
        issue).</font><br>
    </blockquote>
    So while there is now some text that notes that not all compromises
    involve theft of the private key, there is still other text that
    says otherwise.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info"><br>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="15" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.3.3 begins "As
            noted in 3.4.1", but there is no Section 3.4.1.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- This
                  reference will be changed to “Section 3.4”.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This reference was corrected, but draft -14 still has problems with
    incorrect references. I have not checked all of the references, but
    there is a parenthetical in Section 3.3.1 that says "<font
      color="#3333ff">(see 3.1.2.2)</font>" even though there is no
    Section 3.1.2.2. Similarly, Section 4.2.1.3 begins "<font
      color="#3333ff">As noted above (4.1.1.4)</font>," but there is no
    Section 4.1.1.4.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="18" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The final paragraph of
            Section 3.5 is unrelated to the rest of the section and
            seems to be related to the content of Section 3.4.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">This text was
                  added in response to a comment ion the list (by Rob, I
                  believe) who wanted this document to note that the
                  cited revocation status distribution problems might be
                  addressed by mechanisms not specified by 6962-bis.
                  Thus no changes are planned in response to this
                  comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    Both this comment and
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html</a>
    noted that the final paragraph of Section 3.5 is related to the
    attack in Section 3.4 and not to the contents of Section 3.5. The
    text has nothing to do with the rest of Section 3.5 nor does it
    "note that the cited revocation status distribution problems might
    be addressed by mechanisms not specified by 6962-bis."<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="20" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.1.1.2 says
            that "A log or Monitor that is conspiring with the
            attacker," but it is not clear what attacker there is in the
            scenario being described.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The attacker is
                  one who wants a syntactically mis-issued certificate
                  to not be detected and revoked.<span
                    class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is a non-answer. Did the attacker do something that caused the
    certificate to be mis-issued? If so, how? The CA can't be the
    attacker since it is non-malicious in Section 4.1. Is this sentence
    considering the possibility that the Subject could an an "attacker,"
    sending a certificate request that somehow tricks the CA into
    issuing an erroneous certificate? Is there any other than the CA or
    Subject that could influence the contents of the certificate?<br>
    <br>
    Could it be that the "attacker" had no influence over the issuance
    of the certificate, but was just hoping that a certificate would be
    mis-issued? If so, what role does it play in the "attack" (other
    than passive observer)?<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"> </p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="21" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.1.1.4 says
            "Unfortunately, experience suggests that many browsers do
            not perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates, and
            so it seems unlikely that browsers will be a reliable way to
            detect erroneous certificates." and Section 4.2.1.4 says "As
            noted above (4.1.1.4), most browsers fail to perform
            thorough syntax checks on certificates." These sentences
            should be removed or modified. There is no reason that a
            browser should perform thorough syntactic checks on
            certificates, and there are good reasons for browsers not
            to. So, this document should not be labeling this as
            unfortunate or a failure. We do not want to encourage
            browsers to perform thorough syntax checks on certificates,
            as this could lead to the same types of problems that TLS
            has experienced, where making a change in something causes
            deployed products to break.<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">It seems likely
                  that the primary reason that browsers fail to perform
                  thorough syntactic checks on certificates is because,
                  at least historically, some CAs fail to issue
                  syntactically valid certificates. This failure by
                  browsers flies in the face of PKIX standards; you, as
                  one who usually insists that failures to follow
                  standards ought to be a capital crime, have no basis
                  for criticizing this text. No changes will be made in
                  response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    As I noted previously (see, for example,
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html</a>)
    this response is not related to the comment. There is a difference
    between a browser checking for things that can be expected not to
    change (e.g., is the keyUsage extension DER encoded -
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html</a>)
    and checking for things may may change (e.g., does a subject field
    that doesn't contain an organizationName attribute contain a
    streetAddress attribute -
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html</a>).<br>
    <br>
    While the underlying syntax rules for X.509 certificates can be
    presumed to be unchanging, certificate profiles can change over
    time, and this document makes clear that syntax checks includes
    checking for conformance with the appropriate profile. If a browser
    performed "thorough syntax checks" as this document defined that
    term, then it would be effectively checking for conformance to a
    particular version of a certificate profile. There can't be an
    assumption that every browser on every client will be updated as
    soon as any certificate profile changes, so browsers performing such
    checks would create problems. As a related example, consider the
    recent discussions in the TLS WG about ossification, the need to
    make last-minute changes to the TLS 1.3 protocol in order to deal
    with version-intolerant servers and middleboxes, and the addition of
    text to RFC 8446 about protocol invariants.<br>
    <br>
    There seems to be some confusion about the nature of syntactic
    mis-issuance. Section 1 of the threats document says:<br>
    <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">A certificate is characterized as
        syntactically mis-issued (aka erroneous) if it violates syntax
        constraints associated with the class of certificate that it
        purports to represent.  Syntax constraints for certificates are
        established by certificate profiles, and typically are
        application-specific.  For example, certificates used in the Web
        PKI environment might be characterized as domain validation (DV)
        or extended validation (EV) certificates. Certificates used with
        applications such as IPsec or S/MIME have different syntactic
        constraints from those in the Web PKI context.</font><br>
    </blockquote>
    Yet, in the response to the above comment and in
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html</a>,
    Steve seems to suggest that checking for syntactic mis-issuance is
    really about checking whether certificates are valid with respect to
    RFC 5280. Of course one could check for both types of errors.
    However, there is a very big difference between just checking for
    compliance with X.509 (RFC 5280) and checking for compliance with
    the current profile rules for DV certificates.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="25" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.2.2 says
            "However, even if errors are detected and reported to the
            CA, a malicious/conspiring CA may do nothing to fix the
            problem or may delay action." As noted previously, no
            explanation is provided as to why this is a threat or
            attack. If the Subject knows that there are errors in the
            certificate, then the Subject can just get another
            certificate (from a different CA, if necessary). It doesn't
            matter whether the CA revokes the erroneous certificate or
            not.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">See previous
                  comment on why syntactic mis-issuance is included in
                  this document.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This is not a response. Neither this comment nor any other comment
    suggested that syntactic mis-issuance should not be included in the
    document.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"> </p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="26" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.3 says</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
        margin-left:1.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level2
        lfo1;tab-stops:list 1.0in" class="MsoNormal"><span class="font"
          style="font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><span class="size"
            style="font-size:10pt"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">o<span
                class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
                Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:7pt">  <span
                    class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></span></span></span><span
          class="size" style="font-size:10pt">It also will likely
          require the targeted Subject to provide assurances that it is
          the authorized entity representing the Subject name
          (subjectAltname) in question.  Thus a Subject should not
          expect immediate revocation of a contested certificate.  The
          time frame in which a CA will respond to a revocation request
          usually is described in the CPS for the CA. <span
            class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><u>Other certificate
            fields and extensions may be of interest for forensic
            purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to
            verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus or
            erroneous, based on applicable criteria.</u></span><br>
      </p>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 1in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:10pt">This text seems to
                say that only the "Subject name (subjectAltname)" is
                required "verify that the certificate to be revoked is
                ... erroneous." This cannot be correct, as a syntactic
                check a certificate would be looking for errors in many
                fields and extensions other than "Subject name
                (subjectAltname)."<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- The
                  sentence will, be truncated after “to effect
                  revocation”.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    The sentence was supposed to end just "to effect revocation," but it
    just ends to "to effect."<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"> </p>
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="27" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.4 (and similar
            text elsewhere in the document) seems out of date given that
            at least one browser now rejects any newly issued
            certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT.<span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0,
        0); font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">See prior comment
                  on why one browser’s behavior is not viewed as
                  sufficient to merit a change to this and similar text.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    See response to prior comment. A method has been defined that is
    compatible with incremental deployment. It may not have been defined
    in an RFC, but it has been defined. So, the text shouldn't be
    implying that no one has defined a mechanism that accommodates
    incremental deployment of a capability to reject certificates that
    have not been logged.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
      <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
        rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style: normal;
        font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing:
        normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
        text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto;
        word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
        -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        start="29" type="1">
        <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
          font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.6, paragraph 5
            says "If a Monitor is compromised by, or conspires with, an
            attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a bogus or
            erroneous certificate targeting that Subject, as noted
            above." As noted previously, this document needs to explain
            how an attacker can "target" a Subject with an erroneous
            certificate.</span><br>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
        font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
        normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent:
        0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:
        0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
        class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0,
          0)"><span class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;"><span class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                  class="size" style="font-size:10pt">As noted above,
                  Ben insisted that syntactically erroneous certificates
                  were considered mis-issued, and hence motivated
                  inclusion of the text in Section 4.<span
                    class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
      </p>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>Again, the comment does not suggest that syntactically erroneous
      certificates are not mis-issued nor does it suggest that syntactic
      mis-issuance should not be discussed in this document. So, the
      response does not address the comment.</p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>


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I've proposed text to the effect of clarifying that we're using Unix time
at:
https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/299


On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 2:34 PM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:

> Jon Callas <joncallas=3D40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > > On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling <Rob@ComodoCA.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does not ignore leap seconds.
>
> NTP's specification is amazingly opaque on this matter, but there is a
> fixed offset between NTP time and POSIX time of (365*70 + 17) * 86400 =3D=
=3D
> 2,208,988,800 which is the "First day UNIX" value in the table in RFC 590=
5
> section 6. You can see from the "Last day 20th Century" that NTP and Unix
> apply leap seconds to their timestamps in the same way (i.e. they don't).
>
> $ perl -MPOSIX -e 'print strftime "%F.%T\n", gmtime (3155587200 -
> 2208988800)'
> 1999-12-31.00:00:00
>
> > I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D i=
t=E2=80=99s pretty
> > well-defined. You could even explain once that it=E2=80=99s the number =
of
> > seconds since 1 January 1970 UTC and then it=E2=80=99s defined about as
> > completely as possible.
>
> It isn't just the number of seconds since 1970-01-01 :-)
>
> RFC 4034 summarizes it as:
>
>    The Signature Expiration and Inception field values specify a date
>    and time in the form of a 32-bit unsigned number of seconds elapsed
>    since 1 January 1970 00:00:00 UTC, ignoring leap seconds, in network
>    byte order.
>
> POSIX time is defined in The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7 /
> IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, volume 1 (XBD) section 4.16 "Seconds
> Since the Epoch"
>
> http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799.2016edition/basedefs/V1_
> chap04.html#tag_04_16
>
> Tony.
> --
> f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
> South Biscay: Northerly or northwesterly 4 or 5. Slight becoming moderate=
.
> Rain for a time. Good, occasionally moderate.
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;ve proposed text to the effect of c=
larifying that we&#39;re using Unix time at:<div><a href=3D"https://github.=
com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/299">https://github.com/googl=
e/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/299</a><br></div><div><br></div></div>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Aug=
 16, 2018 at 2:34 PM, Tony Finch <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:do=
t@dotat.at" target=3D"_blank">dot@dotat.at</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">Jon Callas &lt;joncallas=3D<a href=
=3D"mailto:40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40icloud.com@dmarc.<wbr>ietf.org</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On Aug 15, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Rob Stradling &lt;Rob@ComodoCA.com&g=
t; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
</span><span class=3D"">&gt; &gt; 1970 !=3D 1900, and (IINM) NTP time does =
not ignore leap seconds.<br>
<br>
</span>NTP&#39;s specification is amazingly opaque on this matter, but ther=
e is a<br>
fixed offset between NTP time and POSIX time of (365*70 + 17) * 86400 =3D=
=3D<br>
2,208,988,800 which is the &quot;First day UNIX&quot; value in the table in=
 RFC 5905<br>
section 6. You can see from the &quot;Last day 20th Century&quot; that NTP =
and Unix<br>
apply leap seconds to their timestamps in the same way (i.e. they don&#39;t=
).<br>
<br>
$ perl -MPOSIX -e &#39;print strftime &quot;%F.%T\n&quot;, gmtime (31555872=
00 - 2208988800)&#39;<br>
1999-12-31.00:00:00<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; I think that if you say, =E2=80=9C64-bit, unsigned Unix time=E2=80=9D =
it=E2=80=99s pretty<br>
&gt; well-defined. You could even explain once that it=E2=80=99s the number=
 of<br>
&gt; seconds since 1 January 1970 UTC and then it=E2=80=99s defined about a=
s<br>
&gt; completely as possible.<br>
<br>
</span>It isn&#39;t just the number of seconds since 1970-01-01 :-)<br>
<br>
RFC 4034 summarizes it as:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The Signature Expiration and Inception field values specify a =
date<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and time in the form of a 32-bit unsigned number of seconds el=
apsed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0since 1 January 1970 00:00:00 UTC, ignoring leap seconds, in n=
etwork<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0byte order.<br>
<br>
POSIX time is defined in The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7 /<br>
IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, volume 1 (XBD) section 4.16 &quot;Secon=
ds<br>
Since the Epoch&quot;<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799.2016edition/base=
defs/V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http://=
pubs.opengroup.org/<wbr>onlinepubs/9699919799.<wbr>2016edition/basedefs/V1_=
<wbr>chap04.html#tag_04_16</a><br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Tony.<br>
-- <br>
f.anthony.n.finch=C2=A0 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dot@dotat.at">dot@dotat.at</a=
>&gt;=C2=A0 <a href=3D"http://dotat.at/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">http://dotat.at/</a><br>
South Biscay: Northerly or northwesterly 4 or 5. Slight becoming moderate.<=
br>
Rain for a time. Good, occasionally moderate.</font></span><br>____________=
__________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2018 13:11:53 +0100
Message-ID: <CALzYgEcBufV87cp6AP0CUhqm5mg4a0KmBFZvTcjn7nRfPvnzuA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Corey Bonnell <CBonnell@trustwave.com>
Cc: "trans@ietf.org" <trans@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Error reporting format in draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis
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I've proposed text to that effect in:
https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/300

Eran

On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 4:38 PM, Corey Bonnell <CBonnell@trustwave.com>
wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Apologies if this was previously discussed (I searched the TRANS mail
> archives and didn=E2=80=99t find anything relevant), but section 5 of
> draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-28 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/
> draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-28#section-5) describes the preferred error
> reporting format as a JSON object with =E2=80=9Cerror_code=E2=80=9D and =
=E2=80=9Cerror_message=E2=80=9D
> fields. Instead of using this bespoke error reporting format, I was
> thinking that using the JSON Problem Details format (
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807) would be appropriate here.
>
>
>
> Using the RFC 7807 format provides (at least) two advantages over the
> currently specified format, namely:
>
>    - The use of a standard format, which is already being used in other
>    standards (such as ACME)
>    - The possibility to include additional metadata for error conditions,
>    which may transmit sufficient machine-readable information to allow fo=
r CT
>    clients to automatically recover from errors
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> *Corey Bonnell*
>
> Senior Software Engineer
>
>
>
> *Trustwave* | SMART SECURITY ON DEMAND
> www.trustwave.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">I&#39;ve proposed text to that effect in:=
<div><a href=3D"https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pul=
l/300">https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/300</a>=
<br></div><div><br></div><div>Eran</div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 4:38 PM, Corey Bo=
nnell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:CBonnell@trustwave.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">CBonnell@trustwave.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"m_5465481897961958575WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Hello,<u></u><u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Apologies if this w=
as previously discussed (I searched the TRANS mail archives and didn=E2=80=
=99t find anything relevant), but section 5 of draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis=
-<wbr>28 (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-b=
is-28#section-5" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/<wbr>draft-i=
etf-trans-rfc6962-bis-<wbr>28#section-5</a>)
 describes the preferred error reporting format as a JSON object with =E2=
=80=9Cerror_code=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cerror_message=E2=80=9D fields. Inste=
ad of using this bespoke error reporting format, I was thinking that using =
the JSON Problem Details format (<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc=
7807" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/<wbr>rfc7807</a>)
 would be appropriate here.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Using the RFC 7807 =
format provides (at least) two advantages over the currently specified form=
at, namely:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"m_5465481897961958575MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0i=
n"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The use of a standard format, which is =
already being used in other standards (such as ACME)<u></u><u></u></span></=
li><li class=3D"m_5465481897961958575MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left=
:0in"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">The possibility to include additiona=
l metadata for error conditions, which may transmit sufficient machine-read=
able information to allow for CT clients
 to automatically recover from errors<u></u><u></u></span></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt">Thanks,<u></u><u></=
u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#428fc5">Corey Bonnell</span></b><span style=
=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:#428fc5"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,sans-serif;color:gray">Senior Software Engineer</span><span style=
=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:#428fc5">Trustwave</span></b><b><span style=
=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:gray">=
=C2=A0</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&qu=
ot;,sans-serif;color:gray">|=C2=A0SMART
 SECURITY ON DEMAND<a href=3D"http://www.trustwave.com/" target=3D"_blank">=
<span style=3D"color:gray;text-decoration:none"><br>
www.trustwave.com</span></a></span><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>

<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
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target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Eran Messeri <eranm@google.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2018 13:21:04 +0100
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To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Trans <trans@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] Next steps for 6962-bis
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Points 2-5 in Paul's original email have been addressed (for 4 and 5 I've
proposed text in pull requests).
Re (6), I can propose text - if there's consensus that it's needed.

On the topic of document status, while it's late to affect any decision
about it, I'd like to share that:
(1) I've never had a complete implementation if 6962-bis, but the starts
I've made uncovered issues with the data structure specifications, which
we've fixed. I believe the data structures are stable and implementable,
but don't have all the code to prove it.
(2) TBH I don't fully understand the implication of that change, but would
be good to know what could have been done otherwise if we started with
6962-bis on the experimental track.

I think the exercise of getting broad consensus certainly improved
6962-bis, so I don't think it's bad we started on the standards track.

Eran

On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>
wrote:

>
> We continue to discuss and work with Google on what sorts of improvements
> to
> CT should be standardized in the next "experiment", and our implementation
> will continue to evolve in those directions.
>
> -Tim
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Trans [mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> > Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 9:17 PM
> > To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>; Trans <trans@ietf.org>
> > Subject: Re: [Trans] Next steps for 6962-bis
> >
> >     There has been a discussion about the document status, which was set
> to
> >     Proposed Standard. RFC 6962 itself is Experimental. After some
> discussion
> >     between authors, AD and chairs, we agreed that since the changes
> between
> >     6962 and 6962bis are not trivial, and that we have no implementations
> >     yet that validate that there are no implementation issues, that we
> should
> >     change the document status to Experimental. Please speak up if you
> >     disagree with this decision.
> >
> > This needs to have consensus from the WG.  It should not be a private
> decision
> > among the AD and chairs.  The author is not the owner of the document, it
> is
> > not his to change.  Are you doing a formal consensus call?  So far only
> Google
> > has said they will strongly support 6292-bis experiments. I would like to
> hear
> > from others, especially those who are participating in the current '6292
> > experiment' community -- log operators, for example.
> >
> > In my limited experience, "speak up if you disagree" is used after
> there's
> been
> > discussion and it seems that a WG consensus is emerging. Discussing a
> change
> >
> > I want this discussed in Montreal and then have consensus confirmed on
> the
> > list.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Trans mailing list
> > Trans@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
> _______________________________________________
> Trans mailing list
> Trans@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Points 2-5 in Paul&#39;s original email have been addresse=
d (for 4 and 5 I&#39;ve proposed text in pull requests).<div>Re (6), I can =
propose text - if there&#39;s consensus that it&#39;s needed.</div><div><br=
></div><div>On the topic of document status, while it&#39;s late to affect =
any decision about it, I&#39;d like to share that:</div><div>(1) I&#39;ve n=
ever had a complete implementation if 6962-bis, but the starts I&#39;ve mad=
e uncovered issues with the data structure specifications, which we&#39;ve =
fixed. I believe the data structures are stable and implementable, but don&=
#39;t have all the code to prove it.</div><div>(2) TBH I don&#39;t fully un=
derstand the implication of that change, but would be good to know what cou=
ld have been done otherwise if we started with 6962-bis on the experimental=
 track.</div><div><br></div><div>I think the exercise of getting broad cons=
ensus certainly improved 6962-bis, so I don&#39;t think it&#39;s bad we sta=
rted on the standards track.</div><div><br></div><div>Eran</div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 a=
t 5:16 PM, Tim Hollebeek <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tim.holleb=
eek@digicert.com" target=3D"_blank">tim.hollebeek@digicert.com</a>&gt;</spa=
n> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
We continue to discuss and work with Google on what sorts of improvements t=
o<br>
CT should be standardized in the next &quot;experiment&quot;, and our imple=
mentation<br>
will continue to evolve in those directions.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-Tim<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: Trans [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:trans-bounces@ietf.org">trans-bo=
unces@ietf.org</a><wbr>] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich<br>
&gt; Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 9:17 PM<br>
&gt; To: Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca<=
/a>&gt;; Trans &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trans@ietf.org">trans@ietf.org</a>&gt;=
<br>
&gt; Subject: Re: [Trans] Next steps for 6962-bis<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0There has been a discussion about the document stat=
us, which was set<br>
to<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Proposed Standard. RFC 6962 itself is Experimental.=
 After some<br>
discussion<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0between authors, AD and chairs, we agreed that sinc=
e the changes<br>
between<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A06962 and 6962bis are not trivial, and that we have =
no implementations<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0yet that validate that there are no implementation =
issues, that we<br>
should<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0change the document status to Experimental. Please =
speak up if you<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0disagree with this decision.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This needs to have consensus from the WG.=C2=A0 It should not be a pri=
vate<br>
decision<br>
&gt; among the AD and chairs.=C2=A0 The author is not the owner of the docu=
ment, it<br>
is<br>
&gt; not his to change.=C2=A0 Are you doing a formal consensus call?=C2=A0 =
So far only<br>
Google<br>
&gt; has said they will strongly support 6292-bis experiments. I would like=
 to<br>
hear<br>
&gt; from others, especially those who are participating in the current &#3=
9;6292<br>
&gt; experiment&#39; community -- log operators, for example.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In my limited experience, &quot;speak up if you disagree&quot; is used=
 after there&#39;s<br>
been<br>
&gt; discussion and it seems that a WG consensus is emerging. Discussing a<=
br>
change<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I want this discussed in Montreal and then have consensus confirmed on=
 the<br>
&gt; list.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; Trans mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/trans</a>=
<br>
</div></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Trans mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Trans@ietf.org">Trans@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/trans</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>,  Stephen Kent <stephentkent@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document
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On Thu, 23 Aug 2018, David A. Cooper wrote:

> Below are the comments that I raised in my message on May 9 that I believe have not been resolved.

Thanks for providing these. I hope you and Steve can communicate in
private or via the list to resolve these. As we said, we are not keeping
the working group open for the threat document, so without consensus in
time this document has to find another way to move forward.

> However, it does not seem accurate to suggest that the only issues that need consensus are the ones from my message
> on May 9. Andrew Ayer and Ryan Sleevi also raised issues with the most recent draft (see for example
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03178.html) and I have not seen any messages on the list since
> then to suggest that the issues they raised have been address - only a comment from Steve Kent suggesting that he
> does not feel any changes are needed (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html). In

We stated in the past that we are not letting the threat document put a
hold on the bis document. We are not changing the bis document for the
threat document. So to me these issues cannot be taken on if it requires
changes in the bis document. Wether or not that means changes in the
threat document is up to Steve and the commentors.

> addition, Eric Rescorla submitted some, mainly editorial, comments on draft -12
> (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html), and there was never any response to his
> comments, many of which remain unaddressed.

These seem minor and I trust Steve can make the appropriate changes here.

> I would also like to note again, given the nature of
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03225.html, that I submitted the comments on May 9
> specifically because of a request from the WG chairs
> (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03146.html) to "please review the entire document." So, any
> implication that there was something inappropriate about submitting comments on new issues after draft -13 was
> published is rather unfortunate.

Indeed. Due to the long delays between draft versions we encouraged
people to look at the entire document again. And seeing how it has
taken a lot of time again, any new WGLC on this document would also
be phrased like this.

Paul

> On 05/09/2018 08:49 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>        2. Section 4 of the document includes a lot of text about "attacks" involving syntactic mis-issuance,
>           but there is nothing explain how syntactic mis-issuance could be part of an attack. The text
>           describes a scenario in which a malicious CA intentionally issues a certificate that is syntactically
>           incorrect, the Subject of the certificate reports the problem, and the CA doesn't take action. No
>           explanation is provided as to how this could be part of an attack. Can't the Subject just get a new
>           certificate from a different CA? While it is clear that there is a benefit to detecting syntactic
>           mis-issuance and working to have such errors corrected, it is not at all clear how syntactic
>           mis-issuance could be part of an attack. Either some explanation of how syntactic mis-issuance could
>           be used as part of an attack (particularly an attack in which the Subject is not one of the
>           attackers) or the text about "attacks" in Section 4 should be removed.
>
>       You raise an interesting question. I originally assumed that mis-issuance referred only to certificates
>       that misrepresented the identity of the certificate holder or included bogus info intended to mislead
>       relying parties. Several years ago I requested Ben to clarify what constituted mis-issuance. The term was
>       (and is still) used throughout 6962-bis without definition. (I’m surprised that this lack of a definition
>       for such a critical term in 6962-bis hasn’t merited a comment from you to the authors of that document!)
>       Ben replied that a certificate that violated the syntax imposed by a criteria such as the CABF would
>       qualify as mis-issued. That’s why syntactic mis-issuance became an element of this analysis. Violating
>       the syntax rules imposed by such criteria might cause processing problems for browsers that would have
>       adverse consequences. Perhaps what concerned Ben was the observation that, if a CA issues a certificate
>       not consistent with its advertised syntax criteria, that merits detection by CT, as an example of CA
>       misbehavior.
> 
> 
> The response is not related to the comment. The comment did not suggest that issuing a certificate with syntactic
> errors shouldn't be considered mis-issuance, nor did it suggest that the threat analysis document shouldn't discuss
> syntactic mis-issuance. The problem is that the text suggests that the issuance of a certificate with syntactic
> errors might be part of an attack, but it does not explain how it could be part of an attack.
> 
> This text is particularly confusing in the case in which the Subject is aware that there is an error in the
> certificate. The text states that "a malicious CA may do nothing or may delay the action(s) needed to remedy the
> problem." How can the CA "attack" the Subject in this way when the Subject can just get a new certificate from a
> different CA and not use the mis-issued certificate?
> 
> The source of the problem may be that the document appears to be using rather bizarre definitions for "threat" and
> "attack." For example, there is new text in Section 2 that says:
>       Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived threats against a system to provide a context for
>       understanding attacks (even though some attacks may be the result of errors, not threats).
> 
> The parenthetical makes no sense. It seems to be based on some definition of "attack" that encompasses unintentional
> errors while also relying on an incorrect definition of "threat" (see below). For what reasonable definition of
> "attack" could one say that an attack may be the result of errors in the context of certificate mis-issuance?
>
>        3. Section 2 begins by saying that "A threat is defined, traditionally, as a motivated, capable
>           adversary." But, this is not correct, nor is it consistent with the remainder of this draft. NISTIR
>           7298, for example, defines a threat as "the potential source of an adverse event." This draft is
>           supposed to describe an attack model and describe threats to the Web PKI. Mis-issuance (especially
>           syntactic mis-issuance) does not require an attacker or a motivated, capable adversary. Mis-issuance
>           may be the result of carelessness, but it is still a threat, which is why Section 4.1.1.1 discusses
>           unintentional syntactic mis-issuance. Given that the threat model includes unintentional
>           mis-issuance, Section 2 needs to be rewritten to take into account that not all threats involve
>           "attacks" or "a motivated, capable adversary."
>
>       The definition of threat used here has been employed for a long time, e.g., in the U.S. DoD, decades
>       before the publication of NISTIR 7298. Several, easily found examples (thanks to a quick Google search)
>       include the syllabus for Cornell CS 5430, for MIT course 6.805, the NRC Report “Who Goes There:
>       Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy”, …  Mis-issuance is not a threat; it is an example of an
>       attack. If the mis-issuance is the result of an error, then no adversary is involved. To help clarify the
>       first paragraph of Section 2, will be revised: “Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived threats
>       against a system to provide a context for understanding attacks (even though some attacks may be the
>       result of errors, not threats).”
> 
> 
> I can find no such DoD definition for threat, cannot find the word "threat" in the Cornell CS 5430 syllabus, and
> cannot seem to access either the MIT course 6.805 syllabus or the NRC report. I do see, however, that Steve Kent is
> listed as one of the authors of the NRC report, which suggests that it is not a independent source for the
> definition. Certainly in some cases the only source of a threat may be a "motivated, capable adversary," and in such
> a context the term may be described in that way, but that does not mean the definition of threat is limited to
> motivated, capable adversaries.
> 
> On the other hand, there are sources such as https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/threat and
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_(computer). The Wikipedia article specifically notes that "a threat type can
> have multiple origins" and it lists deliberate, accidental, environmental, and negligence.
> 
> Also, note that in the original comment I did not suggest that mis-issuance is a threat. When I said "Mis-issuance
> may be the result of carelessness, but it is still a threat" I intended to suggest possibility that someone could act
> carelessly is a threat.
>
>        4. Them second paragraph of Section 2 begins "As noted above, the goals of CT are to deter, detect, and
>           facilitate remediation of attacks on the web PKI." This is incorrect. What is noted above is that
>           "Certificate transparency (CT) is a set of mechanisms designed to detect, deter, and facilitate
>           remediation of certificate mis-issuance." As noted in the previous bullet, "certificate mis-issuance"
>           is not the same as "attack." 
>
>       Fair point- The text will be changed to reiterate that deterrence, detection and remediation of
>       mis-issuance as the goal.
> 
> 
> This text is still odd, and seems inconsistent with the previous paragraph. The previous paragraph has new text that
> says "some attacks may be the result of errors," whereas this paragraph now says:
>       As noted above, the goals of CT are to deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of attacks that result
>       in certificate mis-issuance in the Web PKI.  (CT also may facilitate detection and remediation of errors
>       that result in certificate mis-issuance.)
> 
> So, unlike in the previous paragraph, this text seems to acknowledge that an error is not an attack. It is still not
> clear the reason for two separate sentences. What is actually "noted above" is that CT is "designed to detect, deter,
> and facilitate remediation of certificate mis-issuance" (regardless of the reason the mis-issuance happened), so why
> imply that it is primarily about mis-issuance that was caused by an attack, especially when Section 4 is devoted to
> syntactic mis-issuance, which is far more likely to be the result of an error than an attack.
>
>        6. The final sentence of Section 1, paragraph 5 says that "This extension also may be used by a browser
>           to request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]." The
>           sentence should be referring to the "status_request" TLS extension, but the only extension mentioned
>           before this sentence is the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension. So, saying "This extension"
>           is incorrect. 
>
>       Good catch- The text in this sentence will be revised to refer to “The data from this extension …”
> 
> 
> This text is still incorrect.  It now says "The data from this [Authority Information Access] extension also may be
> used by a browser to request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
> 
> To obtain OCSP responses from a TLS server the browser just sends a status_request [RFC6066] (or status_request_v2
> [RFC6961]) extension in the ClientHello. The status_request extension sent in the ClientHello does not contain any
> information from the server certificate's AIA extension - the client doesn't obtain the server's certificate until
> after sending the ClientHello. Also, there is no information in the AIA extension that could be included in the
> status_request extension.
> 
> The sentence should just be changed to something like: "A browser may also request OCSP responses from a TLS server
> with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
>
>        8. Section 3.1 says that a CA "may have mis-issued a certificate as a result of an error." This further
>           suggests that the "threats" that are covered by this draft are not limited to ones involving "a
>           motivated, capable adversary."
>
>       Not all attacks are the result of a threat, and attacks are not the same as threats. Thus no changes are
>       planned in response this comment.
> 
> 
> The response here seems to be based on the highly unusual, but unspecified definition of "attack" used in this
> document. The response certainly has nothing to do with the comment, which doesn't suggest anything like what the
> response implies that it does.
> 
>
>        10. The organization of Section 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing. Sometimes self-monitoring subjects and benign
>           third-party monitors are covered together (in the same section), sometimes they are covered in
>           separate sections even though there are no differences between the two, and sometimes the third-party
>           monitor is overlooked. Sometimes the case of a benign third-party monitor is covered, but the case of
>           a misbehaving third-party monitor is overlooked.
>
>       Separate subsections were created when there are meaningful differences in cases involving
>       self-monitoring vs. third party m monitors, etc. But, when these distinctions do not matter, the
>       subsections have been merged, and the text explains this. No changes are planned in response to this
>       comment.
>
>        12. Section 3.2.2.1, and other places in the document that make similar statements, should be updated
>           given that at least one browser is now requiring SCTs for all newly issued certificates. 
>
>       One browser does not the Internet make. Moreover, the text in 6962-bis is rather “flexible” with regard
>       to what a browser MUST do, e.g., “It is up to a client's local policy to specify the quantity and form of
>       evidence (SCTs, inclusion proofs or a combination) needed to achieve compliance and how to handle
>       non-compliance.”  Thus no changes are planned in response to this comment.
> 
> 
> See https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html and
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html.
> 
> There was no suggestion that one browser makes the Internet. The problem is that the text says, for example:
>       If a browser rejects certificates without SCTs (see Section 5.4), CAs may be "encouraged" to log the
>       certificates they issue.  This, in turn, would make it easier for Monitors to detect bogus certificates.
>       However, the CT architecture does not describe how such behavior by browsers can be deployed
>       incrementally throughout the Internet. As a result, this attack model does not assume that browsers will
>       reject a certificate that is not accompanied by an SCT.
> 
> 
> It might be perfectly fine to say that the attack model does not assume that browsers will reject a certificate that
> is not accompanied by an SCT since the CT architecture does not require browsers to do so. But, that is not what the
> text says. The text says that the model doesn't make the assumption because the CT architecture does describe how
> browsers can do it.
> 
> The comment was not suggesting that since Chrome requires SCTs for all newly issued certificates, the attack model
> needs to assume that browsers will reject certificates not accompanied by an SCT. The point is that since the
> developers of Chrome have described "how such behavior by browsers can be deployed incrementally throughout the
> Internet," the lack of such a description in "the CT architecture" isn't relevant. Browser developers may have good
> reasons not to reject certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT, but it is not because no one described to them
> how to deploy such behavior.
>
>        13. As noted previously, if Section 3.3 is to remain, then the text needs to be modified to make it
>           clear that Section 3.3 is only about CAs/logs that have had their keys stolen (compromised) rather
>           than all types of compromise (e.g., DigiNotar). 
>
>       Changes to 3.2 and 3.3 (as noted in response to comment #1) address this comment.
> 
> 
> This problem is still not addressed. The DigiNotar case was moved to Section 3.3, where parts of the corresponding
> paragraph notes that not all compromises involve theft of the private key. However, the second paragraph of Section
> 3.3 still says:
>       The section focuses on undetected compromise of CAs.  Such compromises warrant some additional
>       discussion, since some relying parties may see signed objects issued by the legitimate (non-malicious)
>       CA, others may see signed objects from its compromised counterpart, and some may see objects from both
> 
> and Section 3.3.1 begins:
>       In the case of a compromised (non-malicious) CA, an attacker uses the purloined private key to generate a
>       bogus certificate (that the CA would not knowingly issue).
> 
> So while there is now some text that notes that not all compromises involve theft of the private key, there is still
> other text that says otherwise.
> 
>
>        15. Section 3.3.3 begins "As noted in 3.4.1", but there is no Section 3.4.1.
>
>       Fair point- This reference will be changed to “Section 3.4”.
> 
> 
> This reference was corrected, but draft -14 still has problems with incorrect references. I have not checked all of
> the references, but there is a parenthetical in Section 3.3.1 that says "(see 3.1.2.2)" even though there is no
> Section 3.1.2.2. Similarly, Section 4.2.1.3 begins "As noted above (4.1.1.4)," but there is no Section 4.1.1.4.
>
>        18. The final paragraph of Section 3.5 is unrelated to the rest of the section and seems to be related
>           to the content of Section 3.4.
>
>       This text was added in response to a comment ion the list (by Rob, I believe) who wanted this document to
>       note that the cited revocation status distribution problems might be addressed by mechanisms not
>       specified by 6962-bis. Thus no changes are planned in response to this comment.
> 
> 
> Both this comment and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html noted that the final
> paragraph of Section 3.5 is related to the attack in Section 3.4 and not to the contents of Section 3.5. The text has
> nothing to do with the rest of Section 3.5 nor does it "note that the cited revocation status distribution problems
> might be addressed by mechanisms not specified by 6962-bis."
>
>        20. Section 4.1.1.2 says that "A log or Monitor that is conspiring with the attacker," but it is not
>           clear what attacker there is in the scenario being described.
>
>       The attacker is one who wants a syntactically mis-issued certificate to not be detected and revoked.
> 
> 
> This is a non-answer. Did the attacker do something that caused the certificate to be mis-issued? If so, how? The CA
> can't be the attacker since it is non-malicious in Section 4.1. Is this sentence considering the possibility that the
> Subject could an an "attacker," sending a certificate request that somehow tricks the CA into issuing an erroneous
> certificate? Is there any other than the CA or Subject that could influence the contents of the certificate?
> 
> Could it be that the "attacker" had no influence over the issuance of the certificate, but was just hoping that a
> certificate would be mis-issued? If so, what role does it play in the "attack" (other than passive observer)?
>
>        21. Section 4.1.1.4 says "Unfortunately, experience suggests that many browsers do not perform thorough
>           syntactic checks on certificates, and so it seems unlikely that browsers will be a reliable way to
>           detect erroneous certificates." and Section 4.2.1.4 says "As noted above (4.1.1.4), most browsers
>           fail to perform thorough syntax checks on certificates." These sentences should be removed or
>           modified. There is no reason that a browser should perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates,
>           and there are good reasons for browsers not to. So, this document should not be labeling this as
>           unfortunate or a failure. We do not want to encourage browsers to perform thorough syntax checks on
>           certificates, as this could lead to the same types of problems that TLS has experienced, where making
>           a change in something causes deployed products to break. 
>
>       It seems likely that the primary reason that browsers fail to perform thorough syntactic checks on
>       certificates is because, at least historically, some CAs fail to issue syntactically valid certificates.
>       This failure by browsers flies in the face of PKIX standards; you, as one who usually insists that
>       failures to follow standards ought to be a capital crime, have no basis for criticizing this text. No
>       changes will be made in response to this comment.
> 
> 
> As I noted previously (see, for example, https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html) this
> response is not related to the comment. There is a difference between a browser checking for things that can be
> expected not to change (e.g., is the keyUsage extension DER encoded -
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html) and checking for things may may change (e.g., does
> a subject field that doesn't contain an organizationName attribute contain a streetAddress attribute -
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html).
> 
> While the underlying syntax rules for X.509 certificates can be presumed to be unchanging, certificate profiles can
> change over time, and this document makes clear that syntax checks includes checking for conformance with the
> appropriate profile. If a browser performed "thorough syntax checks" as this document defined that term, then it
> would be effectively checking for conformance to a particular version of a certificate profile. There can't be an
> assumption that every browser on every client will be updated as soon as any certificate profile changes, so browsers
> performing such checks would create problems. As a related example, consider the recent discussions in the TLS WG
> about ossification, the need to make last-minute changes to the TLS 1.3 protocol in order to deal with
> version-intolerant servers and middleboxes, and the addition of text to RFC 8446 about protocol invariants.
> 
> There seems to be some confusion about the nature of syntactic mis-issuance. Section 1 of the threats document says:
>       A certificate is characterized as syntactically mis-issued (aka erroneous) if it violates syntax
>       constraints associated with the class of certificate that it purports to represent.  Syntax constraints
>       for certificates are established by certificate profiles, and typically are application-specific.  For
>       example, certificates used in the Web PKI environment might be characterized as domain validation (DV) or
>       extended validation (EV) certificates. Certificates used with applications such as IPsec or S/MIME have
>       different syntactic constraints from those in the Web PKI context.
> 
> Yet, in the response to the above comment and in https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html,
> Steve seems to suggest that checking for syntactic mis-issuance is really about checking whether certificates are
> valid with respect to RFC 5280. Of course one could check for both types of errors. However, there is a very big
> difference between just checking for compliance with X.509 (RFC 5280) and checking for compliance with the current
> profile rules for DV certificates.
>
>        25. Section 4.2.2 says "However, even if errors are detected and reported to the CA, a
>           malicious/conspiring CA may do nothing to fix the problem or may delay action." As noted previously,
>           no explanation is provided as to why this is a threat or attack. If the Subject knows that there are
>           errors in the certificate, then the Subject can just get another certificate (from a different CA, if
>           necessary). It doesn't matter whether the CA revokes the erroneous certificate or not.
>
>       See previous comment on why syntactic mis-issuance is included in this document.
> 
> 
> This is not a response. Neither this comment nor any other comment suggested that syntactic mis-issuance should not
> be included in the document.
>
>        26. Section 5.3 says
>
>       o   It also will likely require the targeted Subject to provide assurances that it is the authorized
>       entity representing the Subject name (subjectAltname) in question.  Thus a Subject should not expect
>       immediate revocation of a contested certificate.  The time frame in which a CA will respond to a
>       revocation request usually is described in the CPS for the CA.  Other certificate fields and extensions
>       may be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to verify that
>       the certificate to be revoked is bogus or erroneous, based on applicable criteria.
>
>       This text seems to say that only the "Subject name (subjectAltname)" is required "verify that the
>       certificate to be revoked is ... erroneous." This cannot be correct, as a syntactic check a certificate
>       would be looking for errors in many fields and extensions other than "Subject name (subjectAltname)." 
>
>       Fair point- The sentence will, be truncated after “to effect revocation”.
> 
> 
> The sentence was supposed to end just "to effect revocation," but it just ends to "to effect."
>
>        27. Section 5.4 (and similar text elsewhere in the document) seems out of date given that at least one
>           browser now rejects any newly issued certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT. 
>
>       See prior comment on why one browser’s behavior is not viewed as sufficient to merit a change to this and
>       similar text.
> 
> 
> See response to prior comment. A method has been defined that is compatible with incremental deployment. It may not
> have been defined in an RFC, but it has been defined. So, the text shouldn't be implying that no one has defined a
> mechanism that accommodates incremental deployment of a capability to reject certificates that have not been logged.
>
>        29. Section 5.6, paragraph 5 says "If a Monitor is compromised by, or conspires with, an attacker, it
>           will fail to alert a Subject to a bogus or erroneous certificate targeting that Subject, as noted
>           above." As noted previously, this document needs to explain how an attacker can "target" a Subject
>           with an erroneous certificate.
>
>       As noted above, Ben insisted that syntactically erroneous certificates were considered mis-issued, and
>       hence motivated inclusion of the text in Section 4. 
> 
> 
> Again, the comment does not suggest that syntactically erroneous certificates are not mis-issued nor does it suggest
> that syntactic mis-issuance should not be discussed in this document. So, the response does not address the comment.
> 
> 
> 
>


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David,
>>
>>  2. Section 4 of the document includes a lot of text about "attacks"
>>     involving syntactic mis-issuance, but there is nothing explain
>>     how syntactic mis-issuance could be part of an attack. The text
>>     describes a scenario in which a malicious CA intentionally issues
>>     a certificate that is syntactically incorrect, the Subject of the
>>     certificate reports the problem, and the CA doesn't take action.
>>     No explanation is provided as to how this could be part of an
>>     attack. Can't the Subject just get a new certificate from a
>>     different CA? While it is clear that there is a benefit to
>>     detecting syntactic mis-issuance and working to have such errors
>>     corrected, it is not at all clear how syntactic mis-issuance
>>     could be part of an attack. Either some explanation of how
>>     syntactic mis-issuance could be used as part of an attack
>>     (particularly an attack in which the Subject is not one of the
>>     attackers) or the text about "attacks" in Section 4 should be
>>     removed.
>>
>> *You raise an interesting question. I originally assumed that 
>> mis-issuance referred only to certificates that misrepresented the 
>> identity of the certificate holder or included bogus info intended to 
>> mislead relying parties. Several years ago I requested Ben to clarify 
>> what constituted mis-issuance. The term was (and is still) used 
>> throughout 6962-bis without definition. (I’m surprised that this lack 
>> of a definition for such a critical term in 6962-bis hasn’t merited a 
>> comment from you to the authors of that document!) Ben replied that a 
>> certificate that violated the syntax imposed by a criteria such as 
>> the CABF would qualify as mis-issued. That’s why syntactic 
>> mis-issuance became an element of this analysis. Violating the syntax 
>> rules imposed by such criteria might cause processing problems for 
>> browsers that would have adverse consequences. Perhaps what concerned 
>> Ben was the observation that, if a CA issues a certificate not 
>> consistent with its advertised syntax criteria, that merits detection 
>> by CT, as an example of CA misbehavior.*
>>
>
> The response is not related to the comment. The comment did not 
> suggest that issuing a certificate with syntactic errors shouldn't be 
> considered mis-issuance, nor did it suggest that the threat analysis 
> document shouldn't discuss syntactic mis-issuance. The problem is that 
> the text suggests that the issuance of a certificate with syntactic 
> errors might be part of an attack, but it does not explain how it 
> could be part of an attack.
Sorry if my reply was not clear. A cert that is syntactically 
inconsistent with criteria established by (or for) a CA could, as I 
suggested, cause problems for a Subject. I have revised the text in 
Section 4.1 as follows:

This section analyzes the scenario in which the CA has no intent to

issue a syntactically incorrect certificate, but it may do so in error. 
(Remember that errors are consideredform of attack in this document, see 
Section 2).As noted in Section 1, we refer to a syntactically incorrect 
certificate as erroneous. A certificate is erroneous if it violates a 
criteria to which the issuing CA claims to adhere. This might be a 
general profile such as RFC 5280 [5280], or a narrower profile such as 
those established by the CABF for domain validated (DV) or extended 
validation (EV) certificates. If the Subject is a web site that expected 
to receive an EV certificate, but the certificate issued to it carries 
the DV policy OID, or no policy OID, relying parties may reject the 
certificate, causing harm to the business of the Subject. Conversely, if 
a CA issues a certificate to a web site and erroneously includes the EV 
policy OID, relying parties may place more trust in the certificate than 
is warranted.


> This text is particularly confusing in the case in which the Subject 
> is aware that there is an error in the certificate. The text states 
> that "a malicious CA may do nothing or may delay the action(s) needed 
> to remedy the problem." How can the CA "attack" the Subject in this 
> way when the Subject can just get a new certificate from a different 
> CA and not use the mis-issued certificate?
I hope the text above clarifies this issue, by giving two examples. It's 
not that the Subject could not detect the attack, but that the Subject 
may not detect the attack, because it does not carefully the cert issued 
to it. We know that many web servers have failed to pay attention to 
details such as expiration dates, so it does not seem unlikely that a 
server might not carefully examine the cert issued to it.
>
> The source of the problem may be that the document appears to be using 
> rather bizarre definitions for "threat" and "attack." For example, 
> there is new text in Section 2 that says:
>
>     Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived threats against a
>     system to provide a context for understanding attacks (even though
>     some attacks may be the result of errors, not threats).
>
> The parenthetical makes no sense. It seems to be based on some 
> definition of "attack" that encompasses unintentional errors while 
> also relying on an incorrect definition of "threat" (see below). For 
> what reasonable definition of "attack" could one say that an attack 
> may be the result of errors in the context of certificate mis-issuance?
Errors by CAs are considered attacks in some contexts, c.f., RFC 8211. 
Also, the revised text above gives examples that might be the result of 
errors by a CA.
>
>>  3. Section 2 begins by saying that "A threat is defined,
>>     traditionally, as a motivated, capable adversary." But, this is
>>     not correct, nor is it consistent with the remainder of this
>>     draft. NISTIR 7298, for example, defines a threat as "the
>>     potential source of an adverse event." This draft is supposed to
>>     describe an attack model and describe threats to the Web PKI.
>>     Mis-issuance (especially syntactic mis-issuance) does not require
>>     an attacker or a motivated, capable adversary. Mis-issuance may
>>     be the result of carelessness, but it is still a threat, which is
>>     why Section 4.1.1.1 discusses unintentional syntactic
>>     mis-issuance. Given that the threat model includes unintentional
>>     mis-issuance, Section 2 needs to be rewritten to take into
>>     account that not all threats involve "attacks" or "a motivated,
>>     capable adversary."
>>
>> *The definition of threat used here has been employed for a long 
>> time, e.g., in the U.S. DoD, decades before the publication of NISTIR 
>> 7298. Several, easily found examples (thanks to a quick Google 
>> search) include the syllabus for Cornell CS 5430, for MIT course 
>> 6.805, the NRC Report “Who Goes There: Authentication Through the 
>> Lens of Privacy”, …Mis-issuance is not a threat; it is an example of 
>> an attack. If the mis-issuance is the result of an error, then no 
>> adversary is involved. To help clarify the first paragraph of Section 
>> 2, will be revised: “Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived 
>> threats against a system to provide a context for understanding 
>> attacks (even though some attacks may be the result of errors, not 
>> threats).”*
>>
>
> I can find no such DoD definition for threat, cannot find the word 
> "threat" in the Cornell CS 5430 syllabus, and cannot seem to access 
> either the MIT course 6.805 syllabus or the NRC report. I do see, 
> however, that Steve Kent is listed as one of the authors of the NRC 
> report, which suggests that it is not a independent source for the 
> definition. Certainly in some cases the only source of a threat may be 
> a "motivated, capable adversary," and in such a context the term may 
> be described in that way, but that does not mean the definition of 
> threat is limited to motivated, capable adversaries.
I don't know what happened to the syllabi I cited. I should have copied 
the text, which seemed to have changed. Sorry.

I was  the editor of the NRC report, so the cite is not independent, but 
it's still appropriate. Also, the committee that produced the report 
included Steve Bellovin, a former Sec AD, Drew Dean, Bob Blakley, and 
other well-known security experts, all of whom were OK with the definition.

You can also find a similar characterization of "threat" in: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=jDhr1Egw-n0C&pg=PA240&lpg=PA240&dq=motivated+capable+adversary&source=bl&ots=TmazJ98jMM&sig=TR_jbWTChVQBJeJSEEZPdAkNpB8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjug9qAs4TdAhXSct8KHS_8CtUQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=motivated%20capable%20adversary&f=false

For the Cornell course, the syllabus may have changed, but a current 
handout page discussing threat models is available here: 
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2018sp/lectures/04-threats/threats.pdf

Nonetheless, in the spirit of compromise, I have revised the text as 
follows:

In the context of this document, a threat is defined as a motivated, capable

adversary.

>
>>  4. Them second paragraph of Section 2 begins "As noted above, the
>>     goals of CT are to deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of
>>     attacks on the web PKI." This is incorrect. What is noted above
>>     is that "Certificate transparency (CT) is a set of mechanisms
>>     designed to detect, deter, and facilitate remediation of
>>     certificate mis-issuance." As noted in the previous bullet,
>>     "certificate mis-issuance" is not the same as "attack."
>>
>> *Fair point- The text will be changed to reiterate that deterrence, 
>> detection and remediation of mis-issuance as the goal.*
>>
>
> This text is still odd, and seems inconsistent with the previous 
> paragraph. The previous paragraph has new text that says "some attacks 
> may be the result of errors," whereas this paragraph now says:
>
>     As noted above, the goals of CT are to deter, detect, and
>     facilitate remediation of attacks that result in certificate
>     mis-issuance in the Web PKI.  (CT also may facilitate detection
>     and remediation of errors that result in certificate mis-issuance.)
>
> So, unlike in the previous paragraph, this text seems to acknowledge 
> that an error is not an attack. It is still not clear the reason for 
> two separate sentences. What is actually "noted above" is that CT is 
> "designed to detect, deter, and facilitate remediation of certificate 
> mis-issuance" (regardless of the reason the mis-issuance happened), so 
> why imply that it is primarily about mis-issuance that was caused by 
> an attack, especially when Section 4 is devoted to syntactic 
> mis-issuance, which is far more likely to be the result of an error 
> than an attack.
You're right that this text is inconsistent. I have revised the text as 
follows:

As noted above, the goals of CT are to deter, detect, and facilitate

remediation of attacks that result in certificate mis-issuance in the

Web PKI. (Note that errors by a CA are viewed as attacks in the context 
of this document.)


>
>>  6. The final sentence of Section 1, paragraph 5 says that "This
>>     extension also may be used by a browser to request OCSP responses
>>     from a TLS server with which it is communicating
>>     [RFC6066][RFC6961]." The sentence should be referring to the
>>     "status_request" TLS extension, but the only extension mentioned
>>     before this sentence is the Authority Information Access (AIA)
>>     extension. So, saying "This extension" is incorrect.
>>
>> *Good catch- The text in this sentence will be revised to refer to 
>> “The data from this extension …”*
>>
>
> This text is still incorrect.  It now says "The data from this 
> [Authority Information Access] extension also may be used by a browser 
> to request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is 
> communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
>
> To obtain OCSP responses from a TLS server the browser just sends a 
> status_request [RFC6066] (or status_request_v2 [RFC6961]) extension in 
> the ClientHello. The status_request extension sent in the ClientHello 
> does not contain any information from the server certificate's AIA 
> extension - the client doesn't obtain the server's certificate until 
> after sending the ClientHello. Also, there is no information in the 
> AIA extension that could be included in the status_request extension.
>
> The sentence should just be changed to something like: "A browser may 
> also request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is 
> communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
Thanks for the clear characterization of the mechanism. I'll use your 
text above in lieu of the last sentence you noted.
>
>>  8. Section 3.1 says that a CA "may have mis-issued a certificate as
>>     a result of an error." This further suggests that the "threats"
>>     that are covered by this draft are not limited to ones involving
>>     "a motivated, capable adversary."
>>
>> *Not all attacks are the result of a threat, and attacks are not the 
>> same as threats. Thus no changes are planned in response this comment.*
>>
>
> The response here seems to be based on the highly unusual, but 
> unspecified definition of "attack" used in this document. The response 
> certainly has nothing to do with the comment, which doesn't suggest 
> anything like what the response implies that it does.
>
I believe the revised text I proposed addresses this issue, i.e., the 
explicit statement that errors by a CA are viewed as attacks in this 
document.
>>
>> 10. The organization of Section 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing. Sometimes
>>     self-monitoring subjects and benign third-party monitors are
>>     covered together (in the same section), sometimes they are
>>     covered in separate sections even though there are no differences
>>     between the two, and sometimes the third-party monitor is
>>     overlooked. Sometimes the case of a benign third-party monitor is
>>     covered, but the case of a misbehaving third-party monitor is
>>     overlooked.
>>
>> *Separate subsections were created when there are meaningful 
>> differences in cases involving self-monitoring vs. third party m 
>> monitors, etc. But, when these distinctions do not matter, the 
>> subsections have been merged, and the text explains this. No changes 
>> are planned in response to this comment.*
>>
>> 12. Section 3.2.2.1, and other places in the document that make
>>     similar statements, should be updated given that at least one
>>     browser is now requiring SCTs for all newly issued certificates.
>>
>> *One browser does not the Internet make. Moreover, the text in 
>> 6962-bis is rather “flexible” with regard to what a browser MUST do, 
>> e.g.,“It is up to a client's local policy to specify the quantity and 
>> form of evidence (SCTs, inclusion proofs or a combination) needed to 
>> achieve compliance and how to handle non-compliance.”Thus no changes 
>> are planned in response to this comment.*
>>
>
> See https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html 
> and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html.
>
> There was no suggestion that one browser makes the Internet. The 
> problem is that the text says, for example:
>
>     If a browser rejects certificates without SCTs (see Section 5.4),
>     CAs may be "encouraged" to log the certificates they issue.  This,
>     in turn, would make it easier for Monitors to detect bogus
>     certificates. However, the CT architecture does not describe how
>     such behavior by browsers can be deployed incrementally throughout
>     the Internet. As a result, this attack model does not assume that
>     browsers will reject a certificate that is not accompanied by an SCT.
>
>
> It might be perfectly fine to say that the attack model does not 
> assume that browsers will reject a certificate that is not accompanied 
> by an SCT since the CT architecture does not require browsers to do 
> so. But, that is not what the text says. The text says that the model 
> doesn't make the assumption because the CT architecture does describe 
> how browsers can do it.
>
> The comment was not suggesting that since Chrome requires SCTs for all 
> newly issued certificates, the attack model needs to assume that 
> browsers will reject certificates not accompanied by an SCT. The point 
> is that since the developers of Chrome have described "how such 
> behavior by browsers can be deployed incrementally throughout the 
> Internet," the lack of such a description in "the CT architecture" 
> isn't relevant. 
The threat and attack analysis is based primarily on what 6962-bis says, 
not what a specific browser may have implemented, so the lack of a 
description of how to incrementally deploy mandatory SCT checking is 
relevant. However, I have revised the text in 5.4 to better address this 
issue:

If a browser is to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT,

or is not accompanied by an SCT transported via the TLS handshake,this 
behavior needs to be defined in a way that is compatible withincremental 
deployment. 6962-bis does not describe a strategy for incremental 
deployment, however it calls for local policy controls that might be 
used to facilitate incremental deployment (see 3.2.2.1 earlier). For 
example a browser might establish a date after which all certificates 
issued MUST contain an SCT or be accompanied by an SCT during TLS 
session establishment. A strategy like this wouldallow certificates 
issued before that date to be “grandfathered”. This approach would allow 
a malicious CA to backdate a certificate to avoid logging it, exploiting 
a window of vulnerability.


> Browser developers may have good reasons not to reject certificates 
> that are not accompanied by an SCT, but it is not because no one 
> described to them how to deploy such behavior.
I think the text above address this comment.
>
>> 13. As noted previously, if Section 3.3 is to remain, then the text
>>     needs to be modified to make it clear that Section 3.3 is only
>>     about CAs/logs that have had their keys stolen (compromised)
>>     rather than all types of compromise (e.g., DigiNotar).
>>
>> *Changes to 3.2 and 3.3 (as noted in response to comment #1) address 
>> this comment.*
>>
>
> This problem is still not addressed. The DigiNotar case was moved to 
> Section 3.3, where parts of the corresponding paragraph notes that not 
> all compromises involve theft of the private key. However, the second 
> paragraph of Section 3.3 still says:
>
>     The section focuses on undetected compromise of CAs.  Such
>     compromises warrant some additional discussion, since some relying
>     parties may see signed objects issued by the legitimate
>     (non-malicious) CA, others may see signed objects from its
>     compromised counterpart, and some may see objects from both
>
> and Section 3.3.1 begins:
>
>     In the case of a compromised (non-malicious) CA, an attacker uses
>     the purloined private key to generate a bogus certificate (that
>     the CA would not knowingly issue).
>
> So while there is now some text that notes that not all compromises 
> involve theft of the private key, there is still other text that says 
> otherwise.
I've revised 3.3.1 as follow, to address this observation:

In the case of a compromised (non-malicious) CA, an attacker may have 
acquired the CA’s private key, or it may be able to cause the CA to sign 
certificates using that key, even though the attacker does not know the 
key per se. In ether case the goal is to cause the CA to issues a bogus 
certificate (that the CA would not knowingly issue).


>
>>
>> 15. Section 3.3.3 begins "As noted in 3.4.1", but there is no Section
>>     3.4.1.
>>
>> *Fair point- This reference will be changed to “Section 3.4”.*
>>
>
> This reference was corrected, but draft -14 still has problems with 
> incorrect references. I have not checked all of the references, but 
> there is a parenthetical in Section 3.3.1 that says "(see 3.1.2.2)" 
> even though there is no Section 3.1.2.2. Similarly, Section 4.2.1.3 
> begins "As noted above (4.1.1.4)," but there is no Section 4.1.1.4.
Thanks for noting this. I have changed the reference to be to 3.2.2.1 I 
expect the RFC Editor will work with us to find and correct other typos 
of this sort.
>
>> 18. The final paragraph of Section 3.5 is unrelated to the rest of
>>     the section and seems to be related to the content of Section 3.4.
>>
>> *This text was added in response to a comment ion the list (by Rob, I 
>> believe) who wanted this document to note that the cited revocation 
>> status distribution problems might be addressed by mechanisms not 
>> specified by 6962-bis. Thus no changes are planned in response to 
>> this comment.*
>>
>
> Both this comment and 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html 
> noted that the final paragraph of Section 3.5 is related to the attack 
> in Section 3.4 and not to the contents of Section 3.5. The text has 
> nothing to do with the rest of Section 3.5 nor does it "note that the 
> cited revocation status distribution problems might be addressed by 
> mechanisms not specified by 6962-bis."
I have moved the paragraph to the end of 3.4, and revised the text, 
slightly, to better fit there.
>
>> 20. Section 4.1.1.2 says that "A log or Monitor that is conspiring
>>     with the attacker," but it is not clear what attacker there is in
>>     the scenario being described.
>>
>> *The attacker is one who wants a syntactically mis-issued certificate 
>> to not be detected and revoked.*
>>
>
> This is a non-answer. Did the attacker do something that caused the 
> certificate to be mis-issued? If so, how? The CA can't be the attacker 
> since it is non-malicious in Section 4.1. Is this sentence considering 
> the possibility that the Subject could an an "attacker," sending a 
> certificate request that somehow tricks the CA into issuing an 
> erroneous certificate? Is there any other than the CA or Subject that 
> could influence the contents of the certificate?
>
> Could it be that the "attacker" had no influence over the issuance of 
> the certificate, but was just hoping that a certificate would be 
> mis-issued? If so, what role does it play in the "attack" (other than 
> passive observer)?
Section 4.1 deals with a non-malicious CA, so the CA is not 
intentionally mis-issuing a cert, but it may mis-issuae a cert as a 
result of an error. The revised text for 4.1 makes this clear.
>
>> 21. Section 4.1.1.4 says "Unfortunately, experience suggests that
>>     many browsers do not perform thorough syntactic checks on
>>     certificates, and so it seems unlikely that browsers will be a
>>     reliable way to detect erroneous certificates." and Section
>>     4.2.1.4 says "As noted above (4.1.1.4), most browsers fail to
>>     perform thorough syntax checks on certificates." These sentences
>>     should be removed or modified. There is no reason that a browser
>>     should perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates, and
>>     there are good reasons for browsers not to. So, this document
>>     should not be labeling this as unfortunate or a failure. We do
>>     not want to encourage browsers to perform thorough syntax checks
>>     on certificates, as this could lead to the same types of problems
>>     that TLS has experienced, where making a change in something
>>     causes deployed products to break.
>>
>> *It seems likely that the primary reason that browsers fail to 
>> perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates is because, at 
>> least historically, some CAs fail to issue syntactically valid 
>> certificates. This failure by browsers flies in the face of PKIX 
>> standards; you, as one who usually insists that failures to follow 
>> standards ought to be a capital crime, have no basis for criticizing 
>> this text. No changes will be made in response to this comment.*
>>
>
> As I noted previously (see, for example, 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html) 
> this response is not related to the comment. There is a difference 
> between a browser checking for things that can be expected not to 
> change (e.g., is the keyUsage extension DER encoded - 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html) and 
> checking for things may may change (e.g., does a subject field that 
> doesn't contain an organizationName attribute contain a streetAddress 
> attribute - 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html).
>
> While the underlying syntax rules for X.509 certificates can be 
> presumed to be unchanging, certificate profiles can change over time, 
> and this document makes clear that syntax checks includes checking for 
> conformance with the appropriate profile. If a browser performed 
> "thorough syntax checks" as this document defined that term, then it 
> would be effectively checking for conformance to a particular version 
> of a certificate profile. There can't be an assumption that every 
> browser on every client will be updated as soon as any certificate 
> profile changes, so browsers performing such checks would create 
> problems. As a related example, consider the recent discussions in the 
> TLS WG about ossification, the need to make last-minute changes to the 
> TLS 1.3 protocol in order to deal with version-intolerant servers and 
> middleboxes, and the addition of text to RFC 8446 about protocol 
> invariants.
I agree that trhe phrase thorough syntax checks" is ambiguous, and that 
adherence to a version of a cert profile is something that would be hard 
to a browser to check. However,a (now expired) I-D described exactly how 
a log could check for compliance to a specified version of a profile, as 
asserted by a CA, which would address the issue you cite. So, I have 
rewored the text as follows (and fixed the refereces to 4.1.1.4 to be to 
4.1.3.2.

Unfortunately, experience suggests thatmany browsers do not always 
perform very good syntactic checks oncertificates. For example, a 
browser may fail to verify that a certificate used in a certificate path 
is properly marked as a CA certificate. Also, it would be problematic 
for a browser to check a certificate against a specific version of a 
profile if the profile changes and the policy OID remains constant. Thus 
it seems unlikely that browsers will be a reliable was to detect 
erroneous certificates in all circumstances.

>
> There seems to be some confusion about the nature of syntactic 
> mis-issuance. Section 1 of the threats document says:
>
>     A certificate is characterized as syntactically mis-issued (aka
>     erroneous) if it violates syntax constraints associated with the
>     class of certificate that it purports to represent.  Syntax
>     constraints for certificates are established by certificate
>     profiles, and typically are application-specific.  For example,
>     certificates used in the Web PKI environment might be
>     characterized as domain validation (DV) or extended validation
>     (EV) certificates. Certificates used with applications such as
>     IPsec or S/MIME have different syntactic constraints from those in
>     the Web PKI context.
>
> Yet, in the response to the above comment and in 
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html, 
> Steve seems to suggest that checking for syntactic mis-issuance is 
> really about checking whether certificates are valid with respect to 
> RFC 5280. Of course one could check for both types of errors. However, 
> there is a very big difference between just checking for compliance 
> with X.509 (RFC 5280) and checking for compliance with the current 
> profile rules for DV certificates.
I agree that there are different criteria against which syntactic 
mis-issuance may be judged. I thiink the revised text for 4.1, which 
cites DV and EV profiles, and the uodated text for4.1.3.2, address the 
concern you cited.

>
>> 25. Section 4.2.2 says "However, even if errors are detected and
>>     reported to the CA, a malicious/conspiring CA may do nothing to
>>     fix the problem or may delay action." As noted previously, no
>>     explanation is provided as to why this is a threat or attack. If
>>     the Subject knows that there are errors in the certificate, then
>>     the Subject can just get another certificate (from a different
>>     CA, if necessary). It doesn't matter whether the CA revokes the
>>     erroneous certificate or not.
>>
>> *See previous comment on why syntactic mis-issuance is included in 
>> this document.*
>>
>
> This is not a response. Neither this comment nor any other comment 
> suggested that syntactic mis-issuance should not be included in the 
> document.
The revised text for 4.1 provides examples of how syntactic mis-issuance 
may result in an attack.
>
>> 26. Section 5.3 says
>>
>> oIt also will likely require the targeted Subject to provide 
>> assurances that it is the authorized entity representing the Subject 
>> name (subjectAltname) in question.  Thus a Subject should not expect 
>> immediate revocation of a contested certificate.  The time frame in 
>> which a CA will respond to a revocation request usually is described 
>> in the CPS for the CA. _Other certificate fields and extensions may 
>> be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect 
>> revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus 
>> or erroneous, based on applicable criteria._
>>
>> This text seems to say that only the "Subject name (subjectAltname)" 
>> is required "verify that the certificate to be revoked is ... 
>> erroneous." This cannot be correct, as a syntactic check a 
>> certificate would be looking for errors in many fields and extensions 
>> other than "Subject name (subjectAltname)."
>>
>> *Fair point- The sentence will, be truncated after “to effect 
>> revocation”.*
>>
>
> The sentence was supposed to end just "to effect revocation," but it 
> just ends to "to effect."
Sorry for the omission of "revocation". I've fixed that.
>
>> 27. Section 5.4 (and similar text elsewhere in the document) seems
>>     out of date given that at least one browser now rejects any newly
>>     issued certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT.
>>
>> *See prior comment on why one browser’s behavior is not viewed as 
>> sufficient to merit a change to this and similar text.*
>>
>
> See response to prior comment. A method has been defined that is 
> compatible with incremental deployment. It may not have been defined 
> in an RFC, but it has been defined. So, the text shouldn't be implying 
> that no one has defined a mechanism that accommodates incremental 
> deployment of a capability to reject certificates that have not been 
> logged.
The document did not mean to imply that no browser has a strategy for 
incremental deployment. I have revised the text in 5.4 to address this 
comment.


Section 3.1.2.1 mentioned incremental deployment. Upon re-reading it, I 
decied to delete that section, as it is in a part of the analysis that 
deals with a non-malicious CA.

Section 3.2.2.1 also mentioned incremental deployment. I have revised 
that text as follows:

If careful browsers reject certificates without SCTs, CAs may be

"encouraged" to log certificates (see section 5.4.)However, the CT 
architecture does not require a browser to reject a certificate lacking 
a matching SCT (or equivalent evidence of logging) in all cases. This is 
a matter of local policy. Section 8.1.6 of [6962-bis] says: “It is up to 
a client's local policy to specify the quantity and form of evidence 
(SCTs, inclusion proofs or a combination) needed to achieve compliance 
and how to handle non-compliance.” As a result, this attack model does 
not assume that browsers will reject a certificatethat is not 
accompanied by an SCT in all circumstances.Since certificates have to be 
logged to enable detection of mis-issuance by Monitors, and to trigger 
subsequent revocation, the effectiveness of CT is diminished in 
circumstances where local policy does not mandate SCT or inclusion proof 
checking.



>
>> 29. Section 5.6, paragraph 5 says "If a Monitor is compromised by, or
>>     conspires with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a
>>     bogus or erroneous certificate targeting that Subject, as noted
>>     above." As noted previously, this document needs to explain how
>>     an attacker can "target" a Subject with an erroneous certificate.
>>
>> *As noted above, Ben insisted that syntactically erroneous 
>> certificates were considered mis-issued, and hence motivated 
>> inclusion of the text in Section 4.*
>>
>>
> Again, the comment does not suggest that syntactically erroneous 
> certificates are not mis-issued nor does it suggest that syntactic 
> mis-issuance should not be discussed in this document. So, the 
> response does not address the comment.
>
Hopefully the revised text for 4.1 address this concern.

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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">David,<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov">
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="2" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4 of the
              document includes a lot of text about "attacks" involving
              syntactic mis-issuance, but there is nothing explain how
              syntactic mis-issuance could be part of an attack. The
              text describes a scenario in which a malicious CA
              intentionally issues a certificate that is syntactically
              incorrect, the Subject of the certificate reports the
              problem, and the CA doesn't take action. No explanation is
              provided as to how this could be part of an attack. Can't
              the Subject just get a new certificate from a different
              CA? While it is clear that there is a benefit to detecting
              syntactic mis-issuance and working to have such errors
              corrected, it is not at all clear how syntactic
              mis-issuance could be part of an attack. Either some
              explanation of how syntactic mis-issuance could be used as
              part of an attack (particularly an attack in which the
              Subject is not one of the attackers) or the text about
              "attacks" in Section 4 should be removed.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">You raise an
                    interesting question. I originally assumed that
                    mis-issuance referred only to certificates that
                    misrepresented the identity of the certificate
                    holder or included bogus info intended to mislead
                    relying parties. Several years ago I requested Ben
                    to clarify what constituted mis-issuance. The term
                    was (and is still) used throughout 6962-bis without
                    definition. (I’m surprised that this lack of a
                    definition for such a critical term in 6962-bis
                    hasn’t merited a comment from you to the authors of
                    that document!) Ben replied that a certificate that
                    violated the syntax imposed by a criteria such as
                    the CABF would qualify as mis-issued. That’s why
                    syntactic mis-issuance became an element of this
                    analysis. Violating the syntax rules imposed by such
                    criteria might cause processing problems for
                    browsers that would have adverse consequences.
                    Perhaps what concerned Ben was the observation that,
                    if a CA issues a certificate not consistent with its
                    advertised syntax criteria, that merits detection by
                    CT, as an example of CA misbehavior.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      The response is not related to the comment. The comment did not
      suggest that issuing a certificate with syntactic errors shouldn't
      be considered mis-issuance, nor did it suggest that the threat
      analysis document shouldn't discuss syntactic mis-issuance. The
      problem is that the text suggests that the issuance of a
      certificate with syntactic errors might be part of an attack, but
      it does not explain how it could be part of an attack.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Sorry if my reply was not clear. A cert that is syntactically
    inconsistent with criteria established by (or for) a CA could, as I
    suggested, cause problems for a Subject. I have revised the text in
    Section 4.1 as follows:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText">This section analyzes the scenario in which
      the CA has no intent to</p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"></span>issue
      a syntactically incorrect certificate, but it may do so in error.
      (Remember that errors are considered<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> 
      </span>form of attack in this document, see Section 2).<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>As noted in Section 1, we
      refer to a syntactically incorrect certificate as erroneous. A
      certificate is erroneous if it violates a criteria to which the
      issuing CA claims to adhere. This might be a general profile such
      as RFC 5280 [5280], or a narrower profile such as those
      established by the CABF for domain validated (DV) or extended
      validation (EV) certificates. If the Subject is a web site that
      expected to receive an EV certificate, but the certificate issued
      to it carries the DV policy OID, or no policy OID, relying parties
      may reject the certificate, causing harm to the business of the
      Subject. Conversely, if a CA issues a certificate to a web site
      and erroneously includes the EV policy OID, relying parties may
      place more trust in the certificate than is warranted.</p>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> This
      text is particularly confusing in the case in which the Subject is
      aware that there is an error in the certificate. The text states
      that "<font color="#3333ff">a malicious CA may do nothing or may
        delay the action(s) needed to remedy the problem</font>." How
      can the CA "attack" the Subject in this way when the Subject can
      just get a new certificate from a different CA and not use the
      mis-issued certificate?<br>
    </blockquote>
    I hope the text above clarifies this issue, by giving two examples.
    It's not that the Subject could not detect the attack, but that the
    Subject may not detect the attack, because it does not carefully the
    cert issued to it. We know that many web servers have failed to pay
    attention to details such as expiration dates, so it does not seem
    unlikely that a server might not carefully examine the cert issued
    to it.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      The source of the problem may be that the document appears to be
      using rather bizarre definitions for "threat" and "attack." For
      example, there is new text in Section 2 that says:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">Nonetheless, it is useful to
          document perceived threats against a system to provide a
          context for understanding attacks (even though some attacks
          may be the result of errors, not threats).</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      The parenthetical makes no sense. It seems to be based on some
      definition of "attack" that encompasses unintentional errors while
      also relying on an incorrect definition of "threat" (see below).
      For what reasonable definition of "attack" could one say that an
      attack may be the result of errors in the context of certificate
      mis-issuance?<br>
    </blockquote>
    Errors by CAs are considered attacks in some contexts, c.f., RFC
    8211. Also, the revised text above gives examples that might be the
    result of errors by a CA.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="3" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 2 begins by
              saying that "A threat is defined, traditionally, as a
              motivated, capable adversary." But, this is not correct,
              nor is it consistent with the remainder of this draft.
              NISTIR 7298, for example, defines a threat as "the
              potential source of an adverse event." This draft is
              supposed to describe an attack model and describe threats
              to the Web PKI. Mis-issuance (especially syntactic
              mis-issuance) does not require an attacker or a motivated,
              capable adversary. Mis-issuance may be the result of
              carelessness, but it is still a threat, which is why
              Section 4.1.1.1 discusses unintentional syntactic
              mis-issuance. Given that the threat model includes
              unintentional mis-issuance, Section 2 needs to be
              rewritten to take into account that not all threats
              involve "attacks" or "a motivated, capable adversary."</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
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          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoPlainText"><span
            class="colour" style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:Courier"><span class="size"
                style="font-size:10.5pt"><b><span class="font"
                    style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                      class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The definition
                      of threat used here has been employed for a long
                      time, e.g., in the U.S. DoD, decades before the
                      publication of NISTIR 7298. Several, easily found
                      examples (thanks to a quick Google search) include
                      the syllabus for Cornell CS 5430, for MIT course
                      6.805, the NRC Report “Who Goes There:
                      Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy”, …<span
                        class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span> </span>Mis-issuance
                      is not a threat; it is an example of an attack. If
                      the mis-issuance is the result of an error, then
                      no adversary is involved. To help clarify the
                      first paragraph of Section 2, will be revised:
                      “Nonetheless, it is useful to document perceived
                      threats against a system to provide a context for
                      understanding attacks (even though some attacks
                      may be the result of errors, not threats).”</span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I can find no such DoD definition for threat, cannot find the word
      "threat" in the Cornell CS 5430 syllabus, and cannot seem to
      access either the MIT course 6.805 syllabus or the NRC report. I
      do see, however, that Steve Kent is listed as one of the authors
      of the NRC report, which suggests that it is not a independent
      source for the definition. Certainly in some cases the only source
      of a threat may be a "motivated, capable adversary," and in such a
      context the term may be described in that way, but that does not
      mean the definition of threat is limited to motivated, capable
      adversaries.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I don't know what happened to the syllabi I cited. I should have
    copied the text, which seemed to have changed. Sorry. <br>
    <br>
    I was  the editor of the NRC report, so the cite is not independent,
    but it's still appropriate. Also, the committee that produced the
    report included Steve Bellovin, a former Sec AD, Drew Dean, Bob
    Blakley, and other well-known security experts, all of whom were OK
    with the definition. <br>
    <br>
    You can also find a similar characterization of "threat" in: <a
      class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jDhr1Egw-n0C&amp;pg=PA240&amp;lpg=PA240&amp;dq=motivated+capable+adversary&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=TmazJ98jMM&amp;sig=TR_jbWTChVQBJeJSEEZPdAkNpB8&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjug9qAs4TdAhXSct8KHS_8CtUQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=motivated%20capable%20adversary&amp;f=false">https://books.google.com/books?id=jDhr1Egw-n0C&amp;pg=PA240&amp;lpg=PA240&amp;dq=motivated+capable+adversary&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=TmazJ98jMM&amp;sig=TR_jbWTChVQBJeJSEEZPdAkNpB8&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjug9qAs4TdAhXSct8KHS_8CtUQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&amp;q=motivated%20capable%20adversary&amp;f=false</a><br>
    <br>
    For the Cornell course, the syllabus may have changed, but a current
    handout page discussing threat models is available here: <a
      class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2018sp/lectures/04-threats/threats.pdf">http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2018sp/lectures/04-threats/threats.pdf</a><br>
    <br>
    Nonetheless, in the spirit of compromise, I have revised the text as
    follows:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText">In the context of this document, a threat is
      defined as a motivated, capable</p>
    <span
      style="font-size:10.5pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier;
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      明朝&quot;;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;
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mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:JA;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">   </span>adversary.<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span></span> <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
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          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="4" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Them second paragraph
              of Section 2 begins "As noted above, the goals of CT are
              to deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of attacks on
              the web PKI." This is incorrect. What is noted above is
              that "Certificate transparency (CT) is a set of mechanisms
              designed to detect, deter, and facilitate remediation of
              certificate mis-issuance." As noted in the previous
              bullet, "certificate mis-issuance" is not the same as
              "attack."<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
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          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- The
                    text will be changed to reiterate that deterrence,
                    detection and remediation of mis-issuance as the
                    goal.</span></b></span></span></span></p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This text is still odd, and seems inconsistent with the previous
      paragraph. The previous paragraph has new text that says "some
      attacks may be the result of errors," whereas this paragraph now
      says:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">As noted above, the goals of CT
          are to deter, detect, and facilitate remediation of attacks
          that result in certificate mis-issuance in the Web PKI.  (CT
          also may facilitate detection and remediation of errors that
          result in certificate mis-issuance.)</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      So, unlike in the previous paragraph, this text seems to
      acknowledge that an error is not an attack. It is still not clear
      the reason for two separate sentences. What is actually "noted
      above" is that CT is "designed to detect, deter, and facilitate
      remediation of certificate mis-issuance" (regardless of the reason
      the mis-issuance happened), so why imply that it is primarily
      about mis-issuance that was caused by an attack, especially when
      Section 4 is devoted to syntactic mis-issuance, which is far more
      likely to be the result of an error than an attack.<br>
    </blockquote>
    You're right that this text is inconsistent. I have revised the text
    as follows:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText">As noted above, the goals of CT are to
      deter, detect, and facilitate</p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">   </span>remediation
      of attacks that result in certificate mis-issuance in the</p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">   </span>Web
      PKI. (Note that errors by a CA are viewed as attacks in the
      context of this document.)
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        size="-1"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"></span> </font></p>
    <font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace" size="-1"> </font><br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="6" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The final sentence of
              Section 1, paragraph 5 says that "This extension also may
              be used by a browser to request OCSP responses from a TLS
              server with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."
              The sentence should be referring to the "status_request"
              TLS extension, but the only extension mentioned before
              this sentence is the Authority Information Access (AIA)
              extension. So, saying "This extension" is incorrect.<span
                class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Good catch- The
                    text in this sentence will be revised to refer to
                    “The data from this extension …”</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This text is still incorrect.  It now says "<font color="#3333ff">The
        data from this [Authority Information Access] extension also may
        be used by a browser to request OCSP responses from a TLS server
        with which it is communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961].</font>"<br>
      <br>
      To obtain OCSP responses from a TLS server the browser just sends
      a status_request [RFC6066] (or status_request_v2 [RFC6961])
      extension in the ClientHello. The status_request extension sent in
      the ClientHello does not contain any information from the server
      certificate's AIA extension - the client doesn't obtain the
      server's certificate until after sending the ClientHello. Also,
      there is no information in the AIA extension that could be
      included in the status_request extension.<br>
      <br>
      The sentence should just be changed to something like: "A browser
      may also request OCSP responses from a TLS server with which it is
      communicating [RFC6066][RFC6961]."<br>
    </blockquote>
    Thanks for the clear characterization of the mechanism. I'll use
    your text above in lieu of the last sentence you noted.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="8" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.1 says that
              a CA "may have mis-issued a certificate as a result of an
              error." This further suggests that the "threats" that are
              covered by this draft are not limited to ones involving "a
              motivated, capable adversary."</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Not all attacks
                    are the result of a threat, and attacks are not the
                    same as threats. Thus no changes are planned in
                    response this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      The response here seems to be based on the highly unusual, but
      unspecified definition of "attack" used in this document. The
      response certainly has nothing to do with the comment, which
      doesn't suggest anything like what the response implies that it
      does.<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    I believe the revised text I proposed addresses this issue, i.e.,
    the explicit statement that errors by a CA are viewed as attacks in
    this document.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov">
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info"><br>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="10" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The organization of
              Section 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing. Sometimes
              self-monitoring subjects and benign third-party monitors
              are covered together (in the same section), sometimes they
              are covered in separate sections even though there are no
              differences between the two, and sometimes the third-party
              monitor is overlooked. Sometimes the case of a benign
              third-party monitor is covered, but the case of a
              misbehaving third-party monitor is overlooked.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Separate
                    subsections were created when there are meaningful
                    differences in cases involving self-monitoring vs.
                    third party m monitors, etc. But, when these
                    distinctions do not matter, the subsections have
                    been merged, and the text explains this. No changes
                    are planned in response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="12" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.2.2.1, and
              other places in the document that make similar statements,
              should be updated given that at least one browser is now
              requiring SCTs for all newly issued certificates.<span
                class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">One browser does
                    not the Internet make. Moreover, the text in
                    6962-bis is rather “flexible” with regard to what a
                    browser MUST do, e.g.,<span> </span>“<span
                      class="colour" style="color:black">It is up to a
                      client's local policy to specify the quantity and
                      form of evidence (SCTs, inclusion proofs or a
                      combination) needed to achieve compliance and how
                      to handle non-compliance.”<span> <span
                          class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span>Thus
                    no changes are planned in response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      See <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html</a>
      and <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03103.html</a>.<br>
      <br>
      There was no suggestion that one browser makes the Internet. The
      problem is that the text says, for example:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">If a browser rejects
          certificates without SCTs (see Section 5.4), CAs may be
          "encouraged" to log the certificates they issue.  This, in
          turn, would make it easier for Monitors to detect bogus
          certificates. <span style="background-color:#ff6;">However,
            the CT architecture does not describe how such behavior by
            browsers can be deployed incrementally throughout the
            Internet. As a result, this attack model does not assume
            that browsers will reject a certificate that is not
            accompanied by an SCT.</span></font><br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      It might be perfectly fine to say that the attack model does not
      assume that browsers will reject a certificate that is not
      accompanied by an SCT since the CT architecture does not require
      browsers to do so. But, that is not what the text says. The text
      says that the model doesn't make the assumption because the CT
      architecture does describe how browsers can do it.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      The comment was not suggesting that since Chrome requires SCTs for
      all newly issued certificates, the attack model needs to assume
      that browsers will reject certificates not accompanied by an SCT.
      The point is that since the developers of Chrome have described
      "how such behavior by browsers can be deployed incrementally
      throughout the Internet," the lack of such a description in "the
      CT architecture" isn't relevant. </blockquote>
    The threat and attack analysis is based primarily on what 6962-bis
    says, not what a specific browser may have implemented, so the lack
    of a description of how to incrementally deploy mandatory SCT
    checking is relevant. However, I have revised the text in 5.4 to
    better address this issue:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">If
        a browser is to reject a certificate that lacks an
        embedded SCT,</font></p>
    <font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">
    </font>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"></span>or is not
        accompanied by an SCT transported via the TLS handshake,</font><font
        face="Courier New, Courier, monospace"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>this behavior
        needs to be defined in a way that is compatible with<span
          style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"></span></span></font><font
        face="Courier New, Courier, monospace" size="-1"><span
          style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">
          </span>incremental deployment. 6962-bis does not describe a
          strategy for
          incremental deployment, however it calls for local policy
          controls that might
          be used to facilitate incremental deployment </span></font><font
        face="Courier New, Courier, monospace" size="-1"><span
          style="font-size: 12pt;">
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          <span style="font-size: 12pt;">(see
            3.2.2.1 earlier</span>). For example a browser might
          establish a date after which all certificates issued MUST
          contain an SCT or be
          accompanied by an SCT during TLS session establishment. A
          strategy like this
          would</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> allow certificates
          issued before that date to be “grandfathered”. This approach
          would allow a
          malicious CA to backdate a certificate to avoid logging it,
          exploiting a window
          of vulnerability. </span></font>
      <br>
    </p>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov">Browser
      developers may have good reasons not to reject certificates that
      are not accompanied by an SCT, but it is not because no one
      described to them how to deploy such behavior.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I think the text above address this comment.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
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          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"> </p>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="13" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">As noted previously,
              if Section 3.3 is to remain, then the text needs to be
              modified to make it clear that Section 3.3 is only about
              CAs/logs that have had their keys stolen (compromised)
              rather than all types of compromise (e.g., DigiNotar).<span
                class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
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          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Changes to 3.2
                    and 3.3 (as noted in response to comment #1) address
                    this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This problem is still not addressed. The DigiNotar case was moved
      to Section 3.3, where parts of the corresponding paragraph notes
      that not all compromises involve theft of the private key.
      However, the second paragraph of Section 3.3 still says:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">The section focuses on
          undetected compromise of CAs.  Such compromises warrant some
          additional discussion, since some relying parties may see
          signed objects issued by the legitimate (non-malicious) CA,
          others may see signed objects from its compromised
          counterpart, and some may see objects from both</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      and Section 3.3.1 begins:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">In the case of a compromised
          (non-malicious) CA, an attacker uses the <span
            style="background-color:#ff6;">purloined private key</span>
          to generate a bogus certificate (that the CA would not
          knowingly issue).</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      So while there is now some text that notes that not all
      compromises involve theft of the private key, there is still other
      text that says otherwise.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I've revised 3.3.1 as follow, to address this observation:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText">In the case of a compromised (non-malicious)
      CA, an attacker may have acquired the CA’s private key, or it may
      be able to cause the CA to sign certificates using that key, even
      though the attacker does not know the key per se. In ether case
      the goal is to cause the CA to issues a bogus certificate (that
      the CA <span
        style="font-size:10.5pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Courier;
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        明朝&quot;;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;
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        Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;
mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:JA;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"></span>would not knowingly issue).<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span></span> <br>
    </p>
     <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info"><br>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
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          start="15" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 3.3.3 begins
              "As noted in 3.4.1", but there is no Section 3.4.1.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- This
                    reference will be changed to “Section 3.4”.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This reference was corrected, but draft -14 still has problems
      with incorrect references. I have not checked all of the
      references, but there is a parenthetical in Section 3.3.1 that
      says "<font color="#3333ff">(see 3.1.2.2)</font>" even though
      there is no Section 3.1.2.2. Similarly, Section 4.2.1.3 begins "<font
        color="#3333ff">As noted above (4.1.1.4)</font>," but there is
      no Section 4.1.1.4.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Thanks for noting this. I have changed the reference to be to
    3.2.2.1 I expect the RFC Editor will work with us to find and
    correct other typos of this sort.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
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          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
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          start="18" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The final paragraph of
              Section 3.5 is unrelated to the rest of the section and
              seems to be related to the content of Section 3.4.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">This text was
                    added in response to a comment ion the list (by Rob,
                    I believe) who wanted this document to note that the
                    cited revocation status distribution problems might
                    be addressed by mechanisms not specified by
                    6962-bis. Thus no changes are planned in response to
                    this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Both this comment and <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03160.html</a>
      noted that the final paragraph of Section 3.5 is related to the
      attack in Section 3.4 and not to the contents of Section 3.5. The
      text has nothing to do with the rest of Section 3.5 nor does it
      "note that the cited revocation status distribution problems might
      be addressed by mechanisms not specified by 6962-bis."<br>
    </blockquote>
    I have moved the paragraph to the end of 3.4, and revised the text,
    slightly, to better fit there.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="20" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.1.1.2 says
              that "A log or Monitor that is conspiring with the
              attacker," but it is not clear what attacker there is in
              the scenario being described.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">The attacker is
                    one who wants a syntactically mis-issued certificate
                    to not be detected and revoked.<span
                      class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This is a non-answer. Did the attacker do something that caused
      the certificate to be mis-issued? If so, how? The CA can't be the
      attacker since it is non-malicious in Section 4.1. Is this
      sentence considering the possibility that the Subject could an an
      "attacker," sending a certificate request that somehow tricks the
      CA into issuing an erroneous certificate? Is there any other than
      the CA or Subject that could influence the contents of the
      certificate?<br>
      <br>
      Could it be that the "attacker" had no influence over the issuance
      of the certificate, but was just hoping that a certificate would
      be mis-issued? If so, what role does it play in the "attack"
      (other than passive observer)?<br>
    </blockquote>
    Section 4.1 deals with a non-malicious CA, so the CA is not
    intentionally mis-issuing a cert, but it may mis-issuae a cert as a
    result of an error. The revised text for 4.1 makes this clear.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"> </p>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="21" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.1.1.4 says
              "Unfortunately, experience suggests that many browsers do
              not perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates, and
              so it seems unlikely that browsers will be a reliable way
              to detect erroneous certificates." and Section 4.2.1.4
              says "As noted above (4.1.1.4), most browsers fail to
              perform thorough syntax checks on certificates." These
              sentences should be removed or modified. There is no
              reason that a browser should perform thorough syntactic
              checks on certificates, and there are good reasons for
              browsers not to. So, this document should not be labeling
              this as unfortunate or a failure. We do not want to
              encourage browsers to perform thorough syntax checks on
              certificates, as this could lead to the same types of
              problems that TLS has experienced, where making a change
              in something causes deployed products to break.<span
                class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">It seems likely
                    that the primary reason that browsers fail to
                    perform thorough syntactic checks on certificates is
                    because, at least historically, some CAs fail to
                    issue syntactically valid certificates. This failure
                    by browsers flies in the face of PKIX standards;
                    you, as one who usually insists that failures to
                    follow standards ought to be a capital crime, have
                    no basis for criticizing this text. No changes will
                    be made in response to this comment.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      As I noted previously (see, for example, <a
        class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html</a>)
      this response is not related to the comment. There is a difference
      between a browser checking for things that can be expected not to
      change (e.g., is the keyUsage extension DER encoded - <a
        class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03172.html</a>)
      and checking for things may may change (e.g., does a subject field
      that doesn't contain an organizationName attribute contain a
      streetAddress attribute - <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03162.html</a>).<br>
      <br>
      While the underlying syntax rules for X.509 certificates can be
      presumed to be unchanging, certificate profiles can change over
      time, and this document makes clear that syntax checks includes
      checking for conformance with the appropriate profile. If a
      browser performed "thorough syntax checks" as this document
      defined that term, then it would be effectively checking for
      conformance to a particular version of a certificate profile.
      There can't be an assumption that every browser on every client
      will be updated as soon as any certificate profile changes, so
      browsers performing such checks would create problems. As a
      related example, consider the recent discussions in the TLS WG
      about ossification, the need to make last-minute changes to the
      TLS 1.3 protocol in order to deal with version-intolerant servers
      and middleboxes, and the addition of text to RFC 8446 about
      protocol invariants.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I agree that trhe phrase thorough syntax checks" is ambiguous, and
    that adherence to a version of a cert profile is something that
    would be hard to a browser to check. However,a (now expired) I-D
    described exactly how a log could check for compliance to a
    specified version of a profile, as asserted by a CA, which would
    address the issue you cite. So, I have rewored the text as follows
    (and fixed the refereces to 4.1.1.4 to be to 4.1.3.2.<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText">Unfortunately, experience suggests that<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>many browsers do not always
      perform very good syntactic checks on<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>certificates. For example, a
      browser may fail to verify that a certificate used in a
      certificate path is properly marked as a CA certificate. Also, it
      would be problematic for a browser to check a certificate against
      a specific version of a profile if the profile changes and the
      policy OID remains constant. Thus it seems unlikely that browsers
      will be a reliable was to detect erroneous certificates in all
      circumstances.<span
        style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Cambria;
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        JA;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span><span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span></span> <br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      There seems to be some confusion about the nature of syntactic
      mis-issuance. Section 1 of the threats document says:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">A certificate is characterized
          as syntactically mis-issued (aka erroneous) if it violates
          syntax constraints associated with the class of certificate
          that it purports to represent.  Syntax constraints for
          certificates are established by certificate profiles, and
          typically are application-specific.  For example, certificates
          used in the Web PKI environment might be characterized as
          domain validation (DV) or extended validation (EV)
          certificates. Certificates used with applications such as
          IPsec or S/MIME have different syntactic constraints from
          those in the Web PKI context.</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      Yet, in the response to the above comment and in <a
        class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html"
        moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg03174.html</a>,
      Steve seems to suggest that checking for syntactic mis-issuance is
      really about checking whether certificates are valid with respect
      to RFC 5280. Of course one could check for both types of errors.
      However, there is a very big difference between just checking for
      compliance with X.509 (RFC 5280) and checking for compliance with
      the current profile rules for DV certificates.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I agree that there are different criteria against which syntactic
    mis-issuance may be judged. I thiink the revised text for 4.1, which
    cites DV and EV profiles, and the uodated text for4.1.3.2, address
    the concern you cited.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="25" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 4.2.2 says
              "However, even if errors are detected and reported to the
              CA, a malicious/conspiring CA may do nothing to fix the
              problem or may delay action." As noted previously, no
              explanation is provided as to why this is a threat or
              attack. If the Subject knows that there are errors in the
              certificate, then the Subject can just get another
              certificate (from a different CA, if necessary). It
              doesn't matter whether the CA revokes the erroneous
              certificate or not.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">See previous
                    comment on why syntactic mis-issuance is included in
                    this document.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This is not a response. Neither this comment nor any other comment
      suggested that syntactic mis-issuance should not be included in
      the document.<br>
    </blockquote>
    The revised text for 4.1 provides examples of how syntactic
    mis-issuance may result in an attack.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"> </p>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="26" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.3 says</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
          margin-left:1.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level2
          lfo1;tab-stops:list 1.0in" class="MsoNormal"><span
            class="font" style="font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt"><span
                style="mso-list:Ignore">o<span class="font"
                  style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:7pt">  <span
                      class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></span></span></span><span
            class="size" style="font-size:10pt">It also will likely
            require the targeted Subject to provide assurances that it
            is the authorized entity representing the Subject name
            (subjectAltname) in question.  Thus a Subject should not
            expect immediate revocation of a contested certificate.  The
            time frame in which a CA will respond to a revocation
            request usually is described in the CPS for the CA. <span
              class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><u>Other certificate
              fields and extensions may be of interest for forensic
              purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to
              verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus or
              erroneous, based on applicable criteria.</u></span><br>
        </p>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 1in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0,
          0); font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal;
          font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align:
          start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space:
          normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><span class="size"
                  style="font-size:10pt">This text seems to say that
                  only the "Subject name (subjectAltname)" is required
                  "verify that the certificate to be revoked is ...
                  erroneous." This cannot be correct, as a syntactic
                  check a certificate would be looking for errors in
                  many fields and extensions other than "Subject name
                  (subjectAltname)."<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Fair point- The
                    sentence will, be truncated after “to effect
                    revocation”.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      The sentence was supposed to end just "to effect revocation," but
      it just ends to "to effect."<br>
    </blockquote>
    Sorry for the omission of "revocation". I've fixed that.<br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"> </p>
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="27" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.4 (and
              similar text elsewhere in the document) seems out of date
              given that at least one browser now rejects any newly
              issued certificates that are not accompanied by an SCT.<span
                class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.25in; caret-color: rgb(0,
          0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal;
          font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align:
          start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space:
          normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">See prior
                    comment on why one browser’s behavior is not viewed
                    as sufficient to merit a change to this and similar
                    text.</span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      See response to prior comment. A method has been defined that is
      compatible with incremental deployment. It may not have been
      defined in an RFC, but it has been defined. So, the text shouldn't
      be implying that no one has defined a mechanism that accommodates
      incremental deployment of a capability to reject certificates that
      have not been logged.<br>
    </blockquote>
    The document did not mean to imply that no browser has a strategy
    for incremental deployment. I have revised the text in 5.4 to
    address this comment.<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
    </p>
    Section 3.1.2.1 mentioned incremental deployment. Upon re-reading
    it, I decied to delete that section, as it is in a part of the
    analysis that deals with a non-malicious CA.<br>
    <br>
    Section 3.2.2.1 also mentioned incremental deployment. I have
    revised that text as follows:<br>
    <br>
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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span><span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>If careful browsers reject
      certificates without SCTs, CAs may be</p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">   </span>"encouraged"
      to log certificates (see section 5.4.)<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>However, the CT <span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">   </span>architecture does not require
      a browser to reject a certificate lacking a matching SCT (or
      equivalent evidence of logging) in all cases. This is a matter of
      local policy. Section 8.1.6 of [6962-bis] says: “<span class="s1"><span
          style="color:black">It is up to a client's local policy to
          specify the quantity and form</span> of evidence (SCTs,
        inclusion proofs or a combination) needed to</span> achieve
      compliance and how to handle non-compliance.” As a result, this <span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>attack model does not assume
      that browsers will reject a certificate<span
        style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>that is not accompanied by an
      SCT in all circumstances.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>Since
      certificates have to be logged to enable detection of mis-issuance
      by Monitors, and to trigger subsequent revocation, the
      effectiveness of CT is diminished in circumstances where local
      policy does not mandate SCT or inclusion proof checking.</p>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:1a1badda-c856-d010-1222-3cecf1ad3a2b@nist.gov"> <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:IUUXIbDImicbov7jLKxe4l9QVrF_cCO0F1_mY4LpATYvr-Eag7fAJwnwqnviKXU3drx1vKgpuE6hkehmUMBq2QzPSKNKaMdM3D6LIMv2Gig=@zerho.info">
        <ol style="margin-bottom: 0in; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color:
          rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: -webkit-standard; font-style:
          normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
          letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust:
          auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"
          start="29" type="1">
          <li style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt;
            font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;" class="MsoNormal"><span
              class="size" style="font-size:10pt">Section 5.6, paragraph
              5 says "If a Monitor is compromised by, or conspires with,
              an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a bogus or
              erroneous certificate targeting that Subject, as noted
              above." As noted previously, this document needs to
              explain how an attacker can "target" a Subject with an
              erroneous certificate.</span><br>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <p style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
          font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
          normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
          text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
          word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
          text-decoration: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="colour"
            style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0)"><span class="font"
              style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><span
                class="size" style="font-size:medium"><b><span
                    class="size" style="font-size:10pt">As noted above,
                    Ben insisted that syntactically erroneous
                    certificates were considered mis-issued, and hence
                    motivated inclusion of the text in Section 4.<span
                      class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></b></span></span></span><br>
        </p>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
      <p>Again, the comment does not suggest that syntactically
        erroneous certificates are not mis-issued nor does it suggest
        that syntactic mis-issuance should not be discussed in this
        document. So, the response does not address the comment.</p>
    </blockquote>
    Hopefully the revised text for 4.1 address this concern.<br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------A99AB638A3579E55D236AE4E--


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public Notary Transparency WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Attack and Threat Model for Certificate Transparency
        Author          : Stephen Kent
	Filename        : draft-ietf-trans-threat-analysis-15.txt
	Pages           : 31
	Date            : 2018-08-30

Abstract:
   This document describes an attack model and discusses threats for the
   Web PKI context for which security mechanisms to detect mis-issuance
   of web site certificates are being developed.  The model provides an
   analysis of detection and remediation mechanisms for both syntactic
   and semantic mis-issuance.  The model introduces an outline of
   attacks to organize the discussion.  The model also describes the
   roles played by the elements of the Certificate Transparency (CT)
   system, to establish a context for the model.


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