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Cc: Margaret Wasserman <mrw@lilacglade.org>, Rhys Smith <smith@cardiff.ac.uk>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, trust-router@ietf.org
Subject: [Trust-router] New Non-WG Mailing List: trust-router -- ABFAB Trust Router	discussion list
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A new IETF non-working group email list has been created.

List address: trust-router@ietf.org
Archive: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trust-router/
To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trust-router

Purpose: =

This list is for the discussion of Trust Routers. Trust Routers are
used to construct multi-hop Application Bridging for Federated Authenticati=
on Beyond the Web (ABFAB) federations, without the requirement for a centra=
lized Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). =


For additional information, please contact the list administrators.

From hartmans@painless-security.com  Tue Mar 12 08:11:02 2013
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Jim asked me to send a test message.
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From smith@Cardiff.ac.uk  Tue Mar 12 08:20:59 2013
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Subject: [Trust-router] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps-03.txt
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Hi all,

A new version of a problem statement driving the reasoning for needing =
trust router has been posted. There's still a lot of work needing doing =
on it. Compared to previous versions, this is trying to articulate the =
problem in a more general sense than has previously been done.

Rhys.
--
Dr Rhys Smith
Identity, Access, and Middleware Specialist
Cardiff University & Janet - the UK's research and education network

email: smith@cardiff.ac.uk / rhys.smith@ja.net
GPG: 0xDE2F024C



Begin forwarded message:

> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps-03.txt
> Date: 11 March 2013 18:25:28 EDT
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
>=20
>=20
> 	Title           : Trust Requirements in a Federated World
> 	Author(s)       : Josh Howlett
>                          Rhys Smith
>                          Margaret Wasserman
> 	Filename        : draft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps-03.txt
> 	Pages           : 14
> 	Date            : 2013-03-11
>=20
> Abstract:
>   TODO: This document outlines the requirements for trust in a
>   federated environment, and enumerates the requirements for a trust
>   infrastructure.  It also examines existing trust infrastructures
>   given these requirements and concludes that none fulfil all of the
>   requirements, and suggests that maybe a new one is required that
>   does.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps-03
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> =
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-howlett-abfab-trust-router-ps-03
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


From hartmans@painless-security.com  Mon Mar 25 09:13:49 2013
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: trust-router@ietf.org, bew@cisco.com, Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com
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Subject: [Trust-router] How much are trust routers trusted?
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Hi.

One obvious question folks who have worked on routing security ask when
they examine trust router is how well does it handle Byzantine failures.
most generally, a Byzantine failure is a failure in which some component
does not act according to spec. This can cover everything from hardware
failures to attack.

We've found that BGP speakers are compromised often enough that it is
desirable to investigate and specify solutions to some forms of BGP
attacks; SIDR is working on that now.

I'll first talk about the actual trust/threat model and then talk about
why we believe that's a reasonable model.

A trust router keeps track of which statements each of its peers are
authorized to make. These are roughly either requests to establish a
temporary identity so that a source realm can communicate with a target
realm or route announcements. These authorizations can be constrained on
a number of axes.

However within the set of authorized statements a trust router is
trusted not to have Byzantine failures. For example if trust router Byzantine2
authorizes  TR1 to request temporary identities on behalf of realm A,
then it trust TR1 not to request a temporary identity claiming to be on
behalf of realm A when it is really on behalf of realm B.

There are a number of differences between trust routers and Internet
routing. We imagine that fewer trust routers will be needed than BGP
speakers. Typically, if an organization needs a trust router, it will
only run more than one instance for redundancy and fault
tolerance. Trust routers can and should be deployed in secure data
centers and managed using the same procedures as AAA servers, Kerberos
KDCs and other critical security infrastructure.

Trust routers near the center of a trust connectivity graph will often
have significant authorizations and if compromised would be able to do
significant damage. However, trust routers on the edges of the graph and
clients on the edges of the graph will typically have very constrained
authorizations. These nodes may be able to act on behalf of one
organization or a small number of organizations.
While a compromise of these nodes might have significant consequences
for that organization, constraints in authorization will minimize the
impact globally.

Also, note that AAA servers, identity providers and other components of
the federation infrastructure that trust routers are designed to
facilitate already have a similar threat model.

Technology similar to SIDR could be applied to trust router in some
instances. However, one of the assumptions behind trust router is that
credentialing and security associations are maintained on a pairwise
basis between each set of trust routers. There is no assumption that a
set of trust anchors is shared across the graph or even across any
significant segment of the graph. Such common trust anchors are required
to make something like SIDR work. In addition, there is a specific
desire in some (but not all) deployments to insert trusted intermediates
that perform jobs such as attribute rewriting.

Finally, note that hardware security modules or other approaches
resistant to compromise can be used for the pairwise security between
trust routers. This will serve to limit the scope of a compromise. Once
any temporary identities established during the scope of the compromise
are expired, then the trust infrastructure is trustworthy again.

From hartmans@painless-security.com  Mon Mar 25 10:21:02 2013
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: trust-router@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:21:00 -0400
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Subject: [Trust-router] Captured items from the side meeting
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Hi.

I want to thank those who attended the side meeting and/or rtgarea
presentation at IETF 86.
I notice that we don't seem to have sent pointers to the bar bof slides
here.
I'll see if we can arrange for that soon.

I did want to capture a few items I heard at the side meeting and ask
for any items I missed.

1) Brian recommended that we keep the mapping layer (the routing
protocol) separate from the TID protocol so that another mapping
mechanism could potentially be substituted.
He drew an analogy between LISP and trust router.
In LISP, mapping between map servers and map resolvers is carried over a
BGP overlay in the default instantiation, but there are other proposals
for how mapping could be handled.

I certainly never noticed that similarity, and if Margaret did, she
never mentioned it to me. 
Thanks Brian for pointing that out; it's something to ponder.

2) Brian and Sandy both brought up the Byzantine failure question. I
hope I have provided an answer to that.


In particular, I'm wondering if any of Klaas or Hannes's questions
require updates or whether they made any suggestions for changes.

At the IETf meeting we also received a number of other use cases to
consider:

1) In the rtgarea meeting we were asked whether something like trust
router could key some of the KARP use cases; I think group keying.

2) We were advised to take a look at what's going on in CDNI and see if
their federated trust problem would be useful.

We're also aware from previous discussions that various AAA roaming
problems are similar to trust-router's problem statement outside the
specific ABFAB context.

--Sam
